Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules

Federal RegisterSep 17, 1999

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 73

[MM Docket No. 91-221, 87-8; FCC 99-209]

Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television

Broadcasting; Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document amends the Commission's local TV multiple

ownership rule and its radio/TV cross-ownership rule. This document

also adopts a grandfathering policy for certain TV local marketing

agreements and certain conditional waivers of the radio/TV cross-

ownership rule. The purpose of this action is to balance the

Commission's competition and diversity goals with the efficiencies and

public interest benefits that can be associated with common ownership

of same-market broadcast stations.

DATES: Effective November 16, 1999, except for the requirements that:

(1) radio/TV cross-ownership conditional waiver grantees file with the

Commission showings sufficient to convert their compliance or non-

compliance with the Commission's revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule;

and (2) holders of local marketing agreements (LMAs) that have become

attributable under the Commission's revised rules file a copy of their

LMA with the Commission. These requirements contain information

collection requirements that are not effective until approved by the

Office of Management and Budget. The FCC will publish a document in the

Federal Register announcing the effective dates for those sections.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Bash, (202) 418-2120, Policy and

Rules Division, Mass Media Bureau.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report

and Order (``R&O''), FCC 99-209, adopted August 5, 1999, and released

August 6, 1999. The full text of the Commission's R&O is available for

inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC Dockets

Branch (Room TW-A306), 445 12 St. S.W., Washington, D.C. The complete

text of this R&O may also be purchased from the Commission's copy

contractor, International Transcription Services (202) 857-3800, 1231

20th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Synopsis of Report and Order

I. Introduction

1. In this R&O, we revise our local TV multiple ownership rule and

the radio/TV cross-ownership rule to respond to ongoing changes in the

broadcast television industry. The new rules we adopt today reflect a

recognition of the growth in the number and variety of media outlets in

local markets, as well as the significant efficiencies and public

service benefits that can be obtained from joint ownership. At the same

time, our decision reflects our continuing goals of ensuring diversity

and localism and guarding against undue concentration of economic

power. The rules we adopt today and in our related national television

ownership and broadcast attribution proceedings, being adopted

simultaneously with this R&O, balance these competing concerns and are

intended to facilitate further development of competition in the video

marketplace and to strengthen the potential of broadcasters to serve

the public interest.

II. Background

2. The local TV multiple ownership rule currently prohibits an

entity from having cognizable interests in two television stations

whose Grade B signal contours overlap. The Commission rarely grants

permanent waivers of the duopoly rule, reserving such relief for cases

with unique or highly unusual circumstances. Under current policy, the

time brokerage by one television station of another television station,

even one in the same market, pursuant to a time brokerage or ``local

marketing'' agreement (``LMA''), is not attributable, and accordingly

these relationships are not subject to our multiple ownership rules.

The radio-television cross-ownership rule generally forbids joint

ownership of a radio and a television station in the same local market.

We have presumed it is in the public interest to waive this rule in the

top 25 television markets if, post-merger, at least 30 independently

owned broadcast voices remain, or if the merger involves a failed

station. Such waivers are available to permit ownership of up to one

television, one AM, and one FM station per market. We have evaluated

other waiver requests case by case, based on an analysis of five

criteria (the ``five factors'' test).

3. This proceeding began in 1991 with the issuance of a Notice of

Inquiry (``NOI''), 56 FR 40847, August 16, 1991, soliciting comment on

whether existing television ownership rules and related policies should

be revised in light of ongoing changes in the competitive market

conditions facing broadcast licensees. After reviewing the comments

received in response to the NOI, the Commission issued a Notice of

Proposed Rule Making (``NPRM''), 57 FR 28163, June 24, 1992, containing

a number of alternative proposals involving the national and local

television ownership rules, and seeking comment on the extent and

impact of LMAs in the broadcast television industry.

4. In 1994, in a Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making

(``FNPRM''), 60 FR 06490, February 2, 1995, in this docket, the

Commission set forth a competition and diversity analysis for examining

our ownership rules. Based

[[Page 50652]]

on this analysis, the Commission proposed changes to the national

television ownership rule, the local television ownership rule

(otherwise known as the ``duopoly'' rule), and the radio-television

cross-ownership rule. In addition, the Commission solicited comment on

whether broadcast television local marketing agreements (``LMAs'')

should be considered attributable for purposes of applying the

ownership rules in a manner similar to radio LMAs.

5. On February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became

law. Section 202 of the Act directed the Commission to make a number of

significant revisions to its broadcast ownership rules. Section 202

also requires us to review aspects of our local ownership rules that

were the subject of the FNPRM. Specifically, section 202 requires the

Commission to: (1) conduct a rulemaking proceeding concerning the

retention, modification, or elimination of the duopoly rule; and (2) to

extend the top 25 market/30 independent voices one-to-a-market waiver

policy to the top 50 markets, ``consistent with the public interest,

convenience, and necessity.'' In addition, both the Act and its

legislative history contain language regarding the appropriate

treatment of existing television LMAs under our ownership rules.

Finally, section 202 directs the Commission to conduct a biennial

review of all of its broadcast ownership rules and to repeal or modify

any regulation it determines is no longer in the public interest.

6. In view of the 1996 Act's directives regarding broadcast

multiple ownership, the Commission in 1996 adopted a Second Further

Notice of Proposed Rule Making (``2FNPRM''), 61 FR 66978, December 19,

1996, in this proceeding inviting comment on several issues in light of

the 1996 Act. The Commission solicited further comment in light of its

review of comments previously filed in this proceeding, and invited

comments on a number of specific issues pertaining to the duopoly rule,

the radio-television cross-ownership rule, and the treatment of

existing television LMAs in the event they are deemed attributable

under any rules adopted in our attribution proceeding.

7. Our ownership rules, particularly the local ownership rules at

issue in this proceeding, serve a vital public interest by promoting

competition and diversity in the mass media. These are bedrock goals--

reaffirmed by Congress and the Supreme Court on numerous occasions--in

carrying out our statutory mandate of ensuring that broadcast licensees

serve the ``public interest, convenience, and necessity.'' With these

goals in mind, and after carefully reviewing the record in this

proceeding, we believe we should relax to some extent our local

television ownership restrictions where the public interest benefits

resulting from same-market common ownership outweigh the threat to

diversity and localism. The record reflects that there has been an

increase in the number and types of media outlets available to local

communities.

8. Specifically, we have decided to modify our local television

ownership rule as follows. First, we are relaxing our television

duopoly rule by narrowing the geographic scope of the rule from the

current Grade B contour approach to a ``DMA'' test. Thus, common

ownership of two television stations will be permitted without regard

to contour overlap if the stations are in separate Nielsen Designated

Market Areas (``DMAs''). In addition, we will allow common ownership of

two stations in the same DMA if their Grade B contours do not overlap

(a continuation of our current rule), or if eight independently owned,

full-power and operational television stations (commercial and

noncommercial) will remain post-merger, and one of the stations is not

among the top four-ranked stations in the market, based on audience

share, as measured by Nielsen or by any comparable professional and

accepted rating service, at the time the application is filed. We will

also adopt three waiver criteria as follows. First, we will presume a

waiver of the rule is in the public interest to permit common ownership

of two television stations in the same market where one station is a

``failed station,'' as supported by a showing that the station either

has been off the air for at least four months immediately preceding the

application for waiver, or is currently involved in involuntary

bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. Second, we will presume a waiver

of the rule is in the public interest where one of the merging stations

is a ``failing'' station, as supported by a showing that the station

has had a low audience share and has been financially struggling during

the previous several years, and that the merger will result in

demonstrable public interest benefits. Third, we will presume a waiver

is in the public interest where applicants can show that the

combination will result in the construction and operation of an

authorized but as yet ``unbuilt'' station, supported by a showing that

the permittee has made reasonable efforts to construct. For all of

these waivers, we will also require a showing that the in-market

applicant is the only buyer ready, willing, and able to operate the

station, and that sale to an out-of-market applicant would result in an

artificially depressed price.

9. With respect to the radio-television cross-ownership rule, we

are adopting a new, three-part rule that permits some degree of same-

market radio and television joint ownership. We will permit a party to

own a television station (or two television stations if permitted under

our modified TV duopoly rule or television LMA grandfathering policy)

and any of the following radio station combinations in the same market:

Up to six radio stations (any combination of AM or FM

stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio ownership

rules) in any market where at least 20 independent voices would remain

post-merger;

Up to four radio stations (any combination of AM or FM

stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio ownership

rules) in any market where at least 10 independent voices would remain

post-merger; and

One radio station (AM or FM) notwithstanding the number of

independent voices in the market.

In addition, in those markets where our revised rule will allow parties

to own eight outlets in the form of two TV stations and six radio

stations, we will permit them to own one TV station and seven radio

stations instead.

10. For purposes of the new radio-television cross-ownership rule,

we will count as voices all independently owned, full-power,

operational, commercial and noncommercial television stations licensed

to a community in the DMA in which the TV station in question is

located, and all independently owned and operational commercial and

noncommercial radio stations licensed to, or with a reportable share

in, the radio metro market where the TV station involved is located. In

addition, we will count independently owned daily newspapers that are

published in the DMA and have a circulation exceeding 5 percent in the

DMA. Finally, we will count, as a single voice, wired cable service,

provided cable service is generally available in the DMA. As with our

revised duopoly rule, we will permit waiver of our new radio/TV cross-

ownership rule where one station is a failed station. We will not,

however, adopt a presumptive waiver based on a showing that one station

is a failing station or that the combination will result in the

construction and operation of an authorized but as yet unbuilt station.

[[Page 50653]]

We will consider further relaxation of this rule and waiver policies as

part of future biennial reviews.

11. We have granted a number of radio-television cross-ownership

rule waivers conditioned on the outcome of this proceeding. The

majority of these waivers involve radio-television combinations that

will now be permissible under the revised rule we adopt today. For

those that are not covered by the revised rule, as well as for those

for which an application was filed on or before July 29, 1999 (the date

of the ``sunshine'' notice for this R&O) if such application is

ultimately granted by the Commission, we will allow these combinations

to continue, conditioned on the outcome of the Commission's 2004

biennial review. Parties who wish the Commission to conduct this review

prior to 2004 may apply for such relief, using criteria set forth

below, beginning one year after the date this R&O is published in the

Federal Register. Any transfer of a grandfathered combination after the

adoption date of this R&O (whether during the initial grandfathering

period of after a permanent grandfathering decision has been made) must

meet the radio/TV cross-ownership rule.

12. Finally, with respect to existing television LMAs, we have

decided in our related attribution proceeding to attribute time

brokerage of another television station for purposes of our multiple

ownership rules where the brokered and brokering station are in the

same market and the amount of time brokered is more than 15 percent of

the brokered station's weekly broadcast hours. Once attributed,

however, the majority of currently existing same-market television LMAs

will not violate our new TV duopoly rule going forward, because they

either will be in separate DMAs, or will constitute an otherwise

permissible arrangement under the new rule or related waiver policies.

We will permit those LMAs that do not comply with our new duopoly rule

and waiver policies to continue in full force and effect, if entered

into before November 5, 1996, the grandfathering cut-off date proposed

in the 2FNPRM. LMAs entered into on that date or thereafter must come

into compliance with our new duopoly rule and/or waiver policies or

terminate within two years of the adoption date of this R&O. Television

LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will be grandfathered,

conditioned on the outcome of the Commission's 2004 biennial review, at

which time the Commission will reconsider their status. Parties who

wish the Commission to review the status of their LMAs prior to the

2004 biennial review may apply for such relief, using the criteria

specified below, beginning one year after the date this R&O is

published in the Federal Register. During the initial grandfathering

period, the parties to the LMA may renew and/or transfer the term of

LMA that remains in the five-year period.

III. The Local Television Ownership Rule

A. Geographic Scope of the Rule

13. Background. Our local television ownership rule presently

prohibits common ownership of two television stations whose Grade B

signal contours overlap. In the FNPRM, we sought comment on whether the

geographic scope of the rule should be changed to Grade A signal

contours or to Designated Market Areas (``DMAs''). Based on the

comments we received, we tentatively concluded in the 2FNPRM that the

geographic scope of the local television ownership rule should be based

on a combination of DMAs and Grade A contours. We sought comment on

that tentative conclusion in the 2FNPRM, as well as comment about

possible exceptions to and waivers of the rule to permit television

duopolies in certain circumstances where they would serve the public

interest.

14. Discussion. We have decided to narrow the geographic scope of

the television duopoly rule so as to permit common ownership of two

television stations provided they are in different DMAs without regard

to contour overlap. We will also continue to allow common ownership of

stations within the same DMA as long as their Grade B contours do not

overlap. We have chosen this DMA test based on our belief that,

compared to the current Grade B signal contour standard, DMAs are a

better measure of actual television viewing patterns, and thus serve as

a good measure of the economic marketplace in which broadcasters,

program suppliers and advertisers buy and sell their services and

products. Changing the geographic scope of the duopoly rule will

consequently more accurately define a local television market and

permit mergers of stations in different markets without harming local

competition and diversity. Moreover, we believe that the mergers that

will be allowed under our new rule can lead to improved television

service and viewer choice.

15. There are several benefits to defining the geographic

dimensions of the local television market by reference to DMAs. Most

importantly, unlike a rule relying on predicted field strength

contours, DMAs reflect actual television viewing patterns and are

widely used by the broadcasting and advertising industries. DMAs

reflect the fact that a station's audience reach, and hence its ``local

market,'' is not necessarily coextensive with the area of its broadcast

signal coverage. For example, a station's over-the-air reach can be

extended by carriage on cable systems and other multichannel delivery

systems, as well as through such means as satellite and translator

stations. In designating DMAs and compiling DMA-based ratings of

television programs, Nielsen Media Research, a TV audience measuring

service, collects viewing data from diaries placed in television

households four times a year. Nielsen assigns counties to DMAs annually

on the basis of television audience viewership as recorded in those

diaries. Counties are assigned to a DMA if the majority or, in the

absence of a majority, the preponderance, of viewing in the county is

recorded for the programming of the television stations located in that

DMA. Nielsen uses its DMA viewing data to compile DMA-based audience

ratings for television programs. These data are used by television

stations in deciding which programming should be aired, and by

advertisers and stations in negotiating advertising rates.

16. We recognize that we proposed in the 2FNPRM to supplement the

DMA test with a Grade A contour standard to prohibit common ownership

of stations with Grade A signal contour overlap even when they are in

separate DMAs. However, after considering the comments in response to

this proposal, we believe a ``DMA-only'' test is more appropriate.

Although a station may attract some viewers who live outside its

designated DMA, the preponderance of its audience will reside within

its DMA. Local advertisers use DMA-based ratings to make their

purchases of advertising time on local television stations, television

networks generally have only one affiliate in each DMA, and stations

target their programming to viewers inside the DMA because these are

the viewers that advertisers pay to reach. The record also indicates

that there are a fair number of stations that lie in different DMAs and

serve wholly different markets even though they may have slightly

overlapping Grade A contours. In addition, a DMA-only standard is more

straightforward and easy to apply in terms of administering the rule.

We consequently will not adopt a Grade A component in our new

definition of the geographic scope of the duopoly rule.

17. This new definition will generally be less restrictive than the

current Grade B signal contour test. There may be

[[Page 50654]]

some situations, however, in which this is not the case, particularly

in some geographically large DMAs west of the Mississippi River. In

these situations, the DMA may be large enough that two stations

situated in the DMA do not have overlapping Grade B contours. Common

ownership of the two stations would be permitted under the existing

rule but not under a strict application of the new DMA standard.

18. In the 2FNPRM, we noted our belief that there are currently few

stations within the same DMA that could be commonly owned under the

existing Grade B signal contour standard that are not already jointly

owned. We sought comment on whether we should, if we adopted a DMA/

Grade A rule, grandfather existing joint ownership combinations that

conform to our current Grade B test. We also sought comment on an

alternative approach of adopting a two-tiered rule under which we would

permit common ownership both under the new test using DMAs and in

situations where there is no Grade B overlap.

19. It is our intention in this proceeding to relax the duopoly

rule consistent with our competition and diversity objectives. It is

not our intention to restrict combinations that would be permitted

under our present Grade B signal contour test. To avoid this result, we

will continue to permit common ownership of television stations in the

same DMA where there is no Grade B overlap between those stations.

Although such stations may compete to some extent for viewers and

advertisers, we believe any harm to diversity and competition from

permitting such combinations will be minimal and we wish to avoid

instances in which application of our new rule would be more

restrictive than our current duopoly rule. In addition, this approach

avoids disrupting current ownership arrangements involving stations in

the same DMA with no Grade B overlap.

B. Permitting Television Duopolies in the Same Local Market

20. Background. In both the FNPRM and the 2FNPRM, we invited

comment on whether, in certain situations, we should allow entities to

acquire more than one television station in the same geographic market.

We sought comment both on exceptions to our ``one-station'' local

ownership rule, including the exception currently provided in our rules

for television satellite stations, as well as on a number of possible

waiver criteria.

21. Costs and Benefits of Broadcast TV Station Duopolies. We

believe that the demonstrated benefits of same-market television

station combinations support allowing the formation of such

combinations in certain cases where competition and diversity will not

be unduly diminished. The record in this proceeding shows that there

are significant efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and operation

of television stations in the same market, including efficiencies

related to the co-location and sharing of studio and office facilities,

the sharing of administrative and technical staff, and efficiencies in

advertising and news gathering. These efficiencies can contribute to

programming and other benefits such as increased news and public

affairs programming and improved entertainment programming, and, in

some cases, can ensure the continued survival of a struggling station.

In markets with many separate television licensees, the public interest

benefits of common ownership can outweigh any cost to diversity and

competition of permitting combinations.

22. While we conclude that the public interest would be served by

permitting television duopolies in certain circumstances, we are not

eliminating or relaxing the rule to the extent a number of commenters

advocate given the important diversity and competition issues at stake.

Television broadcasting plays a very special role in our society. It is

the primary source of news and information, as well as video

entertainment to most Americans, and we must continue to ensure that

the broadcast television industry has a diverse and competitive

ownership structure. Moreover, as discussed above, because the

communications industry is undergoing rapid change and increasing

consolidation, significant yet measured relaxation of the television

duopoly rule is appropriate to allow us to monitor the results of these

sweeping changes.

23. In light of these considerations, we have decided to adopt a

modification to our duopoly rule, and three waiver tests, that are

targeted to promote the public interest without appreciable harm to our

competition and diversity goals. In particular, as described below, we

will modify the TV duopoly rule to allow common ownership of two

stations in the same DMA, if eight independently owned and operating

commercial and noncommercial television stations will remain in the DMA

post-merger, and at least one of the stations is not among the top

four-ranked stations in the market, based on audience share, as

measured by Nielsen or by any comparable professional and accepted

rating service, at the time the application is filed. In addition, we

will presume that a waiver of the rule is in the public interest if the

applicant satisfies a ``failed'' or ``failing'' station test, or

involves the construction of an ``unbuilt'' station.

1. Modification of the Rule: Eight Voice/Top Four-Ranked Station

Standard

24. Background. In the 2FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on

whether we should entertain joint ownership of stations that (1) have

very small audience or advertising market shares and (2) are located in

a very large market where (3) a specified minimum number of

independently owned voices remain post-merger. We stated that the

purpose of such a standard would be to enhance competition and

diversity in the local market by allowing small stations to share costs

and thereby compete more effectively. We further stated that such joint

ownership could potentially serve the public interest if such stations

were to use their economic savings to produce new and better-quality

programming or related enhancements. Such advantages may be

particularly helpful to small and independent UHF stations. We invited

comment on the circumstances under which joint ownership should be

permitted, and on the size of the market share we might adopt, the

number and kinds of voices we should count in any minimum voice

criterion, and whether we should include a market rank test.

25. Discussion. After considering the record, and our competition

and diversity goals, we have decided to modify the duopoly rule to

permit any two television stations in the same market to merge if:

At least eight independently owned and operating full-

power commercial and noncommercial TV stations would remain post-merger

in the DMA in which the communities of license of the TV stations in

question are located, and

The two merging stations are not both among the top four-

ranked stations in the market, as measured by audience share.

If any entity acquires a duopoly under this standard, it will not later

be required to divest if the number of operating television voices

within the market falls below eight or if the two merged stations

subsequently are both ranked among the top four stations in the market;

however, a duopoly may not automatically be transferred to a new owner

if the market does not satisfy the eight voice/top four-ranked

standard. In such a case, the transaction must either meet one of the

waiver standards enunciated below, or involve a sale to separate

parties. We will not include a market rank component in our new rule

[[Page 50655]]

because we believe such a test is unnecessary given the station rank

and minimum number of stations criteria we are adopting. We adopt this

``eight voice/top four-ranked station'' standard as a modification of

the rule as opposed to the adoption of a waiver criterion in order to

fashion a bright-line test, bring certainty to the permissibility of

these transactions, and expedite their consummation, given that we do

not believe as a general matter that they unduly compromise our

competition and diversity goals. We delegate to the Mass Media Bureau

the authority to grant any application that satisfies the eight

station/top four ranked station standard, and presents no new or novel

issues.

26. This standard provides measured relaxation of the television

duopoly rule, particularly in the larger television markets. It will

allow weaker television stations in the market to combine, either with

each other or with a larger station, thereby preserving and

strengthening these stations and improving their ability to compete.

These station combinations will allow licensees to take advantage of

efficiencies and cost savings that can benefit the public, such as in

allowing the stations to provide more local programming. At the same

time, the station rank and voice criteria are designed to protect both

our core competition and diversity concerns.

27. The ``top four ranked station'' component of this standard is

designed to ensure that the largest stations in the market do not

combine and create potential competition concerns. These stations

generally have a large share of the audience and advertising market in

their area, and requiring them to operate independently will promote

competition. In addition, our analysis has indicated that the top four-

ranked stations in each market generally have a local newscast, whereas

lower-ranked stations often do not have significant local news

programming, given the costs involved. Permitting mergers among these

two categories of stations, but not among the top four-ranked stations,

will consequently pose less concern over diversity of viewpoints in

local news presentation, which is at the heart of our diversity goal.

28. The ``eight independent voice'' component of the rule provides

a clear benchmark for ensuring a minimum amount of diversity in a

market. Taking into account current marketplace conditions, the eight

voice standard we adopt today strikes what we believe to be an

appropriate balance between permitting stations to take advantage of

the efficiencies of television duopolies while at the same time

ensuring a robust level of diversity. Thus, under our new rule, at

least eight independently owned and operating full-power commercial and

noncommercial broadcast television stations must remain in the DMA

post-merger. We will not include in our count of independently owned

television stations those that are brokered pursuant to an attributable

same-market LMA because a substantial portion of the programming of

brokered stations is furnished by the brokering station. This gives the

brokering station a significant degree of influence over the brokered

station's operations and programming such that it should not be counted

as an independent source of viewpoint diversity; indeed, it is for this

reason we have decided to attribute such TV LMAs in our attribution

proceeding.

29. We believe that an ``eight station'' test that focuses only on

the number of full-power broadcast television outlets in the market is

necessary for two reasons. First, we believe that broadcast television,

more so than any other media, continues to have a special, pervasive

impact in our society given its role as the preeminent source of news

and entertainment for most Americans. As the Supreme Court recently

stated, ``[b]roadcast television is an important source of information

to many Americans. Though it is but one of many means for

communication, by tradition and use for decades now it has been an

essential part of the national discourse on subjects across the whole

broad spectrum of speech, thought, and expression.''

30. Second, we are unable to reach a definitive conclusion at this

time as to the extent to which other media serve as readily available

substitutes for broadcast television. In the FNPRM and 2FNPRM, we

sought information about the extent to which other media serve as

substitutes for television in the advertising and delivered video

programming markets, and for purposes of diversity. For example, in the

FNPRM, we stated that for the purpose of competition analysis, we would

tentatively consider local advertising markets to include broadcast and

cable television advertising, radio advertising, and newspaper

advertising. For delivered video programming, we tentatively included

commercial and noncommercial television stations and cable television.

While we expressed our inclination to tentatively include MMDS, DBS,

and television delivered by telephone companies, we expressed concern

about the extent to which the latter three alternatives were actually

available to most Americans and sought quantitative, behavioral studies

estimating the extent to which broadcast television actually faced

substitutes from any and all sources in the marketplace. Although we

have received voluminous materials debating such substitutability, we

have not received the quantitative, empirical studies that we sought in

order to assess this issue in a complete and accurate fashion. Nor does

there seem to be a consensus on the extent to which various media are

substitutes for purposes of diversity. Thus, while we agree with those

commenters who argued that different types of media, such as radio,

cable television, VCRs, MMDS, and newspapers, may to some extent be

substitutes for broadcast television, in the absence of the factual

data we requested we have decided to exercise due caution by employing

a minimum station count that includes only broadcast television

stations.

31. Our ``eight voice/top four ranked station'' standard provides

significant relaxation of the television duopoly rule while at the same

time ensures that markets remain sufficiently diverse and competitive

at the local level so that common ownership of two television stations

in these markets does not threaten our core diversity concerns. We

recognize that stations in markets with less than nine independent

voices will not be able to take advantage of this standard. But we

believe this is appropriate given that these markets start with fewer

broadcast television outlets, and thus a lower potential for providing

robust diversity to viewers in such markets. While we recognize, as

several commenters argued, that smaller markets also benefit from the

efficiency gains and cost savings associated with joint station

ownership, it is in these small markets that consolidation of broadcast

television ownership could most undermine our competition and diversity

goals. Moreover, the three waiver standards we adopt today--the failed

and failing station criteria, and the unbuilt station test--will,

consistent with our competition and diversity goals, provide relief in

a more tailored fashion for stations in smaller markets that are unable

to compete effectively.

2. Waiver Criteria

a. Failed Stations

32. Background. We invited comment in the 2FNPRM on whether, if an

applicant can show that it is the only viable suitor for a failed

station, the Commission should grant the application regardless of

contour overlap or DMA designations. We noted that for purposes of our

one-to-a-market rule waiver standard, a ``failed'' station

[[Page 50656]]

is a station that has not been operated for a substantial period of

time, e.g., four months, or that is involved in bankruptcy proceedings.

We asked whether this standard should be used in evaluating a request

to waive the television duopoly rule.

33. Discussion. We are persuaded that the public interest would be

served by adopting a failed station waiver standard for our revised

television duopoly rule. A station that is off the air or in

involuntary bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings can contribute little,

if anything, to any type of diversity in a local market. Nor does such

a station constitute a viable alternative in the local advertising

market. As we concluded in adopting our current failed station waiver

standard for the one-to-a-market rule, the benefits to the public of

joint ownership under these circumstances outweigh the costs to

diversity. In fact, dark or bankrupt stations actually disserve our

goal of efficient use of the spectrum because those stations are

holding valuable frequencies without providing service to the public.

Permitting another local station to acquire a failed station will

result in additional programming, perhaps an increase in diversity in

the market, and more advertising time available for sale in larger

quantities.

34. We have decided to define a ``failed station'' for purposes of

our television duopoly rule as one that has been dark for at least four

months or is involved in court-supervised involuntary bankruptcy or

involuntary insolvency proceedings. In addition, we will require that

the waiver applicant demonstrate that the ``in-market'' buyer is the

only reasonably available entity willing and able to operate the failed

station, and that selling the station to an out-of-market buyer would

result in an artificially depressed price for the station.

35. This standard is stricter than the failed station standard used

in the context of our current one-to-a-market rule. First, we are

limiting our TV duopoly failed station waiver to stations in court-

supervised involuntary bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. By

excluding voluntary bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, we hope to

avoid the issue of whether an owner has filed for bankruptcy or

insolvency simply in order to qualify for a waiver. We will extend our

failed station waiver here to apply to both insolvency and bankruptcy

proceedings, as the former are a state-regulated mechanism similar to

bankruptcy. Second, we are requiring applicants to make a serious

attempt to sell the troubled station to an entity that would not

require a waiver of our revised duopoly rule. Waiver applicants must

demonstrate that the ``in-market'' buyer is the only reasonably

available entity willing and able to operate the station, and that

selling to another buyer would lead to an artificially depressed price

for the station. One way to make this showing will be to provide an

affidavit from an independent broker affirming that active and serious

efforts have been made to sell the station, and that no reasonable

offer from an entity outside the market has been received. We believe

that a strict failed station waiver standard is warranted in view of

the other steps we are taking today to relax the television duopoly

rule. While there are now other limited criteria pursuant to which

same-market television stations may combine, we hope to limit the

special relief awarded to failed stations to those situations where

this relief is clearly needed. As with our current one-to-a-market

failed station waiver standard, we will be predisposed to grant

applications that meet the waiver standard, but will entertain

petitions to deny seeking to rebut the waiver request.

36. To qualify for a waiver under the failed station standard, we

will require the waiver applicant to provide relevant documentation,

i.e., proof of the length of time that the station has been off the

air, or proof that the station is involved in bankruptcy or insolvency

proceedings. We will also require, in the case of a silent station, a

statement that the failed station went dark due to financial distress,

not because of other, non-financial reasons. This documentation will

ensure that the waiver standard is applied only to stations facing

financial difficulties. We will not require the waiver applicant to

demonstrate that the market will contain post-merger a minimum number

of voices. As noted above, we have concluded that the benefits to the

public of preventing a station from going dark or bringing a dark

station back on the air cannot harm and may help diversity and

competition, regardless of the number of broadcast and other voices in

the local market. Any combination formed as a result of a failed

station waiver may be transferred together only if the combination

meets our new duopoly rule or one of our three waiver standards at the

time of transfer.

b. ``Failing'' Stations

37. Background. The 2FNPRM also invited comment on whether we

should adopt a failing station waiver criteria, and, if so, the

appropriate definition of a failing station.

38. Discussion. We will adopt a ``failing'' station waiver

standard. It will permit two stations to merge where at least one of

the stations has been struggling for an extended period of time both in

terms of its audience share and in its financial performance.

Permitting such stations to merge should pose minimal harm to our

diversity and competition goals, since their financial situation

typically hampers their ability to be a viable ``voice'' in the market.

These stations rarely have the resources to provide local news

programming, and often struggle to provide significant local

programming at all. Allowing a ``failing'' station to join with a

stronger station in the market can greatly improve its ability to

improve its facilities and programming operations, thus benefitting the

public interest. This waiver standard may be of particular assistance

to struggling stations in smaller markets that are not covered by the

eight voice/top four ranked station test.

39. We agree with the commenters that argued that it makes little

sense to force a station to go dark or declare bankruptcy before

considering whether it should receive a waiver of the duopoly rule to

permit it to merge with another station in the market. Of course,

determining when a station is ``failed'' is a more straightforward

task, since there are clear, objective criteria for identifying such a

status, i.e., a station is dark or in bankruptcy. A ``failing'' station

standard, by contrast, will involve more of an individualized, case-by-

case assessment to determine when a station is struggling to such an

extent that permitting it to merge with another station will not

undermine our competition and diversity goals and may in fact promote

them.

40. With these considerations in mind, and based on the record

before us, we establish the following criteria for granting waivers

under a ``failing'' station waiver standard. We will presume such a

waiver is in the public interest if the applicant satisfies each of

these criteria:

(1) One of the merging stations has had low all-day audience share

(i.e., 4% or lower).

(2) The financial condition of one of the merging stations is poor.

A waiver is more likely to be granted where one or both of the stations

has had a negative cash flow for the previous three years. The

applicant will need to submit data, such as detailed income statements

and balance sheets, to demonstrate this. Commission staff will assess

the reasonableness of the applicant's showing by comparing data

[[Page 50657]]

regarding the station's expenses to industry averages.

(3) The merger will produce public interest benefits. A waiver will

be granted where the applicant demonstrates that the tangible and

verifiable public interest benefits of the merger outweigh any harm to

competition and diversity. At the end of the stations' license terms,

the owner of the merged stations must certify to the Commission that

the public interest benefits of the merger are being fulfilled,

including a specific, factual showing of the program-related benefits

that have accrued to the public. Cost savings or other efficiencies,

standing alone, will not constitute a sufficient showing.

(4) The in-market buyer is the only reasonably available candidate

willing and able to acquire and operate the station; selling the

station to an out-of-market buyer would result in an artificially

depressed price. As with the showing required of failed station waiver

applicants, one way to satisfy this fourth criterion will be to provide

an affidavit from an independent broker affirming that active and

serious efforts have been made to sell the station, and that no

reasonable offer from an entity outside the market has been received.

Any combination formed as a result of a failing station waiver may be

transferred together only if the combination meets our new duopoly rule

or one of our three waiver standards at the time of transfer.

c. Unbuilt Stations

41. Background. In the 2FNPRM, we invited comment on whether we

should entertain requests to waive the local television ownership rule

to permit a local broadcast television licensee to apply for a

television channel allotment that has remained vacant or unused for an

extended period of time. We stated there that it may not be in the

public interest to allow allotted broadcast channels to lie fallow--

particularly in markets where it might be possible to allow additional

NTSC stations to come on the air without adversely affecting the DTV

allotment table and the transition to digital television. Similarly, we

asked whether, if it is possible to create new channel allotments in a

market without interfering with nearby channels and without adversely

affecting the DTV allotment table, the Commission should entertain

applications by an incumbent television licensee to establish a new

channel in its market.

42. Discussion. Since we adopted the 2FNPRM, the rationale for a

vacant allotment waiver policy has become less relevant. In the DTV

Sixth Report and Order, 62 FR 26684, May 14, 1997, we eliminated vacant

NTSC allotments in order to better achieve our DTV objectives of full

accommodation, service replication and spectrum recovery. We further

stated that new television stations should be operated as DTV stations,

and that there would be no need to maintain vacant NTSC allotments that

were not the subject of a pending application or rule making

proceeding. Thus, with the licensing of new NTSC service coming to an

end, we believe that the proposed rationale for a vacant allotment

waiver policy has been largely vitiated because there would be few, if

any, situations where that basis for a waiver would apply. As the

development of DTV continues, it is possible that new channels may

again become available for licensing. If so, we may reconsider this

issue at that time or in the context of our biennial review of our

multiple ownership rules.

43. Although we no longer find it appropriate to adopt a vacant

allotment waiver standard, we have concluded that the public interest

would be served at this time by adopting a duopoly waiver standard for

``unbuilt'' television stations. The unbuilt station waiver we adopt is

premised on essentially the same logic as supports our failed and

failing station waiver standards. A station that has gone unbuilt, like

a built station that has gone dark, cannot contribute to diversity or

competition. On the other hand, activation of a construction permit and

construction of a station, even by the owner of another television

station in the market if that is the only viable means to obtain

service, increases program choice for viewers, may increase outlet

diversity, and increases the amount of advertising time available for

sale in the market. We believe that the benefits to the public of

construction and operation of such a station, even if through joint

ownership, rather than allowing the channel to remain unused, outweigh

any costs to diversity and competition.

44. To qualify for a duopoly waiver under this standard, we will

require that applicants satisfy each of these criteria:

(1) The combination will result in the construction of an

authorized but as yet unbuilt station.

(2) The permittee has made reasonable efforts to construct, and has

been unable to do so.

(3) The in-market buyer is the only reasonably available candidate

willing and able to acquire the construction permit and build the

station and selling the construction permit to an out-of-market buyer

would result in an artificially depressed price. As with the showing

required of failed and failing station waiver applicants, one way to

satisfy this criterion will be to provide an affidavit from an

independent broker affirming that active and serious efforts have been

made to sell the permit, and that no reasonable offer from an entity

outside the market has been received.

Any combination formed as a result of an unbuilt station waiver may be

transferred together only if the combination meets our new duopoly rule

or one of our three waiver standards at the time of transfer.

d. UHF Combinations

45. Background. In the 2FNPRM, we invited comment on the extent to

which the Commission should distinguish between UHF and VHF stations in

applying our TV duopoly rule.

46. Discussion. After careful consideration of the comments, we

have decided not to create a UHF exception or UHF waiver policy for

several reasons. First, a UHF exemption or waiver policy is an

overbroad means of promoting the public interest. As we noted in our

R&O eliminating the prime time access rule for television networks,

many UHF stations are financially successful, are network affiliates,

and are part of large station groups. Thus, a blanket exception or

waiver for all UHF stations would unfairly benefit more powerful

affiliates as well as struggling stations. Second, cable carriage

compensates for many of the technical disadvantages faced by UHF

stations vis-a-vis their VHF counterparts. Cable penetration is near 70

percent nationwide. Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision upholding

the statutory must-carry rights of television stations removes a major

source of uncertainty among UHF stations about their ability to obtain

cable carriage. Third, deployment of DTV should eliminate, over the

next several years, many of the remaining disadvantages of UHF

stations. The Commission's power limitations for DTV licensees will

likely reduce the technical discrepancy of UHF and VHF stations, and

the multichannel capabilities of digital transmission should enhance

the ability of UHF stations to compete in the video marketplace.

Fourth, licensees may continue to take advantage of the satellite

station exception to the TV duopoly rule, which is designed to assist

financially struggling stations that cannot operate as stand-alone

full-service stations. Finally, we believe that the financial problems

faced by particular UHF stations can more appropriately be addressed,

at least to some extent, by the other duopoly waiver criteria we are

adopting today.

[[Page 50658]]

As discussed above, these criteria are targeted to assist stations

facing financial hardships. We therefore will not create a waiver

policy or exception to the TV duopoly rule based on whether a station

is in the UHF or VHF band.

3. Satellite Stations

47. Background. Generally, television satellite stations retransmit

all or a substantial part of the programming of a commonly-owned parent

station. Satellite stations are generally exempt from our broadcast

ownership restrictions. In the 2NPRM, we noted that the Commission

first authorized TV satellite operations in small or sparsely populated

areas with insufficient economic bases to support full-service

operations. Later we authorized satellite stations in smaller markets

already served by full-service operations but not reached by major

networks. More recently, we have authorized satellite stations in

larger markets where the applicant has demonstrated that the proposed

satellite could not operate as a stand-alone full-service station. We

stated in the 2FNPRM that we saw no reason to alter our policy of

exempting satellite stations from our local ownership rules, but

invited comment on this conclusion. All the commenters that addressed

this issue supported continuing the exception of satellite stations

from the duopoly rule.

48. Discussion. We believe that continued exception of satellite

stations from the duopoly rule is appropriate. As we stated in the

2FNPRM, our satellite station policy rests in part on the questionable

financial viability of the satellite as a stand-alone facility. As

such, our policy has furthered the underlying goals of our ownership

restrictions by adding additional stations to local television markets

where these stations otherwise would not have been established. In

addition, the other criteria we use to evaluate satellite operations,

including service to underserved areas, ensure that satellite

operations are consistent with our goals of promoting diversity and

competition.

IV. Radio-Television Cross-Ownership Rule

49. Background. The radio-television cross-ownership rule, or the

``one-to-a-market'' rule, forbids joint ownership of a radio and a

television station serving substantial areas in common. In 1989, the

Commission amended the rule to permit, on the basis of a presumptive

waiver, radio-television mergers involving one television and one AM

and one FM station, in the top 25 television markets if, post-merger,

at least 30 independently owned broadcast voices remain in the relevant

market, or if the merger involves a failed station. Our current policy

also permits waivers on a case-by-case basis if the merger satisfies a

group of five separate criteria.

50. In the FNPRM, we proposed to eliminate the cross-ownership

restriction in its entirety or replace it with an approach under which

cross-ownership would be permitted where a minimum number of post-

acquisition, independently owned broadcast voices remained in the

relevant market. We tentatively concluded there were two alternative

approaches toward modifying the rule. If radio and television stations

do not compete in the same local advertising, program delivery, or

diversity markets, we proposed to eliminate the rule entirely and rely

on our radio and television local ownership rules to ensure competition

and diversity at the local level. Under the local radio ownership rules

in effect at that time, this would have permitted entities to own one

AM, one FM, and one television station in even the smallest markets,

and up to 2 AM, 2 FM, and one television station in larger markets. In

contrast, if we concluded that radio and television did compete in some

or all of the local markets, we proposed to modify the one-to-a-market

rule to permit radio-television combinations in markets where there are

a sufficient number of remaining independent voices to ensure

sufficient diversity and competition.

51. After adoption of the FNPRM, Congress passed the 1996 Act,

which affects the radio-television cross-ownership rule in at least two

ways. First, section 202(d) of the Act directs the Commission to extend

the radio-television cross-ownership presumptive waiver policy to the

top 50, rather than top 25, television markets ``consistent with the

public interest, convenience and necessity.'' Second, section 202(b)(1)

of the Act liberalized the local radio ownership rules.

52. In our 2FNPRM, based on the statutory changes to the local

radio ownership rules, we requested further comment on our radio-

television cross-ownership rule proposals. First, we sought further

comment on whether the rule should be eliminated based on a finding

that radio and television stations do not compete in the same market.

Second, even if we consider television and radio stations to be

competitors, we asked if the radio-television cross-ownership rule

could be eliminated because the respective radio and television

ownership rules alone can be relied upon to ensure sufficient diversity

and competition in the local market. We also sought to update the

record on a number of specific options for modifying, but not

eliminating, the rule. In this regard, and consistent with section

202(d) of the 1996 Act, we proposed, at a minimum, to extend the top 25

market/30 voice waiver policy to the top 50 markets. However, we also

invited comment on a number of options to change the rule beyond what

was contemplated by section 202(d) of the 1996 Act. For example, we

asked whether the presumptive waiver policy should be extended further

to any television market where the minimum number of independent voices

would remain after the merger. We also invited comment on whether the

presumptive waiver policy should be extended to entities that seek to

own more than one FM and/or AM radio station, and whether the

Commission should reduce the number of required independently owned

voices that must remain after a merger. Finally, we asked whether our

``five factors'' test should be changed or refined to be more effective

in protecting competition and diversity.

A. Modification of the Rule

53. Discussion. We have determined that the public interest would

be best served at this time by relaxing the radio-television cross-

ownership rule to permit same-market joint ownership of radio and

television facilities up to a level that permits broadcasters and the

public to realize the benefits of common ownership while not

undermining our competition and diversity concerns. Our new rule

consists of three parts. First, we will permit a party to own up to two

television stations (provided this is permitted under our modified TV

duopoly rule or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and up to six radio

stations (any combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted

under our local radio ownership rules) in any market where at least 20

independently owned media voices remain in the market after the

combination is effected. In those markets where our revised rule will

allow parties to own a total of eight outlets in the form of two TV

stations and six radio stations, we will also permit them instead to

own eight outlets in the form of one TV station and seven radio

stations. Second, we will permit common ownership of up to two

television stations and up to four radio stations (any combination of

AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted under our local radio

ownership rules) in any market where at least 10 independently owned

media voices remain after the combination is effected. And, third, we

will permit common ownership of up to two television stations and one

radio

[[Page 50659]]

station notwithstanding the number of independent voices in the market.

In determining which stations are subject to the new rule, we will use

the same contour overlap standards used in our present rule. We

delegate to the Mass Media Bureau the authority to grant any

application that satisfies the new radio/TV cross-ownership rule, and

presents no new or novel issues. If a voice test is required to acquire

a given combination (i.e., any combination that includes more than one

radio/TV combination), that combination will not later be required to

be undone if the number of independent voices in the market later falls

below the applicable voice test. However, a radio/TV combination may

not be transferred to a new owner if the market does not satisfy the

applicable voice standard at the time of sale.

54. As described below, we will eliminate our five factor case-by-

case waiver standard. Waivers of our new three-part rule will be

granted only in situations involving a failed station and in

extraordinary circumstances in which the proponent of the waiver will

face a high hurdle. We will define a failed station for purposes of our

new radio/TV cross-ownership rule in the same manner as that term is

defined for purposes of the failed station waiver we adopt today in

connection with our television duopoly rule. Any combination formed as

a result of a failed station waiver may be transferred together only if

the combination meets our new radio/TV cross-ownership rule or our

failed station waiver standard at the time of transfer.

55. Rationale for Modified Rule. We relax our radio/TV cross-

ownership rule to balance our traditional diversity and competition

concerns with our desire to permit broadcasters and the public to

realize the benefits of radio/TV common ownership. We believe that the

revised rule reflects the changes in the local broadcast media

marketplace. The relaxed rule recognizes the growth in the number and

types of media outlets, the clustering of cable systems in major

population centers, the efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and

operation of both television and radio stations in the same market, as

well as the public service benefits that can be obtained from joint

operation. At the same time, the voice test components of the revised

rule also ensure that the local market remains sufficiently diverse and

competitive.

56. The new three-part rule also ensures the application of a

clear, reasoned standard. One of our primary goals in this proceeding

is to provide concrete guidance to applicants and the public about the

permissibility of proposed transactions. This minimizes the burdens

involved in complying with and enforcing our rules. It also promotes

greater consistency in our decision-making. Since development of the

Commission's waiver policy in 1989, the Commission has granted a

significant number of waivers in order to provide broadcasters relief

from the one-to-a-market rule, which prohibited any common ownership of

television and radio stations in the same market. Indeed, some

commenters argue that this waiver process has come to govern regulation

of same-market radio-television cross-ownership, rather than the rule

itself. Today, we redirect our approach by amending the rule to provide

a greater degree of common ownership of radio and television stations

while at the same time limiting waivers of this new rule to only

extraordinary circumstances. In addition, the new rule will ease

administrative burdens and will provide predictability to broadcasters

in structuring their business transactions.

57. A number of commenters argued that we should eliminate our

radio-television cross-ownership rule entirely. We do not believe that

course is appropriate at this time. We stated in the FNPRM that

elimination of the rule might be warranted if we concluded that radio

and television stations do not compete in the same local advertising,

program delivery, or diversity markets. Although radio and television

stations may or may not compete in different advertising markets, we

believe a radio-television cross-ownership rule continues to be

necessary to promote a diversity of viewpoints in the broadcast media.

The public continues to rely on both radio and television for news and

information, suggesting the two media both contribute to the

``marketplace of ideas'' and compete in the same diversity market. As

these two media do serve as substitutes at least to some degree for

diversity purposes, we will retain a relaxed one-to-market rule to

ensure that viewpoint diversity is adequately protected.

58. Although we decline to eliminate our radio-television cross-

ownership rule, the demonstrated benefits of same-market broadcast

combinations support relaxing the rule and allowing such combinations

in circumstances where we find that diversity and competition remain

adequately protected. The record in this proceeding demonstrates that

there are significant efficiencies inherent in joint ownership and

operation of broadcast stations in the same market, even when the

stations are in separate services (i.e., radio-TV combinations). Among

other benefits, these efficiencies often lead to improved programming

and can help stations in financial difficulty remain on the air. The

revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule we adopt today will establish

clear guidelines that will permit common ownership of radio and

television stations in markets where diversity and competition are

preserved.

59. Turning to the specifics of the first two prongs of the new

rule, we will use a ``voice count'' approach rather than also applying

a market rank restriction as with our current top 25 market, 30 voice

presumptive waiver policy. In particular, the first prong of our new

rule, which permits a party to own up to two television stations

(provided this is permitted under our modified TV duopoly rule or TV

LMA grandfathering policy) and up to six radio stations (any

combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted under our

local radio ownership rules) in any market with at least twenty

independently owned media voices, focuses on the number of independent

voices remaining in the market post-merger, rather than market rank

(e.g., the top 100 markets). A rule based on the number of independent

voices more accurately reflects the actual level of diversity and

competition in the market. As a number of commenters in this proceeding

noted, a market-size restriction is unnecessary for purposes of

competition and diversity as long as there are a minimum number of

independent sources of news and information available to listeners, and

a minimum number of alternative outlets available to advertisers. In

addition, unlike a rule based on market rank, our revised rule will

account for changes in the number of voices in a market resulting from

consolidation, the addition of new voices, or the loss of any outlets.

Mergers will be permitted only when the voice count is satisfied,

thereby ensuring the preservation of a minimum level of diversity and

competition in the market.

60. The second prong of our new rule permits a party to own up to

two television stations (provided this is permitted under our modified

TV duopoly rule or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and up to four radio

stations (any combination of AM or FM stations, to the extent permitted

under our local radio ownership rules) in any market with at least ten

independently owned media voices. This standard also focuses on the

number of independent voices remaining in the market post-merger rather

than market rank, and extends the benefits of common ownership to

smaller markets. In this regard, our

[[Page 50660]]

revised rule permits broadcasters and the public in these markets to

realize the same benefits of common ownership we have concluded are

worthwhile for the largest markets.

61. The third prong of our new rule will allow common ownership of

up to two television stations (provided that is permissible under our

rules or TV LMA grandfathering policy) and one radio station

notwithstanding the number of independent voices in the market. Based

on the record before us, we find that the service benefits and

efficiencies achieved from the joint ownership and operation of a

television/radio combination in local markets further the public

interest and outweigh the cost to diversity in these instances.

62. Applying the Voice Count Tests. We will apply the voice test

under both prongs of our new radio/TV cross-ownership rule that include

such a test as follows:

(1) We will count all independently owned and operating full-power

commercial and noncommercial broadcast television stations licensed to

a community in the DMA in which the community of license of the

television station in question is located.

(2) We will also count all independently owned and operating

commercial and noncommercial broadcast radio stations licensed to a

community within the radio metro market in which the community of

license of the television station in question is located. In addition,

we will count broadcast radio stations outside the radio metro market

that Arbitron or another nationally-recognized audience rating service

lists as having a reportable share in the metro market. In areas in

which there is no radio metro market, the party seeking the waiver may

count the radio stations present in an area that would be the

functional equivalent of a radio market.

(3) We will count all independently owned daily newspapers that are

published in the DMA at issue and that have a circulation exceeding 5%

of the households in the DMA.

(4) We will count cable systems provided cable service is generally

available to television households in the DMA. For DMAs in which cable

service is generally available, cable will count as a single voice for

purposes of our voice analysis, regardless of the number of cable

systems within the DMA, their ownership, and any overlap in service

area.

63. In counting broadcast television and radio stations as

``voices'' we are being consistent with the voice count analysis used

in our current ``top 25 market/30 voice'' presumptive waiver standard.

That standard, however, counts radio stations licensed to the relevant

television metropolitan market. Under our new rule, we will instead use

the radio metropolitan market, and will include both radio stations

licensed within the radio metro market and stations with a reportable

share in that market. We believe it is important to count radio

stations with a reportable share in the relevant market because those

stations clearly serve as a source of information and entertainment

programming for the relevant market. We have chosen to use the radio

metro market rather than the television metro market for counting the

number of independent radio voices because the former more accurately

reflect the competitive and core signal availability realities for

radio service in the market. All independently owned radio stations in

the radio market can be presumed to be available to residents of that

market because of signal reach. Radio stations outside the radio metro

market may also be presumed to be available to all residents of the

radio market if Arbitron, or another nationally recognized audience

rating service, lists them as having a reportable audience share in the

radio metro. Reportable audience share information is not generally

available for television metro markets. Thus, use of radio markets will

ease the burden on applicants seeking approval of assignment and

transfer applications, and on the Commission staff reviewing such

applications.

64. We will also include in our voice count daily newspapers and

cable systems because we believe that such media are an important

source of news and information on issues of local concern and compete

with radio and television, at least to some extent, as advertising

outlets. Although we have not previously explicitly counted cable and

newspapers as voices under our current top 25 market/30 voice

presumptive waiver standard, we have counted these outlets in applying

the case-by-case, five factor waiver standard. While we will count

these media outlets in applying our amended rule, we will restrict the

number of newspapers we will include and limit the weight we will

ascribe to cable. Specifically, we will include all independently owned

daily newspapers that are published in the DMA that have a circulation

exceeding 5 percent of the households in the DMA. Our intent in this

regard is to include those newspapers that are widely available

throughout the DMA and that provide coverage of issues of interest to a

sizeable percentage of the population. Although we recognize that other

publications also provide a source of diversity and competition, many

of these are only targeted to particular communities and are not

accessible to, or relied upon by, the population throughout the local

market. We will also include wired cable television in the DMA as one

voice, since cable service is generally available to households

throughout the U.S. We believe it is appropriate to include at least

one voice for cable, where cable passes most of the homes in the

market, because there are PEG and other channels on cable systems that

present local informational and public affairs programming to the

public. At this time we count cable as no more than one voice since

most cable subscribers have only one cable system to choose from. In

addition, despite a multiplicity of channels provided by each cable

system, most programming is either originated or selected by the cable

system operator, who thereby ultimately controls the content of such

programming. As most cable programming available to a household is

controlled by a single entity, we believe cable should be counted as a

single voice in applying our voice test.

B. Waiver Criteria

1. Failed Stations

65. We will continue to grant waivers of our radio-television

cross-ownership rule, on a presumptive basis, in situations involving a

failed station. However, we will adopt the definition of a failed

station used in the context of our television duopoly failed station

waiver standard. In order to qualify as ``failed'' a station must be

dark for at least four months or involved in court-supervised

involuntary bankruptcy or involuntary insolvency proceedings. In

addition, we will require that the waiver applicant demonstrate that

the ``in market'' buyer is the only reasonably available entity willing

and able to operate the failed station and that selling the station to

an out-of-market buyer would result in an artificially depressed price

for the station. As in the past, we will require the applicant seeking

the waiver to provide relevant documentation, i.e., proof of the length

of time that the station has been off the air, or proof that the

station is involved in bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, in the case

of a silent station, we will require a statement that the failed

station went dark due to financial distress, not because of other, non-

financial reasons. Any combination formed as a result of a failed

station waiver may be transferred together only

[[Page 50661]]

if the combination meets our radio/TV cross-ownership rule, or failed

station waiver, at the time of transfer.

66. Our new waiver standard is significantly stricter than the

failed station standard used in the context of our current one-to-a-

market rule. As we stated in adopting our television duopoly failed

station waiver, we are limiting the waiver to involuntary bankruptcy

and insolvency proceedings to avoid the risk that an owner has filed

for bankruptcy or insolvency simply to qualify for a waiver. We will

extend the waiver to include stations in insolvency as well as

bankruptcy proceedings, as the former is a state-regulated mechanism

similar to bankruptcy. Finally, we are requiring that applicants make a

serious effort to sell the troubled station to an out-of-market buyer

in order to limit the relief afforded by the waiver to those situations

in which it is clearly needed. In view of the other steps we are taking

today to relax our radio/TV cross-ownership rule, we believe that it is

appropriate to ensure that the relief offered by our failed station

waiver is directed to stations that are clearly facing financial

difficulty and that cannot be sold absent a waiver of our rule.

67. Our rationale for this waiver standard is the same as that of

the failed station waiver standard we are adopting today for the

television duopoly rule. We believe that the benefits to the public of

joint ownership, namely preserving a bankrupt station or allowing a

dark station to return to the air, do not pose costs from a diversity

perspective. Once a station has been off the air for a substantial

period or has become involved in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings (so

that it is likely to go off the air), competition and diversity in a

local market cannot be improved by forbidding joint ownership of that

station with another station in the market. It is our view that two

operating, commonly-owned stations serve the public better than one

operational station and one nonoperational station that provides no

service to the public at all. We note that Congress reached the same

conclusion in the 1996 Act when it authorized an exception to the local

radio ownership limits to permit an entity to exceed those limits if so

doing would result in an increase in the number of stations in

operation. Increasing the number of stations in a market provides

additional voices to address community needs and issues and increases

listeners' programming choices.

68. This waiver will not be extended to failing or unbuilt

stations. Thus, evidence that a station is losing money (i.e., a

negative cash flow) is not adequate to qualify for the waiver. We do

not believe that it is necessary at this time to permit such additional

waivers in view of the measured liberalization of our radio/TV cross-

ownership rule and the 1996 Act's liberalization of the local radio

ownership limits.

2. ``Five Factors'' Waiver Standard

69. Background. We invited comment in the 2FNPRM on whether our

``five factors'' case-by-case waiver standard should be changed or

refined to be more effective in protecting our competition and

diversity concerns. Under this standard, we make a public interest

determination on a case-by-case basis currently using the following

five criteria: (1) the potential public service benefits of common

ownership of the facilities, such as economies of scale, cost savings,

and programming benefits; (2) the types of facilities involved; (3) the

number of media outlets already owned by the applicant in the relevant

market; (4) any financial difficulties involving the station(s); and

(5) issues pertaining to the level of diversity.

70. Discussion. In light of the modifications we are making today

in the radio-television cross-ownership rule and our goals of

protecting competition and diversity, we will eliminate the case-by-

case, ``five factors'' waiver test we have previously employed. Our

amended rule goes beyond the criteria pursuant to which we have

delegated authority to the Commission staff to act on one-to-a-market

waiver requests, most of which have been approved under the five

factors standard. We have revised the rule based on our recognition

that the benefits of joint ownership in many circumstances outweigh the

harm to diversity, and have based that conclusion in large part on an

assessment of the same general criteria identified in our current five

factor waiver standard. In the event that extraordinary evidence exists

that a waiver of our revised rule is warranted, the Commission will

consider that evidence pursuant to our general waiver authority. Given

the significant relaxation of our radio-TV cross-ownership rule,

applicants seeking combinations that exceed the new rule will bear a

substantially heavier burden than in the past in justifying joint

ownership.

71. We are eliminating the five-factor waiver standard because it

has been difficult to apply. After a number of years of experience in

applying this test, we have come to conclude that the standard does not

sufficiently protect our competition and diversity goals. We believe

that our new, three-part rule, along with our failed station waiver,

will be easier to administer, better protect the Commission's

competition and diversity goals, and therefore further the public

interest.

3. Existing Conditional Waivers

72. In a number of rulings since passage of the 1996 Act, the

Commission has granted, conditioned on the outcome of this proceeding,

applications for waiver of the radio-television cross ownership rule

where the number of radio stations exceeded the radio limits in

existence prior to the Act. The conditional waiver grantees are

directed to file with the Commission within sixty days of publication

of this R&O in the Federal Register a showing sufficient to demonstrate

their compliance or non-compliance with our new rule. In situations

where the revised rule is met, we delegate to the Mass Media Bureau the

authority to replace the conditional waiver with permanent approval of

the relevant assignment or transfer of license.

73. A number of the conditional waivers that have been granted will

not comply with our newly revised radio/TV cross-ownership rule.

Although parties that received these waivers were placed on notice that

their proposed station transactions were subject to the outcome of this

rulemaking proceeding, we nonetheless will extend these conditional

waivers, until the conclusion of our biennial review in 2004, during

which we will review the radio/TV cross-ownership rule itself. We will

also extend this grandfathering relief to any pending application for

conditional waiver, if filed on or before July 29, 1999 (the date of

this ``sunshine'' notice for this R&O), and ultimately granted by the

Commission. In 2004, the Commission will review these waivers, on a

case-by-case basis, as part of its biennial review and determine the

appropriate treatment of them beyond that point in time. In order to

qualify for permanent grandfathering relief after 2004, conditional

waiver grantees will be required to demonstrate that such relief is in

the public interest, based upon, to the extent applicable to radio/TV

combinations, the same criteria that we will use to review the LMAs

that we have concluded to grandfather for a similar period of time. As

is the case with the grandfathered LMAs, if conditional waiver grantees

wish to establish greater certainty about the status of their waiver

prior to the 2004 biennial review, they may make a showing using the

2004 biennial review criteria, beginning one year after the date that

this R&O is published in the

[[Page 50662]]

Federal Register. Any transfer of a grandfathered combination after the

adoption date of this R&O (whether during the initial grandfathering

period or after a permanent grandfathering decision has been made) must

meet the radio/TV cross-ownership rule or waiver policy in effect at

the time of transfer.

V. Television Local Marketing Agreements

74. Background. A television local marketing agreement (``LMA'') or

time brokerage agreement is a type of contract that generally involves

the sale by a licensee of discrete blocks of time to a broker that then

supplies the programming to fill that time and sells the commercial

spot announcements to support the programming. Our current data

indicate that there are at least 70 existing LMAs where the brokering

and brokered station are in the same DMA. Most of these LMAs are in the

top 50 television markets.

75. In our companion Attribution R&O, we have decided to attribute

time brokerage of another television station in the same market for

more than fifteen percent of the brokered station's broadcast hours per

week and to count LMAs that fall in this category toward the brokering

licensee's ownership limits. In the 2FNPRM, we stated that we would

decide in this proceeding how to treat existing television LMAs under

any new attribution rules that we might adopt in the Attribution

proceeding. In this R&O, we adopt policies to afford ``grandfather''

rights to existing television LMAs according to the provisions

discussed below.

76. In the 2FNPRM, we stated that, in the event that we found

television LMAs attributable, we were inclined to extend some

grandfathering relief to all television LMAs entered into before the

November 5, 1996 adoption date of the 2FNPRM for purposes of compliance

with our ownership rules. We sought comment on an approach whereby such

LMAs would not be disturbed during the pendency of the original term of

the LMA in the event the cognizability of the LMA would result in

violation of an ownership rule. We also tentatively concluded that

television LMAs entered into on or after the adoption date of the

2FNPRM, if they resulted in violation of any ownership rule, would not

be grandfathered and would be accorded only a brief period within which

to terminate. We also reserved the right to invalidate an otherwise

grandfathered LMA in circumstances raising particular competition and

diversity concerns, such as might occur in very small markets.

77. After reviewing the comments received in response to the 2FNPRM

in this proceeding and the FNPRM in our related attribution proceeding,

the Commission concluded that the commenters had not provided

sufficient information on a range of important factual issues related

to television LMAs. To provide a more complete record, the Commission

released a Public Notice on June 17, 1997 (62 FR 33792, June 23, 1997),

requesting parties to any existing television LMA to provide certain

information regarding the terms and characteristics of these agreements

to help us determine, inter alia, the number of existing television

LMAs, the date of origination and duration of these arrangements, and

the efficiencies or public interest benefits that may have resulted

from the LMA.

78. Discussion. We adopt our proposal in the 2FNPRM to grandfather

television LMAs entered into prior to November 5, 1996, the adoption

date of that document, for purposes of compliance with our ownership

rules. Television LMAs entered into on or after that date will have two

years from the adoption date of this R&O to come into compliance with

our rules or terminate. LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will

be grandfathered until the conclusion of our 2004 biennial review, a

period of approximately five years. As part of that review, the

Commission will conduct a general review of the TV duopoly rule and a

case-by-case review of grandfathered LMAs, and assess the

appropriateness of extending the initial grandfathering period. Parties

who wish the Commission to conduct this review prior to 2004 may apply

for such relief, using the biennial review criteria, beginning one year

after the date the R&O is published in the Federal Register. We now

turn to a more detailed explanation of our decision on this issue.

79. Section 202(g) of the 1996 Act. Some commenters argue that the

1996 Act directs us to grandfather television LMAs permanently. Section

202(g) of the 1996 Act addresses the construction of section 202 with

respect to LMAs. Section 202(g) states that ``[n]othing in this section

shall be construed to prohibit the origination, continuation, or

renewal of any television local marketing agreement that is in

compliance with the regulations of the Commission.'' (Emphasis added.)

As we stated in the 2FNPRM, the plain language of this provision states

that section 202 shall not be construed to prohibit any television LMA

that is in compliance with the Commission's rules.

80. We do not regard section 202(g) as limiting our ability to

promulgate attribution rules under Title I and Title III of the

Communications Act affecting the status of television LMAs. As a

result, we do not see section 202(g) of the 1996 Act as posing a legal

restraint in resolving questions raised in the FNPRM as to (1) whether

television LMAs in which a broker obtains the ability to program 15% or

more of a broadcast television station's weekly broadcast output should

be deemed an attributable interest (which has been decided in our

companion Attribution R&O); and (2) whether grandfathering existing

television LMAs from any applicable ownership rules that would follow

from that attribution decision is appropriate.

81. We consequently believe that the 1996 Act left the Commission

with the discretion to adopt a grandfathering policy with respect to

television LMAs that appropriately addresses the equity, competition,

and diversity issues these arrangements raise. Having said that, we

fully recognize the need to avoid undue disruption of television LMAs

that were entered into in good faith reliance on our previous rules at

the time, and that these arrangements may in fact have resulted in

significant public interest benefits. We now turn to striking the

appropriate balance regarding these factors.

82. Grandfathering Cut-Off Date. We will adopt our proposal in the

2FNPRM to grandfather television LMAs entered into before the adoption

date of that document, i.e., November 5, 1996. It was on this date that

the Commission gave clear notice that it intended to attribute

television LMAs in certain circumstances, and that LMAs entered into on

or after that date that violated our local television ownership rule

would not be grandfathered and would be accorded only a fixed period in

which to terminate.

83. Treatment of LMAs Entered Into on or After November 5, 1996.

LMAs that are not eligible for grandfathering relief--i.e., those LMAs

entered into on or after November 5, 1996, that are attributable under

the new attribution criteria and that would violate the TV duopoly

rule--will be given two years from the adoption date of this R&O to

terminate. Even though the holders of such LMAs entered into after our

grandfathering date could not have a legitimate expectation of being

eligible for the grandfathering rights we adopt today, we believe that

such a transition is appropriate to avoid undue disruption of existing

arrangements and will allow the holders of LMAs to order their affairs.

For example, the licensee

[[Page 50663]]

of a brokered station may need time to arrange for programming to

replace that provided under the LMA; a two-year transition to do this

will allow the licensee to avoid disruption of its service to the

public. In addition, stations with non-grandfathered LMAs could, of

course, apply for a TV duopoly under our new rule or waiver criteria,

just as any other station owner in the market could. Applications based

on a waiver may be based on circumstances as they existed at the time

just prior to the parties entering into the LMA.

84. Scope of Grandfathering Relief. We believe television LMAs

entered into prior to the November 5, 1996 adoption date of the 2FNPRM

should receive significant grandfathering relief. The parties to these

LMAs entered into these arrangements when there was no Commission rule

or policy prohibiting them. There consequently are strong equities

against requiring them to divest their interests in these LMAs and

upset the settled expectations established by these plans and

investments. Doing so could impose an unfair hardship on these parties.

85. In addition to these equities, the record shows that a number

of television LMAs resulted in public interest benefits. ALTV submitted

a study showing that LMAs helped some struggling stations complete

construction of their facilities or upgrade them, allowed others to add

a local newscast or other local programming to their schedule, and more

generally permitted stations to take advantage of operating

efficiencies to serve their viewers better. We do not wish to disrupt

these public interest benefits.

86. We consequently will grandfather television LMAs entered into

prior to November 5, 1996, conditioned on the Commission's 2004

biennial review. During this initial grandfathering period and during

the pendency of the 2004 review, these LMAs may continue in full force

and effect, and may also be transferred and renewed by the parties,

though the renewing parties and/or transferees take the LMAs subject to

the review of the status of the LMA as part of the 2004 biennial

review. At that time, the Commission will reevaluate these

grandfathered television LMAs, on a case-by-case basis, to examine the

competition, diversity, equities, and public interest factors they

raise and to determine whether these LMAs should continue to be

grandfathered. In order to qualify for permanent grandfathering relief

after 2004, parties to LMAs entered into before November 5, 1996 will

be required to demonstrate that such relief is in the public interest

based upon the biennial review factors described below.

87. We believe that reevaluation of the LMAs is reasonable as the

record shows that many parties entered into television LMAs, and made

substantial investments in these arrangements, with the belief that

they could be renewed or transferred. If any party to an LMA wishes the

Commission to determine the status of its agreement prior to the 2004

biennial review, it may request the Commission to do so at any time

beginning one year after this R&O is published in the Federal Register,

using the biennial review factors noted below, to demonstrate that

continuation of the LMA is in the public interest. (In addition, at any

time the parties to an LMA may seek, just as any other applicant, to

form a duopoly or justify an LMA indefinitely under our new rule and

waiver policies. A showing based on voice counts must meet our new rule

at the time the showing is filed; a showing based on a waiver may be

based on the circumstances existing just prior to the parties entering

into the LMA.) Whether LMA holders obtain a duopoly outright or

permanent grandfathering relief for arrangements that do not comply

with our new TV duopoly rule and waiver policies, such relief will not

be extended to any transfers subsequent to 2004; any transfer of

permanently grandfathered arrangements after that time must meet our

duopoly rule or waiver policies in effect at the time of transfer.

88. As part of the 2004 biennial review, the Commission will

examine the following factors to assist in its review of grandfathered

television LMAs:

Public Interest Factors--The FCC will assess the extent to

which parties, by virtue of their joint operation, have achieved

certain efficiencies allowing them, in turn, to produce specific and

demonstrable benefits to the public. For example, the Commission may

consider, among other things, the following: the extent to which

broadcasters involved have fostered the regulatory goal of promoting

localism, including locally-originated programming, such as news and

public affairs programming; the extent to which the joint operations

have made possible capital investments and technical improvements that

have improved service; the extent to which the joint operations have

increased the amount and investment in children's educational

programming; and the extent to which the joint operations have

otherwise produced specific and demonstrable benefits to the viewing

public;

DTV Conversion--The FCC will evaluate the extent to which

the same-market joint operations are on or ahead of schedule to convert

to DTV and digital service. We will examine the extent to which one

station has enabled the other to convert to digital operations, and

whether joint operation has expedited that conversion, as well as has

produced more over-the-air programming using digital transmission.

Marketplace Conditions--The FCC will evaluate the status

of competition and diversity in the marketplace.

Equities--In considering the appropriateness of

grandfathering beyond the initial five year period, the FCC will take

into account the capital investments the broadcasters involved have

already made to improve the quality of the technical facilities of the

stations involved, and weigh these equities against the competition and

diversity issues involved.

89. Filing Existing LMAs. Those parties with existing LMAs that are

attributable under our new attribution rules are directed to file a

copy of the LMA with the Commission within thirty days of the

publication of this R&O in the Federal Register.

VI. New Applications

90. Applications filed pursuant to this R&O will not be accepted by

the Commission until the effective date of this R&O. We realize that

the rules adopted in this R&O could result in two or more applications

being filed on the same day relating to stations in the same market and

that due to the voice count all applications might not be able to be

granted. We will address how to resolve such conflicts in a subsequent

action.

VII. Conclusion

91. For the reasons discussed, we adopt this R&O revising our local

television ownership rules. We intend by these revisions to improve the

ability of television broadcasters to realize the efficiencies and cost

savings of common station ownership, and to strengthen their potential

to serve the public interest. We believe that our decision strikes the

appropriate balance between common ownership and our fundamental

competition and diversity concerns, and ensures that our television

ownership restrictions appropriately reflect ongoing changes in the

broadcast television industry.

VIII. Administrative Matters

92. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis. This R&O has been

analyzed with respect to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and found

to impose new reporting requirements on

[[Page 50664]]

the public. Implementation of these new reporting requirements will be

subject to approval by the Office of Management and Budget as

prescribed in the Act. The new reporting requirements contained in this

R&O have been submitted to OMB for emergency clearance.

93. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Pursuant to the Regulative

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., the

Commission's Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in this document.

94. Ordering Clauses. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to

the authority contained in sections 4(i) & (j), 303(r), 308, 310 and

403 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 154(i) & (j), 303(r),

308, 310 and 403, as amended, 47 CFR Part 73 is amended as set forth in

the Rule Changes.

95. It is further ordered that, pursuant to the Contract with

America Advancement Act of 1996, the amendment set forth in the Rule

Changes shall be effective November 16, 1999.

96. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of Public

Affairs, Reference Operations Division, shall send a copy of this R&O,

including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

97. It is further ordered that this proceeding is terminated.

98. Additional Information. For addition information concerning

this proceeding, please contact Eric Bash, Mass Media Bureau, (202)

418-2130.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

99. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA''), 5

U.S.C. 603, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') was

incorporated in the 2FNPRM in this proceeding. The Commission sought

written public comment on the proposals in this document, including

comment on the IRFA. The comments received are discussed below. This

present Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``FRFA'') conforms to

the RFA.

I. Need For, and Objectives of, Report and Order

100. In February, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (``1996

Act'') was signed into law. Section 202 of the 1996 Act directed the

Commission to make a number of significant revisions to its broadcast

media ownership rules. Section 202 also requires us to review aspects

of our local ownership rules which were the subject of the TV Ownership

FNPRM in this docket. Specifically, section 202 requires the Commission

to: (1) conduct a rulemaking proceeding concerning the retention,

modification, or elimination of the duopoly rule; and (2) extend the

Top 25 market/30 independent voices one-to-a-market waiver policy to

the Top 50 markets, ``consistent with the public interest, convenience,

and necessity.'' In view of the 1996 Act's directives regarding

broadcast multiple ownership, the Commission in 1996 adopted a 2FNPRM

in this proceeding inviting comment on several issues prompted by the

1996 Act. We seek to foster both competition and diversity in the

changing video marketplace, and this R&O modifies the local ownership

rules consistent with these goals.

II. Significant Issues Raised by the Public in Response to the Initial

Analysis

101. Media Access Project, et al. (``MAP et al.'') submitted the

only set of comments that was filed directly in response to the IRFA

contained in the 2FNPRM.

III. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which

the Rules Will Apply

102. The amended rules will affect commercial television and radio

broadcast licensees, permittees, and potential licensees. MAP asserts

that the estimate contained in the IRFA of the number of broadcast

radio and television licensees that qualify as ``small entities'' is

flawed.

1. Definition of a ``Small Business''

103. Under the RFA, small entities may include small organizations,

small businesses, and small governmental jurisdictions. 5 U.S.C.

601(6). The RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601(3) defines the term ``small business'' as

having the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under

the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632. A small business concern is one

which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in

its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria

established by the Small Business Administration (``SBA'').

104. The Small Business Administration defines a television

broadcasting station that has no more than $10.5 million in annual

receipts as a small business, (13 CFR 121.201, Standard Industrial Code

(SIC) 4833 (1996). Television broadcasting stations consist of

establishments primarily engaged in broadcasting visual programs by

television to the public, except cable and other pay television

services. Included in this industry are commercial, religious,

educational, and other television stations. Also included are

establishments primarily engaged in television broadcasting and which

produce taped television program materials. Separate establishments

primarily engaged in producing taped television program materials are

classified under another SIC number.

105. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting station that has no more

than $5 million in annual receipts as a small business. A radio

broadcasting station is an establishment primarily engaged in

broadcasting aural programs by radio to the public. Included in this

industry are commercial religious, educational, and other radio

stations. Radio broadcasting stations which primarily are engaged in

radio broadcasting and which produce ratio program materials are

similarly included. However, radio stations which are separate

establishments and are primarily engaged in producing radio program

material are classified under another SIC number.

106. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the statutory definition of a

small business applies ``unless an agency after consultation with the

Office of Advocacy of the SBA and after opportunity for public comment,

establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate

to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the

Federal Register.''

2. Issues in Applying the Definition of a ``Small Business''

107. As discussed below, we could not precisely apply the foregoing

definition of ``small business'' in developing our estimates of the

number of small entities to which the rules will apply. Our estimates

reflect our best judgments based on the data available to us.

108. An element of the definition of ``small business'' is that the

entity not be dominant in its field of operation. We are unable at this

time to define or quantify the criteria that would establish whether a

specific radio or television station is dominant in its field of

operation. Accordingly, the estimates that follow of small businesses

to which the new rules will apply do not exclude any radio or

television station from the definition of a small business on this

basis and are therefore overinclusive to that extent. An additional

element of the definition of ``small business'' is that the entity must

be independently owned and operated. As discussed further below, we

could not fully apply this criterion, and our estimates of small

businesses to which the rules may apply

[[Page 50665]]

may be overinclusive to this extent. The SBA's general size standards

are developed taking into account these two statutory criteria. This

does not preclude us from taking these factors into account in making

our estimates of the numbers of small entities.

109. With respect to applying the revenue cap, the SBA has defined

``annual receipts'' specifically in 13 CFR 121.104, and its

calculations include an averaging process. We do not currently require

submission of financial data from licensees that we could use in

applying the SBA's definition of a small business. Thus, for purposes

of estimating the number of small entities to which the rules apply, we

are limited to considering the revenue data that are publicly

available, and the revenue data on which we rely may not correspond

completely with the SBA definition of annual receipts.

110. Under SBA criteria for determining annual receipts, if a

concern has acquired an affiliate or been acquired as an affiliate

during the applicable averaging period for determining annual receipts,

the annual receipts in determining size status include the receipts of

both firms. 13 CFR 121.104(d)(1). The SBA defines affiliation in 13 CFR

121.103. In this context, the SBA's definition of affiliate is

analogous to our attribution rules. Generally, under the SBA's

definition, concerns are affiliates of each other when one concern

controls or has the power to control the other, or a third party or

parties controls or has the power to control both. 13 CFR

121.103(a)(1). The SBA considers factors such as ownership, management,

previous relationships with or ties to another concern, and contractual

relationships, in determining whether affiliation exists. 13 CFR

121.103(a)(2). Instead of making an independent determination of

whether television stations were affiliated based on SBA's definitions,

we relied on the databases available to us to provide us with that

information.

3. Estimates Based on Census Data

111. The rules adopted in this R&O will apply to full service

television and radio stations.

112. There were 1,509 television stations operating in the nation

in 1992. That number has remained fairly constant as indicated by the

approximately 1,594 operating television broadcasting stations in the

nation as of June 1999. For 1992 the number of television stations that

produced less than $10.0 million in revenue was 1,155 establishments.

Thus, the new rules will affect approximately 1,594 television

stations; approximately 77%, or 1,227 of those stations are considered

small businesses. These estimates may overstate the number of small

entities since the revenue figures on which they are based do not

include or aggregate revenues from non-television affiliated companies.

113. The new rule will also affect radio stations. The 1992 Census

indicates that 96 percent (5,861 of 6,127) of radio station

establishments produced less than $5 million in revenue in 1992.

Official Commission records indicate that 11,334 individual radio

stations were operating in 1992. As of June 1999, official Commission

records indicate that 12,560 radio stations are currently operating.

IV. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other

Compliance Requirements

114. The R&O imposes compliance requirements. Pursuant to the R&O,

applicants will be required to file with the Commission upon the

effective date of the rules showings to convert conditional waivers to

permanent license grants under the new rules or waiver standards. In

addition, licensees with existing local marketing agreements (LMAs)

that are attributable under the revised rules will be required to file

a copy of the LMA with the Commission within thirty days of publication

of the R&O in the Federal Register.

V. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small

Entities and Significant Alternatives Considered

115. We believe that our revised TV duopoly rule, radio/TV cross-

ownership rule, and related waiver policies strike the appropriate

balance between allowing broadcast stations to realize the efficiencies

of combined operations, and furthering our policy goals of competition

and diversity. Both of our revised rules and their associated waiver

policies allow small stations to reduce expenses through shared

operations, but at the same time protect them from acquisition that

could eliminate their voice, and from the exercise of undue market

power.

116. In addition to having amended the geographic scope of our TV

duopoly rule, we have also modified the rule to permit common ownership

of two stations in the same DMA if at least eight independently owned

and operated full power TV stations (commercial and noncommercial) will

remain post-merger, and both of the stations are not in the top four-

ranked stations in the DMA. The new rule ensures that small stations

may combine operations, reduce expenses, and perhaps diversify

programming. At the same time, both the market rank and the voice count

components of the rule further our competition goal and protect small

stations from their competitors. The market rank test ensures that the

two largest stations cannot combine to dominate and exercise market

power in the advertising and programming markets in which TV stations

compete; the voice count test ensures that more than eight competitors

must exist in the market before any two of them may combine to increase

their market share. Both components of the new rule also further our

diversity goal and preserve small stations in markets with less than

eight voices.

117. We have revised our radio/TV cross-ownership rule to permit

common ownership of one or two TV stations and up to six radio stations

if twenty independent voices will remain post-merger; one or two TV

stations and up to four radio stations if at least ten voices will

remain post-merger; and one or two TV stations and one radio station

regardless of the number of voices that will remain post-merger. As

with our amended TV duopoly rule, the modified radio/TV cross-ownership

rule will allow stations, including small stations, to realize

economies of scale, but at the same time ensure that no market will

become concentrated to such an extent that any one or series of

combinations will dominate the markets in which broadcasters compete,

or monopolize the media and sources of information for their audiences.

118. Our TV duopoly waiver policies, based on a showing of a

``failed'' station, a ``failing'' station, and the construction of an

authorized but as yet unbuilt station, and our radio/TV cross-ownership

waiver policies, based on a showing of a ``failed'' station, likewise

accommodate small stations, while protecting our competition and

diversity goals. Each of these waiver policies was designed to ensure

that only truly financially distressed, which are typically smaller,

stations, can benefit from them. The waiver policies also ensure that

more financially successful in-market stations, which are typically

larger and likely would value same-market broadcast assets more highly

than out-of-market stations, cannot foreclose out-of-market buyers. The

in-market buyer must demonstrate that it is the only purchaser ready,

willing, and able to operate the station, and that sale to an out-of-

market buyer would result in an artificially depressed price.

119. We also believe that our grandfathering policies for

conditional

[[Page 50666]]

radio/TV cross-ownership waivers, and TV LMAs, may help small stations.

For example, the record suggested that TV LMAs may have helped smaller,

struggling stations to remain on or return to the air, and to diversity

and expand their programming. The R&O grandfathers all LMAs entered

into prior to November 5, 1996, and therefore permits them to remain in

full force and effect, subject to further review in the Commission's

biennial review in 2004.

120. For the above reasons, we believe that the Commission has

taken steps not only to reduce the economic impact on small entities,

but also to assist them realize the benefits of common operations, and

to protect them from undue market power.

VI. Report to Congress

121. The Commission will send a copy of this R&O, including this

FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the Small Business

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

In addition, the Commission will send a copy of this R&O, including

FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business

Administration. A copy of this R&O and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will

also be published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. 604(b).

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73

Television broadcasting.

Federal Communications Commission.

Magalie Roman Salas,

Secretary.

Rule Changes

For the reason discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communication

Commission amends 47 CFR part 73 as follows:

PART 73--RADIO BROADCAST SERVICES

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334 and 336.

2. Section 73.3555 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c)

and Note 7 to read as follows:

Sec. 73.3555 Multiple ownership.

* * * * *

(b) Local television multiple ownership rule. An entity may

directly or indirectly own, operate, or control two television stations

licensed in the same Designated Market Area (DMA) (as determined by

Nielsen Media Research or any successor entity) only under one or more

of the following conditions:

(1) The Grade B contours of the stations (as determined by

Sec. 73.684 of this part) do not overlap; or

(2)(i) At the time the application to acquire or construct the

station(s) is filed, at least one of the stations is not ranked among

the top four stations in the DMA, based on the most recent all-day

(9:00 a.m.-midnight) audience share, as measured by Nielsen Media

Research or by any comparable professional, accepted audience ratings

service; and

(ii) At least 8 independently owned and operating full-power

commercial and noncommercial TV stations would remain post-merger in

the DMA in which the communities of license of the TV stations in

question are located. In areas where there is no Nielsen DMA, count the

TV stations present in an area that would be the functional equivalent

of a TV market.

(c) Radio-television cross ownership rule. (1) This rule is

triggered when:

(i) The predicted or measured 1 mV/m contour of an existing or

proposed FM station (computed in accordance with Sec. 73.313 of this

part) encompasses the entire community of license of an existing or

proposed commonly owned TV broadcast station(s), or the Grade A

contour(s) of the TV broadcast station(s) (computed in accordance with

Sec. 73.684) encompasses the entire community of license of the FM

station; or

(ii) The predicted or measured 2 mV/m groundwave contour of an

existing or proposed AM station (computed in accordance with

Sec. 73.183 or Sec. 73.386), encompasses the entire community of

license of an existing or proposed commonly owned TV broadcast

station(s), or the Grade A contour(s) of the TV broadcast station(s)

(computed in accordance with Sec. 73.684) encompass(es) the entire

community of license of the AM station.

(2) An entity may directly or indirectly own, operate, or control

up to two commercial TV stations (if permitted by paragraph (b) of this

section, the local television multiple ownership rule) and 1 commercial

radio station situated as described above in paragraph (1) of this

section. An entity may not exceed these numbers, except as follows:

(i) If at least 20 independently owned media voices would remain in

the market post-merger, an entity can directly or indirectly own,

operate, or control up to:

(A) Two commercial TV and six commercial radio stations (to the

extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, the local radio

multiple ownership rule); or

(B) One commercial TV and seven commercial radio stations (to the

extent that an entity would be permitted to own two commercial TV and

six commercial radio stations under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A) of this

section, and to the extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section,

the local radio multiple ownership rule).

(ii) If at least 10 independently owned media voices would remain

in the market post-merger, an entity can directly or indirectly own,

operate, or control up to two commercial TV and four commercial radio

stations (to the extent permitted by paragraph (a) of this section, the

local radio multiple ownership rule).

(3) To determine how many media voices would remain in the market,

count the following:

(i) TV stations: independently owned full power operating broadcast

TV stations within the DMA of the TV station's (or stations') community

(or communities) of license;

(ii) Radio stations:

(A) (1) Independently owned operating primary broadcast radio

stations that are in the radio metro market (as defined by Arbitron or

another nationally recognized audience rating service) of:

(i) The TV station's (or stations') community (or communities) of

license; or

(ii) The radio station's (or stations') community (or communities)

of license; and

(2) Independently owned out-of-market broadcast radio stations with

a minimum share as reported by Arbitron or another nationally

recognized audience rating service.

(B) When a proposed combination involves stations in different

radio markets, the voice requirement must be met in each market; the

radio stations of different radio metro markets may not be counted

together.

(C) In areas where there is no radio metro market, count the radio

stations present in an area that would be the functional equivalent of

a radio market.

(iii) Newspapers: English-language newspapers that are published at

least four days a week within the TV station's DMA and that have a

circulation exceeding 5% of the households in the DMA; and

(iv) One cable system: if cable television is generally available

to households in the DMA. Cable television counts as only one voice in

the DMA, regardless of how many individual cable systems operate in the

DMA.

* * * * *

[[Page 50667]]

Note 7: The Commission will entertain applications to waive the

restrictions in paragraph (b) and (c) of this section (the TV

duopoly and TV-radio cross-ownership rules) on a case-by-case basis.

In each case, we will require a showing that the in-market buyer is

the only entity ready, willing, and able to operate the station,

that sale to an out-of-market applicant would result in an

artificially depressed price, and that the waiver applicant does not

already directly or indirectly own, operate, or control interest in

two television stations within the relevant DMA. One way to satisfy

these criteria would be to provide an affidavit from an independent

broker affirming that active and serious efforts have been made to

sell the permit, and that no reasonable offer from an entity outside

the market has been received. We will entertain waiver requests as

follows:

(1) If one of the broadcast stations involved is a ``failed''

station that has not been in operation due to financial distress for

at least four consecutive months immediately prior to the

application, or is a debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy or

insolvency proceeding at the time of the application.

(2) For paragraph (b) of this section only, if one of the

television stations involved is a ``failing'' station that has an

all-day audience share of no more than four per cent; the station

has had negative cash flow for three consecutive years immediately

prior to the application; and consolidation of the two stations

would result in tangible and verifiable public interest benefits

that outweigh any harm to competition and diversity.

(3) For paragraph (b) of this section only, if the combination

will result in the construction of an unbuilt station. The permittee

of the unbuilt station must demonstrate that it has made reasonable

efforts to construct but has been unable to do so.

* * * * *

[FR Doc. 99-23696 Filed 9-16-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.