Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department)

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to amend its

commercial space transportation licensing regulations to add licensing

and safety requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date,

commercial launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges

under safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To

enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by

a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific

licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether

that site located on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed

rules would provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and

safety requirements to protect the public from the risks associated

with activities at a launch site.

A separate rulemaking will address licensing and safety

requirements for operation of a reentry site.

DATES: Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or

before September 23, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or

delivered, in duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets,

Docket No. FAA-1999-5833, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Room Plaza 401,

Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be sent electronically to the

following Internet address: [email protected] Comments may be filed

and/or examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays

except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and

Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal

Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;

telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief

Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;

telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by

submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.

Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic

impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this notice are

also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost

estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory docket or notice

number and be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket address

specified above.

All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each

substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will

be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection

before and after the comment closing date.

All comments received on or before the closing date will be

considered by the FAA before taking action on this proposed rulemaking.

Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable, and

consistent with statutory deadlines. The proposals contained in this

Notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice must include a pre-addressed,

stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement

is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.'' The postcard will be

date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem

and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section

of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-

3339), the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board

service (telephone: 202-512-1661), or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking

Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: (800) 322-2722 or

(202) 267-5948). Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://

www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's

webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently

published rulemaking documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request

to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1,

800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202)

267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket

number of this NPRM.

Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future

NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular

No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that

describes the application procedure.

Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:

I. Background

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

C. Current Practices

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations

A. License and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch

Site

B. Explosive Site Plan Review

C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

D. Launch Site Location Review

E. License Conditions

F. Operational Responsibilities

III. Part Analysis

IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C.

Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space

Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the

Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a

lunch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States.

49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this

responsibility in the interests of public health and safety, safety of

property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the

United States 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space

Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the

commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the

Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating

private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on

September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the

lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space

transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated

commercial space licensing authority to the Federal

[[Page 34317]]

Aviation Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the

operation of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing

regulations at 14 CFR Ch. III. The commercial launch licensing

regulations were issued in April 1988, when no commercial launches had

yet taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing

process intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while

ensuring public safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue

to evaluate and, when necessary, reshape its program in response to

growth, innovation, and diversity in this critically important

industry.'' ``Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing Regulations,''

53 FR 11,004, 11,006 (Apr. 4, 1988).

Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach

to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At

the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take

place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and

flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development

of commercial launch sites. The Federal launch ranges provided

commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support,

including flight safety services.

Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to

simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The

regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on

launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has

only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

The commercial space transportation industry continues to grow and

diversify. Between the first licensed commercial launch in August 1989,

and June 1999, 113 licensed launches have taken place from five

different federal launch ranges, one from a launch site operated by a

licensed launch site operator and one has taken place from Spain. The

vehicles have included traditional orbital expendable launch vehicles,

such as the Atlas, Titan, and Delta, sub-orbital launch vehicles such

as the Starfire, new expendable launch vehicles using traditional

launch techniques, such as Athena and Conestoga, and unique vehicles,

such as the air-borne Pegasus. In a notice of proposed rulemaking

issued on March 19, 1997, 62 FR 13216, the FAA discussed how the

commercial launch industry has evolved from one relying on traditional

orbital and suborbital launch vehicles to one with a diverse mix of

vehicles using new technology and new concepts. A number of

international ventures involving U.S. companies have also formed,

further adding to this diversity.

Development in cost savings and innovation are not confined to the

launch industry. The launch site industry, the focus of this NPRM, has

also made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on

line with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective

facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When

the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based

their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by

the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported

licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral

Air Station in Florida (CCAS), and the Western Range located at

Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the

U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA;

White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S.

Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy.

Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch

infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to

obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including

radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch

services.

Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal

launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites

become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first

license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to

operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB.

Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport

Florida Authority (SEA) received an FAA license to operate Launch

Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight

Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight

Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently,

Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to

operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island,

Alaska. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC)

proposes to operate Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) adjacent to the

White Sands Missile Range as a site for reusable launch vehicles. It is

evident from this list that federal launch ranges still play a role in

the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. California

Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal launch

range property.

Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site

located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a

launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its

FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply

with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety

rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of

the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to

satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when

launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's

responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance.

In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent

upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and

flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a

commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been

planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance

concerning the information that might be requested as part of an

application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to

these requests. DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation

(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for

Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site

operators. The guidelines describe the information that DOT, and now

the FAA, expects from an applicant for a license to operate a

commercial launch site. This information includes launch site location

information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations

document that governs how the facility should be operated to ensure

public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the

guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application

that are critical to assuring the suitability of the launch site

location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing

safe operations.

The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for

potential developers of launch sites pending this

[[Page 34318]]

rulemaking, and the guidelines describe the information that the FAA

requests of an applicant as part of its application for a license to

operate a launch site. The pace of development of the launch site

industry has resulted in the FAA describing the process and

requirements for applications for launch site operator licenses under

the guidelines. As noted above, the FAA issued its first license to

operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International for the

operation of California Spaceport. The FAA issued this license under

its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch.

III to license the operation of a launch site. Because the operation of

California Spaceport as a launch site occurs at a federal launch range,

the U.S. Air Force is expected to play a significant role in California

Spaceports's safety process. In fact, the FAA was able to review the

Spaceport Systems International application expeditiously because the

applicant certified its intention to observe the safety requirements

currently applied by the Western Range and contained in ``Eastern and

Western Range 127-1. Range Safety Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar.

1995).\1\ The FAA determined that applicant compliance with EWR 127-1,

together with Air Force approval of other important elements of the

operation of a launch site protected public health and safety and the

safety of property. In general, the FAA deems the compliance by a

licensed launch site operator with these requirements in combination

with other safety practices imposed by a federal launch range as

acceptable for purposes of protecting the public and property from

hazards associated with launch site activities at a licensed launch

site operator's facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum

of Agreement with Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and

Space Administration regarding safety oversight of licensed launch site

operators located on federal launch ranges.

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\1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version

of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/45SW/.

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Until these proposed rules become final, the guidelines provide the

only published criteria for guiding a prospective license applicant and

in identifying the criteria that the FAA uses in determining whether a

proposed commercial launch site is acceptable.

Comparison of the Guidelines and the Proposed Regulations

The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect once the

proposed regulations are issued as final rules. A comparison of some of

the similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The

FAA will issue a license to operate a launch site under either the

guidelines or the proposed rules only if the operation of the launch

site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the safety of

property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the

United States. The guidelines are flexible and are intended to identify

the major elements of an application and lead the applicant through the

application process with the FAA. The proposed rules would codify the

requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.

The guidelines and the proposed rules share some common elements,

namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the

FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national

security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in

detail below, in the description of the proposed regulations. Under the

proposed regulations, the information requirements for these reviews

remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.

A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch

site is an important component of both the guidelines and the proposed

regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review,

the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request

an applicant to provide information regarding geographic

characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological

environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an

applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site

location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological

characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local

commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches

such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An

applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general

impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly

land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety

analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where

applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to

launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment,

the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding

temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature

inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch

site operations. Under the guidelines, an application should include

the frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in

wind or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.

In contrast, the proposed rules would require an applicant to use

specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch site

location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, including

orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital expendable launch

vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed launch point on

the launch site must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle that

the applicant wishes to have launched from the launch point. An

applicant would be provided with a choice of methods to develop a

flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or guided

sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of impact

dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of impact

dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, no

additional analysis would be required. Otherwise, an applicant would be

required to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the

public from a representative launch would not exceed a casualty

expectation (Ec) of 30 x 10-6. The FAA would

review the applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was

correct, and would approve the launch site location if the

Ec risk criteria were met.

Under either the guidelines or the proposed regulations, little or

no launch site location review would be needed if the applicant

proposed to locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The

fundamental purpose of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--

to assure that a launch may potentially take place safely from the

proposed launch site--has been amply demonstrated at each of the

ranges. Exceptions may occur if a prospective launch site operator

plans to use a launch site at a federal launch range for launches

markedly different from past federal launch range launches, or if an

applicant proposes a new launch point from which no launch has taken

place.

The guidelines and proposed regulations differ markedly in their

approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the

guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a

comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive

safety is part of the analysis

[[Page 34319]]

and safety plan. In contrast, the proposed regulations require the

submission of an explosive site plan, but impose fewer operational

ground safety responsibilities on a launch site operator. For flight

safety, under the guidelines and proposed rules, a launch site operator

license contains minimal flight safety responsibilities. The FAA

assigns almost all responsibility for flight safety and significant

ground safety responsibility to a licensed launch operator. Extensive

ground and flight safety requirements will accompany a launch license.

This does not mean a launch site operator cannot offer flight safety

services or equipment to its customers. However, the adequacy of such

service and equipment typically will be assessed in the FAA's review of

a launch license application.

II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations

The proposed regulations specify who must obtain a license to

operate a launch site, application requirements and licensee

responsibilities. Because a launch licensee's license covers ground

operations as well as the flight of a launch vehicle, a launch operator

is not required to obtain a license to operate a launch site. The FAA

is aware that a launch operator may select a launch site for its own

launches. In that event, a launch operator requires a license to

launch. Only if a prospective launch site operator proposes to offer

its launch site to others, need that person obtain a license to operate

a launch site.

By means of operational, location, and site layout constraints, the

FAA intends its regulations to ensure that the public is not harmed by

launches that take place from a launch site whose operation the FAA has

licensed. Additionally, in the course of a license review, the FAA will

ensure that environmental and international obligations are addressed,

and that national security interests are reviewed by the appropriate

agencies. To further these objectives, the FAA proposes to create in 14

CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to contain the requirements for

obtaining and possessing a license to operate a launch site. The FAA's

proposed part 420 would require an applicant to obtain certain FAA

approvals in order to receive a license to operate a launch site. These

required approvals consist of policy, explosive site plan, and location

approvals. Environmental review may precede or be concurrent with the

licensing process.

The grant of a license to operate a launch site will not guarantee

that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch

proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA

review and licensing.

A. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

The FAA's proposed approach to licensing the operation of a launch

site would focus on four areas of concern critical to ensuring that

operation of a launch site would not jeopardize public health and

safety, the safety of property or foreign policy and other U.S.

interests. These reviews would encompass the environment, policy,

siting of explosives, and site location. Under the proposed

regulations, an applicant would be required to provide the FAA with

information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews and

determinations. An applicant would also be required to submit an

explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard

facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public

areas.

In the case of launch site location approval, the proposed

regulations would provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA

that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing

public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location

approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to

operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the

applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by

the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a

different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact

that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point

at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that would

be accomplished by the FAA's proposed location review: Namely, a

showing that launch may occur safely from the site.

The FAA is proposing to impose specific ground safety

responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and will require

that an applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A

launch site operator licensee's responsibilities would include:

Preventing unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing

the public and customers to visit the site; informing customers of

limitations on use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous

activities conducted by customers; and arranging for the clearing of

air and sea routes and notifying adjacent property owners and local

jurisdictions of the pending flight of a launch vehicle. Part 420 would

also contain launch site operator responsibilities with regard to

recordkeeping, license transfer, compliance monitoring, accident

investigation and explosives. Other federal government agencies have

jurisdiction over a number of ground safety issues, and the FAA does

not intend to duplicate their efforts.\2\ \3\ The FAA will revisit

ground safety issues in its development of rules for launches from non-

federal launch sites.

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\2\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a

role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA

regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product,

help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note

is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous

chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended

to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly

hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or

explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks

associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These

requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA

regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety

from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part

68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner

or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold

quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the

owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program

to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that

occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite

consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case

releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-

case release would reach the public, the source must develop and

implement a prevention program and an emergency response program.

Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to

conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage

of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which

existing systems could fail and result in accidental release.

\3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.

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Environmental

Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action

for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321

et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental

impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to

determine whether these activities will significantly affect the

quality of the environment. Although the FAA is responsible under NEPA

regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental

impact statement, the proposed rules continue to require a license

applicant to provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an

analysis in accordance with the requirements of the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural

Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures

for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order

[[Page 34320]]

1050.1D. An applicant will typically engage a contractor with

specialized experience in the NEPA process to conduct the study

underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis. This rulemaking marks no

change in the environmental requirements attendant to obtaining a

license to operate a launch site.

The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review,

including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the

assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has

defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The

FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)

may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an

environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is

necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at

a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future

use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an

environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable

alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as

interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a

site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable

alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental

process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will

not issue a license if an environmental review in accordance with all

applicable regulations and guidelines is not concluded.

Policy

Under current practice, the FAA conducts a policy review of an

application for a license to operate a launch site to determine whether

operation of the proposed launch site would jeopardize national

security, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the

United States. The FAA conducts the policy review in coordination with

other federal agencies that have responsibility for national and

international interests. The Department of Defense is consulted to

determine whether a license application presents any issues affecting

national security. The Department of State reviews an application for

issues affecting foreign policy or international obligations. Other

agencies, such as NASA, are consulted as appropriate. By this

rulemaking, the regulations would require an applicant to supply

information relevant to the FAA's policy approval, including, for

example, identification of foreign ownership of the applicant. The FAA

will obtain other information required for a policy review from

information submitted by an applicant in other parts of the

application. During a policy review, the FAA would consult with an

applicant regarding any question or issues before making a final

determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any

questions before completion of the review.

B. Explosive Site Plan Review

Proposed subpart B would establish criteria and procedures for the

siting of facilities at a launch site where solid and liquid

propellants are to be located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads

for flight. Subpart B also would establish application procedures for

an applicant to demonstrate compliance with the siting criteria. The

requirements in subpart B are commonly referred to as quantity-distance

(Q-D) requirements because they provide minimum separation distances

between explosive hazard facilities, surrounding facilities and

locations where the public may be present on the basis of the type and

quantity of explosive material to be located within the area. Minimum

prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public

from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an

explosion does not reach the public.

An applicant would provide the FAA an explosive site plan that

demonstrates compliance with the proposed Q-D requirements. the FAA

must approve this plan, so applicants are cautioned not to begin

construction of facilities requiring an explosives site plan until

obtaining FAA approval. Note also that the proposed Q-D requirements do

not address any toxic hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through

procedural means, and the FAA will address toxic hazards in a separate

rulemaking. If a toxic hazard is a controlling factor in siting, it

should be considered along with the explosives hazards when the site

plan is prepared.

The FAA proposes to adopt the explosive safety practice in use at

federal launch ranges today, namely, the application of quantity-

distance criteria. Prescribed distances provide for a separation of an

explosive source from people and property that may otherwise be exposed

to explosive events. These criteria have long been used to mitigate

explosive hazards to an acceptable level. Q-D criteria address only the

consequences. The underlying assumption of quantity-distance criteria

is that an accidental explosion will occur for any explosive material

operation.

The quantity-distance criteria in the proposed regulations are a

critical mitigation measure required in a launch site operator

application to provide the public protection from ground operations at

a launch site. The proposed rules have other mitigation measures,

including launch site operator responsibilities that address accident

prevention measures, and procedural requirements to protect visitors

and other launch site customers on the launch site. Any other

procedural requirements necessary to protect the public from explosive

hazards will be the responsibility of a launch operator under a launch

license. The scope of a launch license encompasses ground activities,

including the explosive operations involved with the handling and

assembly of launch vehicles at a launch site.

The requirement to submit an explosive site plan to the FAA would

not apply to an applicant applying for a license to operate a launch

site at a federal launch range. Federal launch ranges have separate

rules which are either identical or similar to the rules proposed, or

permit mitigation measures which otherwise ensure safety.

What follows is a discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the

reason the FAA is proposing explosive siting criteria, current Q-D

standards, the FAA's proposed use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other

approaches to explosive safety, application of ATF, DOD or NASA

standards, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid

and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads.

Explosive Hazards on a Launch Site

The hazards associated with launch vehicle pre-flight operations

involving large quantities of propellants may typically be broken down

into phases, including storage, handling, assembly, checkout, ordnance

installation, propellant loading, and final launch preparations. Each

of these are covered below, for liquid and solid propellants.

During storage, liquid propellant hazards include leaking or

ruptured propellant tanks causes by loss of pressure or mechanical

failure. If fuels and oxidizers are stored separately any potentially

harmful event would be limited to fire or tank pressure rupture. Solid

propellant hazards include accidental ordnance initiation caused by

stray electrical energy or dropping a motor with sufficient impact

force to initiate the propellant. Long term storage of solid rocket

motors, although not within the scope of this

[[Page 34321]]

rulemaking,\3\ presents its own unique hazards. As solid rocket motors

age, chemical changes in the binder within the motor cause ammonium

perchlorate to form on the outside of the motor. This is a hazardous

condition. The shelf life of solid rocket motors can be extended by a

carefully controlled environment in the storage facility.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The handling phase may include the transfer of liquid propellants

from one holding tank to another. Explosive reactions may occur if

fuels and oxidizers mix due to under or overpressurization, or if

improper connections cause propellant tanks, transfer lines, or

fittings to leak or rupture. If fuels and oxidizers are handled

separately no explosive reactions should occur. Hazardous handling

operations of solid rocket motors includes transporting and lifting

with cranes at the launch pad or other facility. Any impact during

these activities could cause propellant ignition.

During assembly, liquid propellant operations include the assembly

and encapsulation of spacecraft and upper stages. Assembly and

encapsulation may involve loading hypergolic propellants such as

nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) and hydrazine. Tank

punctures, impacts caused by lifting, and over- or under-pressurization

could cause fuels and oxidizers to come in contact with one another,

causing fire and fragmentation hazards. This phase includes the final

assembly of solid rocket motors at a launch pad or other facility. Any

motor impact on the ground during these activities could cause

propellant ignition.

Checkout at a launch pad may involve a number of hazards due to the

presence of solid propellant and hypergolic propellant stages. Any

accident causing interaction between hypergolic and solid propellants

can result in fires, pressure ruptures, and propulsive flight.

During ordnance installation, inadvertent initiation of electro-

explosive devices (EEDs) is possible. This does not pose a threat to

the public (although it does to the vehicle and personnel) because EEDs

have a small quantity of explosive and are not, by design, capable of

detonating propellants.

The main hazard during propellant loading is over or under-

pressurization of liquid propellant tanks, which may cause major spills

of fuels and oxidizers. These events could lead to significant

explosive yield, which is the energy released by an explosion.

Final launch preparations, which begin just prior to flight,

involve a fully fueled launch vehicle. Systems are switched to internal

power, and liquid propellant systems are brought to flight pressure. A

mishap here could lead to significant explosive yield. The explosive

yield of a launch vehicle exploding on a launch pad is based on shock

impact for solid propellants, and non-dynamic mixing of liquid

propellants by, for example, the failure or interior bulkheads in the

launch vehicle.

Reason for Proposing Explosive Siting Criteria

After careful consideration, the FAA decided it had to propose

explosive siting criteria to protect the public from explosive hazards

associated with the operation of a launch site. Although the FAA places

much of the responsibility for safety of hazardous ground operations on

the launch operator, the FAA believes that the siting requirements

would be better addressed by a launch site operator. This is because

the siting requirements will more efficiently be satisfied prior to

construction of launch site facilities rather than afterwards. The FAA

does not intend to duplicate or supercede existing regulatory

frameworks. Although both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have

regulations on explosives, neither provides all the quantity-distance

criteria applicable to launch site necessary to protect the public.\4\

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\4\ Another agency, the Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA), DOT, has regulations for the commercial

shipment of explosives (and other hazardous material) by rail, motor

vehicle, cargo aircraft and ship within the United States. The

regulations are found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal

Regulations.

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ATF has jurisdiction over the storage of commercial explosives in

order to provide for public safety. The storage requirements in 27 CFR

part 55, Commerce in Explosives, include construction, separation

distances, and some storage compatibility provisions. They also cover

items such as licensing, records, and other administrative procedures.

Two gaps in coverage require FAA involvement, namely, the handling

of explosives and the treatment of liquid bi-propellants. In the first

instance, ATF regulations are limited to storage, not the use or

handling of an explosive. Many of the activities that occur on a launch

site will not constitute storage. These activities include moving or

handling solid rocket motors and other ordnance for the purpose of

preparing a launch vehicle for flight, and the build-up and checkout of

a launch vehicle on a launch pad. The FAA's proposed regulations are

required to ensure the safety of the public from these activities.

Additionally, ATF regulations only address solid explosives and liquid

mono-propellants. Large quantities of liquid by-propellants are often

used on existing launch sites, and many of these bi-propellants pose an

explosive hazard to the public. The FAA is proposing rules to ensure

the safe use and storage of liquid bi-propellants.

OSHA explosives requirements are contained in 29 CFR 1910.109,

Explosives and Blasting Agents. These requirements apply to the

manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of

explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics. OSHA regulations do not

address public safety. For example, 29 CFR 1910.109 only includes Q-D

requirements for the separation of magazines from each other. OSHA

requirements do not address public areas such as inhabited buildings,

passenger railways, and public highways. The FAA believes Q-D

requirements that adequately separate the public from the effects of an

explosion are necessary to protect the public.

The FAA recognizes that procedural measures may also be employed to

achieve explosive safety. For example, if two customers of a launch

site operator intend to conduct explosive handling operations in

adjacent facilities that are not sited for public area distances, a

launch site operator may schedule their operations at different times

and keep one facility vacant to maintain safety. A licensee who

proposed such measures as a substitute for the siting criteria proposed

in this rulemaking would have to anticipate license terms and

conditions that achieve an equivalent level for safety.

Current Q-D Standards

Current standards effectively mitigate explosive hazards on federal

launch ranges. The FAA, therefore, studied these standards in order to

adopt the most relevant parts in its proposed Q-D standards. DOD, NASA,

and, for storage, AFT, have explosive standards designed to protect the

public.

The DOD standard, ``DOD STD 6055.9, DOD Ammunition and Explosives

Safety Standards,'' (Aug. 1997), is the standard used for explosive

siting on DOD launch sites and for commercial launch sites located on

DOD property. DOD 6055.9-STD defines general explosive safety criteria

for use throughout the DOD, and

[[Page 34322]]

establishes protection criteria for personnel and assets such as

facilities, equipment, and munitions. The DOD standard provides

quantity-distance criteria to protect against overpressure and

fragments, and permissible exposure levels to protect against thermal

hazards.

The Q-D criteria in DOD STD 6055.90 constitute a refinement of the

American Table of Distances (ATD), originally published in 1910 by the

Institute of Makers of Explosives. Authors of the ATD criteria

acknowledged very early that listed separation distances do not provide

absolute safety. The magnitude of the hazard is simply mitigated to a

level the ATD authors deemed to be acceptable. Because of this, the FAA

encourages license applicants to use greater distances where

practicable.

DOD STD 6055.9 also provides information relating to the

construction and siting of facilities that are potential explosive

sites or that may be exposed to the damaging effects of explosions. The

effects of potential explosions may be altered significantly by

construction features that limit the amount of explosives involved,

attenuate resultant blast overpressure or thermal radiation, and reduce

the quantity and range of hazardous fragments and debris. DOD also

includes additional criteria for electrical safety and lightning.

ATF also adopted the ATD in its approach to facility siting. ATF

regulations provide procedural and substantive requirements regarding,

in relevant part, the issuance of user permits and the storage of

explosive materials. AFT specifies tables of distances for high

explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents. The tables governing

high explosives and low explosives are very pertinent to launch site

operations.

As noted, the scope of operations within a launch site goes beyond

the on-site receipt, transfer and storage of explosives within ATF

jurisdiction. A launch site may have a number of launch vehicle and

payload customers on site who posses liquid and solid propellants that

are being used for incorporation into a launch vehicle or payload.

NASA's safety standards and policy for operations involving

explosives are contained in ``Safety Standard for Explosives,

Propellants, and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug. 12, 1993) (NASA

Standard). This document contains a uniform set of standards for all

NASA facilities engaged in the development, manufacture, handling,

storage, transportation, processing, or testing of explosives. Like the

DOD standard, the NASA standard contains guidelines and standards for

explosives operations in order to safeguard not only the public, but

personnel and property. It covers not only Q-D criteria, but personnel

training, operating procedures, and other policies such as the use of

all available advances in protective construction to provide the safety

work environment to prevent or minimize the exposure of personnel and

facilities to explosives hazards when performing NASA program

activities.

FAA's Proposed Use of NASA and DOD Q-D Standards for Licensed Operation

of a Launch Site

Because the NASA and DOD standards are similar, and because both

the NASA and DOD standards comprehensively cover explosive hazards at a

launch site, the FAA has used both as a guide in proposing the rules in

subpart B. However, the FAA proposes to employ the tables and many of

the definitions of the NASA standard specifically.

The relevant differences for solid explosives between NASA, DOD,

and ATF are not significant. The NASA and ATF table for division 1.3

explosives (discussed below) are identical except that ATF requirements

stop at 300,000 pounds. The NASA division 1.3 table is also the same as

the DOD standard except that the DOD standard has more increments.

The relevant differences for liquid propellants between the NASA

and DOD standards are also minor.\5\ The hazard groups that liquid

propellants fall into, discussed below, are identical in the two

standards. The values in the table used for explosive equivalents are

also identical for quantities greater than 35,000 pounds. A discrepancy

exists under 35,000 pounds because the DOD requirement is based on a

table used for division 1.1 solid explosives.\6\ The distance specified

below 35,000 pounds in the DOD table is based on the ranges of

hazardous fragments and firebrands from an explosion. This is

appropriate for solid explosives but is not necessary for liquid

propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA standard, on the other hand,

has separate tables for division 1.1 solid explosives and liquid

propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA table for division 1.1 solid

explosives takes fragments and firebrands into account, as appropriate.

NASA's table for liquid propellants does not take fragmentation into

account.

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\5\ ATF does not regulate liquid propellants, other than mono-

propellants.

\6\ Solid explosives, like liquid explosives, may be measured in

terms of explosive equivalency. The explosive equivalency of a

certain weight of solid explosive is the weight of trinitrotoluene

that would provide an equivalent blast effect.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Approaches to Explosive Safety

The FAA has taken a number of measures in order to simplify the

proposed Q-D standards. The proposed requirements do not account for

the use of hardening or barricades, or for any other solid propellant

other than division 1.3. The proposed rules also reflect that only two

liquid propellant compatibility groups are necessary. These are

discussed below.

The proposed requirements do not account for hardening. Both NASA

and DOD have standards for using protective construction to harden an

explosive hazard facility to suppress explosion effects, and to harden

an area potentially exposed to explosive hazards. In the NASA and DOD

standards, the use of hardening may reduce the required distance

between an explosive hazard facility and a public area. The proposed

rules do not explicitly address hardening. The distances required

between explosive hazard facilities and public areas assume that

neither the explosive hazard facilities nor the public areas are

hardened. Because of the complexity of hardening standards, the FAA

believes hardening is better left to case-by-case approval. If an

applicant plans to use hardening, the applicant should plan on

demonstrating an equivalent level of safety to justify a reduction in

applicable Q-D requirements.

Similarly, the proposed requirements do not account for the use of

barricades and other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an

explosion on exposed areas. An applicant proposing to use such measures

in order to deviate from the proposed siting rules may apply for a

waiver to the FAA, accompanied with a demonstration that the applicant

achieves an equivalent level of safety.

The proposed requirements govern only one type of solid explosive,

division 1.3. To classify solid propellants, the FAA is proposing to

adopt the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system for

transport of dangerous goods. This classification system is reflected

in DOD and NASA standards, and standards of the Department of

Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration.

Propellants will be assigned the appropriate DOT class in accordance

with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard classification system used by all

three agencies consists of nine classes for dangerous goods with

ammunition and explosives included in UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.''

Class 1 explosives are

[[Page 34323]]

further subdivided into ``divisions'' based on the character and

predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing

casualties or property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:

Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass

explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the

entire load instantaneously.

Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a

projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.

Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire

hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or

both, but not a mass explosion hazard.

Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor

explosion hazard.

Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.

Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles

which do not have a mass explosion hazard.

The FAA proposes criteria only for division 1.3. The only solid

explosives for commercial launches that will likely affect separation

distances on a launch site are division 1.3 propellants. Although

launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1

explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems,

the quantity is small. Division 1.1 explosives will not likely be

present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D

criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are

from old military missiles which are not likely to be used at a

commercial launch site. When liquid fuels and oxidizers are located

together, as they would be during a fueling test, the combination has

an explosive potential equal to a percentage of division 1.1

explosives. The proposed rules take such activities into account, but

address liquid propellants separately from solid propellants.

The proposed regulations would not assign compatibility groups for

solid propellants. The NASA and DOD standards assign solid explosives

to compatibility groups. Explosives are assigned to the same group when

they can be stored together without significantly increasing either the

probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of

the effects of such an accident. Because division 1.3 solid propellants

are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not incorporate

compatibility groups for solid propellants.

Like the DOD and NASA standards, the proposed rules classify each

liquid propellant into one hazard group and one compatibility group.

Classifying each liquid propellant into a hazard group is necessary

because the hazards associated with different liquid propellants vary

widely, and the quantity-distance relationship varies accordingly.

Hazard group 1 individually represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2

individually represents a more serious fire hazard, and hazard group 3

individually represents a fragmentation hazard because propellants in

this category can cause rupture of a storage container.

The proposed rules classify current launch vehicle liquid

propellants, namely, liquid hydrogen (LH2), RP-1, hydrazine (N2H4) and

its variants (e.g. UDMH and Aerozine-50), hydrogen peroxide, liquid

oxygen (LO2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). RP-1 and N2O4 fall into

hazard group 1, hydrogen peroxide and LO2 fall into hazard group 2, and

LH2 and N2H4 fall into hazard group 3. Other propellants will be

classified on a case-by-case basis.

Like the NASA and DOD standards, the proposed rules also assign

each liquid propellant into a compatibility group. However, unlike

those standards which cover many different types of propellants, only

two compatibility groups are represented in the proposed rules, group A

and group C. Group A represents oxidizers, such as LO2, N2O4, and

hydrogen peroxide, and group C represents fuels. Whenever propellants

of different compatibility groups are not separated by the minimum

distance requirements, that is, when fuels and oxidizers are close

enough to each other to potentially mix and explode, the explosive

equivalency of the explosive mixture must be calculated.

Application of ATF, DOD, or NASA Standards

The storage of solid propellant and liquid mono-propellant on a

launch site is covered by ATF regulations, and therefore not addressed

in the FAA's proposed requirements. ATF has a permit process for the

storage of solid propellants and liquid mono-propellants. The FAA's

proposed rules, therefore, do not cover the separation distance between

magazines, or between magazines and public areas. However, an applicant

must show any magazines in its explosive site plan and their location

in relation to other explosive hazard facilities. Applicants should

note that on federal launch ranges DOD or NASA standards apply. These

launch sites may have Q-D requirements that are different than the

FAA's proposed rules.

Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements

The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) has initiated a DOD

Explosive Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and has

established an interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants

Working Group (LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of

possible inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the

current approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D

criteria for most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in

hazard group and compatibility group definitions, and possible

inaccurate characterization of blast over pressure hazards of liquid

propellant explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of

explosive equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance

criteria, and to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9

addressing liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials. The

LPWG is currently consolidating all available test and accident data,

and non-DOD regulatory information to provide a basis for the

revisions.

Because the DDESB is possibly the best equipped group in the

country to address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its

recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the proposed rule

should not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard

and compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and

the public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible

adoption by the FAA.

Solid and Liquid Bi-propellants at Launch Pads

The FAA is proposing a special requirement at launch pads for

launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant

components. The required separation distance shall be the greater of

the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid

propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant does not

have to add the separation distances of both. This notice assumes that

generally, no credible scenario exists that could produce a

simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and

solid propellant motors. Although not reflected in the published DOD

and NASA standards, the proposed requirement constitutes current

practice at federal launch ranges. The FAA is interested in the

public's view on this approach.

[[Page 34324]]

C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

Application of the proposed quantity-distance rules alone will not

prevent mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The proposed Q-D rules

merely reduce the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap

occurs, and if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance

that is at least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility

design and prudent procedural measure are critical to preventing a

mishap from occurring in the first place. Because visitors to a launch

site cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA has

proposed launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps

involving propellants.

The FAA considered measures taken at federal launch ranges to

prevent inadvertent initiation of propellants. For this notice the FAA

focused on those measures that are appropriate to be taken by a launch

site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent to place

the responsibility on a launch site operator for those measures that

must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more operational

nature will be covered in another rulemaking.

The FAA focused on construction measures intended to prevent

inadvertent initiation of propellant from electricity. These are

particularly important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards

include electrostatic discharge such as lightning, static electricity,

electric supply systems, and electromagnetic radiation. As discussed

below, the FAA is proposing launch site operator requirements for two

of these electric hazards: Lightning and electric supply systems. Other

measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's planned

rulemaking on launches from non-federal launch sites will cover other

procedural measures to guard against inadvertent initiation of

propellants from electricity. Moreover, the FAA believes launch and

launch site operators will implement prudent design and construction

measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as

OSHA requirements. The FAA is interested in public views on this

approach and any need to address other facility requirements.

Lighting Protection

Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by lightning.

The primary method of protecting against damage from lightning is to

provide a means to direct a lightning discharge directly to the earth

without causing harm to people or property. A lightning protection

system consists of a system of air terminals such as lightning rods, a

system of ground terminals, and a conductor system connecting the air

terminals to the ground terminals. These systems are typically

installed during construction.

The FAA proposes to impose certain requirements on launch site

operators involving lightning protection. The requirements are based on

current industry practice, namely, DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 7, and the

NASA standard's chapter 5. Each of those standards define, in detail,

minimum explosives safety criteria for the design, maintenance, testing

and inspection of lightning protection systems. The FAA's proposed

rules are not as detailed as those standards so that an applicant may

have more flexibility in meeting performance standards. The FAA expects

applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and

NASA standard.

The FAA's proposed rules were derived from the DOD and NASA

standards, which are similar to each other. Like NASA and DOD, the

proposed rules require lightning protection for all explosives hazard

facilities. The design of lightning protection systems includes air

terminals, low impedance paths to the ground, referred to as down

conductors, and earth electrode systems. An air terminal is a component

of a lightning protection system that is able to safely intercept

lightning strikes. Air terminals may include overhead wires or grids,

vertical spikes, or a building's grounded structural elements. Air

terminals must be capable of safely conducting a lighting strike. Down

conductors, such as wires or structural elements having high current

capacity, provide low impedance paths from the air terminals described

above to an earth ground system. Earth electrode systems dissipate the

current from a lightning strike to ground.

Bonding and surge protection are other important considerations for

lightning protection systems. Metallic bodies, such as fences and

railroad tracks near an explosive hazard facility, should be bonded to

ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in

the explosive hazard facility. Lightning protection systems should also

include surge protection for all incoming conductors, such as metallic

power, communication, and instrumentation lines coming into an

explosive hazard facility, so as to reduce transient voltages due to

lightning to a harmless level.

The FAA proposes to adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9 that

exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a local

lightning warning system is used to permit operations to be terminated

before the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and

will be provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route

distance, which is equivalent to the FAA's proposed public area

distance. The FAA is interested in views on this exception, and whether

it is sensible in light of the small chance that lightning may cause

inadvertent solid rocket motor flight. The FAA is also interested in

views on whether other exceptions should be added.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park,

Quincy, Massachusetts, has published a Lightning Protection Code, NFPA

780 (1995). The FAA is interested in the public's views on the use and

applicability of this code.

Static Electricity

Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous

electricity such as static electricity, fields around electric supply

lines, and radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and television

transmitters.

Static electricity is generally created by a transfer of electrons

from one substance to another caused by friction or rubbing. The

generation of static electricity is not in itself a hazard. The hazard

arises when static electricity is allowed to accumulate, subsequently

discharging as a spark across an air gap in the presence of highly

flammable materials or energetic materials such as propellants. The

NASA standard states that:

In order for static to be a source of ignition, five conditions

must be fulfilled: (1) A mechanism for generating static electricity

must be present, (2) a means of accumulating or storing the charge

so generated must exist, (3) a suitable gap across which the spark

can develop must be present, (4) a voltage difference sufficient to

cause electrical breakdown or dielectric breakdown must develop

across the gap, and (5) a sufficient amount of energy must be

present in the spark to exceed the minimum ignition energy

requirements of the flammable mixture.\7\

\7\ NASA Standard at 5-29.

Electro-explosive devices are particularly susceptible to static

discharge. The primary method used to neutralize static potential is to

create an electrical path between the objects so that the potential

charges will be equalized. This path can be generated by bonding

potential charged objects to each other and humidifying or ionizing

[[Page 34325]]

the air to create a path for the charge to bleed off.

Both NASA and DOD have standards to control static electricity. For

example, they have standards \8\ to prevent static electricity

accumulations that are capable of initiating combustible dusts, gases,

flammable vapors, or exposed electroexplosive devices. The standards

build on the National Electrical Code, published by the National Fire

Protection Association as NFPA 70, which establishes standards for the

design and installation of electrical equipment and wiring in hazardous

locations containing combustible dusts, flammable vapors and gases.

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\8\ DOD Standard, chapter 6, NASA Standard, chapter 5.

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These standards require personnel and equipment in hazardous

locations and locations where static sensitive EEDs are exposed to be

grounded in a manner to effectively discharge static electricity. For

example, the NASA standard requires personnel to wear static

dissipation devices such as legstats and wriststats. Conductive shoes

are required when handling, installing, or connecting or disconnecting

EEDs.

Solid rocket motors may also be initiated by static electricity.

Material contact, specifically, the rubbing or removing of one material

from another, such as removing tooling from a motor, can produce a

static charge buildup in solid rocket motors. This energy, when

released under appropriate conditions, may lead to a cascade discharge

and propellant ignition. A number of incidents have occurred due to

static electricity, including a Pershing II missile burn in West

Germany, a Stage I Peacekeeper missile initiation at a manufacturing

facility (due to the pulling of a tool), and a Minuteman State II

missile ignition on the rapid pulling of the core.\9\

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\9\ ``JANNAF Propulsion Systems Hazards Subcommittee

Electrostatic Discharge Panel Report,'' CPIA Publication 510 (Mar.

1989).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Although the control of static electricity is important for public

safety, the FAA is not proposing any requirements in this rulemaking.

The FAA believes that the control of static electricity in launch

operations is primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by

the FAA in a future rulemaking on launches. The FAA is interested in

the public's view on whether requirements should be placed on launch

site operators.

Electric Supply Systems

As noted above, rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels

by extraneous electricity such as fields around high tension wires.

Both the NASA standard, chapter 5, and DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 6, have

similar standards to address the hazards from fields around high

tension wires.

The FAA proposes rules that are similar to both the NASA and DOD

standard. As in those standards, the proposed rules require electric

power lines to be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the

length of the lines between the poles or towers that support the lines,

unless effective means is provided to ensure that energized lines

cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive hazard

facility. The proposed rules also require towers or poles supporting

electric distribution lines that carry between 15 and 69 KV, or

electrical transmission lines that carry 69 KV or more, to be no closer

to an explosive hazard facility than the public area distance for that

explosive hazard facility.

Electromagnetic Radiation

Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous

electricity such as radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and

television transmitters. Radio frequency (RF) emitters may present a

hazard to the public by direct exposure to high levels of RF energy.

The levels of RF energy that are hazardous are dependent on frequency.

For instance, ``ANSI C95.1-1991 Electromagnetic Fields, Safety Levels

With Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency'' defines the maximum

safe level for personnel for frequencies between 0.003 and 0.1 MHz at

100mWcm \2\, and a level of 180 mW/Cm \2\ for frequencies between 1.34

and 3.0 MHz. More importantly for this proposal, RF emitters may

present hazard to ordnance. At launch sites today, design and

procedural methods are used to mitigate risks to personnel and

ordnance. Separation distances are also used to ensure personnel and

ordancne are not exposed to hazardous levels.

One hazard of particular importance on a launch site is the

accidental firing of electroexplosvie devices by stray electromagnetic

energy. A large number of these devices are initiated by low levels of

electrical energy and are susceptible to unintentional ignition by many

forms of direct or induced stray electrical energy, such as from

lightning discharges, static electricity, and radio frequency due to

ground and airborne emitters.

One federal launch site operator, the U.S. Air Force, defines its

RF requirements in ``Air Force Manual (AFM) 91-201, Explosives Safety

Standards,'' (Jan. 1998). Safe separation distance criteria are

contained in section 2.58. A table is provided that gives minimum

separation distances between EEDs (within explosive hazard facilities)

and the transmitting antenna of all RF emitters. The distances are

based on the frequency, transmitter power, and power ratio of the

transmitting antenna. For worst-case situations, safe separation

distances are based on frequency and effective radiated power. ``Worst-

case'' is defined as EEDs that are the most sensitive in the Air Force

inventory, unshielded, having leads or circuitry which could

inadvertently be formed into a resonant dipole, loop or other antenna.

Where EEDs are in less hazardous configurations, the standard allows

for shorter distances. The standard also allows for the conduct of

power density surveys to ensure safety, in lieu of using the minimum

safe separation distances defined from the table and figure. Power

density surveys measure the actual conditions in an area here EEDs may

be located, and are appropriate when the minimum distances cannot be

complied with, for whatever reason, and when more than one transmitter

is operating in a certain area at different frequencies.

The FAA has not chosen to specifically address RF hazards in this

proposal. OSHA covers direct exposure of personnel to RF.\10\ Although

the FAA is not aware of any other federal regulations that specifically

protect the public from the accidental firing of electroexplosive

devices by stray electromagnetic energy, the FAA with this proposal is

focussing on those measures that a launch site operator must build into

its facilities. The distance requirements discussed above were

considered by the FAA but other procedural means exist to mitigate RF

hazards, including the FAA's proposed scheduling and coordination

requirement for launch site operators. The procedural requirements of

launch operators, covered in a separate rulemaking, in conjunction with

the requirement in proposed Sec. 420.5 for a licensee to develop and

implement procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch

site customers and their contractors, should prove adequate to address

RF hazards. The FAA is interested in the public's view on whether other

requirements, such as distance requirements, should be placed on launch

site operators.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ 29 CFR 1910.97.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Launch Site Location Review

The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether

the location of a proposed launch site

[[Page 34326]]

would jeopardize public health and safety. To that end, the FAA

proposes to determine whether at least one hypothetical launch could

take place safely from a launch point at the proposed site. The FAA

does not intend to license the operation of a launch site from which a

launch could never safely take place. An applicant should, however,

bear in mind that an FAA license to operate a launch site does not

guarantee that a launch license would be issued for any particular

launch proposed from that site. Accordingly, much of the decision

making with respect to whether a particular site will be economically

successful will rest, as it should, with a launch site operator, who

will have to determine whether the site possesses sufficient flight

corridors for economic viability. The FAA seeks through a location

review only to ensure that at least one flight corridor exists that may

be used safely for a hypothetical launch.

Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at

the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is possible to

launch at least one type of launch vehicle on at least one trajectory

from each launch point at the proposed site while meeting the FAA's

collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that there exists at

least one flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas from a

proposed launch site that would contain debris away from population.

Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will allow to occur only

when the risk to people is below an expected casualty (Ec)

of 30 x 10-6. In other words, if there are too many people

around a launch site or in a flight corridor the FAA will not license

the site. The FAA's proposed methods for determining flight corridors

and impact dispersion areas and estimating Ec are designed

to ascertain whether a hypothetical flight corridor would avoid

creating too much risk.

All this is not to say that the FAA proposed to require an

applicant for a license to operate a launch site to perform a complete

flight safety analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that

an applicant may or may not yet have customers or a particular launch

vehicle in mind. Accordingly, the FAA's proposed launch site location

review methods only approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions

and recognizing that not all factors need to be taken into account, a

full flight safety analysis that would be normally be performed for an

actual launch. Of course, if an applicant does have a customer who

satisfies the FAA's flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a

license for launch from the site, that showing would also demonstrate

to the FAA that a launch may occur safely from the proposed site, and

the FAA could issue a license to operate the launch site on the basis

of the actual launch proposed.

Bear in mind also that the focus of FAA's proposed launch site

location review methods is on expendable launch vehicles with a flight

history. The reusable launch vehicles (RLV) currently proposed by

industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, the FAA considered it unwise to

define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of

a launch site location for RLVs. An applicant proposed a launch site

limited to the launch of reusable launch vehicles would still need to

define a flight corridor and conduct a risk analysis if population were

present within the flight corridor, but the FAA will review such an

analysis on a case-by-case basis consistent with the principles

discussed in this rulemaking.

Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical

method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for

unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited

to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to

the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.

A launch site location review would provide an applicant with

alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site

satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must

demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas

exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to

an Ec risk of greater than 30 x 10-6. Each

proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch

vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided

sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched

from each point.

Each of the three methods the FAA proposes for evaluating the

acceptability of a launch site's location require an applicant to

identify an area, whether a flight corridor or a set of impact

dispersion areas, emanating from a proposed launch site. That area

identifies the public that the applicant must analyze for risk of

impact and harm. The FAA proposes to have an applicant who anticipates

customers who use guided orbital launch vehicles define a flight

corridor for a class of vehicles launched from a specific point along a

specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch

point or until the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point leaves

the earth's surface, whichever is sooner. For guided sub-orbital launch

vehicles, the flight corridor would end at an impact dispersion area of

a final stage. An applicant would have to demonstrate either that there

are no populated areas within the flight corridor or that the risk to

any population in the corridor does not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.

Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided vehicle, an

applicant would analyze the risks associated with a series of impact

dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. If there

are people in the dispersion areas, the applicant must demonstrate that

the expected casualties from stage impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk

criteria.

Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure

of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a

launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of

casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were

thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were

added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and

the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This

Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated

with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and,

as prescribed by the proposed regulations, shall not exceed an expected

average number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 x 10-6) for

each launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This

Ec value defines acceptable collective risk. In contrast to

individual risk, which describes the probability of serious injury or

death to a single person, the launch industry's common measure of risk

is collective risk. The Ec value proposed originated with

the Air Force's measure of acceptable risk. ``EWR 127-1,'' Sec. 1.4, 1-

12. Relying on the Air Force measure, the FAA proposed the adoption of

collective risk and a risk level of 30 x 10-6 for licensed

launches in an earlier proceeding. ``Commercial Space Transportation

Licensing Regulations,'' (62 FR 13216, 13229-30 (Mar. 19, 1997). The

FAA now proposes to use the same measure for evaluating the suitability

of a proposed launch site location.

Collective risk reflects the probability of injury or death to all

members of a defined population set--in this case, those located within

the flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas being analyzed--

placed at risk by a launch event. Collective risk constitutes the sum

total launch related risk, that is, the

[[Page 34327]]

probability of injury or death, to that part of the public exposed to a

launch. Collective risk is analogous to an estimate of the average

number of people hit by lightning each year, while individual annual

risk would be an individual's likelihood of being hit by lightning in

any given year. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual

risk if certain factors associated with any given launch are taken into

account. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual risk

when the exposed population consists of one person. Also, individual

risk may be--and will be, in most instances--less than collective risk,

depending on the size of the population exposed. For example, a

collective Ec risk of 30 x 10-6 for a defined

population of one hundred thousand people exposed to a particular

launch results (assuming the risk is spread equally throughout the

defined population) in a probability of injury or death to any one

exposed individual of 3 x 10-10 (three per ten billion).

The FAA's proposed methods for identifying a flight corridor or

impact dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital launch

vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital

launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles

without an FTS.\11\ For purposes of this proposal, references to a

guided launch vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to

mean that the vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital

may be understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS.

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\11\ This proposal does not propose a means for analyzing risks

posed by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch

vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have

been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a

launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles,

the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA

does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in

the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with

the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated

areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The FAA's proposed regulations divide guided orbital launch

vehicles into four classes, with each class defined by its payload

weight capability, as shown in table 1. Sub-orbital launch vehicles are

not divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as

either guided or unguided. Table 2 shows the payload weight and

corresponding classes of existing orbital launch vehicles. For a launch

site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant

would define a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the

proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated--

which the FAA anticipates would be based on expected customers.

Table 1.--Class of Launch Vehicles by Payload Weight

[LBS]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orbital launch vehicles

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

100 nm orbit Small Medium Medium large Large

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28 deg. inc.\1\................ 4,400 >4,400 to 11,100 >11,100 to 18,500

90 deg. inc.\2\................ 3,300 >3,330 to 8,400 >8,400 to 15,000 >15,000

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ 28 deg. inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 deg. latitude.

\1\ 90 deg. inclination orbit.

Table 2.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Payload weight Payload weight

(lbs) (lbs)

Vehicle -------------------------------- Class

100 nm Orbit 100 nm Orbit

29 deg. inc. 90 deg. inc.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conestoga 1229............................. 600 450 Small.

Conestoga 1620............................. 2,250 1,750 Small.

LML V-1.................................... 1,755 1,140 Small.

LML V-2.................................... 4,390 3,290 Small.

Pegasus.................................... 700 N/A Small.

Pegasus XL................................. 1,015 769 Small.

Scout...................................... 560 460 Small.

Taurus..................................... 3,100 2,340 Small.

Atlas II................................... 14,500 12,150 Medium.

Atlas 2A................................... 16,050 13,600 Medium.

Delta 6920................................. 8,780 6,490 Medium.

Delta 7920................................. 11,220 8,575 Medium.

Titan II................................... N/A 4,200 Medium.

Atlas 2AS.................................. 19,050 16,100 Medium/Large.

Titan III.................................. 31,200 N/A Medium/Large.

Titan IV................................... 47,400 41,000 Large.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch

site for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented

in proposed appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions for

creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch

vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method to appendix A.

Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a flight corridor

for guided launch vehicles, but provides more detailed calculations to

employ so that, although an appendix B flight corridor is typically

less conservative than that of appendix A, it should provide more

representative of actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C

[[Page 34328]]

contains the FAA's proposed method for applicants to analyze the risk

posed by guided launch vehicles within a flight corridor created under

appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented in

appendix D, which describes how an applicant should estimate impact

dispersion areas and analyze the risk in those areas.

Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor,

than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle

trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under

appendix A. Because it is a simpler methodology, an applicant may want

to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can define a flight

corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, that does not

overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the launch site

location review requirements with the least effort. If, however, the

corridor includes populated areas, the applicant has the choice of

creating an appendix B flight corridor, which may be more narrow, or

conducting a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required

to try appendix A before employing appendix B.

The FAA's proposed location review reflects a number of assumptions

designed to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or

addressing a particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more

fully below, but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for

appendices A and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that

launch failure debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful

containment must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination

system. A perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure

that any debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a

flight corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but

launch success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital

launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes a

location review based on an assumption of containment.

The approaches provided in the four proposed location review

appendices are based on some comment assumptions that reflect

limitations of the launch site location review analysis. The FAA is not

requiring an application to analyze the risks posed to the public by

toxic materials that might be handled at the proposed site, nor the

risk to ships or aircraft from launch debris or planned jettisoning of

stages. The FAA recognizes that these assumptions represent a

limitation in the launch site location review. The FAA intends that

these three risks will be dealt with through pre-launch operational

controls and launch commit criteria which will be better identified as

part of a launch license review. All launches that take place from an

approved U.S. launch site will either be regulated by the FAA through a

launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the government

carries out for the government.

The two methods for creating guided launch vehicle flight corridors

are intended to account for launch vehicle failure rate, malfunction

turn capability, and the launch vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by

the impact dispersions of these vehicles. The premise undergirding each

of these proposed methods is that debris would be contained within the

defined flight corridor or impact dispersion areas. Accordingly, for

purposes of a launch site location review, only the populations within

the defined areas need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that

were a flight termination system fail to destroy a vehicle as intended,

a launch vehicle could stray outside its planned flight corridor. That

concern will be better accommodated through another forum, namely, the

licensing of a launch operator and the review of that launch operator's

flight safety system. Because a containment analysis only looks at how

far debris would travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed,

the containment analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight

termination system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the

acceptability of a launch site's location for launching guided

expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning

vehicle will be destroyed and debris will always impact within

acceptable boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to

explore, for purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch

site's location, the possibility that a vehicle's flight termination

system may fail and that the vehicle could continue to travel toward

populated areas. Any proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any

proposed launch presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the

context of individual launch systems. This working assumption of a

perfectly reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply

to the licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider

the reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of

a launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that

for the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced

debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need

for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight

corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.

Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to

analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally

jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for

the final stage of a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The FAA does

not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to assess the

general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable launch

vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently launch

vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided launch

vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks from nominally

jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A launch license

review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not going to impact

in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed for launches

from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by

controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by

wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.

Each of the FAA's proposed approaches to defining flight corridors

or impact dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk

launch event associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is

not meant to imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily

acceptable; only that they will not be considered in the course of this

review. For a guided orbital launch vehicle, that event is vehicle

failure. For an unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle, the launch event

of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted impact of

stages. For a guided launch vehicle the overflight risk, which results

from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction (assuming no FTS

failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally jettisoned debris

are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For an unguided sub-

orbital launch vehicle, the FAA proposes that risk due to stage impact

be analyzed instead of the overflight risk. This distinction is

necessitated by the fact that the failure rate during thrust is

historically significantly lower for unguided vehicles than for guided

vehicles. Current unguided launch vehicles with many years of use are

highly reliable. They do not employ an FTS; therefore, debris pieces

usually consist of vehicle components that are not broken up. Another

reason for the

[[Page 34329]]

difference between analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact

dispersions are significantly larger than guided vehicle impact

dispersions. These differences add up to greater risk within an

unguided launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas

outside the dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only

performed on those populations within an unguided launch vehicle stage

impact dispersion area.

An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion

zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate

that the OEZ can be clear of the public during a launch. An OEZ defines

the area where the public risk criteria of 30 x 10-6 would

be exceeded if one person were present in the open. The overflight

exclusion zone was estimated from risk computations for each launch

vehicle type and class. An applicant must define an OEZ because launch

vehicle range rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle

effective casualty areas, the area within which all casualties are

assumed to occur through exposure to debris, are large, and impact

dispersion areas are dense with debris so that the presence of one

person inside this hazardous area is expected to produce Ec

values exceeding the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant

would either have to own the property, demonstrate to the FAA that

there are times when people are not present, or that it could clear the

public from the overflight exclusion zone prior to a launch. Evacuating

an overflight exclusion zone for an inland site, might, for example,

require an applicant to demonstrate that agreements have been reached

with local officials to close any public roads during a launch. The FAA

seeks comments on the feasibility of evacuating areas inland and on the

impact of the OEZ requirement on the ability to gain a license for an

inland site.

E. License Conditions

A license may contain conditions flowing from the various reviews

conducted during the application process. For example, a license

granted following approval of a launch site location would be limited

to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of vehicle used

in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may choose

to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its application. An

FAA launch site operator license authorizing the operation of a launch

site for launch of an orbital expendable launch vehicle would allow the

launch of vehicles from the site that were less than or equal to the

class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used to demonstrate

the safety of the site location. If a licensee later wanted to offer

the launch site for the launch of a larger class of vehicles or a

different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided sub-orbital

launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a license

modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or different type

of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch site. Likewise, the

addition of a new launch point would require a license modification.

The demonstration would be based on the same kinds of analyses used for

the original license. In some cases, a licensee might be able to use

the safety analyses performed by a launch operator to meet location

review requirements.

Although the authority granted by the launch site operator license

would be limited to certain types or classes of vehicles, the license

would not represent a guarantee that the FAA would necessarily license

any particular launch from an approved launch site. The demonstration

is intended to ensure that the location of the launch site can safely

support at least some type of vehicle, launched on a specific

trajectory. The planned launch of an actual vehicle may differ from the

hypothetical trajectory or vehicle characteristics used for the launch

site location demonstration, potentially posing different risks to the

public than those used in the site location demonstration. In addition

to the protection provided by a safe launch site location, the safety

of any actual flight of a launch vehicle will be dependent on the

safety procedures, personnel qualifications, safety systems, and other

elements of the proposed launch. Consequently, each launch operator,

other than the U.S. Government, must obtain a launch license for its

specific operations.

F. Operational Responsibilities

The FAA is proposing to impose certain operational responsibilities

on an operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA proposes to

distinguish between activities covered by a license to operate a launch

site and those covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be

approved as part of a launch license will not be covered in a launch

site operator license even if the launch site operator provides the

service. For example, because a launch licensee will need to assure the

adequacy of ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will

be handled in the launch license process even if a launch site operator

provides the service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch

site operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe

procedures for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.

The operational requirements being proposed for the operator of a

launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of

operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site

accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch

site operator licensee would be required to control access to the site.

Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone

entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's

safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning

signals would be required to alert persons on the launch site of any

emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site

licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the

licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that

the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.

Because it is more efficient to have a single point of contact for

launches conducted at a site, the FAA is proposing that the launch site

operator be responsible for all initial coordination with the

appropriate FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace

where launches will take place and the U.S. Coast Guard (where

applicable) through a written agreement. The FAA's Air Traffic Service

and the Coast Guard issues Notice to Airmen and Mariners, respectively,

to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air Route Traffic

Control Center also closes airways during a launch window, if

necessary. A launch site operator would be required to obtain an

agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these

agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating

with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for

example, for an inland launch site. A launch site operator licensee

would also have to notify local officials with an interest in the

launch. These would include officials with responsibilities that might

be called into play by a launch mishap, such as fire and emergency

response personnel.

Another operational requirement being proposed is for the operator

of a launch site to develop and implement a launch site accident

investigation plan containing procedures for investigating and

reporting a launch site accident. This would extend similar reporting,

investigation and response procedures

[[Page 34330]]

currently applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to

accidents occurring during ground activities at a launch site. Lastly,

an operator of a launch site would have responsibilities regarding

explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric

power lines. This has been discussed above.

III. Part Analysis

Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site

The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to

address licensing and operation of a launch site.

Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site

Proposed Sec. 420.1 would describe the scope of proposed part 420.

Part 420 would encompass the requirements for obtaining a license to

operate a launch site and with which a licensee must comply.

Proposed Sec. 420.3 would specify the person who must apply for a

license to operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with

regulations that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a

launch site operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for

launch, only someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to

operate a launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its

own launch site need only obtain a launch license because a launch

license will address safety issues related to a specific launch and

because a launch license encompasses ground operations.

Proposed Sec. 420.5 would add terms that have not been previously

defined by the FAA. These definitions would apply in the context of

part 420, which governs the licensing and safety requirements for

operation of a launch site. These terms do not apply outside part 420.

Specifically, the following terms would be defined:

Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object

divided by the quantity product of the coefficient of drag

(Cd) of the object and the area (A) of the object.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.000

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight

characteristics of an object.

Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be

located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage

exists when storing materials together does not increase the

probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of

the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether

materials require segregation. The FAA derived this definition from a

NASA definition, which states that compatibility is ``the chemical

property of materials to coexist without adverse reaction for an

acceptable period of time. Compatibility in storage exists when storing

materials together does not increase the probability of an accident or,

for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.

Storage compatibility groups are assigned to provide for segregated

storage.'' \12\ The FAA proposes to adapt the NASA definition in order

to describe coexistence with greater specificity.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\ NASA Standard at A-2.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated

maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-

case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into

flight. If a launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after ignition, and

a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects the debris to

be contained within an area described by Dmax.

Division 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR

173.50. That provision is part of the hazardous materials regulations

of the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the

Department of Transportation. Section 173.50 defines a division 1.3

explosive as ``. . . consist(ing) of explosives that have a fire hazard

and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both,

but not a mass explosion hazard.'' This classification is identical to

the United Nations Organization classification, and is also used by

NASA and the Department of Defense.

Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where

a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch

point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact

dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.

E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,

geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is

at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive

directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive

directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident

with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is

normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.

E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,

topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system

is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis

is positive directed north. The En-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal

Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic

vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed

away from the Earth.

Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate

casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle

failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty

area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of

the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty,

and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to

be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris

piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact

explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce.

Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that,

when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable

initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large

volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding

medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or

deflagrate. With the exception of a minor editorial change, this

proposed definition is identical to that of NASA.\13\ For comparison,

49 CFR 173.50 of RSPA's regulations defines an explosive as, ``. . .

any substance or article . . . which is designed to function by

explosion . . . or which, by chemical reaction within itself, is able

to function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by

explosion. . . .'' Both definitions are consistent with each other, and

the FAA proposes to use the NASA definition because it is more

descriptive.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\13\ NASA Standard at A-4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from

explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the

weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast

effects when detonated. This proposed definition is identical to the

NASA definition for ``TNT equivalent,'' and similar to the DOD

definition of ``explosive equivalent'' which defines the term, in

relevant part, as ``(t)he amount of a standard explosive that, when

detonated, will produce a blast effect comparable to that which results

at the same distances from the

[[Page 34331]]

detonation or explosion of a given amount of the material for which

performance is being evaluated.'' \14\ DOD uses TNT as the standard

explosive, thus rendering the NASA and DOD terms interchangeable. FAA

proposes to use the more general term ``explosive equivalent'' instead

of ``TNT equivalent.''

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\14\ DOD Standard at A-4.

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Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where

solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled. The FAA proposes to

define this term for the purpose of identifying specific hazard

facilities on a launch site that present potential explosive hazards.

NASA and DOD use the more general term ``potential explosive site,''

which is defined, in part, as ``the location of a quantity of

explosives that will create a blast fragment, thermal, or debris hazard

in the event of an accidental explosion of its contents. . . .'' \15\

As proposed, an explosive hazard facility may include a location where

explosives are either handled or stored.

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\15\ DOD Standard at A-7; NASA Standard at A-9.

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Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch

vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-

degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.

Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to

contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal

flight of an orbital or guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.

Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub: orbital rocket that

employs an active guidance system.

Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated five

standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an

intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle. The

definition is confined to proposed part 420, and should not be confused

with other impact dispersion areas that may be defined by the federal

launch ranges for their particular launch safety programs.

Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a

stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal

impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch

vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.

Impact dispersion radius (R) means a radius that defines an impact

dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle stages.

Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the

impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.

Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, with the use

of a launch vehicle stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an

intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following

thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of

atmospheric drag effects, that is, a vacuum. This shows the point at

which launch vehicle debris would land in the event thrust was

terminated. In this proposal, the IIP calculations would assume a

vacuum.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch

vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is

typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.

Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any

two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control

of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the

propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate

intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard

facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard

facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will

dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will

familiarize themselves with those requirements and conform to them in

accordance with the law. Unlike distances used to protect the public,

intraline distance will not protect workers with the same level of

protection as the public. NASA defines intraline distance as ``(t)he

distance to be maintained between any two operating buildings and sites

within an operating line, of which at least one contains or is designed

to contain explosives, . . .''.\16\ Thus, for NASA, the criteria for

using intraline distance is whether the areas are within an operating

line. An operating line is a ``group of buildings used to perform the

consecutive steps in the loading, assembling, modification, normal

maintenance, renovation, or salvaging of an item or in the manufacture

of an explosive or explosive device.'' \17\ The FAA's proposed

definition is more suitable to its statutory obligation to protect

public safety because public safety dictates only that explosive hazard

facilities of one launch operator be sited in a manner to prevent the

propagation of an explosion. If intraline distances are not maintained

between two explosive hazard facilities, then the larger area

encompassing both quantities must be used for Q-D purposes when

determining prescribed distances to the public.

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\16\ NASA Standard at A-7.

\17\ NASA Standard at A-8.

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Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A,

the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a point 100

nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight corridor

defined using appendix B, a launch site is the portion of a flight

corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the

outer boundary of the last Di dispersion circle.

Launch point means a point on the earth from which the flight of a

launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude,

longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.

Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a

ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious

injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated

with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any

licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or

subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated

with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will

typically include any property belonging to members of the public or

personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity

includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or

either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.

Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in

pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an

item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants,

and for liquid propellants when explosive equivalency applies.

Explosive equivalency applies to liquid propellants when a liquid fuel

and a liquid oxidizer are close enough together that their explosive

potential combined must be used when determining prescribed distances

to the public.

Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance,

trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all

launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle

internal and external systems perform exactly as planned, and there are

no external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric

drag and gravity.

Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a

nominally

[[Page 34332]]

performing launch vehicle relative to an x,y,z, coordinate system,

expressed in x,y,z,x,y,z. The x,y,z coordinates describe the position

of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path and during

actual flight. The x,y,z variables describe the velocity of the

vehicle.

Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a

launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given

populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measure

along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose

normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the

populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory

intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.

Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor

which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch

vehicle.

Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420

site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm

of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block

group in the U.S., and an equivalent size outside the U.S. For analysis

of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm downrange from the

launch point, a populated area is no greater than a 1 deg. X 1 deg.

latitude/longitude grid, whether in the United States or not.

Population density means the number of people per unit area in a

populated area.

Position data means data referring to the current position of a

launch vehicle with respect to time using the X, Y, Z coordinate

system.

Public area means any area outside an explosive hazard facility and

is an area that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of

a launch site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns

or otherwise controls that explosive hazard facility. For purposes of

Q-D criteria, the proposed rules treat any location outside a launch

site boundary as a public area for any activity at a launch site.

Certain areas within a launch site are also considered public areas for

purposes of applying Q-D criteria. With respect to any given launch

operator, areas where other launch operators are located, or where the

launch site operator Commission is located, are public areas.

Public area distance means the minimum separation distance

permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.

Although NASA and DoD differentiate between areas that contain

inhabited buildings and areas that contain public traffic routes, with

inhabited buildings requiring greater separation distances, the FAA's

proposed requirements does not make the same differentiation.\18\ The

FAA proposes to use NASA's and DoD's more conservative inhabited

building distance as the required distance between an explosive hazard

facility and all public areas. This is because a public area is not in

the control of the applicant, and can, therefore, contain anything from

open land to groups of office buildings. This is consistent with the

approach taken by NASA and DoD for areas outside a launch site. For

example, NASA defines inhabited building distance as ``(t)he minimum

allowable distance between an inhabited building and an explosive area.

Inhabited building distances are used between explosives areas and

administrative areas, also between operating lines with dissimilar

hazards and between explosive locations and other exposures. Inhabited

building distances will also be provided between explosive areas and

Center boundaries.''\19\

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\18\ Nor does the FAA attempt to protect inhabited buildings

that are not considered property of the public.

\19\ NASA Standard at A-7.

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Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that

does not have a guidance system.

X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed,

topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system

is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch

azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is

positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the

ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to

the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and

positive directed away from the earth.

0, 0, 0

means a latitude, longitude, height system where 0

is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is

the east longitude of the launch point, and h is the height of the

launch point above a reference ellipsoid. 0 and

0 are expressed in degrees decimal degrees, which

is abbreviated as DDD.

Proposed subpart B would contain the criteria and information

requirements for obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section

420.15 would specify the information that an applicant for a launch

site license would have to submit as part of its license application.

The FAA requires this information to evaluate environmental impacts,

whether the launch site location could safely be used to conduct

launches, issues affecting national security and foreign policy,

explosive site safety, and whether the applicant will operate safely.

Proposed Sec. 420.15(a) contains the environmental review

requirements currently located at Sec. 417.105-107.

Proposed Sec. 420.15(b) would provide the information necessary for

a location review. It would also require foreign ownership information

and an explosive site plan.

Proposed Sec. 420.15(c) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it

will satisfy its subpart D responsibilities. Specifically, a license

applicant must show how the applicant proposes to control public access

pursuant to Sec. 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling

requirements of Sec. 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the

notification obligations of Sec. 420.57. The FAA requires this

information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy

the subpart D performance requirements and for compliance monitoring

purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of Sec. 420.57,

an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard

district and the FAA regional office for air traffic services to

demonstrate satisfaction of the requirements of Sec. 420.57(b) and (c).

A license applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the

accident investigation requirements in Sec. 420.59 and requirements on

explosives in Sec. 420.63.

Proposed Sec. 420.15(d) provides that an applicant who is proposing

to locate a launch site at an existing launch point at a federal launch

range is not required to perform a location review if a launch vehicle

of the same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been

safely launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to

locate at a federal launch range is not required to submit an explosive

site plan.

Section 420.17 would establish the bases upon which the FAA will

make its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination

of the adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the

conclusions of the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of

the explosive site plan, and satisfaction of site location

requirements. The FAA will notify the applicant of, and allow the

applicant to address, any deficiencies in the application.

Section 420.19 would require an applicant to demonstrate that its

proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch of at

least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or impact

dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy.

[[Page 34333]]

Section 420.21 would require an applicant to specify which launch

vehicle type and class would be launched from each launch point at the

proposed launch site. This section also proposes to define the minimum

distance from each launch point to a launch site boundary.\20\ The

three types of expendable launch vehicle proposed account for the

critical distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital or

sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance

systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an

FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris

caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles

will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the

nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, unguided sub-orbital

launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and therefore

crate the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact. The

methods proposed in the appendices are designed to account for these

differences in public risk. Orbital expendable launch vehicles are also

sorted by class, which is determined by payload weight capacity.

Minimum distances are based on actual computations for each of the

launch vehicle types and classes. The safety of launch points for

reusable launch vehicles will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in a

manner consistent with the principles expressed here.

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\20\ The FAA also proposed minimum distances between a launch

point and a launch site boundary in its explosive site plan

requirements in subpart B. Because both requirements apply, an

applicant must apply the greater of the Dmax or Q-D

distance to accommodate the greater of the hazards.

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Section 420.23 would state that the FAA will evaluate the adequacy

of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-

case basis.

Subpart B also contains the FAA's proposed explosive facility

siting standards for the protection of the public from launch site

explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants. These

standards would be used by an applicant to site facilities that support

activities involving liquid and solid propellants, or facilities

potentially exposed to such activities, and to document the layout of

these facilities.\21\

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\21\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards;

fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and

lighting protection systems; electrical installations; natural or

man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In order to comply with proposed subpart B, an applicant would

first determine those areas at its proposed launch site where solid or

liquid propellant would be stored or handled, and which the FAA

proposes to designate as explosive hazard facilities. They may include

payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant storage or

transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. An applicant

must then determine the types and maximum quantity of propellants to be

located at each explosive hazard facility. For solid propellants, the

applicant would determine the total weight, expressed in pounds, of

division 1.3 explosive material to be contained in the items that will

be located at each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants,

the applicant would determine either the explosive equivalency of a

fuel and oxidizer combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located

together at, what is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if

fuels and oxidizers would not be located together, an applicant would

determine the net weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each

explosive hazard facility.

The next step for an applicant would be to determine the minimum

allowable separation distance between each explosive hazard facility

and all other explosive hazard facilities, the launch site boundary,

and other public areas such as the launch complex of another launch

operator, public railways and highways running through the launch site,

and any visitor centers. The distances between explosive hazard

facilities are important to ensure that an explosive event in one

explosive hazard facility would not cause an explosive event in another

explosive hazard facility. The distances between explosive hazard

facilities and public areas are important to ensure that the public is

protected from blast, debris, and thermal hazards. Exact distances must

be given between the wall or corner of the facility closest to the

closest wall or corner of other explosive hazard facilities and public

areas. Minimum allowable distances based on the type and quantity of

propellant to be located within an explosive hazard facility.

Determining the minimum allowable distance between two explosive hazard

facilities is accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each

and then separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed

for each explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of

division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive hazard

facility A, and twice as much division 1.3 solid propellant would be

located at explosive hazard facility B, the prescribed distance

generated by explosive hazard facility B would serve as the minimum

distance permitted between explosive hazard facility A and explosive

hazard facility B.

Proposed Sec. 420.31(a) would require an applicant to provide the

FAA an explosive site plan that establishes that the applicant's

proposed distances satisfy the explosive siting criteria. The explosive

site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the location of

all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and liquid

propellants would be stored or handled.\22\ An applicant must include

the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and

compatibility group for each liquid propellant.

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\22\ Areas where solid propellants would be stored would be

included in the plan even though ATF requirements apply. Applicants

with magazines where solid propellants are to be stored must obtain

an ATF permit and meet ATF quantity-distance requirements. The FAA

will use the information to ensure that those of its requirements

unrelated to storage are satisfied and to coordinate with ATF when

necessary.

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In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map

or maps would indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between

each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities

and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by

which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the

minimum required in the proposed rules would be by drawing a circle or

arc with a radius equal to the minimum allowed distance centered on

each explosive hazard facility.

Unlike the DOD and NASA standards, which both define numerous

separation distances, the proposed rules define only two distances for

solid propellants, namely, a public area distance and an intraline

distance. Public area distance would serve as the minimum distance

permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.

Facilities and other infrastructure such as roads, railways, and

inhabited buildings may or may not be public areas, depending on

whether the public has access at the time explosives are present in the

explosive hazard facility. Examples include a public road or railroad

running through a launch site, and a visitor center where members of

the public would be located.\23\ Likewise,

[[Page 34334]]

different launch site customers are also considered the public with

respect to each other. Intraline distance would provide the minimum

distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by

one launch site customer. In this regard, for planning purposes, an

applicant should bear in mind that using the greater public area

distance would avoid later operational constraints when different

customers wanted to use facilities sited at intraline distances.

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\23\ A launch site operator who does not wish to employ the

appropriate public area distance between an explosive hazard

facility and public areas such as, for example, a visitor center,

must propose operational limitations in its application. These would

consist of such strictures as not allowing members of the public in

the visitor center while explosives are present in the explosive

hazard facility not sited according to the proposed requirements.

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In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan would also

describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and

solid propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, and

the activities to be conducted within each explosive hazard facility.

Pursuant to proposed Sec. 420.31(b), the requirement to submit an

explosive site plan to the FAA would not apply to an applicant applying

for a license to operate a launch site at a federal launch range.

Federal launch ranges have separate rules which are either identical or

similar to the rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which

otherwise ensure safety.

The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between

each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard

facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary,

are proposed in Sec. 420.33 for solid propellants and Sec. 420.35 for

liquid propellants. Proposed Sec. 420.37 includes rules for when liquid

and solid propellants are located together.

Proposed Sec. 420.33 covers quantity determinations and minimum

required distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid

propellants would be handled. Under proposed Sec. 420.33(a), an

applicant would first determine the maximum total quantity of explosive

in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants would be

handled. The total quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard

facility shall be the maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of

division 1.3 explosive material in the contents of the explosive hazard

facility. For example, if a facility could hold up to ten solid rocket

motors of a particular type, even though it might only rarely hold that

many motors, the applicant would calculate the total weight of division

1.3 explosive material in the ten motors.

The proposed rules are based on an assumption that only division

1.3 solid propellant will be located at a launch site in sufficient

quantities to affect facility location. The FAA is aware that the

launch vehicle used for the first launch from Kodiak Launch Complex, a

launch site operated by the recently licensed Alaska Aerospace

Development Corporation (AADC), had a second stage motor with division

1.1 propellant. The FAA believes this will be a rare occurrence in the

future. The FAA realizes that 1.1 explosives, such as those used in

launch operator's flight termination system, will also likely be

located at a launch site. However, current practice is to design such

components so as not to be able to initiate division 1.3 components

when installed on a vehicle. The FAA anticipates that it will require

any licensed launch operator to demonstrate that its 1.1 devices do not

initiate 1.3 components as is the current practice at federal launch

ranges. Therefore, the amount of such ordnance used with division 1.3

explosives may be disregarded for Q-D purposes. The total quantity of

explosives shall be the NEW of the division 1.3 components.

Once an applicant has determined the total quantity of solid

propellants in each explosive hazard facility, proposed Sec. 420.33(b)

would require an applicant to separate each explosive hazard facility

where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard

facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in

accordance with the minimum separation distances contained in proposed

table E-1 in appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each

quantity level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum

distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard

facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance

permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one

launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute

public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area

in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a

launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be

made accordingly. Table E-1 contains the same distances as the NASA and

DOD standards, except that the DOD standard has more increments. An

applicant may use linear interpolation for quantity values between

those provided in the table. Additionally, because table E-1 does not

include quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds, an applicant with an

explosive hazard facility where solid propellants in quantities greater

than 1,000,000 pounds would be handled would use the equations proposed

in Sec. 420.33(b) to obtain separation distances.

An applicant would measure a separation distance from the closest

source of debris or hazard under proposed Sec. 420.33(c). For example,

for a building, an applicant would use for measurement the wall or

corner of the facility closet to the closest wall or corner of other

explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors

or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the

closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that

minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc

centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no

other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance

permitted.

Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not

operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the

existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount

of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.

Proposed Sec. 420.35 covers quantity determinations and distance

requirements for explosive hazard facilities that support the storage

or handling of liquid propellants. In addition to applying to distances

between an explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas, distance requirements may apply within an

explosive hazard facility as well.

Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than

solid propellants. Where solid propellants are classified by class and

division, each liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard

groups and one of two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes

liquid propellants according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1

represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire

hazard, and, because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture

a storage container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid

propellant also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid

propellants are compatible when storing them together does not increase

the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant,

the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the

same compatibility group do not increase the probability or magnitude

of an accident. The two proposed compatibility groups consist of fuels

and oxidizers, and are what the NASA and DOD standards label A and C.

The FAA proposes to use the same labeling to provide continuity.

Proposed group A represents oxidizers

[[Page 34335]]

such as LO2 and N2O4, and proposed group C represents fuels such as RP-

1 and LH2. Proposed appendix E provides the hazard and compatibility

groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants in table E-3.

Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference

between the treatment of solid and liquid propellants. Only if fuels

and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of each other

would the separation requirements designed to account for the hazardous

consequences of their potential combination apply. That combination is

measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive equivalency for

liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects from explosion of

a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture expressed in terms of the

weight of TNT that would produce the same blast effects when detonated.

Fuels should not be located near oxidizers if possible. The

significance of the hazard groups and compatibility groups is that if

fuels are located far enough from oxidizers, the minimum distance

requirements to public areas and other explosive hazard facilities

depend only on the quantity and hazard group of the individual liquid

propellants. If operational requirements require fuels and oxidizers to

be located near each other, that is, at less than the minimum public

area and incompatible distances proposed in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6,

the explosive equivalency of the incompatible propellants must be

calculated and used to determine the distances proposed in table E-7 to

other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.

Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation

requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain

separation distances for hazard group 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table

E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are

located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive

equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for

1.1 solid explosives. This is because the ``explosive equivalency'' of

a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in terms of its equivalent

explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class 1.1 explosive. Table E-

7 also prescribes public area and intraline distances.

Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each

quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public

area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted

between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The

distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants

must be separated (e.g. the minimum distance between a fuel and an

oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and Table E-7 not to apply to the

distance calculations. The second, an ``intragroup and compatible''

distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same hazard

group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be separated

(e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding the

quantity of each propellant container being separated in calculating

distances. This is simply because if two propellant tanks are far

enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to

occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant

separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants.

The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are

different than those for solid propellants may be found in calculations

of the quantity of liquid propellant that determines the distance

relationship with other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.

Quantity calculations may depend on distance. As an example, suppose

one was determining the minimum distance required between a tank farm

having many containers of fuel, and a launch site boundary. If the

containers were all close together the applicant would simply take the

total amount of fuel, look up the ``public area and incompatible''

distance in the table that corresponded to the hazard group of the

fuel, and ensure that the distance between the closest wall or corner

of the explosive hazard facility and the launch site boundary was at

least the distance listed in the table. However, if the containers were

separated from each other so that the distance between each container

met the minimum ``intragroup and compatible'' \24\ distance in the

table, the total quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public

area'' distance determination is only the quantity in each container.

Therefore, as discussed below, although quantity determination

requirements may be found in proposed Sec. 420.35(a) and proposed

Sec. 420.35(b) contains distance determination requirements, quantity

determinations for liquid propellants may depend on distances between

containers.

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\24\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to

cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still

compatible.

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Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance

determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants

would be to determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if

applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be

located in each explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this

through three steps specified in proposed Sec. 420.35(a). First,

proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(1) states that the quantity of propellant in a

tank, drum, cylinder, or other container is the net weight in pounds of

the propellant in that container. The weight of liquid propellant in

associated piping must be included in the determination of quantity to

any point where positive means, such as shutoff valves, are provided

for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or for interrupting a

reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.

Next, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(2) applies when two or more

containers of compatible propellants are stored together in an

explosive hazard facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the

quantity of propellant used to determine the minimum separation

distance between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive

hazard facilities and public areas shall be the total quantity of

liquid propellant in all containers unless either the containers are

separated one from the other by the ``intragroup and compatible''

distance contained in appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on

the hazard group, or the containers are subdivided by intervening

barriers to prevent their mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of

propellant in the explosive hazard facility requiring the greatest

separation distance must be used to determine the minimum separation

distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive

hazard facilities and public areas.

Finally, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(3) applies to quantity

determinations when two or more containers of incompatible liquid

propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If

each container is not separated from every other container by the

``public area and incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E,

tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity

of explosives by calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the

combined liquids, using NASA formulas contained in table E-2, to

determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard

facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the

containers are, in fact, to be separated one from the other by the

appropriate ``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the

minimum separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or

public area using the quantity of propellant within the explosive

hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance. For

[[Page 34336]]

example, if 50 pounds of hazard group 1 fuel were 31 feet from 150

pounds of hazard group 1 fuel, the minimum required distance to a

public area would be 35 feet, reflecting the public area distance

required by the greater quantity of fuel.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid

propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors

in table E-3, and the equation provided. The proposed requirement

reflects a NASA standard.\25\

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\25\ NASA Standard at 7-7.

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After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant

or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants

to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then

determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard

facility and public areas. Proposed Sec. 420.35(b) specifies the rules

by which an applicant determines the separation distances between

propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive

hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table

E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would

then separate propellants from each other and from each public area

using at least the distances provided in tables E-4 through E-7. With

one exception, as discussed below, tables E-1 and E-7 reflect the NASA

standard.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(1) would require that an applicant measure

minimum separation distances from the container, building, or positive

cutoff point in piping which is closet to each public area or explosive

hazard facility requiring separation.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(2) would impose a minimum separation

distance between compatible propellants. An applicant would measure the

separation distance between compatible propellants using the

``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and

group that requires the greater distance prescribed in tables E-4, E-5,

and E-6. The distance between any two propellants is computed by first

determining what the minimum required distances is for each propellant

based on the quantity and hazard group of that propellant. The one

requiring the greater distance is controlling for the pair.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(3) would apply to the minimum separation

distance between incompatible propellants. An applicant would have to

measure the separation distance between propellants of different

compatibility groups using the ``public area and incompatible''

distance from the propellant quantity and group that requires the

greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the

propellants of different compatibility groups are subdivided by

intervening barriers to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers

are to be present, the minimum separation distance shall then be the

``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and

group that requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5,

and E-6.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(4) would apply to the separation of liquid

propellants from public areas. An applicant shall separate these

propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public area''

distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.

Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(5) would apply to propellants where

explosive equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). An

applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will

contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other

explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same

customer public areas is the public area distance in table E-7. Table

E-7 is a revised form of the NASA standard.

Proposed Sec. 420.37 would specify the rules to be used when solid

and liquid propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and

test stands. For applicants proposing an explosive hazard facility

where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together,

Sec. 420.37 provides three steps that an applicant should use to

determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard

facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. An

applicant would first determine the minimum separation distances

between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants alone,

in accordance with proposed Sec. 420.33. An applicant would then

determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard

facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas

required for the liquid propellants alone, in accordance with

Sec. 420.35. If explosive equivalents apply, an applicant would

determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard

facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas

required for the liquid propellants using appendix E, table E-7F, in

accordance with Sec. 420.35. An applicant would then apply the greater

of the distances determined by the liquid propellant alone or the solid

propellant alone.

Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41

would specify the authority granted to a launch site operator by a

license and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations

contained in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms

and conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authority to the

launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles

used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for

orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the class analyzed.

The provision would also clarify the licensee's obligation to comply

with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed

activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a

launch site operator license.

Section 420.43 would specify the duration of a license to operate a

launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license

may be renewed.

Section 420.45 would provide the procedures that an applicant must

follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license

to operate a launch site.

Section 420.47 would specify the procedures that the FAA would

allow to modify a license through a license order or written approval,

and the procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to

obtain an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license

modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a

manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things,

that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue

material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe

the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee

must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations

a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and

conditions of its license.

A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to modifying its

operations. For example, a licensee whose application stated that it

would prevent

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