Suspension of Deportation and Special Rule Cancellation of Removal for Certain Nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Former Soviet Bloc Countries

Federal RegisterMay 21, 1999

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SUMMARY: This rule implements section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment

and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). It amends the Department of

Justice (Department) regulations by offering certain beneficiaries of

section 203 of NACARA who currently have asylum applications pending

with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Service), and their

qualified dependents, the option of applying to the Service for

suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal under the

statutory requirements set forth in NACARA (``special rule cancellation

of removal'').

Described in very general terms, both suspension of deportation and

special rule cancellation of removal are forms of discretionary relief

that, if granted, permit an individual subject to deportation or

removal to remain in the United States as a lawful permanent resident

alien. Integrating the processing of certain applications under NACARA

into the Service's Asylum Program will provide an efficient process for

considering the suspension of deportation and special rule cancellation

of removal applications of most of the approximately 240,000 registered

class members of the American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC)

litigation and certain other beneficiaries of NACARA who have asylum

applications pending with the Service, as well as their qualified

family members. The Immigration Court will retain exclusive

jurisdiction over most suspension of deportation and special rule

cancellation of removal applications submitted by NACARA beneficiaries

who have been placed in deportation or removal proceedings.

This rule also codifies the relevant factors and standards for

extreme hardship identified within existing case law, incorporates

additional extreme hardship factors relevant to battered spouses and

children, creates a rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship for

NACARA-eligible ABC class members who submit completed applications,

sets forth relevant eligibility criteria, creates procedures for

adjudicating suspension of deportation and special rule cancellation of

removal cases before the Service, and provides for the referral of

certain cases to the Immigration Court.

DATES: Effective date: This interim rule is effective June 21, 1999.

Comment date: Written comments must be submitted on or before July

20, 1999.

ADDRESSES: Please submit written comments in triplicate to the

Director, Policy Directives and Instructions Branch, Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 425 I Street, NW, Room 5307, Washington, DC

20536. To ensure proper handling, please reference INS No. 1915-98 on

your correspondence. Comments are available for public inspection at

the above address by calling (202) 514-3048 to arrange for an

appointment.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For matters relating to the

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Joanna Ruppel, International

Affairs, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service,

425 I Street NW, ULLICO Bldg., third floor, Washington, DC 20536,

telephone number (202) 305-2663. For matters relating to the Executive

Office for Immigration Review: Chuck Adkins-Blanch, Acting General

Counsel, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Suite 2400, 5107

Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041, telephone number (703) 305-0470.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

What Is Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American

Relief Act?

Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American

Relief Act (NACARA), enacted as title II of Pub. L. 105-100 (111 Stat.

2160, 2193) (as amended by the Technical Corrections to the Nicaraguan

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. 105-139 (111 Stat.

2644)), permits certain Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and nationals of

former Soviet bloc countries to apply for suspension of deportation or

cancellation of removal under special provisions set forth in that

section.

How Did the Service Propose To Implement Provisions of Section 203 of

NACARA?

On November 24, 1998, the Department of Justice published a

proposed rule to implement certain aspects of section 203 of NACARA in

the Federal Register at 63 FR 64895. The proposed rule would grant

asylum officers jurisdiction to adjudicate certain NACARA cases, create

a new NACARA application form, and outline the eligibility criteria for

obtaining relief, as well as the process for submitting an application

to the Service and processing procedures. The proposed rule would also

codify the factors from relevant case law generally considered in

evaluating extreme hardship claims. Comments were requested from the

public by January 25, 1999.

In response to the proposed rule, the Department received over 400

comments from a wide range of community organizations, legal service

providers, advocacy groups, members of Congress, the private bar, and

individuals. The comments offered suggestions for revising and

streamlining the adjudication and application process, providing

alternative legal interpretations for certain eligibility issues, and

advocating various policy interpretations with regard to implementation

of section 203 of NACARA. The vast majority of comments, however, urged

the Department to create a mandatory finding of extreme hardship for

NACARA beneficiaries, particularly for those ABC class members who are

eligible for relief under section 203 of NACARA.

Why Is the Service Issuing an Interim Rule With Requests for Comments?

The Department has reviewed all the comments submitted in response

to its proposed rule carefully and, in deciding which comments to

incorporate, has kept in mind the ameliorative purposes of NACARA. Many

suggestions from the public have been incorporated, particularly with

regard to streamlining the application form and clarifying certain

aspects of the application and adjudication process. With respect to

alternative legal interpretations of eligibility requirements and other

substantive matters, the Department has made those changes that comport

with the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) and NACARA.

Some of the substantive legal recommendations, however, exceed the

scope of the law and could not be included in the interim rule. This is

particularly true with regard to the

[[Page 27857]]

resolution of the extreme hardship issue. As will be explained in

greater detail, the Department has determined that it would be

inconsistent with both the Act and NACARA to adopt a conclusive finding

of extreme hardship for all NACARA applicants, as well as for the more

limited group of ABC class members. The Department has determined,

however, that a more limited approach is most consistent with the

requirement that suspension of deportation and cancellation of removal

cases be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. This rule, therefore,

creates a rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship for those ABC

class members who are eligible to apply for relief under section 203 of

NACARA. The presumption will not apply to nationals from the former

Soviet bloc countries or any NACARA dependents.

Because the adoption of a rebuttable presumption represents a

significant shift from the proposed rule, the Department has determined

that an additional comment period is needed. However, due to the

substantial number of aliens eligible to apply for relief under section

203 of NACARA, the Department finds that there is good cause to avoid

further delay in allowing applications by issuing this regulation as an

interim rule. 5 U.S.C. 553.

How Are the Comments to the Proposed Rule Addressed in This Interim

Rule?

Given the large number of comments and the variety of issues

addressed, the discussion of the comments is divided into the general

categories of jurisdiction, initial and substantive eligibility

requirements, application procedures, adjudication procedures, and

revisions to the form that will generally be used to request relief

under section 203 of NACARA, Form I-881, ``Application for Suspension

of Deportation or Special Rule Cancellation of Removal (pursuant to

section 203 of Public Law 105-100 (NACARA)).'' Within each category,

the discussion contains a brief summary of relevant comments, the

Department's responses, and the changes made to the rule or form.

Additionally, this interim rule at 8 CFR part 246 gives asylum

office directors the same authority currently accorded district

directors to rescind adjustment of status granted to an individual by

an asylum officer in cases in which the individual is later found to

have been ineligible for adjustment of status. This interim rule also

outlines certain conditions and consequences of filing an application

for NACARA relief at 8 CFR 240.63(d).

II. Discussion of Comments

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction Over NACARA Applications

Several commenters requested that the Service be given initial

jurisdiction over all applications for suspension of deportation and

special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. One comment stated

that the Service should have jurisdiction over applications of

individuals whose asylum applications were adjudicated under the terms

of the ABC settlement agreement while NACARA was under legislative

consideration, but before it passed, and also over individuals who have

no mechanism for applying with the Service, such as those who

registered for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), but never applied for

asylum.

The Department will not change the jurisdictional scheme initially

proposed, as it is the best way for ensuring timely resolution of

NACARA applications. As explained in greater detail in the

supplementary information published with the proposed rule,

administrative efficiency is and has always been the Department's

primary consideration in delineating jurisdiction. 63 FR 64895

(November 24, 1998). Distributing the NACARA caseload between the

Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Service's Asylum

Program increases the Department's ability to resolve cases quickly,

because, in the vast majority of cases, a NACARA application will be

heard by the agency that also has jurisdiction over an applicant's

pending asylum application. For those persons with asylum claims

currently pending before the Service, the rule permits concurrent

adjudication of the asylum and NACARA applications. If an applicant is

granted either asylum or NACARA relief, it will be unnecessary to refer

his or her case to the Immigration Court. It would be administratively

inefficient to transfer the cases of individuals currently in

immigration proceedings, including ABC class members whose asylum

applications have already been given a de novo adjudication by the

Service, back to the Service solely for a NACARA adjudication and would

delay the resolution of their cases.

The interim rule does include two exceptions to the general rule

that individuals in proceedings before the Immigration Court may apply

for relief under section 203 of NACARA only before the Immigration

Court. The first exception covers those registered ABC class members

whose proceedings before the Immigration Court or the Board of

Immigration Appeals (Board) were administratively closed or continued,

including those class members with final orders of deportation or

removal who have filed and been granted NACARA motions to reopen under

8 CFR 3.43. An individual in this category is eligible to file a NACARA

application with the Service if the individual is eligible for the

benefits of the ABC settlement agreement, has not already had a de novo

adjudication of the asylum claim by the Service pursuant to the

agreement, and has not moved for and been granted a motion to

recalendar proceedings before the Immigration Court or the Board to

request suspension of deportation.

Under the second exception, a qualified family member of an

individual who has a section 203 NACARA application pending with the

Service, or who has been granted relief under that provision, may move

to close the proceedings before the Immigration Court in order to apply

with the Service. Administrative efficiency will likely be enhanced

where family members have similar claims and there are strong policy

reasons based on family unity to make this exception to the general

jurisdiction rule.

The Department also declines to adopt the proposal that the Service

be given jurisdiction over applications of individuals who have neither

applied for asylum with the Service nor have been placed in immigration

proceedings before the Immigration Court. The Department is concerned

that such an expansion of the Service's jurisdiction would result in a

large number of fraudulent applications being filed solely for the

purposes of obtaining employment authorization, and thereby expose the

Asylum Program to a recurrence of the same problems that necessitated

asylum reform in 1995.

Concerns regarding fraud arise because an applicant for suspension

of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal will be entitled

to apply immediately for and be granted employment authorization. The

determination of eligibility for employment authorization will

necessarily be made by Service Center personnel based solely on a

written application. However, an asylum office must accurately verify

whether an individual is an ABC class member and registered for ABC

benefits. Verification of ABC class membership and registration is a

time consuming process that, because of limitations in the registration

databases, often cannot be done without interviewing the individual. If

the affirmative process is

[[Page 27858]]

not limited as set forth in the proposed rule, an individual who is not

an ABC class member, or who is an unregistered class member, could

easily submit a fraudulent application for relief under section 203 of

NACARA and be granted employment authorization.

Restricting the availability of the affirmative NACARA process to

certain categories of NACARA beneficiaries who have pending asylum

applications with the Service and those who have a qualified relative

whose asylum application has been adjudicated by the Service or is

pending with the Service ensures that the Service has an existing

record of the applicant or the applicant's qualified relative before he

or she is able to apply for affirmative relief under section 203 of

NACARA. This restriction minimizes the Asylum Program's vulnerability

to fraud and avoids diverting resources from the adjudication process

in order to verify the status of each new applicant claiming to be a

registered ABC class member. This allows the Service to focus on

resolving the status of the approximately 240,000 registered ABC class

members who have asylum applications pending with the Service and their

qualified relatives.

Process for Placing NACARA Beneficiaries Ineligible to Apply With the

Service Into Removal Proceedings

One commenter requested that the regulations provide a mechanism

for those who are not eligible to apply with the Service to receive

charging documents placing them in removal proceedings where they may

apply for special rule cancellation of removal before the Immigration

Court.

The Department recognizes that registered ABC class members who

never applied for asylum and who have not been placed in immigration

proceedings are unable to apply for special rule cancellation of

removal unless the Service places them in removal proceedings by

issuing charging documents. An individual may request that the district

office with jurisdiction place him or her in proceedings, but the

Service retains prosecutorial discretion to determine the priority

status of such a request. The Department is considering the possibility

of having the asylum offices issue charging documents to registered ABC

class members who request to be placed into proceedings and who provide

sufficient information for the Service to issue the charges. The

preparation and service of charging documents is labor intensive and

would require diverting resources from the adjudication of applications

filed by the large number of individuals who have asylum applications

pending with the Service. Therefore, an asylum office's ability to

issue charging documents upon request necessarily depends on the

resources of the asylum office, the number of applications for

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal

initially filed by NACARA beneficiaries, the number of affirmative

asylum applications the asylum office must adjudicate within the time

limits imposed by statute, and other program requirements, such as the

number of credible fear and reasonable fear interviews requested of the

office. The Department will be in a better position to determine the

feasibility of issuing charging documents upon request after the

affirmative program has begun and allocation of resources based on the

number of NACARA applications filed each month can be evaluated more

accurately.

Jurisdiction--``Still Pending Adjudication by the Service''

Several commenters requested that the regulations clarify what is

meant by ``still pending adjudication by the Service'' for purposes of

determining who is eligible to apply with the Service.

Section 240.62(a) of the proposed rule provides for Service

jurisdiction over certain applicants whose asylum applications are

``pending adjudication by the Service'' at the time the applicants

apply for relief under NACARA. For the sake of clarity, the interim

rule contains a definition of this phrase at Sec. 240.60. An asylum

application will be considered ``pending adjudication by the Service,''

if the Service has not served the applicant with a final decision or

referred the application to the Immigration Court. This means that,

unless the Service has served the applicant with a final decision to

grant asylum or deny asylum, or has served the applicant with documents

referring his or her application to the Immigration Court, the asylum

application will be considered pending with the Service, even if a

final decision has been made by the Service, but not yet served on the

applicant.

Jurisdiction--Scope of ABC Class Members' Eligibility to File With the

Service

Several commenters requested that the regulations clarify the

statement ``otherwise met the asylum filing deadline pursuant to the

ABC settlement agreement,'' contained in Sec. 240.62(a). The commenters

recommended that the phrase be interpreted to mean that certain ABC

class members can still apply for asylum under the settlement agreement

if the Service failed to serve them properly with required notices.

Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of Sec. 240.62 give the Service

jurisdiction over applications for suspension of deportation or special

rule cancellation of removal filed by registered ABC class members who,

in the Service's determination, are eligible for benefits of the

settlement agreement and whose asylum applications are still pending

adjudication by the Service. To be eligible for the benefits of the

settlement agreement, a registered class member must have filed for

asylum by a specified date. Consistent with the settlement agreement,

the Service has allowed a very small number of Salvadoran class members

who registered for ABC benefits, but missed the requisite asylum filing

date, to apply for asylum under the terms of the settlement agreement.

Such applications are permissible where the Service determines that it

failed to send those individuals a copy of Notice 5, as required by the

settlement agreement. Under the settlement agreement, the Service was

obligated to send Notice 5, which informed class members that they had

to apply for asylum on or before January 31, 1996, in order to retain

benefits of the settlement agreement, to Salvadoran class members who

had applied for TPS. To date, the Service has not excepted any other

class members from the asylum filing deadlines for any other reason.

However, the Department included the broad language in

Sec. 240.62(a)(1) and (2), ``or otherwise met the asylum application

filing deadline pursuant to the ABC settlement agreement,'' to enable

the Service to maintain jurisdiction over a class member who

demonstrates that he or she did not meet the requisite filing deadline

because of some fault of the Service, such as failure to serve certain

required notices. The burden is on the class member, however, to

establish that the Service was at fault.

The Department declines to adopt the definition recommended in the

comments because it would not afford the necessary flexibility that may

benefit the ABC class. The Department takes this action with the

understanding that, pursuant to current practice and as documented in

the ABC Procedures Manual that is used by field personnel in

implementing the ABC settlement agreement, the Service will extend the

asylum filing deadline if it determines that a Salvadoran class member

who applied for temporary protected status was not properly sent Notice

5.

[[Page 27859]]

Initial Eligibility

Advance Parole and Eligibility to Apply for NACARA

Several commenters disagreed with the Department's determination

that NACARA beneficiaries in deportation proceedings who had previously

left the country and returned under a grant of advance parole are

ineligible for NACARA relief. They argued that, while such persons may

be ineligible for suspension of deportation, they should be eligible to

apply for special rule cancellation of removal by virtue of their

status of inadmissibility.

For aliens present in the United States, a grant of advance parole

under section 212(d)(5) of the Act permits the individual to leave the

United States temporarily with advance permission to return to the

United States. Upon expiration of parole, however, the statute requires

that an applicant must be ``dealt with in the same manner as that of

any other applicant for admission to the United States.'' Consequently,

an applicant who was previously considered deportable would be

considered inadmissible for purposes of determining eligibility for any

form of relief. As a practical matter, very few individuals in

deportation proceedings were ever granted advance parole, but those who

did receive permission to depart would have been subject, upon return,

to termination of the deportation proceedings along with receipt of new

charging documents placing them in exclusion proceedings. A very small

number of ABC class members whose deportation proceedings were

administratively closed pursuant to the settlement agreement received

advance parole. Upon their return, they were then technically

inadmissible to the United States rather than deportable. In the normal

course of events, those persons denied asylum at their de novo ABC

adjudication would have been placed in exclusion proceedings once their

parole was terminated. Because ABC asylum adjudications did not begin

until 1997 and were subsequently suspended in 1998, as a result of

NACARA, many, if not all of these cases have not yet been adjudicated.

For purposes of a NACARA adjudication before the Service, this

small group of ABC class members might be ineligible for suspension of

deportation based solely on their change in status from deportable to

inadmissible, if their deportation proceedings are still pending when

their NACARA applications are adjudicated. Though temporary absences

from the United States ordinarily would not automatically terminate or

nullify previously commenced deportation proceedings, they likely would

in this circumstance because these individuals became applicants for

admission upon their return to the United States under advance parole,

and the deportation charges contained in the show cause orders

previously issued in their cases are no longer applicable. See Matter

of Brown, 18 I & N Dec. 324 (BIA 1982). In these narrow set of

circumstances, it is appropriate to consider the deportation

proceedings against an individual who departed and returned to the

United States under a grant of advance parole while those deportation

proceedings were pending as having terminated as of the date of the

person's departure from the United States. If the Service determines

that such an applicant is eligible for relief under section 203 of

NACARA, the applicant will be granted special rule cancellation of

removal. If the applicant is not granted NACARA relief and is not

granted asylum, the Service will issue charging documents placing the

person into removal proceedings.

To the best of the Department's knowledge, only ABC class members

will be affected by this provision. However, the rule permits asylum

officers to follow the same procedure for any other applicant within

their jurisdiction who received advance parole while in deportation

proceedings.

Eligibility To Apply for NACARA in Exclusion Proceedings

Another issue raised by the commenters is whether section 203 of

NACARA and the implementing regulations apply to NACARA beneficiaries

who were in exclusion proceedings as of April 1, 1997, including those

ABC class members who were in exclusion proceedings and had those

proceedings administratively closed or continued by EOIR to allow the

class members to pursue de novo adjudications of their asylum claims by

the Service, as provided by the ABC settlement agreement. These

commenters argued that Congress indicated its clear intent to make

NACARA relief available to persons in exclusion proceedings, because

the statute provides that NACARA's special rules apply ``regardless of

whether the alien is in exclusion or deportation proceedings.* * * ''

IIRIRA section 309(c)(5)(C)(i), as amended by section 203(a)(1) of

NACARA. Several commenters suggested that the intent of Congress can be

carried out by placing individuals currently in exclusion proceedings

into removal proceedings by: (1) electing to proceed under new removal

procedures in those cases where an evidentiary hearing in the exclusion

process had not commenced prior to April 1, 1997, pursuant to section

309(c)(2) of IIRIRA; or (2) terminating exclusion proceedings where

there has not been a final administrative decision and reinitiating

them as removal proceedings, as provided for under section 309(c)(3) of

IIRIRA.

Courts have consistently stated that suspension of deportation is

unavailable to persons in exclusion proceedings, see Matter of Torres,

19 I & N 371, 372-73 (BIA 1986); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 26-

27, 103 S.Ct. 321, 325-26, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (``[T]he alien who

loses his right to reside in the United States in a deportation hearing

has a number of substantive rights not available to the alien who is

denied admission in an exclusion proceeding'[including the right to]

seek suspension of deportation.''), even if the person has been present

in the United States for an extended period of time under a grant of

parole. Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General of U.S., 479 F.2d 820, 822

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973). This principle has

recently withstood statutory and constitutional challenges, despite the

recognition that IIRIRA eliminated the distinction between deportation

and exclusion for proceedings initiated on or after April 1, 1997, by

replacing them with a single removal process. See Patel v. McElroy, 143

F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 1998) (statutory challenge); Skelly v. INS, 168 F.3d

88 (2nd Cir. 1999) (constitutional challenge based on equal protection

principles).

The general rule laid out in IIRIRA for the transition from

exclusion and deportation procedures to a unified removal process is

that, for ``an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as

of [April 1, 1997],'' the amendments to the procedures for removing

individuals from the United States instituted by IIRIRA ``shall not

apply,'' and exclusion and deportation proceedings ``shall continue to

be conducted without regard to such amendments.'' IIRIRA section

309(c)(1). The IIRIRA transitional rules dealing with suspension of

deportation, as amended by section 203 of NACARA, are directed solely

to outlining the circumstances under which the new cancellation of

removal rules regarding continuous residence and physical presence,

found in section 240A(d)(1) and (2) of the Act, apply to individuals

who were placed in exclusion or deportation proceedings prior to April

1, 1997.

[[Page 27860]]

Under the transitional rules for suspension of deportation cases,

section 309(c)(5)(A) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, states that the

rules regarding continuous residence and physical presence generally

apply to orders to show cause regardless of when the orders to show

cause are issued, thus making these rules applicable to requests for

suspension of deportation. The first exception to this rule, located at

section 309(c)(5)(B) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, provides that the

new continuous residence and physical presence rules found at section

240A(d)(1) and (2) of the Act will not apply to an order to show cause

issued prior to April 1, 1997, when the Attorney General decides to

terminate a pending exclusion or deportation proceeding under section

309(c)(3) of IIRIRA and reinitiate the proceeding under removal

provisions. The exception described in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i) of

IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, states that these new rules regarding

continuous residence and physical presence will not apply to NACARA

beneficiaries who request suspension of deportation or cancellation of

removal. While the first exception simply prevents the application of

the new continuous residence and physical presence rules to an order to

show cause in one particular situation, the second exception exempts

NACARA beneficiaries from the continuous residence and physical

presence rules whenever they file for suspension of deportation under

the pre-IIRIRA section 244 of the Act, or for regular cancellation of

removal under section 240A of the Act (additional rules establishing

eligibility for NACARA special rule cancellation of removal are covered

separately in section 309(f) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA),

``regardless of whether the alien is in exclusion or deportation

proceedings before [April 1, 1997].'' IIRIRA section 309(c)(5)(C)(i),

as amended by NACARA.

Contrary to showing a congressional intent that NACARA relief be

made available to persons in exclusion proceedings, the phrase quoted

above and cited in several comments simply indicates that Congress did

not want the new continuous residence and physical presence rules to

apply to NACARA beneficiaries who are eligible to apply for suspension

of deportation or cancellation of removal no matter what charging

documents, if any, may have been issued to them prior to April 1, 1997.

This language makes clear that the initiation of exclusion proceedings

against NACARA beneficiaries prior to April 1, 1997, does not result in

the application of the new continuous residence and physical presence

rules to their cases, acknowledging the possibility that such

individuals may have their exclusion proceedings changed into removal

proceedings under the transitional rules covered in section 309(c)(2)

and (3) of IIRIRA.

None of these transitional rules dealing with suspension of

deportation override the general transition rule that subjects a person

placed into exclusion proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, to the rules

governing exclusion that were in place before IIRIRA was enacted.

IIRIRA section 309(c)(1). Included among those rules is the long-

standing principle that persons in exclusion proceedings are ineligible

to apply for suspension of deportation. As noted by certain comments,

the IIRIRA transitional rules provide a way to allow such individuals

to apply for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. This

could be done by applying removal procedures to those cases in which an

evidentiary hearing has not commenced as of April 1, 1997, as allowed

under section 309(c)(2) of IIRIRA, or by terminating the exclusion

proceedings and reinitiating proceedings under section 240 of the Act,

as provided for under section 309(c)(3) of IIRIRA. For purposes of this

interim rule, the Department declines to pursue these options at this

time, but invites additional comments on this point.

Effect of ``Apprehended at Time of Entry'' Limit on Eligibility

Several commenters requested that the regulations define the term

``apprehended at time of entry'' to promote consistency in

interpretation. The commenters also proposed the following definition:

``The phrase ``apprehended at time of entry'' means a person who was

arrested at a United States port-of-entry between December 19, 1990,

the preliminary approval date of the settlement agreement, and January

31, 1991, the date the court approved the settlement agreement.''

The interim rule will not be amended to include this definition.

Section 203 of NACARA provides that a registered ABC class member who

``was not apprehended after December 19, 1990, at the time of entry,''

may apply for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of

removal under the provisions enacted by NACARA. The language

``apprehended * * * at time of entry'' was derived from paragraph 2 of

the ABC settlement agreement, which states, ``Class members apprehended

at the time of entry after the date of preliminary approval of this

agreement shall not be eligible for the benefits hereunder.'' See

American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 800 (N.D.

Cal. 1991). The date of preliminary approval of the settlement

agreement was December 19, 1990. There is no provision in either the

settlement agreement or section 203 of NACARA limiting this provision

to those registered class members apprehended at time of entry between

December 19, 1990, and January 31, 1991, nor is there any provision

that excludes from the applicability of this provision registered class

members apprehended after January 31, 1991. The Service consistently

has implemented the plain meaning of the language in the settlement

agreement in denying ABC benefits to class members apprehended at the

time of entry after December 19, 1990. There is no indication that

Congress intended to redefine the exclusionary ground included in the

settlement agreement or to limit the corresponding statutory provision

only to registered class members apprehended at the time of entry prior

to January 31, 1991. Therefore, the Department does not believe that

the interpretation suggested in the comments is permitted by NACARA.

The Department has carefully considered the value of including a

definition of ``apprehended at time of entry'' within the rule, but

does not believe that it is appropriate to do so. The Service has

issued and continues to provide policy guidance to its officers

explaining that a class member who has been apprehended after the class

member has effected an entry (consistent with the former ``entry

doctrine'') cannot be considered to have been apprehended at the time

of entry. Deriving guidance from the definition of ``entry'' under the

Act, as it existed prior to April 1, 1997, and as developed by case

law, the Service has instructed officers that the determination of

whether an entry has been effected involves consideration of the

following three factors: (1) whether the class member has crossed into

the territorial limits of the United States; (2) whether the class

member has been inspected or admitted by an immigration officer, or has

actually and intentionally evaded inspection at the nearest inspection

point; and (3) whether the class member crossed into the territorial

limits of the United States free from official restraint, including

free from surveillance. Because these factors necessarily are dependent

on the individualized factors of each case, the Department has

determined that it is more appropriate

[[Page 27861]]

to continue to provide internal guidance on the factors to consider in

evaluating whether an entry has been effected than to attempt to codify

a definition that would cover the wide variety of facts that may be

present in an individual case.

Guatemalans and Salvadorans Filing for Asylum by April 1, 1990

Several commenters suggested that the proposed rule reads too

narrowly the eligibility requirement contained at section

309(c)(5)(C)(i)(II) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA. This sections

permits Salvadorans and Guatemalans who ``filed an application for

asylum with the Immigration and Naturalization Service'' prior to April

1, 1990, to apply for relief under NACARA. Section 240.61(a)(2) of the

proposed rule would limit eligibility to those persons who filed an

application for asylum directly with the Service. The commenters note

that the proposed rule fails to account for those persons who filed for

asylum by April 1, 1990, before the Immigration Court. The comments

argue that the critical factor in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(II) of the

statute relates to asylum filing date, rather than the forum of filing.

The comments further note that any application filed with the

Immigration Court was necessarily served on the Service. They argue

that a restrictive reading of the statute unnecessarily limits

eligibility, and that filing for purposes of this section should be met

whenever an applicant filed for asylum with the Department of Justice.

The Department agrees that section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(II) of IIRIRA is

subject to different interpretations. In drafting the proposed rule,

the Department contrasted the wording of this section with that of

section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(V) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, which

permits certain nationals of former Soviet bloc countries to apply for

relief under NACARA if they ``filed for asylum on or before December

31, 1991.'' The proposed rule reflected the Department's initial

interpretation that subclauses (II) and (V) should be read together,

such that subclause (II) should be read to limit eligibility to those

who filed an affirmative asylum application with the Service, while an

individual could be eligible for relief under subclause (V) as long as

an asylum application was filed before either the Service or before the

Immigration Court.

Although this interpretation is consistent with the literal wording

of the statute, the Department recognizes that, in determining

eligibility to apply for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal under NACARA, ``filed'' could be read more

broadly to mean either submitted to or served on the Service. This

interpretation is supported by several factors. First, it is more

appropriate to track subclauses (I) and (II) rather than subclauses

(II) and (V). Section 309(c)(5)(C)(i) of IIRIRA contains two provisions

specifically relating to Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Subclause (I)

permits Salvadorans and Guatemalans who entered the United States prior

to September 19, 1990, and October 1, 1990, respectively, to file for

NACARA relief if they registered for benefits under the ABC agreement

by the dates specified in the agreement. Subclause (II) relates to

Salvadorans and Guatemalans who filed for asylum by April 1, 1990,

regardless of whether they also registered for ABC benefits. When

subclause (I) and (II) are read together, the application of the

statute creates inconsistent results unless subclause (II) is

interpreted to cover both Service and EOIR asylum filings. For

instance, a Salvadoran placed in immigration proceedings who filed an

application for asylum with the Immigration Court by April 1, 1990 is,

by definition, a member of the ABC class because he or she entered the

United States prior to September 19, 1990. If he or she registered for

ABC benefits, he or she would be eligible to apply for relief under

subclause (I), even though he or she did not initially file the asylum

application with the Service. Given that subclause (II) essentially

concerns ABC class members who failed to register for ABC benefits, it

is inconsistent with the ameliorative purposes of NACARA to limit

eligibility solely to those persons who filed directly with the

Service.

Second, NACARA makes use of either ABC registration deadlines or

asylum filing deadlines to identify eligible aliens. A grant of asylum

confers the same benefits regardless of whether the grant is conferred

by an asylum officer or an Immigration Court. It is the act of filing

for asylum or registering for ABC benefits, rather than the forum, that

distinguishes subclause (II) applicants from those Salvadorans and

Guatemalans in the United States who never applied for asylum or

registered for ABC benefits.

Consequently, 8 CFR 240.61(a)(2) has been amended to include a

Guatemalan or Salvadoran national who filed an application for asylum

with the Service on or before April 1, 1990, either by filing an

application directly with the Service or filing the application with

the Immigration Court and serving a copy of that application on the

Service.

Determining When an Application for Asylum is Filed

Though not included in the proposed rule, the Department has

included in Sec. 240.60 of this interim rule a definition for

determining when a person is considered to have ``filed an application

for asylum.'' This definition is necessary in order to determine

eligibility to apply for relief under section 203 of NACARA. The

definition will also be used to determine the date a dependent included

in an asylum application is considered to have ``filed'' for asylum.

Under this definition, any dependent spouse or child who was present in

the United States and included in the principal's asylum application at

the time it was filed will be considered to have filed an application

for asylum on the date the principal's asylum application was filed.

Any dependent who is added to the principal's asylum application after

it was initially filed will be considered to have filed an application

for asylum on the date the dependent was added to principal's asylum

application.

Eligibility--NACARA Dependents

One commenter requested that the regulations specify that children

and spouses can file for relief under NACARA after they have attained 7

years of continuous physical presence in the United States, even if

they had not been continuously present in the United States for 7 years

at the time the statute was enacted, or have not reached 7 years by the

time the rule implementing section 203 of NACARA becomes effective.

The Department agrees with this interpretation. Both section 203 of

NACARA and the interim rule allow children and spouses to apply for

relief under NACARA, even if they had not been continuously physically

present in the United States for 7 years at the time NACARA was enacted

or implemented. To meet the physical presence requirement, the spouse

or child must have 7 years of continuous physical presence in the

United States (10 years, if certain inadmissibility or deportability

grounds apply) as of the date the application for relief was filed.

Unlike section 202 of NACARA, there is no deadline for applying for

relief under section 203 of NACARA.

Eligibility of Dependents Who Have Turned 21 Years of Age Since NACARA

Was Enacted

Several commenters expressed concern about children who have lost

or will lose eligibility to apply for relief pursuant to section

309(c)(5)(C)(i)(III) of

[[Page 27862]]

IIRIRA, as amended by section 203(a) of NACARA, because they turned 21

years of age between November 19, 1997, the date NACARA was enacted,

and the effective date of this regulation. Several commenters suggested

that the regulations ``grandfather'' in all unmarried sons and

unmarried daughters who have turned 21 years of age since November 19,

1997. The commenters compare the current situation to that faced by

juveniles eligible for special immigration status under section 153 of

the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. 101-649 (104 Stat.

4978), who aged out prior to the publication of regulations

implementing that section of the law. Under the rule, juveniles who met

the statutory requirements on the date the statute was enacted, but who

had aged out prior to implementation of regulations, were permitted to

apply for and receive special immigrant status.

Comparison to the rule implementing section 153 of IMMACT 90 is not

persuasive, as the statutes and circumstances in question are not

analogous. Regulations implementing section 153 of the Immigration Act

of 1990, governing special eligibility provisions for juveniles to

adjust to lawful permanent resident status, ``grandfathered'' in

certain juveniles who met eligibility requirements on November 29,

1990. This was done because IMMACT 90 did not originally exempt special

immigrant juvenile aliens from the normal statutory requirements for

adjustment of status. Recognizing that most special immigrant juvenile

alien adjustment applicants were statutorily ineligible for adjustment

of status, for reasons unrelated to their age, Service offices were

directed to accept and hold in abeyance applications filed by juveniles

who appeared to meet the statutory requirements for special immigrant

juvenile classification, but who may have been precluded based on

statutory requirements for adjustment of status. This policy was

adopted because the Service had put forward technical amendments that

would exempt these applicants from many of the ineligibility grounds

contained in sections 245 (a) and (c) of the Act. The technical

amendments to the Act were enacted at the end of 1991. The

supplementary information published as a final rule in the Federal

Register on August 12, 1993, at 58 FR 42843, explained that the rule

would apply the exemptions contained in the technical amendments to

aliens who could establish that they otherwise met the eligibility

criteria on November 29, 1990, ``to ensure that special immigrant

juveniles are not precluded from obtaining lawful permanent residence

because of the passage of time while the Service was awaiting

Congressional action to amend the adjustment of status provisions * *

*.''

Unlike the special immigrant cases, NACARA predicates eligibility

for dependents of a NACARA principal applicant on a grant of suspension

of deportation or cancellation of removal to the principal applicant.

The Department may not extend eligibility to qualified individuals who

were 21 years of age or older on the date of enactment of NACARA, or

prior to promulgation of regulations implementing the affirmative

application process because it exceeds the scope of eligibility

permitted by the statute. In section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(IV)(bb) of IIRIRA,

as amended by NACARA, Congress explicitly linked the age of the

unmarried son or daughter to the date the parent is granted suspension

of deportation or cancellation of removal, not to the date the

unmarried son or daughter's application is adjudicated or any other

date.

In contrast to individuals covered by section 153 of IMMACT 90,

nothing in NACARA precludes qualified children of NACARA beneficiaries

from applying for relief once the parent or spouse has been granted

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal. Any

NACARA beneficiary who has a NACARA-eligible dependent nearing the age

of 21 years old, and who has had an asylum application pending with the

Service, has been afforded the opportunity to request an expedited

adjudication of the asylum application. In such a case, if the asylum

application were not granted, the applicant would be placed in removal

proceedings where he or she could apply for relief under section 203 of

NACARA with the Immigration Court. Alternatively, the parent could

request that his or her pending asylum application be withdrawn in

order to apply with the Immigration Court for both asylum and relief

under section 203 of NACARA. In such cases, if the dependent was listed

on the parent's asylum application and was included in the request for

asylum, he or she would also be placed in proceedings and could file a

NACARA application with the Immigration Court. The Service has outlined

these options to the public in previous section 203 of NACARA

information materials issued through the Service's Office of Public

Affairs. (``Questions and Answers about NACARA and Cancellation of

Removal,'' February 10, 1998; ``Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

American Relief Act of 1997,'' April 1, 1998; and ``Section 203 of the

Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997,''

November 24, 1998.)

Initial Eligibility and ABC Class Members

One commenter stated that registered ABC class members who did not

apply for asylum by the dates required to retain eligibility for

benefits of the ABC settlement agreement should not be allowed to apply

for relief under NACARA. The commenter argued that NACARA was intended

to provide ABC class members with the opportunity to apply for

suspension of deportation under the rules that existed before IIRIRA

was enacted, and that if an ABC class member did not comply with the

requirements of the ABC settlement agreement, the class member should

not be allowed to apply for relief under NACARA.

Section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(I) of IIRIRA, as amended by section 203(a)

of NACARA, provides that any registered ABC class member who has not

been apprehended, after December 19, 1990, at time of entry or

convicted of an aggravated felony may apply for suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal under the

provisions enacted by NACARA. In contrast to sections

309(c)(5)(C)(i)(II) and (V) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, there is

no statutory language in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(I) of IIRIRA

connecting eligibility to apply for relief under NACARA to the filing

of an asylum application. Section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(I) of IIRIRA contains

no requirement that the registered class member have applied for asylum

on any particular date, or ever have applied for asylum, but instead

predicates eligibility to apply solely on nationality and entry date

(which correspond to ABC class membership) and registration for ABC

benefits. Therefore, the Department believes it would be improper to

include in the regulations a substantive restriction on eligibility

that is not reflected in the statute.

Substantive Eligibility

Eligibility-Continuous Physical Presence

Several commenters suggested revisions to Sec. 240.64, regarding

the calculation of continuous physical presence. With respect to

Sec. 240.64(b)(1), concerning continuous physical presence for

suspension of deportation cases, the commenters suggested modifying the

``brief, casual, and innocent'' standard by defining single absences

not exceeding 90 days or

[[Page 27863]]

aggregate absences not exceeding 180 days to be considered ``brief'' in

order to parallel the standard used in cancellation of removal cases.

The commenters further proposed that absences of greater duration

should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and that the applicant

should still be required to establish that any departure was casual or

innocent.

With respect to Sec. 240.64(b)(2), relating to special rule

cancellation of removal, several commenters objected to the requirement

that an applicant must establish that single absences of 90 days or

less were brief, casual, and innocent. These commenters argued that

such a requirement was inconsistent with the Act. Similarly, these

commenters objected to the language contained in Sec. 240.64(b)(3),

which states that a departure incident to a final order of deportation

or removal, or an order of voluntary departure, or with the intent to

commit a crime terminates continuous physical presence. The commenters

suggested amending the provision for special rule cancellation of

removal to delete the mandatory finding and substitute language

providing that such absences may be the basis for finding that

continuous physical presence has been terminated.

The Department will adopt certain suggestions regarding the

definition of a ``brief'' absence from the United States. As proposed,

Sec. 240.64(b)(1) reiterates former section 244(b)(2) of the Act, as in

effect prior to IIRIRA, which establishes that for purposes of

continuous physical presence, absences from the United States will be

evaluated based on a determination of whether the absence was brief,

casual, and innocent. Initially, the Department chose to adopt this

language without further clarification in the rule, based on the body

of case law interpreting this provision, as well as the greater

flexibility inherent in the phrase ``brief, casual, and innocent.''

Because the concept of ``brief, casual, and innocent,'' however, goes

to the nature of a departure, it is consistent with section 244(d)(2)

of the Act, as in effect prior to IIRIRA, to provide some guidance

within the rule regarding one or more of these factors. Given the use

of the 90/180-day rule within the context of both cancellation of

removal and special rule cancellation of removal, it is reasonable to

adopt these timeframes for purposes of suspension of deportation under

NACARA. To assist adjudicators and to ensure consistent determinations

regarding the length of a departure, the Department will revise the

rule to define a ``brief'' absence as one of 90 days or less or an

aggregate of 180 days or less. Absences of greater duration will still

be considered on a case-by-case basis in suspension cases in order to

comply with the broader language of ``brief, casual, and innocent''

contained in the statute. All absences will be evaluated, however, to

determine whether or not they were casual and innocent.

The Department will also amend Sec. 240.64(b)(2) of the proposed

rule relating to special rule cancellation of removal to reflect the

definition of ``brief'' adopted in Sec. 240.64(b)(1). It is not

appropriate, however, to adopt the remaining suggestions relating to

special rule cancellation of removal. The commenters suggest that it is

contrary to the statute to disqualify a special rule cancellation of

removal applicant based on the nature of his or her absences. Neither

NACARA nor the Act, as amended by IIRIRA, precludes such an evaluation,

and when the 90/180-day rule is read within the context of immigration

reform under IIRIRA, it is apparent that Congress intended certain

kinds of departures, such as those made in furtherance of criminal

offenses, to terminate continuous physical presence. Similarly, through

reinstatement under section 241(a)(5) of the Act, Congress severely

limited the opportunity to seek relief for aliens who illegally reenter

the United States after previously being removed, or departing

voluntarily under final orders.

The interim rule resolves the apparent inconsistency by clarifying

the effect of certain absences of 90 days or less in a manner

consistent with suspension of deportation. Specifically, the second

sentence of Sec. 240.64(b)(2) retains the analytical framework of the

brief, casual, and innocent standard to account for those situations in

which a relatively brief absence nonetheless meaningfully interrupts

continuous physical presence. The burden of proof remains on the

applicant to establish the ``casual and innocent'' nature of such

departures in order to conform with the burden of proof required under

suspension of deportation. While Sec. 240.64(b)(2) attempts to account

for departures generally, Sec. 240.64(b)(3) identifies specific

departures that have long been considered to break continuous physical

presence in the context of suspension of deportation adjudications. It

is, therefore, both reasonable and necessary to place the same

restrictions on special rule cancellation applicants.

Eligibility-Statutory Bars

Several commenters asserted that the regulations should not subject

NACARA beneficiaries to bars to eligibility for suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal, such as section

242B(e) of the Act, as in effect prior to April 1, 1997, and current

section 240(b)(7) of the Act. The commenters maintain that Congress

intended to waive substantive bars relating to eligibility. Citing

section 203(c) of NACARA, which allows beneficiaries to file a motion

to reopen ``[n]otwithstanding any limitation imposed by law,'' the

commenters argue that the plain language of the statute indicates that

the goal of section 203 of NACARA was to waive all limitations on

relief. The commenters note that Congress excepted from this provision

limitations premised on an alien's conviction of an aggravated felony.

The commenters argue that, because there is no provision of law that

bars an individual convicted of an aggravated felony from filing a

motion to reopen, Congress must have intended this provision to apply

to all other limitations to relief, not just to limitations on motions

to reopen.

The regulatory requirements reflecting the statutory bars will

remain unchanged. The Department's analysis of the statutory bars has

been fully set out in both the supplemental information in the proposed

rule, at 63 FR 64895, and in the supplemental information in the

interim rule concerning NACARA motions to reopen, at 63 FR 31890. The

parenthetical relating to aggravated felonies contained in section

203(c) of NACARA does not overcome the definitive statutory language

indicating that the paragraph is directed at statutory limitations on

motions to reopen. The parenthetical is more properly read as a

reiteration of the basic eligibility requirement rather than a

rejection of all other substantive eligibility requirements. This

parenthetical in no way exempts NACARA beneficiaries from the statutory

bars to suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal.

Eligibility-Battered Spouses and Children

A significant number of commenters requested that the Department

address the special circumstances of battered spouses and children who

are eligible for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(3) of

the Act, prior to IIRIRA, or cancellation of removal under section

240A(b)(2) of the Act. Those provisions permit the battered spouse and

child(ren) of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident

spouse or parent to qualify for suspension of deportation or

cancellation of removal by showing 3, rather than 7 years of continuous

physical presence, good

[[Page 27864]]

moral character, and extreme hardship to the alien, the alien's child,

or in the case of an alien who is a child, to the child's parent.

Specifically, the commenters asked that the special criteria used to

evaluate extreme hardship in adjustment of status self-petitions

submitted by battered spouses and children should also be made

explicitly applicable to those individuals seeking relief through

suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal. The commenters

noted that the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), a component of the

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322

(108 Stat. 1902-1955), created provisions to aid battered immigrants

whose ability to remain permanently in the United States may be

threatened by abusive spouses or parents.

In the context of self-petitioning, provided for in sections

204(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (iv) and 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) of the Act,

the Service has issued guidance instructing adjudicators to consider

certain factors when evaluating a claim of extreme hardship based on

domestic abuse. These factors are:

(1) The nature and extent of the physical or psychological

consequences of abuse;

(2) The impact of loss of access to the United States courts and

criminal justice system (including, but not limited to, the ability to

obtain and enforce orders of protection, criminal investigations and

prosecutions, and family law proceedings or court orders regarding

child support, maintenance, child custody, and visitation);

(3) The likelihood that the batterer's family, friends, or others

acting on behalf of the batterer in the home country would physically

or psychologically harm the applicant or the applicant's child(ren);

(4) The applicant's needs and/or needs of the applicant's

child(ren) for social, medical, mental health, or other supportive

services for victims of domestic violence that are unavailable or not

reasonably accessible in the home country;

(5) The existence of laws and social practices in the home country

that punish the applicant or the applicant's child(ren) because they

have been victims of domestic violence or have taken steps to leave an

abusive household; and

(6) The abuser's ability to travel to the home country and the

ability and willingness of authorities in the home country to protect

the applicant and/or the applicant's child(ren) from future abuse.

The commenters requested inclusion of these factors in the

regulation in order to ensure consistent application of these

considerations, whether the applicant seeks relief through the self-

petitioning process, under NACARA, or in the course of non-NACARA

immigration proceedings. Many commenters expressed concern that

omission of the factors would suggest that domestic violence issues

were irrelevant in the context of suspension or cancellation

adjudications. The commenters also noted that many applicants who had

experienced domestic violence would be reluctant to raise such issues

on their own, and that including these factors would assist attorneys

and adjudicators in eliciting information, and would help applicants to

understand that fears of domestic abuse or other repercussions were

legitimate issues for the adjudicator to consider.

The commenters correctly note that the suspension and cancellation

provisions pertaining to domestic abuse are part of a broader series of

initiatives to protect battered spouses and children within the

immigration laws. Most notably, sections 204(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the

Act, as amended, permit victims of domestic violence to self-petition

for adjustment of status so that their ability to reside permanently in

the United States is not conditioned on submission of a petition on

their behalf by the abusive spouse or parent. The criteria for

adjustment of status under this provision is similar to that required

in the suspension or cancellation context, except that the spouse or

child must be able to establish 3 years of residence in the United

States. To assist adjudicators in evaluating extreme hardship to these

self-petitioners, the Service has issued guidance regarding the special

nature of domestic abuse cases and the kind of hardship that may be

present. See Supplementary Information to the interim rule, published

on March 26, 1996, at 61 FR 13061, ``Petition to Classify Alien as

Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a Preference

Immigrant; Self-Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and

Children;'' Memorandum for Terrance M. O'Reilly, Director,

Administrative Appeals Office, from Paul Virtue, Office of General

Counsel, `` `Extreme Hardship' and Documentary Requirements Involving

Battered Spouses and Children,'' (October 16, 1998), reprinted at 76

Interpreter Releases 162 (January 25, 1999).

Nothing in the proposed rule prohibits an applicant from raising

the VAWA factors in support of a suspension of deportation or

cancellation of removal application. The Department agrees, however,

that the factors should be included in the interim rule to avoid

confusion. The addition of these factors also affirms the Department's

commitment to aiding victims of domestic violence and will assist

adjudicators, attorneys, and applicants in eliciting and developing

relevant facts.

Consequently, new Sec. 240.58(c) lists the VAWA factors and also

clearly states that these factors are relevant in any extreme hardship

determination in the context of a request for suspension of

deportation, whether or not it is within the context of section

244(a)(3) of the Act, as in effect prior to IIRIRA. Sections 240.64(c)

and 240.20(c) of the interim rule will also reflect that domestic

violence factors are relevant to the extreme hardship determination

with regards to requests for special rule cancellation of removal and

cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act,

respectively.

Rebuttable Presumption of Extreme Hardship for Certain NACARA

Beneficiaries

Virtually all public commenters contained a request that the

Department extend some form of a presumption of extreme hardship to

principal NACARA applicants, including nationals of the former Soviet

bloc. In particular, the majority of commenters asked the Department to

extend a presumption to those Salvadorans and Guatemalans who are class

members of the ABC lawsuit. Many of the commenters requested that

evidence of class membership should be considered sufficient to

establish extreme hardship based on the conditions in El Salvador and

Guatemala, particularly after Hurricane Mitch. Additionally, commenters

argued that the class had been protected for prolonged periods of time

from deportation as a result of the ABC settlement agreement and other

measures staying deportation, including TPS for Salvadorans, such that

class members had established ties to the United States, a significant

factor in evaluating hardship.

Some commenters discussed at great length factors the authors

believed to be relevant to an extreme hardship determination for the

ABC class. The commenters noted, for instance, that many class members

have children who were either born in the United States or who came to

this country at such a young age that they have little or no memory of

El Salvador or Guatemala. The commenters also identified other factors,

including the circumstances under which the class members fled

[[Page 27865]]

their countries, the quality of health care and educational opportunity

in those countries, the psychological effects of returning to a country

where an individual or a family member may have suffered persecution,

the lack of sufficient employment opportunities in those countries, and

the possibility of significant financial loss, as the commenters

believe that many class members have purchased homes or started

businesses in the United States. Many of the public comments also noted

that a mandatory finding would enhance administrative efficiency by

eliminating the need to make individual determinations of extreme

hardship for the approximately 240,000 ABC class members who are

eligible to apply for relief under section 203 of NACARA. As a further

matter of administrative convenience, many commenters urged that the

mandatory presumption should also be extended to nationals of the

former Soviet bloc and all spouses, children, and unmarried sons and

daughters over the age of 21 eligible for NACARA on the basis of a

grant of relief to a parent or spouse (NACARA dependents).

One commenter objected to a presumption of extreme hardship on the

grounds that it was contrary to NACARA and the Act, arguing that

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal

requires individualized determinations of extreme hardship in all

cases.

The Department declines to adopt a blanket finding that all NACARA

beneficiaries will suffer extreme hardship if they are deported or

removed to their home countries, as such a finding would be contrary to

the specific requirements of both NACARA and the Act, as well as the

body of administrative and judicial interpretations that have been

adopted regarding the meaning of ``extreme hardship.'' The Department

has concluded, however, that strong factual evidence exists to support

an evidentiary presumption of extreme hardship for those ABC class

members who are eligible to apply for NACARA relief, as defined in

Sec. 240.61(a) or (b) of this interim rule. This conclusion is based on

a determination that the ABC class shares certain characteristics that

give rise to a strong likelihood that an ABC class member or qualified

relative would suffer extreme hardship if the class member were

deported or removed. Such a presumption may be rebutted by the Service

if evidence in the record establishes that it is more likely than not

that extreme hardship would not result from removal or deportation.

The creation of a presumption will not, however, eliminate the

necessity of examining the evidence of extreme hardship in each case.

An applicant will be required to submit a completed application that

includes answers to questions relating to extreme hardship and to

answer questions regarding hardship at the interview or hearing.

Adjudicators will determine whether there is anything to disprove the

presumption of extreme hardship and may ask additional questions at the

interview or hearing, if necessary. The burden of proof will lie with

the Service to overcome the presumption, if supported by evidence in

the record. In this way, the likelihood that ABC class members will

suffer extreme hardship is balanced against the necessity of a case-by-

case evaluation of the individual application. Eligibility criteria for

the presumption, and the burden and standard of proof that will apply

in presumption cases, are described in new Sec. 240.64(d).

As noted in the supplemental material in the proposed rule, extreme

hardship is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the

particular circumstances of the individual applicant. Matter of Hwang,

10 I & N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). While each application must be

assessed on its own merits, and each applicant must be found

statutorily eligible before being considered for this discretionary

form of relief, neither NACARA nor the Act limits the Attorney

General's authority to create appropriate rules and procedures for

determining eligibility for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal. The Attorney General may elect to create a

rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship as part of the adjudication

of such cases. Initially, the Department believed that including a list

of relevant factors and general guidance regarding a determination of

extreme hardship would be sufficient to address concerns raised by the

public. The concerns outlined in comments to the proposed rule have led

the Department to assess whether further measures, consistent with the

statute, are appropriate based on the unique circumstances of NACARA

beneficiaries. The Department has concluded that such measures would be

appropriate and would further an interest in greater administrative

efficiency.

Further examination of the issue yields two conclusions. First,

certain factors routinely noted in evaluations of extreme hardship may

serve as strong predictors of the likelihood of extreme hardship in a

given case. For instance, under the relevant case law, the longer an

individual has lived in the United States beyond the requisite 7 years,

the more likely he or she is to develop significant ties to the United

States, and the more likely it is that the adjudicator will find

extreme hardship. See Matter of O-J-O, Int. Dec. 3280 (BIA 1996)

(dissenting opinion listing all published suspension cases). Similarly,

the longer an applicant lives in the United States under protection

from deportation, the more likely it is that he or she has developed

long-term ties to the United States. See Matter of L-O-G, Int. Dec.

3281 (BIA 1996).

Second, the unique immigration history and circumstances of the ABC

class has given rise to a group of approximately 240,000 NACARA-

eligible individuals who share the general predictors of extreme

hardship described in the preceding paragraph, as well as other

predictors that are unique to this class. The composition of the group

itself is unusual, as it is composed of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who

either entered the United States and filed for asylum prior to April 1,

1990, or entered the United States prior to September 19, 1990, or

October 1, 1990, respectively, and registered for benefits under the

terms of the ABC settlement. These individuals fled circumstances of

civil war and political violence in their homelands during the 1980s,

and some applied for asylum in the United States. In 1985, advocates

for Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, church groups, and refugees

themselves brought suit against the United States Government for

allegedly discriminatory treatment of Guatemalan and Salvadoran asylum

applicants. The Department settled the litigation in 1990, following

significant developments in its asylum and refugee law and procedures,

including the creation of a professionally trained asylum officer corps

and Congress's grant of TPS to Salvadorans.

As a result of the settlement, ABC class members who complied with

all registration requirements were entitled to remain in the United

States until such time as they received either a de novo review of

their asylum applications, or, for those whose cases had not been

adjudicated previously, a determination under special procedures. For

administrative reasons and because of provisions in the settlement

agreement regarding asylum filing deadlines, these adjudications were

postponed during the period of time in which Salvadorans, who comprise

approximately 80 percent of the class, were protected from deportation

under TPS (January 1, 1991, to June 30, 1992) and Deferred Enforced

Departure (DED)

[[Page 27866]]

(June 30, 1992, to December 31, 1994). The special adjudications were

further postponed to provide registered class members who had not yet

applied for asylum an opportunity to do so under the terms of the

settlement. Consequently, Guatemalans and Salvadorans who wished to

continue to remain eligible for ABC benefits (and also free from the

fear of deportation) were required to file an asylum application if

they had not previously done so. Guatemalans had to have filed for

asylum on or before January 4, 1995, while Salvadorans were required to

have filed their applications no later than January 31, 1996 (with an

administrative extension until February 16, 1996). Although ABC

adjudications began in April 1997, they were suspended in February 1998

in order to permit those ABC class members with pending asylum

applications to apply for NACARA relief with the Service.

Yet another shared characteristic pertaining to immigration history

is the difficulty many Salvadorans and Guatemalans might have faced had

they repatriated during the early 1990s. Although the Salvadoran

government and opposition were engaged in peace negotiations throughout

1990 and 1991, the United States recognized the need to provide special

protection to Salvadorans residing in the United States. Congress first

gave Salvadorans protection through TPS, and then, even after peace

accords had been signed, the President extended protection through DED

until the end of 1994. While these special protections were only

formally accorded to Salvadorans, registered Guatemalan class members

also benefited from these protections because it was not

administratively efficient to conduct ABC interviews solely for

Guatemalans. Furthermore, the Guatemalan peace accords were not signed

until 1996, making it less likely that Guatemalan class members in the

United States would have sought to repatriate prior to that time.

The result of this unusual immigration history is the creation of a

large class of individuals who share certain strong predictors of

extreme hardship. By the time NACARA adjudications before the Service

begin, all NACARA-eligible ABC class members will have been in the

United States at least 9 years, while more than two-thirds will have

lived here for a decade or more. Most NACARA-eligible ABC class members

will also have lived in the United States for a prolonged period of

time without fear of deportation, and will have done so continuously

from the date of the settlement agreement to the present day, if they

maintained their eligibility for ABC benefits by filing an asylum

application by the relevant deadline. As previously noted, length of

stay, coupled with some form of authorized presence, can be a strong

indicator that an applicant is likely to suffer extreme hardship.

Additional characteristics of the ABC class appear to add to the

likelihood of extreme hardship. All NACARA-eligible class members who

applied for asylum were entitled to work authorization in conjunction

with their asylum applications. Similarly, all Salvadorans protected

under TPS and DED were also entitled to work lawfully while under that

protection. Recognizing that the expiration of DED in 1994 could harm

those Salvadoran class members who had not yet filed an asylum

application to maintain their eligibility for the benefits of the ABC

settlement because the deadline for filing had not yet passed, the

Government extended DED-based work authorization for Salvadorans until

April 30, 1996. As a practical matter, ABC class members with work

authorization are more likely to have access to steady employment,

career opportunities, and reasonable wages than someone working in the

United States unlawfully. Thus, it is more likely that ABC class

members are participating more fully in the economy and would

experience extreme hardship upon deportation or removal. While work

authorization alone may not be a clear predictor of extreme hardship,

the fact that class members were entitled to receive it, when viewed in

addition to their long-term and authorized presence in the United

States, adds to the likelihood that they have built strong ties to this

country and would suffer extreme hardship if returned to El Salvador or

Guatemala. For those class members with steady employment in the United

States, the possibility of extreme hardship might be further compounded

by reportedly significant underemployment in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Consequently, ABC class members eligible for relief under section

203 of NACARA will be presumed to satisfy the requirements for extreme

hardship upon submission of a completed Form I-881. Although the

Department has carefully considered requests to include other NACARA-

eligible applicants within the presumption, the facts do not appear to

justify a presumption for those applicants. The ABC class is

distinguished from other NACARA applicants by its distinct legal

identity and the specific characteristics identified in this

discussion. This interim rule will, therefore, continue to require

applicants who are not ABC class members to bear the burden of proof in

establishing extreme hardship. However, the Department recognizes that

these predictive characteristics may be present in other cases.

Accordingly, the rule will provide that evidence of an extended stay in

the United States without fear of deportation and with the benefit of

work authorization shall be considered relevant to the determination of

whether deportation will result in extreme hardship.

The Form I-881 and Instructions have been modified to address these

changes. The form will explain that an applicant who is either a

registered member of the ABC class, as described in Part II (a) of the

form, or a Salvadoran or Guatemalan who applied for asylum prior to

April 1, 1990, as described in Part II (b) of the form, will be

presumed to meet the extreme hardship requirement unless evidence in

the record establishes that neither the applicant nor a qualified

relative is likely to experience extreme hardship. To qualify for the

presumption, an applicant must answer all questions on the Form I-881

regarding extreme hardship, but will not initially be required to

attach documentary evidence to support his or her answers. The

instructions will note, however, that the Service may request

additional documents for any aspect of the application, including

extreme hardship, at the time of the interview.

The lack of one or more factors will not lead to a conclusion that

the presumption has been overcome. Instead, adjudicators will evaluate

an application on the basis of whether, given the presumption, the

application contains evidence of factors associated with extreme

hardship (as set forth in Sec. 240.58). Generally, the presumption will

be overcome only under two circumstances. First, the presumption might

be overcome in those cases where there is no evidence of factors

associated with extreme hardship (for example, an applicant who has no

family in the United States, no work history, and no ties to the

community). Second, evidence contained in the record could

significantly undermine the basic assumptions on which the presumption

is based. For example, if an individual has acquired significant

resources or property in his or her home country, the individual and

his or her qualified family members may be able to return without

experiencing extreme hardship, in the absence of other hardship factors

in the case (such as a serious medical treatment for which there is no

treatment in the home country).

[[Page 27867]]

The adjudicator must evaluate all the evidence in the record and

weigh it accordingly in making a determination as to whether the

presumption has been overcome. In the case of applications submitted to

the Service, a determination that the presumption has been overcome

will result in referral to the Immigration Court or dismissal of the

application, while such a determination by an Immigration Court will

result in denial of the application.

Eligibility--Other Comments Regarding Extreme Hardship

Several commenters requested that the Department modify

Sec. 240.58(b) by deleting the sentence, ``To establish extreme

hardship, an applicant must demonstrate that deportation would result

in a degree of hardship beyond that typically associated with

deportation.'' The commenters argued that this phrase could allow an

adjudicator to discount an individual's particular hardship claim if it

was similar to that of other applicants from the same country.

The Department believes it is not appropriate to delete this

sentence. The discussion of extreme hardship contained in

Sec. 240.58(b) is based on the general principles set forth in numerous

administrative law opinions and federal case law. These cases routinely

note that extreme hardship must be something greater than the kind of

disruption in a person's life that is likely to occur whenever someone

is deported. As the supplemental discussion in the proposed rule

explained, hardship does not have to be unique to be extreme, but the

effect of deportation or removal on the individual or a qualified

relative must be sufficiently clear to show that the hardship would be

extreme.

Several commenters asked the Department to modify the list of

extreme hardship factors contained in Sec. 240.58 by providing expanded

definitions for each factor. For instance, the commenters requested

that Sec. 240.58(b)(4), regarding an alien's ability to find employment

in the proposed country of removal, should be further modified to

indicate that the employment must pay a living wage. Similarly,

commenters requested that Sec. 240.58(b)(9), regarding the

psychological effect of removal, list specific types of psychological

harm, such as that which may be caused by an inability to support one's

family. Other suggestions included specifically discussing membership

in the ABC class as a relevant immigration history factor, as well as

including remittances sent to family members abroad as a relevant

factor under contributions to a community in the United States or to

the United States, the impact of an environmental disaster within the

proposed country of removal, and the difficulty of readjusting to one's

country of origin.

Section 240.58(b) contains a non-exclusive and broadly worded list

of factors that have been found relevant by adjudicators when

determining whether extreme hardship would result from an individual's

deportation. The present rule specifically notes that the listed

factors are those that have generally been recognized in case law, but

that other factors that have not been listed may be particularly

significant in an individual applicant's case. It would be difficult to

list all of the factors that may arise in a particular case.

Additionally, the attempt to do so could be counter-productive because,

as the description of each factor becomes more detailed, it could

restrict the focus of the inquiry to the more narrow description of

each factor. Moreover, some of the suggested modifications, if included

in the rule, would exceed the scope of the current understanding of

extreme hardship and, therefore, exceed the intended purpose of

codifying these factors. The broader language of the present rule

permits greater flexibility for applicants and adjudicators and will

allow the assessment of new factors to occur within the context of

specific adjudications. As previously explained, the Department has

made an exception only in the case of the factors related to VAWA,

which have been independently developed in the course of the self-

petitioning process and are already in use in immigration proceedings.

Eligibility--Discretion

Several commenters requested that Sec. 240.64(a) provide that

status as an ABC class member or as a recipient of TPS or DED be

considered a discretionary factor that weighs positively in favor of

granting relief. The commenters further requested that the regulations

explicitly provide that such authorized presence in the United States

will outweigh all but the most egregious adverse discretionary factors.

Although the fact that an applicant has received TPS or DED may be

considered in the discretionary decision to grant suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal, the Department

believes that it should not be given any more weight than other

discretionary considerations. Immigration history, including the

receipt of TPS or DED, is an appropriate factor to consider when

evaluating extreme hardship during the eligibility determination. As

such, it is unnecessary to require an adjudicator to give additional

weight to immigration history in making a final determination.

Eligibility--Evidence

Several commenters requested that the regulations provide that the

applicant's credible testimony by itself may be sufficient to satisfy

the eligibility requirements. Other commenters stated that the

regulation must include reference to the use of ``any credible

evidence'' in any case involving battered spouses and children under

section 244(a)(3) of the Act, as in effect prior to IIRIRA, or section

240A(b)(2) of the Act.

The Department declines to provide that credible testimony may be

sufficient to establish eligibility for suspension of deportation or

special rule cancellation of removal. In contrast to an applicant for

asylum for whom credible testimony may be sufficient to establish

eligibility, an applicant for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal may reasonably be expected to provide

corroborating evidence of certain eligibility criteria. An asylum

applicant understandably may not be able to provide documentary

evidence of the circumstances that caused flight, given the nature of

the claim. However, an individual who has lived in the United States

for at least 7 years should be able to provide, where necessary, some

form of documentary evidence of physical presence in the United States

and, where necessary, corroboration of community ties or other evidence

establishing that removal would result in extreme hardship.

With respect to applicants for suspension of deportation or

cancellation of removal who are eligible to apply for relief under the

special standards of section 244(a)(3) of the Act, as in effect prior

to IIRIRA, or section 240A(b)(2) of the Act, those statutory provisions

already provide that credible testimony may be sufficient to establish

material facts in a case. Because the interim rule affects these cases

only with respect to extreme hardship, it is unnecessary and

potentially confusing to carve out a special provision within the

NACARA implementing rule to address this issue.

Application Process

Fee for Filing NACARA Application

Comments regarding the proposed fee structure ($215 for individual

applications, with a $430 family cap) ranged from adopting the $100 fee

required for an application filed with the Immigration Court to

expanding the

[[Page 27868]]

family cap to include family members who do not submit their

applications simultaneously. One commenter requested that the

regulations explain the fee requirements for someone who already paid a

$100 application fee to submit an application for suspension of

deportation or cancellation of removal in Immigration Court

proceedings, but then requested that the Immigration Court or Board

administratively close the case to allow the individual to apply with

the Service.

As explained in greater detail in the supplementary information to

the proposed rule, the Service is required by statute to fund the

processing of applications through user fees. No appropriations have

been provided by Congress from tax dollars to adjudicate applications

for relief under section 203 of NACARA. The cost to the Service to

adjudicate applications must be funded from the Immigration

Examinations Fee Account, which is the sole source of funding for the

processing of immigration and naturalization applications and

petitions, and for other purposes designated by Congress, such as the

processing of asylum applications for which no fee is required. Having

carefully studied the estimated costs of adjudicating applications

under section 203 of NACARA, the Service calculated that a fee of $215

for a single applicant, or $430 for a family filing at the same time,

is necessary to recover costs associated with processing the

applications. Therefore, the filing fee cannot be lowered to $100.

Similarly, the benefit of the family cap cannot be extended to

those persons who do not file simultaneously because the $430 family

cap takes into account administrative cost savings achieved by

processing and adjudicating multiple cases as a single unit. Permitting

applicants who file separately to take advantage of the cap undermines

the projected savings and creates additional administrative costs. The

only way to account for those costs would be to increase the fee for

individual applications or to increase the family cap. The current fee

represents an appropriate balance between the need to cover the costs

of adjudication and avoiding prohibitively expensive filing fees.

The Department believes the current language in the regulation

addresses the fee requirements for applying with the Service.

Regardless of any fees an individual has paid in the past in the course

of immigration proceedings, each individual who submits an application

with the Service will be required to pay the full $215 application fee

or the $430 family fee, as applicable. This includes any NACARA

beneficiary who has already paid $100 to pursue an application for

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal in

immigration proceedings.

There are two general categories of NACARA beneficiaries who may be

in immigration proceedings that have been administratively closed to

allow the beneficiary to apply for relief with the Service. The first

category comprises dependents of NACARA beneficiaries who have applied

for section 203 NACARA relief with the Service. An individual in the

first category may or may not have already submitted a fee to EOIR,

depending on whether the individual has applied for any relief that

requires an application fee. In such cases, the individual may opt to

remain within the jurisdiction of the Immigration Court, rather than

pay a higher fee to apply with the Service.

The second category comprises individuals who had final orders of

deportation or removal that were reopened to allow the individuals to

apply for benefits under section 203 of NACARA, and who then move to

administratively close the proceedings to apply for benefits with the

Service. An applicant is not required to pay the $100 filing fee for a

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal

application submitted in order to perfect a motion to reopen. The

applicant is required only to submit to EOIR a copy of the application

and supporting documents that would be filed if the case is reopened.

The applicant is not required to pay the application fee until after a

motion to reopen has been granted and the applicant has thus been

allowed to apply for relief. At that time, the applicant will have a

choice to either pay the fee and submit the original application to

EOIR for adjudication by an Immigration Court, or ask that the case be

administratively closed so that the applicant may apply with the

Service. If the applicant has already paid the $100 to apply with EOIR

and wishes to apply with the Service, the applicant will nonetheless be

required to pay the full $215 application fee.

Filing the Form I-881 With the Service To Perfect a NACARA Motion To

Reopen

One commenter requested that the rule should permit an applicant

who must file a motion to reopen under section 203(c) of NACARA to

submit the Form I-881 directly to the Service before his or her case

has been reopened. Proof of filing with the Service would then permit

the Immigration Court to reopen the case. The Department declines to

adopt this procedure because it is contrary to 8 CFR 3.43, which

establishes the procedure for NACARA motions to reopen. Additionally,

this proposal, if adopted, would create an inefficient process for the

Service and might result in applicants paying fees to the Service for

applications that are never adjudicated. The proposed procedure to

allow an individual to first submit an application to the Service

before an Immigration Court has granted a motion to reopen would lead

to instances in which an applicant pays $215 to the Service, but then

is not allowed to proceed on the application, because an Immigration

Court denies the motion to reopen or denies the motion to close the

case once it has been reopened.

Limited Submission of the Form EOIR-40 to the Service

Many commenters requested that the regulations allow the limited

submission to the Service of an already completed Form EOIR-40, for

those applicants who submitted the Form EOIR-40 in proceedings that

have been administratively closed.

The Department agrees that it would be unnecessarily burdensome for

an applicant who had submitted a completed Form EOIR-40 to the

Immigration Court to then complete a Form I-881 in order to apply with

the Service. Most of the information requested on the Form I-881 is

also requested on the Form EOIR-40. However, the information on the

first page of the Form I-881 is necessary for the Service to determine

jurisdiction, eligibility to apply, and for completion of data entry

when accepting the application. Therefore, an applicant who filed a

Form EOIR-40 before the date that the Form I-881 is available may apply

with the Service by submitting the Form EOIR-40 attached to a completed

first page of the Form I-881.

Also, any applicant who is filing with the Service a Form I-881 or

Form EOIR-40 (with page 1 of the Form I-881 attached), and was

previously in proceedings before EOIR that have been administratively

closed or continued should attach to the application a copy of the

order to administratively close the proceedings issued by the

Immigration Court or Board. This documentation requirement has now been

added to the instructions to the Form I-881.

[[Page 27869]]

E. Adjudication

Procedure for Interview Before an Asylum Officer--Fingerprinting,

Rescheduling of Fingerprint and Interview Appointments

There were several comments regarding provisions governing

fingerprinting and the rescheduling of fingerprinting appointments and

interviews. Several commenters requested that fingerprinting

appointments should be scheduled at the designated Application Support

Center (ASC) nearest to applicant's home. Others requested that the

regulation specify that an applicant may submit a request to reschedule

the interview or fingerprinting appointment and should also provide a

procedure for rescheduling the interview or the fingerprinting

appointment. The comments suggested that the regulation allow

applicants to make the requests either in writing or by phone and that

the Service should assign staff to answer the phone. One commenter

requested that all notices to applicants explain the procedure for

canceling and rescheduling fingerprinting appointments and interviews.

Another commenter suggested that the regulations incorporate paragraph

13 of the ABC settlement agreement, which provides special procedures

to reschedule interviews for class members eligible for ABC benefits.

Many commenters suggested that the ABC settlement procedures governing

failure to appear for interviews should be applied to all NACARA

adjudications.

The Service recognizes that an applicant must sometimes reschedule

interviews and fingerprint appointments and intends to accommodate all

reasonable requests, as long as resources permit and applicants do not

appear to be abusing the process for purposes of delay.

With respect to initial fingerprint appointments, each applicant

will be scheduled for fingerprinting at the ASC having jurisdiction

over the applicant's place of residence. Only certain ASCs presently

have the capability to accept requests for rescheduling. For an

applicant scheduled for a fingerprint appointment at an ASC with the

capability of rescheduling fingerprint appointments, the appointment

notice will provide the applicant with the information necessary to

request a rescheduling. For an applicant scheduled for an appointment

at ASCs without this capability, the applicant will automatically be

rescheduled by the Service for another fingerprint appointment if the

Service does not receive confirmation that the applicant appeared for

fingerprinting during the time period designated on the appointment

notice.

The proposed rule required an applicant to show good cause in order

to reschedule a missed interview. In order to avoid conflicts with the

ABC settlement requirements, language governing the rescheduling of

interviews contained in Sec. 240.68 of the proposed rule has been

amended to mirror the language of paragraph 13 of the ABC settlement

agreement. A reasonable excuse provided to the Service will be

sufficient to obtain a rescheduling of the fingerprint appointment or

NACARA interview. A request to reschedule an interview should be

submitted in writing to the asylum office having jurisdiction over the

case before the date of the interview, where the need to reschedule is

known by the applicant prior to the interview date, or immediately

after the scheduled interview when the circumstances that led the

applicant to miss the interview could not be foreseen in advance. Any

significant delay by an applicant in submitting a written request to

reschedule an interview increases the risk that the Service will find

the applicant's failure to appear for an interview as unexcused, thus

resulting in dismissal of the NACARA application or referral of the

application to EOIR.

It is the applicant's duty to provide the Service with a mailing

address to which the fingerprint and interview notice can be delivered.

For cases in which the Service fails to send the appointment notice to

the applicant's current address, the regulation continues to treat the

failure to appear for fingerprinting or interview that results from the

Service error as excused, provided that the applicant properly

submitted his or her current address to the Service prior to the date

the notice was mailed. In such circumstances, the Service would move to

regain jurisdiction, if the case has already been referred to EOIR.

The Service does not presently have the capability to take requests

to reschedule fingerprint appointments or interviews over the phone,

and believes that a written record of such requests is in the

applicant's best interests, because it creates a record of the

applicant's attempt to comply with application requirements. The

Department also does not agree with the comment that applicants should

not be sanctioned for failure to appear unless they have been notified

of the interview by certified mail or personal service. An asylum

interview can be sent by regular mail to an individual's last address

properly provided to the Service. A failure to appear for the asylum

interview without prior authorization may result in dismissal of the

application or waiver of the right to an interview. 8 CFR 208.10.

One commenter requested that fingerprinting delays not be permitted

to delay the adjudication and approval by the Service of an application

for relief under section 203 of NACARA. The Service intends to make no

change in its plan to schedule NACARA applicants for interviews on

their applications for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal only after the Service has received a

definitive response from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that

a full criminal background check has been completed. This will allow an

asylum officer to make a decision on the eligibility for NACARA relief

at the time of the interview and give the Service the ability to grant

an applicant who has an approvable NACARA claim legal permanent

resident status on the day of the interview, where appropriate. Unlike

the affirmative asylum process, there will be no need to issue

recommended approvals to applicants for NACARA relief while the Service

awaits fingerprint clearance.

Recent improvements in fingerprint processing were designed to

reduce delays and should not affect interview scheduling and the

adjudication of applications for suspension of deportation or special

rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. Among the improvements in

fingerprint processing are the automatic scheduling of a second

fingerprint appointment for an applicant whose fingerprints are

rejected upon first submission to the FBI, and the notification of

asylum offices when an applicant's fingerprint submission has been

rejected by the FBI for a second time.

Consequences for Failure to Appear

Several commenters requested amendments to the provisions regarding

the consequences for failure to appear for an interview. Many

commenters maintained that dismissal of an application for failure to

appear for fingerprinting is a disproportionate penalty and that,

instead, the applicant should have to pay the $25 fingerprinting fee

again and be rescheduled for another fingerprinting appointment.

Several commenters proposed that the regulations be amended to require

the Service to grant suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation if it is clear from the application that the application

should be granted, even if the person fails to appear for an interview.

However, if the applicant is not clearly eligible for relief

[[Page 27870]]

and has not shown ``good cause'' for failure to appear, the

application, in the view of the commenters, should be referred to the

Immigration Court and not dismissed.

The Department declines to adopt these suggestions for minimizing

the consequences of failing to appear for fingerprinting or for an

interview. A proper determination of eligibility for suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal cannot be made

without interviewing the applicant. Suspension of deportation and

special rule cancellation of removal are discretionary forms of relief

with several substantive requirements that cannot be evaluated based

upon a paper record. Therefore, the Service cannot properly grant an

application for relief under section 203 of NACARA if an applicant

fails to appear for an interview.

The Department believes that it is appropriate to adopt procedures

restricting access to the Service application process when individuals

fail to comply with procedural requirements. To do otherwise would

disrupt the system and create delays that unfairly penalize applicants

who complied with the requirements. The provisions allowing referral or

dismissal are not only reasonable, but also more generous than other

immigration provisions that permit denial of applications for failure

to comply with interviewing or fingerprinting requirements.

In almost all cases in which an applicant fails to appear for an

interview or fingerprinting appointment, the Service will refer the

application to an Immigration Court for a decision. Therefore, the

applicant will still have the opportunity to apply for suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal before the

Immigration Court.

The Service will not refer an application to the Immigration Court

when the applicant does not appear inadmissible or removable. In such

cases, the Service will dismiss the application without prejudice so

that it does not remain pending indefinitely with the Service. If the

application were to remain pending indefinitely with the Service, the

applicant would continue to be eligible for employment authorization,

even though he or she was not pursuing the application. To avoid such a

procedural loophole, the Service must be able to dismiss the

application. If the applicant still wishes to pursue relief under

section 203 of NACARA and is otherwise still eligible to file for

relief with the Service, he or she could file a new application.

Consequences for Failing to Bring an Interpreter

One commenter stated that the failure to bring an interpreter to

the interview should not be treated as a failure to appear for the

interview and that, instead, the case should be rescheduled.

As in the case of asylum interviews, the Service intends to include

in the interview notice notification that the applicant is required to

bring an interpreter to the interview if the applicant is not fluent in

English. Therefore the applicant will be given notice of the need to

bring a qualified interpreter to the interview.

It has been the practice of the Asylum Program to reschedule all

asylum interviews in which an applicant fails, for the first time, to

bring an interpreter to the interview or, for the first time, brings an

incompetent interpreter to the interview. The Service intends to

continue this practice with interviews conducted pursuant to NACARA, as

long as resources permit the liberal rescheduling policy. However, to

retain the administrative flexibility necessary to continue processing

a large number of applications should a large number of applicants

begin to appear for interviews without interpreters, the Department

does not believe it appropriate to mandate such rescheduling by

regulation.

Access to Interpreters

Several commenters requested that the Service provide Spanish

speaking-asylum officers at various points in the NACARA interview and

decision-issuing process to relieve applicants of the burden of having

to provide interpreters and to help applicants understand the decisions

they receive. The Service is unable to change the present requirement

that an applicant provide his or her own interpreter if unable to

proceed in English. The Service has neither the qualified staff nor the

resources to provide Spanish-speaking asylum officers at all steps of

the NACARA process.

F. Decisions by the Service

Concessions of Inadmissibility and Deportability

One commenter requested that the Service not ask a NACARA applicant

to sign a concession of inadmissibility or deportability until the last

stage of the decision-making process, after fingerprints have cleared.

One commenter requested that the explanation given to the applicant

regarding the consequences of certain decisions an applicant will need

to make regarding concession of inadmissibility and deportability and

whether to continue to pursue a pending asylum request should not be

delayed until the day the applicant returns to receive the decision.

The Department agrees with these comments. Section 240.70(b) of the

interim rule provides that, ``[i]f the Service has made a preliminary

decision to grant the applicant suspension of deportation under this

subpart, the applicant shall be notified of that decision and will be

asked to sign an admission of deportability or inadmissibility.'' This

is the last step before an individual is granted relief, because no

preliminary decision may be made until after the fingerprints have been

cleared. Pursuant to Sec. 240.67(a) of the rule, an applicant subject

to the fingerprinting requirements will be interviewed only after the

individual has complied with the fingerprinting requirements, and the

Service has received a definitive response from the FBI that a full

criminal background check has been completed.

PART III, section (F) of the instructions to Form I-881 presently

contains an explanation of the requirement that an applicant sign an

admission of inadmissibility or deportability before he or she can be

granted suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of

removal by the Service. The Service also intends to present the

applicant with a further explanation of the requirement to admit

inadmissibility or deportability, as well as the opportunity to

continue to pursue a request for asylum or to withdraw the asylum

application should the application for suspension or special rule

cancellation be approved at the time of the interview. The Service will

also continue to consider the feasibility of providing this important

information to the applicant prior to the interview.

Timing of Approval of NACARA Application

Many commenters requested that the regulations permit an asylum

officer to grant an application at the time of interview. The

Department intends to do so in appropriate cases. The interim rule, at

Sec. 240.70(a), will permit an asylum officer to grant an application

at the time of the interview. The Service will have the discretion to

determine the circumstances under which it is appropriate for an asylum

officer to grant an application at the time of the interview.

Notice of Reasons for Referral or Dismissal

Many commenters requested that the regulations require the Service

to justify

[[Page 27871]]

the reason for not granting suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal. One comment stated that the Service should, at

a minimum, include in a decision a list of factors considered in

evaluating whether removal would result in extreme hardship.

The Department agrees that the referral or dismissal letter served

on an applicant should include notification of the reason or reasons

for the decision, and the Service intends to include such notification

in all referral and dismissal letters. The decision will not contain a

list of all the factors considered in evaluating whether removal would

result in extreme hardship. Rather, the contents of such letters will

model the referral letters issued after an asylum interview, briefly

indicating the basis for the decision. This process will allow the

Service to adjudicate NACARA applications in an efficient and timely

fashion, while also requiring the deciding officer to give the

applicant an explanation for why the claim is being referred to the

Immigration Court. Section 240.70(d) and (e) now provides that the

applicant will be given written notice of the statutory or regulatory

basis for the referral or dismissal.

Presumed Withdrawal of an Asylum Application

Several commenters requested that the proposed revisions to 8 CFR

208.14, relating to the presumption of abandonment of an asylum

application when the applicant is granted legal permanent resident

status, be revised to give an applicant granted adjustment of status to

lawful permanent resident 60 days, rather than the proposed 30 days, to

decide whether to pursue a pending asylum application, and that the

regulations should also require the Service to provide written notice

in Spanish and English advising the applicant of the deadline and its

significance.

The revisions to 8 CFR 208.14 are primarily aimed at addressing

those circumstances in which an applicant for asylum adjusts his or her

status to that of lawful permanent resident by some other means while

the asylum application is pending. The revised Sec. 208.14 will not

apply to the majority of applicants under section 203 of NACARA,

because the vast majority of those applicants are eligible for benefits

of the ABC settlement agreement. As such, the processing of their

asylum applications is largely governed by the 1990 asylum regulations,

which do not contain a similar provision allowing the Service to

presume that an asylum application is abandoned. This revised provision

will apply only to lawful permanent resident applicants who are not

eligible for ABC benefits, such as those who adjust status under

section 202 of NACARA or through other means such as relative

petitions.

The Department believes that it is unnecessary to increase the

notice period to 60 days. If an individual needs additional time to

consult with counsel, he or she may submit a request for additional

time. If an individual's application is presumed withdrawn, but the

individual still wishes to pursue asylum in the United States, even

though he or she has lawful permanent resident status, the individual

may submit a new asylum application to the Service for adjudication.

The Department agrees that the written notice should be required

and has incorporated that requirement into Sec. 208.14. However, the

notice will not be translated into any other languages.

Distinction Between ABC and NACARA Adjudications

Several commenters stated that the regulations should recognize the

Service's obligations under paragraph 15 of the ABC settlement

agreement regarding preliminary asylum recommendations and should apply

those provisions to all NACARA beneficiaries.

Paragraph 15 of the ABC settlement agreement provides very specific

procedural requirements for making preliminary and final decisions on

eligibility for asylum. For example, it specifies procedures for

sending asylum assessments to the Department of State and requires the

Service to provide a written notice of intent to deny an asylum

application prior to issuing a final adverse decision. It is limited to

asylum applicants who meet the criteria for eligibility for ABC

benefits as provided in the settlement and is not relevant to the

adjudication of applications under section 203 of NACARA, which is an

application for a completely separate form of relief. While the

interview for asylum eligibility and relief under NACARA may be

combined, the decision-making process is distinct. The parties to the

settlement agreement--the Service, EOIR and the Department of State--

remain bound by the provisions of the settlement agreement and will

continue to comply with all aspects of the settlement agreement in

adjudicating asylum requests filed by ABC class members who are

eligible for the benefits of the settlement agreement. The Department

declines to incorporate the settlement agreement requirements governing

the processing of ABC asylum applications into regulations governing

procedures for the unrelated benefit of suspension of deportation and

special rule cancellation of removal, or extending the ABC settlement

agreement provisions governing asylum adjudication to applicants not

covered by the settlement agreement.

Effect of Mandatory Pick-up on ABC Agreement

Several commenters assert that Sec. 240.70(a), which requires

applicants to return to an asylum office to receive a decision,

violates the ABC settlement agreement because the settlement agreement

does not require this.

The Department disagrees with this interpretation of the ABC

settlement agreement. First, Sec. 240.70(a) provides for service of a

decision on eligibility for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal, and the ABC settlement agreement has no

bearing on any process relating to Service adjudication of a request

for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal.

Second, neither the ABC settlement agreement nor the 1990 regulations,

which also govern adjudication of ABC asylum applications, contains any

provisions governing the service of a final decision on eligibility for

asylum. Therefore, the Department believes that requiring an ABC

applicant to return to the Asylum Office to receive an asylum decision

would not be inconsistent with the settlement agreement. It would make

little sense to require an individual to return to an Asylum Office to

receive a decision on the NACARA application, but to prohibit the

Asylum Office from informing the applicant of any final or preliminary

decision on the asylum application while the applicant is at the Asylum

Office. It would be much more efficient for both the Service and the

applicant for the Service to deliver both decisions at once, where

appropriate.

Restriction of Asylum Officer's Authority

Another commenter requested that the regulations provide that no

final decision may be made by a Service officer, but can be made only

by an Immigration Court. The commenter also stated that applicants must

be made aware of the right to appeal a decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals.

The Department declines to adopt the recommendation that the

regulations require that the final decision can be made only by an

Immigration Court. If an asylum officer were not given authority to

issue a final grant of suspension of deportation or special

[[Page 27872]]

rule cancellation of removal, there would be no benefit to allowing

NACARA beneficiaries to apply with the Service for relief under section

203 of NACARA. The rule, however, does not give asylum officers

authority to deny relief under section 203 of NACARA. If an asylum

officer determines that an applicant is not eligible for a grant of

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal and

has not been granted asylum, the asylum officer must refer the

application to an Immigration Court for adjudication. The exception

would be those cases in which the applicant does not appear

inadmissible or deportable and therefore could not be placed in removal

proceedings. In such rare instances, the application would be

dismissed.

The Department does not believe it is necessary for the rule to

require that an applicant be made aware of the right to appeal a

decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, because 8 CFR 3.3 already

provides that a party affected by a decision who is entitled to appeal

an Immigration Court's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals

must be given notice of the right to appeal.

G. Miscellaneous Comments

Employment Authorization

Several commenters requested that the regulations specify where to

file an application for employment authorization. The Department

declines to provide this procedural information in the regulation. It

is more appropriate that such procedural information, which is subject

to change, be provided in the instructions to the application used to

obtain the benefit. The instructions to the Form I-881 have been

amended to state that an individual who does not have employment

authorization and is eligible for employment authorization under 8 CFR

274.12(c)(10) should submit a completed Form I-765, with his or her

completed Form I-881, to the Service Center that has jurisdiction over

the Form I-881.

Extension of Deadline to Perfect NACARA Motion to Reopen

One commenter requested that the deadline to complete a motion to

reopen be extended. On January 14, 1999, EOIR announced that it would

extend the deadline for supplementing NACARA motions to reopen that

were submitted on or before September 11, 1998. Under 8 CFR 3.43, as

amended, NACARA motions to reopen must be supplemented with an

application and supporting documents no later than 150 days after the

effective date of the rule implementing section 203 of NACARA. 64 FR

13663 (March 22, 1999). Because the statute limited the initial filing

period, the September 11, 1998, deadline for submitting initial motions

cannot be extended. The Service has agreed to consider joining in

motions to reopen in certain cases for NACARA applicants who were prima

facie eligible for relief as of September 11, 1998, and who can

establish a valid reason for failing to submit a timely motion to

reopen.

H. Comments on the Form I-881 and Instructions

The public comments on the Form I-881, Application for Suspension

of Deportation or Special Rule Cancellation of Removal, ranged from

requests for simple word changes and comments of significant

complexity, to a request that the Form EOIR-40 be used for NACARA

applications instead of the Form I-881.

In response to the comment that suggested that the Form EOIR-40 be

used for NACARA applications for suspension of deportation or special

rule cancellation of removal instead of creating a new form, the

Department believes that the Form I-881 is useful in (1) drawing out

the basis for an applicant's claim to eligibility for NACARA section

203 relief, and (2) providing NACARA applicants who may submit the

application for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation

of removal to the Service without the aid of an attorney or

representative some guidance as to the type of factors that are

relevant to the determination of extreme hardship. Despite the decision

by the Attorney General to establish a rebuttable presumption of

extreme hardship for certain NACARA beneficiaries, applicants will

still need to provide responses to the questions in the Form I-881

directed towards the extreme hardship issue in order to qualify for

suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal.

Certain Changes to the form or instructions reflect substantive

changes made to the regulation. For example, both PART 1(C) of the

Instructions and Part 2(b) of the Form I-881 are amended to read ``A

Guatemalan or Salvadoran national who filed an application for asylum

on or before April 1, 1990,'' in light of the Department's decision,

previously discussed, to adopt a broader interpretation of the

eligibility language in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(II) of IIRIRA, as added

by section 203 of NACARA. The Department has deleted language that

limited eligibility to those Guatemalan or Salvadoran nationals who

filed their asylum applications by April 1, 1990, directly with the

Service.

In response to several comments, PART II (C) of the Instructions is

amended to indicate the fee required when submitting the Form I-881.

Many comments also requested that the Service accept a Form EOIR-40

instead of a Form I-881 when an applicant has already filed the Form

EOIR-40 with EOIR. As stated earlier, the Service will accept a

previously filed Form EOIR-40 as a NACARA application, so long as the

applicant fills out page 1 of the Form I-881 and attaches it to the

front of the Form EOIR-40 for data entry purposes. At PART III(C) and

PART IV, the Instructions are amended to clarify when the Form I-881

must be used and when the Form EOIR-40 may be used.

Several commenters requested that the language in the Instructions

and the Form I-881 be amended regarding the type of evidence of tax

payments that should be submitted, and asked that evidence of tax

payments be accepted at the interview or hearing and not required to be

attached to the application, pointing out the difficulty of obtaining

this information quickly. PART V of the Instructions and Part 4,

question 4 of the Form I-881 now provide that an applicant may submit

any evidence of filing a tax return, including Internal Revenue Service

computer printouts, and does not specify that the evidence should be a

tax return. The Instructions indicate that the Form I-881 may be

supplemented at the time of interview or hearing. The Department

declines to amend this section or other sections that request

documentation be attached to the Form I-881, because the Service Center

will not reject the application of an applicant who does not have

records of tax payments or other documentation at the time he or she

submits the Form I-881, and the applicant may submit this information

at the time of the interview or hearing.

At PART VI of the Instructions for the Form I-881, language has

been added in response to a commenter requesting information on where a

person should apply for employment authorization. The Instructions now

note that an individual who wishes to work, who does not have

employment authorization, and is eligible for employment authorization

under 8 CFR 274.12(c)(10), should submit a completed Form I-765 with

his or her completed Form I-881 to the Service Center that has

jurisdiction over the Form I-881.

Part 4 of the Form I-881 includes a change in the order of the

subdivisions in that Part in response to a number of

[[Page 27873]]

comments requesting a more logical flow of the elicited information.

Several other changes have been made in Part 4 of the Form I-881 in

response to comments. Section 1 has been amended to clarify that

periods of ``unpaid employment'' may include work as a homemaker,

intern, etc. In section 2, the order of the types of assets has been

changed. In response to a number of comments, the term ``motor

vehicles'' replaces ``autos,'' and a column for spouse's assets is now

included. Also, the section now requests that information on assets

owned by ``self'' include those assets jointly owned with ``spouse or

others.''

Several commenters urged that the question relating to receipt of

public benefits, contained at Part 4, question 3 of the form, be

deleted or limited to requesting information regarding only the receipt

of cash benefits. The commenters stated that the case law permits but

does not require that the receipt of public benefits be considered as a

discretionary factor. The commenters argued that the presence of such a

question on the form would have a chilling effect on the legitimate

access and use of programs promoting public health and well-being by

NACARA beneficiaries and their United States citizen family members.

The Department initially included the question on the form to avoid

surprise to an applicant who might be asked about receipt of public

benefits at the hearing or interview, and to give the applicant an

opportunity to prepare a statement of the circumstances that led to the

receipt of public benefits. However, in light of forthcoming guidance

from the Department regarding the broader public charge issues, the

question will be deleted from the Form I-881. Omission of the question,

however, does not mean that an adjudicator cannot raise the issue in

the course of an interview or hearing in appropriate cases. In the

context of suspension of deportation or cancellation of removal,

questions about receipt of public benefits are not necessarily meant to

draw inferences against an applicant. A full and accurate understanding

of an applicant's financial condition is always relevant to the

determination to grant or deny relief. In light of the ongoing review

by the Department, and the possibility that this question may

discourage people from applying for benefits to which they are

entitled, the Department has decided that the limited value of reducing

the element of surprise is outweighed by broader public health

concerns.

Parts 6 and 7 of the Form I-881, which request information about

the applicant's parents and children, have been switched from their

previous order, as requested by several commenters. In addition, the

request for information about children's weekly earnings and whether

the applicant supports his or her children financially has been deleted

as overly burdensome. Question 3 in this Part, which elicits

information about the applicant's support of family members, has been

deleted. Also, Part 8 of the previous version of the Form I-881, where

information about the applicant's community ties was requested, has

been deleted, and a question regarding community ties has been

incorporated into Part 9 on Extreme Hardship.

In response to a number of suggestions to shorten or simplify the

hardship section of the Form I-881, the spaces between questions have

been eliminated and the form requests the applicant to provide

explanations to the answers on a separate sheet of paper. Additionally,

as requested in some comments, this section has been modified to

request ``yes/no'' answers to questions regarding extreme hardship. The

questions elicit the same type of information as the questions on the

original version of the Form I-881. Question 11 has been added to Part

9 of the Form I-881 to elicit information regarding community ties.

Finally, this part explains that applicants who meet the eligibility

requirements for NACARA suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal listed in (a) or (b) of Part 2 on page 1, and

thus are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship, do

not need to submit documentation with their application to support

their claim of extreme hardship. This is also stated in PART II(A) and

PART V of the Instructions.

At PART II(A), the Instructions are amended to include a reference

to ``page 8'' of the form, with the explanation that page 8 may be used

as an additional sheet. Page 8 of the Form I-881 has been added to

provide applicants with a blank sheet of paper to allow them to

supplement or explain responses provided in other parts of the form,

such as the hardship section previously described. In addition, Part 10

of the previous version of Form I-881, Miscellaneous Information, is

now Part 8.

Requested Changes not Incorporated into the Form I-881

Additional lines for requested information have been added, and the

order of questions has been changed where possible and appropriate, as

requested by the commenters and explained previously. However, due to

space limitations and in an effort to avoid making the form longer, not

all requests to move sections or add spaces could be accommodated. For

example, the number of lines provided to list places of residence has

not been increased (an applicant must attach additional sheets if more

space is needed to complete the section).

One commenter requested that a row for debts and other liabilities

be added to the information requested about an applicant's assets in

Part 4, section 2 of the form. The Department does not believe it is

necessary to add a row requesting information about debts and

liabilities of an applicant. When requesting information about the

value of any motor vehicles or real estate owned by applicant and his

or her spouse, Part 4, section 2 of the Form I-881 specifically asks

that the value listed should be ``minus any amount owed'' on the

property. It is sufficient that the individual list only the equity

owned in the assets.

One commenter suggested that the introductory paragraph in Part 9

of the form be changed to make it easier for the applicant to complete

the form. This commenter proposed that the introductory paragraph list

the factors considered in establishing extreme hardship, followed by a

single open-ended question asking for an explanation of all hardship

factors relevant to the applicant's claim.

As noted previously, Part 9 now asks for responses to ``yes/no''

questions and explanations for those responses. Each question elicits

information about a particular hardship factor, except for the last

question in the section, which asks for other hardship the applicant

would suffer if removed from the United States. Specific questions

eliciting information about each particular extreme hardship factor

alert the applicant to the kind of information that is relevant to

demonstrate extreme hardship. The last question is open-ended and gives

the applicant the opportunity to expand upon circumstances not covered

by previous questions. The Department believes that the present format,

where particular hardship questions are followed by an open-ended

hardship question, best elicits information required for the

adjudicator to make a determination on extreme hardship.

Several commenters argued that the information requested in Part 8

of the form, Miscellaneous Information, should be limited to the

applicable statutory period of good moral character.

[[Page 27874]]

As explained in an earlier response to comments on the form that is

on file with the Director, Policy Directives and Instructions Branch,

questions that request information beyond the 7-year and 10-year

periods for continuous physical presence are relevant to the

adjudication of suspension of deportation and special rule cancellation

of removal claims, because this information may be considered in the

exercise of discretion. Other questions in this part relate to

eligibility requirements that have no time limits. For example, there

are questions in the Miscellaneous Information part of the form

relating to whether the applicant has been admitted to the United

States as a crewman after June 30, 1964, or has had the status of

exchange visitor. Because the statute explicitly excludes individuals

who obtained such status from a grant of suspension of deportation or

cancellation of removal, this information is relevant to the

eligibility determination, regardless of whether the applicant held

such status more than 10 years ago.

Finally, several commenters noted that the Department's estimate of

12 hours to complete the form would prove inadequate. Because this is a

new form, it is difficult to estimate the number of hours needed to

complete it. As noted in the earlier response (and because of a wide

discrepancy in completion times in our sample study), the time to

complete this form will vary significantly. For those applicants who

have readily available required documents and information, the time to

complete the form will be substantially less than the 12-hour estimate.

For some applicants, the time to gather the information for the form

will be significantly greater than the 12-hour estimate. For the vast

majority of the individuals who do not need to provide documentation to

demonstrate extreme hardship, the present time estimate seems

sufficient.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Attorney General, in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility

Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), has reviewed this regulation and, by approving

it, certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small entities because of the

following reason: This rule would provide new administrative procedures

for the Service to consider applications from certain Guatemalans,

Salvadorans, nationals of former Soviet bloc countries, and their

qualified relatives who are applying for suspension of deportation or

special rule cancellation of removal and, if granted, to adjust their

status to that of lawful permanent resident. It will have no effect on

small entities, as that term is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(6).

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local and

tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100

million or more in any 1 year, and it will not significantly or

uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions were deemed

necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of

1995.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 251 of the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. 5 U.S.C.

804. This rule will not result in an annual effect on the economy of

$100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or

significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment,

productivity, innovation, or on the ability of the United States-based

companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and

export markets.

Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review

This rule is considered by the Department of Justice to be a

``significant regulatory action'' under section 3(f) of Executive Order

12866, Regulatory Planning and Review. Accordingly, this regulation has

been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.

Executive Order 12612: Federalism

The regulation adopted herein will not have substantial direct

effects on the States, on the relationship between the National

government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibility among the various levels of government. Therefore, in

accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this rule

does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Executive Order 12988: Civil Justice Reform

This proposed rule meets the applicable standards set forth in

sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.

Family Assessment

The Attorney General has reviewed this regulation and has

determined that it may affect family well-being as that term is defined

in section 654 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. A. Accordingly, the

Attorney General has assessed this action in accordance with the

criteria specified in section 654(c)(1). In this rule, the factors that

may be considered in evaluating whether deportation or removal would

result in extreme hardship include the safety and stability of the

family.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule requires applicants to provide biographical data and

information regarding eligibility for relief under section 203 of

NACARA on Form I-881. This requirement is considered an information

collection that is subject to review by OMB under the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA). The Service issued a 60-day notice in the

Federal Register on May 8, 1998, at 63 FR 25523, requesting comments on

this new information collection. No comments were received during that

initial 60-day comment period. On July 23, 1998, the Service issued a

notice in the Federal Register, at 63 FR 39596, extending the comment

period by 30 days. On November 24, 1998, the Service issued a 30-day

notice in the Federal Register, at 63 FR 64895, and OMB subsequently

approved the Form I-881. The OMB control number for this collection is

contained in 8 CFR 299.5, Display of control numbers. As discussed in

the supplementary information to this rule, comments were received and

considered, and certain changes were made to the proposed Form I-881 in

light of those comments.

Since a delay in issuing this interim rule could create a further

delay with respect to allowing aliens to apply for relief under section

203 of NACARA, the Service is using emergency review procedures for

review and clearance by OMB in accordance with the PRA. If granted, the

emergency approval is only valid for 180 days. Comments concerning the

information collection should be directed to: Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs, OMB Desk Officer for the Immigration and

Naturalization Service, Office of Management and Budget, Room 10235,

Washington, DC 20503.

List of Subjects

8 CFR Part 103

Administrative practice and procedure, Authority delegations

[[Page 27875]]

(Government agencies), Freedom of information, Privacy, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Surety bonds.

8 CFR Part 208

Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration,

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

8 CFR Part 240

Administrative practice and procedure, Immigration.

8 CFR Part 246

Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration,

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

8 CFR Part 274a

Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Employment,

Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

8 CFR Part 299

Immigration, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Accordingly, chapter I of title 8 of the Code of Federal

Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 103--POWERS AND DUTIES OF SERVICE OFFICERS; AVAILABILITY OF

SERVICE RECORDS

1. The authority citation for part 103 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552, 552(a); 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1201, 1252

note, 1252b, 1304, 1356; 31 U.S.C. 9701; E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874,

15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166; 8 CFR part 2.

2. In Sec. 103.1, the last sentence in paragraph (g)(3)(ii) is

revised to read as follows:

Sec. 103.1 Delegations of authority.

* * * * *

(g) * * *

(3) * * *

(ii) Asylum officers. * * * Asylum officers are delegated the

authority to hear and adjudicate credible fear of persecution

determinations under section 235(b)(1)(B) of the Act, applications for

asylum and for withholding of removal, as provided under 8 CFR part

208, and applications for suspension of deportation and special rule

cancellation of removal, as provided under 8 CFR part 240, subpart H.

* * * * *

3. In Sec. 103.7, paragraph (b)(1) is amended by adding the entry

for ``Form I-881'' to the listing of fees, in proper numerical

sequence, to read as follows:

Sec. 103.7 Fees.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(1) * * *

Form I-881. For filing an application for suspension of

deportation or special rule cancellation of removal (pursuant to

section 203 of Public Law 105-100):

-- $215 for adjudication by the Service, except that the maximum

amount payable by family members (related as husband, wife,

unmarried child under 21, unmarried son, or unmarried daughter) who

submit applications at the same time shall be $430.

-- $100 for adjudication by the Immigration Court (a single fee of

$100 will be charged whenever applications are filed by two or more

aliens in the same proceedings). The $100 fee is not required if the

Form I-881 is referred to the Immigration Court by the Service.

* * * * *

PART 208--PROCEDURES FOR ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

4. The authority citation for part 208 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1226, 1252, 1282, 8 CFR part 2.

5. Section 208.14 is amended by revising the section heading and by

adding a new paragraph (f), to read as follows:

Sec. 208.14 Approval, denial, referral, or dismissal of application.

* * * * *

(f) If an asylum applicant is granted adjustment of status to

lawful permanent resident, the Service may provide written notice to

the applicant that his or her asylum application will be presumed

abandoned and dismissed without prejudice, unless the applicant submits

a written request within 30 days of the notice, that the asylum

application be adjudicated. If an applicant does not respond within 30

days of the date the written notice was sent or served, the Service may

presume the asylum application abandoned and dismiss it without

prejudice.

PART 240--PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE REMOVABILITY OF ALIENS IN THE

UNITED STATES

6. The authority citation for part 240 is revised to read as

follows:

Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103; 1182, 1186a, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227,

1251, 1252 note, 1252a, 1252b, 1362; secs. 202 and 203, Pub. L. 105-

100 (111 Stat. 2160, 2193); sec. 902, Pub. L. 105-277 (112 Stat.

2681); 8 CFR part 2.

In subpart B, Sec. 240.20 is amended by adding a new paragraph (c),

to read as follows:

Sec. 240.20 Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under

section 240A of the Act.

* * * * *

(c) For cases raised under section 240A(b)(2) of the Act, extreme

hardship shall be determined as set forth in Sec. 240.58 of this part.

8. In subpart F, a new Sec. 240.58 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 240.58 Extreme hardship.

(a) To be eligible for suspension of deportation under former

section 244(a)(1) of the Act, as in effect prior to April 1, 1997, the

alien must meet the requirements set forth in the Act, which include a

showing that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien

or to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the

United States, or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

Extreme hardship is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into

account the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Applicants

are encouraged to cite and document all applicable factors in their

applications, as the presence or absence of any one factor may not be

determinative in evaluating extreme hardship. Adjudicators should weigh

all relevant factors presented and consider them in light of the

totality of the circumstances, but are not required to offer an

independent analysis of each listed factor when rendering a decision.

Evidence of an extended stay in the United States without fear of

deportation and with the benefit of work authorization, when present in

a particular case, shall be considered relevant to the determination of

whether deportation will result in extreme hardship.

(b) To establish extreme hardship, an applicant must demonstrate

that deportation would result in a degree of hardship beyond that

typically associated with deportation. Factors that may be considered

in evaluating whether deportation would result in extreme hardship to

the alien or to the alien's qualified relative include, but are not

limited to, the following:

(1) The age of the alien, both at the time of entry to the United

States and at the time of application for suspension of deportation;

(2) The age, number, and immigration status of the alien's children

and their ability to speak the native language and to adjust to life in

the country of return;

(3) The health condition of the alien or the alien's children,

spouse, or parents and the availability of any required medical

treatment in the country to which the alien would be returned;

[[Page 27876]]

(4) The alien's ability to obtain employment in the country to

which the alien would be returned;

(5) The length of residence in the United States;

(6) The existence of other family members who are or will be

legally residing in the United States;

(7) The financial impact of the alien's departure;

(8) The impact of a disruption of educational opportunities;

(9) The psychological impact of the alien's deportation;

(10) The current political and economic conditions in the country

to which the alien would be returned;

(11) Family and other ties to the country to which the alien would

be returned;

(12) Contributions to and ties to a community in the United States,

including the degree of integration into society;

(13) Immigration history, including authorized residence in the

United States; and

(14) The availability of other means of adjusting to permanent

resident status.

(c) For cases raised under section 244(a)(3) of the Act, the

following factors should be considered in addition to, or in lieu of,

the factors listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

(1) The nature and extent of the physical or psychological

consequences of abuse;

(2) The impact of loss of access to the United States courts and

criminal justice system (including, but not limited to, the ability to

obtain and enforce orders of protection, criminal investigations and

prosecutions, and family law proceedings or court orders regarding

child support, maintenance, child custody, and visitation);

(3) The likelihood that the batterer's family, friends, or others

acting on behalf of the batterer in the home country would physically

or psychologically harm the applicant or the applicant's child(ren);

(4) The applicant's needs and/or needs of the applicant's

child(ren) for social, medical, mental health or other supportive

services for victims of domestic violence that are unavailable or not

reasonably accessible in the home country;

(5) The existence of laws and social practices in the home country

that punish the applicant or the applicant's child(ren) because they

have been victims of domestic violence or have taken steps to leave an

abusive household; and

(6) The abuser's ability to travel to the home country and the

ability and willingness of authorities in the home country to protect

the applicant and/or the applicant's children from future abuse.

(d) Nothing in Sec. 240.58 shall be construed as creating any

right, interest, or entitlement that is legally enforceable by or on

behalf of any party against the United States or its agencies,

officers, or any other person.

9. Part 240 is amended by adding Subpart H to read as follows:

Subpart H--Applications for Suspension of Deportation or Special

Rule Cancellation of Removal Under Section 203 of Pub. L. 105-100

Sec.

240.60 Definitions.

240.61 Aplicability.

240.62 Jurisdiction.

240.63 Application process.

240.64 Eligibility--general.

240.65 Eligibility for suspension of deportation.

240.66 Eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal.

240.67 Procedure for interview before an asylum officer.

240.68 Failure to appear at an interview before an asylum officer

or failure to follow requirements for fingerprinting.

240.69 Reliance on information compiled by other sources.

240.70 Decision by the Service.

Subpart H--Applications for Suspension of Deportation or Special

Rule Cancellation of Removal Under Section 203 of Pub. L. 105-100

Sec. 240.60 Definitions.

As used in this subpart the term:

ABC means American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796

(N.D. Cal. 1991).

ABC class member refers to:

(1) Any Guatemalan national who first entered the United States on

or before October 1, 1990; and

(2) Any Salvadoran national who first entered the United States on

or before September 19, 1990.

Asylum application pending adjudication by the Service means any

asylum application for which the Service has not served the applicant

with a final decision or which has not been referred to the Immigration

Court.

Filed an application for asylum means the proper filing of a

principal asylum application or filing a derivative asylum application

by being properly included as a dependent spouse or child in an asylum

application pursuant to the regulations and procedures in effect at the

time of filing the principal or derivative asylum application.

IIRIRA means the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Pub. L. 104-208 (110 Stat. 3009-

625).

NACARA means the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief

Act (NACARA), enacted as title II of Pub. L. 105-100 (111 Stat. 2160,

2193), as amended by the Technical Corrections to the Nicaraguan

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. 105-139 (111 Stat.

2644).

Registered ABC class member means an ABC class member who:

(1) In the case of an ABC class member who is a national of El

Salvador, properly submitted an ABC registration form to the Service on

or before October 31, 1991, or applied for temporary protected status

on or before October 31, 1991; or

(2) In the case of an ABC class member who is a national of

Guatemala, properly submitted an ABC registration form to the Service

on or before December 31, 1991.

Sec. 240.61 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this

subpart H applies to the following aliens:

(1) A registered ABC class member who has not been apprehended at

the time of entry after December 19, 1990;

(2) A Guatemalan or Salvadoran national who filed an application

for asylum with the Service on or before April 1, 1990, either by

filing an application with the Service or filing the application with

the Immigration Court and serving a copy of that application on the

Service.

(3) An alien who entered the United States on or before December

31, 1990, filed an application for asylum on or before December 31,

1991, and, at the time of filing the application, was a national of the

Soviet Union, Russia, any republic of the former Soviet Union, Latvia,

Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Albania, East Germany, Yugoslavia, or any state of the former

Yugoslavia;

(4) An alien who is the spouse or child of an individual described

in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section at the time a

decision is made to suspend the deportation, or cancel the removal, of

the individual described in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this

section;

(5) An alien who is:

(i) The unmarried son or unmarried daughter of an individual

described in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section and is

21 years of age or older at the time a decision is made to suspend the

deportation, or cancel the removal, of the parent described in

paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section; and

[[Page 27877]]

(ii) Entered the United States on or before October 1, 1990.

(b) This subpart H does not apply to any alien who has been

convicted at any time of an aggravated felony, as defined in section

101(a)(43) of the Act.

Sec. 240.62 Jurisdiction.

(a) Office of International Affairs. Except as provided in

paragraph (b) of this section, the Office of International Affairs

shall have initial jurisdiction to grant or refer to the Immigration

Court or Board an application for suspension of deportation or special

rule cancellation of removal filed by an alien described in

Sec. 240.61, provided:

(1) In the case of a national of El Salvador described in

Sec. 240.61(a)(1), the alien filed a complete asylum application on or

before January 31, 1996 (with an administrative grace period extending

to February 16, 1996), or otherwise met the asylum application filing

deadline pursuant to the ABC settlement agreement, and the application

is still pending adjudication by the Service;

(2) In the case of a national of Guatemala described in

Sec. 240.61(a)(1), the alien filed a complete asylum application on or

before January 3, 1995, or otherwise met the asylum application filing

deadline pursuant to the ABC settlement agreement, and the application

is still pending adjudication by the Service;

(3) In the case of an individual described in Sec. 240.61(a)(2) or

(3), the individual's asylum application is pending adjudication by the

Service;

(4) In the case of an individual described in Sec. 240.61(a)(4) or

(5), the individual's parent or spouse has an application pending with

the Service under this subpart H or has been granted relief by the

Service under this subpart.

(b) Immigration Court. The Immigration Court shall have exclusive

jurisdiction over an application for suspension of deportation or

special rule cancellation of removal filed pursuant to section

309(f)(1)(A) or (B) of IIRIRA, as amended by NACARA, by an alien who

has been served Form I-221, Order to Show Cause, or Form I-862, Notice

to Appear, after a copy of the charging document has been filed with

the Immigration Court, unless the alien is covered by one of the

following exceptions:

(1) Certain ABC class members. (i) The alien is a registered ABC

class member for whom proceedings before the Immigration Court or the

Board have been administratively closed or continued (including those

aliens who had final orders of deportation or removal who have filed

and been granted a motion to reopen as required under 8 CFR 3.43);

(ii) The alien is eligible for benefits of the ABC settlement

agreement and has not had a de novo asylum adjudication pursuant to the

settlement agreement; and

(iii) The alien has not moved for and been granted a motion to

recalendar proceedings before the Immigration Court or the Board to

request suspension of deportation.

(2) Spouses, children, unmarried sons, and unmarried daughters. (i)

The alien is described in Sec. 240.61(a) (4) or (5);

(ii) The alien's spouse or parent is described in

Sec. 240.61(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) and has a Form I-881 pending with

the Service; and

(iii) The alien's proceedings before the Immigration Court have

been administratively closed, or the alien's proceedings before the

Board have been continued, to permit the alien to file an application

for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal

with the Service.

Sec. 240.63 Application process.

(a) Form and Fees. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this

section, the application must be made on a Form I-881, Application for

Suspension of Deportation or Special Rule Cancellation of Removal

(pursuant to section 203 of Public Law 105-100 (NACARA)), and filed in

accordance with the instructions for that form. An applicant who

submitted to EOIR a completed Form EOIR-40, Application for Suspension

of Deportation, before the effective date of the Form I-881 may apply

with the Service by submitting the completed Form EOIR-40 attached to a

completed first page of the Form I-881. Each application must be filed

with the filing and fingerprint fees as provided in Sec. 103.7(b)(1) of

this chapter, or a request for fee waiver, as provided in Sec. 103.7(c)

of this chapter. The fact that an applicant has also applied for asylum

does not exempt the applicant from the fingerprinting fees associated

with the Form I-881.

(b) Applications filed with EOIR. If jurisdiction rests with the

Immigration Court under Sec. 260.62(b), the application must be made on

the Form I-881, if filed subsequent to June 21, 1999. The application

form, along with any supporting documents, must be filed with the

Immigration Court and served on the Service's district counsel in

accordance with the instructions on or accompanying the form.

Applications for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation

of removal filed prior to June 21, 1999 shall be filed on Form EOIR-40.

(c) Applications filed with the Service. If jurisdiction rests with

the Service under Sec. 240.62(a), the Form I-881 and supporting

documents must be filed at the appropriate Service Center in accordance

with the instructions on or accompanying the form.

(d) Conditions and consequences of filing. Applications filed under

this section shall be filed under the following conditions and shall

have the following consequences:

(1) The information provided in the application may be used as a

basis for the initiation of removal proceedings, or to satisfy any

burden of proof in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings;

(2) The applicant and anyone other than a spouse, parent, son, or

daughter of the applicant who assists the applicant in preparing the

application must sign the application under penalty of perjury. The

applicant's signature establishes a presumption that the applicant is

aware of the contents of the application. A person other than a

relative specified in this paragraph who assists the applicant in

preparing the application also must provide his or her full mailing

address;

(3) An application that does not include a response to each of the

questions contained in the application, is unsigned, or is

unaccompanied by the required materials specified in the instructions

to the application is incomplete and shall be returned by mail to the

applicant within 30 days of receipt of the application by the Service;

and

(4) Knowing placement of false information on the application may

subject the person supplying that information to criminal penalties

under title 18 of the United States Code and to civil penalties under

section 274C of the Act.

Sec. 240.64 Eligibility--general.

(a) Burden and standard of proof. The burden of proof is on the

applicant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or

she is eligible for suspension of deportation or special rule

cancellation of removal and that discretion should be exercised to

grant relief.

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Suspension of Deportation and Special Rule Cancellation of Removal for Certain Nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Former Soviet Bloc Countries · 64 FR 27856 | Frix