Application by Association of Waste Hazardous Materials Transporters for a Preemption Determination as to Tennessee Hazardous Waste Transporter Fee and Reporting Requirements
Federal RegisterApr 9, 1998
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Research and Special Programs Administration
[Docket No. RSPA-98-3665 (PDA-21 (R))]
Application by Association of Waste Hazardous Materials
Transporters for a Preemption Determination as to Tennessee Hazardous
Waste Transporter Fee and Reporting Requirements
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Public notice and invitation to comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Interested parties are invited to submit comments on an
application by the Association of Waste Hazardous Materials
Transporters (AWHMT) for an administrative determination whether
Federal hazardous materials transportation law preempts requirements of
the State of Tennessee, applicable to transporters of hazardous waste,
for the payment of a remedial action fee and the filing of a written
report of any hazardous waste discharge within the State.
DATES: Comments received on or before May 26, 1998, and rebuttal
comments received on or before July 8, 1998, will be considered before
an administrative ruling is issued jointly by RSPA's Associate
Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety and FHWA's Administrator.
Rebuttal comments may discuss only those issues raised by comments
received during the initial comment period and may not discuss new
issues.
ADDRESSES: The application and all comments received may be reviewed in
the Dockets Office, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400
Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590-0001. The application and all
comments are also available on-line through the home page of DOT's
Docket Management System, at ``http://dms.dot.gov.''
Comments should be submitted to the Dockets Office at the above
address. Three copies of each written comment should be submitted.
Comments may also be submitted by E-mail to
``[email protected].'' Each comment should refer to the Docket
Number set forth above. A copy of each comment must also be sent to (1)
Mr. Michael Carney, Chairman, Association of Waste Hazardous Materials
Transporters, 2200 Mill Road, Alexandria, VA 22314, and (2) Mr. Milton
Hamilton, Jr., Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Environment &
Conservation, 401 Church Street, 21st Floor, L&C Tower, Nashville, TN
37243. A certification that a copy has been sent to these persons must
also be included with the comment. (The following format is suggested:
``I certify that copies of this comment have been sent to Messrs.
Carney and Hamilton at the address specified in the Federal
Register.'')
A list and subject matter index of hazardous materials preemption
cases, including all inconsistency rulings and preemption determination
issued, are available through the home page of RSPA's Office of the
Chief Counsel, at ``http://rspa-atty.dot.gov.'' A paper copy of this
list and index will be provided at no cost upon request to the
individual named in ``For Further Information Contact'' below.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Frazer C. Hilder, Office of the Chief Counsel, Research and Special
Programs Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington,
DC 20590-0001 (Tel. No. 202-366-4400).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Application for a Preemption Determination
AWHMT has applied for a determination that Federal hazardous
material transportation law preempts Tennessee statutory and regulatory
requirements that transporters of hazardous waste pay a remedial action
fee and file written reports of any discharge of hazardous waste within
the State.
According to AWHMT, each person who is issued a hazardous waste
transporter permit under the Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act
must pay both a registration fee and a Superfund Remedial Action Fee.
The Superfund Remedial Action Fee is currently set at $650 per year,
under Tennessee Code 68-212-203(a)(6) and Rule 1200-1-13-.03(1)(e) of
the Tennessee Department of Environment & Conservation (DEC). It
appears that a transporter must hold a permit from the Tennessee DEC in
order to transport, within the State, hazardous waste that originates
or terminates in Tennessee. DEC Rule 1200-1-11-.04(2)(a).
AWHMT also states that a transporter of hazardous waste must submit
a written report to DEC of ``each hazardous waste discharge during
transportation that occurs in this state.'' DEC Rule 1200-1-
11-.04(4)(a)(4). The Note to that section states that a copy of DOT
form 5800.1, as required by 49 CFR 171.16, ``shall suffice for this
report provided that it is properly completed and supplemented as
necessary to include all information required by this paragraph.''
AWHMT asserts that Tennessee's Superfund Remedial Action Fee is
preempted because the proceeds are not used exclusively for purposes
related to transporting hazardous material, including enforcement and
planning, developing, and maintaining a capability for emergency
response. AWHMT also contends that this is a ``flat fee'' that is
preempted because it has no relation to the transporter's operations
within the State. AWHMT states that Tennessee's requirement to submit
written reports of any hazardous waste discharge is preempted because
it is not substantively the same as DOT's requirements in 49 CFR
171.16.
The text of AWHMT's application and a list of the attachments are
set forth in appendix A. A paper copy of the attachments to AWHMT's
application will be provided at no cost upon request to the individual
named in ``For Further Information Contact'' above.
II. Federal Preemption
Section 5125 of Title 49 U.S.C. contains several preemption
provisions that are relevant to AWHMT's application. Subsection (a)
provides that--in the absence of a waiver of preemption by DOT under
section 5125(e) or specific authority in another Federal law--a
requirement of a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian
tribe is preempted if
(1) complying with a requirement of the State, political
subdivision or tribe and a requirement of this chapter or a
regulation issued under this chapter is not possible; or
(2) the requirement of the State, political subdivision, or
Indian tribe, as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to the
accomplishing and carrying out of this chapter or a regulation
prescribed under this chapter.
These two paragraphs set forth the ``dual compliance'' and ``obstacle''
criteria which RSPA had applied in issuing inconsistency rulings prior
to 1990, under the original preemption provision in the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA). Public Law 93-633 112(a), 88 Stat.
2161 (1975). The dual compliance and obstacle criteria are based on
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on preemption. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, Inc., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
Subsection (b)(1) of 49 U.S.C. 5125 provides that a non-Federal
requirement concerning any of the following subjects, that is not
``substantively the same as'' a provision of Federal hazardous material
transportation law or a regulation prescribed under that
[[Page 17480]]
law, is preempted unless it is authorized by another Federal law or DOT
grants a waiver of preemption:
(A) the designation, description, and classification of
hazardous material.
(B) the packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
placarding of hazardous material.
(C) the preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
related to hazardous material and requirements related to the
number, contents, and placement of those documents.
(D) the written notification, recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material.
(E) the design, manufacturing, fabricating, marking,
maintenance, reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or
a container represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for
use in transporting hazardous material.
To be ``substantively the same,'' the non-Federal requirement must
``conform[] in every significant respect to the Federal requirement.
Editorial and other similar de minimis changes are permitted.'' 49 CFR
107.202(d).
Subsection (g)(1) of 49 U.S.C. 5125 provides that a State,
political subdivision, or Indian tribe may
impose a fee related to transporting hazardous material only if the
fee is fair and used for a purpose relating to transporting
hazardous material, including enforcement and planning, developing,
and maintaining a capability for emergency response.
These preemption provisions in 49 U.S.C. 5125 carry out Congress's
view that a single body of uniform Federal regulations promotes safety
in the transportation of hazardous materials. In considering the HMTA,
the Senate Commerce Committee ``endorse[d] the principle of preemption
in order to preclude a multiplicity of State and local regulations and
the potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations in the
area of hazardous materials transportation.'' S. Rep. No. 1102, 93rd
Cong. 2nd Sess. 37 (1974). When it amended the HMTA in 1990, Congress
specifically found that:
(3) many States and localities have enacted laws and regulations
which vary from Federal laws and regulations pertaining to the
transportation of hazardous materials, thereby creating the
potential for unreasonable hazards in other jurisdictions and
confounding shippers and carriers which attempt to comply with
multiple and conflicting registration, permitting, routing,
notification, and other regulatory requirements.
(4) because of the potential risks to life, property, and the
environment posed by unintentional releases of hazardous materials,
consistency in laws and regulations governing the transportation of
hazardous materials is necessary and desirable,
(5) in order to achieve greater uniformity and to promote the
public health, welfare, and safety at all levels, Federal standards
for regulating the transportation of hazardous materials in
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce are necessary and
desirable.
Public Law 101-615 section 2, 104 Stat. 3244. A Federal Court of
Appeals has found that uniformity was the ``linchpin'' in the design of
the HMTA, including the 1990 amendments which expanded the original
preemption provision. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d
1571, 1575 (10th Cir. 1991). (In 1994, the HMTA was revised, codified
and enacted ``without substantive change,'' at 49 U.S.C. Chapter 51.
Pub. L. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745.)
Under 49 U.S.C. 5125(d)(1), any directly affected person may apply
to the Secretary of Transportation for a determination whether a State,
political subdivision or Indian tribe requirement is preempted. The
Secretary of Transportation has delegated authority to RSPA the
authority to make determinations of preemption, except for those
concerning highway routing which have been delegated to FHWA. 40 CFR
1.53(b). Under RSPA's regulations, preemption determinations are issued
by RSPA's Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety. 49
CFR 107.209(a).
Section 5125(d)(1) requires that notice of an application for a
preemption determination must be published in the Federal Register.
Following the receipt and consideration of written comments, RSPA will
publish its determination in the Federal Register. See 49 CFR
107.209(d). A short period of time is allowed for filing of petitions
for reconsideration. 49 CFR 107.211. Any party to the proceeding may
seek judicial review in a Federal district court. 49 U.S.C. 5125(f).
Preemption determinations do not address issues of preemption
arising under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution or under statutes
other than the Federal hazardous material transportation law unless it
is necessary to do so in order to determine whether a requirement is
authorized by another Federal law. A State, local or Indian tribe
requirement is not authorized by another Federal law merely because it
is not preempted by another Federal statute. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Harmon, above, 951 F.2d at 1581 n.10.
In making preemption determinations under 49 U.S.C. 5125(d), RSPA
is guided by the principles and policy set forth in Executive Order No.
12612, entitled ``Federalism'' (52 FR 41685, Oct. 30, 1987). Section
4(a) of that Executive Order authorizes preemption of State laws only
when a statute contains an express preemption provision, there is other
firm and palpable evidence of Congressional intent to preempt, or the
exercise of State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of
Federal authority. Section 5125 contains express preemption provisions,
which RSPA has implemented through its regulations.
III. Public Comments
All comments should be limited to the issue whether 49 U.S.C. 5125
preempts the Tennessee requirements challenged by AWHMT. Comments
should:
(A) Set forth in detail the manner in which the Tennessee Superfund
Remedial Action Fee and discharge reporting requirements are applied
and enforced, including but not limited to:
(1) The total amount of Superfund Remedial Action Fees collected by
Tennessee for fiscal year 1996-97 and all purposes for which those fees
were used (including an identification of the specific accounts into
which those fees were deposited); and
(2) Whether the information required to be submitted on a written
report of a hazardous waste discharge exceeds the information required
to be reported to RSPA on DOT form 5800.1; and
(B) Specifically address the preemption criteria set forth in Part
II, above.
Persons intending to comment should review RSPA's standards and
procedures governing consideration of applications for preemption
determinations, set forth at 49 CFR 107.201-107.211.
Issued in Washington, DC, on April 2, 1998.
Alan I. Roberts,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, Research and
Special Programs Administration.
Appendix A
Before the United States Department of Transportation Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety
Application of the Association of Waste Hazardous Materials
Transporters to initiate a proceeding to determine Whether Certain
Fees and Incident Reporting Requirements Imposed By the State of
Tennessee on Persons Involved in the Transportation of Hazardous
Wastes to or From Locations Within The State are Preempted by the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.
March 23, 1998.
Application of the Association of Waste Hazardous Materials
Transporters to initiate a proceeding to determine whether certain
fees and incident reporting requirements imposed by the State of
Tennessee on persons involved in the transportation of
[[Page 17481]]
hazardous wastes to or from locations within the State are preempted
by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.
Interest of the Petitioner
The Association of Waste Hazardous Materials Transporters
(AWHMT) represents companies that transport, by truck and rail,
waste hazardous materials, including industrial, radioactive and
hazardous materials, throughout the United States, including within
the State of Tennessee (State). Despite full compliance with the
hazardous materials regulations (HMRs), members of the AWHMT are
precluded from transporting manifested shipments of hazardous waste
within the State unless, among other things, certain fees are paid
to the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC). In
addition, transporters are in violation of DEC requirements and in
jeopardy of losing their permits to transport hazardous waste until
they file written reports following any hazardous waste incident.
The AWHMT asserts that the State requirements are in contravention
to the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).
Background
The Association of Waste Hazardous Materials Transporters
(AWHMT) was invited to provide comment on several bills before the
Tennessee legislature earlier this year. These bills dealt with
reforming permit requirements currently imposed on transporters of
hazardous waste in the State. Part of our review disclosed that the
DEC annually imposes a flat $650 remedial action fee on transporters
of hazardous waste. We presented arguments that suggested the DEC's
fee violates federal law. The DEC has rejected our argument.
Further review of the DEC requirements suggests to us that a
requirement to file written incident reports with the Department
also violates federal law.
Despite the questionable legality of these requirements, the DEC
imposes such stringent penalties for non-compliance that
transporters comply. First, the Code declares it ``unlawful to * * *
refuse or fail to pay to the department fees assessed pursuant to
the provisions of (the Code or to) fail to provide information in
violation of the rules, regulations, or orders of the (DEC).'' \1\
The Code then makes clear that transporters are precluded from
transporting hazardous waste to or from any location in the state
without first obtaining a permit from the DEC.\2\ Failure of a
permit applicant or permittee to pay the required annual remedial
action fee is grounds for denial or revocation of a permit.\3\
Finally, any person who violates or fails to comply with any
provision, term or condition of any permit issued, or any rule,
regulation or standard adopted pursuant to the Code is subject to a
civil penalty of up to $50,000 per day for each day of violation.
Each day upon which such violation occurs constitutes a separate
punishable offense.\4\ As proof that the DEC applies and enforces
its fees, a current permit application package is attached.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Tenn. Code 68-212-105(4) & (5).
\2\ Tenn. Code 68-212-108(a)(1).
\3\ Tenn. Code 68-212-110(d).
\4\ Tenn. Code 68-212-114(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Requirement for Which A Determination is Sought
This application seeks preemption of the following State
requirements:
Tennessee Code (Code) section 68-212-203(a)(6)
concerning remedial action fees
Tennessee DEC Rule (Rule) section 1200-1-13-.03(1)(e)
concerning remedial action fees
Rule section 1200-1-11-.04(4)(a)4 concerning written
incident reports
RCRA does not shield State Hazardous Waste Requirements from
Scrutiny Under The HMTA
The challenged requirements pertain to the transportation of
hazardous waste. Tennessee is authorized by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to administer the federal hazardous waste
program. Many states have pointed to such authorization as a defense
against the preemptive authority of the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act (HMTA). This defense, however, is without merit.
All hazardous wastes are designated ``hazardous substances''
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).\5\ As such, hazardous wastes are explicitly
required to be ``listed and regulated as * * * hazardous materials
under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.'' \6\ The U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) defines the term ``hazardous
material'' to include ``hazardous waste.'' \7\ The hazardous
materials regulations (HMR) issued pursuant to the HMTA apply to the
transportation of hazardous wastes by intrastate, interstate, and
foreign carriers.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 42 U.S.C. 9601(14)(C).
\6\ 42 U.S.C. 9656(a).
\7\ 49 CFR 171.8, definition of ``hazardous materials.''
\8\ 49 CFR 171.1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in
1976, Congress provided that EPA's regulations on transporters of
hazardous waste must be consistent with the requirements of the HMTA
and the HMR.\9\ The deferral to the HMTA and the HMR for the
regulation of hazardous waste in transportation was intended to
avoid duplicative requirements. EPA's concern about such
inefficiency and confusion lead the Agency to state that the HMR are
``capable of being modified under the HMTA to address the
transportation hazards of waste materials and that RCRA affirms the
need for such a modification.'' \10\ When EPA delegates its
authority to issue regulations to a state, as it has in Tennessee,
the state's hazardous waste program must be equivalent to the
federal program and consistent with other state authorized
programs.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ 42 U.S.C. 6923(b).
\10\ 43 FR 22626 (May 25, 1978).
\11\ 42 U.S.C. 6926.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA has consistently maintained that its approval of a state's
hazardous waste program does not preclude preemption under the
HMTA.\12\ Provisions of RCRA which allow states to impose ``more
stringent'' requirements than those established by EPA,\13\ must be
read consistently with the HMTA.\14\ Thus, while RCRA does not
contain a procedure for prohibiting states from imposing
requirements on the transportation of hazardous waste that are more
stringent or broader in scope that those imposed by EPA, states may
not rely on RCRA to shield such requirements from review under the
HMTA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 57 FR 32726, 32728 (July 23, 1994), and letter to Cynthia
Hilton, Chemical Waste Transportation Institute (CWTI), from
Devereaux Barnes, EPA, October 29, 1992.
\13\ 49 U.S.C. 6929.
\14\ Morton versus Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The HMTA Provides for the Preemption of Non-Federal Requirements
When Those Non-Federal Requirements Fail Certain Federal Preemption
Tests
The HMTA was enacted in 1975 to give the DOT greater authority
``to protect the Nation adequately against the risks of life and
property which are inherent in the transportation of hazardous
materials in commerce.'' \15\ By vesting primary authority over the
transportation of hazardous materials in the DOT, Congress intended
to ``make possible for the first time a comprehensive approach to
minimization of the risks associated with the movement of valuable
but dangerous materials.'' \16\ As originally enacted, the HMTA
included a preemption provision ``to preclude a multiplicity of
State and local regulations and the potential for varying as well as
conflicting regulations in the area of hazardous materials
transportation.'' \17\ This preemption provision was implemented
through an administrative process where DOT would issue
``inconsistency rulings'' as to, [w]hether compliance with both the
State or political subdivision requirement and the Act or the
regulations issued under the Act is possible; and [t]he extent to
which the State of political subdivision requirement is an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the Act and the regulations
issued under the Act.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Pub. L. 93-633 sec. 102.
\16\ S. Rep. 1192, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1974, page 2.
\17\ S. Rep. 1192, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, 1974, page 37.
\18\ 41 FR 38171 (September 9, 1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These criteria, commonly referred to as the ``dual compliance''
and ``obstacle'' tests, ``comport[ed] with the test for conflict
between Federal and State statutes enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Hines versus Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 41 FR 38168 (September 9, 1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1990, Congress codified the dual compliance and obstacle
tests as the Act's general preemption provision.\20\ The 1990
amendments also expanded on DOT's preemption authorities, setting
four other standards under which non-federal requirements could be
subject to preemption
[[Page 17482]]
review. Two of these standards are of significance to this petition:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ 49 U.S.C. 5125(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, Congress expressly preempted non-federal
requirements in five covered subject areas if they are not
``substantively the same'' as the federal requirements. Among these
covered subject areas is the written notification, recording, and
reporting of the unintentional release in transportation of
hazardous materials.\21\ ``Substantively the same'' was defined to
mean ``conforms in every significant respect to the Federal
requirement. Editorial and other similar de minimis, changes are
permitted.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ 49 U.S.C. 5125(b)(1)(D).
\22\ 49 CFR 107.202(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, non-federal fees related to the transportation
of hazardous materials are preempted unless the fees are ``fair and
used for a purpose related to transporting hazardous materials.''
\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ 49 U.S.C. 5125(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT's preemption authority is limited only to the extent that
non-federal requirements are ``otherwise authorized'' by federal
law. As noted above, state requirements affecting transporters of
hazardous waste are not ``authorized by another law of the United
States,'' within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 5125, simply because they
are contained in an EPA-authorized state hazardous waste
program.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n versus Harmon, 951 F.2d, 1571, 1581
n. 10, (10th Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our review of federal law and the Code leads us to believe that
the following specific requirements, absent further modification
and/or clarification, are subject to preemption pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 5125(a)(2) and (b)(1)(D).
The Remedial Action Fee Imposed by the Code and Rule is not
``Fair'' Or ``Used for a Purpose Related to Transporting Hazardous
Material'' and is Subject to Preemption Under the Obstacle Test
Code Sec. 68-212-203(a)(6) and Rule Section 1200-1-13-.03(1)(e)
authorize and impose an annual assessment of $650 on transporters of
manifested hazardous waste shipments moving to or from locations in
the State. The revenue from this fee collection is deposited in the
DEC's ``Hazardous Waste Remedial Action Fund'' (Fund) \25\ Code
Sec. 68-212-205 outlines the uses to which the revenues in the Fund
can be applied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Code section 68-212-204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the HMTA provides that ``a State * * * may
impose a fee related to transporting hazardous materials only if the
fee is fair and used for a purpose related to transporting hazardous
materials, including enforcement and planning, developing, and
maintaining a capability for emergency response.'' \26\ DOT
considered ``transportation-related fees'' to include fees imposed
``as a condition for authority or permission to transport any
hazardous materials into, through, or within'' a state.\27\ DOT has
affirmed that fees imposed by a State that did not meet the
standards set forth in the law would ``create an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the [HMTA]'', and consequently, be
subject to administrative preemption under the ``obstacle test.''
\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ U.S.C. 5125(g)(1).
\27\ Letter to Robert Shinn, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental
Protection, from Alan I. Roberts, RSPA, May 24, 1995.
\28\ Letter to Cynthia Hilton, CWTI, from Alan I. Roberts, DOT,
October 6, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Used For Test
The DEC is in violation of federal law because the revenue
collected from hazardous waste transporters in the Fund is used for
``identifying and investigating inactive hazardous substance sites *
* * and for investigating and reasonably and safely containing,
cleaning up, monitoring and maintaining such sites as provided in
the [Code].'' \29\ The Fund may also be used, in conjunction with
the above purpose, for consultants and personnel, for equipment, or
``other necessary expenses.'' \30\ The Fund may be used to match
federal funds available under CERCLA.\31\ Other authorized uses of
the Fund are to provide technical assistance to generators; to
promote the DEC's waste reduction and pollution prevention programs;
to operate an information clearinghouse for generators; to
coordinate an award program for innovative approaches to reducing
hazardous waste generation; to conduct training sessions and publish
reports targeted to segments of industry concerning hazardous waste
reduction; to prepare an annual report to the State Legislature; to
accept gifts and grants; to provide grants to generators of
hazardous waste; to provide research grants to develop new
technology for the reduction or better treatment of hazardous waste;
and to review waste reduction plans. Despite the exhaustive uses of
the Fund, none address enforcement and emergency response for
transportation of hazardous materials within the meaning of 49
U.S.C. 5125(g)(1). DOT has already preempted non-federal fees based
on the non-federal entity's unauthorized use of a hazmat
transportation-related fee. DOT should not tolerate the continuation
of the Remedial Action fee for the same reason.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Code section 68-212-205(a).
\30\ Code section 68-212-205(b).
\31\ Code section 68-212-205(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fairness Test
The DEC's remedial action fee is set at a flat rate and
unapportioned to each motor carrier's presence in the State. The
U.S. Supreme Court has declared fees which are flat and
unapportioned to be unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
because, among other things, such fees fail the ``internal
consistency'' test.\32\ The Court reasoned that a state fee levied
on an interstate operation violates the Commerce Clause because, if
replicated by other jurisdictions, such fees lead to interstate
carriers being subject to multiple times the rate of taxation paid
by purely local carriers even though each carrier's vehicles operate
an identical number of miles.\33\ In addition, because they are
unapportioned, flat fees cannot be said to be ``fairly related'' to
a feepayer's level of presence or activities in the fee-assessing
jurisdiction.\34\ In a number of subsequent cases, courts have
relied on these arguments to strike down, enjoin, or escrow flat
hazardous materials taxes and fees.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ American Trucking Assn's versus Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987).
\33\ Ibid., 284-86.
\34\ Ibid., 290-291 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. versus
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 629 (1981).
\35\ American Trucking Assn's, Inc. versus State of New Jersey,
No. 11562-92 (N.J.T.C., March 11, 1998) (oral opinion declaring
flat, annual $250 per truck hazardous waste transporter fee
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause), American Trucking
Assn's Inc. versus State of Wisconsin, No. 95-1714, 1996 WL 593806
(Wisc. App. Ct., October 1996) (holding flat, annual per-company
hazardous materials fees to be violative of the Commerce Clause).
American Trucking Assn's Inc. versus Secretary of Administration,
613 N.E.2d 95 (Mass. 1993) (finding unconstitutional annual, flat
per-vehicle hazardous waste fee). American Trucking Assn's Inc.
versus Secretary of State, 595 A.2d 1014 (Me. 1991) (finding
unconstitutional flat per-vehicle hazardous materials fees).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We submit that the DEC's flat remedial action fee also runs
afoul of the HMTA because it is inherently ``unfair.'' Some motor
carriers, otherwise in compliance with the HMRs, will inevitably be
unable to shoulder multiple flat fees, and thus be excluded from
some sub-set of fee-imposing jurisdictions. If the State's flat fee
scheme is allowed to stand, similar fees must be allowed in the
Nation's other 30,000 non-federal jurisdictions. The cumulative
effect of such outcome would be not only a generally undesirable
patchwork of regulations necessary to collect the various fees, but
the balkanization of carrier areas of operation and attendant,
unnecessary handling of hazardous materials as these materials are
transferred from one company to another at jurisdictional borders.
The increased transfers would pose a serious risk to safety, since
``the more frequently hazardous material is handled during
transportation, the greater the risk of mishap.'' 36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. versus Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 671
F. Supp. 466, 480-81 (W.D. Tex. 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recognition of these outcomes, Congress amended the HMTA, in
1990, to provide, in addition to the ``used for'' test, the
hazardous materials transportation-related fee ``fairness'' test.
Augmenting this authority, Congress further provided, in the 1994
amendments to the HMTA, that DOT collect information about the basis
on which the fee is levied.37 The then-Chairman of the
Senate Subcommittee to authorize the amendment explained that DOT
was to use this authority to determine if the hazardous materials
fees are ``subject to preemption.'' 38 When determining
what constitutes, ``fair,'' the Chairman clarified that ``the usual
constitutional commerce clause protections remain applicable and
prohibit fees that discriminate or unduly burden interstate
commerce.'' 39 In closely analogous circumstances, the
Supreme Court considered the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 1513(b), which
authorizes States to impose ``reasonable'' charges on the users of
airports. The Court read the statute to apply a ``reasonableness
standard taken directly from * * * dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.'' 40 In the absence of any
[[Page 17483]]
evidence the Congress meant to sanction non-federal fees that are
discriminatory or malapportioned, a ``fair'' fee within the meaning
of 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(1) surely is one that, at a minimum, complies
with the requirements of the Commerce Clause.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ 49 U.S.C. 5125(g)(2).
\38\ Cong. Record, August 11, 1994, page 11324.
\39\ Ibid.
\40\ Northwest Airlines v. State of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 374, 127
L.Ed. 2d 183, 114 S.Ct. 855 (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, it must be remembered that the Code and Rule
impose the challenged flat fee only on transporters engaged in the
transportation of manifested shipments of hazardous waste moving to
or from locations in Tennessee. However, AWHMT has reviewed the
hazardous materials incident reports filed with DOT pursuant to 49
CFR 171.16 and discovered, for the five-year representative period
1992-1996, that 1819 hazardous materials incidents were reported in
Tennessee of which 102 involved the transportation of hazardous
waste.41 Forty-six percent of the hazardous waste
incidents involved shipments by transporters technically unpermitted
by the State and not subject to the remedial action fee because the
shipments were not destined to or from locations in the State. Of
the 1819 incidents, 42 met DOT's definition of ``serious;'' only one
of the 42 involved the transportation of hazardous
waste.42 The State clearly has unfairly burdened certain
hazardous waste carriers with fees and requirements that are
unsupported by the risk presented to the citizens and/or environment
of the State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Hazardous Materials Information System, U.S. Department of
Transportation--1992-1996, January 28, 1998.
\42\ ``Serious'' incidents are those that result in one or more
of the following: death; accident/derailment of vehicle; evacuation
of six or more individuals; injury requiring hospitalization; or
road closure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the above listed reasons, we assert that flat fees are
inherently ``unfair'' and that the State's fee scheme should fall to
the obstacle test pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5125(a)(2).
The Written Notification, Recording, and Reporting of the
Unintentional Release in Transportation of Hazardous Material Is
Reversed to the Federal Government
Rule 1200-1-11.04(4)(a)4 requires written notification of each
hazardous waste discharge during transportation that occurs in the
State. These reports must be filed with the DEC within 15 days. The
written notification must provide information about the incident.
The DEC allows the filing of form F5800.1, the DOT incident report,
to suffice if it is ``properly completed and supplemented as
necessary to include all information required by the (DEC).''
43
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Rule 1200-1-11.04(4)(a)4. Note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is clear that the DEC's written notification requirements are
not substantively the same as corresponding federal
requirements.44 The HMTA expressly preempts such
requirements.45 DOT has even moved to preempt non-federal
written incident reports when the non-federal requirement has been
only ``to provide copies of the incident reports filed with (DOT) *
* * .'' 46
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ 49 CFR 171.16.
\45\ 49 U.S.C. 5125(b)(1)(D).
\46\ IR-31, 55 FR 25582 (June 21, 1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The State's hazardous waste remedial action fee requirements
imposed on the transportation of manifested shipments of hazardous
waste are preempted by federal law. The State is enforcing the above
suspect requirements. We request timely consideration of the
concerns we have raised.
Certification
Pursuant to 49 CFR 107.205(a), we hereby certify that a copy of
this application has been forwarded with an invitation to submit
comments to: Milton Hamilton, Jr., Commissioner, Department of
Environment & Conservation, 401 Church St., 21st Floor, L&C Tower,
Nashville, TN 37243.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael Carney,
Chairman.
Enclosures.
cc: Ed Bonekemper, Asst. Chief Counsel for, Hazardous Materials
Safety, RSPA-DCC-10, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh
St., SW., Washington, DC 20590.
Attachments
(A) Tenn. Code 68-212 Secs. 101-121
(B) Tenn. Code 68-212 Secs. 203-206
(C) DEC Rule 1200-1-11-.04
(D) DEC Rule 1200-1-11-.08
(E) DEC Rule 1200-1-13
(F) Hazardous Waste Transporter Permit Application
[FR Doc. 98-9212 Filed 4-8-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-M
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.