Royalty Relief for Producing Leases and Certain Existing Leases In Deep Water
Federal RegisterJan 16, 1998
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Minerals Management Service
30 CFR Part 203
RIN 1010-AC13
Royalty Relief for Producing Leases and Certain Existing Leases
In Deep Water
AGENCY: Minerals Management Service (MMS), Interior.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This rule establishes conditions for reducing royalties on
producing leases; provides for suspension of royalty payments on
certain deep water leases issued as the result of lease sales held
before November 28, 1995; and describes the information required for a
complete application for royalty relief.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective February 17, 1998. However, the
information collection requirements contained in Sec. 203.61 will not
become effective until approved by the Office of Management (OMB). MMS
will publish
[[Page 2606]]
a document at that time announcing the effective date.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Marshall Rose, Chief, Economics
Division, at (703) 787-1536.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Objectives of Royalty Relief
Royalty relief can lead to increased development and production of
natural gas and oil, creating profits for lessees and royalty and tax
revenues for the government that it might not otherwise receive. This
rule establishes economic incentives that encourage Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) lessees to spend or invest the money needed to promote
development and encourage increased production. For all Federal
offshore planning areas, we may provide enough relief to allow a
reasonable operating profit if expenses plus royalties are approaching
revenues. For cases in certain deep water (water at least 200 meters
deep) planning areas of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), we may suspend
royalty payments to permit lessees to earn a reasonable return on their
capital investments.
The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) carries out royalty
relief as part of his stewardship and sound management of public lands.
This includes conserving resources, getting a fair return to the public
on OCS resources, and ensuring all OCS development is safe and
consistent with sound environmental standards.
II. Legislative Background
The Secretary has broad legislative authority to reduce royalty
rates on OCS leases. Section 8(a)(3)(A)of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A)), gives the
Secretary authority to reduce royalties on leases in order to increase
production. Relief must be justified and granted case by case.
On November 28, 1995, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-58,
which included the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA). Section 302
of the DWRRA amends section 8(a) of the OCSLA (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(B))
authority so the Secretary may grant relief on a producing or non-
producing lease, or category of leases. Its purpose is to promote
development or increased production, or to encourage production of
marginal resources, for GOM leases lying west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes
West longitude.
The DWRRA also covers leases issued in water depths greater than
200 meters (deep water) as a result of sales held before the DWRRA's
enactment. Section 302 of the DWRRA singles out ``new production'',
from a lease or unit existing on the date of its enactment and in the
GOM's deep water west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude. The
amended OCSLA (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(C)) says this new production
doesn't qualify for royalty suspension if the Secretary determines that
this new production would be economic without royalty relief.
Otherwise, the Secretary must determine for each case how much
production to exclude from royalty in order to make the new production
economic.
Existing leases or units having no royalty-bearing production,
other than test production, before November 28, 1995, and qualified for
relief under Section 302, need not pay royalties from a field on the
first:
17.5 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMBOE) for leases
in fields in 200 to 400 meters of water,
52.5 MMBOE for leases in fields in 400 to 800 meters of
water, and
87.5 MMBOE for leases in fields in more than 800 meters of
water.
These leases or units may qualify for a larger suspension volume if
this specified volume wouldn't make the field economic.
Under Sec. 8(a) of the OCSLA as amended by Sec. 302 of the DWRRA,
we may also grant a royalty-suspension volume for production from lease
development involving a substantial capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg
platform, subsea template and manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple
well projects, etc.) proposed in a Development Operations Coordination
Document (DOCD), or a supplement to an approved DOCD, approved by the
Secretary after November 28, 1995. This type of relief is available to
leases that produced before November 28, 1995. In this case, we'll
grant the suspension volume we determine necessary to make the new
production economic.
We issued the Interim Rule for Royalty Relief for Producing Leases
and Certain Existing Leases in Deep Water on May 31, 1996 (61 FR
27263). We asked for comments, received many, and are now issuing a
final rule.
III. Response to Comments
Fifteen respondents--the American Petroleum Institute (API), the
National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA), the Independent Petroleum
Association of America (IPAA), and 12 oil and gas companies--submitted
comments on the Interim Rule and the supplementary guidelines. We
analyzed all comments and sometimes revised the final language based on
them. We first address the general concern expressed about the Net
Revenue Share (NRS) royalty relief system, followed by the three main
themes raised in the comments on the Deep Water royalty relief system.
Finally, we provide responses to the other individual comments and
answer questions relating to selected provisions retained from the
Interim Rule.
Comment on Utility of NRS Relief
Comment: The regulations dealing with NRS leases will be of little
or no utility. Regarding leases with inadequate revenues to sustain
production, the qualifying requirement stipulating that royalty
payments must be at least 75 percent of net revenues over the most
recent 12-month period is unrealistic and too stringent (Secs. 203.50,
52 and 53).
Response: We've chosen to keep the two principal features of the
proposed NRS system. These are a qualification requirement based on a
75 percent royalty share of net revenue and a feature whereby the
average lease rate gradually rises back to the pre-relief level when
production made possible by the relief rises sufficiently. However,
we've made changes in this form of relief that will make it easier to
implement and operate under the NRS system. These changes will reduce
the application burden, simplify the qualification requirements, and
modify the operational framework.
We proposed the NRS system to implement the OCS Lands Act (43
U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A)) authority to offer royalty relief to a producing
lease to promote increased production. We specified different
qualification conditions for two situations: end-of-life leases with
inadequate revenues to sustain production and marginally economic
projects to expand production. We've decided to no longer offer a
separate form of royalty relief for expansion projects, because lessees
with such projects should generally prefer applying for, and operating
under, the revised end-of-life relief system in this final rule. Also,
by dropping project relief we've simplified the program by eliminating
the need for the applicant to show that production would be economic
only with relief and that the project would add at least 1 year's worth
of production. To emphasize this narrower scope and avoid confusion
with an NRS system that has been generally avoided by industry, we've
adopted the new name ``end-of-life relief.'' However, we have retained
the underlying conceptual framework of the proposed NRS system in the
new end-of-life royalty relief system.
For end-of-life situations, the interim rule required a
demonstration that
[[Page 2607]]
royalties were taking 75 percent of net revenues and were projected to
take an increasing share in the future. We designed these stipulations
to fulfill the ``increase production'' condition in the statute.
However, we now believe that the increasing share requirement added
little to the assurance that royalty relief would result in increased
production. Also, it was burdensome and placed us in a position of
relying unnecessarily on projections made by the applicant.
Accordingly, we've dropped the increasing share condition.
Moreover, we've reduced the extent of information that must be
submitted in an application. Instead of 36 months of cost history and
12 months of prospective data, under the new end-of-life system,
applicants provide cost and production for the 12 out of the past most
recent 15 months that have average daily production of at least 100
barrels of oil equivalent (BOE). Note the 100 BOE per day threshold
applies to whole leases, not individual wells. The 12 out of 15 months
provision protects producers from being disqualified by temporary shut
down events like well work-overs, and it mitigates misrepresentations
due to seasonal variation. The 100 BOE average daily production
requirement gives us more assurance than the previous proposed
``increasing share'' requirement of the interim rule that relief would
make the increased production economic. We believe that leases with
production smaller than 100 BOE cannot cover platform operating costs
and that they likely continue to operate for reasons beyond those that
royalty relief would affect. That is, while royalty relief may reduce
losses for under 100 BOE/day operators, it will not increase production
from them.
The proposed NRS relief system took 50 percent of increases or
decreases in net revenue, regardless of the cause. We designed this
feature to allow the public to share automatically in unforeseen
expansions of production, price increases, or cost decreases while
cushioning lessee losses from unforeseen deterioration in these
factors. The absence of applications suggests to us that these
advantages were outweighed by a perception that the NRS system imposed
on lessees a heavy and ongoing data collection burden and extracted
from them too much of their upside profit potential.
Fortunately, we've found that a simpler and less burdensome royalty
system can approximate the sliding rate structure of the NRS system.
Therefore, we've replaced the NRS terms, which typically included a 50
percent rate over any possible level of production, with a 2-tier
royalty rate. We give you relief with a rate fixed at one-half the pre-
relief rate for a specific monthly amount of production followed by an
incremental rate fixed at 50 percent above the pre-relief rate for
production above that monthly amount. We added other features to
balance the end-of-life system. Features that encourage lessees include
a cap on the average royalty rate at the pre-relief rate and a lessee
option to end relief at any time. Features that protect public interest
include lifting of relief during periods of very high prices, an
eventual end of relief if prices or production, or both, remain high
for an extended period, and a provision allowing us to identify
conditions in individual cases which would lead to terminating the
relief arrangement because those conditions are inconsistent with an
end-of-life situation.
Main Themes in Comments on the Deep Water Interim Rule
1. Qualification Circumstances
Comment: The current interim rule is too complex. As an
alternative, API, NOIA, and IPAA suggest setting minimum economic field
sizes (MEFS) by water depth and development system that automatically
qualify fields for royalty relief (Sec. 203.67).
Response: Automatic MEFS are too impractical and difficult to
develop and maintain. So, we won't use them to decide if a field
qualifies for the amount of royalty relief the DWRRA specifies.
We estimate that calculating an MEFS requires values for more than
90 parameters, such as price, quality, water and drilling depth, gas-
to-oil ratio, production rates, and scheduling of costs and production.
We'd need to calculate many MEFS and would have to update them
regularly as prices, costs and other significant values change. With
large amounts of relief and rapidly changing values, and given the
nearly explicit statutory mandate to provide sufficient relief, but not
too much, we'd have to carefully set the qualifying field sizes. As a
result, we'd not be able to set MEFS at sizes that would be worth
developing even with royalty relief.
In contrast, the potential number of non-producing leases that may
come in for relief looks relatively small. These are pre-Act leases,
formerly pre-enactment deep water leases, or PDWLs. We can now identify
fewer than 75 fields in this category, a small fraction of which may
need relief. More importantly, we can't justify relying on generic data
to determine an MEFS when an application gives us specific data for
each field.
2. Early Relief Indication
Comment: MMS requires that a DOCD be approved before an applicant
can submit a complete application for royalty relief on a pre-Act
lease. Unfortunately, that pushes the request for royalty relief too
late into development to be useful. Lessees won't prepare expensive
DOCDs for projects that might not go into production, so they want some
assurance royalty relief will be granted before preparing one
(Sec. 203.83).
Rather than require an approved DOCD before submission of an
application, break approval into two phases. In phase one, an applicant
would file a preliminary application early in the life of a project
based on the best information available at the time but with
significantly less data than required in a final application. Based on
a less extensive review than required for a final application, MMS
would give a preliminary finding about whether the project qualified
for relief and the appropriate suspension volume. Unless there were
material changes, the preliminary finding would be binding. In phase
two, a final application would either confirm the relief or cause MMS
to do a new evaluation because of material changes (Sec. 203.61).
Response: We agree that the DOCD requirement is unnecessarily
restrictive and have removed it in the final rule. Instead, we'll
depend on other means to ensure appraisals are complete enough for the
applicant to make an informed decision to develop and for us to
evaluate the need for royalty relief. We will:
Shorten the period allowed from 2 years to 1 year between
the approval of relief and the start of construction on the development
and production system,
Allow significant new geological and geophysical (G&G)
data to qualify only for the initial redetermination, and
Use our own professional judgment on whether the appraisal
is sufficient for decision making.
Breaking the approval into two phases as proposed by industry
comments has a number of flaws. MMS would have to make a conditionally
binding relief decision in phase one with less data and certainty than
the company would have when it decides whether to develop after phase
two. Foregoing Federal property rights to royalty income under the
existing lease contract without sufficient information would be too
arbitrary. Also, our conditional approval may discourage an applicant
from developing more information that might
[[Page 2608]]
change the preliminary finding, before filing a phase two application.
We've changed the rule to fit industry's request for an assessment
of relief early in the project. In certain circumstances, a lessee or
operator may request a nonbinding assessment of whether a field would
qualify for royalty relief before submitting the first complete
application on a field. This option will help those who don't want to
risk having to meet qualifications for a redetermination if we reject a
complete application, but want to know early about the chances for
royalty relief on a marginal prospect.
The request would involve a draft application plus a processing
fee. It could come any time after discovery (after a well qualifies
under 30 CFR 250.11 or production is allocated under an approved unit
agreement). The detail must be comparable to a complete application to
ensure we assess the same prospect the lessee or operator envisions. We
would develop a nonbinding assessment presuming that continued
appraisal would produce expected values for unknown, but essential,
data. Therefore, applicants must also send in an appraisal plan to
drill one or more wells should MMS issue a favorable nonbinding
assessment. After at least 90 days, a final, complete application can
confirm or revise the data in the draft application and present the
applicant's binding proposal as a condition for receiving royalty
relief.
3. Complexity of Methods and Data Requirements
Comment: MMS proposes to use Monte Carlo simulations to account for
the uncertainty in application data. Probability distributions in Monte
Carlo techniques may be appropriate to analyze exploration and evaluate
the adequacy of lease sale bids for which most data are unavailable and
estimated. However, these approaches are less appropriate to analyze
development. After discovering hydrocarbons, drilling delineation wells
and taking seismic readings, the data are much more certain. Companies
typically use simple scenario modeling and sensitivity analyses on
development projects. MMS should adopt the scenario approach most used
by industry (Secs. 203.85-89).
Response: We've kept the Monte Carlo methods, though somewhat
simplified, for several reasons. No clear milestones show when
appraisal or delineation is adequate for making the development
decision, so scenario modeling would not be suitable for many
applications. Also, we must systematically handle the uncertainty
associated with applications to be submitted at an early stage of
development and we've been given a mandate to deal with the extra risk
deep water poses. The Monte Carlo approach handles these diverse
situations and requirements by allowing for the incorporation of as
much or as little risk as perceived, a full range of sensitivity
analysis, and the small but positive chance for all the circumstances
an operation needs to become highly profitable.
We differ from the scenario approach industry describes mainly in
the way we estimate reserves. The scenario approach offers no
systematic way to arrive at a reserve size and chance of occurrence. We
use careful descriptions of reservoirs and a standard procedure for
calculating resources and aggregating them to the field level.
Generally, we have adopted the reserves and resource definitions of the
Society of Petroleum Engineers. This standardized procedure treats all
applicants alike. It keeps our evaluators from having to learn the
subtleties of each applicant's definition of reserves in order to
verify and perhaps change that part of the evaluation. The level of
detail proposed will ensure that we apply a consistent, analytically
supportable method, especially for estimating producible reserves and
resources.
The G&G report requests measurable reservoir data to help us
validate inputs to the evaluation model. Distributions for all data
items provide a way to document the uncertainty about these factors,
but we don't need estimates for all data items because the model
combines some items and derives other inputs. We've tried to clarify
and simplify the data requirements in the spirit of the ``scenario''
approach.
Under our Monte Carlo procedure, applicants may use up to three
discrete development scenarios, and they may include ranges for many of
their variables. We need this detail so we can clearly understand the
options and uncertainties an applicant faces. Our model has a less
complex structure than publicly available models for estimating
reserves and evaluating economics.
Individual Comments on the Deep Water Interim Rule and Guidelines
The following tables respond to the comments we received on the
interim rule and supplementary guidelines. Each row references
appropriate sections in the final rule and subject areas in the interim
rule that relate to that comment and response.
Comment on General Provisions
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Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response
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203.3/Processing Fees The fees for royalty relief are We estimate fees based on how
too high and more than cover the many hours of work we expect the
costs of processing and average application to take.
deterring nuisance applications. After we have more experience
Applicants should get refunds if with applications, we'll review
fees are more than actual processing costs and adjust fees
processing costs, which could be if necessary. We plan to give
the case if screens for minimum refunds only for incomplete
field size are used to approve applications. But, we won't
relief. charge more when processing
costs exceed the established
fees.
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Comments on Net Revenue Share (NRS) Royalty Relief
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Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response
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203.52/NRS Relief--Approval Criteria for If a lease produces from two or Relief for end-of-life cases is
Multiple-field Leases more fields, one or more of designed for and granted to a
which do not qualify for NRS whole lease or unit, not to a
relief, royalty relief should project or field. If a lease as
still be possible for the lease a whole qualifies for end-of-
production which would otherwise life relief, it gets it
qualify. regardless of how many fields
are involved.
[[Page 2609]]
Guidelines--Supplementing 203.53/Relief Requiring the operator to act as Agree. We've dropped this
Operation a single payor could not have requirement. It was proposed
been anticipated at the time the because the scope of an audit
producer agreed to become the for a lease receiving royalty
operator and exposes the relief is greater than for
operator to unforeseen legal normal leases. A single payor is
implications or burdens. Getting designated to keep our audit
money and accurate information expenses reasonable wherever
to pay and report royalties from multiple lease owners enjoy
other lease owners is difficult, relief. However, the Royalty
if not impossible, and could Simplification and Fairness Act
obligate the operator for late contains language which
or improper payment and precludes our insistence on a
reporting interest and penalties. single payor.
203.56/NRS Relief--Lease Transfers or If a lease is assigned, the NRS In concept, relief is granted to
Assignments terms should be transferred to a lease or unit, not to a
the assignee upon request. If lessee. We've changed the rule
the assignee doesn't ask to to automatically transfer relief
retain NRS terms, the lease terms to the assignee. Lessees
should revert to the standard also have the option to end
lease royalty rate. relief at anytime.
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Comments on Deep Water Royalty Relief (DWRR)
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Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response
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203.60 & 78/Field Definition MMS should elevate the level for field definition Agree in part. The
Decision Level & Appeals. decisions, notify lessees of the field designations, Chief, Reserves
and allow them to object. It should also extend the Section, Office of
period for appealing a field decision from 15 to 30- Resource
60 days. And it should allow companies to review Evaluation, GOM
current field designations for the GOM and industry Region (GOMR), will
input in any revisions make field
decisions after a
lease has been
qualified as
producible. As part
of that process,
affected lessees
and operators will
be able to review
and discuss any
data with us before
we make the final
field decision. We
won't extend the
formal appeal
period after this
decision. Until the
GOMR issues a final
decision on the
field designation,
lessees of a pre-
Act lease can't
apply for DWRR.
However, a DWRR
application based
on the GOM Regions'
final field
designation
decision can be
filed and processed
while the field
designation is
under appeal.
203.60/Field Concept and Industry is accustomed to delineating a field for Agree. The term
Designation--Methodology. reasons of infrastructure, not geology, so ``field'' in
disagreements over ``field'' designation can be geological and
expected. Recommend that MMS make public the methods petroleum
it uses to identify fields and work with industry to literature is
develop a more precise definition for ``field.'' usually defined
relative to
geologic structure
or stratigraphic
conditions. The
Field Naming
Handbook, already
available on the
INTERNET from the
GOMR, explains our
methods. The GOMR
will gladly
entertain
suggestions for
improvements.
Meetings on a field
designation before
starting the
completeness review
can improve
understanding. But
the basic entity
for relief on
royalties in deep
water is the
geologic field, not
the project.
Deep Water Guidelines Will MMS answer questions on preparing an application Yes. As the revised
Supplementing 203.62/ before it is filed and a fee paid? guidelines state,
Applications--Informal Consulting. we'll informally
advise you how to
fill out an
application, but
not whether to file
one. Given the
extensive
guidelines and
model
documentation,
informal advice can
save you time
before filing and
us time during the
completeness review
and evaluation.
203.62 & 65(f)/Applications & The economic, geologic, and engineering reports are Agree in part.
Revising Applicants' Assumptions. too complicated, voluminous, and costly for marginal Application
opportunities that depend on royalty relief. But MMS requirements impose
should not revise any assumptions without consulting a small cost in
the applicant and, if necessary, letting a third comparison to the
party settle disputes. At the very least MMS should size of the royalty
justify any revisions to an applicant's assumptions relief at stake.
We'll use our
judgment and
discretion in
deciding whether to
ask an applicant
for more
information or for
clarification
before making any
changes, tolling
the clock as needed
to complete a full
evaluation.
We also will
identify changes in
related variables
that may need to be
discussed. Where
major assumptions
are unsupported by
backup or important
data elements are
inconsistent with
other parts of the
application, we'll
fully explain the
source of the
problem and provide
a chance to explain
or resolve the
outstanding issues
before deciding on
an application. We
aren't planning to
use third parties
to resolve
disputes.
203.63/Applications--Joint Industry is pleased that DWRR doesn't mandate If lessees want
Application Difficulties. unitization. However, joint applications may be DWRR, they will
unworkable due to different reserve numbers, costs, have to at least
etc., estimated by different lessees design applications
jointly and, if
approved, make sure
they meet
performance
conditions for
retaining relief.
In cases where a
party refuses to
cooperate in
submitting a joint
application, it
won't be eligible
to receive any
relief granted, and
we'll likely need
to make assumptions
about how it might
have participated
in and contributed
to joint
development of the
field.
[[Page 2610]]
203.63/Applications--Joint MMS shouldn't require lessees that share the same Joint applications
Application Coercion. geologic structure to file joint applications because don't require joint
this requirement could inhibit applications or development, but
restrict how companies operate offshore. For they are an
instance, on multi-lease fields, an economic project inescapable feature
might negate another's less robust project; or a more of a field-based
advanced project may refuse to co-operate with a system. The rules
competitive, but lagging, project, etc allow good-cause
exceptions to joint
applications.
Should other
lessees on the
field choose not to
apply for relief,
they're still free
to develop their
leases as they
wish, but they
won't share any
relief granted.
203.64/Applications with A limit of one application per field restricts a The limit is
Assignments. company from seeking relief on a farmed-out lease if intended in part to
the prior owner applied for relief on that field and close the potential
was rejected. The new company that thinks it could loophole of
develop the field with royalty relief must qualify assigning leases to
for a redetermination to apply get around
requirements for
redetermination.
203.65/Review and Evaluation-- MMS should notify all affected lessees when royalty Agree. We will
Notification of MMS relief is granted and publish when, who, and how much notify all
Determinations. relief is given designated lease
operators within a
field when royalty
relief is granted.
The basic summary
information will be
published on MMS's
and GOMR's home
pages on the
INTERNET.
203.65/Review and Evaluation-- MMS's determination review is too long and will delay Public law sets the
Determination Period. field development because lessees can't invest allowed review
without knowing whether royalty relief will be periods. However,
available. Reduce the review time to 3 months we don't plan to
use the entire time
if we can do
determinations
faster. Yet careful
review often
requires time,
especially when new
and complex
developments are
proposed and huge
amounts ($100
million plus) of
royalty relief and
taxpayer assets are
at stake.
203.65/Review and Evaluation-- The clock should be tolled by using one measure of DWRRA stipulated
Tolling the Clock--Measurement. time, either work days or calendar days calendar days for
its deadlines of
120 or 180 days for
approval or
rejection. We'll
continue to use
work days for
reviewing
applications for
completeness
because of the
short time allowed.
MMS must review
each application
thoroughly to
ascertain whether
it is complete
before we start the
statutory clock in
calendar days to
analyze economic
viability. Industry
is accustomed to
our using work days
to conduct
completeness checks
for other filings.
203.65/Review and Evaluation-- Evaluation time should be tolled ``upon receipt by the Agree. As the rule
Method for Tolling the Clock. applicant of written notification'' of an information states, the
deficiency and the clock should be restarted ``upon evaluation clock
receipt of the needed information in the [GOM] will be stopped
Regional MMS office.'' when the applicant
receives written
notice from us and
will begin when the
requested
information is
received in the
regional office.
Deep Water Guidelines How will MMS account for costs and production Each application and
Supplementing 203.65/Review and (revenues) that it believes should be added to the scenario presents a
Evaluation--Consistency with economic evaluation of a field because they are unique proposal.
Differences in Geologic associated with developing reservoirs omitted from an We'll adjust data
Interpretation. application? as necessary. For
example, if we
determine that an
applicant omitted
prospective
reservoirs, it's
reasonable to
assume they'll be
found and developed
later. By adding
the necessary costs
after production
begins, we avoid
the complexity of
having to adjust
the estimated pre-
production costs
used as a
performance
condition.
203.67/Review and Evaluation--Dual Eliminate the dual test, at least for applicants We've kept the dual
Test Role in Evaluation Model seeking only the minimum suspension volume. MMS test, but have
(Royalty Suspension Viability should grant relief and not interject itself into the modified the
Program (RSVP)). process by which a lessee decides to develop and calculations to
incur costs to bring a field into production reflect industry
concerns that our
determinations may
not always coincide
with industry
decisions, even
using the same
input data. If,
under these altered
conditions, the
dual test indicates
that no amount of
royalty relief will
make the field
economic, we can
reasonably infer
that the
application is
missing some key
factor in the
decision to
develop.
203.68/Review and Evaluation--Dual Because sunk costs aren't in the dual test, it doesn't The difference in
Test Treatment of Sunk Costs. prove development is economic without royalty when the way the two
compared to the way the primary test defines economic tests
``economic-ness.'' Treat sunk costs the same in both treat sunk costs
tests and include them in the volume determination. favors the
Chance of relief is lost in a redetermination by applicant. Omission
defining all of the expended development costs as of sunk costs from
sunk the dual test
raises the net
present value
(NPV), improving
chances for passing
that part of the
viability test.
Their inclusion in
the primary test
has the opposite
effect on NPV,
again improving
chances for passing
that part of the
viability test. As
for volume
determinations, the
DWRRA directs us to
consider sunk costs
in determining
eligibility for
relief but not in
setting a volume
suspension to
recover them.
Finally, there is
no difference in
the treatment of
sunk costs in the
original
application and
redetermination.
The only difference
is in timing, i.e.,
more development
costs may have been
expended and hence
treated as sunk at
time of re-
submission. That
will raise the NPV
in the dual test
more than it will
raise the NPV in
the primary test,
expanding the range
of qualifying
values.
[[Page 2611]]
203.70 & 91/Review and Evaluation-- Full development cost is seldom known before first We agree that a
Post-production development production, so a pre-production report would come review before
report. before all wells would be drilled. Drilling costs are production starts
significant, often around 50 percent. Keep self- may be premature.
disclosure to encourage efficiency and reduce audit The rules require
requirements but have an updated estimate of the start-of-
development costs provided before the first production cost
anniversary of start of production. report within 60
days after
production begins.
We may grant short
extensions for
extenuating
circumstances. This
gives applicants
time to compile
data on
expenditures up to
a well-defined
point and avoids
the ambiguity
surrounding the
actual start date
and the need to
estimate some cost
items.
203.70, 76 & 90/Change in Material What constitutes start of construction or fabrication? The revised rule
Fact--Start of Construction. stipulates the
following
requirements to
verify when
construction
starts: (1) a copy
of the contract
with the
fabrication yard,
(2) a letter from
the contractor
certifying that
construction has
started on a
specific system for
a specific
location, and (3)
evidence of a
payment of
appropriate size
based on current
industry standards
for the proposed
development and
production system.
203.71/Applying Suspension Can a higher minimum suspension volume apply if the No. Minimum
Volumes--Adding leases to a field. MMS evaluation of the application includes potential suspension volumes
resources on unleased blocks and or leases not are based on the
currently assigned to the field? deepest lease
assigned to the
field up to the
time the
application is
approved. Of
course, we can
still grant larger
amounts of relief
than the minimum
suspension volumes,
if we find them
necessary to make
the whole field
economic.
203.73/Applying Suspension The fixed conversion factor ignores fluctuations in The oil/gas ratio
Volumes--Gas-to-Oil Conversion the relative values of oil and gas and introduces will continue to be
Factor. bias as it overvalues gas relative to oil properties based on the
at current value ratios. The 8-to-1 ratio implied in British thermal
the DWRRA may be better than the 5.62-to-1 ratio in unit (Btu)
the interim rule conversion factor.
Because the RSVP
model values oil
and gas separately,
the conversion
ratio affects only
the size of the
volume suspension,
not qualification
for relief.
Qualified
applicants already
get minimum volumes
under the DWRRA
even if only small
volume suspensions
are needed. These
minimum stipulated
volumes were based
on our studies
using the Btu
ratio. Hence, it
would be
inconsistent to
have the volume
suspension amounts
based on relative
prices when the
minimum volumes
were based on
studies using the
Btu ratio.
203.74/Redeterminations-- Conditions for redeterminations should include We often can't
Reprocessed Seismic Data. reprocessed seismic data (using new algorithms). This distinguish a new
differs from reinterpreting existing data, which is algorithm from a
explicitly excluded as a basis for redetermination reinterpretation of
an old one, so
we'll limit this
requirement to new
data developed by
the applicant as a
basis for a
redetermination.
203.74/Redeterminations--Price A decline of 25 percent in oil or gas price is much Sharp price swings
Change Size. too low to trigger a redetermination. Cash flow is are often short-run
very sensitive to price and a 10 percent drop in phenomena not
price can be enough to trigger a redetermination matched by changes
in forecasts of
long-term price
trends used in a
redetermination.
Also price/cost
differences, not
just prices, drive
cash flow. Some
cost-cutting
inevitably
accompanies price
declines. Only
sustained, sizeable
price declines,
such as 25 percent,
are likely to
overwhelm cost-
cutting
opportunities
enough to warrant a
redetermination.
203.74/Redeterminations--Price What is the relevant price which must drop by 25 Applicants may seek
Base. percent to qualify an applicant for a a redetermination
redetermination? if a weighted 12-
month moving
average of daily
closing New York
Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) prices for
oil or gas has
decreased by more
than 25 percent
since the most
recent complete
application. As the
revised rule
explains, the
before and after
prices are weighted
using the volumes
of oil and gas
identified in the
most likely
scenario described
in that
application.
Deep Water Guidelines The minimum oil price of $16.30 per barrel and the Starting price
Supplementing 203.74/ average annual growth rate of 1.67 percent is too assumptions are
Redeterminations--Price high for the next 25 years based on Energy
Assumptions. Information
Administration
(EIA) historical
data and growth
rates in EIA's
Annual Energy
Outlook and will be
updated regularly.
To match the GOM
market better,
we'll use recent
prices for
Petroleum
Administration for
Defense District
(PADD) III imports
as a benchmark for
starting prices.
Adjustments for
gravity differences
are allowed. As
with all
projections,
experience may
prove starting
prices
representative or
not and growth
rates right or
wrong. But
applicants will be
on an equal footing
because we mandate
specific
parameters.
Deep Water Guidelines The guidelines aren't consistent with the interim rule Agree. We have
Supplementing 203.76/Changes in language and preamble discussion regarding ``material changed the
Material Fact--Limits. change.'' guidelines to be
consistent with the
rule. In
particular, the
four circumstances
(change of system,
excess delay in
starting,
underspending on
development, or
false statements/
omitted reports)
used to signify a
material change are
the only ones--not
just examples--of
what justifies
withdrawal of
already granted
relief.
[[Page 2612]]
203.76 & 87-89/Changes in Material MMS doesn't need three development scenarios to test The withdrawal
Fact & Engineering, Production, viability because the section on withdrawing approval conditions focus on
and Cost reports--Multiple for royalty relief protects against significant underspending
Development Scenarios. changes development costs
and changes in
development systems
evaluated in the
application. They
don't consider
adjustments to
planned capacity
before or after
production begins.
We consider up to
three scenarios to
reflect uncertainty
about final project
size, timing, and
production rates.
We have clarified
the options for
simplifying the
input data.
Generally, whenever
observed conditions
or formal decisions
foreclose some or
all the uncertainty
about particular
variables, we
accept fewer
scenarios or point
estimates for
reservoirs, costs,
and production.
203.76/Change in Material Fact-- Conversion of proposed development costs to sunk costs Agree. We'll allow
Reapplication with Sunk in a reapplication compounds the penalty from applicants to
Development Costs. withdrawal. The reapplication is allowed less cost renounce relief at
with which to justify relief any point after
approval is granted
and before
production starts.
When violation of a
withdrawal
condition is
anticipated, giving
up relief early can
reduce the share of
development costs
that get considered
as sunk costs in a
subsequent
application.
Deep Water Guidelines What expenditures are included in development costs? We'll count all
Supplementing 203.76 & 89/Change eligible expenses
in Material Fact--Defining planned for the
Development Cost. most likely
scenario between
application and
start of
production. The
spending threshold
and any disallowed
costs (for
uneconomic
reservoirs) will be
specified in the
relief approval. In
assessing the
economic viability
of the subject
field, we may
remove the cash
flows associated
with uneconomic
reservoirs.
Deep Water Guidelines What happens if the development period (i.e., time to We'll compare actual
Supplementing 203.76/Change in first production) deviates from an applicant's to approved pre-
Material Fact--Development Period. proposal? production costs,
regardless of how
much or little time
it takes to start
production.
203.76/Only ``Significant'' Change Withdrawal as a result of actual cost below 80 percent Withdrawal
in Material Fact before (or 90 percent for redetermination that follows conditions need to
Withdrawal of Approved Relief. withdrawal of previously granted relief) of be fixed and
application estimates discourages capital efficiency. obvious, not
Also a 10 to 20 percent cost reduction may not flexible
greatly improve project economics. MMS should combinations to be
withdraw relief only if reduction in capital costs determined later.
``substantially'' improve project economics beyond We've taken three
those on which the project qualified. Even if such a steps to soften the
change occurs, the applicant ought to be allowed to danger of a fixed
appeal to keep relief so as not to encourage threshold. First,
inefficient expenditures the applicant may
keep one-half of
the relief if we're
notified of the
shortfall. Second,
the withdrawal date
is now after
production begins.
Third, the pre-
production period
is variable, so we
count an
applicant's costs
over a flexible
interval. As a
result, it's
unlikely that the
company would
substantially
underspend its
earlier capital
cost projections by
the time of review.
203.78/Applying Suspension Will a market gas price increase that is not No. The statute
Volumes--Price Ceilings on accompanied by a rise in oil price trigger a lifting doesn't explicitly
Different Products. of all the royalty-suspension volume for a field with answer this
mostly oil reserves or vice versa? question. We've
interpreted the
applicable text to
mean that price
ceilings prescribed
in the law for
lifting relief
should apply
separately to each
product for fields
that produce both.
Relief can be
suspended on just
the part of total
production from a
field whose price
exceeded the
threshold. Gas
prices above $3.50
per million Btus
(escalated to then-
current dollars)
won't lift relief
on oil volumes if
oil prices remain
below $28 per
barrel (escalated
to then-current
dollars) and vice
versa. Escalation
by the Gross
Domestic Price
deflator raises the
thresholds each
year.
203.78/Applying Suspension A time limit should be set for MMS to make royalty Agree. The new
Volumes--Time Limits for Royalty refunds or credits, as are set for companies to repay Royalty
Refunds or Credits. back royalties with interest, under the price Simplification and
escalation clause Fairness Act
requires that MMS
process refunds or
credits on
production after
September 1996
within 120 days of
a lessee's request.
Future rules will
set forth
procedures which
deal with this
request. The
repayment period
for companies is
also set at 120
days.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comments on the Required Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
203.81/Independent Certification.. A certified public accountant (CPA) certification of A CPA certification
historical expenditures reported in either the is an independent
application or the pre-production report imposes check and so might
unnecessary costs. Internal records and self substitute for our
certification are adequate audit. Besides,
only eligible
expenditures must
be certified.
However, to reduce
the cost of the
independent audit,
we will accept a
CPA opinion which
identifies
questionable
elements or an
unqualified opinion
on the accuracy and
relevance of the
historical
information
presented.
[[Page 2613]]
Deep Water Guidelines What is a CPA certification for sunk costs? It's a CPA report
Supplementing 203.81/ that certifies your
Certification Format. historical
information is
accurate and meets
our stipulations on
eligibility. As the
revised guidelines
state, an agent of
the CPA firm must
sign the
certification and
identify someone
who knows the case
and is authorized
to respond to
questions on it.
203.83/Administrative report-- Requiring certification that reserves won't be Agree. We've
Certification of Non-Development. produced without relief is not enforceable and can be eliminated this
outdated as conditions change requirement.
Considering sunk
costs in the
evaluation means
that some fields
that qualify for
relief would be
worth developing
without relief.
203.85/Economic viability report-- The spreadsheet model should allow for cost inflation Future versions of
Inflation. the spreadsheet
model may include a
variable to account
for cost-specific
inflation or
deflation.
Technological
progress could
actually lower real
costs over time
despite general
inflation of all
prices and costs.
203.85/Economic viability report-- MMS should fix a schedule for revising price Agree. We'll publish
Updating Price Assumptions assumptions (e.g., quarterly, annually). If MMS updated price
Schedule. issues new assumptions while reviewing an assumptions on the
application, they should clarify which assumptions INTERNET annually,
apply (those at time of application or latest issued probably in the
before the determination) late spring when
EIA's Annual Energy
Outlook releases
new data and
forecasts. We'll
use the price
assumptions in
place on the date
of application
submission.
203.85/Economic viability report-- Will MMS accept the discount rate an applicant We'll use the
Revising Applicants' Assumptions- selects, or reserve the right to revise the discount discount rate an
Discount Rates. rate? applicant proposes
in both the dual
and primary tests,
with no
appropriateness
review as long as
it is within the
range provided in
the guidelines.
203.85/Economic viability report-- The 10 percent discount rate is too low. Even 15 In all cases, the
Discount Rate Size. percent is too low because it risks rejected projects rates of return
being abandoned apply to a field
with a discovery,
so the risk of not
finding oil or gas
is gone. The range
specified in the
guidelines for the
discount rate is
based on recent
historical
experience, which
in future years may
assume a different
trend. The
industry's average
after-tax, real
rate of return, has
been estimated to
range from a high
of 10.9 percent to
a low of 1.4
percent between
1959 and 1988. (See
A.T. Guernsey on
behalf of Shell Oil
Company,
Profitability
Study: Crude Oil
and Natural Gas
Exploration,
Development, and
Production
Activities in the
USA, 1959-1988,
November 1990).
Simulations with a
version of our
model found before-
tax rates of return
ranged from 1.2 to
4 percent higher
than after-tax
rates of return
over various
project conditions.
Together, these
estimates indicate
that expecting
before-tax discount
rates, and hence
rates of return, in
the range of 10 to
15 percent are
appropriate.
203.85/Economic viability report-- Allowing variability in discount rates could lead to The goal of a range
Discount Rate Range. unequal treatment. Where applicants choose discount of discount rates
rates, the playing field isn't level. Instead, is to fit
specify one for each of three water-depth thresholds differences in
and apply uniformly companies' risk
tolerance and
opportunity cost.
Applicants can
tailor their risk
preferences by
water depth within
this range if they
choose to. We use
probability methods
that don't require
a risk premium in
the discount rate.
However, a fixed
discount rate
across fields and
companies within a
water-depth
category places all
the burden for
dealing with
differences in risk
on these
probability
distributions. We
believe a better
compromise is to
give applicants the
chance to use both
factors to express
their risks and
uncertainties.
Allowing companies
to choose a rate
for their projects
is eminently fair,
as long as they
stay within our
stipulated range
and we use it in
both economic
viability tests.
203.89/Cost report--Sunk Costs The way MMS includes sunk costs doesn't recognize the The DWRRA directs us
Measurement. time value of money, as past expenditures are carried to consider all
forward without escalation. It's inappropriate to exploration,
combine after-tax sunk costs with future costs and development, and
revenues expressed on a before-tax basis production costs.
Because the
decision to proceed
on a project is
independent of sunk
costs, the proper
treatment of sunk
costs for economic
viability is to
value them as zero.
We balance these
considerations by
carefully defining
expenses that
constitute sunk
costs, then we
allow them as a
deduction in the
primary test and
exclude them from
the dual test. The
after-tax part of
sunk costs, like
the before-tax size
of prospective
costs, is what the
company still has
to recover from the
proposed project.
203.89/Sunk Costs--Scope.......... Sunk costs should include all reasonable post-lease We won't consider
acquisition costs (seismic data costs, overhead sunk costs incurred
expenses, etc.). Extend the definition to include all by previous owners
project costs incurred by the lessee or on behalf of of your lease or by
a lessee third-parties.
Also, we won't
consider portions
of sunk costs on
your lease that you
incurred prior to
when you last
bought into your
lease. Further, if
you have maintained
continous ownership
but changed the
share of the lease
you own, we count
your sunk costs
only in proportion
to the share you
owned when you
incurred these
costs. We do this
because previous
owners and third-
parties already
have been
compensated through
market
transactions. Also,
we do not believe
we can really
verify the
relevance to
current development
of expenditures by
third-parties or
previous owners.
[[Page 2614]]
203.91 & 76/Review and Evaluation-- What must the post-production report contain? What The report must show
Post-production development happens if it isn't submitted? and compare planned
report. and actual pre-
production costs.
If you don't submit
the report, you'll
lose relief, just
as you would for
providing false
historical or
intentionally
inaccurate
information.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Recovery of Costs
By Federal policy and law, we'll charge lessees applying for
royalty relief under this rule an amount which recovers our cost of
processing their applications. The Independent Office Appropriation Act
(31 U.S.C. 9701) and OMB Circular A-25 require agencies to recover
their costs when they provide services that confer special benefits or
privileges to identifiable non-Federal recipients. Processing of
applications for royalty relief clearly falls within this mandate.
Furthermore, the Omnibus Appropriations Bill (Pub. L. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321, April 26, 1996) authorizes collecting such fees.
We issued NTL No. 96-3N (signed June 21, 1996), which gives
detailed amounts for processing royalty-relief applications and when
and how applicants may pay us. Processing applications for royalty
relief to increase production will cost $8,000. Complete applications
under DWRR will cost either $16,000 to $34,000. Draft applications will
cost either $10,500 to $28,500. For some applications, we may need to
audit the financial data submitted to determine the proposed
development's economics. That would cost up to $37,500. Ordinarily, no
refund is given when we reject an application. However, if we reject a
deep water application for incompleteness during the first 20 business
days after receiving it, we'll refund all but $5,500 of the application
fee. We'll revise the Notice to Lessees (NTL) periodically to reflect
our cost experience and to provide other information helpful or
necessary for administering this program.
Authors: Sam Fraser and Marshall Rose, Economics Division, prepared
this document.
V. Administrative Matters
Executive Order (E.O.) 12866
This rule is significant due to novel policy issues arising from
legal mandates, and OMB has reviewed this rule. We will make a copy of
our determination of the effects of this rule available on request.
In summary, the DWRRA instructs us to grant royalty relief only in
situations that are uneconomic at the lease-stipulated royalty rate.
Hence, the economic effects can be estimated by the additional
royalties that may be collected from fields that would otherwise not be
developed until a later time, if at all. We estimated these effects by
extrapolating to all known deep water fields the results of detailed
analyses of 30 fields in the relevant water depths. MMS's field-based
approach generates up to $45 million per year in additional royalty
revenue, which is less than the threshold amount of $100 million
annually.
The field-based approach provided in this final rule gives a single
royalty-suspension volume for each qualifying field. The main
alternative approach gives each individual lease or unit a separate
royalty-suspension volume, subject to the minimum volumes specified in
the DWRRA.
We chose the field-based approach because:
The DWRRA's primary author stated that he intended the
DWRRA to encourage production from new fields without providing any
more relief than needed;
The field-based approach provides a substantial incentive
for developing marginal fields in deep water while still ensuring a
fair return to the Treasury;
The minimum suspension volumes specified in the DWRRA were
derived from an analysis of fields, not individual leases; and
This rule needs to be consistent with the rules for
royalty suspensions on deep water tracts leased after November 28,
1995, in the same parts of the GOM so that all deep water leases on the
OCS receive equitable treatment.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This rule can have a positive economic effect on some small
entities. A copy of our analysis of this impact is available on
request.
In summary, this rule sets the terms and conditions for granting
royalty relief under the provisions of section 8(a)(3)(A) of the OCSLA.
These terms reduce costs for end-of-life operations by 6 to 10 percent,
more than doubling profits. That should significantly prolong
operations on marginally economic leases. We can't estimate the number
of leases that may be affected from past experience, because the terms
have been changed from those previously available to marginal OCS
leases. We estimate that small entity operators account for under 10
percent of production from OCS leases.
This rule also sets terms and conditions for granting royalty-
suspension volumes under the DWRRA for certain deep water leases on the
OCS in the GOM. These leases were issued as a result of a lease sale
held before November 28, 1995. The conditions limit these terms to the
rare situations in which royalty costs are the difference between
unprofitable and profitable development. One of two applications for
deep water relief received under the interim version of this rule was
from a small entity.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In connection with the interim final rulemaking (IFR) process, we
submitted the information collection requirements in 30 CFR 203 to OMB
and conducted a full review and comment process for this collection of
information. OMB approved the information collection (OMB No. 1010-
0071) on October 7, 1996, to expire on October 31, 1999.
Earlier in the preamble we discussed comments received on the
information collection aspects of the IFR. Based on experience and the
changes made in this rule, we will submit a revised information
collection package to OMB for approval 60 days after this rule is
published. With this rule, we are starting the 60-day comment period.
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) provides
that an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number. The information collection aspects
of this final rule will not take effect until approved by OMB.
We invite the public and other Federal agencies to comment on the
collection of information as discussed below. Send comments regarding
any aspect of the collection to the Minerals Management Service,
Attention: Rules Processing Team, 381 Elden Street, Mail Stop 4020,
Herndon, VA 20170. Your comments should be received by March 17, 1998.
[[Page 2615]]
We use the information to determine whether royalty relief will
result in production that wouldn't otherwise occur. We rely largely on
your information to make these determinations. Your application for
royalty relief must contain enough information on finances, economics,
reservoirs, G&G characteristics, production, and engineering estimates
for us to determine whether: (1) We should grant relief under the law,
and (2) the requested relief will ultimately recover more resources and
return a reasonable profit on project investments. Your fabricator
confirmation and post-production development reports must contain
enough information for us to verify that your application reasonably
represented your plans.
Applicants (respondents) are Federal OCS oil and gas lessees.
Applications are required to obtain or retain a benefit. Therefore, if
you apply for royalty relief, you must provide this information. We
will protect information considered proprietary under applicable law
and under regulations at Sec. 203.63(b) and part 250 of this chapter.
We estimate the annual public reporting burden for this information
collection will average approximately 14,700 hours, not the 38,730
hours originally estimated for the interim final rule. The reduction is
due primarily to an adjustment in re-estimating the number of
applications we expect to receive. We also made minor program
reductions in the estimate based on the changes in the final rule. The
average burden per response is estimated at 335 burden hours. This
includes the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and
reviewing the collection of information. A breakdown of the estimated
burden is included in the supporting statement we submitted to OMB for
this collection of information. You may obtain a copy of that
supporting statement from MMS's Information Collection Clearance
Officer (202/208-7744). In calculating the burdens, we've assumed that
respondents perform some of the requirements and maintain records in
the normal course of their activities. We consider these to be usual
and customary. You are invited to provide information in your comments
if you disagree with this assumption.
We specifically solicit comments on the following questions:
(a) Is the proposed collection of information necessary for us to
properly perform our functions, and will it be useful?
(b) Are the burden hours estimates reasonable for the proposed
collection?
(c) Do you have any suggestions that would enhance the quality,
clarity, or usefulness of the information to be collected?
(d) Is there a way to minimize the information collection burden on
the applicants, including the use of appropriate automated electronic,
mechanical, or other forms of information technology?
In addition, the Paperwork Reduction Act requires us to estimate
the total annual cost burden to respondents or recordkeepers resulting
from the collection of information. We need your comments to identify
any reporting and recordkeeping cost burdens other than those discussed
above. Your response should split the cost estimate into two
components: (a) Total capital and startup cost component; and (b)
annual operation, maintenance, and purchase of services component. Your
estimates should consider the costs to generate, maintain, and disclose
or provide the information. You should describe the methods you use to
estimate major cost factors, including system and technology
acquisition, expected useful life of capital equipment, discount
rate(s), and the period over which you incur costs. Capital and startup
costs include, among other items, computers and software you purchase
to prepare for collecting information; monitoring, sampling, drilling,
and testing equipment; and record storage facilities. Generally, your
estimates should not include equipment or services purchased: (i)
before October 1, 1995; (ii) to comply with requirements not associated
with the information collection; (iii) for reasons other than to
provide information or keep records for the Government; or (iv) as part
of customary and usual business or private practices.
Takings Implication Assessment
DOI certifies that this rule does not represent a governmental
action that can interfere with constitutionally protected property
rights. Therefore, we don't need to do a Takings Implication Assessment
under E.O. 12630, Governmental Actions and Interference with
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.
E.O. 12988
DOI has certified to OMB that the rule meets the applicable reform
standards provided in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988.
National Environmental Policy Act
DOI has determined that this rule isn't a major Federal action that
significantly affects the quality of the human environment, so we don't
need an Environmental Impact Statement.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
DOI has determined and certifies according to the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 1502 et seq., that this rule will not impose a
cost of $100 million or more in any given year on State, local, and
tribal governments or the private sector.
``Plain English'' Style of Writing
We've written this regulation in the form of questions in the first
person (I) and answers in the second person (you) because readers may
find it simpler to read and understand. A question and its answer
combine to establish a rule. The applicant and the agency must follow
the language in the question and its answer.
List of Subjects in 30 CFR Part 203
Continental shelf, Government contracts, Indians-lands, Minerals
Royalties, Oil and gas exploration, Public lands-mineral resources,
Sulphur.
Dated: November 6, 1997.
Bob Armstrong,
Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS) is amending 30 CFR part 203 as follows:
PART 203--RELIEF OR REDUCTION IN ROYALTY RATES
1. The authority citation for part 203 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396 et seq.; 25 U.S.C. 396a et seq.; 25
U.S.C. 2101 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.;
30 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 31 U.S.C. 9701 et
seq.; 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.; 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.; and 43 U.S.C.
1801 et seq.
2. Subpart A is revised to read as follows:
Subpart A--General Provisions
Sec.
203.0 What definitions apply to this part?
203.1 What is MMS's authority to grant royalty relief?
203.2 When can I get royalty relief?
203.3 Why must I pay a fee to request royalty relief?
203.4 How do the provisions in this part apply to different types
of leases and projects?
[[Page 2616]]
Subpart A--General Requirements
Sec. 203.0 What definitions apply to this part?
Authorized field means a field in a water depth of at least 200
meters and in the Gulf of Mexico west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West
longitude from which no current pre-Act lease produced, other than test
production, before November 28, 1995.
Complete application means an original and two copies of the six
reports consisting of the data specified in 30 CFR 203.81, 203.83 and
203.85 through 203.89, along with one set of digital information, which
MMS has reviewed and found complete.
Determination means the binding decision by MMS on whether your
field qualifies for relief or how large a royalty-suspension volume
must be to make the field economically viable.
Draft application means the preliminary set of information and
assumptions you submit to seek a nonbinding assessment on whether a
field could be expected to qualify for royalty relief.
Eligible lease means a lease that results from a lease sale held
after November 28, 1995; is located in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) in
water depths 200 meters or deeper; lies wholly west of 87 degrees, 30
minutes West longitude; and is offered subject to a royalty-suspension
volume authorized by statute.
Expansion project means a project you propose in a Development
Operations Coordination Document (DOCD) or a Supplement approved by the
Secretary of the Interior after November 28, 1995, that will increase
the ultimate recovery of resources from a pre-Act lease and that
involves a substantial capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg platform,
subsea template and manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple well
project, etc.).
Fabrication (or start of construction) means evidence of
irreversible commitment to a concept and scale of development,
including copies of a binding contract between you (as applicant) and a
fabrication yard, a letter from a fabricator certifying that
construction has begun, and a receipt for the customary down payment.
Field means an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple
reservoirs all grouped on, or related to, the same general geological
structural feature or stratigraphic trapping condition. Two or more
reservoirs may be in a field, separated vertically by intervening
impervious strata or laterally by local geologic barriers, or both.
Lease means a lease or unit.
New production means any production from a current pre-Act lease
from which no royalties are due on production, other than test
production, before November 28, 1995. Also, it means any production
resulting from lease-development activities involving a substantial
capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg platform, subsea template and
manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple well project, etc.) on a
current pre-Act lease under a Development Operations Coordination
Document--or its supplement--approved by the Secretary of the Interior
after November, 28, 1995.
Nonbinding assessment means an opinion by MMS of whether your field
could qualify for royalty relief. It is based on your draft application
and does not entitle the field to relief.
Performance conditions means minimum conditions you must meet,
after we have granted relief and before production begins, to remain
qualified for that relief. If you do not meet each one of these
performance conditions, we consider it a change in material fact
significant enough to invalidate our original evaluation and approval.
Pre-Act lease means a lease issued as a result of a lease sale held
before November 28, 1995; in a water depth of at least 200 meters; and
in the Gulf of Mexico west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude.
Production means all oil, gas, and other relevant products you
save, remove, or sell from a tract or those quantities allocated to
your tract under a unitization formula, as measured for the purposes of
determining the amount of royalty payable to the United States.
Project means any activity that requires at least a permit to
drill.
Redetermination means your request for us to reconsider our
determination on royalty relief if we have rejected your application or
if we have granted relief but you want a larger suspension volume.
Renounce means action you take to give up relief after we have
granted it and before you start production.
Sunk costs means costs (as specified in 30 CFR 203.89(a)) of
exploration, development, and production that you incur after the date
of first discovery on the field and before the date we receive your
complete application for royalty relief. Sunk costs include the costs
of the discovery well qualified as producible under 30 CFR part 250,
subpart A but do not include any pre-discovery activity costs or lease
acquisition and holding costs such as cash bonus and rental payments.
Withdraw means action we take on a field that has qualified for
relief if you have not met one or more of the performance conditions.
Sec. 203.1 What is MMS's authority to grant royalty relief?
The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1337, as
amended by the OCS Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), Public Law
104-58, authorizes us to grant royalty relief in three situations.
(a) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A), we may reduce or eliminate any
royalty or a net profit share specified for an OCS lease to promote
increased production.
(b) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(B), we may reduce, modify, or
eliminate any royalty or net profit share to promote development,
increase production, or encourage production of marginal resources on
certain leases or categories of leases. This authority is restricted to
leases in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) that are west of 87 degrees, 30
minutes West longitude.
(c) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(C), we may suspend royalties for
designated volumes of new p
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