Royalty Relief for Producing Leases and Certain Existing Leases In Deep Water

Federal RegisterJan 16, 1998

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Minerals Management Service

30 CFR Part 203

RIN 1010-AC13

Royalty Relief for Producing Leases and Certain Existing Leases

In Deep Water

AGENCY: Minerals Management Service (MMS), Interior.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This rule establishes conditions for reducing royalties on

producing leases; provides for suspension of royalty payments on

certain deep water leases issued as the result of lease sales held

before November 28, 1995; and describes the information required for a

complete application for royalty relief.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective February 17, 1998. However, the

information collection requirements contained in Sec. 203.61 will not

become effective until approved by the Office of Management (OMB). MMS

will publish

[[Page 2606]]

a document at that time announcing the effective date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Marshall Rose, Chief, Economics

Division, at (703) 787-1536.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Objectives of Royalty Relief

Royalty relief can lead to increased development and production of

natural gas and oil, creating profits for lessees and royalty and tax

revenues for the government that it might not otherwise receive. This

rule establishes economic incentives that encourage Outer Continental

Shelf (OCS) lessees to spend or invest the money needed to promote

development and encourage increased production. For all Federal

offshore planning areas, we may provide enough relief to allow a

reasonable operating profit if expenses plus royalties are approaching

revenues. For cases in certain deep water (water at least 200 meters

deep) planning areas of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), we may suspend

royalty payments to permit lessees to earn a reasonable return on their

capital investments.

The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) carries out royalty

relief as part of his stewardship and sound management of public lands.

This includes conserving resources, getting a fair return to the public

on OCS resources, and ensuring all OCS development is safe and

consistent with sound environmental standards.

II. Legislative Background

The Secretary has broad legislative authority to reduce royalty

rates on OCS leases. Section 8(a)(3)(A)of the Outer Continental Shelf

Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A)), gives the

Secretary authority to reduce royalties on leases in order to increase

production. Relief must be justified and granted case by case.

On November 28, 1995, President Clinton signed Public Law 104-58,

which included the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA). Section 302

of the DWRRA amends section 8(a) of the OCSLA (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(B))

authority so the Secretary may grant relief on a producing or non-

producing lease, or category of leases. Its purpose is to promote

development or increased production, or to encourage production of

marginal resources, for GOM leases lying west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes

West longitude.

The DWRRA also covers leases issued in water depths greater than

200 meters (deep water) as a result of sales held before the DWRRA's

enactment. Section 302 of the DWRRA singles out ``new production'',

from a lease or unit existing on the date of its enactment and in the

GOM's deep water west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude. The

amended OCSLA (43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(C)) says this new production

doesn't qualify for royalty suspension if the Secretary determines that

this new production would be economic without royalty relief.

Otherwise, the Secretary must determine for each case how much

production to exclude from royalty in order to make the new production

economic.

Existing leases or units having no royalty-bearing production,

other than test production, before November 28, 1995, and qualified for

relief under Section 302, need not pay royalties from a field on the

first:

17.5 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMBOE) for leases

in fields in 200 to 400 meters of water,

52.5 MMBOE for leases in fields in 400 to 800 meters of

water, and

87.5 MMBOE for leases in fields in more than 800 meters of

water.

These leases or units may qualify for a larger suspension volume if

this specified volume wouldn't make the field economic.

Under Sec. 8(a) of the OCSLA as amended by Sec. 302 of the DWRRA,

we may also grant a royalty-suspension volume for production from lease

development involving a substantial capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg

platform, subsea template and manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple

well projects, etc.) proposed in a Development Operations Coordination

Document (DOCD), or a supplement to an approved DOCD, approved by the

Secretary after November 28, 1995. This type of relief is available to

leases that produced before November 28, 1995. In this case, we'll

grant the suspension volume we determine necessary to make the new

production economic.

We issued the Interim Rule for Royalty Relief for Producing Leases

and Certain Existing Leases in Deep Water on May 31, 1996 (61 FR

27263). We asked for comments, received many, and are now issuing a

final rule.

III. Response to Comments

Fifteen respondents--the American Petroleum Institute (API), the

National Ocean Industries Association (NOIA), the Independent Petroleum

Association of America (IPAA), and 12 oil and gas companies--submitted

comments on the Interim Rule and the supplementary guidelines. We

analyzed all comments and sometimes revised the final language based on

them. We first address the general concern expressed about the Net

Revenue Share (NRS) royalty relief system, followed by the three main

themes raised in the comments on the Deep Water royalty relief system.

Finally, we provide responses to the other individual comments and

answer questions relating to selected provisions retained from the

Interim Rule.

Comment on Utility of NRS Relief

Comment: The regulations dealing with NRS leases will be of little

or no utility. Regarding leases with inadequate revenues to sustain

production, the qualifying requirement stipulating that royalty

payments must be at least 75 percent of net revenues over the most

recent 12-month period is unrealistic and too stringent (Secs. 203.50,

52 and 53).

Response: We've chosen to keep the two principal features of the

proposed NRS system. These are a qualification requirement based on a

75 percent royalty share of net revenue and a feature whereby the

average lease rate gradually rises back to the pre-relief level when

production made possible by the relief rises sufficiently. However,

we've made changes in this form of relief that will make it easier to

implement and operate under the NRS system. These changes will reduce

the application burden, simplify the qualification requirements, and

modify the operational framework.

We proposed the NRS system to implement the OCS Lands Act (43

U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A)) authority to offer royalty relief to a producing

lease to promote increased production. We specified different

qualification conditions for two situations: end-of-life leases with

inadequate revenues to sustain production and marginally economic

projects to expand production. We've decided to no longer offer a

separate form of royalty relief for expansion projects, because lessees

with such projects should generally prefer applying for, and operating

under, the revised end-of-life relief system in this final rule. Also,

by dropping project relief we've simplified the program by eliminating

the need for the applicant to show that production would be economic

only with relief and that the project would add at least 1 year's worth

of production. To emphasize this narrower scope and avoid confusion

with an NRS system that has been generally avoided by industry, we've

adopted the new name ``end-of-life relief.'' However, we have retained

the underlying conceptual framework of the proposed NRS system in the

new end-of-life royalty relief system.

For end-of-life situations, the interim rule required a

demonstration that

[[Page 2607]]

royalties were taking 75 percent of net revenues and were projected to

take an increasing share in the future. We designed these stipulations

to fulfill the ``increase production'' condition in the statute.

However, we now believe that the increasing share requirement added

little to the assurance that royalty relief would result in increased

production. Also, it was burdensome and placed us in a position of

relying unnecessarily on projections made by the applicant.

Accordingly, we've dropped the increasing share condition.

Moreover, we've reduced the extent of information that must be

submitted in an application. Instead of 36 months of cost history and

12 months of prospective data, under the new end-of-life system,

applicants provide cost and production for the 12 out of the past most

recent 15 months that have average daily production of at least 100

barrels of oil equivalent (BOE). Note the 100 BOE per day threshold

applies to whole leases, not individual wells. The 12 out of 15 months

provision protects producers from being disqualified by temporary shut

down events like well work-overs, and it mitigates misrepresentations

due to seasonal variation. The 100 BOE average daily production

requirement gives us more assurance than the previous proposed

``increasing share'' requirement of the interim rule that relief would

make the increased production economic. We believe that leases with

production smaller than 100 BOE cannot cover platform operating costs

and that they likely continue to operate for reasons beyond those that

royalty relief would affect. That is, while royalty relief may reduce

losses for under 100 BOE/day operators, it will not increase production

from them.

The proposed NRS relief system took 50 percent of increases or

decreases in net revenue, regardless of the cause. We designed this

feature to allow the public to share automatically in unforeseen

expansions of production, price increases, or cost decreases while

cushioning lessee losses from unforeseen deterioration in these

factors. The absence of applications suggests to us that these

advantages were outweighed by a perception that the NRS system imposed

on lessees a heavy and ongoing data collection burden and extracted

from them too much of their upside profit potential.

Fortunately, we've found that a simpler and less burdensome royalty

system can approximate the sliding rate structure of the NRS system.

Therefore, we've replaced the NRS terms, which typically included a 50

percent rate over any possible level of production, with a 2-tier

royalty rate. We give you relief with a rate fixed at one-half the pre-

relief rate for a specific monthly amount of production followed by an

incremental rate fixed at 50 percent above the pre-relief rate for

production above that monthly amount. We added other features to

balance the end-of-life system. Features that encourage lessees include

a cap on the average royalty rate at the pre-relief rate and a lessee

option to end relief at any time. Features that protect public interest

include lifting of relief during periods of very high prices, an

eventual end of relief if prices or production, or both, remain high

for an extended period, and a provision allowing us to identify

conditions in individual cases which would lead to terminating the

relief arrangement because those conditions are inconsistent with an

end-of-life situation.

Main Themes in Comments on the Deep Water Interim Rule

1. Qualification Circumstances

Comment: The current interim rule is too complex. As an

alternative, API, NOIA, and IPAA suggest setting minimum economic field

sizes (MEFS) by water depth and development system that automatically

qualify fields for royalty relief (Sec. 203.67).

Response: Automatic MEFS are too impractical and difficult to

develop and maintain. So, we won't use them to decide if a field

qualifies for the amount of royalty relief the DWRRA specifies.

We estimate that calculating an MEFS requires values for more than

90 parameters, such as price, quality, water and drilling depth, gas-

to-oil ratio, production rates, and scheduling of costs and production.

We'd need to calculate many MEFS and would have to update them

regularly as prices, costs and other significant values change. With

large amounts of relief and rapidly changing values, and given the

nearly explicit statutory mandate to provide sufficient relief, but not

too much, we'd have to carefully set the qualifying field sizes. As a

result, we'd not be able to set MEFS at sizes that would be worth

developing even with royalty relief.

In contrast, the potential number of non-producing leases that may

come in for relief looks relatively small. These are pre-Act leases,

formerly pre-enactment deep water leases, or PDWLs. We can now identify

fewer than 75 fields in this category, a small fraction of which may

need relief. More importantly, we can't justify relying on generic data

to determine an MEFS when an application gives us specific data for

each field.

2. Early Relief Indication

Comment: MMS requires that a DOCD be approved before an applicant

can submit a complete application for royalty relief on a pre-Act

lease. Unfortunately, that pushes the request for royalty relief too

late into development to be useful. Lessees won't prepare expensive

DOCDs for projects that might not go into production, so they want some

assurance royalty relief will be granted before preparing one

(Sec. 203.83).

Rather than require an approved DOCD before submission of an

application, break approval into two phases. In phase one, an applicant

would file a preliminary application early in the life of a project

based on the best information available at the time but with

significantly less data than required in a final application. Based on

a less extensive review than required for a final application, MMS

would give a preliminary finding about whether the project qualified

for relief and the appropriate suspension volume. Unless there were

material changes, the preliminary finding would be binding. In phase

two, a final application would either confirm the relief or cause MMS

to do a new evaluation because of material changes (Sec. 203.61).

Response: We agree that the DOCD requirement is unnecessarily

restrictive and have removed it in the final rule. Instead, we'll

depend on other means to ensure appraisals are complete enough for the

applicant to make an informed decision to develop and for us to

evaluate the need for royalty relief. We will:

Shorten the period allowed from 2 years to 1 year between

the approval of relief and the start of construction on the development

and production system,

Allow significant new geological and geophysical (G&G)

data to qualify only for the initial redetermination, and

Use our own professional judgment on whether the appraisal

is sufficient for decision making.

Breaking the approval into two phases as proposed by industry

comments has a number of flaws. MMS would have to make a conditionally

binding relief decision in phase one with less data and certainty than

the company would have when it decides whether to develop after phase

two. Foregoing Federal property rights to royalty income under the

existing lease contract without sufficient information would be too

arbitrary. Also, our conditional approval may discourage an applicant

from developing more information that might

[[Page 2608]]

change the preliminary finding, before filing a phase two application.

We've changed the rule to fit industry's request for an assessment

of relief early in the project. In certain circumstances, a lessee or

operator may request a nonbinding assessment of whether a field would

qualify for royalty relief before submitting the first complete

application on a field. This option will help those who don't want to

risk having to meet qualifications for a redetermination if we reject a

complete application, but want to know early about the chances for

royalty relief on a marginal prospect.

The request would involve a draft application plus a processing

fee. It could come any time after discovery (after a well qualifies

under 30 CFR 250.11 or production is allocated under an approved unit

agreement). The detail must be comparable to a complete application to

ensure we assess the same prospect the lessee or operator envisions. We

would develop a nonbinding assessment presuming that continued

appraisal would produce expected values for unknown, but essential,

data. Therefore, applicants must also send in an appraisal plan to

drill one or more wells should MMS issue a favorable nonbinding

assessment. After at least 90 days, a final, complete application can

confirm or revise the data in the draft application and present the

applicant's binding proposal as a condition for receiving royalty

relief.

3. Complexity of Methods and Data Requirements

Comment: MMS proposes to use Monte Carlo simulations to account for

the uncertainty in application data. Probability distributions in Monte

Carlo techniques may be appropriate to analyze exploration and evaluate

the adequacy of lease sale bids for which most data are unavailable and

estimated. However, these approaches are less appropriate to analyze

development. After discovering hydrocarbons, drilling delineation wells

and taking seismic readings, the data are much more certain. Companies

typically use simple scenario modeling and sensitivity analyses on

development projects. MMS should adopt the scenario approach most used

by industry (Secs. 203.85-89).

Response: We've kept the Monte Carlo methods, though somewhat

simplified, for several reasons. No clear milestones show when

appraisal or delineation is adequate for making the development

decision, so scenario modeling would not be suitable for many

applications. Also, we must systematically handle the uncertainty

associated with applications to be submitted at an early stage of

development and we've been given a mandate to deal with the extra risk

deep water poses. The Monte Carlo approach handles these diverse

situations and requirements by allowing for the incorporation of as

much or as little risk as perceived, a full range of sensitivity

analysis, and the small but positive chance for all the circumstances

an operation needs to become highly profitable.

We differ from the scenario approach industry describes mainly in

the way we estimate reserves. The scenario approach offers no

systematic way to arrive at a reserve size and chance of occurrence. We

use careful descriptions of reservoirs and a standard procedure for

calculating resources and aggregating them to the field level.

Generally, we have adopted the reserves and resource definitions of the

Society of Petroleum Engineers. This standardized procedure treats all

applicants alike. It keeps our evaluators from having to learn the

subtleties of each applicant's definition of reserves in order to

verify and perhaps change that part of the evaluation. The level of

detail proposed will ensure that we apply a consistent, analytically

supportable method, especially for estimating producible reserves and

resources.

The G&G report requests measurable reservoir data to help us

validate inputs to the evaluation model. Distributions for all data

items provide a way to document the uncertainty about these factors,

but we don't need estimates for all data items because the model

combines some items and derives other inputs. We've tried to clarify

and simplify the data requirements in the spirit of the ``scenario''

approach.

Under our Monte Carlo procedure, applicants may use up to three

discrete development scenarios, and they may include ranges for many of

their variables. We need this detail so we can clearly understand the

options and uncertainties an applicant faces. Our model has a less

complex structure than publicly available models for estimating

reserves and evaluating economics.

Individual Comments on the Deep Water Interim Rule and Guidelines

The following tables respond to the comments we received on the

interim rule and supplementary guidelines. Each row references

appropriate sections in the final rule and subject areas in the interim

rule that relate to that comment and response.

Comment on General Provisions

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

203.3/Processing Fees The fees for royalty relief are We estimate fees based on how

too high and more than cover the many hours of work we expect the

costs of processing and average application to take.

deterring nuisance applications. After we have more experience

Applicants should get refunds if with applications, we'll review

fees are more than actual processing costs and adjust fees

processing costs, which could be if necessary. We plan to give

the case if screens for minimum refunds only for incomplete

field size are used to approve applications. But, we won't

relief. charge more when processing

costs exceed the established

fees.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments on Net Revenue Share (NRS) Royalty Relief

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

203.52/NRS Relief--Approval Criteria for If a lease produces from two or Relief for end-of-life cases is

Multiple-field Leases more fields, one or more of designed for and granted to a

which do not qualify for NRS whole lease or unit, not to a

relief, royalty relief should project or field. If a lease as

still be possible for the lease a whole qualifies for end-of-

production which would otherwise life relief, it gets it

qualify. regardless of how many fields

are involved.

[[Page 2609]]

Guidelines--Supplementing 203.53/Relief Requiring the operator to act as Agree. We've dropped this

Operation a single payor could not have requirement. It was proposed

been anticipated at the time the because the scope of an audit

producer agreed to become the for a lease receiving royalty

operator and exposes the relief is greater than for

operator to unforeseen legal normal leases. A single payor is

implications or burdens. Getting designated to keep our audit

money and accurate information expenses reasonable wherever

to pay and report royalties from multiple lease owners enjoy

other lease owners is difficult, relief. However, the Royalty

if not impossible, and could Simplification and Fairness Act

obligate the operator for late contains language which

or improper payment and precludes our insistence on a

reporting interest and penalties. single payor.

203.56/NRS Relief--Lease Transfers or If a lease is assigned, the NRS In concept, relief is granted to

Assignments terms should be transferred to a lease or unit, not to a

the assignee upon request. If lessee. We've changed the rule

the assignee doesn't ask to to automatically transfer relief

retain NRS terms, the lease terms to the assignee. Lessees

should revert to the standard also have the option to end

lease royalty rate. relief at anytime.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments on Deep Water Royalty Relief (DWRR)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

203.60 & 78/Field Definition MMS should elevate the level for field definition Agree in part. The

Decision Level & Appeals. decisions, notify lessees of the field designations, Chief, Reserves

and allow them to object. It should also extend the Section, Office of

period for appealing a field decision from 15 to 30- Resource

60 days. And it should allow companies to review Evaluation, GOM

current field designations for the GOM and industry Region (GOMR), will

input in any revisions make field

decisions after a

lease has been

qualified as

producible. As part

of that process,

affected lessees

and operators will

be able to review

and discuss any

data with us before

we make the final

field decision. We

won't extend the

formal appeal

period after this

decision. Until the

GOMR issues a final

decision on the

field designation,

lessees of a pre-

Act lease can't

apply for DWRR.

However, a DWRR

application based

on the GOM Regions'

final field

designation

decision can be

filed and processed

while the field

designation is

under appeal.

203.60/Field Concept and Industry is accustomed to delineating a field for Agree. The term

Designation--Methodology. reasons of infrastructure, not geology, so ``field'' in

disagreements over ``field'' designation can be geological and

expected. Recommend that MMS make public the methods petroleum

it uses to identify fields and work with industry to literature is

develop a more precise definition for ``field.'' usually defined

relative to

geologic structure

or stratigraphic

conditions. The

Field Naming

Handbook, already

available on the

INTERNET from the

GOMR, explains our

methods. The GOMR

will gladly

entertain

suggestions for

improvements.

Meetings on a field

designation before

starting the

completeness review

can improve

understanding. But

the basic entity

for relief on

royalties in deep

water is the

geologic field, not

the project.

Deep Water Guidelines Will MMS answer questions on preparing an application Yes. As the revised

Supplementing 203.62/ before it is filed and a fee paid? guidelines state,

Applications--Informal Consulting. we'll informally

advise you how to

fill out an

application, but

not whether to file

one. Given the

extensive

guidelines and

model

documentation,

informal advice can

save you time

before filing and

us time during the

completeness review

and evaluation.

203.62 & 65(f)/Applications & The economic, geologic, and engineering reports are Agree in part.

Revising Applicants' Assumptions. too complicated, voluminous, and costly for marginal Application

opportunities that depend on royalty relief. But MMS requirements impose

should not revise any assumptions without consulting a small cost in

the applicant and, if necessary, letting a third comparison to the

party settle disputes. At the very least MMS should size of the royalty

justify any revisions to an applicant's assumptions relief at stake.

We'll use our

judgment and

discretion in

deciding whether to

ask an applicant

for more

information or for

clarification

before making any

changes, tolling

the clock as needed

to complete a full

evaluation.

We also will

identify changes in

related variables

that may need to be

discussed. Where

major assumptions

are unsupported by

backup or important

data elements are

inconsistent with

other parts of the

application, we'll

fully explain the

source of the

problem and provide

a chance to explain

or resolve the

outstanding issues

before deciding on

an application. We

aren't planning to

use third parties

to resolve

disputes.

203.63/Applications--Joint Industry is pleased that DWRR doesn't mandate If lessees want

Application Difficulties. unitization. However, joint applications may be DWRR, they will

unworkable due to different reserve numbers, costs, have to at least

etc., estimated by different lessees design applications

jointly and, if

approved, make sure

they meet

performance

conditions for

retaining relief.

In cases where a

party refuses to

cooperate in

submitting a joint

application, it

won't be eligible

to receive any

relief granted, and

we'll likely need

to make assumptions

about how it might

have participated

in and contributed

to joint

development of the

field.

[[Page 2610]]

203.63/Applications--Joint MMS shouldn't require lessees that share the same Joint applications

Application Coercion. geologic structure to file joint applications because don't require joint

this requirement could inhibit applications or development, but

restrict how companies operate offshore. For they are an

instance, on multi-lease fields, an economic project inescapable feature

might negate another's less robust project; or a more of a field-based

advanced project may refuse to co-operate with a system. The rules

competitive, but lagging, project, etc allow good-cause

exceptions to joint

applications.

Should other

lessees on the

field choose not to

apply for relief,

they're still free

to develop their

leases as they

wish, but they

won't share any

relief granted.

203.64/Applications with A limit of one application per field restricts a The limit is

Assignments. company from seeking relief on a farmed-out lease if intended in part to

the prior owner applied for relief on that field and close the potential

was rejected. The new company that thinks it could loophole of

develop the field with royalty relief must qualify assigning leases to

for a redetermination to apply get around

requirements for

redetermination.

203.65/Review and Evaluation-- MMS should notify all affected lessees when royalty Agree. We will

Notification of MMS relief is granted and publish when, who, and how much notify all

Determinations. relief is given designated lease

operators within a

field when royalty

relief is granted.

The basic summary

information will be

published on MMS's

and GOMR's home

pages on the

INTERNET.

203.65/Review and Evaluation-- MMS's determination review is too long and will delay Public law sets the

Determination Period. field development because lessees can't invest allowed review

without knowing whether royalty relief will be periods. However,

available. Reduce the review time to 3 months we don't plan to

use the entire time

if we can do

determinations

faster. Yet careful

review often

requires time,

especially when new

and complex

developments are

proposed and huge

amounts ($100

million plus) of

royalty relief and

taxpayer assets are

at stake.

203.65/Review and Evaluation-- The clock should be tolled by using one measure of DWRRA stipulated

Tolling the Clock--Measurement. time, either work days or calendar days calendar days for

its deadlines of

120 or 180 days for

approval or

rejection. We'll

continue to use

work days for

reviewing

applications for

completeness

because of the

short time allowed.

MMS must review

each application

thoroughly to

ascertain whether

it is complete

before we start the

statutory clock in

calendar days to

analyze economic

viability. Industry

is accustomed to

our using work days

to conduct

completeness checks

for other filings.

203.65/Review and Evaluation-- Evaluation time should be tolled ``upon receipt by the Agree. As the rule

Method for Tolling the Clock. applicant of written notification'' of an information states, the

deficiency and the clock should be restarted ``upon evaluation clock

receipt of the needed information in the [GOM] will be stopped

Regional MMS office.'' when the applicant

receives written

notice from us and

will begin when the

requested

information is

received in the

regional office.

Deep Water Guidelines How will MMS account for costs and production Each application and

Supplementing 203.65/Review and (revenues) that it believes should be added to the scenario presents a

Evaluation--Consistency with economic evaluation of a field because they are unique proposal.

Differences in Geologic associated with developing reservoirs omitted from an We'll adjust data

Interpretation. application? as necessary. For

example, if we

determine that an

applicant omitted

prospective

reservoirs, it's

reasonable to

assume they'll be

found and developed

later. By adding

the necessary costs

after production

begins, we avoid

the complexity of

having to adjust

the estimated pre-

production costs

used as a

performance

condition.

203.67/Review and Evaluation--Dual Eliminate the dual test, at least for applicants We've kept the dual

Test Role in Evaluation Model seeking only the minimum suspension volume. MMS test, but have

(Royalty Suspension Viability should grant relief and not interject itself into the modified the

Program (RSVP)). process by which a lessee decides to develop and calculations to

incur costs to bring a field into production reflect industry

concerns that our

determinations may

not always coincide

with industry

decisions, even

using the same

input data. If,

under these altered

conditions, the

dual test indicates

that no amount of

royalty relief will

make the field

economic, we can

reasonably infer

that the

application is

missing some key

factor in the

decision to

develop.

203.68/Review and Evaluation--Dual Because sunk costs aren't in the dual test, it doesn't The difference in

Test Treatment of Sunk Costs. prove development is economic without royalty when the way the two

compared to the way the primary test defines economic tests

``economic-ness.'' Treat sunk costs the same in both treat sunk costs

tests and include them in the volume determination. favors the

Chance of relief is lost in a redetermination by applicant. Omission

defining all of the expended development costs as of sunk costs from

sunk the dual test

raises the net

present value

(NPV), improving

chances for passing

that part of the

viability test.

Their inclusion in

the primary test

has the opposite

effect on NPV,

again improving

chances for passing

that part of the

viability test. As

for volume

determinations, the

DWRRA directs us to

consider sunk costs

in determining

eligibility for

relief but not in

setting a volume

suspension to

recover them.

Finally, there is

no difference in

the treatment of

sunk costs in the

original

application and

redetermination.

The only difference

is in timing, i.e.,

more development

costs may have been

expended and hence

treated as sunk at

time of re-

submission. That

will raise the NPV

in the dual test

more than it will

raise the NPV in

the primary test,

expanding the range

of qualifying

values.

[[Page 2611]]

203.70 & 91/Review and Evaluation-- Full development cost is seldom known before first We agree that a

Post-production development production, so a pre-production report would come review before

report. before all wells would be drilled. Drilling costs are production starts

significant, often around 50 percent. Keep self- may be premature.

disclosure to encourage efficiency and reduce audit The rules require

requirements but have an updated estimate of the start-of-

development costs provided before the first production cost

anniversary of start of production. report within 60

days after

production begins.

We may grant short

extensions for

extenuating

circumstances. This

gives applicants

time to compile

data on

expenditures up to

a well-defined

point and avoids

the ambiguity

surrounding the

actual start date

and the need to

estimate some cost

items.

203.70, 76 & 90/Change in Material What constitutes start of construction or fabrication? The revised rule

Fact--Start of Construction. stipulates the

following

requirements to

verify when

construction

starts: (1) a copy

of the contract

with the

fabrication yard,

(2) a letter from

the contractor

certifying that

construction has

started on a

specific system for

a specific

location, and (3)

evidence of a

payment of

appropriate size

based on current

industry standards

for the proposed

development and

production system.

203.71/Applying Suspension Can a higher minimum suspension volume apply if the No. Minimum

Volumes--Adding leases to a field. MMS evaluation of the application includes potential suspension volumes

resources on unleased blocks and or leases not are based on the

currently assigned to the field? deepest lease

assigned to the

field up to the

time the

application is

approved. Of

course, we can

still grant larger

amounts of relief

than the minimum

suspension volumes,

if we find them

necessary to make

the whole field

economic.

203.73/Applying Suspension The fixed conversion factor ignores fluctuations in The oil/gas ratio

Volumes--Gas-to-Oil Conversion the relative values of oil and gas and introduces will continue to be

Factor. bias as it overvalues gas relative to oil properties based on the

at current value ratios. The 8-to-1 ratio implied in British thermal

the DWRRA may be better than the 5.62-to-1 ratio in unit (Btu)

the interim rule conversion factor.

Because the RSVP

model values oil

and gas separately,

the conversion

ratio affects only

the size of the

volume suspension,

not qualification

for relief.

Qualified

applicants already

get minimum volumes

under the DWRRA

even if only small

volume suspensions

are needed. These

minimum stipulated

volumes were based

on our studies

using the Btu

ratio. Hence, it

would be

inconsistent to

have the volume

suspension amounts

based on relative

prices when the

minimum volumes

were based on

studies using the

Btu ratio.

203.74/Redeterminations-- Conditions for redeterminations should include We often can't

Reprocessed Seismic Data. reprocessed seismic data (using new algorithms). This distinguish a new

differs from reinterpreting existing data, which is algorithm from a

explicitly excluded as a basis for redetermination reinterpretation of

an old one, so

we'll limit this

requirement to new

data developed by

the applicant as a

basis for a

redetermination.

203.74/Redeterminations--Price A decline of 25 percent in oil or gas price is much Sharp price swings

Change Size. too low to trigger a redetermination. Cash flow is are often short-run

very sensitive to price and a 10 percent drop in phenomena not

price can be enough to trigger a redetermination matched by changes

in forecasts of

long-term price

trends used in a

redetermination.

Also price/cost

differences, not

just prices, drive

cash flow. Some

cost-cutting

inevitably

accompanies price

declines. Only

sustained, sizeable

price declines,

such as 25 percent,

are likely to

overwhelm cost-

cutting

opportunities

enough to warrant a

redetermination.

203.74/Redeterminations--Price What is the relevant price which must drop by 25 Applicants may seek

Base. percent to qualify an applicant for a a redetermination

redetermination? if a weighted 12-

month moving

average of daily

closing New York

Mercantile Exchange

(NYMEX) prices for

oil or gas has

decreased by more

than 25 percent

since the most

recent complete

application. As the

revised rule

explains, the

before and after

prices are weighted

using the volumes

of oil and gas

identified in the

most likely

scenario described

in that

application.

Deep Water Guidelines The minimum oil price of $16.30 per barrel and the Starting price

Supplementing 203.74/ average annual growth rate of 1.67 percent is too assumptions are

Redeterminations--Price high for the next 25 years based on Energy

Assumptions. Information

Administration

(EIA) historical

data and growth

rates in EIA's

Annual Energy

Outlook and will be

updated regularly.

To match the GOM

market better,

we'll use recent

prices for

Petroleum

Administration for

Defense District

(PADD) III imports

as a benchmark for

starting prices.

Adjustments for

gravity differences

are allowed. As

with all

projections,

experience may

prove starting

prices

representative or

not and growth

rates right or

wrong. But

applicants will be

on an equal footing

because we mandate

specific

parameters.

Deep Water Guidelines The guidelines aren't consistent with the interim rule Agree. We have

Supplementing 203.76/Changes in language and preamble discussion regarding ``material changed the

Material Fact--Limits. change.'' guidelines to be

consistent with the

rule. In

particular, the

four circumstances

(change of system,

excess delay in

starting,

underspending on

development, or

false statements/

omitted reports)

used to signify a

material change are

the only ones--not

just examples--of

what justifies

withdrawal of

already granted

relief.

[[Page 2612]]

203.76 & 87-89/Changes in Material MMS doesn't need three development scenarios to test The withdrawal

Fact & Engineering, Production, viability because the section on withdrawing approval conditions focus on

and Cost reports--Multiple for royalty relief protects against significant underspending

Development Scenarios. changes development costs

and changes in

development systems

evaluated in the

application. They

don't consider

adjustments to

planned capacity

before or after

production begins.

We consider up to

three scenarios to

reflect uncertainty

about final project

size, timing, and

production rates.

We have clarified

the options for

simplifying the

input data.

Generally, whenever

observed conditions

or formal decisions

foreclose some or

all the uncertainty

about particular

variables, we

accept fewer

scenarios or point

estimates for

reservoirs, costs,

and production.

203.76/Change in Material Fact-- Conversion of proposed development costs to sunk costs Agree. We'll allow

Reapplication with Sunk in a reapplication compounds the penalty from applicants to

Development Costs. withdrawal. The reapplication is allowed less cost renounce relief at

with which to justify relief any point after

approval is granted

and before

production starts.

When violation of a

withdrawal

condition is

anticipated, giving

up relief early can

reduce the share of

development costs

that get considered

as sunk costs in a

subsequent

application.

Deep Water Guidelines What expenditures are included in development costs? We'll count all

Supplementing 203.76 & 89/Change eligible expenses

in Material Fact--Defining planned for the

Development Cost. most likely

scenario between

application and

start of

production. The

spending threshold

and any disallowed

costs (for

uneconomic

reservoirs) will be

specified in the

relief approval. In

assessing the

economic viability

of the subject

field, we may

remove the cash

flows associated

with uneconomic

reservoirs.

Deep Water Guidelines What happens if the development period (i.e., time to We'll compare actual

Supplementing 203.76/Change in first production) deviates from an applicant's to approved pre-

Material Fact--Development Period. proposal? production costs,

regardless of how

much or little time

it takes to start

production.

203.76/Only ``Significant'' Change Withdrawal as a result of actual cost below 80 percent Withdrawal

in Material Fact before (or 90 percent for redetermination that follows conditions need to

Withdrawal of Approved Relief. withdrawal of previously granted relief) of be fixed and

application estimates discourages capital efficiency. obvious, not

Also a 10 to 20 percent cost reduction may not flexible

greatly improve project economics. MMS should combinations to be

withdraw relief only if reduction in capital costs determined later.

``substantially'' improve project economics beyond We've taken three

those on which the project qualified. Even if such a steps to soften the

change occurs, the applicant ought to be allowed to danger of a fixed

appeal to keep relief so as not to encourage threshold. First,

inefficient expenditures the applicant may

keep one-half of

the relief if we're

notified of the

shortfall. Second,

the withdrawal date

is now after

production begins.

Third, the pre-

production period

is variable, so we

count an

applicant's costs

over a flexible

interval. As a

result, it's

unlikely that the

company would

substantially

underspend its

earlier capital

cost projections by

the time of review.

203.78/Applying Suspension Will a market gas price increase that is not No. The statute

Volumes--Price Ceilings on accompanied by a rise in oil price trigger a lifting doesn't explicitly

Different Products. of all the royalty-suspension volume for a field with answer this

mostly oil reserves or vice versa? question. We've

interpreted the

applicable text to

mean that price

ceilings prescribed

in the law for

lifting relief

should apply

separately to each

product for fields

that produce both.

Relief can be

suspended on just

the part of total

production from a

field whose price

exceeded the

threshold. Gas

prices above $3.50

per million Btus

(escalated to then-

current dollars)

won't lift relief

on oil volumes if

oil prices remain

below $28 per

barrel (escalated

to then-current

dollars) and vice

versa. Escalation

by the Gross

Domestic Price

deflator raises the

thresholds each

year.

203.78/Applying Suspension A time limit should be set for MMS to make royalty Agree. The new

Volumes--Time Limits for Royalty refunds or credits, as are set for companies to repay Royalty

Refunds or Credits. back royalties with interest, under the price Simplification and

escalation clause Fairness Act

requires that MMS

process refunds or

credits on

production after

September 1996

within 120 days of

a lessee's request.

Future rules will

set forth

procedures which

deal with this

request. The

repayment period

for companies is

also set at 120

days.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments on the Required Reports

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirement/Subject Comment MMS Response

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

203.81/Independent Certification.. A certified public accountant (CPA) certification of A CPA certification

historical expenditures reported in either the is an independent

application or the pre-production report imposes check and so might

unnecessary costs. Internal records and self substitute for our

certification are adequate audit. Besides,

only eligible

expenditures must

be certified.

However, to reduce

the cost of the

independent audit,

we will accept a

CPA opinion which

identifies

questionable

elements or an

unqualified opinion

on the accuracy and

relevance of the

historical

information

presented.

[[Page 2613]]

Deep Water Guidelines What is a CPA certification for sunk costs? It's a CPA report

Supplementing 203.81/ that certifies your

Certification Format. historical

information is

accurate and meets

our stipulations on

eligibility. As the

revised guidelines

state, an agent of

the CPA firm must

sign the

certification and

identify someone

who knows the case

and is authorized

to respond to

questions on it.

203.83/Administrative report-- Requiring certification that reserves won't be Agree. We've

Certification of Non-Development. produced without relief is not enforceable and can be eliminated this

outdated as conditions change requirement.

Considering sunk

costs in the

evaluation means

that some fields

that qualify for

relief would be

worth developing

without relief.

203.85/Economic viability report-- The spreadsheet model should allow for cost inflation Future versions of

Inflation. the spreadsheet

model may include a

variable to account

for cost-specific

inflation or

deflation.

Technological

progress could

actually lower real

costs over time

despite general

inflation of all

prices and costs.

203.85/Economic viability report-- MMS should fix a schedule for revising price Agree. We'll publish

Updating Price Assumptions assumptions (e.g., quarterly, annually). If MMS updated price

Schedule. issues new assumptions while reviewing an assumptions on the

application, they should clarify which assumptions INTERNET annually,

apply (those at time of application or latest issued probably in the

before the determination) late spring when

EIA's Annual Energy

Outlook releases

new data and

forecasts. We'll

use the price

assumptions in

place on the date

of application

submission.

203.85/Economic viability report-- Will MMS accept the discount rate an applicant We'll use the

Revising Applicants' Assumptions- selects, or reserve the right to revise the discount discount rate an

Discount Rates. rate? applicant proposes

in both the dual

and primary tests,

with no

appropriateness

review as long as

it is within the

range provided in

the guidelines.

203.85/Economic viability report-- The 10 percent discount rate is too low. Even 15 In all cases, the

Discount Rate Size. percent is too low because it risks rejected projects rates of return

being abandoned apply to a field

with a discovery,

so the risk of not

finding oil or gas

is gone. The range

specified in the

guidelines for the

discount rate is

based on recent

historical

experience, which

in future years may

assume a different

trend. The

industry's average

after-tax, real

rate of return, has

been estimated to

range from a high

of 10.9 percent to

a low of 1.4

percent between

1959 and 1988. (See

A.T. Guernsey on

behalf of Shell Oil

Company,

Profitability

Study: Crude Oil

and Natural Gas

Exploration,

Development, and

Production

Activities in the

USA, 1959-1988,

November 1990).

Simulations with a

version of our

model found before-

tax rates of return

ranged from 1.2 to

4 percent higher

than after-tax

rates of return

over various

project conditions.

Together, these

estimates indicate

that expecting

before-tax discount

rates, and hence

rates of return, in

the range of 10 to

15 percent are

appropriate.

203.85/Economic viability report-- Allowing variability in discount rates could lead to The goal of a range

Discount Rate Range. unequal treatment. Where applicants choose discount of discount rates

rates, the playing field isn't level. Instead, is to fit

specify one for each of three water-depth thresholds differences in

and apply uniformly companies' risk

tolerance and

opportunity cost.

Applicants can

tailor their risk

preferences by

water depth within

this range if they

choose to. We use

probability methods

that don't require

a risk premium in

the discount rate.

However, a fixed

discount rate

across fields and

companies within a

water-depth

category places all

the burden for

dealing with

differences in risk

on these

probability

distributions. We

believe a better

compromise is to

give applicants the

chance to use both

factors to express

their risks and

uncertainties.

Allowing companies

to choose a rate

for their projects

is eminently fair,

as long as they

stay within our

stipulated range

and we use it in

both economic

viability tests.

203.89/Cost report--Sunk Costs The way MMS includes sunk costs doesn't recognize the The DWRRA directs us

Measurement. time value of money, as past expenditures are carried to consider all

forward without escalation. It's inappropriate to exploration,

combine after-tax sunk costs with future costs and development, and

revenues expressed on a before-tax basis production costs.

Because the

decision to proceed

on a project is

independent of sunk

costs, the proper

treatment of sunk

costs for economic

viability is to

value them as zero.

We balance these

considerations by

carefully defining

expenses that

constitute sunk

costs, then we

allow them as a

deduction in the

primary test and

exclude them from

the dual test. The

after-tax part of

sunk costs, like

the before-tax size

of prospective

costs, is what the

company still has

to recover from the

proposed project.

203.89/Sunk Costs--Scope.......... Sunk costs should include all reasonable post-lease We won't consider

acquisition costs (seismic data costs, overhead sunk costs incurred

expenses, etc.). Extend the definition to include all by previous owners

project costs incurred by the lessee or on behalf of of your lease or by

a lessee third-parties.

Also, we won't

consider portions

of sunk costs on

your lease that you

incurred prior to

when you last

bought into your

lease. Further, if

you have maintained

continous ownership

but changed the

share of the lease

you own, we count

your sunk costs

only in proportion

to the share you

owned when you

incurred these

costs. We do this

because previous

owners and third-

parties already

have been

compensated through

market

transactions. Also,

we do not believe

we can really

verify the

relevance to

current development

of expenditures by

third-parties or

previous owners.

[[Page 2614]]

203.91 & 76/Review and Evaluation-- What must the post-production report contain? What The report must show

Post-production development happens if it isn't submitted? and compare planned

report. and actual pre-

production costs.

If you don't submit

the report, you'll

lose relief, just

as you would for

providing false

historical or

intentionally

inaccurate

information.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Recovery of Costs

By Federal policy and law, we'll charge lessees applying for

royalty relief under this rule an amount which recovers our cost of

processing their applications. The Independent Office Appropriation Act

(31 U.S.C. 9701) and OMB Circular A-25 require agencies to recover

their costs when they provide services that confer special benefits or

privileges to identifiable non-Federal recipients. Processing of

applications for royalty relief clearly falls within this mandate.

Furthermore, the Omnibus Appropriations Bill (Pub. L. 104-134, 110

Stat. 1321, April 26, 1996) authorizes collecting such fees.

We issued NTL No. 96-3N (signed June 21, 1996), which gives

detailed amounts for processing royalty-relief applications and when

and how applicants may pay us. Processing applications for royalty

relief to increase production will cost $8,000. Complete applications

under DWRR will cost either $16,000 to $34,000. Draft applications will

cost either $10,500 to $28,500. For some applications, we may need to

audit the financial data submitted to determine the proposed

development's economics. That would cost up to $37,500. Ordinarily, no

refund is given when we reject an application. However, if we reject a

deep water application for incompleteness during the first 20 business

days after receiving it, we'll refund all but $5,500 of the application

fee. We'll revise the Notice to Lessees (NTL) periodically to reflect

our cost experience and to provide other information helpful or

necessary for administering this program.

Authors: Sam Fraser and Marshall Rose, Economics Division, prepared

this document.

V. Administrative Matters

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866

This rule is significant due to novel policy issues arising from

legal mandates, and OMB has reviewed this rule. We will make a copy of

our determination of the effects of this rule available on request.

In summary, the DWRRA instructs us to grant royalty relief only in

situations that are uneconomic at the lease-stipulated royalty rate.

Hence, the economic effects can be estimated by the additional

royalties that may be collected from fields that would otherwise not be

developed until a later time, if at all. We estimated these effects by

extrapolating to all known deep water fields the results of detailed

analyses of 30 fields in the relevant water depths. MMS's field-based

approach generates up to $45 million per year in additional royalty

revenue, which is less than the threshold amount of $100 million

annually.

The field-based approach provided in this final rule gives a single

royalty-suspension volume for each qualifying field. The main

alternative approach gives each individual lease or unit a separate

royalty-suspension volume, subject to the minimum volumes specified in

the DWRRA.

We chose the field-based approach because:

The DWRRA's primary author stated that he intended the

DWRRA to encourage production from new fields without providing any

more relief than needed;

The field-based approach provides a substantial incentive

for developing marginal fields in deep water while still ensuring a

fair return to the Treasury;

The minimum suspension volumes specified in the DWRRA were

derived from an analysis of fields, not individual leases; and

This rule needs to be consistent with the rules for

royalty suspensions on deep water tracts leased after November 28,

1995, in the same parts of the GOM so that all deep water leases on the

OCS receive equitable treatment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

This rule can have a positive economic effect on some small

entities. A copy of our analysis of this impact is available on

request.

In summary, this rule sets the terms and conditions for granting

royalty relief under the provisions of section 8(a)(3)(A) of the OCSLA.

These terms reduce costs for end-of-life operations by 6 to 10 percent,

more than doubling profits. That should significantly prolong

operations on marginally economic leases. We can't estimate the number

of leases that may be affected from past experience, because the terms

have been changed from those previously available to marginal OCS

leases. We estimate that small entity operators account for under 10

percent of production from OCS leases.

This rule also sets terms and conditions for granting royalty-

suspension volumes under the DWRRA for certain deep water leases on the

OCS in the GOM. These leases were issued as a result of a lease sale

held before November 28, 1995. The conditions limit these terms to the

rare situations in which royalty costs are the difference between

unprofitable and profitable development. One of two applications for

deep water relief received under the interim version of this rule was

from a small entity.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In connection with the interim final rulemaking (IFR) process, we

submitted the information collection requirements in 30 CFR 203 to OMB

and conducted a full review and comment process for this collection of

information. OMB approved the information collection (OMB No. 1010-

0071) on October 7, 1996, to expire on October 31, 1999.

Earlier in the preamble we discussed comments received on the

information collection aspects of the IFR. Based on experience and the

changes made in this rule, we will submit a revised information

collection package to OMB for approval 60 days after this rule is

published. With this rule, we are starting the 60-day comment period.

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) provides

that an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required

to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a

currently valid OMB control number. The information collection aspects

of this final rule will not take effect until approved by OMB.

We invite the public and other Federal agencies to comment on the

collection of information as discussed below. Send comments regarding

any aspect of the collection to the Minerals Management Service,

Attention: Rules Processing Team, 381 Elden Street, Mail Stop 4020,

Herndon, VA 20170. Your comments should be received by March 17, 1998.

[[Page 2615]]

We use the information to determine whether royalty relief will

result in production that wouldn't otherwise occur. We rely largely on

your information to make these determinations. Your application for

royalty relief must contain enough information on finances, economics,

reservoirs, G&G characteristics, production, and engineering estimates

for us to determine whether: (1) We should grant relief under the law,

and (2) the requested relief will ultimately recover more resources and

return a reasonable profit on project investments. Your fabricator

confirmation and post-production development reports must contain

enough information for us to verify that your application reasonably

represented your plans.

Applicants (respondents) are Federal OCS oil and gas lessees.

Applications are required to obtain or retain a benefit. Therefore, if

you apply for royalty relief, you must provide this information. We

will protect information considered proprietary under applicable law

and under regulations at Sec. 203.63(b) and part 250 of this chapter.

We estimate the annual public reporting burden for this information

collection will average approximately 14,700 hours, not the 38,730

hours originally estimated for the interim final rule. The reduction is

due primarily to an adjustment in re-estimating the number of

applications we expect to receive. We also made minor program

reductions in the estimate based on the changes in the final rule. The

average burden per response is estimated at 335 burden hours. This

includes the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data

sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and

reviewing the collection of information. A breakdown of the estimated

burden is included in the supporting statement we submitted to OMB for

this collection of information. You may obtain a copy of that

supporting statement from MMS's Information Collection Clearance

Officer (202/208-7744). In calculating the burdens, we've assumed that

respondents perform some of the requirements and maintain records in

the normal course of their activities. We consider these to be usual

and customary. You are invited to provide information in your comments

if you disagree with this assumption.

We specifically solicit comments on the following questions:

(a) Is the proposed collection of information necessary for us to

properly perform our functions, and will it be useful?

(b) Are the burden hours estimates reasonable for the proposed

collection?

(c) Do you have any suggestions that would enhance the quality,

clarity, or usefulness of the information to be collected?

(d) Is there a way to minimize the information collection burden on

the applicants, including the use of appropriate automated electronic,

mechanical, or other forms of information technology?

In addition, the Paperwork Reduction Act requires us to estimate

the total annual cost burden to respondents or recordkeepers resulting

from the collection of information. We need your comments to identify

any reporting and recordkeeping cost burdens other than those discussed

above. Your response should split the cost estimate into two

components: (a) Total capital and startup cost component; and (b)

annual operation, maintenance, and purchase of services component. Your

estimates should consider the costs to generate, maintain, and disclose

or provide the information. You should describe the methods you use to

estimate major cost factors, including system and technology

acquisition, expected useful life of capital equipment, discount

rate(s), and the period over which you incur costs. Capital and startup

costs include, among other items, computers and software you purchase

to prepare for collecting information; monitoring, sampling, drilling,

and testing equipment; and record storage facilities. Generally, your

estimates should not include equipment or services purchased: (i)

before October 1, 1995; (ii) to comply with requirements not associated

with the information collection; (iii) for reasons other than to

provide information or keep records for the Government; or (iv) as part

of customary and usual business or private practices.

Takings Implication Assessment

DOI certifies that this rule does not represent a governmental

action that can interfere with constitutionally protected property

rights. Therefore, we don't need to do a Takings Implication Assessment

under E.O. 12630, Governmental Actions and Interference with

Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.

E.O. 12988

DOI has certified to OMB that the rule meets the applicable reform

standards provided in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988.

National Environmental Policy Act

DOI has determined that this rule isn't a major Federal action that

significantly affects the quality of the human environment, so we don't

need an Environmental Impact Statement.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

DOI has determined and certifies according to the Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 1502 et seq., that this rule will not impose a

cost of $100 million or more in any given year on State, local, and

tribal governments or the private sector.

``Plain English'' Style of Writing

We've written this regulation in the form of questions in the first

person (I) and answers in the second person (you) because readers may

find it simpler to read and understand. A question and its answer

combine to establish a rule. The applicant and the agency must follow

the language in the question and its answer.

List of Subjects in 30 CFR Part 203

Continental shelf, Government contracts, Indians-lands, Minerals

Royalties, Oil and gas exploration, Public lands-mineral resources,

Sulphur.

Dated: November 6, 1997.

Bob Armstrong,

Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Minerals Management

Service (MMS) is amending 30 CFR part 203 as follows:

PART 203--RELIEF OR REDUCTION IN ROYALTY RATES

1. The authority citation for part 203 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 25 U.S.C. 396 et seq.; 25 U.S.C. 396a et seq.; 25

U.S.C. 2101 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.;

30 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 31 U.S.C. 9701 et

seq.; 43 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.; 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.; and 43 U.S.C.

1801 et seq.

2. Subpart A is revised to read as follows:

Subpart A--General Provisions

Sec.

203.0 What definitions apply to this part?

203.1 What is MMS's authority to grant royalty relief?

203.2 When can I get royalty relief?

203.3 Why must I pay a fee to request royalty relief?

203.4 How do the provisions in this part apply to different types

of leases and projects?

[[Page 2616]]

Subpart A--General Requirements

Sec. 203.0 What definitions apply to this part?

Authorized field means a field in a water depth of at least 200

meters and in the Gulf of Mexico west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West

longitude from which no current pre-Act lease produced, other than test

production, before November 28, 1995.

Complete application means an original and two copies of the six

reports consisting of the data specified in 30 CFR 203.81, 203.83 and

203.85 through 203.89, along with one set of digital information, which

MMS has reviewed and found complete.

Determination means the binding decision by MMS on whether your

field qualifies for relief or how large a royalty-suspension volume

must be to make the field economically viable.

Draft application means the preliminary set of information and

assumptions you submit to seek a nonbinding assessment on whether a

field could be expected to qualify for royalty relief.

Eligible lease means a lease that results from a lease sale held

after November 28, 1995; is located in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) in

water depths 200 meters or deeper; lies wholly west of 87 degrees, 30

minutes West longitude; and is offered subject to a royalty-suspension

volume authorized by statute.

Expansion project means a project you propose in a Development

Operations Coordination Document (DOCD) or a Supplement approved by the

Secretary of the Interior after November 28, 1995, that will increase

the ultimate recovery of resources from a pre-Act lease and that

involves a substantial capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg platform,

subsea template and manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple well

project, etc.).

Fabrication (or start of construction) means evidence of

irreversible commitment to a concept and scale of development,

including copies of a binding contract between you (as applicant) and a

fabrication yard, a letter from a fabricator certifying that

construction has begun, and a receipt for the customary down payment.

Field means an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple

reservoirs all grouped on, or related to, the same general geological

structural feature or stratigraphic trapping condition. Two or more

reservoirs may be in a field, separated vertically by intervening

impervious strata or laterally by local geologic barriers, or both.

Lease means a lease or unit.

New production means any production from a current pre-Act lease

from which no royalties are due on production, other than test

production, before November 28, 1995. Also, it means any production

resulting from lease-development activities involving a substantial

capital investment (e.g., fixed-leg platform, subsea template and

manifold, tension-leg platform, multiple well project, etc.) on a

current pre-Act lease under a Development Operations Coordination

Document--or its supplement--approved by the Secretary of the Interior

after November, 28, 1995.

Nonbinding assessment means an opinion by MMS of whether your field

could qualify for royalty relief. It is based on your draft application

and does not entitle the field to relief.

Performance conditions means minimum conditions you must meet,

after we have granted relief and before production begins, to remain

qualified for that relief. If you do not meet each one of these

performance conditions, we consider it a change in material fact

significant enough to invalidate our original evaluation and approval.

Pre-Act lease means a lease issued as a result of a lease sale held

before November 28, 1995; in a water depth of at least 200 meters; and

in the Gulf of Mexico west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude.

Production means all oil, gas, and other relevant products you

save, remove, or sell from a tract or those quantities allocated to

your tract under a unitization formula, as measured for the purposes of

determining the amount of royalty payable to the United States.

Project means any activity that requires at least a permit to

drill.

Redetermination means your request for us to reconsider our

determination on royalty relief if we have rejected your application or

if we have granted relief but you want a larger suspension volume.

Renounce means action you take to give up relief after we have

granted it and before you start production.

Sunk costs means costs (as specified in 30 CFR 203.89(a)) of

exploration, development, and production that you incur after the date

of first discovery on the field and before the date we receive your

complete application for royalty relief. Sunk costs include the costs

of the discovery well qualified as producible under 30 CFR part 250,

subpart A but do not include any pre-discovery activity costs or lease

acquisition and holding costs such as cash bonus and rental payments.

Withdraw means action we take on a field that has qualified for

relief if you have not met one or more of the performance conditions.

Sec. 203.1 What is MMS's authority to grant royalty relief?

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1337, as

amended by the OCS Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), Public Law

104-58, authorizes us to grant royalty relief in three situations.

(a) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(A), we may reduce or eliminate any

royalty or a net profit share specified for an OCS lease to promote

increased production.

(b) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(B), we may reduce, modify, or

eliminate any royalty or net profit share to promote development,

increase production, or encourage production of marginal resources on

certain leases or categories of leases. This authority is restricted to

leases in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) that are west of 87 degrees, 30

minutes West longitude.

(c) Under 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(3)(C), we may suspend royalties for

designated volumes of new p

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.