Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices and Associated Equipment

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-98-4281]

RIN 2127-AG38

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Lamps, Reflective Devices

and Associated Equipment

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Statement of policy.

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SUMMARY: This document announces that NHTSA will participate in an

international effort under the aegis of the United Nations' Meeting of

Experts on Lighting to develop a process for evaluating new ideas for

signal lamps on vehicles. When that effort is complete, NHTSA will

evaluate the results and see if it is appropriate to implement some or

all of that process in the agency's evaluations of signal lighting

ideas. Until the internationally-recommended process is available for

NHTSA's consideration, the agency is adopting the policy (described in

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION) for evaluating requests to require or permit

new or different signal lighting or signal lighting actuation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen R. Kratzke, Director, Office

of Crash Avoidance Standards, NHTSA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington DC 20590. Mr. Kratzke's telephone number is (202) 366-4931

and his facsimile number is (202) 366-4329.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statement of Policy

When the agency is asked to evaluate a new signal lighting idea,

NHTSA will ask:

1. Does the new signal lighting idea require a change in the

standardized operation or appearance of a required lamp or piece of

lighting equipment?

a. If NHTSA determines the answer is NO, does the new signal

lighting idea impair the effectiveness of required lamps or lighting

equipment?

i. If NHTSA determines the answer is YES, the new signal lighting

idea is expressly prohibited by the lighting standard.

ii. If NHTSA determines the answer is NO, the new lighting signal

idea may be installed on vehicles.

b. If NHTSA determines the answer is YES, the agency will proceed

to Part 2 of this evaluation.

2. The current standardized approach for signal lighting has

positive safety benefits by virtue of its broad public and

international acceptance. Does the request to alter the current

standardized approach for signal lighting present data purporting to

show positive safety benefits from the new signal idea?

a. If no data are provided, NHTSA will not treat the request as a

petition for rulemaking. The request will be forwarded to a public

docket that will collect information describing all proposed new signal

lighting ideas and systems. The docket will be available for review by

NHTSA and others who may wish to plan future research based on the

ideas and inventions collected in the docket.

b. If data are provided, NHTSA will treat the request as a petition

for rulemaking. NHTSA will evaluate the data to determine if they show

persuasive evidence of a positive safety impact.

i. If NO determination of positive safety can be made, NHTSA will

not change its regulations to permit the new signal lighting idea,

because that would negatively affect standardization of signal

lighting.

ii. If YES, a determination of positive safety can be made. NHTSA

will propose to amend its lighting standard to either permit or require

the new signal lighting idea.

Background on Stop Lamps

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 108, Lamps, Reflective

Devices and Associated Equipment (49

[[Page 59483]]

CFR 571.108) specifies types of signal lamps to be installed on new

motor vehicles, and regulates their performance in terms of color,

brightness, quantity, duty cycle (steady or flashing), and details of

activation (e.g., activated when the service brakes are applied)

1. All motor vehicles are required to have red stop lamps on

the rear of the vehicle. Standard No. 108 requires that those stop

lamps be activated ``upon application of the service brakes.'' The goal

of this activation requirement is to communicate to following drivers

that the driver of the vehicle ahead has purposefully applied the

brakes. This activation requirement does not differentiate between

tapping the brakes and a hard braking application. Similarly, it does

not indicate all times the vehicle may be slowing, such as when the

driver downshifts or rapidly removes his or her foot from the

accelerator pedal.

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\1\ For the sake of simplicity, the rest of this document uses

``NHTSA's lighting standard'' or ``Standard No. 108,'' instead of

the full legal citation for this standard.

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Many inventors have approached NHTSA over the past 30 years with

ideas for changes that the inventors believe would improve stop lamps.

Most of these ideas involve sending a different signal from the stop

lamps for hard braking than for other, more typical brake applications.

The agency has responded to these ideas by stating that it sees

positive benefits from the current stop lamp activation provisions in

Standard No. 108, which ensure a uniform, unambiguous signal that the

driver has chosen to activate the service brakes. That is useful

information for following drivers. However, NHTSA has acknowledged that

it is possible that using a different action to activate the stop lamps

or having the stop lamps send different signals might improve safety.

The agency has stated it will consider changing the stop lamp

requirements if it were shown that a change would yield a net safety

benefit.

Baran's First Petition for ABWS and NHTSA'S Response

Baran Advanced Technologies, Ltd. of Israel manufactures an

Advanced Brake Warning System (ABWS) that is intended to activate the

stop lamps during emergency braking before the driver puts his or her

foot on the brake pedal. The goal of this system is to give drivers of

following vehicles an earlier warning of emergency braking. ABWS senses

the rate at which the accelerator pedal returns to its upper stop after

being released. It activates the stop lamps for one second if the

accelerator pedal reaches its upper stop at greater than the set rate.

Its operation is based on the assumption that any rapid release of the

accelerator pedal is the beginning of an emergency braking maneuver and

will be immediately followed by application of the brake pedal.

The issue of ABWS and the stop lamp requirements in Standard No.

108 goes back nearly a decade. In 1989, an Israeli competitor of Baran

called ATAT asked for an interpretation to permit its version of ABWS

to be installed in the aftermarket. ATAT did not want any mandate to

use its version of ABWS and it did not want to install the device on

new vehicles. In a January 25, 1990 letter, NHTSA told ATAT that its

device could not legally be installed even in the aftermarket. The

agency explained that activating the stop lamps upon rapid removal of

the driver's foot from the accelerator would undermine standardization

of the stop lamp signal and ``can only create the potential for

confusion and dilution of the effectiveness of the stop [lamp]

signal.''

The subject rested there until Baran filed a petition for

rulemaking in 1993. Baran did not question the agency's interpretation

of the existing requirements of Standard No. 108. However, Baran asked

that the Standard's requirements be changed to permit its ABWS to

activate the stop lamps upon rapid removal of the driver's foot from

the accelerator pedal.

Baran relied upon two studies to support its request for a change

to Standard No. 108 to permit the installation of its ABWS system. The

first was a paper by Enke titled ``Possibilities for Improving Safety

Within the Driver-Vehicle Environment Control Loop.'' This paper

estimates that the impact speed of 25 percent of rear end crashes is no

more than 10 km/h, or 6 miles per hour and that the distance traveled

at that speed in 0.25 second is exactly equal to the distance required

to stop from 10 km/h. Baran claimed that this paper showed that

providing a driver with an additional 0.25 second of warning of an

impending stop by the driver ahead of him or her could yield a 25 to 30

percent reduction in all rear-end crashes.

The second paper on which Baran relied was a NHTSA report on

Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) countermeasures to rear end

crashes (DOT HS 807 995). This report found that 75 percent of rear-end

crashes ``do not involve simply a `too-slow' reaction of the following

driver to a sudden crash threat.'' In fact, the most common scenario

noted in the report for these 75 percent of rear-end crashes involves a

lead vehicle that has been completely stopped for an extended interval

(2 to 6 seconds) before it is struck by a following vehicle. However,

the other 25 percent of rear-end crashes ``may involve driver reaction

time following a sudden crash threat as a critical factor.'' Baran

believed that this report's finding was consistent with and bolstered

the finding in Enke's report.

NHTSA carefully evaluated these reports and other data in response

to Baran's petition. First, the IVHS paper found that rear-end crashes

in which the following driver was attentive enough to respond to an

earlier stop lamp signal were substantially less than 8 percent of all

rear-end crashes, not 25 percent as interpreted by Baran. Second, a

report by the Technical University of Darmstadt in Germany, titled

Efficiency of Advanced Brake Light Devices, FO57 May 1994, found that

responses by attentive test subjects improved by 0.10 to 0.15 second,

instead of the 0.25 second improvement expected by Baran. This

difference would substantially reduce the expected benefits of ABWS.

Third, the potential safety benefits of ABWS appeared questionable.

ABWS would allow as much as an additional 0.15 seconds of braking by

following drivers, but only if the following driver immediately brakes

hard upon seeing the stop lamps activated without waiting for any other

cues that the lead vehicle is stopping, such as the car pitching or the

tires and/or brakes squealing. To the extent the following driver waits

for these other cues before braking, the potential benefits from ABWS

are reduced. Recent research by Mercedes-Benz using a vehicle simulator

in Germany found that more than 90 percent of drivers do not brake hard

enough even when they have these cues and the lead vehicle's stop lamps

are activated.

Fourth and finally, NHTSA was concerned that ABWS could negatively

impact existing safety. At present, stop lamps are activated when the

driver of a vehicle applies the brakes. ABWS would change this so that

stop lamps were activated when the driver applies the brakes or rapidly

removes his or her foot from the accelerator pedal. Baran's report on

its ABWS that was submitted along with its 1993 petition showed that 23

percent of the time drivers did not brake after ABWS activated the stop

lamps. Like the little boy who cried wolf, stop lamps that are

activated when there is no subsequent braking are less likely to be

immediately heeded in a real emergency. That undermines the most basic

purpose of stop lamps. In addition, the agency was concerned that

aggressive drivers could intentionally

[[Page 59484]]

use these ``false alarms'' from the ABWS to further dilute the meaning

of stop lamps.

Based on these analyses, involving both the absence of demonstrated

net safety benefits and the possibility of net safety losses, NHTSA

denied Baran's ABWS petition in a Federal Register notice of August 3,

1994 (59 FR 39522). In this denial, the agency expressly noted that it

would consider data about the safety impacts of ABWS from a field study

then being conducted by the Israeli Highway Safety Administration when

those data became available and might reevaluate its decision in light

of those data.

Baran's Second Petition for ABWS and NHTSA's Response

Less than a year after NHTSA's denial of Baran's first petition to

allow ABWS, Baran submitted a second petition to allow ABWS. There were

two changed factors since Baran's 1993 petition. First, Allied Signal,

a major U.S. manufacturer of braking systems and components, had joined

Baran in the petition. Second, the petition provided some preliminary,

but not validated, data from the ongoing Israeli field study indicating

that ABWS-equipped vehicles were in fewer crashes. The bulk of the

petition contained a thorough explanation of why Baran and Allied

Signal disagreed with NHTSA's judgment that current stop lamp signals

would be more ambiguous if ABWS were permitted in the United States.

Upon review of this petition, NHTSA decided that the overarching

issue was to define and articulate the agency's policy on braking and

other lighting signals, so as to place the ABWS petition in the proper

context. Once this NHTSA policy was articulated, the agency believed it

would be a relatively simple matter to apply that policy in specific

instances, whether to ABWS or some other signal. Up to this point, the

ABWS discussions had involved only the parties asking for ABWS and the

agency. Given the agency's desire to place ABWS in the broader context

of signal lighting signals generally, NHTSA believed many more parties

than ABWS petitioners and NHTSA should be involved in the discussion.

Accordingly, NHTSA decided to publish a Federal Register notice asking

for public comments on the agency's general policy on signals and on

how that general policy should be applied in the case of four specific

brake signaling ideas. Although all of the specific examples discussed

in this notice were brake signaling ideas, NHTSA was also concerned

about the appropriate policy for other signals, like turn signals. The

four specific brake signaling ideas discussed were ABWS, flashing

Center High Mounted Stop Lamps (CHMSLs) to warn of hard braking,

flashing CHMSLs to identify a stopped vehicle, and ``brake'' lamps on

the front of vehicles to indicate the vehicle is braking.

December 1996 Request for Comments

NHTSA published a Federal Register notice on December 13, 1996 (61

FR 65510) that articulated the agency's general policy regarding new

signal lighting ideas and how that policy would apply in the case of

four specific brake signaling ideas, including ABWS, and asked the

public for comments. NHTSA explained the basic purpose underlying its

signal lighting policy as follows:

It is important that the integrity of the required signal lamps

be maintained, and that auxiliary signal lamps not detract attention

from the messages that the required signal lamps are sending. A

vehicle signaling system must be as simple and as unambiguous as

possible to others who share the roadway if traffic is to proceed in

a safe and orderly fashion. As noted earlier, in many other

countries, all auxiliary exterior lamps are expressly forbidden

unless there is a specific regulation allowing it. 61 FR 65516.

The agency went on to explain that its paramount concern with

signaling was to maintain standardization so as to minimize ambiguity

about the meaning of required signal lamps. NHTSA will not give up the

safety benefits of standardization unless there are data showing a net

safety gain from doing so. Such data would generally come from large

scale fleet tests over a significant number of vehicle miles. NHTSA has

sponsored fleet tests to demonstrate the effectiveness of Center High

Mounted Stop Lamps (CHMSLs) and conspicuity treatments for heavy

trailers and truck tractors. However, these fleet tests are very

expensive and time-consuming. Accordingly, the agency only conducts

fleet tests after the signaling concept being evaluated has been

analyzed within the agency and found to be sufficiently promising to

have fleet testing included in NHTSA's research plan. NHTSA has neither

the budget nor the time to sponsor fleet testing of most signal

lighting ideas presented to it.

This leaves the inventor of the signaling concept as the other

likely source to sponsor fleet tests or otherwise gather persuasive

data showing a net safety benefit would result from the new signaling

concept. NHTSA acknowledged that the costs and logistics of fleet

testing may preclude most inventors from sponsoring those tests.

Accordingly, the agency asked for comments on its recommendation to

inventors that, unless the inventor has data showing a net safety

benefit from his or her new signaling concept, the signaling concept

should be presented to NHTSA as a candidate for further research. If

the suggestions are found to have merit, they can influence agency

research priorities and perhaps be included in the agency's research

plan. Upon completion of the research project, NHTSA would have data

that would allow it to consider whether to permit or require a new

signaling concept.

This broad policy was then applied to four specific signaling

concepts. The first three were signaling ideas that were at that time

unsupported by field tests or other data. The AlliedSignal/Baran ABWS

was discussed, along with flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking and

flashing CHMSLs to identify a stopped vehicle. While each of these

concepts has some intuitive appeal, adopting any of these three

suggestions would eliminate the standardization that is already in

place for stop lamps. Since there were no data showing any offsetting

safety benefits for diluting the standardization, NHTSA indicated that

it was reluctant to amend its lighting standard to permit the

introduction of any of these concepts, but asked for public comment on

this approach.

The fourth signaling idea on which public comment was sought was

front ``brake'' lamp systems that would alert an oncoming vehicle that

the subject vehicle was braking. Again, there were no data provided to

show safety benefits for this signaling concept. However, S5.1.3 of

Standard No. 108 provides that, ``No additional lamp, reflective

device, or other motor vehicle equipment shall be installed that

impairs the effectiveness of lighting equipment required by this

standard.'' Front ``brake'' lamps can be implemented in ways that would

not affect the operation of any of the required lamps now on vehicles.

Assuming front ``brake'' lamps were implemented so as not to interfere

with the effectiveness of required front lighting equipment, front

brake lamps are permitted to be installed on vehicles now, without any

changes to the lighting standard.

There are some noteworthy paradoxes associated with these four

signaling ideas. The first three have some intuitive appeal, but may

not be offered because they would dilute standardization of stop lamp

signals. The fourth has little, if any, intuitive appeal. In fact,

NHTSA stated that it expected no safety benefits from front

[[Page 59485]]

``brake'' lamps. However, this concept may be offered on vehicles

because it would not affect the standardized meaning of any required

equipment. Nevertheless, the proponents of front ``brake'' lamps are

not pleased with this result--they believe front ``brake'' lamps should

be required. NHTSA asked the public for comments on its policy approach

in this area and for comments on the four specific signaling ideas

discussed in the notice.

Public Comments on the December 1996 Notice

NHTSA received more than 25 comments in response to its request for

comments. With respect to the policy that should be followed in this

area, Professor Rudolf Mortimer of the University of Illinois cautioned

that decisions on any specific signal lighting idea should be made by

looking broadly at all parts of the signaling system, not by

considering ``a host of seemingly desirable separate items that have no

relationship to each other or the system as a whole.'' Other

commenters, including the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

and the American Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA) noted that

opportunities may exist to further improve the signaling required by

Standard No. 108, and that it is important for the agency to

periodically review design-restrictive standards like Standard No. 108

to assure that its restrictions still serve a safety need.

Volvo's comments urged the agency to adopt a permissive standard.

Volvo suggested that NHTSA permit the installation of any auxiliary

signal function that might work, unless that auxiliary signal plainly

impaired the effectiveness of required signal lamps. However, Volvo

commented that auxiliary signal functions should be mandated only if

there were proof of significant safety benefits.

With the exception of Volvo, however, there was a general consensus

in favor of the broad policy outlined by NHTSA in its request for

comments. Most commenters agreed that NHTSA is correct to treat

unsubstantiated concepts as requests for research and not to spend its

resources responding to every signaling idea presented to the agency.

For instance, the Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) said: ``TMA

believes the responsibility for developing the necessary objective data

lies with the petitioners and that the agency should not grant

petitions unless such data are provided.'' Toyota and AAMA made the

same point, and both also asked that NHTSA consider harmonizing any new

signals with other countries' signaling requirements. Baran and

AlliedSignal, the parties that petitioned for ABWS, concurred with the

agency's intended policy of putting the burden on petitioners to

provide data demonstrating the effectiveness of new signaling ideas

before the agency began any rulemaking to modify its lighting standard.

In the words of the ABWS petitioners:

Petitioners are sensitive to NHTSA's concerns about the agency

being inundated with untested ideas by inventors who lack data to

support their ideas. Clearly, the agency cannot, and should not,

initiate a rulemaking on each such idea. By contrast, where the

efficacy of a logically attractive concept has been demonstrated by

objective data, and where there is actual experience with the

concept, we believe that a rulemaking is warranted. NHTSA Docket 96-

041-N01-014, at 15.

Given this general agreement by commenters on the policy that

should be applied when considering new signaling concepts, it is not

surprising that the primary issue in each of the four examples

identified by the agency was the quality of the available data. ABWS

was the concept that drew the most comments specifically addressing it.

Five commenters favored ABWS. These five included Volvo, who

commented that ABWS might work, so the concept should be permitted but

not required. The petitioners for ABWS commented:

Support for the ABWS concept is based on more than speculation

or testimonials as to the efficacy of these safety devices. The

recent report of a comprehensive fleet study conducted for the

Government of Israel demonstrates that vehicles equipped with ABWS

incurred a statistically significant (at the 95% confidence level)

17.6% lower rate of rear-end crashes than did a control group of

non-equipped vehicles. * * * Together with other available data, the

fleet study results persuasively demonstrate that ABWS devices offer

significant safety benefits to the driving public, and that such

devices do not pose any safety hazard. NHTSA Docket 96-041-N01-014,

at 2.

ABWS petitioners also sought to address the agency's concerns about

the high rate of ``false alarms.'' NHTSA's 1994 denial expressed the

agency's concern that 23 percent of the time ABWS activated the stop

lamps, the driver never applied the brakes. ABWS petitioners included

an Exhibit 9 to their comments. This exhibit was a study of six

vehicles driven more than 61,000 kilometers. Table 1 of this study

shows that ABWS activated the stop lamps 17.33 times per 1000

kilometers, and the driver never applied the brakes 2.57 of those

times. Dividing these numbers gives an updated ``false alarm'' rate of

15 percent.

However, the ABWS petitioners contended that the agency had

improperly calculated the ``false alarms'' for ABWS. NHTSA's

calculations had been made by dividing the number of times ABWS

activated the stop lamps with no subsequent braking by total number of

times ABWS activated the stop lamps. The petitioners urged the agency

to change the denominator and divide the number of times ABWS activated

the stop lamps with no subsequent braking by the total number of times

the stop lamps were activated. This change gives a much lower rate

-2.57 is now divided by 1,564.33 (1,547 times stop lamps activated by

brake application + 17.33 times stop lamps activated by ABWS). By

making this change, the ``false alarm'' rate is reduced to 0.2 percent,

which petitioners argue is so small as to have no impact on drivers'

reactions to stop lamps.

Two other commenters, the American Trauma Society and the

International Association of Chiefs of Police, also were aware of the

Israeli field study. Both stated in their comments that the Israeli

field study had demonstrated an 18% reduction in rear-end crashes, and

that NHTSA should permit ABWS. The Insurance Institute for Highway

Safety (IIHS) commented that, ``if the claims of Baran can be

verified,'' then ABWS should not be a detriment to highway safety and

may actually result in crash reductions. In that case, IIHS favored

permitting ABWS. The American Automobile Association (AAA) did not

comment specifically on ABWS, but did note in its comment that ABWS

``has been demonstrated in field trials to reduce the rear end crash

experience of vehicles in which it has been installed.''

On the other hand, ten commenters stated that ABWS should not be

permitted. These commenters included vehicle manufacturers (American

Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), as well as BMW,

Mitsubishi, and Toyota), the American Trucking Association (ATA), and

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates). Professor Mortimer

commented that the brake signal is ``the most important signal

presently displayed on motor vehicles and nothing should be done to

increase its ambiguity.'' Most of these commenters were of the opinion

that, as expressed by AAMA, ``research to date does not provide

sufficient evidence that motor vehicle safety will be enhanced'' by

ABWS. ATA commented that NHTSA's signaling standards should be changed

only to correct a demonstrated deficiency or when a

[[Page 59486]]

proponent demonstrates significant, cost-effective safety improvements

from the change. The Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) commented

that ABWS should not be permitted because it could result in continuous

activation of stop lamps when the driver of a big truck shifts gears.

However, TMA noted in its comment that there are likely to be

situations in the future where it is appropriate for stop lamps to be

activated without service brake application. TMA offered as examples

automatic braking being explored as part of Intelligent Transportation

Systems and ``differential braking'' for heavy trucks. TMA suggested

that stop lamps then should probably be activated as a function of the

rate of deceleration, instead of by brake application alone.

There were fewer comments on the other three signaling concepts.

Only 11 commenters specifically addressed the idea of flashing CHMSLs

to warn of hard braking. Three commenters supported the idea. Volvo, as

per its overall policy view, believed NHTSA should permit flashing

CHMSLs for hard braking, because the concept might work. In Volvo's

opinion, NHTSA should not prohibit signaling concepts that might work.

Mr. Chris Egger of Las Vegas, Nevada commented that the idea of

flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking would allow following vehicles

``to take quick evasive action,'' and that this idea had merit.

However, Mr. Egger believed flashing CHMSLs would only be beneficial if

they were mandated on all vehicles, because the mandate would

``establish an understood signal and eliminate ambiguity.'' Finally,

Mr. Hamid Kashefy of Montreal, Quebec commented that NHTSA should

permit flashing CHMSLs to indicate hard braking.

The eight commenters, including Advocates, ATA, TMA, Professor

Mortimer, and AAMA, that opposed this concept expressed the view that

the public would get no benefits for the added costs of flashing CHMSLs

to indicate hard braking. TMA referred to NHTSA's 1981 research showing

no additional benefits from a flashing CHMSL for hard braking as

compared with a steady-burning CHMSL. TMA suggested that, until new

data are presented, there is no basis for changing the current

requirements in this area. Both IIHS and Mitsubishi opposed the concept

of flashing CHMSLs for hard braking because they were concerned this

might not be a helpful signal for following drivers.

Nine commenters commented on the concept of flashing CHMSLs to

indicate a stopped vehicle. The only commenter supporting this concept

was Mitsubishi, which said it did not object to flashing CHMSLs as a

stopped vehicle signal. The other eight commenters that addressed this

concept opposed it. Professor Mortimer commented, ``There is no

question that the single most important signal for the rear of motor

vehicles to augment those presently provided would be a signal

indicating that a vehicle is stopped or moving very slowly.'' However,

Professor Mortimer asserted that a flashing CHMSL is not the way to

provide a stopped vehicle signal because of confusion with the flashing

lamps for turn and hazard signals. In the same vein, Advocates and IIHS

commented that flashing CHMSLs could increase confusion and annoyance,

especially in rush hour. Three other commenters, including ATA and

Volvo, noted that 4-way hazard lamps are already on vehicles to serve

exactly this purpose. Volvo stated its preference that flashing CHMSLs

be reserved to indicate hard braking.

Eight commenters addressed the concept of front ``brake'' lamps.

Volvo commented only that, at this time, NHTSA should not prohibit

these signal lamps. The other seven commenters had less favorable

views. Professor Mortimer commented that these signals should be

prohibited because they can do more harm than good. Mr. Kashefy, an

inventor of signal devices himself, also commented that front ``brake''

lamps should be expressly prohibited because there is a greater

likelihood of safety losses than gains from this concept. However, Mr.

Kashefy indicated that NHTSA should consider requiring front lamps that

report when a vehicle is accelerating. TMA and IIHS, among others,

commented that these front ``brake'' lamps might increase crashes and

dilute the meaning of turn signals. ATA commented that front ``brake''

lamps would provide no benefits, while Advocates commented simply that,

in that group's opinion, front ``brake'' lamps ``have no merit

whatsoever.''

October 1997 Notice Reopening the Comment Period

Upon reviewing these comments, it was difficult to reconcile the

general agreement about what policy NHTSA should apply to new signaling

ideas with the widely divergent opinions about whether ABWS should be

permitted. A closer look, however, readily explains the difference.

With the exception of Volvo, the commenters agreed that new signaling

concepts should be permitted when there are data demonstrating net

safety gains from changing the current well-understood and effective

signaling scheme. The commenters that favored ABWS had reviewed the

Israeli field study cited by the ABWS petitioners in their comments and

concluded that it was a convincing demonstration of safety gains from

ABWS. None of the commenters that opposed ABWS referred to the Israeli

study. Hence, this Israeli study of ABWS seemed to be a key factor for

NHTSA in deciding whether to amend the current signaling requirements

of Standard No. 108 to permit ABWS.

Unfortunately, the Israeli study had not been reviewed by many

commenters because it became available to the public in NHTSA's docket

on the day before the comment period closed. None of the commenters who

indicated there was insufficient evidence that ABWS would offer safety

benefits appeared to have reviewed the Israeli study. On the other

hand, all of the parties that said ABWS had been shown to offer

positive safety benefits based their statements on the Israeli study.

Given the importance of this study in commenters' views about

whether ABWS should be permitted, NHTSA decided to reopen the comment

period to make all commenters aware of the Israeli study and to get

comments specifically directed to the merits of the study. NHTSA also

decided it would be helpful to commenters for the agency to set forth

its preliminary review of the Israeli study and ask for public comment

on specific aspects of the Israeli study. Hence, NHTSA published an

October 27, 1997 notice (62 FR 55562) reopening the comment period for

an additional 30 days, with a request that commenters focus on the

Israeli study and the other materials that were not previously

available for public review.

The Israeli study of ABWS involved 764 Israeli government vehicles

tracked over a two-year period. Half the vehicles were equipped with

ABWS, the other half were not. The control group (those vehicles that

did not have ABWS) were matched to the ABWS-equipped vehicles. That is,

each vehicle in the control group was the same make, model, and model

year as a vehicle in the ABWS group.

These 764 vehicles were in a total of 881 crashes, 78 of which were

crashes in which the government vehicle was struck from the rear. Of

these 78 rear-end crashes, 37 occurred in the vehicle fleet equipped

with ABWS, while 41 crashes occurred in the control group. After

adjusting for the distance driven by three particular vehicles, the

study's authors concluded that the rear-end crash involvement rate of

the ABWS equipped vehicles was 17.6 percent less than that of the

control vehicles. In addition, these 78 crashes were then

[[Page 59487]]

sorted into ``relevant,'' defined in the report as ``crashes in which

the government vehicle was struck from behind while braking or

immediately after braking,'' and ``irrelevant,'' defined in the report

as ``crashes in which the government vehicle was already stopped for a

while, or the driver reported that (s)he decelerated or braked

gradually rather than abruptly, and/or the driver of the striking

vehicle testified that he failed to pay attention to the stopping or

stopped vehicle ahead.'' Of the 78 rear-end crashes, 26 were classified

as ``relevant'' and the other 52 were deemed ``irrelevant.'' The study

concluded that the crash involvement rate of the ABWS-equipped vehicles

in relevant rear end crashes was 64 percent less than that of the

control group.

NHTSA identified some concerns about the study and the conclusions.

The first concern was about how closely the ABWS group matched the

control group. The Israeli study mentions that vehicle attributes

(make, model, and year) were matched precisely in the ABWS group and

the control group. However, no mention was made of matching important

vehicle use patterns, such as the driving environment and the typical

driver. It appeared that vehicle use patterns were not considered.

NHTSA next indicated in the October 27, 1997 notice that the

analysis of the results appeared unusual. The data collected in the

field study showed that there were 417 crashes for the ABWS-equipped

vehicles and 464 crashes for the control group, or 9 percent fewer

crashes for the ABWS group. This 9 percent reduction in crashes for the

ABWS-equipped vehicles was found for:

All crashes;

Rear-end crashes; and

Crashes other than rear-end crashes.

In other words, the ABWS-equipped vehicles in this field study were

just as likely to avoid a frontal or side crash as they were to avoid a

rear crash. Since ABWS would not be visible to the driver of the other

vehicle in a frontal or side crash, there is no apparent reason to

believe that ABWS would have any effect on those types of crashes.

Thus, the data from this study do not appear to show any significant

positive effect for ABWS. However, this simple analysis, which would be

a conventional starting point for many analysts, was not reported in

the study. NHTSA asked for comments on what significance should be

given to the fact that one of the simplest uses of the data does not

indicate any significant effect for ABWS in rear-end crashes relative

to all other types of crashes.

The final major concern expressed by the agency in its October 1997

request for comments was that, as noted in the study, there was a large

difference in the ``relevant'' rear-end crashes for the two groups--18

relevant rear-end crashes for the control group, but only eight

relevant rear-end crashes for the ABWS group. However, the total rear-

end crashes reported were substantially identical--41 for the control

group and 37 for the ABWS group. The difference of four crashes in this

sample size is not statistically significant. Thus, one interpretation

of the data is that ABWS shifts rear-end crashes from the relevant to

the irrelevant classification without reducing significantly the number

of rear-end crashes. NHTSA asked for comments on the appropriate

interpretation of the data.

In addition, the parties petitioning for ABWS had noted that

several other countries permit the use of ABWS. The petitioners have

identified Israel, Germany, Norway, the Czech Republic, and Austria,

among others, as countries that currently permit ABWS on vehicles.

NHTSA concurs with the petitioners that the practices in other

countries ought to be given careful consideration. NHTSA has

participated as the United States Delegate to the United Nations-

sponsored Meetings of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling in

Geneva, Switzerland for more than 15 years. To bring insights and

knowledge from lighting experts around the world, NHTSA sent a letter

to each of the other 32 delegates, enclosing a copy of the Israeli

field study and a copy of the October 27, 1997 notice reopening the

comment period on this subject. These delegates to the Meeting of

Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling were invited to review the

documents and share any comments they might have.

Comments on the October 1997 Notice

Twelve parties responded to the reopening of the comment period

with additional comments. Three commenters (the ABWS petitioners, the

National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation

Services, and Data Link, Inc.) said ABWS should be permitted because of

its potential safety benefits, unless there were data showing a safety

detriment from ABWS. Since there are no such data for ABWS, these

commenters urged ABWS be permitted.

NHTSA notes that these comments argue for a different standard than

those commenters favoring ABWS had urged in response to the December

1996 notice. In the previous notice, commenters had indicated that the

Israeli study ``persuasively demonstrate that ABWS devices offer

significant safety benefits to the driving public,'' in the words of

the ABWS petitioners. No such assertions were made on behalf of the

Israeli study in response to the reopening of the comment period. The

position now advocated was that ``the intuitive appeal of ABWS benefits

is so strong as to render unnecessary the conduct of a fleet study to

prove benefits,'' in the words of Data Link (NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-

N02-006). Instead, ``the key question NHTSA should be asking in this

proceeding is whether there is a demonstrable safety disbenefit

associated with ABWS,'' according to the ABWS petitioners (NHTSA Docket

No. 96-041-N02-005, at p.3). Stated in a broader policy perspective,

ABWS advocates believe that a signaling concept that is ``intuitively

appealing'' should be permitted unless there are data demonstrating

that this concept will negatively affect safety.

Three commenters (Nebraska Motor Carriers Association, Advocates,

and AAMA) said that, for the reasons identified in the agency's October

27 notice, the Israeli field study was inadequate to serve as the basis

for any change to current signaling requirements. In its comments, AAMA

agreed with the ABWS petitioners that ``the concept of advanced brake

warning is intuitively appealing and worthy of further research.''

(NHTSA Docket 96-041-N02-007). AAMA recommended that a controlled fleet

study be undertaken in the United States.

The remaining six commenters were Delegates to the United Nations-

sponsored ``Meetings of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling'' in

Geneva, Switzerland. These six international experts said that the

Israeli study was not conclusive and was an insufficient basis for a

change to current signaling. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and

Traders (SMMT), the United Kingdom vehicle manufacturers' group,

commented that ``if all vehicles were fitted with ABWS and gave 23%

false signals, the value of the stop signal would be greatly debased.''

(NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-008). SMMT also commented that the issue

of signaling and ABWS ought to be considered in a world-wide context,

not just by the United States.

The second of the international commenters was Mr. Hanno

Westermann, the chair of a Safety and Visual Performance (SVP) working

group that has been asked by the UN-sponsored ``Meetings of Experts on

Lighting and Light Signaling'' to study the subject of signaling,

including ABWS, and to report the findings back to the Experts. Mr.

Westermann

[[Page 59488]]

commented that the current signaling system has evolved continuously

and is well understood. The Israeli study of ABWS ``shows possible

benefits,'' but those benefits do not appear to be significant,

according to Mr. Westermann. In addition, the study shows that ABWS

``exhibits a number of negative aspects.'' Specifically, Mr. Westermann

referred to the instances when the stop lamp is illuminated but the

brake is never applied (NHTSA Docket 96-041-N02-009). Mr. Westermann

also noted that the 100 millisecond earlier warning of braking that is

achieved with ABWS can also be achieved by means of light-emitting

diodes (LEDs) or neon lamps in stop lamps (because they have a faster

rise time than conventional incandescent lamps), without illuminating

the stop lamps in situations where the brakes are never applied.

The third international commenter was Dr. Karl Manz, a consultant

to the German Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Dr. Manz stated that

the Israeli field study is not sufficient to demonstrate the safety

benefits claimed for ABWS.

The fourth international commenter was Mr. Hans Ammerlan, the

Netherlands Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Ammerlan stated

that ``false alarms,'' i.e., activation of the stop lamps when the

brakes are never applied, are inherent in the design of ABWS because

the assumption that rapid removal of the foot from the accelerator

pedal will be followed by braking may be true most of the time, but

will not be true 100% of the time. Mr. Ammerlan commented, ``We

consider such false alarms as a degradation of the brake signal.''

(NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-012). Mr. Ammerlan also commented that if

earlier warning of braking is useful, one would begin by addressing the

rise times of current stop lamps since that has no possibility of

degrading the brake signal.

The fifth international commenter was Mr. Kari Saari, Finland's

Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Saari commented that Finland

follows the European Commission's lighting regulations, so it does not

allow ABWS on vehicles.

The sixth international commenter was Mr. I. Ajtos, Hungary's

Delegate to the Meeting of Experts. Mr. Ajtos commented that he agreed

with NHTSA's observations about the shortcomings of the Israeli study.

Mr. Ajtos also commented that human factors should have been studied,

and specifically asked whether more frequent illuminations of stop

lamps would not adversely affect the response of following drivers to

those lamps. Mr. Ajtos concluded by stating that Hungary specifically

rejected a petition to allow ABWS in that country in 1995 for two

reasons. First, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, which

Hungary has ratified, defines a ``stop lamp'' as ``the lamp used to

indicate to other road users to the rear of the vehicle that the driver

is applying the service brake.'' (Emphasis in Mr. Ajtos' comment--NHTSA

Docket No. 96-041-N02-013, at page 5). According to Mr. Ajtos, Hungary

interprets this language as precluding the use of ABWS. Second, Mr.

Ajtos commented that Hungary denied the ABWS petition because it agreed

with the reasoning in NHTSA's 1994 ABWS petition denial.

September 1998 Withdrawal of ABWS Petition

On September 16, 1998, the ABWS petitioners withdrew their petition

for rulemaking to permit ABWS. The petitioners explained the withdrawal

as follows:

Given that NHTSA now seems to be applying a higher standard than

that which should be applied for optional safety devices, and in

spite of the considerable evidence of the safety benefits of ABWS

that Petitioners have presented to date, Petitioners have decided

that they cannot at this time move forward with their Petition.

Other nations have approved the use of ABWS based on the

considerable volume of data showing that it is a proven crash

avoidance device, and additional nations are in the process of

considering ABWS technology. In light of NHTSA's current views,

resources at this time will be focused on these nations.

NHTSA's Conclusions and Decisions

After considering all the comments and the other information that

is available on the subject of signals for braking, the agency has

reached the following conclusions.

1. Current NHTSA Signaling Requirements Are the Norm Internationally,

Not the Exception

The current signaling requirements for braking in NHTSA's lighting

standard (stop lamps come on when service brakes are applied, stop

lamps are steady-burning, not flashing, and stop lamps do not give a

different signal for hard braking than lighter braking) are all

consistent with the prevailing international practice. Indeed, the 1968

Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, signed by the United States and many

other countries, sets forth an international consensus on what signal

lamps should mean. Suggested changes to the prevailing international

consensus on signaling requirements may of course be considered by

individual countries to respond to particular needs, but such changes

should also be considered internationally at an international forum.

2. Current Information Provided by Signal Lamps That Conform With

NHTSA's Signaling Requirements is Standardized and Well Understood by

the Driving Public

The information currently provided by signal lamps that conform

with the requirements of NHTSA's lighting standard is well understood

by the driving public. The information that is provided by signals

(driver has applied brakes, has shifted into reverse, etc.) is

instantly recognized and unambiguously informative. Even the ABWS

petitioners expressly acknowledge the importance of uniform,

unambiguous signals. Petitioners said, ``The October 27 notice

recognizes, quite properly, that there is a benefit associated with a

uniform, unambiguous signal system;'' NHTSA Docket No. 96-41-N02-005,

at page 6. Given the benefits of the current standardized signaling

system, it is reasonable and appropriate to require parties asking for

a change to the current system to bear the burden of demonstrating that

the benefits that will be lost by changing from the current uniform,

unambiguous signals will be more than offset by new safety benefits

from the signaling change.

3. It Is Appropriate for NHTSA and Other Countries To Re-Examine the

Current Signaling Requirements To See If They Can Be Improved

The Vienna Convention set forth the international consensus about

the state of the art of signaling information in 1968. There have been

significant advances in electronics and sensors in vehicles over the

past 30 years. Those advances make it appropriate to reexamine the

information provided by signal lamps to see if the information can be

improved.

NHTSA understands that the total information that can be provided

by signal lamps is limited. It is clear that drivers won't respond

instinctively to 100 different lights on the rear of vehicles.

Likewise, illumination of a lamp can't mean ten different things.

However, much human factors work needs to be done to understand these

limits and other areas such as how many signals will produce

``information overload,'' dilution of the intended message, and the

risk that activation of one signal lamp will mask information from

other signal lamps. In addition,

[[Page 59489]]

NHTSA understands that much work needs to be done on crash data

analysis to determine what new functions that could be served by signal

lamps in 1998 would provide the biggest added safety gains. The goal of

this work would not be to have vehicles provide more and more signals,

but to assure that vehicles have clear signals that provide the most

important information to other drivers.

In addition, NHTSA believes that any decision about what additional

or improved information can or should be provided by signal lamps

should be made after a comprehensive look at all the possibilities for

enhancement, instead of as a piecemeal response to individual concepts.

For instance, a decision to permit stop lamps to perform the ABWS

function may limit those lamps' suitability for performing other

functions, such as signaling onset of rapid deceleration or following

too closely. While that may ultimately be the right decision, it should

be made after considering the significance of those other functions.

In accordance with these conclusions, NHTSA is taking the following

actions.

1. NHTSA Will Participate in the Efforts To Try To Develop an

International Consensus on How To Handle New Signaling Ideas

The SVP Group has been asked by the UN-sponsored Experts on

Lighting to study the subject of signaling and to report

recommendations back to the Experts Group. The need to reexamine

signaling ideas as we enter the 21st Century is an international

concern. It seems appropriate to try to address that concern

internationally. For example, according to the ABWS petitioners,

Israel, Germany, Norway, and the Czech Republic currently permit the

installation of ABWS on vehicles. The United States and Hungary have

previously said no to ABWS. It would seem to be better for everyone,

including the driving public, the governments, and vehicle and lighting

manufacturers, if there were clear standardized meanings for signal

lamps in all six of these countries.

Moreover, there is an international need to address this concern.

All 16 of the countries that regularly participate in the U.N. Meeting

of Experts on Lighting and Light Signaling report that they have been

approached by people who believe they have devised improvements to the

current signaling. It would be preferable to develop a global means for

considering such changes to signaling, instead of having each nation

consider the changes in isolation from the rest of the world.

NHTSA has already had a representative, the same person who is the

United States Delegate to the Meeting of Experts on Lighting and Light

Signaling, attend three meetings and participate in two video

conferences of the SVP to participate in the effort to develop

recommendations for signaling to be presented to the Meeting of Experts

on Lighting and Light Signaling. NHTSA will make every effort to assure

that an agency representative is actively involved in the SVP work and

any other efforts of the Meeting of Experts to forge an international

consensus on updating light signaling.

2. Until a New International Consensus Emerges, NHTSA Will Follow the

Policies for Evaluating New Signaling Concepts Described in the

December 1996 Request for Comments

NHTSA recognizes that it often takes years to arrive at an

international consensus. It would be inappropriate for the agency to

refuse to take any action on the subject of improved signaling until an

international consensus is reached and the agency evaluates that

consensus to see if some or all of it can be implemented by NHTSA,

consistent with its safety mission and applicable legal requirements.

Accordingly, NHTSA is announcing the policy it will follow for

evaluating requests for changes to current signaling requirements for

lamps. This policy is the same approach that was set forth in the

December 1996 request for comments, which was supported by the vast

majority of commenters to that notice.

The first question NHTSA must address in considering a new signal

lighting idea is whether it requires a change in the standardized

operation or appearance of a required lamp or piece of lighting

equipment. As indicated above, the agency reiterates that there is a

positive benefit to the motoring public from standardizing signals.

NHTSA has always tried to tailor its signal lamp requirements to assure

the public of the benefits of standardization, while at the same time

allowing as much design freedom as possible for the location, shape,

styling, and light source designs for those lamps. In the December 1996

request for comments, NHTSA noted that the intensity ranges of

taillamps and stop lamps are regulated so that a following driver can

distinguish a red stop lamp from a red taillamp as soon as the stop

lamp is actuated by braking, without having to notice the transition.

However, the size and shape of stop lamps and taillamps are left to the

designer of the lamps. Likewise, stop lamps are required to be steady-

burning to distinguish them from the required flashing of turn signals

and hazard warning signal lamps of the same brightness and color.

In keeping with this approach, NHTSA also allows for lighting

equipment beyond what is required by the lighting standard, called

``auxiliary'' lighting, provided that this auxiliary lighting does not

``impair the effectiveness'' of the required lamps and reflectors.

Thus, when NHTSA is asked about a new signal lighting idea, the

agency's first question is whether the new signal lighting would

require a change to the standardized operation of required lighting

equipment. If the new idea does not require a change to the

standardized operation of required lighting equipment, the only

question left for the agency is whether the new lighting would impair

the effectiveness of required lighting. If it would impair the

effectiveness of required lighting (e.g., by masking the operation of

required lighting or introducing ambiguity into the meaning of required

lighting), the idea is expressly prohibited by S5.1.3 of Standard No.

108 and it may not be installed on vehicles. That is because this

lighting would undermine the safety benefits that NHTSA has determined

are associated with the required lighting.

If, however, NHTSA determines the new signal lighting would not

impair the effectiveness of required lighting, it may be installed on

vehicles consistent with the existing requirements of the lighting

standard. This is true even if there is no safety value for such

auxiliary lighting. In these circumstances, the public is not losing

any of the safety benefits from the required lighting. Thus, even if

the public gains nothing of value from such auxiliary lighting, the

result is safety-neutral.

Many new signal lighting ideas, however, would require a change in

the standardized operation of required lamps or lighting equipment. In

these instances, the hurdle that these ideas must clear is higher. This

is because the public would be losing the safety benefits of the

current standardized operation of required lighting that result from

the broad public and international acceptance of the standardized

operation. In these cases, NHTSA has long said that it is certainly

possible that a new idea for the operation of signal lighting might

improve safety. However, given the safety benefits associated with the

standardized operation and meaning of required lighting, the burden is

on the proponents of the new signal lighting idea to demonstrate that

the use of the

[[Page 59490]]

new signal lighting idea would yield a positive safety benefit large

enough to more than offset the adverse safety effects of giving up the

standardized operation and meaning of signal lights.

Some commenters to the October 1997 notice reopening the comment

period argued that this standard is too demanding. Instead, they urged

that the appropriate standard should be that lighting will be permitted

that necessitates changes to the standardized operation and meaning of

required lighting unless there are data available showing adverse

safety consequences from the new signal lighting. In other words, one

should not have to demonstrate that new signal lighting offers the

public any safety gains, just that it would not cause the public any

safety harm.

NHTSA is not adopting this position as its policy. As noted above,

the currently standardized operation and meaning of required lighting

gives safety benefits because it enjoys broad public and international

recognition and acceptance. NHTSA has made findings of benefits for the

current standardized approach and discussed its current standardized

approach with lighting experts from other nations at a United Nations-

sponsored forum. Given this background, it seems reasonable and

appropriate to require advocates of change to the current standardized

approach to say more than that different decisions could have been made

to achieve the same results from standardization. Even if that is true,

it results in nothing of value for the American driving public. NHTSA

concludes that it is more appropriate to require advocates of change to

demonstrate that different decisions would have achieved better safety.

But, those advocates may ask, why is it acceptable for auxiliary

lighting that does not impair the effectiveness of required lighting to

merely be safety-neutral, while changes to the standardized approach

for required lighting must be shown to be affirmatively safety-

beneficial? The answer is that whatever happens with such auxiliary

lighting does not effect the core safety functions performed by the

required lighting, whereas changes to the standardized operation of

required lighting directly impacts the core safety functions performed

by those lamps. NHTSA believes a higher standard is appropriate for

changes to the core safety functions of required lamps and signals than

for changes to peripheral, non-required lamps that do not affect any of

the core safety functions of required lamps and signals.

Required lighting cannot achieve its intended safety purpose unless

the message of the lighting is instantly and unambiguously recognized

by other drivers. The only way to achieve that level of clear

recognition is to standardize the operation and meaning of required

lamps--in other words, NHTSA must pick a single approach. When NHTSA

changes the single standardized approach, it must specify a different

single standardized approach for required lamps and lighting equipment.

Such a change requires the public to adapt to new meaning and/or

operation for required lamps and vehicle and lighting manufacturers to

make any needed changes to their products. Something of this magnitude

should not be undertaken lightly and should be justified by a greater

good for all at the end, such as enhanced safety for the driving

public.

In the case of auxiliary lighting that does not impair the

effectiveness of required lighting, NHTSA has not recognized any safety

purpose for that auxiliary lighting. It does not matter whether the

public recognizes the message of the auxiliary lighting, as long as

this lighting does not detract from the required lighting. There are

hundreds of possible approaches for this type of lighting and NHTSA has

no reason to pick any single approach over the others. In this

situation, all that is required is that the auxiliary lighting not do

harm to the required lighting.

NHTSA's regulations currently set forth at 49 CFR Part 552 the

requirements for the agency to treat a request as a petition for

rulemaking. Section 552.4 provides:

Each petition filed under this part must:

(a) Be written in the English language;

(b) Have, preceding its text, a heading that includes the word

``Petition'';

(c) Set forth facts which it is claimed establish that an order is

necessary;

(d) Set forth a brief description of the substance of the order

which it is claimed should be issued; and

(e) Contain the name and address of the petitioner.

The pertinent requirement for this discussion is the one in

Sec. 552.4(c) that a petition must ``set forth facts'' to support the

contention that a rulemaking change is needed. In the case of signal

lighting ideas, NHTSA has, as noted, made findings of benefits for the

current standardized approach and discussed this approach at least

twice a year with lighting experts from other nations at a United

Nations-sponsored forum on lighting. In this context, NHTSA interprets

its regulation as requiring that a request for a change to signal

lighting must provide more than assertions of an unaddressed need,

speculations about how to address that need, and testimonials about the

efficacy of the requested approach, and the like. Those are not

``facts'' within the meaning of 49 CFR 552.4(c); they are simply

opinions.

Thus, when NHTSA is requested to alter the current standardized

operation and meaning for signal lighting, the agency determines

whether the request provides data purporting to show positive safety

benefits sufficient to more than offset the benefits lost from eroding

standardization. If the request contains no such data, NHTSA interprets

its regulations as providing that such a request will not be treated as

a petition for rulemaking. Instead, the request will be treated as a

suggestion for research to try to gather the necessary data. The

request will be forwarded to a public docket that will collect

information describing all proposed new signal lighting ideas and

systems. The docket will be available for review by NHTSA and others

who may wish to plan future research based on the ideas and inventions

collected in the docket.

If the request provides data, NHTSA will treat it as a petition for

rulemaking asking for changes to the current standardized meaning and

operation for signal lighting. The agency will evaluate the data to

determine if they show persuasive evidence of a positive safety impact.

If that evaluation does not permit a determination of positive safety

from the requested change, NHTSA will not change its lighting standard

to permit the new signal lighting idea. If the evaluation of the data

leads the agency to the conclusion that positive safety effects are

likely from the requested change, NHTSA will propose to amend its

lighting standard to either permit or require the new signal lighting

idea.

NHTSA intends to apply this policy to any requests it receives for

new signal lighting ideas. Because this notice explains how the agency

will analyze requests and what sort of data is needed to support

requests for changes in the standardized operation and meaning of

required lighting, people with ideas for new signal lighting should now

have a better understanding of what supporting information is needed

when they request changes to standardized signal lighting. The agency

will reexamine this policy periodically to assure that it continues to

be appropriate. NHTSA will carefully consider the work in this area of

SVP and the United Nations-sponsored Meeting of Experts on Lighting and

Light Signal when such

[[Page 59491]]

work becomes available. To repeat, the agency will actively participate

in the international effort in this area.

3. Results of Applying These Policies To the Four New Signaling

Concepts Described in the December 1996 Request for Comments

a. ABWS. ABWS requires a change in the standardized operation of

required lamps (the stop lamps). Those lamps are currently required to

be activated only when the service brakes are applied. ABWS would also

activate those lamps if the driver rapidly removes his or her foot from

the accelerator pedal. The next question for NHTSA's determination is

whether the ABWS request to alter the activation of stop lamps presents

data purporting to show positive safety benefits. Again the answer to

this question is yes. The Israeli field study that was the subject of

NHTSA's October 27, 1997 reopening of the comment period concluded that

the rear-end crash involvement rate of ABWS-equipped vehicles was 17.6

percent less than the rear-end crash involvement rate of the control

vehicles. Thus, NHTSA would treat the ABWS request as a petition for

rulemaking under this policy.2

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ Under its policies in place at that time, NHTSA treated the

ABWS request as a petition and granted it on July 26, 1996.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The next step under this policy would be for the agency to evaluate

the Israeli study to determine if it shows persuasive evidence of a

positive safety impact. After its evaluation, NHTSA has concluded that

the Israeli study does not demonstrate any significant positive effect

for ABWS. As noted in the October 27, 1997 request for comments, the

data collected in the field study showed that there were 417 crashes

for the ABWS-equipped vehicles and 464 crashes for the control, or 9

percent fewer crashes for the ABWS group. However, this 9 percent

reduction in crashes for the ABWS-equipped vehicles was found for:

All crashes;

Rear-end crashes, and

Crashes other than rear-end crashes.

In other words, the ABWS-equipped vehicles in this field study were

just as likely to avoid a frontal or side crash as they were to avoid a

rear crash. Since ABWS would not be visible to the driver of the other

vehicle in a frontal or side crash, there is no reason to believe it

would have any effect on these types of crashes. Thus, the data from

this study do not appear to show any positive effect for ABWS.

In addition, the Israeli study did not show any significant effect

on the total number of rear end crashes for ABWS-equipped vehicles. As

noted in the October 27, 1997 request for comments, the authors of the

field study sorted the rear-end crashes into a ``relevant'' and an

``irrelevant'' category, and claimed a major reduction of ``relevant''

rear-end crashes for ABWS--there were 18 relevant rear end crashes for

the control vehicles, as compared with 8 relevant rear end crashes for

the ABWS-equipped vehicles. However, the total rear end crashes for the

ABWS vehicles and the control vehicles were substantially identical--41

rear-end crashes for the control group and 37 for the ABWS group.

Whatever the merits of ABWS at shifting rear-end crashes from the

``relevant'' to the ``irrelevant'' category, the crashes still

occurred. The data from the Israeli field study do not demonstrate any

substantial reduction in total rear-end crashes for vehicles with ABWS

compared with vehicles with conventional activation of stop lamps.

After evaluating the data from the Israeli study, NHTSA concludes

that these data do not demonstrate any significant positive safety

impact for ABWS, so there would be nothing gained for the American

public to more than offset the safety lost by changing the current

standardized approach to stop lamps. It seems that the ABWS petitioners

came to the same conclusion after reviewing the Israeli study. In March

1997, when the ABWS petitioners submitted the Israeli study to NHTSA,

they said that ``the fleet study results persuasively demonstrate that

ABWS devices offer significant safety benefits to the driving public.''

NHTSA Docket 96-041-N01-014, at 2. However, eight months later in

November 1997, when they responded to the reopening of the comment

period to allow public review of the Israeli study, the ABWS

petitioners made no such claims. Instead, they now asserted, ``In sum,

all of the real-world evidence drawn from actual crash statistics, and

all of the available studies, point in the same direction--there is no

safety disbenefit associated with ABWS.'' NHTSA Docket No. 96-041-N02-

005, at p.9. The agency also notes that none of the other commenters

whose March 1997 comments indicated that they believed the Israeli

study demonstrated significant benefits for ABWS (AAA, International

Association of Chiefs of Police, and the American Trauma Society)

responded to the agency's reopening of the comment period and

preliminary evaluation of the Israeli study.

The Israeli study is an insufficient demonstration of positive

safety impacts from ABWS. Accordingly, NHTSA's rulemaking action on

ABWS is hereby withdrawn.

b. Flashing CHMSLs to warn of hard braking.

c. Flashing CHMSLs to warn that the vehicle is stopped. Flashing

CHMSLs to warn of hard braking or that the vehicle is stopped would

require a change in the standardized operation of required lamps (the

stop lamps). Those lamps are currently required to be steady-burning.

As noted above, the requirement for stop lamps to be steady-burning is

intended to assure that drivers can instantly distinguish stop lamps

from turn signals and hazard warning lamps, which flash when activated.

The next question NHTSA must answer then is whether the requests to

alter the activation of stop lamps to permit flashing CHMSLs for hard

braking or a stopped vehicle have presented data purporting to show

positive safety benefits sufficient to more than offset the safety

losses from changing standardization. The answer to this is no. As

noted by TMA in its comments, the only data in this area indicates no

significant improvement from flashing CHMSLs (NHTSA's large scale field

study in 1981). Accordingly, NHTSA would not treat these requests as

petitions for rulemaking. Instead, the requests would be treated as

suggestions for research to try to gather the necessary data. The

requests would be forwarded to a public docket that will collect

information describing all proposed new signal lighting ideas and

systems. The docket will be available for review by NHTSA and others

who may wish to plan future research based on the ideas and inventions

collected in the docket. NHTSA notes that since it has already

researched the merits of flashing CHMSLs, it is unlikely that the

agency will research the same area again until there is some reason

(such as new data in this area) to believe the 1981 study may no longer

be valid.

d. Front ``Brake'' lamps to alert oncoming vehicles the subject

vehicle is braking. Front ``brake'' lamp systems to alert oncoming

vehicles that the subject vehicle was braking would not require any

change in the standardized operation of required lamps. Thus, this idea

has a much lower hurdle to clear than ideas that would require changes

in the standardized operation of required lamps. The only issue for

these front ``brake'' lamps is whether they would impair the

effectiveness of required lighting. Assuming NHTSA determines that the

front ``brake'' lamps are designed so as not to impair the

effectiveness of the required lighting on the front of the vehicle,

NHTSA's

[[Page 59492]]

lighting standard already permits these front ``brake'' lamps to be

installed on vehicles.

Of course, petitions to require front brake lamps or any other

motor vehicle equipment are evaluated according to NHTSA's normal

approach--will the American public get its money's worth from this

requirement? In other words, are the safety benefits for the new

equipment sufficient to justify the costs that will be imposed on the

American people by a new requirement for this equipment? In the case of

front brake lamps, NHTSA concluded in 1996 (61 FR 10556; March 14,

1996) that the answer was no, and denied a petition to require front

``brake'' lamps. Any future petitions to require front ``brake'' lamps

will need to demonstrate greater safety benefits (which can most

readily be done with testing and other data) to perhaps get a different

result than the denial NHTSA announced in 1996.

In the December 1996 request for comments, NHTSA asked for comments

on whether the agency should expressly prohibit front ``brake'' lamps

because of the lack of data to show any positive safety effects for

these lamps and the likely negative safety consequences of the

widespread use of these lamps. After consideration of this possibility,

NHTSA has decided not to take this action. These lamps do not

necessarily affect the standardized operation, or impair the

effectiveness, of any required lighting. NHTSA has traditionally had no

regulations for such lamps, because they had no impact on the core

safety functions of lighting. The agency will reexamine this approach

if it has some testing or other indication that this approach may need

to be changed. At this time, NHTSA has no such data. If front ``brake''

lamps are installed more widely and the agency's concerns remain, NHTSA

will carefully consider a research effort to get more information about

the safety impact of such lamps.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;

delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on October 30, 1998.

James R. Hackney,

Acting Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 98-29520 Filed 11-3-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P