Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-549-502]

Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand: Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Review; Certain Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand.

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SUMMARY: In response to a request by Saha Thai Steel Pipe Company, Ltd.

(``Saha Thai''), and its affiliated exporter S.A.F. Pipe Export Co.,

Ltd., (``SAF''), and two importers, Ferro Union Inc. (``Ferro Union''),

and ASOMA Corp. (``ASOMA''), the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') is conducting an administrative review of the antidumping

duty order on certain welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from

Thailand. This review covers the following manufacturer/exporter of the

subject merchandise to the United States: Saha Thai/SAF. The period of

review (POR) is March 1, 1996 through February 29, 1997. We received

comments on the preliminary results and rebuttal comments from the

petitioners and respondent.

Based on our analysis of comments received, we have calculated a

margin for Saha Thai. The final weighted-average dumping margins are

listed below in the section entitled Final Results of Review.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 16, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Totaro or Dorothy Woster, AD/CVD

Enforcement Group III, Office 7, Import Administration, International

Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

1374 or (202) 482-3362, respectively.

Applicable Statute

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are

references to the provisions effective January 1, 1995, the effective

date of the amendments made to the Tariff Act of 1930 (hereinafter,

``the Act'') by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). In addition,

unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Department's

regulations are to the regulations codified at 19 CFR Part 353 (April

1997). Although the Department's new regulations, codified at 19 CFR

351 (62 FR 27296, May 19,

[[Page 55579]]

1997) (``Final Regulations''), do not govern this administrative

review, citations to those regulations are provided, where appropriate,

as a statement of current Departmental practice.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On March 11, 1986, the Department published in the Federal Register

an antidumping duty order on welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from

Thailand (51 FR 8341). On March 7, 1997, the Department published a

notice of opportunity to request an administrative review of this order

covering the period March 1, 1996 through February 28, 1997 (62 FR

10521). A timely request for an administrative review of the

antidumping order with respect to sales by Saha Thai/SAF during the POR

was filed jointly by Saha Thai, SAF, Ferro Union, and ASOMA. The

Department published a notice of initiation of this antidumping duty

administrative review on April 24, 1997 (62 FR 19988). On May 14, 1997,

certain domestic producers of standard pipe products entered an

appearance in this review: Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation, Sawhill

Tubular Division--Armco, Inc., Wheatland Tube Company, and Laclede

Steel Company, (``petitioners'' or ``domestic interested parties'').

Because the Department determined that it was not practicable to

complete this review within statutory time limits, on November 19,

1997, we published in the Federal Register our notice of extension of

time limits for this review (62 FR 61802) pursuant to section

751(a)(3)(A) of the Act. On April 7, 1998, the Department published in

the Federal Register (63 FR 16974) the preliminary results of its

administrative review of this antidumping order covering the period

March 1, 1996 through February 28, 1997. The Department has now

completed this review in accordance with section 751(a) of the Act.

Scope of the Review

The products covered by this administrative review are certain

circular welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from Thailand. The subject

merchandise has an outside diameter of 0.375 inches or more, but not

exceeding 16 inches. These products, which are commonly referred to in

the industry as ``standard pipe'' or ``structural tubing,'' are

hereinafter designated as ``pipe and tube.'' The merchandise is

classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) item numbers

7306.30.1000, 7306.30.5025, 7306.30.5032, 7306.30.5040, 7306.30.5055,

7306.30.5085 and 7306.30.5090. Although the HTS subheadings are

provided for convenience and Customs purposes, our written description

of the scope of the order is dispositive. This review covers sales of

these products by Saha Thai/SAF during the period March 1, 1996 through

February 28, 1997.

Verification

As provided in section 782(i) of the Act, we verified sales

information provided by the respondent Saha Thai from March 2-6, 1997,

using standard verification procedures, including examination of

relevant financial records and analysis of original documentation used

by Saha Thai to prepare responses to requests for information from the

Department. We also verified sales and level of trade issues at one of

Saha Thai's affiliated home market resellers. Our verification results

are outlined in the public version of the verification report

(Memorandum to Roland L. MacDonald from John B. Totaro and Dorothy A.

Woster, March 19, 1998 (``Saha Thai Verification Report'').

Analysis of Comments Received

Saha Thai, SAF, Ferro Union, and ASOMA (collectively ``Saha Thai'')

and the petitioners submitted case briefs on May 22, 1998, and rebuttal

briefs on June 1, 1998.

Comment 1

Saha Thai argues that the Department correctly found that Saha Thai

is jointly controlled by more than one person, but incorrectly found

that Somchai Lamatipanont individually controls Saha Thai. Saha Thai

states that in view of Mr. Lamatipanont's limited role in Saha Thai,

there is no basis upon which to find that he is either ``legally or

operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction'' over

Saha Thai. Citing to a commentator on Securities and Exchange

Commission rules, Saha Thai advocates a definition of control based on

identifying who ``calls the day-to-day shots'' in the company. A.A.

Sommer, Jr., ``Who's `In Control'--SEC,'' 21 Bus. Law 559, 582 (1966).

Saha Thai argues that the Department's discussions with Saha Thai's

officers at verification showed that Saha Thai, a closely held

corporation, operates through a consensus of its owners and operators.

Saha Thai claims that the company is controlled ``jointly'' by a

control group consisting of either the entire board acting together or

a majority of the board; thus, no single individual, particularly

Somchai Lamatipanont, can be said to control Saha Thai. Saha Thai

asserts that only the board can exercise restraint or direction over

the company.

Petitioners respond that the opinions of a particular commentator

on the definition of control in the context of securities law are

irrelevant to the application of the antidumping statute. Petitioners

note that the statute requires that a person be ``legally or

operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction'' for

control to exist. Moreover, petitioners refer to the statement in the

Preamble to the Final Regulations that the analysis of whether a person

is in a position to exercise restraint or direction ``focuses on the

relationships that have the potential to impact decisions concerning

production, pricing or cost. . . . the ability to exercise `control'

rather than the actuality of control over specific decisions.'' 62 FR

at 27297-98. Petitioners contrast this definition of control with that

proffered by Saha Thai--whether a person ``calls the day-to-day

shots''--which focuses on the actuality of control instead of the

potential to impact decisions. Petitioners state that Saha Thai's

definition of control promotes the idea that only a person or persons

who can compel a vote of the majority of the stock or board seats can

exercise control, and that this idea is contrary to the statute, the

SAA, and the regulations. Petitioners conclude that all of Saha Thai's

arguments regarding control were considered and rejected by the

Department in the preliminary results.

Petitioners also reject Saha Thai's argument that Somchai

Lamatipanont is not ``in control'' of Saha Thai. First, Petitioners

state that Somchai Lamatipanont's role in the company is substantial

and meets the statutory test for control. Second, petitioners argue

that the fact that the board of directors may be deemed to be in

control of Saha Thai does not preclude a finding that Somchai

Lamatipanont, or other individuals, may also be in a position to

exercise restraint and direction over Saha Thai. Petitioners state that

the Department correctly recognized in the preliminary results that

multiple persons of varying degrees of control may individually and

jointly control a company for purposes of the statute. Petitioners

claim that Saha Thai's own description of its corporate structure

supports this finding. Petitioners argue that within that type of

structure, the Deputy Managing Director, Somchai Lamatipanont, would

have the potential to impact decisions concerning production, pricing

or cost, which meets the Department's definition of control as

[[Page 55580]]

stated in the Preamble to the Final Regulations. Petitioners conclude

that the Department correctly determined that Somchai Lamatipanont

controls Saha Thai within the meaning of section 771(33).

Department's Position

We find Saha Thai's concept of ``control'' inconsistent with the

statute. Section 771(33) of the Act states that ``control'' exists

where one person ``is legally or operationally in a position to

exercise restraint or direction'' over another person. This definition

is stated in terms of the ability to restrain or direct a company's

operations. As explained in the Preamble to the Proposed Regulations

and reiterated in the Final Regulations, the Department need not find

evidence of actual control to satisfy this statutory definition.

Proposed Rule, 61 FR at 7310, 7311; Final Regulations, 62 FR at 29298.

The control test advocated by Saha Thai defines control in terms of

actual direction of a company's operations. However, this argument is

similar to several comments rejected by the Department in the Preamble

to the Final Regulations. For example, the Preamble states:

[i]n general we agree with the suggestion that we focus on

relationships that have the potential to impact decisions concerning

production, pricing or cost. This does not mean however, that proof

is required that a relationship in fact has had such an impact. In

this regard, section 771(33), which refers to a person being ``in a

position to exercise restraint or direction,'' properly focuses the

Department on the ability to exercise ``control'' rather than the

actuality of control over specific decisions. Therefore, we will

consider the full range of criteria identified in the SAA, at 838,

in determining whether ``control'' exists. (emphasis added).

62 FR 27297-98. The Department declined to adopt the suggestion that

the Department define ``legal or operational control'' under section

771(33)(F) of the Act as the ``enforceable ability to compel or

restrain commercial actions.'' Id. at 27298. Thus, we agree with

petitioners that the definition of control proposed by Saha Thai is

inconsistent with the antidumping statute and the Department's

regulations. Although this more narrow application may be appropriate

for the securities laws, the definition contained in the antidumping

statute is consistent with Congress' intent to expand the category of

business relationships examined for purposes of the Department's

antidumping analysis.

We also disagree with Saha Thai's assertion that Somchai

Lamatipanont does not control Saha Thai within the meaning of section

771(33)(F). As discussed above, consistent with the statute and

regulations, the Department's control analysis properly examines the

ability or potential to restrain or direct a company's operations. As

we stated in the preliminary results, the facts on the record establish

that Somchai Lamatipanont is one of the nine members of Saha Thai's

board of directors, and has held this position for at least the last

ten years. July 30, 1997 QR at 2. Further, as Deputy Managing Director,

Mr. Lamatipanont (1) assists the Managing Director in ensuring that

decisions made are executed in accordance with the Managing Director's

instructions, (2) acts for the Managing Director with respect to

administrative matters when Managing Director is out of the office, and

(3) is responsible for significant issues involving day-to-day

operations and management decisions in consultation with the Managing

Director. October 31, 1997 QR at 2. These responsibilities place

Somchai Lamatipanont in a position to exercise restraint or direction

over Saha Thai's operations, particularly with respect to pricing and

production decisions.

Our conclusion is not altered by Saha Thai's argument that, because

Saha Thai operates through a consensus of its owners and operators, no

individual can be said to control Saha Thai without a majority of the

remainder of the group. Neither the statute nor the legislative history

expressly limits the definition of control to a single person. The

definition of ``control'' is based solely on the ability to direct or

restrain operations. Therefore, multiple persons or groups may be in

control, individually and jointly, of a single entity, each having the

ability to direct or restrain the company's activities. Based on this

analysis, we confirm our preliminary finding that the Lamatipanont

family, through its equity interest and a family member's position as a

director and senior executive officer of Saha Thai, controls Saha Thai

within the meaning of section 771(33)(F).

Comment 2

Saha Thai disputes the Department's finding under section

771(33)(F) of the Act that Saha Thai is affiliated with two Thai

producers of the subject merchandise, Thai Hong Steel Pipe Import

Export Co., Ltd. (``Thai Hong'') and Thai Tube Co., Ltd. (``Thai

Tube''). Saha Thai argues that the Department erred in finding common

control of these producers by the Lamatipanont family because,

according to Saha Thai, there is no such family group who possesses the

power of common control over these producers. Saha Thai argues that

besides Somchai Lamatipanont, the other Lamatipanont family members own

small percentages of Saha Thai stock and have no role in Saha Thai. In

addition, Saha Thai notes that Somchai Lamatipanont does not own any

shares in Thai Tube or Thai Hong and is not involved with either

company.

Saha Thai argues that it had no commercial transactions with Thai

Hong or Thai Tube and does not share officers, directors, employees,

information, or facilities with these companies. Saha Thai states that

the three producers never supplied each other with production materials

or finished products, never provided loans or capital, and never

discussed their common industry and/or markets in spite of the

Lamatipanont family's involvement in each. Saha Thai adds that, based

on the supplier lists obtained at verification, the reseller identified

as Company B in the Federal Register notice of the preliminary results

(owned and controlled by Somchai Lamatipanont and his son, Worawut) did

not purchase pipe from either Thai Hong or Thai Tube.

Saha Thai concludes that the Saha Thai stock owned by Somchai

Lamatipanont's brother, Samarn, and Samarn's family (shareholders,

officers and directors in Thai Tube and Thai Hong) is the only link

between Saha Thai and Thai Hong and Thai Tube, and that this connection

does not amount to evidence of a family group. Saha Thai asserts that

the Department based its preliminary finding of a family group on a

shared last name as opposed to record evidence. Saha Thai continues

that the Department's finding that a significant potential for

manipulation of price and production does not exist between these

companies casts doubt on the Department's conclusion that the

Lamatipanont family members constitute a family control group. Saha

Thai argues that the ``Somchai Lamatipanont branch'' of the family

should be recognized as operating distinctly from and without

involvement by the ``Samarn-Thai Hong/Thai Tube branch'' of the

Lamatipanont family.

Saha Thai argues that by considering the Lamatipanonts a ``family

group,'' the Department has ``collapsed'' these individuals under

section 771(33)(A) of the Act. Saha Thai argues that this is incorrect

because nephews and in-laws are not affiliated under the section

771(33)(A) definition of the types of family members that can be

considered affiliates. Thus, according to Saha Thai, there is no

affiliation under section

[[Page 55581]]

771(33)(A) between Somchai Lamatipanont and his nephew and in-laws

involved in Thai Tube and Thai Hong. Even if the Department finds that

the members of the Lamatipanont family are affiliated under section

771(33)(A), Saha Thai argues that based on the record evidence the

Department should not collapse these individuals into a single family

control group for purposes of the antidumping law.

Petitioners agree with the Department's preliminary determination

that the Lamatipanont family constitutes a family group who controls

Saha Thai, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. To support their argument, the

petitioners refer to elements of the Department's preliminary results

collapsing analysis. The petitioners argue that, contrary to Saha

Thai's claim, the Department did not find that there was no potential

for manipulation, but that there was not a ``significant'' potential

for manipulation. Petitioners emphasize that the focus of the

Department's collapsing analysis is on the potential for sharing

information and cooperation, not on the structure of ownership

interest. Petitioners state that in the preliminary results, the

Department found every element for collapsing present other than

evidence of intertwined operations; petitioners note that actual

evidence of intertwined operations is not required to find significant

potential for manipulation. Petitioners continue that finding actual

evidence of cooperation between Saha Thai and Thai Hong and Thai Tube

would have been nearly impossible, and the Department was unable to

verify such cooperation, because (1) Saha Thai chose not to provide

relevant information, (2) Saha Thai's responses are not reliable, and

(3) Thai Hong and Thai Tube refused to participate in this review.

Furthermore, petitioners argue that the record evidence does

support the conclusion that a significant potential for price and

production manipulation exists. Petitioners cite Collated Roofing Nails

from Taiwan, in which the Department found that persons in ``positions

of legal and operational control in their respective companies [can]

create a significant potential for price or production manipulation.''

62 FR 51427, 51436 (Oct. 1, 1997) (emphasis added). Petitioners assert

that family members can be expected to act in concert when doing so is

in their common interests. Petitioners add that the Department has not

improperly adopted a presumption that family members necessarily act in

concert because such cooperation between family members is not required

to find affiliation under the statute. Because the statute defines

family members as affiliated persons, it is reasonable to presume that

they will cooperate with one another. Petitioners continue that the

Department reasonably interpreted the statute to find that a person is

affiliated with the children of his brother. Petitioners conclude that

the Department correctly found that Saha Thai is affiliated with Thai

Hong and Thai Tube in the preliminary results, and should find the same

in the final results.

Department's Position

We disagree with Saha Thai's argument that we improperly examined

the Lamatipanont family as a control group for purposes of our

affiliation analysis under section 771(33)(F) of the Act. Section

351.102(b) of the Final Regulations provides that, in determining

whether control exists for the purpose of finding affiliation, the

Department will consider, among other things, corporate or family

groupings, franchise or joint-venture agreements, debt financing, and

close supplier relationships. 62 FR at 27380. The directive in the

regulations that the Department consider family groupings in examining

affiliation recognizes that control may be exerted through familial

holdings and corporate positions. It is therefore reasonable to examine

familial control in the aggregate to ensure that prices and costs used

in the dumping calculation reflect market value, and are not influenced

by familial relationships, and that the appropriate methodology is

employed (e.g., affiliated producers are collapsed where warranted).

See e.g., Queen's Flowers de Colombia v. United States, F.Supp. 617,

626 (CIT 1997).

The facts on the record demonstrate that several families are each

involved in the ownership and management of Saha Thai. Four of these

families also own and control at least one other Thai company that

produces and/or sells the subject merchandise. Throughout its

questionnaire responses, Saha Thai refers to ``six family groups with

ownership interests in Saha Thai.'' See, e.g., October 31, 1997 QR at

9. Each family owns a significant minority of Saha Thai's shares. Each

of these six stockholding families holds at least one seat on Saha

Thai's nine-member Board of Directors (together they hold all of the

nine board seats in Saha Thai), and members of the four families with

the largest equity interests also serve as the senior executive

officers in Saha Thai: Chairman of the Board (Ampapankit), Managing

Director (Karuchit/Kunanantakul), Deputy Managing Director

(Lamatipanont), and Financial Director (Sae Haeng/Ratanasirivilai). The

facts on the record demonstrate that Saha Thai's ownership and

management structure is family-oriented, and that within this

structure, these families are legally or operationally in a position,

jointly and severally, to control Saha Thai within the meaning of

section 771(33) of the Act.

The Department's analysis in this case follows current practice by

evaluating all indicia of control by the family, not just stock

ownership. For instance, in an analysis of affiliation based on common

control by a family group, the Department explained:

The legislative history of the URAA makes it clear that the statute

does not require majority ownership for a finding of control. Even a

minority shareholder interest, examined within the context of the

totality of other evidence of control, can be a factor that we

consider in determining whether one party is operationally in a

position to control another.

Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Brazil: Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 18486, 18490 (April 15,

1997). In the most recently completed segment of this proceeding, the

Department noted the breadth of the term ``control'' under section

771(33) of the Act: ``the statutory definition of control encompasses

both legal and operational control. Multiple persons or groups may be

in control, individually and jointly, of a single entity, i.e., each

has the ability to direct or restrain the company's activities.''

Certain Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand;

Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review, 62 FR 53808 at

53815 (October 16, 1997).

Our finding that Saha Thai is affiliated under section 771(33)(F)

of the Act with Thai Tube and Thai Hong by virtue of common control by

the Lamatipanont family is based on record evidence that this family is

one of the control groups within Saha Thai. Our analysis of the

Lamatipanont family's control is consistent with the statute,

regulations and current practice.

We disagree with Saha Thai's assertion that we should consider the

Lamatipanonts as two separate branches of the same family who operate

independently of each other. In its questionnaire responses and case

briefs, Saha Thai does not deny that Somchai Lamatipanont, the center

of one alleged branch of the family, is the brother of Samarn

Lamatipanont, the center of the second alleged branch of the family.

These brothers, their wives, and their children are owners, directors

and managers of three producers of standard pipe: Saha Thai, Thai Hong

and Thai Tube. Where members of the same

[[Page 55582]]

family hold interests and management positions in several companies in

the same industry, it is reasonable to examine the interests of the

family as a whole for purposes of determining where common control

exists. See Queen's Flowers 981 F.Supp. at 626.

Saha Thai misconstrues our analysis by claiming that we improperly

collapsed the Lamatipanont family members under section771(33)(A) of

the Act. We did not rely on this provision for purposes of aggregating

the interests of the Lamatipanont family members. Rather, we made

reference to this subsection merely as further support for considering

familial holdings in our affiliation analysis, i.e., the fact that

family members are affiliated, confirms the reasonableness of examining

control by family groups. We, therefore, find it reasonable to examine

the interests of the Lamatipanont family as a whole in steel pipe

businesses.

Moreover, in determining the existence of a ``corporate or family

grouping'' for purposes of affiliation, the Department is not required

to find, as Saha Thai suggests, the existence of a ``control group

acting in concert.'' Drawing such a bright line test ignores the focus

of the statute and the regulations on the ability of a person to exert

restraint or direction over a company in determining ``control'' for

purposes of affiliation. The Department is equally concerned with a

control group which has the potential to act in concert or act out of

common interest.

Finally, Saha Thai's arguments that it had no commercial

transactions and does not share officers, directors, employees,

information or facilities with Thai Hong or Thai Tube to support its

argument that the Lamatipanont family does not control these producers

is unpersuasive. These factors are relevant to a collapsing analysis

but are not determinative of control within the meaning of section

771(33) of the Act. (See Department's Position in response to Comment

3.) For the purpose of examining the existence of common control, we

examined indicia of control, such as the ownership interests, board of

directors seats and management positions held by members of the

Lamatipanont family in Saha Thai, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. Analysis of

these facts led us to conclude that these three producers of the

subject merchandise are affiliated because they are under the common

control of the Lamatipanont family within the meaning of section

771(33)(F) of the Act. Our conclusion is unchanged for the final

results.

Comment 3

Petitioners argue that the Department incorrectly found in the

preliminary results that Saha Thai and Thai Tube and Thai Hong should

not be collapsed because there is no evidence of intertwined

operations. Petitioners argue that while evidence of actual price and

production manipulation is not present on the record, the Department in

its regulations explicitly rejected the need for a showing of actual

manipulation in favor of finding a significant potential for

manipulation. Petitioners also argue that there is significant

potential for manipulation of price and production where affiliation is

based on control under section 771(33) of the Act. Petitioners contend

that whenever a person or group of people are legally or operationally

in a position to exercise restraint or direction over two entities,

there is a significant potential for manipulation of price and

production. Petitioners cite Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes

and Tubes From India; Final Results of New Shippers Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 62 FR 51427, 51436 (Sept. 10, 1997), as a case

where the Department found that it was ``immaterial'' that two

collapsed entities were operated as separate entities, and that there

may be overlap between the evidence used to find affiliation based on

control and the evidence used to determine the appropriateness of

collapsing. Petitioners then cite Collated Roofing Nails From Taiwan;

Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 62 FR 51427,

51436 (Oct. 1, 1997), as support for the proposition that significant

potential for manipulation of price or production can be created by a

person or a group of persons in positions of legal and operational

control in their respective companies.

Petitioners argue that the Department's preliminary affiliation

analysis regarding the Lamatipanont family's ownership, management and

access to marketing, sales and production data support the existence of

a significant potential for price and production manipulation.

Petitioners note that the Department found that Saha Thai's competition

policy on its own does not rebut the potential for manipulation of

prices and production. Petitioners note that the focus of the

Department's regulations on this issue is the potential for

manipulation, and argue that requiring a showing of actual intertwined

operations undercuts this focus of the regulations.

Petitioners also argue that Saha Thai has frustrated the

Department's attempts to gain information on Thai Tube and Thai Hong,

and that the record contains numerous instances where Saha Thai refused

to provide basic information. Petitioners continue that the Department

should hold Saha Thai responsible if the record contains inconclusive

evidence of intertwined operations between Saha Thai and Thai Tube and

Thai Hong. Petitioners conclude that the Department should collapse

these three companies for the final results.

Saha Thai responds that there is no basis on which Thai Tube and

Thai Hong can be collapsed with Saha Thai, particularly because Saha

Thai had no commercial or other transactions with these companies, and

in fact had a twelve-year-old company policy prohibiting such

transactions. Saha Thai states that petitioners' arguments that these

companies should be collapsed are irrelevant and ludicrous. Saha Thai

concludes that the Department should affirm its decision not to

collapse Saha Thai and Thai Tube.

Department's Position

A finding of affiliation has been and continues to be a necessary,

but not determinative, criterion in deciding whether to ``collapse''

two or more companies, i.e., treat them as a single entity for margin

calculation purposes. For example, the Department may find two

companies affiliated on the basis of an equity interest and then

consider the level of that interest in deciding whether to collapse the

affiliated parties. One producer's equity interest of ten percent of

another would result in treating two companies as affiliated, but

absent other factors may be insufficient to warrant collapsing them.

Similarly, a finding of control results in treating companies as

affiliated. However, it is appropriate to consider the level of control

in deciding whether to collapse those companies. The existence of some

degree of control alone is not necessarily determinative of the

collapsing question. In short, affiliation alone is not a sufficient

basis to collapse. See Preamble to the Final Regulations, 62 FR at

27345.

In the preliminary results, we found Saha Thai affiliated with Thai

Tube and Thai Hong under section 771(33)(F) of the Act by virtue of

common control by the Lamatipanont family. We then applied our

collapsing analysis, using factors set forth in the Final Regulations

at Sec. 351.401(f), to determine whether these two producers should be

collapsed with Saha Thai for purposes of calculating dumping margins.

Although each producer is affiliated with Saha Thai and each company

produces subject merchandise, we

[[Page 55583]]

concluded that the record evidence did not support a finding of

significant potential for manipulation of pricing or production.

Therefore, we did not collapse Saha Thai with either Thai Tube or Thai

Hong. See Memo to File from John Totaro, March 30, 1998. We continue to

find that collapsing Saha Thai with these producers is inappropriate in

this review.

Although we agree with the petitioners' assertion that evidence of

actual manipulation is not a prerequisite to finding a significant

potential for manipulation, the record evidence must demonstrate a

``significant potential'' for such manipulation to justify treating

affiliated producers as a single entity. We also agree that each factor

set forth as a relevant indicator to determine whether a significant

potential for manipulation exists need not be met in each case. Rather,

as explained in the Preamble to the Final Regulations, this is a non-

exhaustive list of factors which the Department considers in

determining whether to collapse affiliated producers. Id. In practice,

where factors such as substantial transactions, shared distributors, or

interlocking boards or management indicate a significant potential for

manipulation, the Department has treated separate entities as one. See

Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia; Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Reviews, 61 FR 42833, 42853 (Aug. 19, 1996); Cut to

Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil; Preliminary Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 47436, 47437 (Sept. 9,

1997) and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 12744, 12749

(March 16, 1998); Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes and Tubes

from India; Final Results of New Shippers Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 62 FR 47632, 47638-39 (Sept. 10, 1997).

In this instance, we found the factors indicating a potential for

manipulation insufficient to collapse Saha Thai and Thai Tube and Thai

Hong. While the Lamatipanont family exercises some control over each of

these entities, it is only one of several groups that jointly and

severally control Saha Thai. There is little overlap between the boards

and management of Saha Thai and the other two producers. While the

Lamatipanont family holds all the board seats and high management

positions in Thai Tube and Thai Hong, another member of the family

holds only one of nine board seats and the Deputy Managing Director

position in Saha Thai. Moreover, there are no commercial transactions

or other evidence of intertwined operations between Saha Thai and

either Thai Hong or Thai Tube. Petitioners claim that there is some

evidence on the record of intertwined operations, but we cannot

conclude from the evidence to which petitioners refer that Saha Thai's

operations are intertwined with Thai Hong or Thai Tube. (Due to the

proprietary nature of this information, details of our analysis are

contained in the proprietary version of the Memorandum to File from

John Totaro, dated October 5, 1998.) Thus, the facts presented in this

review are similar to those in Chilean salmon, where the Department did

not collapse two companies because it found no evidence to suggest a

significant possibility of price or production manipulation. See Notice

of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Fresh Atlantic

Salmon From Chile, 63 FR 31411, 31421 (June 9, 1998).

We do not consider our finding of the Lamatipanont family's

ownership and control, by itself, as a sufficient basis to collapse

these affiliates. As discussed above, the Lamatipanont family is a

significant but minority owner of Saha Thai, and multiple entities are

in control of Saha Thai. In Standard Pipes from India, Commerce

recognized that there may be overlap in the evidence establishing

affiliation by control and our collapsing analysis, but the evidence

relied on in our collapsing analysis goes beyond that which is

necessary to find common control. For example, in Standard Pipes from

India, the two affiliated producers shared four members of their boards

of directors out of a total of seven directors for one company and nine

directors for the other. 62 FR at 51438. In addition, the same

individuals held the top management positions in both producers. Id.

Similarly, in Collated Roofing Nails from Taiwan, the family members

who owned and controlled the affiliated producers also had significant

ties to both companies. The chairman of one producer was the past

general manager and current advisor to the second producer, where his

son was the current general manager. Each family member had substantial

responsibility for the sales and production decisions of their

respective companies, which facilitated the sharing of employees and

the transferring of sales between the two. See Collated Roofing Nails

from Taiwan, 62 FR at 51436.

In the present case, the level of control and the absence of

evidence of intertwined operations leads us to conclude the collapsing

is not warranted. This determination does not reflect a heightened

evidentiary standard, as petitioners suggest. Rather, it is consistent

with the Department's practice of not collapsing producers solely on

the basis of affiliation. See Preamble to the Final Regulations, 62 FR

at 27345.

Saha Thai provided sufficient information for the Department to

make a collapsing information. Therefore, despite that fact that Thai

Tube and Thai Hong refused to provide information, the use of facts

available was unnecessary. We note, however, that we will continue to

examine the appropriateness of collapsing these affiliated producers in

future reviews. Therefore, continued lack of participation from these

companies may result in the application of facts available.

Comment 4

Saha Thai argues that the Department failed to undertake the

requisite statutory and regulatory analysis of the Siam Steel Group

companies in reaching its conclusion that those companies are

affiliated on the basis of common control by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul

family. Saha Thai argues that because Saha Thai is controlled by a

group other than the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family, Saha Thai cannot be

affiliated with Siam Matsushita \1\ or any other Siam Steel Group

company by means of common control under section 771(33)(F) by the

Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. Saha Thai asserts that the Karuchit/

Kunanantakul family does not control Saha Thai and that major company

decisions require board approval. Further, Saha Thai argues that the

Karuchit/Kunanantakul family does not control Siam Matsushita because

(1) it held only 39% of Siam Matsushita's shares, (2) Karuchit/

Kunanantakul family members held only ceremonial titles in the company,

(3) the operational and management roles in Siam Matsushita are held by

Japanese individuals, and (4) a majority of the board members are

Japanese individuals. Saha Thai concludes that Japanese investors

control Siam Matsushita, while the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family is

merely the

[[Page 55584]]

company's local conduit into the Thai market.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ In its case and rebuttal briefs, Saha Thai referred to Siam

Matsushita Steel Co., Ltd. as ``Company E,'' the name used by the

Department to refer to this company in the preliminary results

because Saha Thai requested for business proprietary treatment of

this company's name. However, Saha Thai has referred to this company

on the public record of this review, for example, at page 2 and

Exhibit A of its December 31, 1997 questionnaire response (public

version), Exhibit 2 of its October 31, 1997 questionnaire response

(public version). Therefore, the company's identity is no longer

proprietary.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Saha Thai contends that the Department's conclusions in the

preliminary results regarding the influence of Siam Steel International

on the manufacturing policies and product selection of the Siam Steel

Group companies were not supported by the record. Saha Thai claims that

the reference to the Siam Steel Group name is for public relations

purposes only and there is no legal entity known as the Siam Steel

Group. Saha Thai contends that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family holds

only minority interests in the Siam Steel Group companies and exerts no

managerial control in the series of joint ventures that comprise these

entities. Saha Thai asserts that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family does

not have the ability to direct the production decisions of the Siam

Steel Group members because that control rests with Japanese investors.

Second, Saha Thai argues that the Department correctly decided to

not collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita for the preliminary results

because of the substantial retooling needed to shift production from

Saha Thai to Siam Matsushita. In addition, Saha Thai argues that the

record does not contain evidence of any potential for the manipulation

of price or production between these companies. Saha Thai references

the company policy adopted twelve years ago that prohibits certain

kinds of cooperation, and its statement in its October 31, 1997,

questionnaire response that none of the operations of Saha Thai and

Siam Matsushita were intertwined. Saha Thai asserts that neither

company was performing any part of the other's production processes,

nor were they sharing designs. Moreover, except for Siam Matsushita's

extremely small-quantity purchases from Saha Thai, Saha Thai claims

there were no commercial interactions between Saha Thai and Siam

Matsushita.

Finally, Saha Thai states that it provided information concerning

Saha Thai's relationship to and interactions with many other companies

in response to the Department's questions. Saha Thai claims that it

made overtures to the Department concerning the need to include

meetings with Siam Matsushita or visits to the company as part of its

verification, but that the Department did not request any additional

information. Saha Thai urges the Department to affirm its preliminary

results decision to not collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita.

Petitioners agree with the Department's conclusion in the

preliminary results that the facts on the record establish that Saha

Thai is affiliated within the meaning of section 771(33)(F) with Siam

Matsushita. However, petitioners argue that the Department should

collapse Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita for the final results.

Petitioners disagree with the Department's preliminary analysis, in

which the Department concluded that the substantial retooling criterion

of the collapsing analysis is not satisfied.

Petitioners argue that the record does not contain sufficient

information on Siam Matsushita's PVC-lined pipe production process to

determine whether it produces this pipe at full capacity or whether it

has excess capacity to devote to the production of the subject

merchandise. Also, petitioners contend that the record does not contain

information on the capacity of Siam Matsushita's pipe mill relative to

Saha Thai's, or its galvanizing facilities and PVC-coating equipment.

Petitioners argue that, absent this record evidence, the Department's

conclusion that Siam Matsushita would have to significantly alter its

manufacturing process is flawed.

Petitioners also disagree with the Department's conclusion that

allowing a portion of production facilities to stand idle constitutes a

substantial retooling of Siam Matsushita's facility. Petitioners

contend that retooling requires the addition of new equipment or

modification of existing equipment, not merely the lack of use of

existing equipment. Petitioners contend that, unlike the circumstances

in Certain Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware From Mexico: Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 42496 (July 30, 1997), no

infrastructure changes would be necessary for Siam Matsushita to

produce the subject merchandise because Siam Matsushita produces

standard pipe as an intermediate product. Further, petitioners argue

that the record establishes that Siam Matsushita has break points in

its process after pipe production for galvanizing and PVC coating that

allow it to use portions of its facilities without engaging other

portions of its facilities. Petitioners conclude that the record

evidence supports the fact that Siam Matsushita could produce standard

pipe identical to that produced by Saha Thai without substantial

retooling of its production facilities.

Furthermore, petitioners note that the Department's preliminary

analysis did not address the third collapsing criterion contained in

section 351.401(f)(1) of the Final Regulations, i.e., significant

potential for price or production manipulation. However, petitioners

argue that the facts which support the Department's preliminary finding

that Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita are affiliated by means of common

control by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family and membership in the Siam

Steel Group also support this collapsing factor. Petitioners argue that

family ownership and control under section 771(33) necessarily

constitutes a significant potential for manipulation, citing Collated

Roofing Nails from Taiwan, 62 FR at 51436. Petitioners also note that

the Department need not find that this factor exists, but must find

that, based on the totality of circumstances, the two companies are

sufficiently related to warrant treatment as a single entity, citing

Certain Welded Carbon Standard Steel Pipes and Tubes from India, 62 FR

at 47638.

Petitioners claim the Department's preliminary findings regarding

the Siam Steel Group indicate at least some degree of common

involvement by the group in pricing decisions of the two companies.

However, petitioners state that additional information about the

intertwined nature of Saha Thai's and Siam Matsushita's operations is

not available because Saha Thai did not make such information

available. Petitioners claim these are essentially the same

circumstances that led the Department to apply adverse facts available

to Saha Thai in the last review.

Department's Position

We disagree with Saha Thai's assertions that it is not affiliated

with Siam Matsushita under the Act. Section 351.102(b) of the Final

Regulations provides that, in determining whether control exists for

the purpose of finding affiliation, the Department will consider, among

other things, corporate or family groupings, franchise or joint-venture

agreements, debt financing, and close supplier relationships. The facts

on the record demonstrate that the Siam Steel Group is a grouping of

Thai entities involved in the steel industry which is owned and managed

by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. Although these companies may

operate independently of each other, they are nonetheless subject to

direct or indirect control, within the meaning of section 771(33) of

the Act, by the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family.

The record indicates that one of the Siam Steel Group companies,

Siam Steel Group International Co., Ltd., (``SSGI''), is the primary

organizing body of the Siam Steel Group. SSGI is 98.88 percent owned by

members of the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family. October

[[Page 55585]]

31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5. The Siam Steel Group brochure describes SSGI

as follows:

Siam Steel Group International Co., Ltd. was established with an

intention to promote and support the operation of affiliated

companies in Siam Steel Group together with help in company's

expansion and development business of the group to proceed more

efficiently. . . .

Apart from a strong purpose to develop technology and local

industry in order to compete with other countries, Siam Steel Group

have stable policy to continuously help preserving the environment

and conserving the nature directly by selection of products that do

not harm the nature and strictly control the manufacturing process

conformable to technical know-how basis.

June 2, 1997 QR at Exhibit 6. Thus, the Siam Steel Group holds itself

out to the public as an organization of affiliated companies, whose

expansion and development of business is promoted and supported by

SSGI, and who follow, to one degree or another, common policies on

manufacturing methods and selection of products to be produced. Further

evidence of SSGI's role in the Siam Steel Group companies is the fact

that SSGI funded the Siam Steel Group brochure. December 22, 1997 QR at

6. From this record evidence, we conclude that the Siam Steel Group is

the type of corporate grouping envisioned by the SAA and the

Department's regulations.

The Karuchit/Kunanantakul family, together with Siam Steel

International Public Company Ltd.2, own between 8.17 percent

and 100 percent of each of the 26 Siam Steel Group companies, averaging

57.97 percent ownership of each company. The members of the Karuchit/

Kunanantakul family are in various positions of legal and/or

operational control in each member company through ownership and or

management in each company, and through ownership and management of

SSGI and Siam Steel International Public Company Ltd.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ Siam Steel International Public Company, Ltd. is a Siam

Steel Group member, furniture manufacturer, Saha Thai shareholder

and Saha Thai customer. The Karuchit/Kunanantakul family owns a

controlling (65.33 percent) interest in this company.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to Saha Thai in particular, the Karuchit/Kunanantakul

family directly or indirectly owns a significant percentage of Saha

Thai's stock. This family controls three of the nine seats on Saha

Thai's Board of Directors, as well as the Managing Director's position.

Saha Thai notes that ``[p]ricing decisions (either in the establishment

of a price list or changes to it) are not considered major decisions

requiring board approval.'' December 22, 1997 QR at 1. As stated above,

pricing decisions are made by the Managing Director, Somchai Karuchit.

The significant minority equity interest, seats on the Board of

Directors, and the Managing Director's position combine to place the

Karuchit/Kunanantakul family in a position of legal and/or operational

control of Saha Thai.

Furthermore, the record evidence demonstrates that, of the seven

directors of Siam Matsushita, three are Karuchit/Kunanantakul family

members. October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 2. In addition, the record

demonstrates that Wanchai Kunanantakul is the President of Siam

Matsushita, Anantachai Kunanantakul is the Personnel and General

Affairs Director of Siam Matsushita, and another Karuchit/Kunanantakul

family member is the Chairman of Siam Matsushita. Id. Saha Thai Case

Brief at 29; October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5; Memorandum to the File

from John Totaro, August 3, 1998.

The record does not support Saha Thai's claim that the titles held

by these Karuchit/Kunanantakul family members are merely ceremonial.

There is evidence on the record that Siam Matsushita's President,

Wanchai Kunanantakul, is one of only two individuals, along with

Takashi Ozasa, Siam Matsushita's Vice President, with the power to bind

the company with his signature. October 31, 1997 QR at Exhibit 5 and

Exhibit 2. Anantachai Kunanantakul's position as Personnel and General

Affairs Director of Siam Matsushita suggests substantial involvement in

the operation of the company. Id. Moreover, given the Chairman's

responsibility in Saha Thai, we can infer that the Karuchit/

Kunanantakul family member's position as Chairman in Siam Matsushita is

equally substantive in nature. Saha Thai has offered no evidence to

demonstrate otherwise. Thus, the record evidence supports our

determination that the Karuchit/Kunanantakul family controls the

members of the Siam Steel Group, particularly Saha Thai and Siam

Matsushita. The fact that Japanese investors also have controlling

interests in certain Siam Steel Group companies does not detract from

this finding because, as discussed above, multiple persons or groups

may individually and jointly control the same companies under section

771(33) of the Act. On this basis, we continue to find that Saha Thai

and Siam Matsushita are affiliated under section 771(33)(F) of the Act.

However, we do not find that the record evidence supports treating

these affiliated companies as a single entity under our collapsing

analysis. In the preliminary results, we stated that the record

evidence indicates that shifting production to subject merchandise

would require extensive and expensive infrastructure changes in Siam

Matsushita.

The record establishes that Saha Thai's and Siam Matsushita's

production facilities are devoted to manufacturing very different

products: Saha Thai produces standard pipe and Siam Matsushita produces

PVC-lined pipe. The record demonstrates that Siam Matsushita produces

standard pipe as an intermediate product, but also that Siam

Matsushita's production process requires substantially more processing

to produce its final product, PVC-lined steel pipe. It is therefore

reasonable to infer that shifting production to standard pipe would

require Siam Matsushita to significantly alter its production process

and incur additional costs in shifting production. This determination

is consistent with prior cases where the Department did not collapse

affiliated producers who produced similar but not comparable products

which required different processes and equipment. See Certain

Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware From Mexico: Final Results of Antidumping

Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 42496, 42497 (Aug. 7, 1997); Certain

Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-

Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Preliminary Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 60 FR 42511, 42512 (Aug. 16,

1995) and Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and

Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada; Preliminary

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 13815 (March

28, 1996).

In reaching this conclusion, we have not adopted the petitioner's

view of ``substantial retooling,'' which advocates a finding of

substantial retooling only where new equipment is added to the existing

production facilities. This concept does not reflect commercial reality

because a company may substantially revise its production facilities

without adding new equipment. For example, we cannot conclude from the

facts on the record that it would not involve significant time and

expense for Siam Matsushita to restructure its continuous production

process to transform what is now an intermediate product into a

finished product. Thus, we do not consider Siam Matsushita's capacity

to produce standard pipe as an intermediate product as decisive on the

issue of whether substantial retooling would be necessary to shift

production to the lower-grade standard pipe produced by Saha Thai.

[[Page 55586]]

Therefore, based on our analysis of the record evidence, we do not

find that the facts support collapsing Saha Thai and Siam Matsushita in

this review. Because we were able to reach this determination based on

the information provided by Saha Thai, application of the facts

available rule is unwarranted. We note, however, that we will continue

to examine any shift in production between these two affiliates in any

subsequent reviews.

Comment 5

Saha Thai argues that it is not affiliated under section 771(33)(F)

with the three resellers, because none of the three Saha Thai directors

who, with their families, control the resellers also control Saha Thai.

Petitioners reject this argument. Petitioners assert that Saha

Thai's interpretation of control is inconsistent with sections

771(33)(B) and 771(33)(E) of the statute and the Department's

statements in the Preamble to the Final Regulations that an enforceable

ability to compel or restrain certain actions is not a necessary

element for finding control under section 771(33) of the Act.

Petitioners conclude that the Department should continue to find Saha

Thai affiliated with Resellers A, B, and C for the final results.

Department's Position

We disagree with Saha Thai's assertions that it is not affiliated

with these resellers identified in the preliminary results. As

discussed above in Comment 1, Saha Thai's argument is premised upon an

interpretation of ``control'' that is inconsistent with the statute and

the regulations. In the preliminary results, we found that Saha Thai

was affiliated under section 771(33)(F) of the Act with three home

market resellers of the subject merchandise, referred to in the notice

of preliminary results as Company A, Company B and Company C. Each of

these resellers is entirely owned by one of the six families that

jointly and severally control Saha Thai. Each of these families owns a

substantial minority interest in Saha Thai, has at least one family

member on Saha Thai's board of directors, and has a family member who

is an executive officer of Saha Thai. As we explained above, evidence

of actual control is not a prerequisite to finding ``control'' within

the meaning of section 771(33) of the Act, which defines control in

terms of the ability of one person to restrain or direct another

person. The statutory definition of control encompasses both legal and

operational control, and multiple persons or groups may be in control,

individually and jointly, of a single entity, each having the ability

to direct or restrain the company's activities. Furthermore, among

several individuals in a position to control an entity, one individual

may possess a greater degree of control than the others. For example,

the Managing Director of Saha Thai may have the greatest authority

among Saha Thai's executives. However, the Managing Director's superior

position would not eliminate the ability of the other officers--the

Financial Director, the Deputy Managing Director and the Chairman of

the Board--to direct or restrain the company's activities.

We, therefore, conclude that the Sae Haeng/Ratanasirivilai family

controls both Saha Thai and Company A, the Lamatipanont family controls

both Saha Thai and Company B, and the Ampapankit family controls both

Saha Thai and Company C. Our position on this issue remains unchanged

for the final results.

Comment 6

Petitioners argue that the Department has no choice but to apply

the facts available under 19 U.S.C. Secs. 1677e and 1677m (section

776(a) and (b) of the Act) because the record contains neither home

market and U.S. sales data nor information on cost of production for

Siam Matsushita, Thai Hong, and Thai Tube. Petitioners argue that this

information is necessary to perform the dumping analysis. Petitioners

state that the record is now so incomplete that it cannot serve as the

basis for the final results, and neither Saha Thai nor its affiliates

acted to the best of their ability to provide information requested by

the Department. Petitioners argue that an adverse inference under 19

U.S.C. 1677e(b) (section 776 (b) of the Act) is appropriate given the

outright refusal of Thai Tube and Thai Hong to cooperate. Furthermore,

argue petitioners, the record is replete with instances where either

Saha Thai did not provide information that was requested or the

Department found at verification that Saha Thai had not completely or

correctly answered the questionnaires. Petitioners argue that the

evidence on the record of this review should be viewed in light of Saha

Thai's ``dissembling and prevarication'' in the original investigation

and the most recently completed review. In this review, petitioners

argue that Saha Thai's submissions, particularly concerning the

affiliation and collapsing issues, contains enough unanswered

questions, inconsistencies, and proven errors to render the entire

response unreliable for the final results.

Petitioners identify two issues in particular that demonstrate Saha

Thai's lack of cooperation in this review. First, petitioners cite Saha

Thai's alleged inability to produce documents at verification related

to its corporate governance, including its memorandum of association,

minutes of board meetings, or a record of a company policy decided at a

board meeting. Petitioners assert that Saha Thai cannot reasonably

claim that such documents do not exist. Second, petitioners note Saha

Thai's stated inability to substantiate its claim that major company

decisions are made by a 60% vote of the board. Petitioners identify

other instances where Saha Thai provided inadequate responses and

conclude that Saha Thai has provided less than full disclosure in this

case. Petitioners argue that to accept Saha Thai's responses as an

adequate basis for the final results would allow Saha Thai to ``control

the amount of antidumping duties by selectively providing [the

Department] information,'' citing Olympic Adhesives Inc., v. United

States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Petitioners contend that

the circumstances in this case require the use of adverse facts

available, and recommend the 37.55% rate applied to Thai Union in the

last review.

Saha Thai responds that none of the alleged inconsistencies

identified by petitioners warrants serious consideration by the

Department as justification for total adverse facts available.

Specifically, Saha Thai addresses petitioners' focus on Saha Thai's

lack of ability to provide its memorandum of association and board of

directors meetings. Saha Thai argues that the memorandum of association

could not be located, and that board meeting minutes were not

maintained except in instances where important company policies were

established. Saha Thai argues that it has fully cooperated with the

Department and provided all requested information. With respect to the

requested corporate governance documents, Saha Thai notes that it

explained that such documentation does not exist, and therefore, it

should not be penalized for its informal governance structure. Saha

Thai argues that in circumstances where it is unable to provide

information or is never requested to provide information, the

application of facts available is inappropriate, citing Borden, Inc. v.

United States; Olympic Adhesives; Daewoo Elec. Co.

[[Page 55587]]

Department's Position

Section 776(a) of the Act authorizes the resort to facts available

only where necessary information is not available on the record or an

interested party withholds information, fails to comply with the

Department's reporting requirements, significantly impedes the

proceeding, or submits unverifiable information. We have examined Saha

Thai's submissions in light of these factors and determine that resort

to facts available is inappropriate in this review. Saha Thai was

unable to produce certain corporate governance documents because such

documents do not exist. Further, the lack of this information did not

hinder our ability to reach the necessary determinations concerning its

affiliations with other entities.

Further, as noted above, the information submitted by Saha Thai was

sufficient to make a determination that Saha Thai, Thai Tube and Thai

Hong should not be collapsed. Therefore, responses from Thai Hong and

Thai Tube were not necessary for calculating a dumping margin in this

review. This consideration applies equally to additional information

from Siam Matsushita. We note, however, as discussed in the relevant

collapsing analyses, that we will continue to examine these issues in

future reviews and the failure of these affiliates to respond may lead

to application of the facts available.

In short, the record contains information necessary to complete the

review and Saha Thai: (1) Has not withheld information that has been

requested by the Department, (2) has submitted responses to the

Department's requests timely and in the form requested, (3) did not

significantly impede the review, and (4) provided information that was

largely verifiable.

Comment 7

Petitioners claim that Saha Thai's questionnaire responses and

other data indicate that the contract date should be used as the date

of U.S. sales. Petitioners claim that Saha Thai did not provide any of

the requested factual information about changes in quantity after the

contract date. Instead, petitioners assert that Saha Thai insisted upon

using invoice date as the date of sale, claiming that the Department

requires invoice date in all or most instances, that the company

records sales based on invoice date, and that a change in date of sale

methodology from review to review would result in either the double-

reporting or omission of certain sales.

Second, petitioners assert that the contract establishes the final

agreement of the parties to the sale. Petitioners cite the 1995-1996

review of Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of

Korea, 62 FR 64559 (Dec. 8, 1997) (Pipe from Korea), where based on an

understanding of the U.S. sales process, in which price and quantity

are established at contract date, the Department instructed the

respondent to report contract date as the date of sale. Petitioners

contend that the Final Regulations allow flexibility in using a date

other than the invoice date as date of sale; the appropriate date of

sale occurs when the material terms of sale are set. Petitioners assert

that Saha Thai has offered both the wrong factual and legal arguments

for its choice in date of sale.

According to the petitioners, as a consequence of an incorrect date

of sale, (1) a different set of sales will be evaluated, (2) in a

country subject to currency devaluation or inflation, the sale's value

may be distorted, and (3) incorrect dates lead to incorrect matching,

all of which ultimately distorts the antidumping duty margin. Thus,

petitioners argue that because Saha Thai did not provide the contract

dates as requested, the Department should find in its final results

that Saha Thai has significantly impeded the investigation and use the

facts available to determine Saha Thai's dumping margin. If the

Department does not use facts available, petitioners argue that the

U.S. date of sale should be corrected on the basis of non-adverse facts

available, i.e., based on the difference between reported contract and

invoice dates provided in Saha Thai's questionnaire responses.

Petitioners propose an additional method, calculating the interval

between the letter of credit date and the invoice date to derive a

weighted-average interval for the number of days between contract and

invoice.

Saha Thai responds that the Department correctly used invoice date

as the date of sale. Saha Thai states that the Department's policy

clearly called for the use of invoice date as date of sale, since the

invoice date is the date on which the final quantity and price were

established. Saha Thai defends its reporting methodology, stating that

upon issuance of the questionnaire, Saha Thai contacted the official in

charge. Following the methodology set forth in the Final Regulations,

Saha Thai used invoice date as the date of sale. Saha Thai notes that

the Department's regulations, 351.401(i), express a preference for the

use of invoice date as the sale date based on commercial reality. Saha

Thai contends that there is no date which better reflects the final

terms of sale than the invoice date, the date which, as verified, is

recorded in Saha Thai's records maintained in the ordinary course of

business. Saha Thai states that only by reference to the invoice can

one see the quantities which were the subject of the sale.

Saha Thai distinguishes this review from Pipe from Korea, where the

exporter's U.S. prices and quantities were seldom revised prior to

invoicing. Saha Thai further notes that the decision in the Korean case

did not depend on the existence of ``tolerance'' levels in the

contracts. Saha Thai also cites Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rod from

India, 62 FR 38976, 38979 (July 21, 1997), where the Department used

invoice date due to changes in quantity between the purchase order date

and shipment dates. Finally, Saha Thai argues that the Department uses

a date other than invoice date only when there are compelling reasons

to deviate from this practice, citing Cold Rolled and Corrosion

Resistant-Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea, 63 FR 13170, 13194

(March 18, 1998). Saha Thai asserts that there is no compelling reason

in this review to deviate from the Department's standard practice of

using invoice date as date of sale.

Moreover, Saha Thai claims that because it accurately reported

invoice date as the date of sale, application of facts available is

entirely unwarranted. Saha Thai notes that petitioners did not take

issue with Saha Thai's assertion that quantity was subject to change

from contract to invoice date until the end of this proceeding. Saha

Thai also claims that it never once refused to provide information

requested by the Department. Saha Thai notes that the Department did

not make an absolute and specific demand that Saha Thai report its

contract dates. Saha Thai further states that petitioners never

suggested that Saha Thai revise its sales listing. Saha Thai claims

that moving the sale date this late in the proceeding unfairly

penalizes Saha Thai by increasing the possibility that sales will be

matched to constructed value. Saha Thai claims that it was fully

cooperative with the Department and went to great lengths to provide

the information requested, and thus did not impede the Department's

investigation.

Department's Position

The Department's current practice, as codified in the Final

Regulations at section 351.401(i), is to use invoice date as the date

of sale unless the record evidence demonstrates that the material terms

of sale, i.e., price and quantity, are

[[Page 55588]]

established on a different date. See 19 CFR 351.401(i), 62 FR at 27411;

Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe From the Republic of Korea; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 FR 32833, 32835-

36 (June 16, 1998). In this review, Saha Thai reported invoice date as

the date of sale in response to the Department's initial questionnaire.

June 2, 1997 QR at 3. To ascertain whether Saha Thai accurately

reported the date of sale, we requested additional information

concerning whether prices and quantities were fixed on a different

date. Saha Thai reported that it generally enters into short-term

contracts that establish price but quantities often change and are not

finally established in any written document prior to the issuance of

the invoice at the time shipment is arranged. July 30, 1997 QR at 18.

Saha Thai also stated that the invoice date is recorded in its records

kept in the ordinary course of business, whereas dates of contract and

related dates are not so maintained. Id. at 19.

The Department verified that Saha Thai records sales in its

financial records by date of invoice. Verification Report at 17. We

also discussed Saha Thai's export sales process with the company's

export sales manager. As described in the Verification Report, Saha

Thai negotiates price and quantity, a contract is signed and a letter

of credit is arranged. At that point, a production order is issued to

the mill and delivery department, and the sales invoice is issued just

prior to shipping. Id. Based on verification and other information on

the record, the Department was satisfied that invoice date was the

appropriate date of sale for Saha Thai's U.S. sales, and we used this

date in the preliminary results.

Petitioners' claim that the contract date fixes prices and

quantities is not supported by the record evidence. We examined the

sample contract and invoices supplied by Saha Thai, and this

information demonstrates that quantities were not fixed in the

contract. (Due to the proprietary nature of this information, details

of our analysis are contained in the proprietary version of the

Memorandum to File from John Totaro, dated October 5, 1998). While we

agree with petitioners that changes consistent with the tolerance level

established in the contract may establish a binding agreement on

quantity at the contract date, our analysis of the sample contract and

corresponding invoices reveals that changes frequently were made beyond

the agreed upon tolerance levels. Where such changes occur frequently

after the contract date, we have relied upon a later date. See Certain

Internal-Combustion Industrial Forklift Trucks from Japan; Final

Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 34216, 34227

(June 25, 1997); Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene Resin from Italy;

Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 62 FR 48592,

48593 (Sept. 16, 1997). Consistent with this practice, we find that the

record evidence in this case supports using invoice date as the date of

sale.

The facts in Pipe from Korea are distinguishable from those

presented in this review. In that case, the Department was satisfied

that invoice date was inappropriate because ``the material terms of

sale in the U.S. are set on the contract date and any subsequent

changes are usually immaterial in nature or, if material, rarely

occur.'' Pipe from Korea, 63 FR at 32836. However, as discussed above,

we have determined that the record evidence in this case supports Saha

Thai's assertions that its contracts do not fix quantity, and that

quantity is not established until invoice date. Therefore, given that

quantity can and regularly does change between contract date and

invoice date, we find that the invoice date better reflects the date on

which the essential terms of the sale are established. We also find

that Saha Thai accurately reported the appropriate date of sale;

therefore, application of facts available is unwarranted.

Comment 8

Petitioners argue that the Department should reduce Saha Thai's

claimed duty drawback adjustment using the actual/ theoretical weight

conversion. Petitioners state that Saha Thai purchases hot-rolled sheet

in coils on an actual weight basis, and that customs duties on its

purchases are applied on the same basis. However, the sales of subject

merchandise on which duty drawback is granted are made on a theoretical

weight basis. Thus, claim petitioners, the drawback received per unit

of pipe exported exceeds the duties paid on the coil included in that

unit of pipe by the ratio of one minus the actual/ theoretical weight

conversion factor. Petitioners cite Certain Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe

from the Republic of Korea; Final Results of Administrative Review, 62

FR 55574, 55577 (Oct. 27, 1997) in support of their argument.

Petitioners argue that as in the first administrative review on

standard pipe from Korea, the adjustment for duty drawback for Saha

Thai should be reduced by multiplying the drawback amount by the

actual/theoretical conversion factor whenever the conversion factor is

less than one. Petitioners claim that this will limit the drawback to

the duties paid on material actually incorporated into the exported

product as required by the statute and precedent.

Saha Thai responds that petitioners' interpretation is incorrect

and based on a misrepresentation of the Department's determination in

Certain Welded Non-Alloy Steel pipe from the Republic of Korea. Saha

Thai claims that there is a direct correlation, transaction-by-

transaction, between the drawback received and the duties actually paid

on the inputs of the exported product. Saha Thai claims that

petitioners' reference to the Korean Pipe case is erroneous, because in

the Korean case respondents received drawback under a fixed rate

refund, whereas Saha Thai based drawback on a transaction-by-

transaction calculation of duties actually paid on the inputs exported

in the finished product. Saha Thai further states that the Department

verified that Saha Thai paid the duties for which it received drawback

and, with slight modification to certain clerical errors, accurately

quantified drawback in its response.

Department's Position

The information on the record indicates that Saha Thai accurately

calculated duty drawback based on the amount of duties actually paid

and received by Saha Thai. The Department in Certain Welded Non-Alloy

Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea examined two different types of

duty drawback calculations,

``fixed-rate'' duty drawback provision and . . . ``individual-

transaction'' duty-drawback provision. We found that, when

respondents received duty drawback under the individual-transaction

duty drawback provision, companies received duty drawback based on

the duties actually paid on the input of the exported product. . . .

We also found that companies receiving duty drawback under the

fixed-rate provision paid duties on the basis of the actual weight

of inputs imported but received drawback on the basis of the

theoretical weight of merchandise exported to the United States.

Because theoretical weight is generally greater than actual weight,

fixed-rate drawback calculated on a theoretical-weight basis is

greater than that calculated on an actual-weight basis. Therefore we

conclude that the reported duty drawback of respondents who received

the drawback under the fixed-rate provision exceeds the duties

actually paid.

62 FR 55574 at 55577 (Oct. 27, 1997).

In the instant review, Saha Thai's duty drawback calculation does

not resemble the ``fixed-rate'' methodology alluded to by petitioners

in the Korean

[[Page 55589]]

Pipe case, wherein the duty paid on imported coil differed from the

duty drawback received on exports incorporating that coil due to

quantities calculated on actual versus theoretical weight. We examined

the record of this review and have determined that Saha Thai has

correctly calculated its duty drawback adjustment because the duty

drawback Saha Thai received from Thai customs authorities was equal to,

and not in excess of, the amount of duty paid. In its July 30, 1997

supplemental questionnaire response at Exhibit 11-2, Saha Thai

submitted the documentation generated by Thai customs which lists Saha

Thai's ``Duty Drawback classified by Export Entry,'' indicating the

amount of duty drawback paid to Saha Thai for a group of export sales,

as well as the ``Duty Drawback Classified by Import Entry,'' indicating

the actual duties Saha Thai paid on imports of coil. These documents

show that the amount of duties paid by Saha Thai on imported coil

equals the amount of duty drawback received by Saha Thai from Thai

customs on exports of pipe. Saha Thai allocated this drawback amount

over the total quantity of export sales. Thus, we find, based on the

facts on the record, that Saha Thai has not overstated its duty

drawback claims.

In addition, the Department verified Saha Thai's duty drawback

calculation (see Saha Thai Verification Report at 28, and exhibit C6).

With the exception of several minor clerical errors noted at

verification, the Department was satisfied with Saha Thai's

calculations. Therefore for purposes of these final results, the

Department will continue to adjust U.S. price by the amount of duty

drawback calculated by Saha Thai.

Comment 9

Petitioners claim that the Department made a ministerial error in

the preliminary results margin calculation by limiting the price-to-

price analysis to sales with entries during the POR. Petitioners argue

that while antidumping duties are assessed against entries that were

made during the POR, the Department bases margin calculations on sales

during the POR, citing Silicon Metal from Brazil, 61 FR 46763, 46765

(Sept. 5, 1996).

Saha Thai responds that date filters should be tied to entry date

in accordance with standard Department practice. Saha Thai argues that

the cases cited by petitioners involve situations where sales in

addition to those entered during the POR are included in the database

because respondents were unable to tie sales to entries. Saha Thai

points out that it was able to tie all sales to entry dates, and

reported only sales entered during the POR, as instructed by the

Department.

Department's Position

We agree with Saha Thai that the Department correctly calculated

the dumping margin using all sales of merchandise entered during the

POR. The Department's standard questionnaire instructed Saha Thai to

report U.S. sales based on entry date during the POR, and we verified

that Saha Thai accurately reported all sales with entry dates during

the POR. See Saha Thai Verification Report at 21. As the Department

stated in a recent case, the Department's preference is to base an

administrative review on entries during the period of review. Circular

Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from the Republic of Korea; Final Results

of Administrative Review, 63 FR 32833, 32836 (June 16, 1998). See also

Ferrosilicon from Brazil; Final Results of Antidumping Administrative

Review, 62 FR 43504, 43510 (Aug. 14, 1997). As the Department stated in

Korean Pipe, section 751(a)(2)(A) of the Act states that a dumping

calculation should be performed for each entry during the POR. Although

the Department's regulations at section 351.213(e) provide some

flexibility in this issue, the Department's preference is to review

sales based on entry dates unless there are compelling circumstances

that warrant a different approach to determining the universe of sales

to be examined during a particular review. See Korean Pipe, 63 FR at

32836. There is no record evidence of such compelling circumstances in

this review. Therefore, we have continued to use sales with entries

during the period of review, as reported by Saha Thai, for purposes of

these final results.

Comment 10

Saha Thai argues that if the Department continues to include

reseller sales in the database, the Department should use the actual

reseller sales quantities to calculate normal value. Saha Thai states

that the resellers do not identify pipes held in inventory by producer,

and thus do not identify the producer of the pipes they sell. The

resellers' sales files include all sales of those products sold by Saha

Thai to each reseller. In addition, the resellers' monthly average

price for each product represents the monthly average price for all

producers, including Saha Thai. Saha Thai claims that the replacement

of the actual quantities of sales in each month made by each reseller

with the Department's calculated simple monthly average of quantities

sold by Saha Thai to the resellers has distorted the results of the

antidumping calculations. Saha Thai claims that this methodology

created the two highest dumping amounts for all U.S. transactions. Saha

Thai further claims that the use of actual reseller sales quantities

creates no distortion, as the resellers sold the pipe at the same

price, regardless of manufacturer.

Petitioners argue that the Department appropriately used average

sales quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers. Petitioners

suggest that the Department's choice to use non-adverse facts available

was not arbitrary, as claimed by Saha Thai, but rather the only

accurate tabulation of Saha Thai's pipe sales quantities that the

Department could verify. Petitioners further state that the average

sales quantities chosen by the Department were more, not less,

probative of actual conditions, because the Department verified actual

sales quantities of Saha Thai pipe. Petitioners note that the

Department is accorded ``considerable deference'' in determining what

constitutes the appropriate facts available, referring to Allied-Signal

Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F 2d 1185 at 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Department's Position

Because the resellers' sales data did not identify sales by

producer, we were unable to segregate the resellers' sales of Saha Thai

pipe. As a substitute, we determined a simple average by model of the

monthly quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers. These simple

average quantities were then used to weight average the reseller home

market normal value for all reseller sales with the Saha Thai home

market sales in order to calculate the normal value. See Memorandum to

File from Dorothy Woster, March 31, 1998 (preliminary results analysis

memorandum).

Saha Thai proposes including the actual quantities of subject pipe

sold by the resellers to calculate the margin, but these sales include

pipe manufactured by other manufacturers. Using the resellers' complete

sales databases would be contrary to the statutory directive that the

Department calculate normal value based on sales of foreign like

product. See, section 773(B)(i) of the Act. The foreign like product is

merchandise manufactured by the same person that produced the subject

merchandise sold to the United States. See section 771(16) of the Act.

The statute indicates that, for the purposes of our antidumping

analysis, sales of merchandise produced by manufacturers other than the

manufacturer of the merchandise sold to the United States are not

appropriate

[[Page 55590]]

bases for the calculation of normal value.

Therefore, in other cases where a reseller's sales database

contains sales of merchandise produced by other manufacturers, the

Department used a weighting methodology that permits us to use the

sales listing while neutralizing the effect of sales of other

producers' merchandise. See, e.g., Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel

Plate from Sweden: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review, 60 FR 18502, 18503 (Sept. 19, 1995), and Certain

Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Sweden: Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 15772 (April 9, 1996);

Stainless Steel Bar from Spain; Final Determination of Sales at Less

than Fair Value, 59 FR 66931, 66936 (Dec. 28, 1994).

Under the circumstances presented in this review, using a weight

averaging methodology based on the facts on the record (Saha Thai's

verified sales quantities to the resellers, see Saha Thai Verification

Report at 15 and 16) is a reasonable approach that addresses the intent

of the statute that normal value be based on sales of subject

merchandise manufactured by the producer of subject merchandise sold to

the United States. Therefore, for purposes of these final results, we

have continued to use the simple average by model of the monthly

quantities sold by Saha Thai to the resellers.

Comment 11

Petitioners argue that interest costs on coil inputs should be

treated as a cost of manufacturing, as opposed to G&A costs, in

accordance with Saha Thai's internal cost accounting procedures and

generally accepted accounting principles in Thailand. Petitioners note

that Saha Thai's practice of deducting these interest costs from the

cost of coil and transferring them to G&A is consistent with the

Department's treatment of these costs in the original investigation and

previous reviews. However, petitioners claim that in accordance with an

amendment to the statute at section 773(f)(1)(A) of the Act, these

interest costs must be treated in the same manner as Saha Thai treats

them internally. Petitioners argue that there is a presumption that the

Department shall use the respondent's normal cost allocations based on

how they are kept in its records, unless they are determined to be

unreasonable and distortive of the dumping margin. Moreover, argue

petitioners, these interest costs are directly attributable to the

acquisition of hot-rolled coil inventories. For these reasons,

petitioners contend that interest costs on coil inputs should be

treated as a cost of manufacturing.

Saha Thai responds that interest costs on coil inputs should be

treated as they always have in this proceeding and according to

standard Department practice. Saha Thai claims that the Department

treats finance expenses as fungible business expenses, citing Silicon

Metal from Brazil, 61 FR 46,763, 46,773 (Sept. 5, 1996) and Tapered

Roller Bearings from China, 62 FR 6189, 6201 (Feb. 11, 1997). Saha Thai

contends that such expenses were treated as a general expense of

operating the company in previous reviews, and that nothing in the

revisions to the antidumping law requires a change. Saha Thai stated

that for purposes of the cost questionnaire response it transferred the

coil finance costs from the purchases account to its reported selling,

general (including financing expense) and administrative expense

calculations.

Department's Position

We disagree with petitioners that interest costs on coil inputs

should be treated as a cost of manufacturing, as opposed to G&A costs.

As we explained in less than fair value determination, the Department

considers ``the financing expense of assets, long-term or short-term,

to be fungible and, therefore, a general expense of operating the

company.'' Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from Thailand;

Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, 51 FR 3384, 3386

(Jan. 27, 1986). See also Titanium Sponge from Japan; Final Results of

Antidumping Administrative Review, 55 FR 42227 (Oct. 18, 1990). In its

July 30, 1997 supplemental questionnaire response at 27, Saha Thai

stated that, ``the finance charge is based upon payment terms.'' Saha

Thai provided further detail in its October 31, 1997, second

supplemental questionnaire response: ``[t]he expense clearly is an

interest cost directly associated with Saha Thai's extended accounts

payable on purchases of coil. If Saha Thai did not receive financing

from its coil suppliers, it would have to borrow from banks to pay them

at an earlier date.'' Thus, by incurring these interest costs, Saha

Thai made a deliberate decision to delay payment of its payables (in

effect borrowing money from its suppliers). Section 773(f)(1)(A) states

that costs shall normally be calculated based on the records of the

respondent where those records are prepared in accordance with home

country GAAP and reasonably reflect the cost of producing the

merchandise. While Saha Thai records these types of expenses as cost of

manufacturing in its normal books and records which are prepared in

accordance with GAAP of Thailand, our longstanding practice has been to

treat these types of interest costs as general expenses and we find no

basis to alter this approach in these final results. Therefore, the

Department will continue to classify these interest costs on coil

inputs as a financing expense, and continue to include these costs in

our calculation as reported by Saha Thai.

Final Results of the Review

As a result of this review, we have determined that the following

weighted-average dumping margin exists for the period March 1, 1996,

through February 28, 1997:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturer/Exporter Period (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Saha Thai................................ 3/1/96-2/28/97 1.92

------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department shall determine, and the U.S. Customs Service shall

assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. The Department

shall issue appraisement instructions directly to the Customs Service.

For assessment purposes, we have calculated importer-specific duty

assessment rates for the merchandise based on the ratio of the total

amount of antidumping duties calculated for the examined sales during

the POR to the total entered value of sales examined during the POR. As

a result of this review, we have determined that the importer-specific

duty assessments rates are necessary.

Furthermore, the following deposit requirements shall be effective

upon publication of this notice of final results of review for all

shipments of certain welded carbon steel pipes and tubes from Thailand,

entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the

publication date, as provided for by section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff

Act: (1) the cash deposit rate for the reviewed company will be the

rate stated above; (2) for previously investigated companies not listed

above, the cash deposit rate will continue to be the company-specific

rate published for the most recent period; (3) if the exporter is not a

firm covered in these reviews, or the original LTFV investigations, but

the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will be the rate established

for the most recent period for the manufacturer of the merchandise; and

(4) if neither the exporter nor the manufacturer is a firm covered in

these reviews, the cash

[[Page 55591]]

deposit rate for this case will continue to be 15.67 percent, the ``All

Others'' rate made effective by the LTFV investigation. These deposit

requirements shall remain in effect until publication of the final

results of the next administrative review.

This notice serves as a final reminder to importers of their

responsibility under 19 CFR 353.26 to file a certificate regarding the

reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation of the

relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply with this

requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that

reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent

assessment of double antidumping duties.

This notice also serves as a reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (``APO'') of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with section 353.34(d) of the Department's

regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials

or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure

to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a

sanctionable violation.

This administrative review and notice are in accordance with

section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and section 353.22

of the Department's regulations.

Dated: October 5, 1998.

Robert S. LaRussa,

Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 98-27876 Filed 10-15-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P