Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration Environmental Assessment and Research and Development Activities

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration Environmental

Assessment and Research and Development Activities

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.

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SUMMARY: An environmental assessment (EA) has been prepared to assess

potential environmental impacts associated with a U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) proposed action to test an integrated pit disassembly and

conversion process on a relatively small sample of pits and plutonium

metal at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. The

proposed action would involve performing work in a series of

interconnected gloveboxes using remote handling, automation, and

computerized control systems to minimize operator exposure where

possible, increase safety, and minimize the amount of waste generated

by the process. Based on the analysis in the EA and considering

comments received, DOE has determined that the proposed action is not a

major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA). Therefore, the preparation of an environmental impact statement

(EIS) is not required. The EA also discusses other on-going research

and development activities, which have already been reviewed pursuant

to NEPA, and which concern pit disassembly and conversion, potential

mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, and immobilization of surplus

plutonium.

ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Single copies of the EA and further

information concerning the proposed action are available from: Mr. G.

Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 23786,

Washington, DC 20026-3786, (202) 586-5368.

For further information regarding the DOE NEPA Process, contact:

Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance,

Office of Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy,

1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or

(800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Purpose and Need

DOE needs to develop the capability to disassemble surplus

plutonium pits which are sealed in metallic shells. (A pit is a nuclear

weapons component.) In order to develop this capability in a timely

manner, safety and operational design information must be obtained from

the actual disassembly of up to 250 representative pits and the

conversion of the recovered plutonium to plutonium metal ingots and

plutonium dioxide. The resulting experience would be used to supplement

information developed to support the design of a full-scale disassembly

and conversion facility should DOE decide to construct such a facility

in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement

(SPD EIS) Record of Decision (ROD).

Background

DOE is implementing a long-term program to provide safe and secure

storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, and to allow for the

timely disposition of weapons-usable plutonium declared surplus to

national security needs. The program's goal is to ensure that there is

a high standard of security and accounting of these materials while in

storage, and that the surplus plutonium is never used again in nuclear

weapons.

In January 1997, DOE issued the ROD for the Storage and Disposition

of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition Final PEIS). In the PEIS ROD,

DOE announced a decision to pursue a strategy to dispose of surplus

United States plutonium that allows for two separate approaches: (1)

Immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium;

and (2) using some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in existing

commercial reactors. In that decision, DOE explained that the timing

and extent to which either or both of the disposition approaches are

ultimately deployed would depend in part on the follow-on SPD EIS, as

well as technology development and research.

Proposed Action

In order to meet the purpose and need for this action, DOE proposes

that an integrated Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration take

place at LANL's Plutonium Facility-4 in Technical Area-55. No new

facilities are needed to support this demonstration; however, minor

internal modifications

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would be made to existing facilities. These minor modifications,

relating to the installation of new gloveboxes, would not involve

worker exposure.

Implementation of this demonstration requires direct demonstration

activities, such as pit bisection, and general support activities, such

as receipt and storage of plutonium, that are typical support

activities at LANL. These direct and support activities include the

following:

Shipment of pits and non-pit, clean plutonium metal from

offsite to LANL;

Receipt, unpackaging, and placement into storage of

offsite pit and non-pit, clean plutonium metal;

Interim storage of pit and non-pit, clean plutonium metal,

awaiting use in the demonstration;

Removal of any external pit features;

Bisection and disassembly of pits;

Processing pit hemishells to separate the plutonium from

other materials;

Recasting the plutonium to metal ingots or converting it

to plutonium dioxide;

Thermally processing the plutonium to remove gallium and

other impurities;

Sealing the plutonium in an appropriate container for

storage;

Decontaminating the container;

Sealing the decontaminated container in a second

container;

Performing nondestructive assay on all components for

material accountability purposes; and

Storing the resulting plutonium metal and plutonium

dioxide until an ultimate disposition decision is made.

These direct and support activities are analyzed in this EA to capture

the cumulative impact of this demonstration.

Technical Area-55 has historically performed plutonium processing

activities similar to those required in this demonstration, and

currently disassembles pits in a series of individual gloveboxes. Most

of the plutonium, in the form of pits or metal, to be used in the

demonstration would be taken from storage at LANL. Additional surplus

pits may be shipped from the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, or the

Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) near Golden,

Colorado, if there is a need to test additional types of pits.

Plutonium in the form of metal would be shipped, if needed, from the

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) near

Idaho Falls, Idaho; the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South

Carolina; or the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in

Livermore, California. Highly enriched uranium would be recovered from

some of the pits during the disassembly process and shipped to DOE's

Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) for storage in accordance with DOE's Y-12

Plant EA and the Storage and Disposition Final PEIS.

Alternatives Considered

In addition to the No Action Alternative, the EA also discusses the

consideration of DOE sites other than LANL for this proposed action.

No Action: Under the No Action Alternative, an integrated pit

disassembly and conversion line would not be demonstrated at LANL.

Research related to these activities would continue to be performed in

a series of individual gloveboxes. Information that would be generated

as a result of the proposed Pit Disassembly and Conversion

Demonstration (e.g., specifications for the main operating line and

information needed to optimize the layout in terms of shielding,

residence time in the gloveboxes, and distance between gloveboxes)

would not be available under the No Action Alternative.

Consideration of Other DOE Sites: Other DOE sites were considered

for this proposed action. The only other site, however, that was a

potential alternative was LLNL because it is the only other DOE

national laboratory with extensive, operating plutonium facilities that

could be used to conduct the demonstration. LLNL was eliminated from

further consideration because, among other things, LLNL's plutonium

administrative limits are significantly lower and would restrict the

proposed demonstration. Furthermore, because much of the plutonium that

would be used in the demonstration is already located at LANL, it would

need to be transported to LLNL. In addition, the capabilities at LANL

were readily available during the timeframe in which DOE needed the

demonstration to be conducted. Also, the majority of the gloveboxes

that would be used in the demonstration are already at LANL.

Consequently, there would be no need to decontaminate LANL gloveboxes

for the express purpose of sending them to LLNL for use in the

demonstration.

DOE also considered other potential disassembly and conversion

options as alternatives to the proposed demonstration. However, none of

the potential options are reasonable alternatives and, therefore, are

not analyzed in detail in the EA. As one potential option, DOE

considered a demonstration that would involve disassembling a fewer

number of pits. However, this option would not encompass all of the

types of surplus pits that would be involved in surplus plutonium

disposition (immobilization or MOX fuel) or continued safe storage. As

such, this option would not meet the purpose and need for the proposed

demonstration and would not generate complete information. For

conversion, DOE considered the potential alternative of converting only

plutonium from pits, but not non-pit plutonium metal, to plutonium

dioxide. Since this option would exclude plutonium metal, this option

would not test and demonstrate conversion of all types of surplus

plutonium material that may be subject to disposition under the MOX or

immobilization approaches, would not generate complete information, and

would not fully meet the purpose and need for the proposed

demonstration. In addition, DOE considered converting plutonium to a

metal form only. This option would not test and demonstrate conversion

of pit plutonium to the oxide form most suitable for either

immobilization or MOX fuel. Thus, this option would not generate

complete information, and would not fully meet the purpose and need for

the proposed action.

Environmental Impacts

The environmental consequences of the proposed action are not

expected to result in any appreciable risks to members of the public,

workers, or the environment. The results of evaluations in key impact

areas are summarized, as follows:

Water Quality Impacts--A small amount of process water would be

used as part of the decontamination module. This process water, less

than 100 liters (26 gallons) per year, would be handled in accordance

with LANL's procedures for the treatment and disposal of liquid low-

level waste. No increased release of radionuclides is expected by

liquid pathways as a result of the proposed action.

Air Quality Impacts--As a part of this demonstration, it is

estimated that small amounts of plutonium and americium would be

released into the atmosphere. The maximally exposed individual (MEI) is

estimated to receive an effective dose equivalent of 0.043 mrem per

year from the demonstration and a total dose from all site operations

of 4.3 mrem per year. There is not expected to be any airbourne release

of beryllium as a result of the demonstration. Any hazardous compounds

released would be very small quantities related to routine cleaning

operations connected with the demonstration.

[[Page 44853]]

Radiological Impacts--Total radiological releases would be

significantly lower than either the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) limit or past annual releases from LANL. The resulting

maximum concentrations for radionuclides measured at the location of

the MEI for the demonstration is estimated to be less than two percent

of the EPA limit. Radiological impacts associated with the proposed

action could increase LANL total site impacts by a small percentage

(1.0 percent for the MEI, 1.3 percent for the surrounding population,

and 1.3 percent for the average individual).

Under the proposed action, the estimated annual average dose to pit

disassembly workers would be 750 mrem. The annual dose received by the

plutonium workers who would perform these activities would increase by

35 person-rem to 90 person-rem. Doses to individual workers would be

kept to minimal levels by current administrative policies, exposure

monitoring, and the as low as reasonably achievable program.

Accident Impacts--The spectrum of plausible accidents and abnormal

events associated with the proposed action was evaluated to identify

those with the highest radiological impacts. The consequences of the

hydride-oxidation (HYDOX) process accidents are more severe and

therefore envelope process accident consequences. The hydrogen

deflagration in the reactor vessel was identified as having the highest

potential consequences to the public. A mitigated accident, where

credit is taken for the building's ventilation system including high-

efficiency particulate air filters and other features, would result in

a source term of 1.4 x 10-8 grams of plutonium and a MEI

dose at the site boundary, near the Royal Crest Trailer Court, of

2.8 x 10-8 rem. The likelihood of this accident occurring

was categorized as ``unlikely.'' Workers in the room at the time of the

deflagration may be injured by flying glass and other missiles

depending on their proximity to the deflagration.

Waste Management Impacts--The proposed action would generate

transuranic waste, low-level waste, mixed low-level waste, and

hazardous waste, but the volume generated is expected to be small.

Therefore, the projected increase in the total waste volume for each

category would have little or no impact on current LANL waste

management processes and procedures.

Transportation Impacts--Under the proposed action, plutonium in the

form of pits, might be shipped to LANL from RFETS or the Pantex Plant

and in the form of metal from INEEL, SRS, or LLNL. Highly enriched

uranium recovered from these pits would be shipped to ORR. The greatest

risk to the public from these proposed shipments would be from a

traffic accident involving the safe secure trailer (SST) or the escort

vehicles and not from radiological exposure. If the demonstration is

implemented, it is estimated that this proposed action would result in

a risk to the public (either as a latent cancer or a traffic accident)

of less than 5 chances in 1,000 of a fatality.

Socioeconomic Impacts--The proposed action would not affect

employment at LANL because no additional personnel are anticipated to

be required to support the demonstration. It is standard practice for

workers at LANL to move from one project to another without any impact

on the overall employment level. No significant socioeconomic effects,

therefore, would be expected to result from the proposed action.

Environmental Justice Impacts--Implementation of the proposed

action would pose no significant risk to the general population

including minority and low-income populations. No disproportionately

high and adverse impacts on minority and low-income populations would

result from implementation of the proposed action.

Other Environmental Impacts--The demonstration would be located

within an existing building, Plutonium Facility-4. Therefore, there

would not be any new construction that could affect floodplains,

wetlands, biological resources, or cultural resources.

Cumulative Impacts--The Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact

Statement on the Continued Operation of the Los Alamos National

Laboratory (Draft LANL Site-Wide EIS), which is incorporated by

reference in the EA, discusses the cumulative impacts of the proposed

demonstration, ongoing LANL operations, potential expanded LANL

operations, and other activities in the LANL region. As explained in

the Draft LANL Site-Wide EIS, expanded operations at LANL, including

the proposed demonstration and other activities, would result in an

additional latent cancer fatality risk of about .0002 over the lifetime

of the MEI.

No Action Alternative Impacts--Under the No Action Alternative, an

integrated pit disassembly and conversion line would not be

demonstrated at LANL. There would, therefore, be no change in the

current environmental or health effects associated with work done in

Plutonium Facility-4 and Technical Area-55, and these facilities would

continue to operate as they do currently.

Transportation Risks Associated with the No Action Alternative--

Under the No Action Alternative, pits or plutonium metal would not be

shipped to LANL from INEEL, LLNL, RFETS, SRS or Pantex, and there would

not be any highly enriched uranium recovered from these pits, so there

would be no shipments of highly enriched uranium to ORR. However, DOE

has committed to consolidate its inventory of weapons-grade plutonium,

so the pits at RFETS would continue to be be shipped to Pantex, where

they would be stored pending a decision on their ultimate disposition

in accordance with the ROD that would be issued after the SPD Final EIS

is completed. The greatest risk to the public from this alternative

would continue to be from a traffic accident involving the SST or its

escort vehicles and not from radiological exposure.

Determination

Based on the analysis in the EA, and after considering the

preapproval review comments, I conclude that the proposed action does

not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. Therefore,

an EIS for the proposed action is not required.

Issued in Washington, DC, this 14th day of August 1998.

Andre I. Cygelman,

Acting Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Department of

Energy.

[FR Doc. 98-22524 Filed 8-20-98; 8:45 am]

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