Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150-AF98

Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering amending the

event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors: to update the

current rules, including reducing or eliminating the reporting burden

associated with events of little or no safety significance; and to

better align the rules with the NRC's current needs, including revising

reporting requirements based on importance to risk and extending the

required reporting times consistent with the need for prompt NRC

action. This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public

comment on issues related to such an amendment.

The Commission is also interested in evaluating other current

regulations to identify areas where reporting requirements can be

simplified and/or modified to a less burdensome, more risk-informed

approach, and this advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public

comment on identification of other reporting requirements that are

potential candidates for such modification.

DATE: Submit comments by September 21, 1998. Comments received after

this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the

Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received

on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20055-0001, Attention:

Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff.

Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,

between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.

Electronic comments may be provided via the NRC's interactive

rulemaking web site through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov).

From the home page, select ``Rulemaking'' from the tool bar at the

bottom of the page. The interactive rulemaking website can then be

accessed by selecting ``Rulemaking Forum.'' This site provides the

ability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser

supports that function. For information about the interactive

rulemaking web site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e-

mail [email protected]

Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments

received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L

Street NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents also

may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the interactive

rulemaking website established by NRC for this rulemaking.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis

and Evaluation of Operational Data, Washington DC 20555-0001, telephone

(301) 415-6835, e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Section 50.72 has been in effect, with minor modifications, since

1983. Its essential purpose is ``* * * to provide the Commission with

immediate reporting of twelve types of significant events where

immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may

be required or where the Commission needs timely and accurate

information to respond to heightened public concern.'' (48 FR 39039;

August 29, 1983). Events defined in Sec. 50.72 are currently required

to be reported, by telephone, in the following time frames:

(1) Declaration of an emergency class is reported immediately after

notification of appropriate State or local agencies and not later than

1-hour after declaration.

(2) Non-emergency, 1-hour events are reported as soon as practical

and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence.

(3) Non-emergency, 4-hour events are reported as soon as practical

and in all cases within 4 hours of occurrence.

(4) Followup notification is made immediately during the course of

the event for: further degradation in the level of plant safety, other

worsening plant conditions, declaration of an emergency class, changes

in an emergency class, termination of an emergency class, results of

ensuing evaluations of plant conditions, effectiveness of response or

protective measures taken, or information related to plant behavior

that is not understood.

Section 50.73 has also been in effect, with minor modification,

since 1983. Its essential purpose is to identify ``* * * the types of

reactor events and problems that are believed to be significant and

useful to the NRC in its effort to identify and resolve threats to

public safety. It is designed to provide the information necessary for

engineering studies of operational anomalies and trends and patterns

analysis of operational occurrences. The same information can be used

for other analytic procedures that will aid in identifying accident

precursors.'' (48 FR 33851; July 26, 1983). Events defined in

Sec. 50.73 are reported, in writing, within 30 days of discovery. Most

of these events are initially reported under Sec. 50.72. However, for

two categories of events the initial report is the 30-day LER. These

categories are: (1) Operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS

and (2) failure of independent components due to a common cause.

Experience has shown a need for change in several areas. Specific

proposals under consideration are discussed below.

State Input

Many States (Agreement States and Non-Agreement States) have

agreements with power reactors to inform the States of plant issues.

State reporting requirements are frequently triggered by NRC reporting

requirements. Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input on issues related

to amending power reactor reporting requirements. Appropriate State

agencies will be requested by letter to provide comments on this

advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

Specific NRC Proposals for Amending 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73

Objectives: The objectives of contemplated amendments would include

the following.

(1) To better align the reporting requirements with the NRC's

current reporting needs. Examples would

[[Page 39523]]

include: (a) extending the required reporting times, consistent with

the need for timely NRC action and (b) revising the reporting

requirements based on importance to risk, such as by adding reports

related to actuation of systems that are risk-significant and dropping

reports related to actuation of systems that are not risk-significant.

(2) To reduce the reporting burden, consistent with the NRC's

reporting needs. Examples include: (a) reducing or eliminating the

reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety

significance, provided reporting is not otherwise needed to support NRC

regulatory programs, and (b) simplifying the reporting effort, such as

by redesigning the LER form to employ a ``check the box'' approach to

the extent feasible.

(3) To clarify the reporting requirements where needed. The

principal example would be clarifying which events involving design or

analysis defects or deviations must be reported.

Issues and contemplated amendments: The issues under consideration

and the contemplated amendments include the following.

(1) Required initial reporting times. In the contemplated

amendments, the required initial reporting times would be as follows.

(a) Emergencies: Declaration of an emergency class would continue

to be reported immediately after notification of appropriate State or

local agencies and not later than 1-hour after declaration. Emergency

actions taken pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(x) would continue to be reported

as soon as practical and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence.

(b) Follow up notifications: Follow up notifications during the

course of an event would continue to be made immediately.

(c) Loss of capability to perform safety function: An event or

condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a

structure or system [as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and

50.73(a)(2)(v)] would be reported promptly (e.g., within 8 hours) if

the plant is in a mode where the affected structure or system is

required to be operable. Otherwise, the initial report would be

required in writing within 30 days. It should be noted that an event or

condition that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function includes

design and analysis defects and deviations. For example, if there is a

defect in an analysis and as a result of that defect a system is not

capable of performing its specified safety functions, that is a

reportable event or condition under this criterion. In addition,

reportable events or conditions can result from factors such as:

personnel errors; procedure violations; procedural errors; equipment

failures; inadequate maintenance; or deficiencies in fabrication,

construction or equipment qualification.

(d) Partial loss of capability to perform a safety function: An

operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS [as described in 10

CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)] would continue to be reported in writing within

30 days. It should be noted that an operation or condition prohibited

by the plant's TS results from any operation or condition, including a

design or analysis defect or deviation, that results in one train of a

multiple-train safety system being incapable of performing its

specified safety function for a period of time longer than allowed by

the TS.

(e) No loss of capability to perform a safety function: Conditions,

including design or analysis defects or deviations, that do not result

in a structure, system, or train being incapable of performing its

specified safety function would no longer be reportable under 10 CFR

50.72 and 50.73, unless they meet one of the other reporting criteria

discussed below. However, other regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR

50.59, 10 CFR 50.71(e), or Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 may be applicable.

(f) Other non-emergency events: Other non-emergency events that are

currently reported in 1 hour would be reported in 8 hours, except for a

condition outside the coverage of procedures, which would be deleted as

discussed further in Item (7) below. Thus, the remaining events in this

category, which would be reported in 8 hours, are summarized as

follows:

(i) Initiation of shutdown (S/D) required by (TS);

(ii) Serious degradation of plant including its principal safety

barriers;

(iii) Plant in unanalyzed condition, significantly compromising

plant safety;

(iv) External condition that poses an actual threat or

significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties

necessary for safe operation of the plant;

(v) Valid Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal

that results (or should have resulted) in discharge to the reactor

coolant system;

(vi) Internal event that poses an actual threat or significantly

hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for safe

operation of the plant; and,

(vii) Major loss of capability for emergency assessment, offsite

response, or communication.

Unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), which

is currently reported in 4 hours, would be reported in 8 hours when the

reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing within

30 days. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF)

other than the RPS, which is currently reported in 4 hours, would be

reported in 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual

actuation or (b) a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual

plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be

reported in writing within 30 days.

Other non-emergency events that are currently reported in 4 hours

would be reported in 8 hours. These are summarized as follows:

(i) Airborne radioactive release that results in concentrations

over 20 times allowable levels in an unrestricted area;

(ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 times allowable concentrations

released to an unrestricted area;

(iii) Radioactively contaminated person transported to an offsite

medical facility for treatment;

(iv) News release or other government agency notification related

to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or

protection of the environment;

(v) Defect in a spent fuel storage cask structure, system, or

component which is important to safety or significant reduction in the

effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system.

Failure of independent components due to a common cause would

continue to be reportable in writing within 30 days.

(2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or

condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a

structure or system. The current rules require reporting ``Any event or

condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety

function of structures or systems that are needed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown

condition;

(B) Remove residual heat;

(C) Control the release of radioactive material; or

(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'' [Emphasis added.]

In the contemplated amendments, in order to eliminate any potential

for misunderstanding the requirement, the wording would be revised to

require reporting any event or condition that alone or in combination

with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment

of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to * *

*

[[Page 39524]]

(3) Reporting of design issues: In the contemplated amendments

there would be no specific criterion to require reporting conditions

outside the design basis of the plant. However, depending on whether

they result in loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety

function, design or analysis defects or deviations would be reported as

discussed in Items (1)(c) and (1)(d) above.

There has been some confusion and controversy about the meaning of

the current requirement to report conditions outside the design basis

of the plant. For instance, in one case the Final Safety Analysis

Report (FSAR) characterized a building design basis as follows:

pressure relief panels will relieve at about 45 psf in order to ensure

that building pressure does not exceed its design pressure of 80 psf.

When it was found that the panels would not relieve at 45 psf but would

still relieve well below 80 psf, controversy ensued between the NRC

staff and the licensee regarding whether a report was required.

Under the contemplated amendments, the pressure relief panel

example, discussed above, would not be reportable because the structure

(building that houses the potentially affected safety systems) remains

within its design capabilities so that the systems within the building

would still be capable of performing their specified safety functions.

The event would be reportable if the pressure relief panels would not

prevent the building from exceeding its design capabilities such that

the systems housed within the building would not be considered capable

of performing their specified safety functions because of potential

building collapse.

(4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses:

Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue

to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it applies, as is

currently the case. As required by that section, failure to meet the

ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature [PCT] greater

than 2200 deg.F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and 50.73. Errors where

PCT increases by more than 50 deg.F but remains below 2200 deg.F

would be reported in writing in 30 days. Lesser errors would be

compiled and reported annually.

(5) Reporting of information with a significant implication for

public health and safety or common defense and security: In connection

with the contemplated amendments, no changes would be made with regard

to the requirement in 10 CFR 50.9(b) to report ``* * * information

identified by the applicant or licensee as having for the regulated

activity a significant implication for public health and safety or

common defense and security.''

(6) Reporting of missed or late equipment surveillance tests.

Section 50.73 requires reporting a condition or operation prohibited by

the plant's TS. In some cases, this leads to reporting events that

consist of late surveillance tests where the oversight is corrected and

the equipment is tested. These events have proven to be of little or no

risk-significance when the equipment is found to be functional or,

alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented (i.e., any

applicable action statements are carried out) and no systematic

breakdown of compliance with the TS is involved.

In the contemplated amendments, the reporting requirement would be

eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance

tests where there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS,

the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment

is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are

implemented.

(7) Reporting of a condition outside the coverage of procedures.

The current requirement is to report when the plant is in ``a condition

not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.''

Experience indicates that this criterion does not result in needed

reports. In addition, this criterion is redundant since the other

reporting criteria capture events of safety significance.

In the contemplated amendments, the requirement to report a

condition outside the coverage of procedures would be deleted.

(8) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF. The

current requirement is to report ``Any event or condition that results

in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature

(ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS) except when * *

*.'' This leads to confusion and variability in reporting because there

are varying definitions of what constitutes an ESF. It also leads to

reporting for systems of lesser risk-significance, such as reactor

water clean up system (RWCU) isolation.

In the contemplated amendments, instead of using the term ESF, the

rules would specify the systems for which reporting is required.

Systems with lesser risk-significance would be dropped and systems with

greater risk-significance would be added. The result would be similar

to the discussion in the NRC staff's reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-

1022, Revision 1, ``Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and

50.73,'' January 1998, Page 60.) These changes would result in the

following list:

(a) Reactor Protection System (reactor scram, reactor trip).

(b) Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (general actuation

signals affecting numerous components such as: safety injection

actuation signal, containment isolation signal, or recirculation

actuation signal).

(c) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for Pressurized Water

Reactors (PWRs) including: high-, intermediate-, and low-head injection

systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay)

heat removal systems.

(d) ECCS for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) including: high-and low-

pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system,

feedwater coolant injection system, the low pressure injection function

of the residual heat removal system; and automatic depressurization

system.

(e) BWR Isolation Condenser System and Reactor Core Isolation

Cooling System.

(f) Containment Systems including: containment and reactor vessel

isolation systems (general containment isolation signals affecting

numerous valves, main steam isolation valve [MSIV] closure signals in

BWRs); and containment heat removal and depressurization systems,

including the containment spray and the fan cooler system.

(g) Electrical Systems including: emergency ac electrical power

systems, including emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and their

associated support systems; the hydroelectric facilities used in lieu

of EDGs at the Oconee Station; safety related gas turbine generators;

BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs and their associated support systems; and

station blackout diesel generators (and black-start gas turbines that

serve a similar purpose and are started from the control room and

included in the plant's and emergency procedures).

(h) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigating Systems.

(i) PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.

(j) Service Water (actuation of standby, emergency service water

systems only).

(k) Reactor Building and Containment Annulus Filter Systems.

(9) Shutdown events. The current rule requires providing the

``Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at

the start of the event and that contributed to the event'' and ``An

assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the

[[Page 39525]]

event. This assessment must include the availability of other systems

or components that could have performed the same function as the

components and systems that failed during the event.'' In some cases,

this does not provide enough information to estimate the risk

associated with important shutdown events.

In the contemplated amendments, these requirements would be

clarified to better indicate information required on the status of

systems that are included in the operating or emergency procedures that

could have been used in recovering from the event to support risk

assessment of the event.

(10) Human performance. The current rule requires reporting the

following information regarding human performance as a part of the

narrative description of the event contained in the written 30 day

report:

``(1) Operator actions that affected the course of the event,

including operator errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, that

contributed to the event.

(2) For each personnel error, the licensee shall discuss:

(i) Whether the error was a cognitive error (e.g., failure to

recognize the actual plant condition, failure to realize which systems

should be functioning, failure to recognize the true nature of the

event) or a procedural error;

(ii) Whether the error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a

direct result of an error in an approved procedure, or was associated

with an activity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure;

(iii) Any unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., heat,

noise) that directly contributed to the error; and

(iv) The type of personnel involved (i.e., contractor personnel,

utility-licensed operator, utility non-licensed operator, other utility

personnel).''

Human performance information is needed to support analysis of

human error probabilities used in risk assessments. This helps in

making risk-informed decisions regarding human performance issues in

areas such as inspection program development, evaluation of licensing

actions, preparation of generic communications and resolution of

generic issues. Consistent with the advanced incident reporting system

of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee on the Safety of Nuclear

Installations (CSNI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

the contemplated amendments would require information on how the human

performance factors listed below affected the event to the extent they

apply. (See NEA/CSNI/R(97)15, PART I, ``Improving Reporting and Coding

of Human and Organizational Factors in Event Reports,'' April 1998,

Page 15 and Page 16.)

(a) Personnel errors and human performance related issues in the

areas of procedures, training, communication, human engineering,

management, and supervision.

(b) In the area of procedures, errors due to missing procedures,

procedures which are inadequate due to technical or human factors

deficiencies, or which have not been maintained current.

(c) Training errors due to a failure to provide training, having

provided inadequate training, or training (such as simulator training

or on-the-job training) that does not provide an environment comparable

to that in the plant.

(d) Communications errors due to inadequate, untimely,

misunderstood, or missing communication or due to the quality of the

communication equipment.

(e) Human engineering issues related to the interface or lack

thereof between the human and the machine (such as size, shape,

location, function or content of displays, controls, equipment or

labels) as well as environmental issues such as lighting, temperature,

noise, radiation and work area layout.

(f) Management errors due to management expectations, corrective

actions, root cause determinations, or audits which are inadequate,

untimely or missing.

(g) In the area of supervision, errors due a lack of supervision,

inadequate supervision, job staffing, overtime, scheduling and

planning, work practices (such as briefings, logs, work packages, team

work, decision making, and housekeeping) or because of inadequate

verification, awareness or self-checking.

(h) The department for which key personnel work and the type of

work or activity being performed.

This information is already being captured in the narrative section

of most LERs submitted under the current rule, as discussed in the NRC

staff's reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-1022, Revision 1, ``Event

Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,'' January 1998, Page

110.) The amended rule would explicitly recognize the information

discussed in the guidelines.

In the amended rule, such human performance information would be

provided using a ``check the box'' approach added to the LER form, to

minimize the reporting burden.

(11) LER form. The current LER form relies heavily on a narrative

to provide information such as the human performance information

discussed above, equipment that was not available, and equipment that

was actuated. It appears that the reporting effort could be reduced by

adopting a ``check the box'' approach to the extent practical. A

narrative would still be required to convey an understanding of the

event. However, data regarding human and equipment performance, for

example, would be included in the narrative only if they are pertinent

to understanding the event.

In conjunction with the contemplated amendments, the LER form would

be redesigned to reduce the reporting effort. To the extent practical,

this approach would be compatible with equipment failure reporting in

the industry's Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX)

program.

(12) Electronic reporting. The NRC staff is currently planning to

implement an electronic reporting program, known as the Agency-wide

Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), that will in general

provide for electronic submittal of many types of reports, including

LERs. Accordingly, no separate rulemaking effort to provide for

electronic submittal of LERs is contemplated.

(13) Enforcement. Since the criteria for reporting arising from

this rulemaking would focus on matters of safety significance and be

more risk informed, the reporting criteria may be a relevant

consideration in determining the severity level of a violation under

the Enforcement Policy. The staff intends to consider the reporting

criteria in its ongoing review of the severity levels in the NRC

Enforcement Policy.

Contemplated Schedule: The contemplated schedule for the rulemaking

is as follows:

8/21/98, Conduct public workshop to discuss ANPR

9/18/98, Receive public comments on ANPR

10/16/98, Provide proposed rule package to NRC staff

working group for comment

11/27/98, Provide proposed rule package to formal

concurrence chain

1/8/99, Provide proposed rule package to CRGR and ACRS

2/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS

2/26/99, Provide proposed rule package to Commission

4/2/99, Publish proposed rule

5/2/99, Initial public comments due to OMB (with copies to

NRC), 30 days after publication

6/1/99, Receive OMB approval, 60 days after publication

6/15/99, Public comments due to NRC, 75 days after

publication

[[Page 39526]]

7/2/99, Provide final rule package to NRC staff working

group for comment

8/13/99, Provide final rule package to formal concurrence

chain

9/17/99, Provide final rule package to CRGR and ACRS

11/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS

11/26/99, Provide final rule package to Commission

1/7/00, Publish final rule

Comments requested: The Commission invites advice and

recommendations from all interested persons regarding changes to the

event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors contained in 10

CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Comments and supporting reasons are particularly

requested on:

(1) the objectives;

(2) the contemplated amendments, including:

(a) the clarity and specificity of the contemplated criteria for

reporting design and analysis defects and deviations; and

(b) the proposed initial reporting time of 8 hours for events that

warrant prompt telephone notification but do not involve emergencies;

(3) the contemplated schedule.

To the extent feasible, commenters are requested to address the

following factors.

(1) Identify a specific reporting requirement.

(2) Describe the problem with that requirement.

(3) Describe the proposed resolution.

(4) Estimate the change in resource burden as a result of the

proposed resolution.

In order to support meaningful consideration, comments on resource

burden should provide the basis for the burden estimate in sufficient

detail to allow specific identification of what causes the burden and

how particular changes might affect the burden.

Other Reactor Reporting Requirements

Objectives: The NRC is also interested in evaluating other reactor

reporting rules (beyond 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73) to identify areas where

reporting requirements can be risk-informed and/or simplified. For

example, the time limit for reporting could be adjusted based on the

safety significance of the event or issue and the need for NRC's

immediate action. The burden associated with reporting events,

conditions or issues with little or no safety or risk significance

should be minimized.

Comments requested: Public comments are requested to identify and

propose changes to other reactor reporting requirements (beyond 10 CFR

50.72 and 50.73) that are potential candidates for modifying to a

simplified, less burdensome, more risk-informed approach. This issue

will be included in the agenda for the public meeting to discuss this

ANPR, which is identified in the schedule provided above.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire

protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and

reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for this document is: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42

U.S.C. 5841.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of July, 1998

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

L. Joseph Callan,

Executive Director for Operations

[FR Doc. 98-19637 Filed 7-22-98; 8:45 am]

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