Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Docket No. 87-2, Notice. No. 7]

RIN 2130-AB20

Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement

System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final order of particular applicability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA issues an order of particular applicability (order)

applying to certain trains operating on the track controlled by the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the Northeast

Corridor (NEC) between Washington, DC, and Boston, Massachusetts. The

order requires all trains operating between New Haven, Connecticut and

Boston (NEC-North End) to be controlled by locomotives equipped to

respond to a new advanced civil speed enforcement system (ACSES) in

addition to the automatic train control (ATC) system currently required

on the NEC. On the NEC between Washington, DC and New York, New York

(NEC-South End), where access to the high-speed track is prevented by

switches locked in the normal position and a parallel route to the

high-speed track is provided at crossovers from adjacent tracks, and

where no junctions providing direct access exist, ACSES-equipped trains

may operate to a maximum speed not to exceed 135 miles per hour (mph).

This order also contains performance standards for the cab signal/ATC

and ACSES systems on the NEC, and authorizes increases in certain

maximum authorized train speeds and safety requirements supporting

improved rail service.

DATES: This order becomes effective on August 21, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E. Goodman, Staff Director, Signal

and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

SW, Washington, DC, 20590 ((202) 632-3353), Paul Weber, Railroad Safety

Specialist, Signal and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC, 20590 ((202) 632-3354), or

Patricia V. Sun, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590 ( (202) 632-3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

FRA has both discrete and plenary legal authority to require all

trains operating on the NEC to be equipped with automatic train control

devices. FRA has broad legal authority to ``prescribe regulations, and

issue orders for every area of railroad safety * * *'' 49 U.S.C. 20103.

Section 20502 of Title 49, United States Code specifically provides

that ``[w]hen the Secretary of Transportation decides after an

investigation that it is necessary in the public interest, the

Secretary may order a railroad carrier to install * * * a signal system

that complies with the requirements of the Secretary.'' As originally

enacted and prior to formal codification, this provision referred to

``automatic train stop, train control, and/or other similar appliances,

methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of railroad

operation * * .'' This authority has been previously invoked to require

the installation of signal systems on 49 specific railroads and to

require all railroads desiring to operate at high speeds to install

signal systems of varying degrees of sophistication consonant with

those higher speeds.

Proceedings to Date

On November 20, 1997, FRA published a Proposed Order of Particular

Applicability (proposed order) that would require all trains operating

on the NEC-North End to be controlled by locomotives equipped to

respond to a new advanced civil speed enforcement system in addition to

the automatic train control system currently required on the NEC (62 FR

62097).

The proposed order called for written comments to be received by

January 20, 1998, and requests for a public hearing to be received by

December 22, 1997. On February 17, 1998, FRA held a public hearing at

the request of several commentators.

Background--Development of the NEC

Amtrak provides service over the NEC from Washington, DC, to

Boston, Massachusetts. Amtrak owns or dispatches most of the NEC, which

it shares with several commuter authorities and freight railroads.

Current speeds on the NEC-North End range up to 110 mph.

[[Page 39344]]

Amtrak is currently undertaking a major improvement project on the

NEC, with particular emphasis on completion of electrification,

installation of concrete ties and high-speed turnouts, elimination of

some remaining highway-rail crossings, and other modifications

concentrated between New Haven and Boston. These improvements are

designed to facilitate service utilizing high-speed trains (HSTs) at

speeds up to 150 mph. During 1999, Amtrak will begin taking delivery of

HSTs expected to qualify for operation through curves at higher levels

of unbalance (and thus higher speeds) than conventional trains.

Through this order, FRA ensures that planning for high-speed

service will not occur in isolation from measures that could reasonably

address increased traffic densities, and drive future innovative

technology.

Regulatory Approvals Required

In general, new signal and train control systems must comply with

FRA's Rules, Standards and Instructions Governing the Installation,

Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control

Systems, Devices, and Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will implement

any exceptions on a case-by-case basis through the waiver process as

provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train operations in excess of 110 mph must

be authorized by FRA after examination of pertinent safety

considerations in accordance with 49 CFR 213.9(c) (operating speed

limits). Metroliner service on the NEC is already conducted in

accordance with such an authorization.

In addition, NEC operations are subject to special requirements of

the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, which mandated that all NEC

trains be equipped with ``automatic train control systems designed to

slow or stop a train in response to external signals.'' Sec. 9, Pub. L.

No. 100-342, implemented at 52 FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433

(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct. 12, 1988).

Summary of the Proposed Order

The proposed order would implement ACSES on the NEC-North End by

October 1, 1999, allowing Amtrak to increase its maximum operating

speed on this segment of the NEC from 105 mph to 150 mph. In addition

to Amtrak, the Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT),

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), the Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority (MBTA), and the Providence and Worcester

Railroad Company (P&W), which also operate on this territory, would be

required to equip their locomotives and cab cars with ACSES. (On July

23, 1998, the Surface Transportation Board is expected to approve the

division of Conrail between the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS) and

the CSX Corporation (CSX); NS and CSX have yet to announce a date for

this division. NS and CSX, as successors to Conrail, will be subject to

this order to the extent that they operate on this segment of the NEC.)

FRA initially discussed the features and functions of ACSES with

the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee in September of 1994, and

Amtrak continued to brief the affected railroads as system development

proceeded. ACSES would enforce permanent speed restrictions caused by

curves, bridges and other factors, positive stops at interlocking home

signals and control points, work limits, and temporary slow orders,

through transponders similar to those used by European railroads.

Transponders are devices containing encoded information on such factors

as location and distance to the beginning of a speed restriction, type

of speed restriction, target speed, average grade, distance to the next

transponder, and message verification information. Transponders would

be installed at all approaches to interlockings within high speed

territory, including those where trains could mistakenly pass an

interlocking signal and encroach onto high speed track, as part of a

train control system which would be independent of the on-board cab

signal/automatic train control system, but would interface with it to

provide displays to train crews on factors such as civil speed

restrictions, trains located ahead, and interlocking conditions. A data

radio network would be used to download temporary movement

restrictions, among other functions.

Equipped rail vehicles would continuously transmit a signal which,

when received by a transponder, would cause the transponder to transmit

back its encoded message. Those messages, including speed and braking

conditions, would be received in the train's cab, interpreted by an on-

board computer, and passed along to the train's engineer for

appropriate action. If necessary, automatic braking would take place.

Amtrak would also expand its existing 4-aspect cab signal system,

which provides for ``restricted speed'', 30 mph, 45 mph, and the

maximum authorized speed for the equipment on which it is installed, to

a 9-aspect system, which provides for additional aspects of 60 mph, 80

mph, 100 mph, 125 mph, and 150 mph. The current 4-aspect system employs

a 100 Hz carrier frequency coded at the rates of 75, 120, and 180

pulses per minute; the 9-aspect system would employ an additional

carrier frequency of 250 Hz, and an additional code rate of 270 pulses

per minute. Amtrak developed this 9-aspect system to provide four

independent functions: (1) Operation of high-speed trainsets at a new

maximum speed of 150 mph; (2) higher speed diverging signal aspects,

upgrading the previous 45 mph diverging aspect; (3) an enforced 30 mph

diverging aspect; and (4) closer headways by adding three enforced

speeds between the existing 45 mph and 125 mph enforced speeds.

On the NEC-South End, the proposed order would require ACSES

wherever speeds exceeded 125 mph (the current maximum speed), with only

high speed trains equipped where crossovers could be locked to avoid

incursion. The proposed order contemplated, but did not require,

implementation of ACSES by all NEC users (except possibly the Metro-

North Commuter Railroad Company), including Amtrak, commuter railroads,

and freight carriers. To minimize the impact on users, ACSES would be

implemented incrementally as funding became available, so that

operational benefits could begin immediately as each portion of line

and each vehicle became equipped.

Summary of Modifications to the Proposed Order

In response to comments and technical changes in the proposed order

FRA has made modifications in this final order, the more significant of

which are highlighted below. The proposed order stated that comments

received after the close of the comment period would be considered to

the extent possible. Amtrak has continued to refine and adapt its

design specifications, as proposed in Amtrak's February 17, 1998

supplemental comments, May 8, 1998 letter (copies of both are in the

docket), and subsequent conversations with FRA (memorializations of

which are also in the docket). This order contains modifications

responsive to Amtrak's proposed design specification changes, which are

discussed below. A detailed analysis of the comments appears elsewhere

in this order.

Major Modifications

(1) Use of Temporary Transponders in Lieu of Loading Temporary

Restrictions

Under ACSES, temporary restrictions flow directly from the computer

assisted dispatch center into the data radio channel and thus into the

on-board computer, virtually eliminating errors in transmission or

recordation and

[[Page 39345]]

ensuring that information is acted upon. Were train crew members to

enter this data, they could make errors and then be tempted to rely on

the ``system'' to provide the required speed reductions on the cab

display in lieu of relying on a paper copy.

In a letter dated May 8, 1998, Amtrak requested permission to use

temporary transponders (placed in the gage of the rail) as an

alternative to inputting temporary restrictions by direct data radio

link into the on-board computer. Typically, Amtrak would place these at

locations approaching work zones and other slow order zones. Although

FRA considers temporary transponder placement acceptable for last

minute slow orders in emergencies where reliable communication to the

en route train cannot be assured, FRA believes the better practice is

to require temporary restrictions to be automatically loaded into the

on-board computer. FRA will allow Amtrak to use temporary transponders

as an alternative routinely for the first 12 months after

implementation of this order in order to ease transition to this new

system. After this period, temporary transponders may be deployed only

on an emergency basis unless they are being used as an additional

safety measure.

(2) Availability of Data Radio Release at Interlockings

FRA proposed to require, and Amtrak expects to provide, a

capability that would automatically permit movement of a train past an

interlocking signal displaying a stop and proceed or restricting aspect

without the necessity of the engineer leaving his or her normal

position in the cab to press a release button. To ensure that this

capability is in place and fully operational, FRA requires data radio

transmitters to be located at interlockings and interfaced with

interlocking controllers not less than 12 months following activation

(cut in) of ACSES.

Elimination of recurring acknowledgment. Amtrak's original plan

included a recurring 15 second audible alarm and a 20 second

acknowledgment while operating at restricted speed. In a May 8, 1998

letter, Amtrak proposed to modify this ATC feature, disliked by many

locomotive engineers. The modified feature would sound a warning

immediately and require acknowledgment within 5 seconds whenever

initial movement is detected while the cab signal displays

``restricting,'' in order to prevent a penalty brake application. (FRA

assumes that the one-time acknowledgment would be required on downgrade

to restricting as well.) Through the use of data radio at the

interlockings, this feature would automatically permit movement of a

train past an interlocking signal displaying a stop and proceed or

restricting aspect without the necessity of the engineer leaving his or

her normal position in the cab to press a release button. FRA has

agreed to this proposed feature, which Amtrak suggests would be

particularly useful when a train is starting from a stop at a station

close to an interlocking home signal.

(3) Speeds Over Highway-Rail Crossings

In the proposed order, FRA suggested a speed limit over any

highway-rail crossing of 80 mph, for the following reasons:

Speeds over highway-rail crossings will be limited to 80 mph,

the maximum speed planned under the NEC program until very recently.

This limit is lower than the 110 mph cap included in current

guidelines for high-speed corridors (absent barrier and presence

detection systems tied into the signal system), because of the

density of NEC operations and the increased possibility that a

collision with a motor vehicle might cause a secondary collision

between trains operating at very high combined closing speeds. FRA

reserves the right to allow higher speeds over individual highway-

rail crossings after demonstration by Amtrak that appropriate safety

measures have been implemented.

Dense operations on the NEC-North End present special safety

concerns, particularly since both intercity and commuter trains will be

operating with improved acceleration as electric locomotives and HSTs

are deployed--driving up average speeds. This is a two-track railroad

throughout its length, with 13 crossings between New Haven and Boston.

Although the crossings in question are generally low-volume, most are

subject to the movement of large vehicles such as flatbed trucks

carrying boats, garbage trucks, fire trucks, and other substantial

vehicles known to be capable of derailing a train. The likelihood of a

derailment may increase to some extent, even in the case of collision

with a relatively light vehicle, if the crossing in question is on a

curve and Amtrak is successful in qualifying its HSTs for levels of

unbalance up to 9 inches, as provided in a previously issued waiver.

Therefore, in this order, FRA sets a maximum operating speed of 80

mph over any highway-rail crossing where only conventional warning

systems are in place, and a maximum operating speed of 95 mph where 4-

quadrant gates and presence detection are provided and tied into the

signal system. FRA also requires Amtrak to submit for approval plans

for site-specific improvements with timetables for each of the 13

crossings on the NEC-North End by January 1, 1999.

(4) Signal and Train Control Enhancements

Providing signalization for high-speed intercity service requires

implementation of an enhanced cab signal/speed control system that

allows for higher train speeds while providing sufficient gradations of

intermediate speeds to allow efficient movement of other scheduled

trains operating in the conventional speed range. Reasonable

interoperability of existing and up-graded on-board equipment is also

necessary to allow for the continued use of existing on-board equipment

at conventional speeds only.

9-Aspect Cab Signal System. The cab signal/ATC portion of the

upgraded system will employ two carrier frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible

with existing equipment, and 250 Hz. Both frequencies will be coded at

standard rates of 75, 120, 180, and 270 cycles per minute. Upgraded

equipment will be able to take advantage of the 150 mph code rate for

maximum authorized speed, the 80 mph code rate for high speed diverging

moves, and separate 45/40 and 30 mph speed commands for limited and

medium speed turnouts.

ACSES. In contrast to the modified cab signal system, ACSES will

provide new safety functions that, with limited exceptions, are not

currently provided. For purposes of civil speed control, permanent

wayside transponders will be placed in sets (normally two to a set) at

convenient, accessible locations in the center of the track approaching

speed restriction zones. Most of these transponders will be passive

devices requiring no energy source other than that transmitted from a

passing train. Each permanent transponder set will contain encoded

information about speed restrictions ahead, including: (i) The distance

to the beginning of the speed restriction; (ii) The target speed; (iii)

The type of speed restriction; (iv) The average grade between the

location where the speed reduction must begin and the location where

the reduced speed must be reached; (v) The distance to the next

permanent transponder set location; and (vi) Necessary sync and check

bytes to allow for message verification.

Improvements that Amtrak will gain with the new systems are:

Train speeds of up to 150 mph;

A high speed diverging aspect (80 mph);

The efficient handling of both high speed and conventional

trains;

[[Page 39346]]

New intermediate speeds between 45 mph and 150 mph;

The capability for headway improvement in congested

commuter areas; and

Practical staging from present wayside and on-board

equipment.

Commuter and freight railroads will both benefit from enhanced

safety of Amtrak operations, given the common operating environment,

since Amtrak's implementation of the 9-aspect cab signal system will

provide increased flexibility to schedule high speed intercity service

in a way that does not conflict with commuter operations. In addition,

as ACSES is implemented on commuter and freight trains, the safety of

those operations will be enhanced by ensuring that those trains do not

pass absolute stop signals or operate at excessive speed approaching

stations or bridges. To the extent equipment design permits, commuter

operators may take advantage of higher speeds on curves without

diminished safety margins with the new flexibility for operation at

higher cant deficiencies in FRA's revised Track Safety Standards (63 FR

33992; June 22, 1998).

Amtrak will phase-in installation in order to obtain the maximum

benefit from the positive stop and civil speed enforcement system prior

to its installation on the Amtrak-dispatched portions of the NEC. The

initial installations will protect entry to and operations along the

high speed territory. During this initial phase, transponders will not

be installed on non-high speed tracks where flanking protection

protects against possible encroachment into adjacent high speed tracks.

The transponder system will be extended to the balance of the NEC after

all installations are in place on high speed tracks and on adjacent

tracks where flanking protection does not exist. (This description in

no way pre-decides the issue of whether trains of other operators on

other portions of the NEC will be required to be equipped.)

(5) Nighttime Operations

As an interim measure to allow for gradual equipping of a

railroad's locomotive fleet, FRA had proposed to allow unequipped

freight operations to enter the NEC-North End during low-volume night

hours. After considering the comments (discussed in more detail below),

FRA is not adopting this proposal for two reasons. First, train delays

could cause fast trains to invade the window or unequipped trains to

fail to clear the window in time. Second, Amtrak expects to conduct

most production track work at night, and unequipped trains would not be

prevented from entering work zones or passing work groups at excessive

speed, resulting in reduced safety benefits. Instead of the proposed

time window, FRA will handle any exceptions to this order through

waivers or spot amendments to the order.

Proceedings on This Order

FRA sought public comment on the proposed order and related

matters, including any authorization that may be required for Amtrak to

implement a modified cab signal system on the NEC. FRA has placed in

the docket of this proceeding copies of Amtrak's program description

for the ACSES system, proposed operating rules for use in conjunction

with the system, and other related information, including current

Amtrak projections for operating speeds over highway-rail crossings on

the NEC-North End. FRA has reviewed the comments and hearing testimony,

which have been extremely helpful in resolving these issues.

The following parties testified at the February 17 hearing: The

American Public Transit Association (APTA), the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers-American Train Dispatchers Division (BLE-ATTD),

ConnDOT, Conrail, MBTA, P&W, and Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority (SEPTA).

In addition, written comments were submitted by the following:

Amtrak, APTA, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), ConnDOT,

Conrail, Long Island Railroad (LIRR), MBTA, Metro-North Commuter

Railroad Company (Metro-North), National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB or Board), P&W, Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Senator Edward

M. Kennedy, Senator Jack Reed, and SEPTA.

The following also submitted comments in support of P&W's concerns:

Arnold Lumber Co., Atlantic Wire, BB&S Treated Lumber of New

England, Colfax Inc., Dominion Rebar, Fortune Plastics Inc., The

Narragansett Bay Commission, Seaview Transportation Company, Inc.,

Ring's End, and Unilever.

While many commentators spoke or wrote on more than one issue, and

while most of the comments supported the position(s) of at least one

other commentator, the issues themselves were grouped around a few key

points, which are discussed below.

General Issues

(1) Scope of Order

Several commentators stated that the proposed order did not define

its applicability clearly. SEPTA commented that the proposed order did

not specify its applicability south of New Haven, and APTA also

requested additional clarification on the order's scope and

applicability on the NEC-South End.

As proposed by Amtrak, implementation of the ACSES system would

impact all NEC users including Amtrak, commuter railroads, and freight

carriers, with the exception of the NEC segment operated by the New

York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and Metro-North. ACSES

would be implemented incrementally as funding becomes available, so

that operational benefits would begin immediately as each portion of

line and each vehicle becomes equipped.

At this time, FRA mandates that all trains operating on the NEC-

North End be equipped with operative on-board equipment that responds

to ACSES, as proposed. This order also authorizes higher speeds for

such equipped trains on high-speed tracks on the NEC-South End, but

other trains utilizing those tracks or adjacent tracks are not required

to be equipped. FRA will continue to study the reliability and safety

benefits of ACSES as implementation on the NEC-North End is completed,

and may later propose to require ACSES on the rest of the NEC as

traffic densities increase.

ConnDOT commented that the proposed order contained errors

regarding the ownership of the New Haven, Connecticut-New Rochelle, New

York section of NEC track. FRA agrees that Metro-North does not own any

segment of the NEC, that ConnDOT owns the track between New Haven and

the Connecticut-New York border, and that MTA owns the track between

that border and New Rochelle. Thus, this order does not address the

territory owned by MTA between the Connecticut/New York State line and

New Rochelle, or the area owned by ConnDOT between the Connecticut/New

York State line and New Haven, both of which are dispatched by Metro-

North.

(2) Implementation Schedule

Several commentators felt that the proposed implementation date of

October 1, 1999 did not provide sufficient time for financing and

equipment installation. MBTA recommended a longer time period to

provide sufficient time for responsible design, engineering and

prototyping. MBTA also commented that modifications to safety critical

systems should not be made on a high speed schedule, and that the

proposed

[[Page 39347]]

implementation date was unrealistic and would impose premium costs.

Conrail commented that the proposed order failed to indicate any target

dates or deadlines, which are necessary to determine the migration

plan. ConnDOT requested to be removed from the scope and applicability

of the order unless full funding is provided and compliance is delayed

until 2001. P&W commented that compliance with the proposed October

1999 implementation deadline would be impossible unless Amtrak supplied

substitute power and assistance in accomplishing the required

retrofits.

The NTSB, however, while recognizing the need for an interim period

to allow equipping of locomotives, strongly urged that FRA set a fixed

time for compliance.

FRA recognizes that completion of all steps required to implement

ACSES by October 1, 1999 depends upon Amtrak rigorously adhering to a

well-crafted timetable that allows adequate time for installation of

on-board units on all affected operators without depriving those

operators of equipment necessary to provide normal service. This should

be achievable by combining required inspections and tests with the

installation process, provided production runs of on-board equipment

commence in a timely way and deliveries are sequenced properly.

However, thus far Amtrak has provided FRA with a very limited amount of

information concerning its test program and key milestones.

Accordingly, this order requires early delivery of a very specific

timetable for initial testing and qualification, for installation of

on-board equipment on Amtrak, ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W locomotives, and

for final acceptance testing for the system. FRA will evaluate this

timetable for reasonableness. To the extent the timetable indicates

unacceptable impacts on third parties, or to the extent milestones in

this schedule slip, FRA will defer the implementation date as

necessary. FRA will keep open the docket of this proceeding to receive

any petitions for adjustment of the compliance date.

(3) Financial Responsibility

Commentators expressed the most concern about the overall cost of

ACSES, and the related issue of who would bear the cost of equipping

non-Amtrak equipment. In addition to the implementation costs of

locomotive retrofitting, passive transponders and other related

expenses, commentators were concerned about maintenance, equipment

down-time, schedule disruptions, and life-cycle expense. Many

commentators submitted preliminary estimates of their anticipated

costs. MBTA, for instance, has already budgeted the estimated $11

million cost of retrofitting its locomotives with the 9-aspect system

into its current locomotive procurement and planned overhaul.

P&W commented that the final order should require the High Speed

Passenger Project (Project) to assume the costs of retrofitting

locomotives since ACSES is a fundamental component of the Project. P&W

indicated that as a small private sector freight operator, it is not

subsidized (unlike Amtrak and commuter rail operations), and would not

stay competitive with trucking operations on the I-95 corridor if it

passed ACSES implementation costs onto its customers. Although P&W

objected to paying for ACSES implementation to realize the proposed 150

mph speeds on the NEC-North End, P&W pledged to work with Amtrak to

develop an implementation schedule once a retrofit design is available

for review.

Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Jack Reed, and Representative

Patrick J. Kennedy wrote in support of P&W's views. In his comments,

Senator Kennedy reiterated his support for the Project, and agreed with

P&W's recommendation that the Project assume P&W's implementation

costs.

MBTA also objected to the proposed order, commenting that it would

impose unfunded mandates on state authorities. MBTA also recommended

that the proposed order be amended to require funding by the Project,

and, in addition, to hold MBTA harmless from right of way construction

costs.

ConnDOT commented that FRA and Amtrak should provide full funding

for ACSES implementation, since this investment in equipment and

infrastructure is necessitated by Amtrak's new HST service. ConnDOT

indicated that it does not have access to funding required to comply

with the order on its Shore Line East operation. Moreover, the tenuous

viability of Shore Line East commuter service and the concurrent

funding needed for double-sided high speed platforms could force this

line of commuter rail service to close. ConnDOT requested that FRA

pledge to provide full funding for any mandated conversion to ACSES.

SEPTA commented that NEC commuter railroads have undergone a number

of mandatory retrofits in recent years (e.g., speed control, event

recorders, ditch lights, and emergency door access), and expect

additional required retrofits even though separate funding has never

been provided for this work. Since SEPTA capital is limited, requiring

commuter railroads to fund systems such as ACSES would force tradeoffs

with other safety improvements. SEPTA proposed that the proposed

modifications and civil speed enforcement system be funded by Amtrak,

as the beneficiary of these proposed requirements.

Conrail commented that the proposed order's purpose is to enable

higher speed passenger operations through improved train control

systems. Conrail, however, has already invested in the Locomotive Speed

Limiter (LSL) system, to provide train control compatible with the NEC

cab signal system. While Conrail has a vested interest in improving

safety and reducing risk, the additional risks caused by higher speed

passenger operations are being introduced by other parties and should

not be borne by Conrail. Like other commentators, Conrail urged FRA to

structure the final order to provide relief from the cost burden,

arguing that ACSES will provide no quantifiable benefits beyond

Conrail's current LSL system.

Metro-North requested that its territory be excluded from the final

order, stating that it will not operate at high speeds since the

catenary and signal systems on the territory between New Rochelle and

New Haven are designed for a maximum of 100 mph.

The NTSB, on the other hand, strongly supported the proposed order,

since Positive Train Separation (PTS) is one of the Board's ``Most

Wanted'' safety measures. The Board recommended that FRA require

implementation of PTS for ``all trains where commuter and intercity

passenger railroads operate,'' including the South End.

Allocation of financial responsibility. FRA appreciates that

resolving the issue of which organizations bear the ultimate financial

responsibility for this safety system is not a simple or

straightforward matter. The Project with which this safety enhancement

is associated has been aggressively advocated by the Coalition of

Northeastern Governors for many years and supported by most members of

the northeast congressional delegations. While the Project has national

significance, a large share of the benefits will accrue to the region,

including potential avoidance of major costs associated with

improvement of aviation and highway facilities. As a result of careful

planning and aggressive advocacy, the region will enjoy many related

improvements to its transportation infrastructure, including the

opening of rail access for double

[[Page 39348]]

stack intermodal service to the site of the former U.S. Navy facilities

at Quonset Point and Davisville, Rhode Island, at a cost to the Federal

taxpayer estimated at $55 million.

Amtrak has recognized its stake in this Project by budgeting 100%

of wayside costs of ACSES, even though much of the territory involved

is actually owned by other public authorities. In addition, Amtrak will

bear the cost for equipping its own trains, high-speed and

conventional.

Since issuance of the notice of proposed order, Amtrak has

communicated with ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W regarding the logistics of

this Project. Although FRA has not been privy to the details of these

conversations, copies of letters provided for the docket of this

rulemaking affirm that Amtrak has secured an option with its vendor for

a sufficient number of on-board equipment sets to the benefit of these

other railroads. Amtrak has offered to complete installation at a cost

of $40,000, split between approximately $27,000 for the equipment and

$13,000 for installation. Amtrak has also offered to assist these

railroads by supporting their ``efforts to find a source of funding.''

FRA is concerned that parties to the rulemaking may have hesitated

to make reasonable financial arrangements for this work with the

anticipation that FRA would spare them the necessity by allocating that

responsibility in this final order. From the point of view of staging

the work, FRA has confidence that Amtrak will ensure interim financing

to complete equipping of ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W locomotives. Conrail

and its successors (NS and CSX) are major Class I railroads fully

capable of handling their own financing. The remaining issue is who

will bear the ultimate financial burden, and the considerations

pertaining to this question are far more complex than could be

developed within the scope of this proceeding.

It seems reasonable to expect that Conrail or its successors will

shoulder the cost of this safety improvement and equip as many

locomotives as may be appropriate for optimum power utilization over

its system. FRA has provided funding under a cooperative agreement with

Conrail, NS and CSX for development of an on-board platform capable of

providing interoperability among various train control systems,

including ACS, ATC, and ACSES. This innovation may help hold down the

cost of ACSES compliance.

FRA has carefully considered P&W's comments regarding its role in

this safety improvement. FRA appreciates P&W's willingness to cooperate

and its concerns regarding the timing of the necessary retrofits

(further addressed below), and accepts P&W's representation that at

least 22 locomotives will need to be equipped with ACSES and that

nighttime operation is not a viable option. However, FRA had not

identified from P&W's submission a basis for becoming more directly

involved in deciding the matter of financial responsibility.

P&W operates on the NEC largely as a result of an expedited

supplemental transaction effected under section 1155 of the Northeast

Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) (45 U.S.C. 745). Pursuant to that

statute, and under an order of the Special Court established by the

Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Conrail was compelled to

surrender certain properties and service rights to a successor railroad

that would commit to providing at least 4 years of service on the

properties transferred. P&W aggressively pursued that opportunity, with

the full knowledge that public planning from the 1960's forward had

focused on dramatic passenger service improvements on the NEC between

New York and Boston. As recently as the past year, P&W has sought to

extend its service rights farther west into Connecticut based upon

P&W's claim that the proposed acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX

constitutes a termination of Conrail's residual franchise and

activation of rights P&W enjoys under the Special Court's order. As

noted above, as an adjunct to the current improvement project, P&W will

be the beneficiary of construction of a third track on the NEC between

Davisville and ``Boston Switch'' that will provide the new doublestack

access that otherwise would not exist.

MBTA and ConnDOT are also realizing considerable benefits from the

improvement project. MBTA is already implementing plans to utilize

electric locomotives which will provide improved accelerations, reduced

trip times and reduced emission of polluting gases and particulates.

ConnDOT and MBTA benefit substantially from Amtrak's substantial

investments in the track structure associated with high-speed

operations.

All of the operators over the affected territory will enjoy

benefits from ACSES, such as the following:

(1) Reduction of risk related to collisions at junctions. This

feature may help avoid a collision with a high-speed or conventional

passenger train that could result in massive liability.

(2) Reduction of the risk of derailment on curves and secondary

collisions following such derailments. Although principally a benefit

to high-speed trains, this feature may benefit other passenger

operators that wish to take advantage of higher levels of unbalance to

achieve improved trip times (which, without ACSES, might be imprudent).

Even freight operators may benefit under conditions where cab signals

must be cut out due to en route malfunction.

(3) Reduction of risk related to incidents involving roadway

workers and their equipment. This benefit should accrue to all

operators very nearly in direct proportion to the number of trains they

operate.

(4) Improved scheduling and execution of roadway inspections and

maintenance associated with the ability to load temporary movement

restrictions into the on-board units of trains en route through data

radio facilities along the route. This benefit, which may be realized

over a period of several years, should help hold down costs and

increase efficiency for all operators. If the data radio network is

fully exploited, dispatching may also be enhanced through access to

real-time train location information.

FRA is aware of contrary arguments for allocation of financial

responsibility based upon the institution of high-speed service and the

timing of requirements for compliance. These arguments may be worthy of

consideration within the full context of the commercial relationships

involved, including existing arrangements for allocating costs of

operation over the affected NEC segments, contractual arrangements for

operation of commuter service, and any relationships established for

executing the obligations imposed by this order. Forums such as the

Surface Transportation Board, arbitration panels referenced in existing

agreements, and courts of appropriate jurisdiction may have a role in

determining the ultimate allocation of financial responsibility for

implementation of ACSES, should the parties fail to come to mutually

acceptable accommodations.

In summary, the arguments related to financial responsibility are

complex; and various forums are available to resolve them. It is

neither necessary nor appropriate for those determinations to be made

in this order, and FRA does not intend by this order to govern the

ultimate allocation of financial responsibility for equipping non-

Amtrak locomotives and cab cars. However, FRA does require that trains

be equipped within a fixed time frame as a condition of operating over

the subject territory. This approach is consistent with prior orders of

the Interstate

[[Page 39349]]

Commerce Commission and FRA actions pertaining to train control,

including prior train control orders for the NEC, which have generally

required that all trains operating in a designated territory be

equipped, without regard to ownership.

(4) ACSES and the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

In 1996, FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

(RSAC or the Committee) to implement a more consensual approach to

rulemaking. RSAC is comprised of 48 representatives from 27 member

organizations, including railroads, labor groups, equipment

manufacturers, state government groups, public associations, and two

associate non-voting representatives from Canada and Mexico. To address

specific tasks, RSAC formed working groups, comprised of knowledgeable

persons from the organizations represented on RSAC. Among the current

working groups is a group on positive train control (PTC), which was

tasked on September 30, 1997, and met for the first time in November.

This group is considering three tasks related to development of

performance standards for new train control systems, evaluation of

costs and benefits of PTC, and consideration of issues related to

implement.

Both APTA and Conrail commented that the proposed order contained

no input from the PTC working group. Since the final order would define

and implement PTC on the NEC-North End, both recommended that FRA not

issue the final order until the PTC working group has completed its

task. Conrail also commented that the proposed order would impose

similar costs for functions that duplicate PTC.

Although FRA and Amtrak have briefed the RSAC PTC Working Group on

ACSES and the proposed order in this proceeding, FRA has not tasked the

PTC Working Group with development of this order, which pertains to a

specific territory already equipped with ACS and ATC (in contrast to

most of remainder of the general rail system). ACSES is intended to

supplement the existing train control system on the NEC, completing

positive train control functions in a manner that is cost effective and

capable of execution within the time period necessary to support

enhanced service associated with electrification and the delivery of

new HSTs.

Though not required to do so, FRA utilized the Northeast Corridor

Safety Committee to develop issues related to ACSES at a meeting in

September of 1994, and Amtrak has proceeded since that time to bring

ACSES to a high state of maturity. The ACSES system is specifically

designed to support dense passenger operations at up to 150 mph. Its

architecture provides a particularly suitable approach for NEC and

related operations (as illustrated by New Jersey Transit's use of a

similar approach to rapidly implement a positive stop system on its own

lines).

ACSES uses components and strategies already extensively employed

in European train control and other applications. ACSES will be applied

to equipment that--with the exception of a small number of freight

locomotives on the NEC at any given time--is largely dedicated to NEC

operations.

By contrast, the RSAC PTC Working Group is considering the

potential for train control systems that would be applied principally

in non-electrified territory, over most of which freight operations

predominate and shared power arrangements permit locomotives to range

extensively. For most of the National rail system, there is presently

no ACS/ATC infrastructure on the wayside, and many locomotives are not

equipped with responsive apparatus. PTC systems for most of the general

rail system will likely utilize a much different architecture that the

combination of ACS, ATC and ACSES provided in this and related orders.

In concert with a train control project sponsored by the State of

Illinois and the FRA, the Association of American Railroads'

Transportation Technology Center Inc. is just now commencing work on

criteria for interoperability of such systems that is expected to

extend past the actual cut-in date for ACSES. The extent to which PTC

systems designed for general applications may be capable of supporting

train speeds above 110 or 125 miles per hour is not currently known,

and widespread deployment of these systems will not be possible until

test and demonstration projects now underway reach fruition.

In short, awaiting the results of the RSAC PTC Working Group would

defer important safety enhancements for territory where the chosen

strategy is ready to implement and particularly appropriate. The PTC

Working Group was formed to accelerate movement toward implementation

of PTC safety functions, not to impede it. FRA looks forward to

institution of high-speed service on the NEC-North End late next year,

and implementation of ACSES is necessary to ensure the safety of that

service within the context of dense passenger and freight operations.

(5) Nighttime operations

P&W commented that it would not be feasible to limit its train

operations to night time, the window within which the order proposed to

permit non-equipped trains to run on the NEC, since nighttime switching

service would result in a dramatic increase in costs, cause operational

disruptions for P&W customers, disrupt neighborhoods, and raise serious

safety issues. Conrail commented that while the order was unclear as to

whether Conrail would be permitted to operate non-equipped trains using

time separation from high speed passenger schedules, mandatory time

separation is not an acceptable business solution since Conrail already

operates during lightly scheduled passenger periods for efficiency.

Although the proposed order properly anticipates potential increases in

operation by Conrail or its successors, Conrail commented that

operations would be adversely impacted if time separations are mandated

for trains not equipped with ACSES.

As discussed above, after considering the comments, FRA is not

allowing a window within which non-equipped trains could operate during

early morning hours when high-speed trains are not on the territory.

Any exceptions will be handled through waivers or spot amendments to

the order.

Technical Issues

(1) Flanking Protection

BLE-ATTD asked for an interpretation of the term ``flanking

protection,'' and a description of how such protection would work. BLE-

ATTD also requested clarification as to how flanking protection would

work on the NEC-South End, on whether electric lock derails would be

used instead of flanking protection in two-track areas, and on who

would enter information into the mobile communication package.

Flanking protection is inherent in interlockings where there are

parallel tracks. On a four track railroad, for example, with high speed

middle tracks, lower speed outer tracks, and crossovers across all four

tracks, a train could not overrun a signal on an adjacent track and

encroach onto the path of a high speed train if the signal was lined up

for the high speed track straight down one of the middle tracks.

Flanking protection is not a new concept designed to work with ACSES

since it is already in place at interlockings where there is a parallel

route to the track being protected in the event of a signal overrun.

[[Page 39350]]

(2) Interoperability With Existing Systems

Several commentators were concerned about the impact of the new

ACSES system on current signal systems. Conrail questioned whether its

existing 4-aspect system would be compatible with the new 9-aspect

system, and whether ACSES would interfere with an ongoing Conrail/CSX/

NS project to develop an on-board platform to support multiple system

configurations. LIRR also questioned how ACSES would interfere with

existing ATC systems, and how the proposed order would impact those

railroads sharing track with Amtrak at speeds over 100 mph. APTA wanted

to review Amtrak's equipment specifications because of concerns about

the reliability and maintainability of untested equipment. APTA also

questioned ACSES' impact on existing ATC systems and commuter rail

outside the NEC. ConnDOT questioned the benefits of the proposed

system, and SEPTA expressed concern about how ACSES would affect

operations outside of the areas where wayside equipment is installed.

In Amtrak's proposed system, the brake and propulsion interface

between the ACSES and the locomotive would be similar to that utilized

in conventional cab signal/ATC systems. The interface would be separate

and distinct from the interface used by the cab signal/ATC system. The

failure of either the cab signal/ATC system or the ACSES would not

prevent the remaining functioning system from performing its intended

operation and displaying the proper on-board aspect. Both the signal

speed and the civil speed would be displayed with the lower of the two

speeds to be enforced.

FRA questioned the need or prudence of displaying both speeds and

requested comment on the appropriate means of displaying system

information to the locomotive engineer. Amtrak submitted the only

response on this issue. In a January 16, 1998 letter, Amtrak clarified

that the 9-Aspect Cab Signal/ATC system and the ACSES system are

independent systems that share a common display. The 9-ACS/ATC system

will continuously display the ``signal'' speed, dependent upon routes

opening up in front of the approaching train, and supported by eight

simple codes supplied continuously to the train through the rails. The

ACSES system, on the other hand, will enforce the track (civil) maximum

authorized speeds, supported by more complex codes received at

intermittent intervals from transponders located along the track

structure. The ``signal'' speed is actually part of the cab signal

aspect (e.g., ``CLEAR 150,'' ``CLEAR 125,'' ``CAB SPEED 80''), with

discrete aspects displayed in accordance with Part 236. The ``track''

speed will be carefully coordinated with the cab signal aspect, and

highlighted to clearly indicate which speed (always the lower) governs.

The lower speed will always be enforced. Thus, merging the two digital

``speed'' displays into one ``window'' would seriously complicate and

undermine the stand-alone capability of each system if the other should

fail, and would compromise the viability of the redundancy or ``back-

up'' capability envisioned for the total system.

(3) 60 mph Turnouts

Amtrak had proposed, as an interim measure, to install #26.5

straight-frog turnouts at those crossovers where there is insufficient

space to install the #32.7 turnouts needed for diverging moves at 80

mph. Since these #26.5 straight-frog turnouts could be used only for

diverging moves at 60 mph, ACSES passive transponder sets approaching

such locations would enforce a 60 mph civil speed restriction for all

routes through the interlocking where the # 26.5 turnout is located.

The 60 mph speed restriction would also be backed up by a site specific

instruction and an appropriate reflectorized sign on the distant

signal.

NTSB, however, remained concerned about how this system would work

when a train's on-board ACSES system was cut out, since the train would

then be unable to read the speed restrictions transmitted by the

temporary transponders. In a June 4, 1998 conversation with FRA

(memorialized in the docket), Amtrak stated that implementation of this

proposed interim system was unlikely. While long-range planning may

eventually require the installation of some 60 mph turnouts on the NEC,

none are currently planned for the territory between New Haven and

Boston. If such installations become necessary in the future, Amtrak

intends to restrict passenger train speeds at these locations to 45

mph, or request a site specific waiver for each location.

Section-by-Section Analysis

The section-by-section analysis below discusses the modifications

made from the proposed order in response to comments or technical

considerations. Each section of the final order is printed in small

type and followed by its analysis. The final order is reprinted in its

entirety at the end of this preamble discussion.

Effective Date

As discussed above, this order becomes effective on the date

proposed, October 1, 1999. FRA will defer the implementation date if

necessary and keep open the docket of this proceeding to receive any

petitions for adjustment of the compliance date.

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236

and existing orders for automatic train control on track controlled

by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the

Northeast Corridor (NEC) between Washington, D. C., and Boston,

Massachusetts. This order applies in territory where Amtrak has

installed wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement

System (ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the

conditions set forth below.

All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such equipped

territory between Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven, Connecticut

(NEC-North End), or on tracks providing access to such high-speed

tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following

entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail

service--

Amtrak;

Connecticut Department of Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation and its successors;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; and

Providence and Worcester Railroad Company.

The requirement that all trains be equipped with operative on-

board ACSES applies as specified in paragraph (2) from milepost 73.2

at New Haven, Connecticut, to South Station, Boston, Massachusetts,

but applies only to high-speed trains operating on NEC high-speed

tracks between Washington, D.C., and New York, New York (NEC-South

End), as set forth in paragraph 9(b).

Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak has undertaken the planning and

installation of the ACSES as part of its capital program for intercity

service on the NEC, consistent with legislation providing for improved

rail service in the region. This order requires all carriers operating

in ACSES territory to equip their controlling locomotives with

operative on-board equipment, consisting of a transponder scanner, an

on-board computer, a display unit for the locomotive engineer, and

appropriate interface with the cab signal/train control apparatus. The

final order clarifies that trains other than HSTs must be equipped on

the NEC-North End but not on the NEC-South End.

Over time, the ACSES system may be completed and used by all

operators throughout the NEC for routes where speeds exceed 110 mph on

any segment, enhancing safety throughout the NEC.

[[Page 39351]]

For example, New Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJT) intends to equip

its controlling locomotives with an Advanced Speed Enforcement System

(ASES), deriving safety advantages both on the NEC and on certain of

its lines where the ASES system can be used as an intermittent train

stop system. As Amtrak, NEC-North End operators and NJT demonstrate the

benefits and reliability of the system, progress toward universal

upgrading of the NEC signal and train control system will be fostered.

At a later date, FRA may propose to amend this order to require more

extensive use of this new safety technology, as determined by increases

in traffic and types of equipment used on the NEC.

Definitions. Unless otherwise provided terms used in this order

have the same definitions contained in Part 236. For purposes of

this order--

ACSES means a transponder based system that operates independent

of the cab signal system, and provides enforcement of permanent

speed restrictions, temporary speed restrictions, and stop signals

at interlockings.

High-speed train means a train operating in excess of 125 miles

per hour (mph) on the NEC-South End, and 110 mph on the NEC-North

End.

High-speed track means (1) a track on the main line of the NEC-

South End, where the authorized train speed for any class of train

exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a track on the main line of the NEC-North

End where the maximum authorized train speed for any class of train

is in excess of 110 mph.

Immediately adjacent track means a track within 30 feet of a

high-speed track when measured from track center to track center.

Signal and train control system means the automatic cab signal/

automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC

at the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by ACSES,

together with such modifications as Amtrak shall make consistent

with this order.

Explanation and analysis. In its comments, BLE-ATTD suggested that

FRA define the terms ``civil speed enforcement system'' (ACSES), ``off-

peak operating times,'' and ``repair facilities.'' As explained above,

the term ``off-peak operating times'' is no longer relevant since FRA

does not adopt its proposed window for nighttime operations. Similarly,

FRA believes it unnecessary to define ``repair facilities'' considering

the limited scope of this order. FRA has added a definition for

``ACSES'' that is derived from Amtrak's performance specifications.

The proposed order had suggested requiring ACSES on tracks

immediately adjacent to (within 30 feet of) high-speed tracks. In this

order, FRA extends the requirements for ACSES to trains operating on

immediately adjacent tracks where the maximum authorized speed exceeds

20 mph, since such tracks are located within the effective operating

envelope of high-speed tracks where derailments could endanger high-

speed operations.

Operations are already highly dense on the NEC-North End, with

projected increases in both freight and passenger traffic. Track

curvature on the NEC-North End also exceeds the average curvature on

the NEC-South End, resulting in greater potential concern for

compliance with civil speed restrictions. Accordingly, FRA

distinguishes between the two operations for purposes of determining

applicability of the new performance requirements.

Performance standards. Effective October 1, 1999, the following

performance standards and special requirements shall apply:

1. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), the signal and train

control system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil

speed restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders)

on all high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks where the

maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 mph. Permanent restrictions

shall be loaded into the onboard computer by direct data transfer

from a verified database. Temporary restrictions shall be loaded

into the onboard computer by direct data transfer from the computer-

aided dispatching system. (For not to exceed 12 months following

cut-in of the system, use of temporary transponders programmed with

appropriate speed restrictions will be deemed to satisfy this

paragraph. Thereafter, use of temporary transponders alone shall be

acceptable only in the case of an emergency restriction for which

transfer of the restriction into the onboard computers of all

affected trains is not practicable.)

Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, the existing signal

system does not enforce temporary speed restrictions, such as slow

orders over defective track or protections for roadway workers. Amtrak

had proposed to use temporarily placed transponders, and entry of

restrictions into the on-board computer by milepost, to protect train

movements and workers and equipment on or adjacent to live high-speed

tracks. BLE-ATTD commented that this proposed use of temporary

transponders would be insufficient to enforce temporary speed

restrictions, and recommended as a failsafe that FRA also require the

train dispatcher to enter these restrictions into the on-board computer

by milepost.

FRA agrees with BLE-ATTD that temporary transponders should not be

routinely used to enforce temporary speed restrictions. Rather, the

dispatcher will automatically load temporary restrictions into the on-

board computer, through the computer-aided dispatching system and a

data radio network, to avoid the possibility of data entry errors by

the train crew. Amtrak may use temporary transponders as an alternative

routinely for the first 12 months after implementation of this order,

and only on an emergency basis thereafter. Data entry by train crews is

not an acceptable alternative.

FRA also clarifies that permanent restrictions will also be loaded

by direct data transfer from a verified database. FRA is not specifying

a method for verifying the database, but expects that Amtrak will

utilize appropriate reviews and field verifications to ensure a high

level of accuracy.

Nothing in this order excuses compliance with current Amtrak

requirements for creating and issuing appropriate authorities or for

providing protection for roadway workers. Amtrak has represented to FRA

that these protections will remain, supplemented by the additional

layer of safety provided by the ACSES. FRA will reopen consideration of

this order should Amtrak undertake any substantial revision of current

procedures that may have the effect of diminishing safety on the NEC.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), all trains operating on

high-speed track, immediately adjacent track where the maximum

authorized speed exceeds 20 mph, or track providing access to high-

speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab

signal/speed control system and ACSES.

Explanation and analysis. The benefits of equipping conventional

speed trains that operate on immediately adjacent tracks providing

access to high-speed tracks may derive primarily from enforcement of

positive stop features. If a train is prevented from inappropriately

proceeding through a junction and onto a high-speed track, the safety

of the subject train and the safety of the oncoming high-speed train

are equally assured. FRA believes that most equipped trains will make

use of high-speed tracks. (See the discussion in paragraph 9(b) below.)

As discussed above, FRA does not adopt its proposed nighttime

operations window and accordingly removes the proposed language from

this section.

3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in

the locomotive cab.

Explanation and analysis. As explained above, FRA believes that

Amtrak's dual display (details of which are contained in the program

description placed in the docket of this proposed order) is appropriate

for a hybrid system such as this. The order

[[Page 39352]]

requires consistent information to be displayed to the locomotive

engineer. Amtrak plans to implement this principle, while providing

information from both the cab signal/ATC system and ACSES, by

displaying both of the resulting maximum speeds, with the lower speed

to be identified and enforced.

4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any

location associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or

cab signal aspect.

Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, the most restrictive

of the limitations indicated by the cab signal/ATC or ACSES system will

be enforced.

5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed

tracks or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks,

the signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop

short of the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an

absolute stop. The system shall function such that the train will be

brought to a complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first

of the following events shall occur: (1) the signal displays a more

permissive aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or

system penalty, the train comes to a complete stop, the engineer

receives verbal authority to proceed from the dispatcher, and the

engineer activates an override or reset device that is located where

it cannot be activated from the engineer's accustomed position in

the cab. The train may then only travel at restricted speed until a

valid speed command is received by the on-board train equipment. For

not to exceed 12 months following cut-in of ACSES, release of the

positive stop feature, under conditions where the signal displays an

aspect more favorable than stop, but not less favorable than

restricting, may be accomplished by use of the reset device;

thereafter, this function shall be accomplished automatically so

that it is not necessary for the engineer to leave his or her

accustomed position in the cab.

Explanation and analysis. As originally conceived by Amtrak, ACSES

would enforce a positive stop through an active transponder near the

distant signal which would recognize that the home signal is capable of

displaying an absolute stop, and enforce a positive stop even if the

home signal actually displayed a restricting indication. FRA requested

that Amtrak redesign this feature to better coordinate with the wayside

signals. Amtrak agreed to accelerate the development of the ACSES data

radio feature to reduce the need to operate the ``stop override''

button to only those instances where a system failure requires the

train to be moved. The Mobile Communication Package (MCP), a data radio

feature located at the interlocking, will broadcast a track specific,

direction specific, and location specific message to the approaching

train which automatically releases the stop-override feature without

the engineer having to operate the ``stop override'' button when the

home signal displays ``stop and proceed.'' This message will only be

transmitted and only be effective when the train is between the distant

signal and the home signal of the interlocking. If the signal displays

``restricting,'' the MCP data radio will broadcast a similar message to

the approaching train relieving the train from actually having to stop.

Over the past year, Amtrak has consistently advised FRA that MCP data

radios may not be installed at all interlockings for some time

following cut-in of the system. Amtrak has not been able to specify

when this element of the system would be completed. To resolve this

concern, FRA has added language to the order requiring that this

element of the system be completed not less than 12 months following

cut-in.

6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at

reduced speeds, as follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of

the cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC

system will be cut out; however, ACSES shall remain operative and

enforce the 79 mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are

provided, the train will continue to operate at speeds not exceeding

79 mph subject to indications of the wayside signal system. In

territory without fixed automatic block signals, the train will

receive information approaching the home signal, through the MCP

radio, with the information actually derived from the ``flashing

lunar signal with the letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.''

When failure occurs after a train has entered such a block, the

train will proceed at restricted speed to the next interlocking and

may not pass the home signal, regardless of the aspect displayed,

until the flashing lunar ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is

displayed. The train may then pass the signal and proceed at a speed

not to exceed 79 mph. This speed limit shall be enforced by ACSES.

Explanation and analysis. As proposed, the cab signal/ATC portion

of the system will be cut out under operating rules meeting 49 CFR

Sec. 236.567 requirements. When the cab signal/ATC portion of the

system fails and/or is cut out, ACSES will still be in operation, with

the central processing unit (CPU) receiving a message from the cab

signal/ATC CPU through a vital link that the cab signal/ATC is cut in

and not failed. If ACSES does not receive this message, a speed of 79

mph will be locked in and the display will be dark, other than the 79

mph displayed in the civil speed portion, which will be enforced. ACSES

will continue to enforce temporary and permanent speed restrictions and

positive stop at home signal locations.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must

be cut out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The

engineer will be required to notify the dispatcher that ACSES has

been cut out. When given permission to proceed, the train must not

exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End). All

trains with cut out ACSES will operate at conventional train speeds.

Explanation and analysis. Amtrak's comments to the proposed order

recommended modifications in the proposed failure modes because the

phrase ``* * * unless a flashing lunar signal with the letter ``N''

reflected Amtrak's previous plan, which would present the ``clear to

next interlocking'' information to the train at the distant signal

through an active transponder at the location. Under Amtrak's current

plan, with the implementation of MCP radio at the interlocking, the

train will receive the information as it approaches the home signal,

with the information derived from the ``flashing lunar signal with the

letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.''

FRA received no other comments on this proposed design standard,

which requires trains to fall back to existing maximum speeds when the

ACSES must be cut out on a train. However, this approach cannot provide

positive stop capability or compensate for higher curving speeds that

may be allowed using tilt HSTs. All trains with a cut out ACSES will

operate at conventional train speeds whether they are tilt train

equipment or conventional equipment. The vital link between CPUs

mentioned in 6(a) above will inform the signal CPU that the civil speed

CPU is cut out or has failed. The signal speed enforcement system will

enforce a default speed limit when ACSES has failed and/or is cut out,

with a maximum speed of 110 mph on the NEC-North End and 125 mph on the

NEC-South End if ACSES is cut out. This places a premium on compliance

with operating rules developed specifically for this purpose (copies of

which are available in the docket).

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system

and ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the

train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.

Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on its proposal

to follow the procedures and restrictions in Sec. 236.567 whenever the

signal and train control system fails and/or is cut out en route.

Accordingly, this section applies as follows whenever the signal and

train control system fails and/or is cut out en route:

Where an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal device

fails and/

[[Page 39353]]

or is cut out enroute, train may proceed at restricted speed or if an

automatic block signal system is in operation according to signal

indication but not to exceed medium speed, to the next available point

of communication where report must be made to a designated officer.

Where no automatic block signal system is in use train shall be

permitted to proceed at restricted speed or where automatic block

signal system is in operation according to signal indication but not to

exceed medium speed to a point where absolute block can be established.

Where an absolute block is established in advance of the train on which

the device is inoperative train may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles

per hour.

These procedures, which are used with present train control systems

on the NEC and throughout the nation, have proven to be a reliable and

safe method of operating whenever the signal and train control system

fails and/or is cut out.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system

fails, train operation will be at restricted speed to a point where

absolute block can be established in advance of the train. Where

absolute block is established in advance of the train, the train may

proceed at speeds not to exceed 79 mph.

Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on its proposal

to allow the carrier's operating rules to effect these requirements. If

a wayside signal system failure occurs, ACSES will continue to

function, by enforcing the 79 mph speed, civil and temporary speed

restrictions, and positive stops, but an absolute block and proceed not

to exceed 79 mph must still be established.

e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where

the equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must

not exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End) until

the next valid transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed

restriction will be enforced by the system and ``--'' will be

displayed to indicate that the civil speed is unknown. The audible

alarm for civil speeds will sound and must be acknowledged. Speed

restrictions previously entered into the system, whether temporary

or permanent, will be displayed at the proper time and continue to

be enforced. If the missing transponder is a positive stop

enforcement transponder at the distant signal to an interlocking,

then the system will treat the missing transponder as if it were

present and a stop will be required. Since the previous transponder

will have transmitted the distance to the stop location, the stop

shall be enforced unless a cab signal is received that indicates the

interlocking signal is displaying an aspect more favorable than

``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.'' The 125/110 mph

speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of whether the

cab signal aspect is being received.

Explanation and analysis. As proposed, permanent transponders will

be programmed with information that includes distance to the next

transponder. Wheel rotations will be logged to determine train position

between transponders. If a transponder is missing (or is not

successfully read), speeds will be slowed to 125 or 110 mph, depending

upon the territory involved, until the next valid transponder is

detected.

7. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC

system, ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered

inoperative until the engine has been repaired, tested and found to

be functioning properly. Repairs shall be made before dispatching

the unit on any subsequent trip.

Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on this section,

which is adopted as proposed.

8. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one

name, and will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the

engine crew. These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or

illuminated letters or numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically

locked derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder

set shall cut in ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto

the main line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive

stop will be required. At entrances from a signaled track, ACSES

shall be cut in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop

enforced at the home signal.

Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on these

sections, which are adopted as proposed.

c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the

required functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive

Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each

transponder is encountered, the information associated with that

transponder, and each use of the positive stop override. These

functions may be incorporated within the on-board computer, or as a

stand alone device, but shall continue to record speeds and related

cab signal/ATC data, even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The

event recorder shall meet all requirements of Sec. 229.135.

Explanation and analysis. The NTSB supported requiring the on-board

event recorder to record the time each transponder is encountered, any

associated information, and each use of the positive stop override. At

a minimum, the event recorder specifications submitted by Amtrak

require the recorder to log with time stamps the following data: speed,

distance traveled, location by milepost in miles and tenths, track

number, brake pipe pressure (for penalty applications), on/off status

of ACSES, driver input to ACSES/system acknowledge on/off, transponder

messages received, and data from ACSES sent to the driver's display

unit and the diagnostic serial port of the driver's diagnostic panel.

9. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory

subject to this order:

a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed

tracks, adjacent tracks where speeds exceed 20 mph, and tracks

providing access to high-speed tracks are equipped with cab signal/

ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so

authorized may operate at maximum speeds not exceeding 150 mph. The

maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing shall not exceed 80

miles per hour where only conventional warning systems are in place.

Train speeds shall not exceed 95 mph over any highway-rail crossing

where arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator for

Safety incorporating four-quadrant gates and presence detection are

provided and tied into the signal system, such that a train will be

brought to a stop should the crossing be determined to be occupied

following descent of the gates. Amtrak shall submit for approval of

the Associate Administrator for Safety plans for site-specific

improvements with timetables for each of the 13 NEC crossings

remaining on the NEC-North End by January 1, 1999.

Explanation and analysis. As discussed above, FRA extends the

requirements for ACSES to trains operating on immediately adjacent

tracks where the maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 mph. Speeds are

permitted to 95 mph, rather than 80 mph as proposed, provided 4-

quadrant gates with presence detection are provided and tied into the

train control system. FRA may consider amendment of this order to allow

alternative secure arrangements at one or more private crossings

following submission of a required crossover safety plan. This section

is otherwise adopted as proposed.

b. In ACSES territory on the NEC-South End, where access to any

high-speed track is prevented by switches locked in the normal

position and a parallel route to the high-speed track is provided at

crossovers from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions providing

direct access exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets

otherwise so authorized may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding

135 mph on such track; and provisions of this order requiring other

tracks and trains to be equipped with the ACSES do not apply.

Explanation and analysis. FRA received no comment on this section,

which is adopted as proposed. Currently maximum speeds for trains on

the general rail system are limited to 110 mph. Under a waiver, Amtrak

operates

[[Page 39354]]

Metroliner service on the NEC-South End at speeds up to 125 mph. This

order allows Amtrak to increase its speeds on the NEC-South End to 135

mph by installing the ACSES transponders on the wayside and by

equipping new high-speed trainsets with on-board scanners and

computers. Other users of Amtrak's NEC-South End high-speed tracks are

not required to be equipped for the present, but will benefit from the

higher level of safety associated with Amtrak operations. On the NEC-

North End, maximum speeds currently top out at 110 mph, with no waiver

for high-speed service. This order authorizes operation of qualified

trainsets at up to 150 mph in territory where Amtrak has installed

ACSES on the wayside, provided Amtrak and other users are equipped.

The phrase ``otherwise authorized,'' as applied to trains, refers

to equipment qualified for higher speeds under the track/vehicle

interaction limits adopted in the recent revisions to the Track Safety

Standards. Metroliner equipment is currently authorized to operate up

to 125 mph. FRA anticipates that the new American Flyer trainsets will

be qualified to operate up to 150 mph. Other equipment presently

operating on the NEC may also qualify to operate at higher than

conventional speeds under the revised Track Safety Standards.

10. Schedule and acceptance requirements.

a. This order is effective August 21, 1998.

b. Not later than 45 days following publication of this order,

Amtrak shall deliver to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA,

a final program and timetable for completion of pre-qualification

tests, submission of final production specifications, availability

of on-board equipment from Amtrak's vendor, staging of installation

of on-board equipment for which Amtrak takes responsibility, and

testing of all wayside and on-board equipment prior to cut-in.

c. Contingent upon FRA's acceptance of the final program and

timetable, and FRA's acceptance of the results of pre-qualification

and pre-service tests, compliance with requirements of this order

for use of ACSES on the NEC-North End is required on and after

October 1, 1999.

d. Amtrak may commence operations under paragraph 9(b) of this

order utilizing equipment qualified under 49 CFR Part 213, as

revised, following FRA's approval of the elements of the final

program, timetable and test results pertinent to the subject

territory and operations.

Explanation and analysis. Several commentators noted concerns

regarding the ability of Amtrak, its vendor and other railroads to

stage installation and testing of ACSES within the remaining time

available. FRA shares this concern, but believes sufficient time

remains prior to scheduled initiation of electrified operations and

high-speed service to address these needs if Amtrak and its vendor move

briskly, but deliberately, to complete final specifications and tests.

FRA also has noted the need to ensure the quality of pre-service

testing of this new system. Although the various elements of the ACSES

system have been routinely used in train control applications

internationally, integration of the system remains a challenge.

Although Amtrak has extensive experience and an excellent record in

implementing train control technology, oversight is appropriate to

verify that safety remains the first priority in this undertaking.

Accordingly, FRA has included a requirement for submission of a

program and timetable for staging the implementation of this system in

a manner that does not impair the ability of other railroads to provide

quality passenger and freight service. FRA will expect that this

timetable reflect consultation with other parties, as necessary and

appropriate, and describe how adverse impacts on other parties will be

prevented. FRA will cooperate with this process by providing one or

more program monitors, who will oversee pre-qualification and pre-

service testing of all aspects of the system, advising the Associate

Administrator for Safety regarding the readiness of the system as

measured against the requirements of this order.

FRA will continue to evaluate the ability of the parties subject to

this order to meet the technical requirements specified without

disruption of normal rail service and may amend the order as necessary

to avoid any such disruptions.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this final order of particular applicability

under its procedures for ensuring full consideration of the potential

environmental impacts of FRA actions, as required by the National

Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and related

directives. This order meets the criteria for classification as a non-

major action for environmental purposes.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) was

enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily

and disproportionately burdened by Government regulations. Only one

small entity is affected by this order, P&W. Their annual revenues are

about $22,000,000, and this order will cost them about $1,100,000 in

total discounted costs over twenty years. The twenty-year cost is thus

about 5% of one year's revenue. This is a substantial impact on that

one entity. This order is, however, only one part of a much larger

infrastructure improvement, and much of the benefit of that improvement

accrues to P&W, including the opening of rail access for double stack

intermodal service to the site of the former U.S. Navy facilities at

Quonset Point and Davisville, Rhode Island, at a cost to the Federal

taxpayer estimated at $55 million. Also, as an adjunct to the current

improvement project, P&W will be the beneficiary of construction of a

third track on the NEC between Davisville and ``Boston Switch'' that

will provide the new doublestack access that otherwise would not exist.

P&W is the only freight railroad operating over those tracks. While the

one-time cost of ACSES is a significant fraction of one year's revenue

for P&W, the other projects will add far more than that to P&W's net

worth, enabling them to compete effectively against other modes. They

do not at present face rail competition.

As noted above, P&W operates on the NEC largely as a result of an

expedited supplemental transaction effected under section 1155 of the

Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) (45 U.S.C. 745). Pursuant to

that statute, and under an order of the Special Court established by

the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Conrail was compelled to

surrender certain properties and service rights to a successor railroad

that would commit to providing at least 4 years of service on the

properties transferred. P&W aggressively pursued that opportunity, with

the full knowledge that public planning from the 1960's forward had

focused on dramatic passenger service improvements on the NEC between

New York and Boston. As recently as the past year, P&W has sought to

extend its service rights farther west into Connecticut based upon

P&W's claim that the proposed acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX

constitutes a termination of Conrail's residual franchise and

activation of rights P&W enjoys under the Special Court's order.

FRA has sought to identify means to mitigate the impact of this

order on P&W. The proposed order would have permitted operations of

unequipped trains during nighttime hours when high-speed trains were

not running. P&W commented that it would not be feasible to limit its

train operations to night time, the window within which the order

proposed to permit non-equipped trains to run on the NEC,

[[Page 39355]]

since nighttime switching service would result in a dramatic increase

in costs, cause operational disruptions for P&W customers, disrupt

neighborhoods, and raise serious safety issues. P&W has thus explained

that the means suggested in the proposed order would not be helpful,

but has not suggested any alternate means of mitigating the impacts

that are compatible with early realization of reasonable returns from

public investments in improved rail service in the region. As a result

of those investments, P&W will be provided access to a third main track

over a key route, and with improved clearances, at a cost to the

Federal Government almost 50 times greater than the cost to P&W of

installing ACSES on its equipment. Further, it is clear that P&W (like

all operators on the subject territory) will realize substantial

benefits from ACSES. Under these circumstances, FRA is unable to

determine that P&W is unduly disadvantaged by the mandate of this

order.

Most importantly, FRA believes that there is no alternative that

could meet the safety concerns which are FRA's primary mission without

imposing similar costs on P&W. The Regulatory Flexibility Act makes

clear that concerns about small entities are not to take precedence

over the government's responsibility for public safety. Further, it is

not the purpose of railroad safety regulations and orders to allocate

societal costs among parties with shared interests in transportation

improvements. Nevertheless, FRA states unequivocally that it does not

by issuance of this order intend to deprive P&W of any claim it may

have against Amtrak related to the assignment of responsibility for the

cost of these safety improvements.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Pub. L. No. 104-

13, Sec. 2,109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 U.S.C.

Secs. 3501-3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part 1320,

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not need to approve

information collection requirements that affect nine or fewer

respondents. FRA has determined that information collection

requirements in this order will affect fewer than nine railroads, and

that therefore OMB approval is not required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies

and procedures, and has been determined to be non-significant under

both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and procedures (44 FR

11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and placed in the docket a

regulatory analysis addressing the economic impact of the rule.

Document inspection and copying facilities are available at 1120

Vermont Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, DC, 20590. Photocopies may also

be obtained by submitting a written request to the FRA Docket Clerk at

Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.

Even though full implementation of ACSES would cost about $200

million, FRA is not ordering that here, nor does FRA plan to require it

at present. For the portion of ACSES ordered here, FRA estimates that

the direct safety benefits will exceed $44 million, discounted to

present value over a 20-year period, through prevention of collisions,

overspeed derailments, and incidents involving harm to roadway workers.

Additional benefits are expected to include avoidance of other public

investments in transportation infrastructure in the region. The

allocated cost for installation and maintenance of ACSES on the

segments affected by this order is expected to be $36 million for the

same period, yielding a net benefit to society of at least $8.5

million, exclusive of non-safety benefits. Of this amount, costs of

installation on the right-of-way and on equipment will be about $33

million, which is expected to be spread over three calendar years.

FRA has based its analysis on many assumptions, which yield a great

deal of uncertainty. The projected accident rates may be significantly

lower without ACSES, in which case the analysis would overstate

benefits. FRA believes it is equally likely that the analysis

underestimates the accident rate without ACSES, in which case the

analysis would understate benefits.

There are several reasons for the uncertainty. The track safety

standards have recently been modified, and will permit railroads to set

maximum speeds on curves according to a performance standard which will

likely permit higher maximum speeds on curves on the affected segments.

This will leave less of a margin for error should the engineer permit

the train to exceed the civil speed restriction for a curve on which

the maximum speed has been increased. At the same time the corridor

will be electrified. This will allow the use of electric locomotives

which are capable of more rapid acceleration, and therefore are capable

of violating civil speed restrictions more often, for longer durations

and by greater speeds. FRA realizes that traffic on the affected

segments will increase (as did A. D. Little, the firm that analyzed the

risks of high speed service for Amtrak), but the consequences of this

increase can only be estimated, and this estimate is itself based on

uncertain volume estimates.

The largest uncertainty, however, comes from the fact that the root

cause of the kinds of accidents which ACSES may prevent is human

failure. Human failure occurs somewhat randomly, and is very difficult

to predict. FRA is aware that the more opportunities for human failure

exist, the greater the likelihood of such failure, but there is no way

to say with certainty that so many human failures will occur within

such a period.

If one accident like the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland accident (11

killed, 24 injured) is prevented, this rule will more than pay for

itself. That accident was a relatively low speed collision between an

Amtrak train and a commuter train, not on the affected segments. Higher

speed accidents could easily have costs many times the total cost of

the order (for example, the Chase, Maryland accident in 1987 which left

16 killed, 228 injured). Even accidents where a collision is not the

first event can be severe. In 1990, an Amtrak train derailed because of

overspeed on a curve in Boston, and struck a train on an adjacent track

(451 injured). In June 1998, a German high-speed train derailed and

struck a bridge, killing approximately 95 people. Although that train

was not derailed because of overspeed and did not have crash-energy

management systems (as far as we now know), it was travelling at 125

mph, a lower speed than trainsets will be capable of on this corridor,

and may be illustrative of what a high-speed derailment could cause.

FRA has already taken steps to see that high-speed trains on this

corridor will have crash-energy management systems, but avoiding

derailments and collisions with conventional passenger trains is

extremely desirable. While it is impossible to know whether this will

prevent something which may never happen, or multiple events,

preventing just one major accident in twenty years will make the system

pay for itself.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the preamble, FRA issues the

following Final Order:

Final Order of Particular Applicability

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501-20505 (1994); and 49

CFR 1.49(f), (g), and (m).

[[Page 39356]]

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and

existing orders for automatic train control on track controlled by the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the Northeast

Corridor (NEC). This order applies in territory where Amtrak has

installed wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement

System (ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the conditions

set forth below.

All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such equipped

territory between Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven, Connecticut

(NEC-North End), or on tracks providing access to such high-speed

tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following

entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail service--

Amtrak;

Connecticut Department of Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation and its successors;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; and

Providence and Worcester Railroad Company.

The requirement that all trains be equipped with operative on-board

ACSES applies as specified in paragraph (2) from milepost 73.2 at New

Haven, Connecticut, to South Station, Boston, Massachusetts, but

applies only to high-speed trains operating on high-speed tracks

between Washington, DC, and New York, New York (NEC-South End), as set

forth in paragraph 9(b).

Definitions

Unless otherwise provided terms used in this order have the same

definitions contained in Part 236. For purposes of this order--

ACSES means a transponder based system that operates independent of

the cab signal system, and provides enforcement of permanent speed

restrictions, temporary speed restrictions, and stop signals at

interlockings.

High-speed train means a train operating in excess of 125 miles per

hour (mph) on the NEC-South End, and 110 mph on the NEC-North End.

``High-speed track'' means (1) a track on the main line of the NEC-

South End, where the authorized train speed for any class of train

exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a track on the main line of the NEC-North End

where the maximum authorized train speed for any class of train is in

excess of 110 mph.

Immediately adjacent track means a track within 30 feet of a high-

speed track when measured from track center to track center.

Signal and train control system refers to the automatic cab signal/

automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC at

the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by ACSES, together

with such modifications as Amtrak shall make consistent with this

order.

Performance Standards

Effective October 1, 1999, the following performance standards and

special requirements shall apply:

1. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), the signal and train

control system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil speed

restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders) on all

high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks. Permanent

restrictions shall be loaded into the onboard computer by direct data

transfer from a verified database. Temporary restrictions shall be

loaded into the onboard computer by direct data transfer from the

computer-aided dispatching system. (For not to exceed 12 months

following cut-in of the system, use of temporary transponders

programmed with appropriate speed restrictions will be deemed to

satisfy this paragraph. Thereafter, use of temporary transponders alone

shall be acceptable only in the case of an emergency restriction for

which transfer of the restriction into the onboard computers of all

affected trains is not practicable.)

2. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), all trains operating on

high-speed track, immediately adjacent track where the maximum

authorized speed exceeds 20 mph, or track providing access to high-

speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab signal/

speed control system and ACSES.

3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in the

locomotive cab.

4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any

location associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or cab

signal aspect.

5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed

tracks or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks,

the signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop short

of the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an absolute

stop. The system shall function such that the train will be brought to

a complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first of the

following events shall occur: (1) the signal displays a more permissive

aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or system penalty,

the train comes to a complete stop, the engineer receives verbal

authority to proceed from the dispatcher, and the engineer activates an

override or reset device that is located where it cannot be activated

from the engineer's accustomed position in the cab. The train may then

only travel at restricted speed until a valid speed command is received

by the on-board train equipment. For not to exceed 12 months following

cut-in of ACSES, release of the positive stop feature, under conditions

where the signal displays an aspect more favorable than stop, but not

less favorable than restricting, may be accomplished by use of the

reset device; thereafter, this function shall be accomplished

automatically so that it is not necessary for the engineer to leave his

or her accustomed position in the cab.

6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at

reduced speeds, as follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of the

cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC system will

be cut out; however, ACSES shall remain operative and enforce the 79

mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are provided, the

train will receive information approaching the home signal, through the

MCP radio, with the information actually derived from the ``flashing

lunar signal with the letter ``C'' displayed at the home signal.'' When

failure occurs after a train has entered such a block, the train will

proceed at restricted speed to the next interlocking and may not pass

the home signal, regardless of the aspect displayed, until the flashing

lunar ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is displayed. The train may

then pass the signal and proceed at a speed not to exceed 79 mph. The

speed limit shall be enforced by ACSES.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must be

cut out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The engineer

will be required to notify the dispatcher that ACSES has been cut out.

When given permission to proceed, the train must not exceed 125 mph

(NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End). All trains with cut out

ACSES will operate at conventional train speeds.

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system

and ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the

train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system

fails, train

[[Page 39357]]

operation will be at restricted speed to a point where absolute block

can be established in advance of the train. Where absolute block is

established in advance of the train, the train may proceed at speeds

not to exceed 79 mph.

e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where the

equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must not

exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph (NEC-North End) until the

next valid transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed

restriction will be enforced by the system and ``--'' will be displayed

to indicate that the civil speed is unknown. The audible alarm for

civil speeds will sound and must be acknowledged. Speed restrictions

previously entered into the system, whether temporary or permanent,

will be displayed at the proper time and continue to be enforced. If

the missing transponder is a positive stop enforcement transponder at

the distant signal to an interlocking, then the system will treat the

missing transponder as if it were present and a stop will be required.

Since the previous transponder will have transmitted the distance to

the stop location, the stop shall be enforced unless a cab signal is

received that indicates the interlocking signal is displaying an aspect

more favorable than ``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.''

The 125/110 mph speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of

whether the cab signal aspect is being received.

7. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC system,

ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered inoperative until the

engine has been repaired, tested and found to be functioning properly.

Repairs shall be made before dispatching the unit on any subsequent

trip.

8. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one name,

and will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the engine crew.

These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or illuminated letters or

numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically

locked derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder set

shall cut in ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto the

main line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive stop

will be required. At entrances from a signaled track, ACSES shall be

cut in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop enforced at the

home signal.

c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the

required functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive

Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each transponder

is encountered, the information associated with that transponder, and

each use of the positive stop override. These functions may be

incorporated within the on-board computer, or as a stand alone device,

but shall continue to record speeds and related cab signal/ATC data,

even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The event recorder shall

meet all requirements of Sec. 229.135.

9. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory

subject to this order:

a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed

tracks, adjacent track where the maximum authorized speed exceeds 20

mph, and tracks providing access to high-speed tracks are equipped with

cab signal/ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets

otherwise so authorized may operate at maximum speeds not exceeding 150

mph. The maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing shall not exceed

80 mph where only conventional warning systems are in place. Train

speeds shall not exceed 95 mph over any highway-rail crossing where

arrangements approved by the Associate Administrator for Safety

incorporating four-quadrant gates and presence detection are provided

and tied into the signal system, such that a train will be brought to a

stop should the crossing be determined to be occupied following descent

of the gates. Amtrak shall submit for approval of the Associate

Administrator for Safety plans for site-specific improvements with

timetables for each of the 13 NEC crossings remaining on the NEC-North

End by January 1, 1999.

b. In ACSES territory on the NEC-South End, where access to any

high-speed track is prevented by switches locked in the normal position

and a parallel route to the high-speed track is provided at crossovers

from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions providing direct access

exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so authorized

may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding 135 mph on such track; and

provisions of this order requiring other tracks and trains to be

equipped with ACSES do not apply.

10. Schedule and acceptance requirements.

a. This order is effective August 21, 1998.

b. Not later than 45 days following publication of this order,

Amtrak shall deliver to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, a

final program and timetable for completion of pre-qualification tests,

availability of on-board equipment from Amtrak's vendor, staging of

installation of on-board equipment for which Amtrak takes

responsibility, and testing of all wayside and on-board equipment prior

to cut-in.

c. Contingent upon FRA's acceptance of the final program and

timetable, and FRA's acceptance of the results of pre-qualification and

pre-service tests, compliance with requirements of this order for use

of ACSES on the NEC-North End is required on and after October 1, 1999.

d. Amtrak may commence operations under paragraph 9(b) of this

order utilizing equipment qualified under 49 CFR Part 213, as revised,

following FRA's approval of the elements of the final program,

timetable and test results pertinent to the subject territory and

operations.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on July 10, 1998.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Federal Railroad Administrator.

[FR Doc. 98-19431 Filed 7-21-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P