Duke Energy Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287]

Duke Energy Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of

Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, issued to Duke Energy Corporation (the

licensee), for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and

3, respectively, located in Seneca, South Carolina.

If approved, the proposed amendments would allow temporary

noncompliance with the Penetration Room Ventilation System air flow

surveillance requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 4.5.4.1.b.1

until modifications can be completed to support testing in accordance

with ANSI Standard N510-1975, as required by the TSs. These

modifications are scheduled to be completed on all three units by

August 30, 1998.

Oconee TS 4.5.4.1.b.1 requires that every 18 months the Penetration

Room Ventilation System fans be demonstrated to operate at design flow

(+/-10 percent) when tested in accordance with ANSI Standard N510-1975.

ANSI Standard N510-1975 requires that a pitot tube velocity-traverse

method be used in accordance with Section 9 of the American Conference

of Government Industrial Hygienists Industrial Ventilation

requirements. The flow measurement method that has been used since

original construction uses installed orifice plates to measure the air

flow.

However, during a Safety System Engineering Inspection at Oconee

for the Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS) and Penetration Room

Ventilation System (PRVS), the NRC identified a violation that

indicated that the PRVS fans were not tested in accordance with the TSs

and ANSI Standard N510-1975. This violation was included in Inspection

Report Nos. 50-269/98-03, 50-270/98-03, and 50-287/09-03 dated May 4,

1998. By letter dated June 4, 1998, the licensee denied the violation

based on a belief that the use of the orifice plates met the

requirements of the TSs and the ANSI standard. As part of the review of

this issue, the licensee conducted flow measurement tests using a pitot

tube array and attempted (unsuccessfully) to locate calibration data

for the orifices. The licensee was unable to develop an alternate

method to measure flow that was reliable.

By letter dated July 6, 1998, the NRC informed the licensee that

its denial of the violation was rejected. Consequently, the licensee

entered TS 3.0, which required that all three units be in the hot

shutdown condition within 12 hours, and requested that a Notice of

Enforcement Discretion (NOED) be granted. The NOED was issued on July

8, 1998, and will be effective until the proposed amendments that were

submitted on July 8, 1998, are processed. Since the proposed amendments

are designed to complete the review process and implement the TS

changes, pursuant to the NRC's policy regarding exercising discretion

for an operating facility set out in Section VII.c of the ``General

Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions''

(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, and be effective for the period until

the issuance of the related TS amendments, these circumstances require

that the amendments be processed under exigent circumstances.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

[This proposed change has been evaluated against the standards

in 10 CFR 50.92 and has been determined to involve no significant

hazards, in that operation of the facility in accordance with the

proposed amendments would not:]

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated:

This proposed change does not increase the probability of an

accident evaluated in the SAR [Safety Analysis Report] because:

This evaluation addresses the potential impact of revising

Technical Specification 4.5.4.1.b.1 to include a note to allow a

temporary noncompliance with this surveillance requirement until

August 30, 1998, to complete the necessary modifications to enable

flow testing in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

As described in the technical justification (Attachment 3 [of

the July 8, 1998, submittal]), the use of orifice plates in the

Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Penetration Room Ventilation Systems

(PRVSs) to measure the flow from the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI

N510-1975 requirements, does not increase the probability of an

accident evaluated in the SAR because this condition is not an

accident initiator. There is no physical change to any plant

structures, systems, or components (SSCs) or operating procedures.

Neither electrical power systems, nor important to safety mechanical

SSCs will be adversely affected. The PRVS has been evaluated as

operable for normal and accident conditions. There are no shutdown

margin, reactivity management, or fuel integrity concerns. There is

no increase in accident initiation likelihood, therefore analyzed

accident scenarios are not impacted.

This proposed change does not increase the probability of a

malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR

because:

As described in the technical justification, the use of orifice

plates which are currently used in Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 to

measure the flow from the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI N510-1975

requirements, does not increase the probability of a malfunction of

equipment important to safety. This activity does not physically

change or modify any plant system, structure, or component. The PRVS

is QA [quality assurance] condition 1 (QA-1) and is required to

filter reactor building leakage which enters the East and West

Penetration Rooms. This activity does not change any test

procedures. Nothing is being done to inhibit the integrity or

function of the PRVS. No valve manipulations, electrical alignments,

or system configurations are required.

This change does not increase the consequences of an accident

evaluated in the SAR because:

This activity will not adversely affect the ability to mitigate

any SAR described accidents. The PRVS flow is within the system

design limits as measured by the orifice plates. In addition, Duke

[Duke Energy Corporation] has performed bounding analyses which

demonstrate that the carbon filter efficiency is still within the

Technical Specification limits at higher flow rates. Therefore,

Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 will meet system design requirements for

the PRVS. There is no adverse impact on containment integrity,

radiological release pathways, fuel

[[Page 38434]]

design, filtration systems, main steam relief valve setpoints, or

radwaste systems.

This change does not increase the consequences of a malfunction

of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR because:

No safety related or important to safety equipment necessary to

place or maintain the plant in safe shutdown condition will be

impacted by allowing a temporary noncompliance with this

surveillance requirement until August 30, 1998, to complete flow

testing in accordance with ANSI N510-1975. As described in the

technical justification, the use of orifice plates which are

currently used in Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 to measure the flow from

the PRVS fans, in lieu of ANSI N510-1975 requirements, does not

increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to

safety. The PRVS flow is within the system design limits as measured

by the orifice plates. In addition, Duke has performed bounding

analyses which demonstrate that the carbon filter efficiency is

still within the Technical Specification limits at higher flow

rates. Therefore, Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 will meet system design

requirements for the PRVS. There is no adverse impact on containment

integrity, radiological release pathways, fuel design, filtration

systems, main steam relief valve setpoints, or radwaste systems.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated:

This change does not create the possibility for an accident of a

different type than any evaluated in the SAR because:

There is no increased risk of unit trip, or challenge to the

Reactor Protection System (RPS) or other safety systems. There is no

physical effect on the plant, i.e. none on Reactor Coolant System

(RCS) temperature, boron concentration, control rod manipulations,

core configuration changes, and no impact on nuclear

instrumentation. There is no increased risk of a reactivity

excursion. No new failure modes or credible accident scenarios are

postulated from this activity.

This change does not create the possibility for a malfunction of

a different type than any evaluated in the SAR because:

There is no physical change to the plant SSCs or operating

procedures. This change does not involve any plant changes,

electrical lineups, or valve manipulations. Analyses have been

performed which demonstrate that the PRVS can perform its intended

safety function relying on the orifice plates to measure flow. No

new equipment or components were installed. No credible new failures

are postulated.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This change does not involve a significant reduction in the

margin of safety because:

No function of any importance to safety SSC will be adversely

affected or degraded as a result of continued operation. No safety

parameters, setpoints, or design limits are changed. There is no

adverse impact to the nuclear fuel, cladding, RCS, or required

containment systems.

Duke has concluded, based on the above, that there are no

significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment

request.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendments until the

expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendments before the expiration

of the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is

that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will consider all public and State comments

received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in

the Federal Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that

the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of

this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to

Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of

written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By August 17, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing

with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility

operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene.

Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall

be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons

should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the

Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at

the Oconee County Library, 501 West South Broad Street, Walhalla, South

Carolina. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene

is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/

or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention

[[Page 38435]]

and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention

at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those

specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on

which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert

opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a

genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or

fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the

amendments under consideration. The contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails

to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with

respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate

as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If the amendments are issued before the expiration of the 30-day

hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the

issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is

requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the

hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendments.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the

Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Mr. J. Michael McGarry, III, Winston

and Strawn, 1200 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036, attorney for

the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(l)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment dated July 8, 1998, which is available for

public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room, located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South

Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of July 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

David E. LaBarge,

Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2, Division of Reactor

Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98-18960 Filed 7-15-98; 8:45 am]

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