Notice of Safety Advisory: Determination of Vision Impairment Among Locomotive Engineers

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory: Determination of Vision Impairment

Among Locomotive Engineers

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 98-1 addressing the vision

standards of certified locomotive engineers in order to reduce the risk

of accidents arising from vision impaired engineers.

[[Page 29298]]

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Conklin, Operating Practices

Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street S.W., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-

3372); Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-11, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone: 202-632-3187); or Mark H. McKeon, Regional Administrator,

55 Broadway, Cambridge, MA 02142 (telephone: 617-494-2243).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: After a tragic 1987 accident and in response

to the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, FRA adopted rules

establishing a program for qualifying locomotive engineers to assure

the uniformity and adequacy of the qualifications standards. FRA's

rule, which became effective in 1991, establishes requirements for

testing the visual acuity of individuals who want to be certified as

locomotive engineers. In the ongoing effort to monitor compliance with

and the effectiveness of its existing regulatory program, FRA has been

examining available data concerning administration of this aspect of

the certification program. The data suggest that there is room for

improving the rule's existing provisions concerning the testing and

evaluation of visual acuity.

FRA also has received a number of recommendations for change to the

rules concerning the qualification and certification of locomotive

engineers. The most recent recommendation was received on May 14, 1998,

when FRA was presented with a recommendation from the Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee (RSAC) that FRA consider changes to the current

provisions concerning the testing and evaluation of visual acuity.

RSAC was established to provide recommendations and advice to the

Administrator on development of FRA's railroad safety regulatory

program, including issuance of new regulations, review and revision of

existing regulations, and identification of non-regulatory alternatives

for improvement of railroad safety. RSAC recommendations carry

considerable weight since RSAC is comprised of 48 representatives from

27 member organizations, including railroads, labor groups, equipment

manufacturers, state government groups, public associations, and two

associate non-voting representatives from Canada and Mexico.

The May 14 RSAC recommendation echoes an earlier recommendation

from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) based on the

NTSB's March 25, 1997 report of its investigation into a fatal

collision between two New Jersey transit commuter trains near Secaucus,

New Jersey. See NTSB's Railroad Accident Report--Near Head-On Collision

and Derailment of Two New Jersey Transit Commuter Trains near Secaucus,

New Jersey, February 9, 1996 (NTSB/RAR-97/01).

Explanation of Current Requirements on Testing and Evaluation of

Visual Acuity

FRA rules require each railroad to test the vision of every

locomotive engineer when initially certified and at periodic intervals

of no more than every three years. Each railroad's program must include

criteria and procedures implementing how the railroad will ensure that

each locomotive engineer will have adequate distant visual acuity and

the ability to recognize and distinguish between the colors of signals.

The rule requires that a railroad have written confirmation from a

licensed medical doctor that the person being certified meets the FRA

visual acuity standards. See 49 CFR part 240 at Secs. 240.121, 240.207.

The rule gives railroad's and railroad medical examiners

considerable latitude when conducting visual acuity testing and

evaluation. During the period the rule has been in effect, the latitude

permitted has generated questions about a number of matters. These

include questions about the use of chromatic lenses; accounting for the

variations in railroad signals when a signal is displaying the color

yellow; the duty of engineers who rely on contact lenses to have a pair

of corrective eyeglasses available when on duty; the obligation of

certified locomotive engineers to alert the railroad when the engineer

has reason to believe that his or her vision has deteriorated to the

extent that the person may no longer meet the acuity requirements; the

duty of each medical examiner to have a clearly articulated basis for

his or her decision that a person who lacks the specified level of

acuity can nonetheless safely operate a locomotive; and the ability to

use a variety of testing methods, including whether it is proper to

conduct color vision tests by displaying yarn or other fabrics.

Of these questions, the most vexing involves the issue of employing

appropriate testing of persons to detect color vision impairment. FRA's

expectation was that the physicians who would be designated as railroad

medical examiners would be trained to competently administer color

vision examinations. Thus, FRA did not anticipate that it would be

necessary to specify for the medical examiners the test procedures to

be employed when testing for whether a person meets the standards

specified in this rule.

That assumption has been called into question under tragic

circumstances. It appears that if the current rule had been implemented

as FRA expected, the rule would have been adequate to prevent the NJT

accident. For example, the NTSB report found that the medical history

of the suspect engineer showed that he had been administered an

acceptable test annually by the same NJT contract physician since at

least 1985. For nine straight years, the engineer scored a perfect

score on his color vision test. However, the NTSB report also found

that beginning in 1994, the test results showed a deterioration of the

engineer's ability to distinguish among some colors and, in February

1995, one year prior to the accident, the engineer's test scores caused

him to be classified as having a moderate color vision handicap. As a

consequence of this low test score, the physician said that he gave the

engineer the Dvorine Nomenclature Test to further evaluate the

engineer's color vision. NTSB reported that the testing protocol states

that the nomenclature test is not a test of color discrimination

ability, since many color blind individuals learn to name the colors

correctly by their brightness instead of their hue. Reliance on this

testing methodology suggests the physician failed to understand that

the purpose of the Dvorine Nomenclature Test is to see whether the

patient can identify the names of the colors--not to test color vision.

In fact, the Dvorine Nomenclature Test is merely a preliminary step in

conducting the Dvorine--Second edition color vision test and is often

skipped because most patients are presumed to be able to identify the

names of the colors. Thus, it is likely that this accident was

preventable if the physician had responded differently to the pattern

of deterioration and had used a sound approach to measuring the

person's ability to distinguish colors.

RSAC'S Recommended Changes to FRA'S Rules on Testing and Evaluation

of Visual Acuity

FRA's goal is to prevent train collisions such as the one that

occurred at Secaucus. Amending the existing regulation, so that

railroad medical examiners are limited to the application of prescribed

acceptable tests, will help achieve this goal. While the RSAC has

recommended modification of the

[[Page 29299]]

regulation, issuance of a final rule could take a substantial period of

time during which it is possible that the circumstances surrounding the

medical evaluation process of the Secaucus accident could be

replicated. FRA has decided that the RSAC recommendations for change on

this issue should be widely disseminated since these recommendations

reflect the current best thinking of the regulated community. Broad

sharing of information concerning the views of the advisory committee

can be of assistance to medical examiners who are responsible for

administering the existing regulation.

Based on past practice, FRA anticipates that the agency will accept

the RSAC recommendation that FRA issue a notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM) to revise the locomotive engineer certification regulation. The

publication of this safety advisory should not be viewed as FRA

endorsement of any particular aspect of the RSAC recommendations nor

prejudging the eventual course of action which FRA may follow after

carefully reviewing the RSAC recommendation. This safety advisory is

intended to encourage all parties to carefully examine their current

practices and, where appropriate, modify those practices to further

reduce the risk of an accident or injury.

FRA anticipates that, when an NPRM may be issued, these and other

RSAC recommendations addressing locomotive engineer certification will

be the subject of public comment. These comments will be considered in

the development of the final rule. As an example, even among members of

the advisory committee who helped shape the consensus recommendations,

FRA understands that some members would prefer to see that locomotive

engineers be banned from wearing chromatic lenses during any color

vision testing and any operation of a train or locomotive. This issue

will be the subject of further discussion following completion of the

public comment period.

Recommendation Details

RSAC Recommended That

a. FRA create an obligation for each certified locomotive engineer

to notify his or her employing railroad's medical department or, if no

such department exists, an appropriate railroad official, if the

person's best correctable vision or hearing has deteriorated to the

extent that the person no longer meets one or more of the prescribed

vision or hearing standards or requirements of 49 CFR part 240;

b. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

have a current copy of 49 CFR part 240, including all appendices, and

request that their medical examiners review the medical requirements;

c. Each railroad should remind all of their medical examiners who

perform testing pursuant to 49 CFR 240.121 that the visual acuity tests

should be conducted in accordance with the directions supplied by the

manufacturer of the chosen test instruments and any American National

Standards Institute (ANSI) standards that are applicable;

d. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

know that no person shall be allowed to wear chromatic lenses during an

initial test of the person's color vision; the initial test is one

conducted in accordance with one of the accepted tests. Chromatic

lenses may be worn in accordance with any subsequent testing if

permitted by the medical examiner and the railroad;

e. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

know that railroad signals do not always occur in the same sequence and

that testing procedures must take that fact into account;

f. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

know that ``yellow signals'' do not always appear to be the same;

g. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

know that it is not acceptable to use ``yarn'' or other materials to

conduct a simple test to determine whether the certification candidate

has the requisite vision;

h. Each railroad should require that its medical examiners retest

and further evaluate any locomotive engineer who reports a

deteriorating vision condition or, upon request, an examinee who fails

to meet the rule's articulated vision standards. The railroad's medical

examiner will be expected to review all pertinent information and,

under some circumstances, must condition certification on any special

restrictions the medical examiner determines in writing to be

necessary, e.g., restrict an examinee who does not meet the criteria

from operating a locomotive or train at night, during adverse weather

conditions, or outside of a yard. This decision should not be made

until after consultation with one of the railroad's designated

supervisors of locomotive engineers;

i. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners

know that engineers who wear contact lenses should have good tolerance

to the lenses and should be instructed to have a pair of corrective

glasses available when on duty; and

j. Each railroad should ensure that when a person is tested

pursuant to 49 CFR 240.121, the person has the ability to recognize and

distinguish between the colors of railroad signals as demonstrated by

successfully completing one of the tests specified in the table below.

Each railroad should clearly explain to the medical examiners

conducting such tests that the key is being able to distinguish among

railroad signals; without such a clarification, medical examiners

unfamiliar with the railroad environment might focus their attention on

colors that do not appear as railroad signals.

k. Each railroad should ensure that medical examiners conducting

tests to determine visual acuity adhere to the following guidance when

administering the vision acuity requirements of 49 CFR 240.121 and

240.207. Select a testing methodology only from the following testing

protocols which are deemed acceptable testing methods for determining

whether a person has the ability to recognize and distinguish among the

colors used as signals in the railroad industry. The acceptable test

methods are shown in the left hand column and the criteria that should

be employed to determine whether a person has failed the particular

testing protocol are shown in the right hand column. Successful

completion of one of these tests should be required, but requiring

successful completion of multiple tests is discouraged since it would

most likely be redundant.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Accepted tests Failure criteria

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pseudoisochromatic Plate Tests

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

American Optical Company 1965....... 5 or more errors on plates 1-15.

AOC--Hardy-Rand-Ritter plates-- Any error on plates 1-6 (plates 1-4 are for demonstration--test plate 1 is

second edition. actually plate 5 in book).

Dvorine--Second edition............. 3 or more errors on plates 1-15.

[[Page 29300]]

Ishihara (14 plate)................. 2 or more errors on plates 1-11.

Ishihara (16 plate)................. 2 or more errors on plates 1-8.

Ishihara (24 plate)................. 3 or more errors on plates 1-15.

Ishihara (38 plate)................. 4 or more errors on plates 1-21.

Richmond Plates 1983................ 5 or more errors on plates 1-15.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Multifunction Vision Tester

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Keystone Orthoscope................. Any error.

OPTEC 2000.......................... Any error.

Titmus Vision Tester................ Any error.

Titmus II Vision Tester............. Any error.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Donald M. Itzkoff,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 98-14010 Filed 5-27-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P