Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-220]

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.

DPR-63, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee), for

operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (NMP1) located

in the town of Scriba, Oswego County, New York.

The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications (TSs)

3/4.6.2, ``Protective Instrumentation,'' to reflect modifications to

the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment

System. Specifically, TS

[[Page 27602]]

Tables 3.6.2l and 4.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System

Initiation,'' would be changed to delete the high radiation signal and

substitute the following initiating signals from the Reactor Protection

System: (1) low-low reactor water level in the reactor vessel, (2) high

steam flow in the main steam line, (3) high temperature in the main

steam line tunnel, and (4) high pressure in the reactor drywell. TS

Table 3.6.2l would specify setpoints for each of these four initiating

parameters ([greater than or equal to] 5 inches-indicator scale, [less

than or equal to] 105 psid, [less than or equal to] 200 degrees F, and

[less than or equal to] 3.5 psig, respectively). TS Table 3.6.2l would

indicate for each of the four parameters that the minimum number of

tripped or operable trip systems and the minimum number of operable

instrument channels per operable trip system are two, and that the four

parameters are required to be operable when the reactor mode switch is

in the ``startup'' or ``run'' positions (but not if in the ``shutdown''

or ``refuel'' positions), except that the high drywell pressure signal

may be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting. For three of

the parameters (low-low reactor water level, high steam flow in the

main steam line, and high drywell pressure), TS Table 4.6.2l would

require daily sensor checks, quarterly instrument channel tests, and

quarterly instrument channel calibrations (except that only the trip

circuit need be calibrated and tested at these quarterly frequencies;

the primary sensor would be calibrated and tested each operating

cycle). For the parameter high temperature in the main steam line

tunnel, TS Table 4.6.2l would require an instrument channel test and an

instrument channel calibration each operating cycle, not to exceed 24

months. Associated TS ``Bases for 3.4.5 and 4.4.5 Control Room Air

Treatment System'' would also be changed to update the system

descriptions consistent with these proposed changes to the automatic

initiation circuitry, and to reflect the system's manual start

capability. These changes to the TS Bases would include deletion of the

statements that (1) the Control Room Air Treatment System is designed

``to automatically start upon a receipt of a high radiation signal from

one of the two radiation monitors located on the ventilation intake''

and that (2) ``* * * air intake radiation monitors will be calibrated

and functionally tested each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 months,

to verify system performance.''

During a system design review, the licensee determined that (1)

contrary to a commitment in letters to the NRC dated January 31 and

March 19, 1984, the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not

automatically initiate during an MSLB [main steam line break] or an

LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident], and (2) initiation of the NMP1 Control

Room Air Treatment System at the current radiation monitor setpoint of

[less than or equal to] 1000 CPM, as required by TS Table 3.6.2l, is

not sufficient for compliance with GDC 19 limits for radiological

protection of the control room operators. Consequently, on April 21,

1998, the licensee declared the Control Room Air Treatment System

inoperable and notified the NRC that a 7 day limiting condition for

operation had been entered as specified by TS 3.4.5. On April 27, 1998,

the licensee informed the NRC Project Manager that resolution of the

inoperability condition would involve modifications more extensive than

mere setpoint adjustments, that these modifications should not be

implemented while NMP1 is operating, and that the licensee was

considering filing an application for an emergency license amendment to

allow the modifications to be implemented and the plant restarted after

a 7-day outage. NMP1 was shut down on April 28, 1998, in accordance

with TS 3.4.5. On May 2, 1998, the licensee filed an application

requesting that the NRC amend the NMP1 license by May 8, 1998, on an

Emergency basis because ``resumption of operation cannot occur until

NRC approval of the proposed change.'' However, on May 11, 1998, the

licensee informed the NRC that as a result of the finding by a team of

licensee engineers who reviewed the control room ventilation systems,

modifications to the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not

be completed and NMP1 determined ready for restart for 2 weeks.

Accordingly, the NRC finds that exigent circumstances exist in that the

full 30 days normally provided for public comment with respect to the

proposed action is not available before NMP1 will be ready to resume

power operation.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

1. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the

proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

* * * The proposed modification and associated TS changes involve a

system that is intended to detect the symptoms of certain events or

accidents and initiate mitigative actions (i.e., the Control Room Air

Treatment System). Accordingly, the proposed changes do not affect the

probability of any accident initiators previously evaluated. Therefore,

the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the

probability of any accidents previously evaluated.

Currently, TS Table 3.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System

Initiation,'' specifies a setpoint of ``1000 CPM'' for

Parameter (1), ``High Radiation Ventilation Intake.'' This requires the

continuous radiation monitors located in the outside air intake duct of

the Control Room Ventilation System to initiate the Control Room Air

Treatment System at a detector count rate of ``[less than or equal to]

1000 CPM.'' The setpoint was established to comply with the radiation

dose limits specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design

Criterion (GDC) 19 and NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan [SRP],''

Section 6.4 for control room habitability during an accident, including

a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). In the event of an accident, timely

initiation and proper operation of the Control Room Air Treatment

System minimizes the amount of airborne radioactivity entering the

control room. However, based on the results of a current study,

initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at this setpoint

does not provide assurance that personnel occupying the control room

under the most limiting Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident

assumptions would not receive radiation exposures in excess of the GDC

19 and SRP 6.4 limits. It was further determined that, contrary to a

1984 commitment, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not

automatically initiate during a LOCA.

[[Page 27603]]

To correct this condition, a modification is proposed that will

automatically initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System on either

a MSLB or LOCA signal. Spare contacts from the RPS logic circuits will

be used to provide the initiation signals. Specifically, MSLB automatic

initiation of the system will be on main steam line high flow or main

steam line tunnel high temperature, and LOCA automatic initiation of

the system will be on high drywell pressure or low-low reactor vessel

water level. Implementation of this modification will provide automatic

initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at the onset of

both a MSLB and a LOCA, as previously committed.

The MSLB accident has been evaluated for full power operating

conditions where radioactive gases released from the turbine building

could be drawn into the Control Room Ventilation System and accumulate

in the control room. Engineering calculations show that the Control

Room Air Treatment System would maintain the dose to the control room

operators below the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits during these releases,

and the addition of an anticipatory automatic initiation on a MSLB

signal (main steam line high flow or main steam line tunnel high

temperature) provides assurance that the consequences of the MSLB

accident are bounded by the analysis.

The LOCA analysis assumes that radioactive gases are released from

the elevated stack and are then drawn back down into the Control Room

Ventilation System intake duct. Analysis shows that for the bounding

condition, the accumulated dose in the control room for a minimum of 30

days would not be detected by the Control Room Air Treatment System

radiation monitors, even at a significantly reduced setpoint.

Consequently, the radiation monitors cannot be relied upon to initiate

the Control Room Air Treatment System in the event of a LOCA. As a

result, an anticipatory automatic initiation of the Control Room Air

Treatment System on a LOCA signal (high drywell pressure or low-low

reactor vessel water level) is proposed to be added to provide

assurance that personnel occupying the control room under the most

limiting LOCA assumptions will not receive radiation exposures in

excess of the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits.

NMPC has also proposed to delete the requirement to have the

Control Room Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high

radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel''

position. This change is acceptable based on 1) neither a LOCA or MSLB

is assumed to occur in refuel; 2) for accidents assumed to occur during

refueling (fuel handling accident), GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met

without the Control Room Air Treatment System; and 3) the Control Room

Air Treatment System can be manually initiated.

In summary, the proposed changes for the Control Room Air Treatment

System initiation channels will assure that the NMP1 control room

operators will not receive radiation exposures in excess of the limits

delineated in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4. Accordingly, the operators will be

able to respond to and mitigate the consequences of anticipated

accident scenarios. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a

significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

2. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the

proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

* * * The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident

initiators and do not involve any alterations to plant configurations

which could initiate a new or different kind of accident. The actuation

circuit of the Control Room Air Treatment System actuation logic does

not control or interface with any primary reactor processes. Addition

of the MSLB logic and the LOCA logic will ensure that the Control Room

Air Treatment System initiates such that habitability of the control

room is not compromised. No new failure modes to existing systems or

equipment important to safety are created by this change. Post-

installation testing will confirm that the new logic will have no

effect on other safety-related circuits and TS required surveillance

testing will routinely confirm operability of the Control Room Air

Treatment System. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility

of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

3. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the

proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The proposed changes to Sections 3.6.2 and 4.6.2 incorporate

modifications to the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room

Air Treatment System. * * * As a result of these changes, the

requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System automatically

initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in

the ``Refuel'' position has been deleted. * * *

The addition of the trip circuit logic from the MSLB accident as

well as from the LOCA circuits assures that the control room operator

will not be exposed to radiation limits in excess of GDC 19 or SRP 6.4

limits. Additionally, the initiation signal will be automatic at the

onset of both accidents, which improves the response time of the

Control Room Air Treatment System to the MSLB accident and the LOCA.

NMPC has proposed to delete the requirement to have the Control Room

Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high radiation signal

when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel'' position. This change

is acceptable based on (1) neither a LOCA nor MSLB is assumed to occur

in refuel; (2) for accidents assumed to occur during refueling (fuel

handling accident) GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met without the

Control Room Air Treatment System; and (3) the Control Room Air

Treatment System can be manually initiated.

In summary, the proposed changes will assure that the Control Room

dose established in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 will not be exceeded. Therefore,

the proposed activity does not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public and State comments received.

Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal

Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to

take this action will occur very infrequently.

[[Page 27604]]

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of

this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to

Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of

written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By June 1, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with

respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating

license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Reference and Documents Department,

Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed

by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references

to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those

facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information

to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material

issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within

the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be

one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A

petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be

permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day

hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the

issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is

requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the

hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

by the above date.

A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the

General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, and to Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400

L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment dated May 2, 1998, which is available for

public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room, located at the Reference and Documents Department,

Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of May, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Darl S. Hood,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor

Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98-13187 Filed 5-18-98; 8:45 am]

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