Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedural Issues for the Phase II 220 MHz Service

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[DA 98-48; Report No. AUC-97-18-A (Auction No. 18)]

Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and

Other Auction Procedural Issues for the Phase II 220 MHz Service

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice; seeking comment.

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SUMMARY: The Commission is seeking comment on a proposed formula for

calculating minimum opening bids as well as other procedural issues in

the auction of licenses for the Phase II 220 MHz Service, Auction No.

18.

DATES: Comments are due on or before January 29, 1998. Reply comments

are due on or before February 5, 1998.

ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties must submit an original and four

copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications

Commission, Room 222, 1919 M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554. In

addition, parties must submit one copy to Kathleen O'Brien Ham, Chief,

Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Room 5202, 2025 M Street

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Hartigan, Bob Reagle or Frank

Stilwell, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) 418-0660.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This public notice was released on January

13, 1998 and is available in its entirety, including attachments; for

inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC

Reference Center (Room 239), 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and

also may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor,

International Transcription Services, (202) 857-3800, fax (202) 857-

3805, 1231 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

SYNOPSIS OF THE PUBLIC NOTICE

Background

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 calls upon the Commission to

prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required

or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to

auction (i.e., because they are mutually exclusive), unless the

Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the

public interest. Section 3002(a), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Public

Law 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (``Budget Act''); 47 U.S.C.

309(j)(4)(F). The Commission's authority to establish a reserve price

or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 CFR 1.2104(c) and (d).

Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') to seek comment on the use of a

minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each

auction. See In the Matter of Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's

Rules--Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5

GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket

No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, FCC 97-413, Third Report and Order and

Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making (rel. December 31, 1997)

at para. 141 (``Part 1 Third Report and Order''). The Bureau was

directed to seek comment on the methodology to be employed in

establishing each of these mechanisms. Among other factors the Bureau

should consider is the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of

incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size

of the geographic service areas, the extent of interference with other

spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that could reasonably

have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned. The

Commission concluded that the Bureau should have the discretion to

employ either or both of these mechanisms for future auctions. Id.

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which

an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be

either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other

hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction

below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate

the competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid

scenario, the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the

amount later in the auction.

The Bureau recently announced the auction of 908 licenses for the

Phase II 220 MHz Service which is scheduled to begin May 19, 1998. See

Public Notice, ``FCC Announces Spectrum Auction Schedule for 1998,'' DA

97-2497 (rel. November 25, 1997), 62 FR 64833, 64833-64834 (December 9,

1997). These licenses encompass the United States, the Northern Mariana

Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands and

Puerto Rico. Specifically, the licenses include: (1) Five licenses in

each of 175 geographic areas known as Economic Areas (EAs); (2) five

licenses in each of six Regional Economic Area Groupings (REAGs), which

we will refer to as ``Economic Area Groupings'' (EAGs); and (3) three

nationwide licenses which encompass the same territory as all of the

EAGs, combined. We note that the geographic area encompassed within a

220 MHz REAG differs from the geographic area encompassed within REAGs

in prior auctions. In order to avoid confusion, therefore, we will use

EAGs in the 220 MHz auction. See 47 CFR 90.717(a) (nationwide channel

assignments); 47 CFR 90.721(b) and 90.761 (Phase II EA and REAG channel

assignments).

In anticipation of this auction and in light of the Balanced Budget

Act, the Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bids for the 220

MHz auction, and retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids.

The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized

in other auctions, is an effective bidding tool, and we propose to use

this approach in the 220 MHz Service auction. See In the Matter of

Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum Opening Bids or

Reserve Prices, DA 97-2147, Order (rel. October 6, 1997), 62 FR 55251

(October 23, 1997); In the Matter of Revision of Rules and Policies for

the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, IB Docket No. 95-168, PP Docket

No. 93-253, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 9712, 9787-9788, para. 186

(1995), 60 FR 65587, 65591 (December 20, 1995). A minimum opening bid

will help to regulate the pace of the auction and provides flexibility.

Specifically, the Commission proposes the following formula for

calculating minimum opening bids in Auction No. 18:

1. Nationwide Licenses: $0.02 MHz/POP

2. EAG Licenses: $0.015 MHz/POP

3. EA Licenses: $0.0175 MHz/POP

with a minimum of no less than $2500.00 per license.

Comment is sought on this proposal. We note that we have received a

proposal from SEA, Inc. to establish a minimum opening bid for the 220

MHz auction. This document has been made a part of the record in this

proceeding. If commenters believe that the formula proposed above for

minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of unsold

licenses, or is not a reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a

reserve price, they should explain why this is so, and comment on the

desirability of an alternative approach.

[[Page 2977]]

Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses

and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas.

In establishing the formula for minimum opening bids, we particularly

seek comment on such factors as, among other things, the amount of

spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of

technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service

areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other

relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of

the Phase II 220 MHz spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on

whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest

would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

II. Other Auction Procedural Issues

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to ``ensure

that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this

subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of

bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction

procedures * * *.'' Budget Act, Sec. 3002(a)(E)(i). Consistent with the

provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential

bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific

provisions that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the

Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated authority,

to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific issues prior to the

start of each auction. Part 1 Third Report and Order at para. 124. The

Commission directed the Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms

related to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the

structure of bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum

opening bids or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum

eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of

the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining reductions

in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid removal,

stopping rules, and information relating to auction delay, suspension

or cancellation. Id. at 125. We therefore seek comment on the following

issues.

a. License Groupings

In the 220 MHz Third Report and Order the Commission concluded that

it would auction the 908 Phase II 220 MHz licenses in a single,

simultaneous multiple-round auction. However, the Commission reserved

the discretion, which it ultimately delegated to the Bureau, to auction

each of the license types (i.e., nationwide, EAG, EA) separately or in

different combinations (e.g., nationwide and EAG together). See In the

Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for

the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private Land Mobile Radio

Service, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications

Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Implementation of Section

309(j) of the Communications Act--Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No.

89-552, RM 8506, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP Docket No. 93-253, Third

Report and Order and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd

10943, 11046, para. 221 (1997) (``220 MHz Third Report and Order''), 62

FR 15978, 15979 (April 3, 1997). For reasons of administrative

efficiency, we propose to award the 908 licenses in the Phase II 220

MHz Service in a single, simultaneous multiple-round auction. We seek

comment on this proposal.

b. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity Requirements, and Criteria for

Determining Reductions in Eligibility

We propose to divide the auction into three stages: Stage One,

Stage Two and Stage Three. The auction will start in Stage One. We

propose that the auction will advance to the next stage (i.e., from

Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when in each

of three consecutive rounds of bidding, the high bid has increased on

10 percent or less of the licenses being auctioned (as measured in

bidding units). However, we further propose that the Bureau retain the

discretion to accelerate the auction by announcement. This

determination will be based on a variety of measures of bidder activity

including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the

percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there

are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in

revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable

period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a

percentage of their maximum eligibility during each round of the

auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that

does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility

in the next round or use an activity rule waiver.

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose that, in each

round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain

its current eligibility is required to be active on licenses

encompassing at least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility.

Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a

reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of

bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage One,

reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (\5/4\). In each

round of the second stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain

its current eligibility is required to be active on at least 90 percent

of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced

eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the

current round activity by ten-ninths (\10/9\). In each round of the

third stage, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on 98 percent of its current bidding eligibility.

In this final stage, reduced eligibility for the next round will be

calculated by multiplying the current round activity by fifty-

fortyninths (\50/49\). We seek comment on these proposals.

c. Minimum Accepted Bids

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment

will be applied to that license to establish a minimum acceptable bid

for the following round. For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we

propose, as described immediately below, to use an exponential

smoothing methodology to calculate minimum bid increments. The Bureau

retains the discretion to change the minimum bid increment if it

determines that circumstances so dictate. The exponential smoothing

methodology has been used in previous auctions, including the WCS

auction and the 800 MHz SMR auction. We seek comment on this proposal.

Exponential Smoothing

The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment

based on a weighted average of the activity received on each license in

the current and all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor the

bid increment for each license based on activity, rather than setting a

global increment for all licenses. For every license that receives a

bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license will be

established as the greater of $0.25 per bidding unit for each license

or a percentage increment that is determined using the exponential

smoothing formula.

Using exponential smoothing, the calculation of the percentage bid

increment for each license will be based

[[Page 2978]]

on an activity index, which is calculated as the weighted average of

the current activity and the activity index from the previous round.

The activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be set at

0. The current activity index is equal to a weighting factor times the

number of new bids received on the license in the current bidding

period plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity index

from the previous round. The activity index is then used to calculate a

percentage increment by multiplying a minimum percentage increment by

one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum

percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting

factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.05, and the

maximum percentage increment at 0.15.

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + ( (1-C) * Ai-1)

Ii = smaller of ( (1 + Ai) * N) and M

Where,

Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)

Ai-1=activity index from previous round (round i-1),

A0 is 0

Ii=percentage bid increment for the current round (round i)

N=minimum percentage increment

M=maximum percentage increment

Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been

received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in

the following round will be the new high bid plus the greater of either

the dollar amount associated with the percentage increment (variable

Ii from above times the high bid) or the absolute increment

(a fixed dollar amount per bidding unit for each license, e.g., $0.25

per bidding unit).

Example

License 1 (800,000 bidding units)

C=0.5, N=0.05, M=0.15, Absolute bid increment=$0.25 per bidding unit

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid=$1,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage increment using exponential smoothing:

A1=(0.5 * 2)+(0.5 * 0)=1

I1=(1+1) * 0.05=0.1

2. Dollar increment using the percentage increment (I1

from above)

0.1 * $1,000,000=$100,000

3. Dollar increment using the absolute increment

$0.25 * 800,000 bidding units=$200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of percentage and

absolute=$200,000

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid=2,000,000)

1. Calculation of percentage increment using exponential smoothing:

A2=(0.5 * 3)+(0.5 * 1)=2

I2=(1+2) * 0.05=0.15

2. Dollar increment using the percentage increment (I2

from above)

0.15 * $2,000,000=$300,000

3. Dollar increment using the absolute increment

$0.25 x 800,000 bidding units=$200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of percentage and

absolute=$300,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = 2,300,000)

1. Calculation of percentage increment using exponential smoothing:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5

I3 = (1 + 1.5) * 0.05 = 0.125

2. Dollar increment using the percentage increment (I3

from above)

0.125 * $2,300,000 = $287,500

3. Dollar increment using the absolute increment

$0.25 \ 800,000 bidding units = $200,000

4. Minimum bid increment: greater of percentage and absolute =

$287,500

d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder

In the 220 MHz Third Report and Order, the Commission delegated to

the Bureau the authority and discretion to determine an appropriate

upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking into account

such factors as the population in each geographic license area, and the

value of similar spectrum. The Commission noted that the Bureau should

establish an upfront payment amount that would roughly equate with a

five percent value for the license. 220 MHz Third Report and Order, 12

FCC Rcd at 11055-11056, para. 255, 62 FR at 15981.

With these guidelines in mind, we propose, for the Phase II 220 MHz

Service auction, an upfront payment of one cent per MHz-pop with no

amount less than $2,500. Our proposal will utilize the data in

Attachment A to this Public Notice. We seek comment on this proposal.

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we further propose that

the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder will determine

the initial maximum eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for each

bidder. Upfront payments are not attributed to specific licenses, but

instead will be translated into bidding units to define a bidder's

initial maximum eligibility. The total upfront payment defines the

maximum amount of bidding units on which the applicant will initially

be permitted to bid. We seek comment on this proposal.

e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current

bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round

being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies

to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity

waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid

the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances

prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient

activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available)

rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will

automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at the

end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below the

minimum required unless: (1) There are no activity rule waivers

available; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a

waiver by reducing eligibility thereby meeting the minimum

requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its

bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must

affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the

bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in the

software. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced

to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as

described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not

be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to

keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a

proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding

software) during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the

auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be

preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no

new valid bids will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction

will be provided five activity rule waivers that may be used in any

round during the course of the auction. We seek comment on this

proposal.

[[Page 2979]]

f. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose the following

bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a

bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids placed in

that round. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder

may effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder

removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal

payments.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However,

in the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids from

previous rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder that

withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the

bid withdrawal payment provisions. See 47 CFR 90.1007; 1.2104(g);

1.2109. We seek comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal

procedures.

In the 220 MHz Third Report and Order, the Commission adopted the

bid withdrawal provisions found in Part 1 of the Commission's Rules for

the Phase II 220 MHz auction. 220 MHz Third Report and Order, 12 FCC

Rcd at 11057, para. 263, 62 FR at 15981. In the Part 1 Third Report and

Order, the Commission recently explained that allowing bid withdrawals

facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and pursuit of efficient

backup strategies as information becomes available during the course of

an auction. The Commission noted, however, that in some instances

bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons, including to

delay the close of the auction for strategic purposes. The Bureau,

therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit the number

of withdrawals to prevent strategic delay of the close of the auction

or other abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should

assertively exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of

rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from

bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is

abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures. Part 1 Third Report

and Order at para. 150. We note that the Part 1 Third Report and Order

for the most part expressly does not apply to the auction of licenses

for the 220 MHz Service. Id. at para. 7. However, as we previously

stated, the 220 MHz Third Report and Order invokes the Part 1

provisions in establishing its withdrawal rules. We therefore follow

the reasoning of the Commission in the Part 1 Third Report and Order

with respect to withdrawals in our analysis of this issue.

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in the

Phase II 220 MHz Service auction to withdrawals in no more than two

rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw

bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding

or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The

two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's

discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the

Commission's Rules. There is no limit on the number of bids that may be

removed in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized.

Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment

provisions specified in the Commission's Rules. We seek comment on this

proposal.

g. Stopping Rules

In the 220 MHz Third Report and Order, the Commission adopted a

simultaneous stopping rule for the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction.

The Commission noted that experience in prior auctions demonstrated

that the simultaneous stopping rule balanced the interests of

administrative efficiency and maximum bidder participation. The

Commission concluded that the substitutability between and among

licenses in different geographic areas and the importance of preserving

bidders' ability to pursue backup strategies support the use of a

simultaneous stopping rule. See 220 MHz Third Report and Order, 12 FCC

Rcd at 11048, para. 228, 62 FR at 15980. The Bureau has discretion to

``establish stopping rules before or during an auction in order to

terminate the auction within a reasonable time.'' See 47 CFR

90.1005(d). We therefore have the discretion to adopt an alternative

stopping rule to the simultaneous stopping rule if we deem appropriate.

Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open

on all licenses until bidding stops on every license. The auction would

close for all licenses when one round passes during which no bidder

submits a new acceptable bid on any license, applies a proactive

waiver, or withdraws a previous high bid.

We propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to keep an auction

open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted

and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the effect will

be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. The

activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with

insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a

remaining activity rule waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare

that the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds

(``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes this special

stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for

licenses on which the high bid increased in at least one of the

preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to exercise

this option only in circumstances such as where the auction is

proceeding very slowly, where there is minimal overall bidding

activity, or where it appears likely that the auction will not close

within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising this option, the

Bureau is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for

example, moving the auction into the next stage (where bidders would be

required to maintain a higher level of bidding activity), increasing

the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of

the minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where

there is still a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on

these proposals.

h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose that, by

public notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may

delay, suspend or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster,

technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful

bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other

reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive

bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect

to: resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current

round; resume the auction starting from some previous round; or cancel

the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau

to delay or suspend the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this

authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is

not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may

wish to apply their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this

proposal.

III. Conclusion

Comments are due on or before January 29, 1998, and reply comments

are due on or before February 5, 1998.

[[Page 2980]]

To file formally, parties must submit an original and four copies to

the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Room

222, 1919 M Street NW., Washington, DC 20554. In addition, parties must

submit one copy to Kathleen O'Brien Ham, Chief, Auctions and Industry

Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal

Communications Commission, Room 5202, 2025 M Street NW., Washington, DC

20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for public

inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference

Room, Room 239, 1919 M Street NW., Washington, DC 20554.

Federal Communications Commission.

Magalie Roman Salas,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 98-1282 Filed 1-16-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-U