Two-Way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices and Certain Passenger Train Operations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 232

[FRA Docket No. PB-9, Notice No. 11]

RIN 2130-AB22

Two-Way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices and Certain Passenger

Train Operations

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FRA is revising the regulations regarding the use and design

of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices (two-way EOTs) to

specifically address certain passenger train operations where multiple

units of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express

cars are part of a passenger train's consist. Trains of this nature are

currently being operated by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak), and these revisions are intended to clarify and address the

applicability of the two-way EOT requirements to these types of

operations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective May 1, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration should identify the docket

number and the notice number and must be submitted in triplicate to the

Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Motive Power and

Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3367), or

Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-12,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone 202-632-3178).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On January 2, 1997, FRA published a final rule amending the

regulations governing train and locomotive power braking systems at 49

CFR part 232 to add provisions pertaining to the use and design of two-

way end-of-train telemetry devices (two-way EOTs). See 62 FR 278. The

purpose of the revisions was to improve the safety of railroad

operations by requiring the use of two-way EOTs on a variety of trains

pursuant to 1992 legislation, and by establishing minimum performance

and operational standards related to the use and design of the devices.

See Pub. L. No. 102-365 (September 3, 1992); 49 U.S.C. 20141.

The regulations published on January 2, 1997, regarding two-way

EOTs, provided an exception from the requirements for ``passenger

trains with emergency brakes.'' See 49 CFR 232.23(e)(9). The language

used in this exception was extracted in total from the statutory

exception contained in the statutory provisions mandating that FRA

develop regulations addressing the use and operation of two-way EOTs or

similar technology. See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(2). A review of the

legislative history reveals that there was no discussion by Congress as

to the precise meaning of the phrase ``passenger trains with emergency

brakes.'' Consequently, FRA is required to effectuate Congress' intent

based on the precise language used in that and the other express

exceptions and based on the overall intent of the statutory mandate.

See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(1)-(c)(5). Furthermore, any exception contained

in a specific statutory mandate should be narrowly construed. See

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. United States, 248 F. 85 (6th Cir. 1918) cert.

den., 248 U.S. 580; DRG R.R. v. United States, 249 F. 822 (8th Cir.

1918); United States v. ATSF Ry., 156 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1946).

The intent of the statutory provisions related to two-way EOTs was

to ensure that trains operating at a speed over 30 mph or in heavy

grade territory were equipped with the technology to effectuate an

emergency application of the train's brakes starting from both the

front and rear of the train. The specific exceptions contained in the

statute were aimed at trains (i) that do not operate within the express

parameters or (ii) that are equipped or operated in a fashion that

provides the ability to effectuate an emergency brake application that

commences at the rear of the train without the use of a two-way EOT.

See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(1)-(c)(5). Based on the intent of the statute

and based upon a consistent and narrow construction of the specific

language used by Congress in the express exceptions, FRA believes it is

clear that Congress did not intend the phrase ``passenger trains with

emergency brakes'' to constitute a blanket exception for all passenger

trains. If that was Congress' intent, it would not have added the

qualifying phrase ``with emergency brakes.''

In FRA's view, this language limits the specific statutory

exception to passenger trains equipped with a separate emergency brake

valve in each car throughout the train and, thus, to passenger trains

possessing the ability to effectuate an emergency application of the

train's brakes from the rear of the train. Therefore, passenger trains

that include RoadRailers, auto racks, express cars, or

other similar vehicles designed to carry freight that are placed at the

rear of the train, that are not equipped with emergency brake valves,

would not fall within the specific statutory or regulatory exception as

they are incapable of effectuating an emergency brake application that

commences at the rear of the train. Further, FRA does not believe that

Congress envisioned a significant number of express or intermodal cars

being hauled at the rear of passenger trains when the specific

exception was included in the statute.

FRA believes that Congress intended to except only those trains

traditionally considered to be passenger trains, which would include

passenger trains containing baggage and mail cars as these have

consistently been considered passenger equipment with emergency brakes.

However, passenger trains which operate with numerous inaccessible

baggage or mail cars attached to the rear of the train that lack any

ability to effectuate an emergency brake application from the rear of

the

[[Page 24131]]

train would, in FRA's view, fall outside the specific statutory and

regulatory exception for ``passenger trains with emergency brakes.''

Subsequent to the issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs

published on January 2, 1997 and the period permitted for the

submission of petitions for reconsideration of that rule, Amtrak raised

concerns regarding the applicability of the final rule to some of its

passenger train operations, particularly those which recently began to

operate with numerous express, material handling cars, or

RoadRailers entrained in the consist. These concerns

focused on FRA's enforcement guidance provided to its field inspectors,

which stated that the exception for ``passenger trains with emergency

brakes'' was intended to apply only to trains traditionally considered

to be passenger trains, a category that would include passenger trains

containing a limited number of baggage and mail cars at the rear of the

train. This guidance was based on the reasoning provided in the

preceding discussion. Amtrak contended that FRA's interpretive guidance

was an improper reading of the statutory and regulatory exception and

did not adequately consider the superior braking capabilities of

passenger equipment. Although FRA disagrees that its guidance was

improper, FRA did agree that a closer examination of the applicability

of the two-way EOT requirements to passenger trains needed to be

performed in light of the superior braking ratios of passenger cars and

the presence of emergency brake valves on the passenger cars in mixed

train consists, which provide certain safety assurances that are not

present in traditional freight operations. Consequently, FRA agreed

that the mixed passenger and ``express'' service currently being

operated by Amtrak is unique and needed to be handled separately from

traditional freight operations.

Amtrak currently operates a number of trains that include numerous

material handling cars, express cars, auto racks, mail cars, and/or

RoadRailer equipment. These types of rolling equipment are

either not equipped with emergency brake valves or, if equipped with

such valves, they are not accessible to any member of the train crew.

Amtrak expects that the operation of this type of rolling equipment

will continue to grow and that many of its trains will eventually have

a number of these vehicles in their consists. As noted above, FRA

believes that a passenger train operated with this rolling equipment

falls outside the statutory and regulatory exception to the two-way EOT

requirement for ``passenger trains with emergency brakes,'' and thus,

would be required under the existing rules to be equipped with an

operative two-way EOT or alternative technology. However, FRA also

recognizes the unique nature of these types of mixed operations and

realizes that the safety assurances provided by the braking ratios and

the presence of emergency brake valves at various locations through

much of the consist on certain mixed passenger trains make requiring

the use of a two-way EOT unnecessary.

To gain a perspective on the stopping characteristics and safety

implications of the mixed passenger train operations, FRA requested the

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) to review the

information and procedures used by Amtrak in developing various

stopping distance calculations submitted to FRA. In addition, FRA

requested that Volpe develop and analyze its own data regarding these

types of mixed passenger trains. In making their calculations, both

Volpe and Amtrak used variables of grade; train configuration; and the

number, weight, and types of cars and locomotives expected to be used

in these types of operations. Although all of the calculations were

based on worse-case scenarios (e.g., the angle cock was assumed to be

closed just behind the last car with an accessible emergency brake

valve, and only friction braking--tread or disc brakes of locomotives

and cars--was considered available to stop the train), all stops were

achieved on the specified grade used in the calculation.

In making its calculations Volpe used a MathCad program to compute

stopping distances. Volpe used the results of its calculations as a

check against the results Amtrak had produced and submitted to FRA.

Volpe concluded that Amtrak's procedures predicted longer (more

conservative) stopping distances than the approach taken by Volpe.

Amtrak's results were also compared to the requirements of the Amtrak

Communication and Signal Department, Specification S-603, Curve 8,

which is used to determine stopping distances for passenger equipment

for signal block spacing. Curve 8 values for stopping distances are

augmented by a factor of 25 percent to account for conditions which may

impair brake performance. The absolute (actual) signal block spacing on

the Northeast Corridor is actually greater than any of the stopping

distances produced by either Volpe or Amtrak in their calculations.

Therefore, stopping distances within established signal blocks should

not be a problem. The process Amtrak used was sufficiently conservative

so that predicted stopping distances were greater than would be

experienced in reality. Nevertheless, FRA worked with Amtrak to define

further limitations adequate to ensure safety under identified worst-

case conditions, and these limitations were set forth in this proposal.

Based on the information provided by Amtrak and the independent

calculations conducted by Volpe, FRA published an NPRM on January 16,

1998, proposing to revise the regulations on two-way EOTs to

specifically address certain passenger train operations where numerous

freight-type cars, material handling cars, or express cars are part of

a train's consist. See 63 FR 2647 (January 16, 1998). In the NPRM, FRA

stated that swift action was necessary with regard to the provisions

proposed and that a lengthy comment period would be impracticable,

unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest. It was noted that a

number of freight railroads were expressing concern and apprehension

over permitting these mixed passenger trains to operate over their

rails in light of FRA's above-mentioned interpretive guidance. In fact,

at least one instance was found in which a mixed Amtrak train was

detained for six hours by a freight railroad until a two-way EOT was

applied because the freight railroad refused to permit the train to

operate without the device. FRA also believed that requiring Amtrak to

acquire a number of two-way EOTs and operate under the provisions of

the current regulatory scheme during a lengthy comment period would

impose a substantial and unwarranted financial and operational burden

without improving the safety of Amtrak operations. Furthermore, the

proposals contained in the NPRM included certain restrictions on the

operation and make-up of certain passenger trains that were proposed

for exception from the two-way EOT requirements, restrictions that FRA

believe will enhance the safety of those operations and that are not

currently mandated.

In addition to the concerns discussed above, FRA also believed that

swift action was necessary because Amtrak is continuing to take

delivery of express and other equipment and to build this line of

business in order to close its operating deficit and to support

continued intercity rail passenger service in a time of declining

support from the public treasury. The public's interest in continued

rail passenger service warrants reasonable flexibility to achieve this

business objective. This

[[Page 24132]]

development corresponded with the implementation of two-way EOT

requirements, rapidly complicating what appeared at the outset to be a

relatively straightforward issue. Prior to the effective date of the

two-way EOT rule, Amtrak implemented a two-way EOT system on its

AutoTrain, previously the only Amtrak train operated with any

significant number of unoccupied cars at the rear of the train.

Anticipating the need to equip other trains as the express business

grows, Amtrak is in the process equipping over 100 locomotives and

deploying rear-end units at appropriate points along its lines where

trains are built. Amtrak also committed to FRA to operate cars with

cables for head-end power transmission (such as mail and baggage cars)

at the front of trains where practicable given constraints on loading

and unloading, in order limit the number of cars to the rear of the

train that are beyond the last car with an accessible emergency valve.

However, as Amtrak's express service grows and Amtrak builds trains

responsive to that growth (a phenomenon that is well underway), there

is an increased danger that Amtrak's own internal policies for use of

available two-way EOT systems would not be honored in the field through

oversight. Thus, FRA believed that having clear and certain Federal

requirements regarding the use of two-way EOTs were essential to public

safety.

Based on the concerns noted above, FRA issued the NPRM with a

comment period of only 15 days in order to quickly address the

applicability of the two-way EOT requirements to mixed passenger train

operations. FRA made clear that if no substantive adverse comments were

received on the NPRM within the 15-day comment period, it would

immediately issue a final rule containing the provisions of the

proposal. FRA also made clear in the NPRM that it intended for any

final rule issued to take effect immediately upon publication.

Written comments on the NPRM have been received from Amtrak,

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), and the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers (BLE). The relatively brief comments received from

Amtrak and Conrail do not substantively affect the approach taken in

the NPRM and primarily relate to clarifying the language used in the

proposed provisions of the NPRM or the discussion contained in the

section-by-section analysis of the NPRM. Therefore, these specific

comments will be directly addressed in the section-by-section analysis

of this final rule. In Amtrak's written comments, Amtrak also requests

that trains consisting of six or fewer mail or express cars be

specifically excepted from the requirements for the use of a two-way

EOT. As the NPRM and this final rule are specifically and narrowly

focused on mixed passenger train operations, FRA believes that this

rulemaking is not the appropriate forum for addressing Amtrak's

request. Furthermore, such a request has much broader industry-wide

implications than the issues addressed in this rulemaking and would

involve consideration of additional safety concerns and the performance

of detailed research not focused on or contemplated in this proceeding.

In its written comments, Conrail raises a concern regarding the

responsibility and potential liability of a host railroad if a

passenger train operates on its line while not in compliance with the

requirements of this rule. The responsibilities of the host railroad

with regard to this rule are the same as they are for any of the

requirements contained in part 232. See 232.0(e). As a matter of

policy, enforcement actions for noncompliance with this rule will

generally be imposed on the railroad or individuals responsible for the

operation of the train (i.e., Amtrak in most cases), unless the host

railroad causes the violation of such requirements.

The BLE submitted brief written comments on the NPRM, generally

objecting to any amendments to the two-way EOT regulations. The BLE

agrees with FRA that Congress did not discuss the potential for mixed

passenger train operations and generally asserts that when passenger

equipment is used in conjunction with freight equipment it should be

equipped with a two-way EOT. The BLE does not provide any specific data

or cite to any potential safety or operational problems involved with

excepting certain mixed passenger trains from the requirements for use

of a two-way EOT. Furthermore, the BLE does not object either to the

data assembled and assessed by FRA regarding mixed passenger trains or

to the additional safety assurances that exist on these types of trains

that are not present in traditional freight operations. Consequently,

based on the discussion above and contrary to the broad assertions of

the BLE, FRA believes that it would be in the public interest and that

there is more than sufficient safety justification for excepting

certain mixed passenger trains from the requirements related to the use

of two-way EOTs.

After reviewing the above noted comments received on the NPRM, FRA

concludes that no substantive adverse comments have been provided that

cause FRA to further consider or delay the implementation of the

requirements proposed in the NPRM. Furthermore, FRA has received no

requests for a public hearing on the NPRM. Consequently, the final rule

that is being issued by FRA revising the regulations on two-way EOTs to

specifically address certain passenger train operations where numerous

freight-type cars, material handling cars, or express cars are part of

a train's consist is virtually identical to the proposal contained in

the NPRM published on January 16, 1998.

Section-by-Section Analysis

FRA is amending Sec. 232.23 by revising paragraphs (e) and (g) and

by adding a new paragraph (h) to specifically address passenger train

operations that include using cars that do not have readily accessible

emergency brake valves.

Paragraph (e) of Sec. 232.23 contains a listing of the trains that

are excepted from the two-way EOT requirements. Conforming changes have

been made to paragraphs (e)(8) and (e)(9). In paragraph (e)(9) FRA

retains the exception for passenger trains in which all of the cars in

the train are equipped with a readily accessible emergency brake valve,

as discussed in detail above.

In paragraph (e)(10) FRA adds an exception to the requirements

regarding two-way EOTs for passenger trains that operate with a car

placed at the rear of the train that is equipped with an emergency

brake valve readily accessible to a crew member in radio communication

with the locomotive engineer of the train. FRA intends for this

exception to be applicable to passenger trains containing cars that do

have a readily accessible emergency brake valve at the rear of the

train. FRA believes this exception is justified as it is virtually

identical to the exception granted to freight trains with an occupied

caboose (contained in paragraph (e)(3)) since it would permit an

emergency application of brakes to be initiated from the occupied car

at the rear of the passenger train.

In paragraph (e)(11) FRA provides an exception for certain

passenger trains that have cars placed at the rear of the train that do

not have readily accessible emergency brake valves. This exception is

intended to recognize the safety of these types of trains if configured

and operated in accordance with the provisions of this exception. The

exception contained in this subparagraph applies only to trains of

twenty-four (24) cars or fewer. Therefore, passenger trains that have

[[Page 24133]]

more than 24 cars in the consist and that do not fall within the

exceptions contained in subparagraphs (e)(9) or (e)(10) would be

required to be equipped with an operative two-way EOT device or

alternative technology. It should be noted that a locomotive that is

used for power and/or controlling purposes and is not designed to carry

passengers will not be considered a car for purposes of these

calculations. Therefore, locomotives hauled dead in tow would be

required to be counted as a car for purposes of these calculations.

In the NPRM, FRA proposed that each bogie used in

RoadRailer operation be counted as a car for purposes of

calculating the number of cars in a passenger train consist. See 63 FR

2649. In its written comments, Amtrak objected to this method of

calculating the number of cars in a train as it would artificially

inflate the number of cars in a train. Amtrak stated that a string of

RoadRailer equipment will always have at least one more

bogie than the total number of RoadRailer vans since bogies

include at least one couplermate. It was not FRA's intention to

artificially inflate the number of cars in the train by proposing such

a method of calculation. FRA's use of the term ``bogie'' was intended

to refer to the intermediate bogies not the couplermates. However,

after consideration of Amtrak's comments, FRA believes it would be

confusing and possibly lead to incorrect calculation of the number of

cars in a train if bogies are used as the determining factor.

Consequently, in order to avoid confusion and clarify the intent of the

final rule, FRA will calculate the number of cars in a train containing

RoadRailer equipment by counting each

RoadRailer van as a car. It should be noted that this

method of calculation is solely for the purpose of applying the

exception contained in this paragraph. In order to accurately calculate

the percentage of operative brakes pursuant to Secs. 232.1 and 232.12,

it is necessary to consider the brakes on all the bogies in the train.

Based on data and information submitted by Amtrak and reviewed by

Volpe and based upon Volpe's independent analysis regarding passenger

train braking ratios and the response of passenger train brakes, FRA

believes that certain mixed passenger trains can be safely operated

without being required to be equipped with a two-way EOT or alternative

technology, provided certain operational and train configuration

restrictions are maintained. Paragraph (e)(11)(i) requires that if the

total number of cars in a passenger train consist is twelve (12) or

fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the consist (counting

from the first car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency

brake valve readily accessible to a crew member. For example, in a

consist containing twelve (12) cars, the sixth (6th) car (or a car

closer to the rear) in the consist must have a readily accessible

emergency brake valve; likewise, in an eleven (11) car consist, the

sixth (6th) car (or a car closer to the rear) must have a readily

accessible emergency brake valve, since all half numbers will be

rounded up. Paragraph (e)(11)(ii) requires that if the total number of

cars in a passenger train consist is from thirteen (13) to twenty-four

(24), a car located no less than two-thirds (\2/3\) of the way through

the consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped

with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member. For

example, in a twenty-one (21) car consist, the fourteenth (14th) car

(or a car closer to the rear) must have a readily accessible emergency

brake valve.

In addition to these train-configuration requirements, paragraphs

(e)(11)(iii) and (iv) contain certain operating requirements that must

be followed by any passenger train operating pursuant to this specific

exception. Such trains are required to have a train crew member occupy

the rearmost car equipped with a readily accessible emergency brake

valve and remain in constant radio communication with the locomotive

engineer whenever the train is operating over a section of track with

an average grade of two percent or higher over two continuous miles.

FRA recommends that the engineer alert the train crew member

approximately ten (10) minutes prior to descending the heavy grade, so

the crew member will be in place at the crest of the grade.

Furthermore, the final rule requires that the crew member not leave his

or her position until the locomotive engineer advises that the train

has traversed the grade. FRA believes that these operational

requirements will ensure that immediate action can be taken by a member

of the train crew to effectuate an emergency brake application whenever

the train is descending a heavy grade.

FRA is also amending paragraph (g) to indicate that the operating

limitations that will be imposed on a passenger train required to be

equipped with a two-way EOT that experiences an en route failure of the

device will be contained in paragraph (h). It should be noted that FRA

intends the criteria contained paragraph (g) for determining when a

loss of communication between the front and rear units will be

considered an en route failure to be applicable to passenger train

operations.

Paragraph (h) contains the operational limitations and restrictions

that are being placed on passenger trains that experience en route

failures of two-way EOTs. Conrail, in its written comments, voiced

concern that the language contained in the proposed rule text did not

accurately reflect the operating restrictions discussed in the

preamble. Consequently, in this final rule FRA has rewritten and

reorganized paragraph (h) to make it more understandable and to clarify

FRA's intent.

Due to the time-sensitive nature of passenger operations, FRA

believes that placing a speed restriction on passenger trains is not

the most effective method of handling en route failures of a two-way

EOT. Rather than delaying the movement of a passenger train that

experiences an en route failure of a device, FRA believes that certain

operating restrictions can be imposed on the train and its crew to

ensure the safety of these trains, particularly in non-heavy-grade

territory. However, FRA believes that in order to realize the benefits

of a two-way EOT as contemplated by Congress, the device must be

operative when the train descends a heavy grade. Thus, FRA will only

permit a passenger train to continue to operate under the operating

restrictions contained in this paragraph in other than heavy grade

territory. Consequently, paragraph (h)(1) has been slightly modified

from the NPRM and is intended to strictly prohibit a passenger train

that is required to be equipped with an operable device, from

descending an average grade of two percent or more for two continuous

miles until an operable device is installed or an alternative method of

initiating an emergency brake application from the rear of the train is

achieved.

Paragraph (h) has been further modified to make clear that the

operating restrictions contained in paragraph (h)(2) are applicable to

all passenger trains that experience en route failures of the two-way

EOT and that are operating on other than heavy grade territory (i.e.,

two percent for two continuous miles). Paragraph (h)(2) is intended to

permit passenger trains that develop an en route failure of the two-way

EOT to continue to operate over track that is not in heavy grade

territory as long as a crew member occupies the rearmost car with a

readily accessible emergency brake valve and remains in constant radio

communication with the locomotive engineer. In addition, FRA believes

that since the train no longer

[[Page 24134]]

has the safety assurances provided by a two-way EOT, the engineer must

periodically test the braking characteristics of the train by making

running brake tests. If the engineer suspects the brakes are not

functioning properly, immediate action shall be taken to bring the

train to a stop until corrections can be made. Paragraph (h)(3)

requires that all en route failures of the devices must be corrected

either at the next location where the necessary repairs can be made or

at the next location where a required brake test of the train is to be

conducted, whichever point the train arrives at first.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing

policies and procedures. Because the requirements contained in this

final rule clarify the applicability of the two-way EOT regulations to

a specific segment of the industry and generally reduce the regulatory

burden on these operators, FRA has concluded that this final rule does

not constitute a significant rule under either Executive Order 12866 or

DOT's policies and procedures.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)

requires a review of rules to assess their impact on small entities.

FRA certifies that this final rule does not have a significant impact

on a substantial number of small entities. Because the requirements

contained in this final rule clarify the applicability of the two-way

EOT regulations to a specific segment of the industry and generally

reduce the regulatory burden on these operators, FRA has concluded that

there are no substantial economic impacts for small units of

government, businesses, or other organizations.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This final rule does not change any information collection

requirements.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its procedures

for ensuring full consideration of the potential environmental impacts

of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act

(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, Executive

Orders, and DOT Order 5610.1c. It has been determined that this final

rule does not have any effect on the quality of the environment.

Federalism Implications

This final rule does not have a substantial effect on the States,

on the relationship between the national government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Thus, in accordance with Executive Order 12612,

preparation of a Federalism Assessment is not warranted.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 232

Penalties, Railroad power brakes, Railroad safety, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Two-way end-of-train devices.

The Rule

In consideration of the foregoing, FRA amends part 232, title 49,

Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 232--RAILROAD POWER BRAKES AND DRAWBARS

1. The authority citation for part 232 is revised to read as

follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20103, 20107, 20108, 20110-20112,

20114, 20133, 20141, 20301-20304, 20701-20703, 21301, 21302, 21304,

and 21311; and 49 CFR 1.49(c), (g), and (m).

2. Section 232.23 is amended by revising paragraphs (e)

introductory text, (e)(8), and (e)(9) and adding a new sentence to the

beginning of the introductory text of paragraph (g), and adding new

paragraphs (e)(10), (e)(11), (g)(2) and (h) to read as follows:

Sec. 232.23 Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices;

prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.

* * * * *

(e) Exceptions. The following types of trains are excepted from the

requirement for the use of a two-way end-of-train device:

* * * * *

(8) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of

the general railroad system;

(9) Passenger trains in which all of the cars in the train are

equipped with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew

member;

(10) Passenger trains that have a car at the rear of the train,

readily accessible to one or more crew members in radio contact with

the engineer, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve readily

accessible to such a crew member; and

(11) Passenger trains that have twenty-four (24) or fewer cars (not

including locomotives) in the consist and that are equipped and

operated in accordance with the following train-configuration and

operating requirements:

(i) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is

twelve (12) or fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the

consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped

with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member;

(ii) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is

thirteen (13) to twenty-four (24), a car located no less than two-

thirds (\2/3\) of the way through the consist (counting from the first

car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency brake valve

readily accessible to a crew member;

(iii) Prior to descending a section of track with an average grade

of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles, the

engineer of the train shall communicate with the conductor, to ensure

that a member of the crew with a working two-way radio is stationed in

the car with the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on

the train when the train begins its descent; and

(iv) While the train is descending a section of track with an

average grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two

continuous miles, a member of the train crew shall occupy the car that

contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on the

train and be in constant radio communication with the locomotive

engineer. The crew member shall remain in this car until the train has

completely traversed the heavy grade.

* * * * *

(g) En route failure of device on a freight or other non-passenger

train. Except on passenger trains required to be equipped with a two-

way end-of-train device (which are provided for in paragraph (h) of

this section), en route failures of a two-way end-of-train device shall

be handled in accordance with this paragraph. * * *

* * * * *

(2) [Reserved]

(h) En route failure of device on a passenger train. (1) A

passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train

device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in

paragraph (g) of this section) shall not operate over a section of

track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a distance

of two continuous miles until an operable two-way end-of-train device

is installed on the train or an alternative method of initiating an

emergency brake application from the rear of the train is achieved.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a

passenger train

[[Page 24135]]

required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train device that

develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in paragraph

(g) of this section) shall be operated in accordance with the

following:

(i) A member of the train crew shall be immediately positioned in

the car which contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake

valve on the train and shall be equipped with an operable two-way radio

that communicates with the locomotive engineer; and

(ii) The locomotive engineer shall periodically make running tests

of the train's air brakes until the failure is corrected; and

(3) Each en route failure shall be corrected at the next location

where the necessary repairs can be conducted or at the next location

where a required brake test is to be performed, whichever is reached

first.

3. Appendix A to Part 232, ``Schedule of Civil Penalties,'' is

amended by revising the heading of the entry for Sec. 232.23 and

revising the entry for Sec. 232.23(g) and adding an entry for

Sec. 232.23(h), to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 232--Schedule of Civil Penalties

* * * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Willful

Section Violation violation

------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

232.23 Operating standards:

* * * * *

(g) En route failure, freight or other non-

passenger 5,000 7,500

(h) En route failure, passenger 5,000 7,500

* * * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 1998.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 98-11408 Filed 4-30-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P