Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity For a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-390]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity For a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.

NPF-90, issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee),

for operation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1 located in

Rhea County, Tennessee. This Notice supersedes a Notice placed in the

Federal Register on March 26, 1997 (62 FR 14469) on this matter.

The proposed amendment would revise the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

(WBN) Unit 1 Technical Specifications to increase the enrichment and

storage capacity of the spent fuel pool racks. The proposed

modification increases the WBN spent fuel storage capacity from 484

fuel assemblies to 1835 fuel assemblies. The initial enrichment of the

fuel to be stored in the spent fuel storage racks will be increased

from 3.5 weight percent (wt%) to 5.0 wt%. This modification would also

change the spacing of stored fuel assembly center-to-center spacing

from a nominal 10.72 inches to 10.375 inches in 24 PaR flux trap rack

modules and 8.972 inches in ten smaller burnup credit rack modules to

be installed peripherally along the south and west pool walls and in a

single 15 x 15 burnup credit rack to be installed in the cask pit.

In addition to the above proposed revisions, two limiting

conditions for operation will be added to require that the combination

of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly to be

stored is in the acceptable region and to require boron concentration

of the cask pit to be greater than or equal to 2000 parts per million

(ppm) during fuel movement in the flooded cask pit. As an added

protection to the fuel stored in the cask pit area, the Technical

Requirements Manual (TRM) is being revised to require that an impact

shield be in place over the fuel when heavy loads are moved near or

across the cask pit area.

The WBN Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases and the TRM would be

revised to support these changes.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided standards for

determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10

CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a

facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation

of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not

(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. Each standard is discussed below for the proposed

amendment.

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The following potential scenarios were considered:

1. A spent fuel assembly drop.

2. Drop of the transfer canal gate or the cask pit divider gate.

3. A seismic event.

4. Loss-of-cooling flow in the spent fuel pool.

5. Installation activities.

The effect of additional spent fuel pool storage cells fully

loaded with fuel on the

[[Page 15734]]

first four potential accident scenarios listed above has been

considered. It was concluded that after installation activities have

been completed, the presence of additional fuel in the pool does not

increase the probability of occurrence of these four events. Also,

based on evaluations of bulk pool temperature, rack seismic

responses, and refueling accidents, it is reasonable to conclude

that there is no significant increase in the consequences of these

events after installation is complete (See Reference 1). During the

installation activities, the following considerations support a

conclusion that neither the probability or consequences of these

four scenarios would be significantly increased.

A spent fuel assembly cannot be dropped during installation of

the 24 Programmed and Remote System Corporation (PaR) flux trap rack

modules because this activity will take place before the end of

operating cycle one and there will be no spent fuel in the WBN pool

to be moved or shuffled. Before installing the ten smaller burnup

credit racks in the pool, some fuel will be moved to create a three

foot lateral free zone clearance from stored fuel. This would

involve a one-time movement of an estimated maximum of 225 fuel

assemblies, which is less tha[n] half the fuel movements during one

refueling outage. This does not significantly increase the

probability of dropping a fuel assembly, particularly when the many

administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel

handling operations are considered. The fuel handling system

consists of equipment and structures utilized for safely

implementing refueling operations in accordance with requirements of

General Design Criteria 61 and 62 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. The

radiological dose consequences of dropping a 5.0 wt% fuel assembly

are different from the previous FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]

evaluation for the 3.5 wt% fuel assembly. The Beta and Gamma doses

decrease and the maximum thyroid dose increase is less than 9%.

Therefore, the change in calculated dose values is insignificant and

remains well within regulatory guidelines.

It may be necessary to move the transfer canal gate and the cask

pit divider gate between their gated and stored positions during

installation of the burnup credit ``baby'' rack modules along the

south and west walls. During rack installation, the previously

mentioned three foot lateral free zone clearance to stored fuel

would exist. Therefore, no heavy load would be carried directly over

irradiated fuel during installation of the racks. There are numerous

design features which comply with NUREG-0612 to preclude these gates

from dropping on spent fuel. These features include design of the

lifting devices, design of the crane, and use of written procedures.

Also, the evaluation results for a gate drop on the racks indicates

that permanent damage to a fuel storage cell is limited to a maximum

depth of less than six inches below the top of the rack with no

effect on the subcriticality of fuel stored in adjacent cells. Based

on the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that gate handling

during the installation of the ``baby'' racks would not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident.

The probability of a seismic event is not related to

installation activities. The worst consequence resulting from a

seismic event during installation activities would occur during

handling of a rack. The consequences would be insignificant because

the Auxiliary Building crane is seismically qualified and both

handling equipment and operations meet the criteria of NUREG-0612.

Nevertheless, if the seismic event resulted in a rack drop, the

consequences are insignificant, i.e., localized damage to the pool

liner and a minor leak rate which would be small in comparison to

available installed makeup capacity. The cooling and shielding of

the spent fuel would remain unaffected. Also the racks being moved

are empty during installation and therefore, the criticality

consequences of seismic events are bounded by evaluations for loaded

racks.

Rack installation activities cannot cause an accidental loss-of-

cooling flow in the spent fuel pool. The vital components of the spent

fuel pool cooling and cleanup system (SFPCCS) are not located proximate

to the pool installation activities. Coolant flow may be deliberately

curtailed to facilitate installation of the ``baby'' racks directly

beneath the discharge piping in the southwest corner of the pool. The

effects of such an action would be readily minimized and made

inconsequential during the detailed installation planning phase by

selecting a time when decay heat input from stored fuel is relatively

constant. Also careful preplanning of the work would minimize out-of-

service time and provide for intermittent coolant flow restart, if

necessary, to maintain acceptable bulk coolant temperatures. Similarly,

the effect of an independently initiated loss-of-coolant flow incident

on reracking activities can be easily accommodated by stopping work, as

necessary, to mitigate any adverse effects on the installation process.

The consequences of loss-of-cooling flow in the spent fuel pool during

installation are bounded by the analysis in Chapter 5 of the report

which includes the situation in which ``baby'' racks and the 15 x 15

cask pit rack are installed, and the pool is filled to capacity with

spent fuel.

With regard to the actual installation activities, the existing

WBN TRM prohibits loads in excess of 2059 pounds from travel over

fuel assemblies in the storage pool and requires the associated

crane interlocks and physical stops be periodically demonstrated

operable. During installation, racks and associated handling tools

will be moved over the spent fuel pool, however there will be no

fuel in the pool when the 24 flux trap rack modules are installed. A

three foot lateral free zone clearance from stored spent fuel will

be maintained during installation of the ten smaller burnup credit

rack modules. Installation work in the spent fuel pit area will be

controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific written

instructions.

NUREG-0612 states that in lieu of providing a single failure-

proof crane system, the control-of-heavy-loads guidelines can be

satisfied by establishing that the potential for a heavy load drop

is extremely small. Storage rack movements to be accomplished with

the WBN Auxiliary Building crane will conform with NUREG-0612

guidelines in that the probability of a drop of a storage rack is

extremely small. The crane has a tested capacity of 125 tons. The

maximum weight of any existing, replacement, or new storage rack and

its associated handling tool is less than 20 tons. Therefore, there

is ample safety factor margin for movements of the storage racks by

the Auxiliary Building crane. Special lifting devices, which have

redundancy or a rated capacity sufficient to maintain adequate

safety factors, will also be utilized in the movements of the

storage racks. In accordance with NUREG-0612, Appendix B, the safety

margin ensures that the probability of a load drop is extremely low.

Future load travel over fuel stored in a rack specifically

designed for the cask loading area of the cask pit will be

prohibited unless an impact shield, which has been specifically

designed for this purpose, is covering the area. Loads that are

permitted when the shield is in place must meet analytically

determined weight, travel height, and cross-sectional area criteria

that preclude penetration of the shield. A Technical Requirement

(TR) has been proposed that incorporates the previously mentioned

load criteria.

Also a rack change-out sequence is being developed that

addresses removal of the existing racks, movement of the new racks

into the Auxiliary Building, initial staging on the refueling floor,

and final installation in the pool. The change-out sequence

objectives include establishing lift heights, travel distances, and

number of lifts to be as low as reasonably achievable. Accordingly,

it is concluded that the proposed installation activities will not

significantly increase the probability of a load-handling accident.

The consequences of a load-handling accident are unaffected by the

proposed installation activities.

The consequences of a spent fuel assembly drop were evaluated,

and it was determined that the racks will not be distorted such that

the racks would not perform their safety function. The criticality

acceptance criterion, Keff less than or equal to 0.95, is not

violated, and the calculated doses are well within 10 CFR Part 100

guidelines. The radiological consequences of the fuel assembly drop

accident evaluated for WBN, have changed, however, the changes do

not involve a significant increase in consequences and are well

within the 10 CFR 100 requirements.

A TRM change has been proposed that would permit the transfer-

canal gate and the divider gate for the cask pit to travel over fuel

assemblies in the spent fuel pool during movement between their

gated and stored position. Rack damage is restricted to an area

above the active fuel region, therefore, neither criticality nor

radiological concerns exist.

The consequences of a seismic event have been evaluated. The

replacement racks are

[[Page 15735]]

designed and fabricated and the new racks will be fabricated to meet

the requirements of applicable portions of the NRC regulatory guides

and published standards. Design margins have been provided for rack

tilting, deflection, and movement such that the racks do not impact

each other or the spent fuel pool walls in the active fuel region

during the postulated seismic events. The free-standing racks will

maintain their integrity during and after a seismic event. The fuel

assemblies also remain intact and therefore no criticality concerns

exist.

The spent fuel pool system is a passive system with the

exception of the fuel pool cooling train and heating, ventilating,

and air-conditioning (HVAC) equipment. Redundancies in the cooling

train and HVAC hardware are not reduced by the planned fuel storage

modification. The potential increased heat load resulting from any

additional storage of spent fuel is well within the existing system

cooling capacity. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or

malfunction of safety equipment leading to the loss-of-cooling flow

in the spent fuel pool is not significantly affected. Furthermore,

the consequences of this type incident are not significantly

increased from previously evaluated cooling system loss of flow

malfunctions. Thermal-hydraulic scenarios assume the reracked pool

is approximately 90% full with spent fuel assemblies. From this

starting point, the remaining storage capacity is utilized by

analyzing both normal and unplanned full core off loads using

conservative assumptions and previously established methods.

Calculated values include maximum pool water bulk temperature,

coincident maximum pool water local temperature, the maximum fuel

cladding temperature, time-to-boil after loss-of-cooling paths, and

the effect of flow blockage in a storage cell.

Although the proposed modification increases the pool heat load,

results from the above analyses yield a maximum bulk temperature

less than 160 degrees Fahrenheit which is below the bulk boiling

temperature. Also the maximum local water temperature is below

nucleate boiling condition values. Associated results from

corresponding loss-of-cooling evaluations give minimums of 5.3 hours

before boiling begins and 45 hours before the pool water level drops

to the minimum required for shielding spent fuel.

This is sufficient time to begin utilization of available

alternate sources of makeup cooling water. Also, the effect of the

increased thermal loading on the pool structure, associated cooling

system, and components was evaluated and determined to establish an

acceptable design basis with the new storage configuration. No

modifications were necessary because of the increased temperature.

(2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

The proposed modification has been evaluated in accordance with

the guidance of the NRC position paper entitled, ``OT Position for

Review and Acceptance of Spent-Fuel Storage and Handling

Applications'', appropriate NRC regulatory guidelines; appropriate

NRC standard review plans; and appropriate industry codes and

standards. Proven analytical technology was used in designing the

planned fuel storage expansion and will be utilized in the

installation process. Basic reracking technology has been developed

and demonstrated in applications for fuel pool capacity increases

that have already received NRC staff approval.

Proposed TSs for the spent fuel storage racks use burnup credit

and fuel assembly administrative placement restrictions for

criticality control. These restrictions are described in the

proposed change to the design features section of the TSs by

reference to the Spent Fuel Pool Modifications report. Additional

evaluations were required to ensure that the criticality criterion,

keff less than or equal to 0.95, is maintained. These include

evaluation for the abnormal placement of unirradiated (fresh) fuel

assemblies of 5.0 wt% enrichment into a storage cell location

designed for lower enrichment or irradiated fuel. Soluble boron, for

which credit is permitted under these abnormal conditions, ensures

that reactivity is maintained substantially less than the design

requirement. For example, if the PaR flux trap racks are

inadvertently all loaded with fresh assemblies of the maximum 5.0

wt% fuel instead of observing the 3.8 wt% and 6.75 MWD/KgU controls,

the worth of the 2000 ppm borated water is sufficient to lower the

keff of the storage racks to 0.83. The existing and proposed

TSs require boron concentration in the pool and cask pit to be

greater than or equal to 2000 ppm during fuel movement. An

analytical determination of the reactivity worth of 2000 ppm borated

water in the spent fuel storage pool predicted the change in

keff to be approximately 17 percent keff. Although no

credit for soluble boron was proposed in the TSs, it was also

determined by an independent calculation that a minimum

concentration of 520 ppm soluble boron allows the unrestricted

storage of 5.0 wt% enriched fuel in the PaR flux trap racks.

The Holtec-designed peripheral ``baby'' racks and the 15 x 15

racks in the cask loading area can safely and conservatively store

fuel of 5 wt% initial enrichment burned to 41 MWD/kgU or lower

enriched fuel with lower burnup, i.e., fuel of equivalent

reactivity. Evaluations have confirmed that, for the abnormal

placement of a fresh fuel assembly of 5.0 wt% in these racks, the

criticality criterion is maintained with the existing and proposed

TS requirements of 2000 ppm soluble boron.

Although these changes required addressing additional aspects of

a previously analyzed accident, the possibility of a previously

unanalyzed accident is not created.

The impact shield design together with its attendant

administrative controls and NUREG-0612 heavy load lift compliance,

renders the possibility of a heavy load drop on fuel as not credible

in accordance with the NUREG-0612 single-failure-proof criteria.

Accordingly, since this particular part of the proposed reracking

modification is not a change that could malfunction by a new single

failure, the movement of heavy loads over the cask pit does not

create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

It is therefore concluded that the proposed reracking does not

create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from

any previously analyzed.

(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

The design and technical review process applied to the reracking

modification included addressing the following areas:

1. Nuclear criticality considerations.

2. Thermal-hydraulic considerations.

3. Mechanical, material, and structural considerations.

The established acceptance criterion for criticality is that the

neutron multiplication factor shall be less than or equal to 0.95,

including all uncertainties. The results of the criticality analyses

for the rack designs demonstrate that this criterion is satisfied.

The methods used in the criticality analysis conform to the

applicable portions of NRC guidance and industry codes, standards,

and specifications. In meeting the acceptance criteria for

criticality in the spent fuel pool and the cask loading area, such

that keff is always less than 0.95 at a 95/95 percent

probability tolerance level, the proposed amendment does not involve

a significant reduction in the margin of safety for nuclear

criticality.

Conservative methods and assumptions were used to calculate the

maximum fuel temperature and the increase in temperature of the

water in the spent fuel pit area. The thermal-hydraulic evaluation

used methods previously employed. The proposed storage modification

will increase the heat load in the spent fuel pool, but the

evaluation shows that the existing spent fuel cooling system will

maintain the bulk pool water temperature at or below 160 degrees

Fahrenheit. Thus it is demonstrated that the worst-case peak value

of the pool bulk temperature is considerably lower than the bulk

boiling temperature. Evaluation also shows that maximum local water

temperatures along the hottest fuel assembly are below the nucleate

boiling condition value. Thus, there is no significant reduction in

the margin of safety for thermal hydraulic or spent fuel cooling

considerations.

The mechanical, material, and structural design of the spent

fuel racks is in accordance with applicable portions of NRC's

position in ``OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent-Fuel

Storage and Handling Applications,'' dated April 14, 1978 (as

modified January 18, 1979), as well as other applicable NRC guidance

and industry codes. The primary safety function of the spent fuel

racks is to maintain the fuel assemblies in a safe configuration

through normal and abnormal loading conditions. Abnormal loadings

that have been evaluated with acceptable results and discussed

previously include the effect of an earthquake and the impact

because of the drop of a fuel assembly. The rack materials used are

compatible with the fuel assemblies and the environment in the spent

fuel pool.

[[Page 15736]]

The structural design for the new racks provides tilting,

deflection, and movement margins such that the racks do not impact

each other or the spent fuel pit walls in the active fuel region

during the postulated seismic events. Also the spent fuel assemblies

themselves remain intact and no criticality concerns exist. In

addition, finite element analysis methods were used to evaluate the

continued structural acceptability of the spent fuel pit. The

analysis was performed in accordance with ``Building Code

Requirements for Reinforced Concrete,'' (ACI 318-63,77). Therefore,

with respect to mechanical, material, and structural considerations,

there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Summary

Based on the above analysis, TVA has determined that operation

of WBN, in accordance with the proposed amendment, would not: (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of

an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety. Therefore, operations of WBN in accordance with the proposed

amendments as described do not involve significant hazard

considerations as defined in 10 CFR 50.92 and that the criteria of

10 CFR 50.91 have accordingly been met.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within thirty (30) days after the

date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any

final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public and State comments received.

Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal

Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing

after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this

action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and

page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also

be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By May 2, 1997, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with

respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating

license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC and at the local public

document room located at the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1001

Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402. If a request for a hearing

or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or

the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of

hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing.

The petitioner must also provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.

Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine

dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.

Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails

to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with

respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate

as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the final determination will serve to

decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective,

[[Page 15737]]

notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and

Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of

the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so

inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at

1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union

operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the

following message addressed to Mr. Frederick J. Hebdon: petitioner's

name and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and

publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A

copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General

Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, and to

General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, ET 10H, 400 West Summit

Hill Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on

an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of

section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C.

10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of

any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with

respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in

controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134

provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by

discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following

argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and

substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to

be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings

are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of

section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.

The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are

found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for

Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear

Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR

2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may

invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding

officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be

timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a

request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the

Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in

particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or

petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The

presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The

presiding officer may grant an untimely request for oral argument only

upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure to

file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to

respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a

request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be

conducted in accordance with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,

those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require

that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must

be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings

requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument

are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,

apply.

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment dated, October 23, 1996, as supplemented on

December 11, 1996, January 31, February 10 and 24 and March 11, 1997

which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room, located at the Chattanooga-

Hamilton County Library, 1001 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of March 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert E. Martin,

Sr. Project Manager, Project Directorate II-3, Division of Reactor

Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97-8401 Filed 4-1-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P