Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-245]

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Nuclear Power

Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR

2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with

regard to a Petition dated August 21, 1995, and supplemented on August

28, 1995, submitted by Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc. (the

Petitioners), requesting action under 10 CFR 2.206. The Petition

pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, operated by

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee).

The Petitioners requested that the NRC (1) suspend the license for

the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after the unit is

brought into compliance with the license and the design basis; (2)

revoke the operating license until the facility is in full compliance

with the terms and conditions of its license; (3) perform a detailed

independent analysis of the offsite dose consequences of the total loss

of spent fuel pool water; and (4) take enforcement action pursuant to

10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9. As bases for their requests, the Petitioners

raised the following three issues: (1) The Licensee has knowingly,

willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone Unit 1 in violation of

License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40; (2) License Amendments Nos. 39 and

40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by

the Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC; and (3) the license

amendment proposed in a letter dated July 28, 1995, should be denied

and the Licensee should be required to operate in full conformance with

License Amendment No. 40. Issue 3 was determined to be a request for a

licensing action and so was beyond the scope of 10 CFR 2.206.

The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

partially granted Requests 1, 2, and 3 of the Petition. The reasons for

this decision are explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-96-23), the complete text of which

follows this notice. With regard to Petitioner's Request 4, the NRC

staff activities are not yet complete. A Final Director's Decision will

be issued upon completion of NRC activities in this area.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be available for

public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public

document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers

Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at

the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,

Waterford, Connecticut.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision has been filed with the

Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Decision will become the

final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests dispositioned

in this Partial Director's Decision) 25 days after the date of issuance

unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the

Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.

[[Page 425]]

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On August 21, 1995, Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc.

(Petitioners), filed a Petition with the Executive Director for

Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR

2.206). A supplement to the Petition was submitted on August 28, 1995.

These two submittals will hereinafter be referred to as the

``Petition.''

The Petition raised three issues regarding the Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Unit 1 (Millstone Unit 1), operated by Northeast Nuclear

Energy Company (NNECO or Licensee). First, Petitioners asserted that

the Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated

Millstone Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40.

Specifically, Petitioners assert that NNECO has offloaded more fuel

assemblies into the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) during

refueling outages than permitted under these license amendments.

Second, Petitioners asserted that License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for

Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by the

Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC. Third, the license

amendment proposed by the Licensee in a letter dated July 28, 1995,

regarding offloading of the entire core of spent fuel assemblies at

Millstone Unit 1 should be denied and the Licensee should be required

to operate in full conformance with License Amendment No. 40.

On the basis of these assertions, the Petitioners requested that

the NRC institute a proceeding under 10 CFR 2.202 to suspend the

license for the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after

the unit is brought into compliance with the license and the design

basis and to revoke the operating license for the Millstone Unit 1

facility until it is in full compliance with the terms and conditions

of its license. Petitioners also requested that before reinstatement of

the license, a detailed independent analysis of the offsite dose

consequences of the total loss of SFP water be conducted and that the

NRC take enforcement action against NNECO pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and

50.9. Finally, Petitioners requested that the license amendment sought

by NNECO be denied.

By letter dated October 26, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioners

that the Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations for

preparation of a response. The NRC also informed the Petitioners that

the NRC staff would take appropriate action within a reasonable time

regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition. Additionally,

the Petitioners were informed that their request with regard to issues

associated with the requested license amendment (i.e., Petitioners'

third issue) was not within the scope of 10 CFR 2.206 and thus was not

appropriate for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. See Pacific Gas and

Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-

81-6, 13 NRC 443 (1981).1 Therefore, this issue will not be

addressed in this or any subsequent Director's Decision.

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\1\ Petitioners' concerns related to the license amendment were

considered by the NRC staff during the license amendment review

process. A license amendment was issued by the NRC staff on November

9, 1995. A number of petitioners, including We the People, Inc.,

sought to intervene in the license amendment proceeding. Two

petitioners, including We the People, Inc., were found to have

standing to intervene and were admitted to the proceeding subject to

the filing of at least one admissible contention. Based upon

confirmation by counsel for these petitioners that no contention

would be filed, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board terminated the

proceeding on April 15, 1996.

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Petitioners' supplement of August 28, 1995, provided additional

information. A portion of the Petitioners' supplemental letter of

August 28, 1995, contained assertions relating to the third issue.

Specifically, regarding Millstone Unit 3, the Petitioners asserted that

there is a material false statement in a submission used to support a

previous license amendment and that there is an unanalyzed condition in

the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to system

piping not being analyzed for the full-core offload normal end-of-cycle

event. Also, with regard to Seabrook Station Unit 1, Petitioners

asserted that there are Technical Specification violations related to

criticality analysis and gaps in Boraflex material. As the third issue

is outside the scope of 10 CFR 2.206, these assertions will not be

addressed in this or subsequent Director's Decisions. However, the

staff is reviewing these assertions and the staff's findings will be

forwarded to the Petitioners by separate correspondence.

Petitioners' supplemental letter also provided additional

information on the first issue. Specifically, the Petitioners asserted

that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and Seabrook Unit 1 also

performed full-core offloads in violation of their licenses. These

assertions will be addressed in this Partial Director's Decision.

Petitioners' issues 1 and 2 assert wrongdoing on the part of the

Licensee. The NRC staff has not yet completed its review of possible

wrongdoing on the part of the Licensee and will address this issue in a

subsequent Director's Decision.

The NRC staff has, however, completed its technical assessment of

core offloading practices at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 and Seabrook

Unit 1 and these areas are discussed below. As explained below, the NRC

staff has taken actions that, in part, address the Petitioners'

requests.

II. Discussion

A. Requests To Revoke and Suspend the Operating License for Millstone

Unit 1

The Petitioners based their requests on their issues that the

Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone

Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and that

License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on

material false statements. Specifically, the Petitioners stated that

the Licensee conducted full-core offloads as a routine practice when

its licensing basis analyses assumed one-third core offloads as the

normal refueling practice. In their August 28 supplemental letter, the

Petitioners asserted that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and

Seabrook Unit 1 also performed full-core offloads in violation of their

licenses. The Petitioners further contend that the Licensee's actions

subjected the public to an unacceptable risk. As previously noted, the

wrongdoing aspects of the Licensee's actions will not be addressed in

this Director's Decision. However, the technical aspects associated

with core offloading practices will be addressed in the following

paragraphs. For perspective, the NRC staff's conclusions are prefaced

by an abbreviated history of this issue.

On October 18, 1993, the Licensee issued Licensee Event Report

(LER) 93-11. The LER stated that the Licensee had made inappropriate

assumptions in the analysis that was performed in support of License

Amendment No. 40 for Millstone Unit 1. Specifically, the normal

refueling analysis assumed a one-third core offload when Unit 1

routinely performed full-core refueling offloads. Following issuance of

LER 93-11, the Licensee conducted refueling

[[Page 426]]

outage (RFO) 14 in 1994. The Licensee used a waiting period between the

one-third core offload and the full-core offload during RFO 14 to

ensure that the SFP bulk temperature remained within the temperature

design parameters identified in LER 93-11 and the UFSAR.

On April 22, 1994, the NRC issued Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/94-

01, 50-336/94-01, and 50-423/94-01. The NRC staff's review of LER 93-11

was included in this inspection report. The NRC staff found that the

Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 had historically removed all of the fuel

assemblies to the SFP during refueling outages. The NRC staff noted

that this operating practice was not consistent with the spent fuel

analysis design-basis assumptions in the UFSAR. Therefore, the NRC

staff concluded that the Licensee had failed to maintain spent fuel

analysis design assumptions in plant operating practices. However,

because the violation was a Licensee-identified Severity Level IV

violation meeting the criteria set out in Section VII.B of the NRC

Enforcement Policy,2 a Notice of Violation was not issued. The

purpose of this policy regarding NRC discretion for citing violations

is to encourage and support licensee initiatives for self-

identification and correction of problems.3

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\2\ ``General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC

Enforcement Actions,'' at that time contained in Appendix C to 10

CFR Part 2.

\3\ The NRC staff, in response to Petitioners' requests, is

evaluating possible wrongdoing associated with this violation and

will reassess the appropriateness of exercising enforcement

discretion when the NRC staff's review is complete.

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From July 10 through July 14, 1995, the NRC staff conducted a

safety inspection of several previously identified technical issues at

Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, including the Licensee's refueling offload

practices that were reviewed previously. The results of the inspection

were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-28, 50-336/95-28, and 50-423/95-28

issued on September 1, 1995. The staff noted that during RFOs 12, 13,

and 14, the Licensee performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1.

The staff concluded that these outages may have been performed outside

the design basis of Millstone Unit 1. The staff also concluded that the

Licensee did not completely and accurately describe in its submittals

for License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 the refueling activities as they

were actually conducted. The Licensee was routinely performing full-

core offloads during refueling outages, but the amendment submittals

stated that ``normal'' refueling offloads were one-third core offloads.

Enforcement action associated with the staff's findings will be taken,

as appropriate, upon final resolution of the Petitioners' contentions

regarding possible wrongdoing.

On July 28, 1995, the Licensee requested a license amendment to use

full-core offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit

1. The Licensee proposed plant modifications to support this license

amendment. The staff granted the Licensee's amendment request on

November 9, 1995. The NRC's approval of the Licensee's request was

based on design changes, procedure revisions, and enhanced

administrative controls that did not exist during prior refueling

activities. In the cover letter forwarding the granted license

amendment, the staff noted that NNECO's design and operational

practices for full-core offloads were more conservative than NRC

recommendations and industry standards.

On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for

the planned 50-day RFO 15. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 has not

yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.

In part, in response to the concerns the Petitioners raised, from

October 24 to November 10, 1995, the NRC staff performed an inspection

at Millstone Unit 1 to ensure the Licensee's planned refueling

operation would be done safely and in accordance with its license,

design basis, and plant procedures. The inspection was continued from

March 4 to 14, 1996. The results of this Millstone Unit 1 inspection

were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-82, issued July 10, 1996. The NRC

staff concluded that the Licensee could safely offload fuel for RFO 15.

However, the inspection identified design control questions related to

the SFP cooling system. Consequently, the staff concluded that

additional Licensee efforts were needed to identify and correct

deficiencies related to the Licensee's SFP cooling systems and their

operation. Two areas of concern involved the Licensee's failure (1) to

conduct adequate safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and

(2) to take adequate design control measures in accordance with

Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. These items were cited as apparent

violations. NRC is considering enforcement action associated with the

staff's findings.

At a public meeting on December 5, 1995, the NRC's Acting Inspector

General stated that, based on an investigation conducted by his office,

refueling activities at Millstone Unit 1 may not have been conducted

consistent with the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR.4

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\4\ The results of the investigation were documented on December

21, 1995, in Office of Inspector General Event Inquiry, ``NRC

Failure to Adequately Regulate--Millstone Unit 1,'' Case No. 95-77I.

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On December 13, 1995, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC required

that NNECO provide the NRC with additional information to describe the

actions taken to ensure that future operation of Millstone Unit 1 will

be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the

Millstone Unit 1 operating license, the Commission's regulations, and

the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. NRC concerns related to past refueling

activities at Millstone Unit 1 were a major impetus for this request.

The December 13, 1995, letter required this information to be submitted

before the plant's restart.

In January 1996, the NRC placed the Millstone facility on NRC's

``Watch List'' as a Category 2 facility. Plants in this category have

been identified as having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC

attention. The NRC staff based its actions on the numerous problems

identified by both the NRC and the Licensee and the repeated failure of

the Licensee's corrective action programs to prevent recurrence of

these problems.

On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when

both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) system were

declared inoperable due to the potential to clog the HPSI discharge

throttle valves during the recirculation phase following a loss-of-

coolant accident. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 2 has not yet

restarted the plant from this shutdown.

On February 22, 1996, the Licensee issued ``ACR 7007--Event

Response Team Report,'' which describes the underlying causes for

numerous inaccuracies contained in Millstone Unit 1's UFSAR. The 7007

Report also acknowledged that because of the nature of the identified

causes, the potential existed for the presence of similar configuration

management problems at the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units 2 and

3. In response to the 7007 Report and on the basis the NRC's own

inspections of Millstone Unit 2 indicating problems such as those

described in the 7007 Report, the NRC issued a letter on March 7, 1996,

to NNECO, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), requiring that the type of

information requested for Millstone Unit 1 on December 13, 1995, also

be provided for Millstone Unit 2. This information had to be submitted

before the plant's restart. In addition, although the NRC's

[[Page 427]]

inspection history did not indicate that similar problems existed at

Millstone Unit 3 and Haddam Neck Plant, the NRC issued a separate

letter on March 7, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) requiring the

Licensee to address the applicability of the conclusions of the 7007

Report to these plants.

Following the March 7 letters, the NRC conducted a special

inspection at Millstone Unit 3 that identified design and other

deficiencies similar to those reported in the 7007 Report. On March 30,

1996, the Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 shut down the plant after it

was determined that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary

feedwater turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did

not meet NRC requirements. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 has not

yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.

In a letter dated April 4, 1996, to the Licensee pursuant to 10 CFR

50.54(f), the NRC stated that an NRC special inspection team found

programmatic issues and design deficiencies at Millstone Unit 3 that

were similar to those at Millstone Units 1 and 2. Thus, by this letter,

the NRC required information for Millstone Unit 3 that was similar to

that previously required for Millstone Units 1 and 2. This information

had to be submitted before the plant's restart.

On April 8, 1996, the NRC staff held the informal public hearing

that the Petitioners requested. Information gained at this hearing was

considered in the preparation of this Partial Director's Decision and

will be considered in the preparation of the Final Director's Decision.

On May 21, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued a

letter to the Licensee requiring specific information regarding design

and configuration deficiencies identified at each of the Millstone

units, as well as a detailed description of the Licensee's plans for

completion of the work required to respond to the NRC's previous

letters.

By letters dated June 20 and July 2, 1996, the Licensee responded

to the NRC's letter of May 21, 1996. In its letters, the Licensee

informed the NRC that Millstone Unit 3 would be the first Millstone

unit that the Licensee planned to restart. The Licensee also described

its configuration management plan (CMP) that is intended to provide

reasonable assurance that the future operation of Millstone Unit 3 will

be conducted in accordance with its design basis.

In June 1996, at the direction of the Commission, the staff

informed the Licensee that the Millstone facility had been designated a

``Watch List'' Category 3 facility. Plants in this category have been

identified as having significant weaknesses that warrant keeping the

plant shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that

adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure

substantial improvement in the plant. This designation also requires

the NRC staff to obtain the Commission's approval before restart of the

facility.

During an August 12, 1996, meeting with the Licensee, the staff

informed the Licensee that the NRC staff believed NNECO should

establish an independent corrective action verification program to

provide additional assurance that the Licensee has effectively

corrected its configuration management problems at all Millstone units.

The NRC concluded that the Licensee's CMP was not sufficient to ensure

the correction of the problems noted at the Millstone units, given the

Licensee's history of poor performance in ensuring complete

implementation of the corrective action for both known degraded and

non-conforming conditions and past violations of NRC requirements.

In response to the staff's comments in the August 12 meeting, in a

letter dated August 13, 1996, the Licensee submitted its plan for

conducting an independent review of the results of the Licensee's CMP

regarding establishment of adequate design bases and design controls.

On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order

Establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program

(Effective Immediately) for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 (ICAVP Order).

The NRC issued the order because of the Licensee's history of poor

performance in ensuring complete implementation of corrective actions

for both known degraded and non-conforming conditions and past

violations of NRC requirements. In addition, the magnitude and scope of

the design and configuration deficiencies identified at the Millstone

units indicated ineffective implementation of oversight programs,

including the NRC-approved quality assurance program. Thus, the NRC

ordered the Licensee to obtain the services of an organization

independent of the Licensee and its design contractors to conduct a

multi-disciplinary review of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3. The ICAVP is

to provide independent verification that for the selected systems, the

Licensee's CMP has identified and resolved existing problems,

documented licensing and design bases, and established programs,

processes, and procedures for effective configuration management in the

future.

Additionally, on the basis, in part, of the UFSAR compliance

deficiencies found at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, on October 9, 1996,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued letters to all operating

reactor licensees. The letters required licensees to submit information

to provide confidence and assurance that licensees are operating and

maintaining their plants within the design bases and that any design-

bases deviations are reconciled in a timely manner. Specifically, the

NRC staff required licensees to describe their configuration management

processes, provide their rationale for concluding that the design-bases

requirements have been translated into procedures, provide their

rationale for concluding that the plant configuration and performance

are consistent with the design-bases, describe their processes for

identifying and correcting design-bases problems, and provide their

assessment of the effectiveness of their current programs.

On the basis of its review and inspections of the Millstone Unit 1

SFP issues, the NRC staff has concluded that the design of the SFP and

related systems at Millstone Unit 1 was adequate to protect public

health and safety during full-core offloads.5 The staff concluded

that the probability of reaching boiling conditions in the SFP when

there has been a full-core offload would be low.

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\5\ Based on its inspection and Licensee submittals, the NRC

staff has identified some instances when the Licensee prematurely

performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1. Although the

safety significance of these offloads was low, there is a regulatory

concern associated with this practice and the NRC staff is

considering enforcement action with regard to it.

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At Millstone Unit 1, the systems that have an SFP cooling

capability (i.e., SFP cooling system (SFPCS) and shutdown cooling

system (SDCS)) are designed to receive power from two separate and

independent emergency buses that can receive power from either of two

onsite power supplies following a loss of normal power. The

independence of the systems reduces the probability of an event capable

of causing a sustained loss of SFP cooling. Assuming the SFP cooling

function is lost, despite this feature, there would be a substantial

period of time available in which to restore cooling before boiling

occurs because of the large volume of water in the SFP and the reactor

cavity during refueling outages. In the unlikely event that boiling

occurs, the adverse safety impact of a boiling SFP is relatively low

because the safety systems subject to adverse environmental conditions

from

[[Page 428]]

SFP boiling would not have a necessary function when irradiated fuel

has been transferred from the reactor vessel to the SFP. The water lost

because of boiling can be replaced by the condensate system, which is a

seismic Category I safety-related makeup source, or from the fire

protection system.

In addition to the design features previously discussed, to support

its license amendment request of July 28, 1995, to conduct full-core

offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit 1, the

Licensee further upgraded its SFP cooling capability by installing a

cross-connect between the SDCS and the SFPCS. This modification

provided a redundant train of shutdown cooling for use during full-core

offloads.

The Petitioners' supplemental letter of August 28, 1995, contained

three allegations regarding core offloading practices at other

facilities. The Petitioners noted that the allegations were given to

Mr. Galatis and that he had no firsthand knowledge of the veracity of

the allegations and did not, himself, allege the conditions exist or

existed. However, Mr. Galatis contended that, considering the source,

the allegations would appear to have substantial merit. These

allegations are addressed in the following paragraphs.

The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 2, the Licensee

engaged in violations of its Technical Specifications by offloading

more than one-third of the core into the SFP during normal end-of-cycle

refueling outages.

On the basis of the NRC staff's review of Licensee documentation,

the NRC staff found that the Licensee routinely, with justified

exceptions, conducted one-third core offloads for the Millstone Unit 2

refueling outages in accordance with its licensing basis.

The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 3, the Licensee

also engaged in full-core offloads during normal refueling outages in

violation of the applicable license amendment.

The staff found that License Amendment No. 60, dated March 31,

1991, was the applicable license amendment for current SFP storage

issues. The Licensee requested this amendment in a letter dated

November 30, 1990. In this letter, the Licensee stated that, although

the design basis had assumed that normal refueling outages would use

partial-core offloads, for Millstone Unit 3, a full-core discharge is

the actual normal refueling practice. The design-bases analyses limited

the allowed number of full-core discharges to six for the 40-year life

of the plant. The Licensee stated that, if it decides to continue

offloading a full-core as a normal event, the design basis would be

changed before it exceeded the design-basis limit of six full-core

offloads. The staff did not object to the Licensee's use of full-core

offloads when License Amendment No. 60 was issued.

The staff notes that the practice at Millstone Unit 3 is

inconsistent with the original design-basis assumptions regarding

normal RFO offloads. As was the case with Millstone Unit 1, the

Licensee was routinely performing full-core RFO offloads when the

design basis assumed partial-core offloads would be the normal RFO

offload. Since the plant was analyzed for at least six full-core

offloads and the Licensee has not exceeded this number of full-core

offloads, the safety significance of this issue is low. The staff, on a

generic basis, is considering the appropriate actions for licensees

that have been conducting full-core offloads as their routine refueling

practice when their design-basis assumptions for normal fuel offloads

were based on partial RFO offloads. The staff will take appropriate

action for Millstone Unit 3 once it makes this generic determination.

The Petitioners asserted that Seabrook Unit 1, which is operated by

the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, was also operated in

violation of the terms of its operating license by discharging the

full-core to the SFP during routine refueling outages.

The NRC staff found that all RFOs at Seabrook Unit 1 have involved

discharge of the entire core to the SFP. Neither the Seabrook Unit 1

operating license nor the plant Technical Specifications contain a

limit on the fraction of the core that may be discharged to the SFP

during refueling. The UFSAR originally did not state which type of

offload would be performed routinely. However, the UFSAR did contain

heat load assumptions. Before the first two RFO offloads, the Licensee

verified that these assumptions would not be exceeded during the RFO.

Before the third refueling outage, under the provisions of 10 CFR

50.59, the UFSAR was revised to explicitly state that full-core

discharge is routinely performed as part of a normal refueling. On the

basis of its review, the staff found that the Licensee for Seabrook

Unit 1 has conducted its core offloads in accordance with the

facility's design basis.

The Petitioners requested suspension and revocation of the

operating license for Millstone Unit 1. As previously discussed, the

relative safety significance of the full-core offloads performed at

Millstone Unit 1 is low. However, all three Millstone units have been

found to have significant design-basis deficiencies. The NRC has issued

letters to NNECO for each Millstone facility requiring that certain

information pertaining to actions taken to address design configuration

issues be submitted to the NRC and requesting its submittal before the

restart of the facilities. Additionally, the NRC has issued the ICAVP

Order to the Licensee requiring an independent verification of its

broad configuration management corrective actions before restarting of

any Millstone units.

These actions taken by the NRC are relevant to the issues raised by

the Petitioners regarding adherence by the Licensee to its licensing

basis. Further, the actions taken are much broader than those requested

by Petitioners in that Petitioners' requests were limited to the SFP

design basis at Millstone Unit 1. Thus, the NRC's actions to date

constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' requests regarding

suspension and revocation of the operating license for Millstone Unit

1.

B. Request to Perform a Detailed Independent Analysis of the Offsite

Dose Consequences of the Total Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Water

The risk of accidents in spent fuel storage pools beyond the design

basis was examined in WASH-1400.6 In this study, it was concluded

that the risks associated with the spent fuel are orders of magnitude

below those involving the reactor core because of the simplicity of the

SFP.

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\6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Reactor Safety

Study--An Assessment of Accident Risk in U.S. Commercial Nuclear

Power Plants,'' WASH-1400, October 1975.

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This issue was reexamined in the late 1980s because (1) spent fuel

was being stored onsite instead of being reprocessed and (2) some

laboratory studies provided evidence of the possibility of fire

propagation between assemblies stored in an air-cooled environment. The

dose estimate portions of the study were performed by the Brookhaven

National Laboratory. The results of this reexamination were published

in NUREG-1353.7 The NRC staff concluded that SFP accidents beyond

the design basis did not warrant additional regulatory action because

of the large inherent safety margins in the design and construction of

the SFP.

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\7\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Regulatory

Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, `Beyond Design

Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,' '' NUREG-1353, April 1989.

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Additionally, because of SFP safety questions that were first

reported to the NRC staff in November 1992 by two engineers who

formerly worked under contract for the Pennsylvania Power & Light

Company, the NRC again revisited

[[Page 429]]

this issue. The principal safety concern the staff reviewed involved

the potential for a sustained loss of SFP cooling and the potential for

a substantial loss of spent fuel coolant inventory that could expose

irradiated fuel.8

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\8\ ``Task Action Plan for Spent Fuel Storage Pool Safety.''

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The NRC staff completed its work under the task action plan in July

1996. The staff forwarded the results of its review to the Commission

on July 26, 1996.9 In the report, the staff concluded that

existing SFP structures, systems, and components provide adequate

protection for public health and safety. Protection is provided by

several layers of defense involving accident prevention (e.g., quality

controls on design, construction, and operation), accident mitigation

(e.g., multiple cooling systems and multiple makeup water paths),

radiation protection, and emergency preparedness. The staff has

reviewed and approved design features addressing each of these areas

for spent fuel storage for each operating reactor. In addition, the

limited risk analyses available for spent fuel storage suggest that

current design features and operational constraints cause issues

related to SFP storage to be a small fraction of the overall risk

associated with an operating light-water reactor.

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\9\ Memorandum to the Commission from J. Taylor, ``Resolution of

Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan Issues,'' dated July 26, 1996.

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The NRC's actions to date in evaluating SFP accidents beyond the

design basis constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' request to

perform analyses of such accidents.

C. Request for Enforcement Action Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9

The NRC staff is still considering the Petitioners' assertions that

the Licensee knowingly, willfully, and flagrantly operated Millstone

Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and submitted

material false statements to obtain License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40,

which will be addressed in a subsequent Director's Decision.

III. Conclusion

The staff has completed its technical review of the full-core

offload issue at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, and Seabrook Unit 1. The

staff has concluded that Millstone Unit 1 could safely offload a full

core. The staff also found that Millstone Unit 3 and Seabrook Unit 1

could safely offload full cores. Additionally, the staff found that

Millstone Unit 2 was not routinely performing full-core offloads as

asserted by the Petitioners. However, the staff followup of spent fuel

pool issues raised by the Petitioners led, in part, to the

identification of a broad spectrum of configuration management concerns

that must be corrected before the restart of any Millstone unit.

The three Millstone units are currently shut down and the NRC staff

has issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an ICAVP for each

Millstone unit to ensure that the plant's physical and functional

characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design basis.

The ICAVP shall be performed and completed for each unit, to the

satisfaction of the NRC, before restart of any unit. To this extent,

Petitioners' requests for suspension and revocation of the Millstone

Unit 1 operating license are granted. In addition, the staff has

evaluated spent fuel accidents beyond the design bases and, to this

extent, Petitioners' request to perform analyses of such accidents is

granted.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be placed in the

Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room located at

the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical

College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the

temporary local public document room located at the Waterford Library,

ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will also be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Partial Decision will

become the final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests 1,

2, and 3) 25 days after its issuance, unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97-64 Filed 1-2-97; 8:45 am]

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