Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

RIN 3150-AF53

Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise

its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with

an internal threat. This action follows reconsideration by the NRC of

nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those

requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer

effective. This action would reduce the regulatory burden on licensees

without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage

required for public health and safety.

DATES: Submit comments by May 6, 1997. Comments received after this

date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission

is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before

this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be sent to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Docketing and Service

Branch.

Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,

between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

For information on submitting comments electronically, see the

discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information

Section.

Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments

received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L

Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also

be viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin

Board established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under

Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6261, e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In a memorandum dated September 3, 1991 (COMFR-91-005), the

Commission requested the NRC staff to re-examine the security

requirements associated with an internal threat to nuclear power plants

that are contained in 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants

and Materials.'' The NRC staff completed its re-examination and

recommended some changes in 10 CFR Part 73 to the Commission (SECY-92-

272, August 4, 1992). In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November

5, 1992, the Commission directed the NRC staff to work with the Nuclear

Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) now known as the Nuclear

Energy Institute (NEI). Following three public meetings with NUMARC,

the NRC staff recommended to the Commission (SECY-93-326, December 2,

1993) additional changes to

[[Page 7722]]

Part 73 that would provide significant relief to licensees without

compromising the physical security of the plants. In a Staff

Requirements Memorandum dated February 18, 1994, the Commission

directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking.

Discussion

Seven areas in Part 73 were identified as candidates for

modification through rulemaking. One of the recommended changes,

relating to access of personnel and materials into reactor containments

during periods of high traffic, has been addressed by a separate

rulemaking. This recommended change was adopted in a final rule

published on September 7, 1995 (60 FR 46497). Six other changes

originally considered for this rulemaking were the subject of Generic

Letter 96-02 issued February 13, 1996. This generic letter identified

certain areas in which licensees might choose to revise their physical

security plans without having to wait for issuance of the rule plan.

One of these (discussed in detail later), an option to leave vital area

doors unlocked provided certain compensatory measures are taken, has

been reconsidered in light of recent tampering events. Consequently,

that change is not being proposed in this rulemaking.

The five remaining changes being addressed in this proposed

rulemaking are as follows:

1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, Sec. 73.55(d)(1);

2. Requirements for vehicle escort, Sec. 73.55(d)(4);

3. Control of contractor employee badges, Sec. 73.55(d)(5);

4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area,

Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and

5. Key controls for vital areas, Sec. 73.55(d)(8).

1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).

Under current regulations, armed security guards who leave the

protected area as part of their duties must be searched for firearms,

explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected

area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or

searching packages carried by the guard protects against the

introduction of contraband. Because an armed guard carries a weapon on

site, passage of the guard through the metal detector, the principal

purpose of which is to detect firearms, serves little purpose. The

guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the

detector or be subject to a hand search. Either approach makes little

sense for the guard who is authorized to carry a weapon on site.

Further, removing and handling the guard's weapon could present a

personnel safety risk.

This proposed rule would allow armed security guards who are on

duty and have exited the protected area on official business to reenter

the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal

detector). Unarmed guards and watchpersons would continue to meet all

search requirements. All guards would continue to be searched for

explosives and incendiary devices because they are not permitted to

carry these devices into the plant.

2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort Sec. (73.55(d)(4)).

The present requirement for a searched, licensee-owned vehicle

within the protected area to be escorted by a member of the security

organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access,

does not contribute significantly to the security of the plant. Under

the current regulations, all vehicles must be searched prior to entry

into the protected area except under emergency conditions. Further, all

vehicles must be escorted by a member of the security organization upon

entry into the protected area except for ``designated licensee

vehicles.'' Designated licensee vehicles are those vehicles that are

limited in their use to onsite plant functions and remain in the

protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security,

and emergency purposes. Under this requirement, those licensee-owned

vehicles that are not ``designated licensee vehicles'' must be escorted

at all times while in the protected area even when they are driven by

personnel with unescorted access.

This proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for escort of

licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related

purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees

who have unescorted access. (This amendment would still preclude

periodic entry of a delivery truck without an escort.) This change

would provide burden relief to licensees without significantly

increasing the level of risk to the plant.

3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).

Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to return

their badges when leaving the protected area. Current regulatory

practice allows licensee employees to leave the protected area with

their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the

security of the badge is not jeopardized. Because contractors and

licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted

access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control

requirements for contractor employees.

This proposed rule would allow contractor employees to take their

badges offsite under the same conditions that apply to licensee

employees.

4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area

(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).

Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and

reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At

many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access

to most or all vital areas. Therefore, licensees presently derive

little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of

individuals allowed access to each separate vital area in the facility.

Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the

access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals

from these lists when appropriate. There is also a requirement to

reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of all

individuals on the lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the

lists have been maintained in an accurate manner is unnecessarily

burdensome.

This rulemaking would replace separate access authorization lists

for each vital area of the facility by a single listing of all persons

who have access to any vital area.

The proposed rulemaking would also change the requirement that the

list must be reapproved at least once every 31 days to quarterly. The

reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and

that only those individuals requiring routine access to a vital area

are included. Because of the requirement for a manager or supervisor to

update the list at least every 31 days, conducting this comprehensive

reapproval every 31 days is of marginal value. Comments from the public

are requested on the question of the benefits of separating the update

and reapproval requirements.

5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).

Under current regulations, licensees change or rotate all keys,

locks, combinations, and related access control devices at least once

every twelve months. Because the rule also requires that these be

changed whenever there is a possibility of their being compromised,

requiring change at least every 12 months has been determined

[[Page 7723]]

by the NRC to be only marginal to security.

This proposed rule would remove the requirement for change every 12

months while retaining the requirement for changing for cause, when an

access control device has been compromised or there is a suspicion that

it may be compromised.

Locking of Vital Areas

As noted earlier, Generic Letter 96-02, described, among other

things, conditions under which licensees could leave vital areas

unlocked. Specifically, to leave a vital area unlocked, the licensee

would have had to ensure that the area is equipped with an alarmed

access control system that will alarm on unauthorized entry; ensure

that the doors to the area can be locked remotely; continue to maintain

a record of personnel access; to examine for explosives, with equipment

specifically designed for that purpose, all hand-carried packages

entering any protected area within which there is an unlocked vital

area; and to demonstrate a capability to protect against an external

adversary.1 This change was considered for inclusion in this

rulemaking but as a result of recent events, it has been rejected. If

vital areas are unlocked but alarmed, the response to an entry by an

unauthorized individual could require a considerable time and level of

effort to assure that important equipment was not damaged. Maintaining

VA doors locked limits the number of people who have access to the area

and ensures that personnel who enter are identified.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ Generic Letter 96-02 (February 13, 1996) identified those

areas in which licensees might choose to revise their security plans

without having to wait for the issuance of the rule changes. One

change would have provided the option of not locking the doors to a

vital area provided that the security of the plant would not be

compromised.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In July and August of this year, tampering events were discovered

within vital areas of a reactor. The first search missed significant

tampering with safety-related switches. If vital areas are unlocked but

alarmed, an entry by an unauthorized individual, deliberate or

inadvertent, could require a considerable level of effort to assure

that important equipment was not damaged. It is also uncertain that

such alarms would always initiate the level of response needed to

evaluate the safety systems within the impacted vital area. In

addition, most safety equipment is automatic and rapid access to vital

areas is generally not required. Thus, this option of leaving a vital

area unlocked is no longer being considered.

Electronic Access

Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or

WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC

Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be

accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly

available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.

Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as

practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.

If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking

subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free

number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set

as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).

Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem

can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the

``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's

Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also

have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the

particular subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial

phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using

Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact

FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld

menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State

Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that

point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu.

The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc''

at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main

menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to

FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access

NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full

access to all NRC systems but you will not have access to the main

FedWorld system.

If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and

menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download

documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or

upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files

can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you

will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).

An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with

descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP

access.

Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,

like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does

not display the NRC Rules Menu.

For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis,

Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-

0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected].

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion

The Commission has determined that this proposed rule is the type

of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR

51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement

nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed

rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that

are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et

seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and

Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements.

Because the rule will reduce existing information collection

requirements, the public burden for this collection of information is

expected to be decreased by 102 hours per licensee. This reduction

includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching

existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and

completing and reviewing the collection of information. The NRC is

seeking public comment on the potential impact of the collection of

information contained in the proposed rule and on the following issues:

1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the

proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the

information will have practical utility?

2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?

3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of

the information to be collected?

4. How can the burden of the collection of information be

minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques?

Send comments on any aspect of this proposed collection of

information, including suggestions for further reducing the burden, to

the Information

[[Page 7724]]

and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail

at [email protected]; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002), Office of Management and

Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Comments to OMB on the collections of information or on the above

issues should be submitted by March 24, 1997. Comments received after

this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance

of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently

valid OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

A discussion of each of the five changes proposed in this rule is

provided in the supplementary information section. The costs and

benefits for each of the changes proposed in this rulemaking are as

follows:

1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).

The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by eliminating

unnecessary weapon searches of guards who are already allowed to carry

a weapon, which would result in better utilization of licensee

resources. There would be no reduction in plant security because the

potential for reduction in security personnel hours does not impact the

total size of the security force. Further, the potential safety risk to

personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon would be

eliminated.

2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort (73.55(d)(4)).

The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by requiring

fewer vehicle escorts which would allow personnel to be utilized more

effectively. Resources could be redirected to areas in which they would

be more cost effective. The decrease in security would be marginal

because unescorted access would be restricted to vehicles owned by the

licensee and driven by licensee employees with unescorted access.

Assuming the number of entries by licensee-owned vehicles driven by

personnel having unescorted access is 10-per-day per-site, the average

time needed for escort is 3 hours, and the cost per hour for security

personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings

per site per year is about $330,000 (10 escorts/day/site x 365 days/

year x 3 hrs/escort x $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the

industry per year would be approximately $24,000,000.

3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).

The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by more

effective use of security personnel, who would no longer be needed to

handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access.

There would be no reduction in plant security because adequate

safeguards would be in place to ensure that the security of the badge

is not jeopardized.

Assuming that one security person per working day (8 hours) is

relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employees badges and

that the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough

estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $88,000 (8

hours/day x 365 days/year x $30 hr). With 75 sites, the savings to

the industry per year would be approximately $6,600,000.

4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area

(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).

The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced because

licensees would have to keep only one access list for all vital areas

and reapprove it quarterly, rather than keep individual access lists

for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly.

Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individual lists is

1 hour per month, that a combined list would take 1.5 hours per month,

that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the

cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough

estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $3,420

[(1 x 10 vital areas/month x 12 months/yr--1.5 x 1 combined vital

area/quarter x 4 quarters/yr) x $30/hr]. With 75 sites, the savings

to the industry per year would be approximately $256,500.

5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).

The regulatory burden on the licensees would be reduced because

fewer resources would be needed to maintain the system.

Assuming that of the approximately 60 locks per year, half of them

had been changed for cause, leaving 30 locks unchanged which would take

a locksmith one day to change at a cost(including overhead) of $45 per

hour. A rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is

about $360 (8 hrs/year x $45/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the

industry per year would be approximately $27,000.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted,

would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of

small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees

authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not

fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth

in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards

set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act,

13 CFR Part 121.

Backfit Analysis

The Commission has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109,

does not apply to this proposed amendment because this amendment would

not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The

proposed changes to physical security are voluntary and should the

licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in

burden to the licensee. Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been

prepared for this amendment.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export,

Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to

adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.

147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as

amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96

Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section

[[Page 7725]]

73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42

U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-

399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4),

(d)(5), (d)(7)(i)(A), and (d)(8) to read as follows:

Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities

in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle

access into a protected area. Identification and search of all

individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and

authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for

detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be

accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection

equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall

subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law

enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon

entry into a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and

have exited the protected area on official business may reenter the

protected area without being searched for firearms.

* * * * *

(4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be

searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to

entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must

include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All

vehicles, except as indicated in this paragraph, requiring entry into

the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security

organization while within the protected area and, to the extent

practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific

designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital

area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or

licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by

licensee employees having unescorted access.

(5) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for

all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without

escort. Badges must be displayed by all individuals while inside the

protected area. An individual not employed by the licensee but who

requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may

be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or

she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the

protected area which indicates:

(i) Non-employee--no escort required;

(ii) Areas to which access is authorized; and

(iii) The period for which access has been authorized.

* * * * *

(7) * * *

(i) * * *

(A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital

areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee

manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be

reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access

list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital

areas during nonemergency conditions.

* * * * *

(d)(8) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control

devices used to control access to protected areas and vital areas must

be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there

is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related

access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or

rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other

access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to

persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual's

unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness,

reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations,

and related access control devices to which that person had access must

be changed or rotated.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 97-4219 Filed 2-19-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P