Northeast Utilities; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206

Federal RegisterFeb 18, 1997

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-245]

Northeast Utilities; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1;

Issuance of Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated

January 5, 1995, by Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petition for action under 10

CFR 2.206). The Petition pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,

Unit 1.

In the Petition, the Petitioner described several examples of what

he alleged were violations of Procedure WC-8, which required that

maintenance and test equipment be signed out from and returned to a

custodian. The Petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission institute sanctions against his department manager, his

first-line supervisor, and two co-workers for engaging in deliberate

misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. The Petitioner also asserted

that the NRC ``desperately needs to conduct an investigation'' into the

procedure violations and to audit the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance

department measuring and test equipment folders to reveal widespread

problems regarding noncompliance with this procedure.

The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

determined to grant the Petition in part, and deny the Petition in

part. The reasons for this decision are explained in the ``Director's

Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-97-04), the complete text of which

follows this notice and is available for public inspection at the

Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at

the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical

College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the

temporary local public document room located at the Waterford Library,

ATTN: Vince

[[Page 7282]]

Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.

A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the

Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this

regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on

its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On January 5, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a

Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). In the Petition, the

Petitioner raised concerns regarding noncompliance with Procedure WC-8,

``Control and Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment,'' at

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, and requested that escalated

enforcement action be taken. Specifically, the Petitioner provided

several examples of what he alleged were violations of Procedure WC-8,

which he stated required that measuring and test equipment (M&TE) be

signed out from, and returned to, a custodian upon completion of work.

The Petitioner requested that the NRC institute sanctions against his

department manager, his first-line supervisor, and ``two coworkers''

1 for engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR

50.5 in failing to comply with Procedure WC-8. The Petitioner also

asserted that the NRC should conduct an investigation into violations

of this procedure and audit the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance department

M&TE folders for widespread problems regarding noncompliance with this

procedure.

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\1\ The ``two coworkers'' are understood to be an individual the

Petitioner alleges willfully falsified (back-dated) an entry on the

form to indicate that the meter was returned on October 13, 1994,

and an individual the Petitioner alleges willfully violated

Procedure WC-8 on November 17, 1994, by signing out his own M&TE.

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On February 23, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioner that the

Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. The NRC also

informed the Petitioner that the staff would take appropriate action

within a reasonable time regarding the specific concerns raised in the

Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues raised by the

Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded, for the reasons

explained below, that the Petition is denied with regard to the request

for escalated enforcement action and instituting sanctions against the

department manager, first-line supervisor, and two co-workers, but

granted with regard to the requests for an ``investigation into the

above mentioned procedure violations'' and for the NRC to ``audit the

Unit 1 maintenance department M&TE folders.''

II. Discussion

In the Petition, the Petitioner raises concerns regarding numerous

noncompliances with Procedure WC-8, Revision 0, at Millstone Unit 1.

Specifically, the Petitioner states that (1) quality assurance (QA)

2 test meter 1587 was signed out on October 13, 1994, for weekly

battery readings, and as of October 19, 1994, the user had not returned

the meter or signed it in. The Petitioner states that this practice was

in violation of Procedure WC-8, which stated ``return M&TE to custodian

upon completion of work,'' 3 (2) although he identified a problem

with Procedure WC-8 (specifically, who was responsible for the actual

signing in and out of M&TE) to his first-line supervisor on November 7,

1994, as of December 1994, the procedure still had not been changed (in

accordance with Procedure DC-4, ``Procedural Compliance,'' which

requires that if a procedure conflict or interpretation problem exists,

a change or revision should be made); (3) on November 10, 1994, he

noticed on a station form that someone signed in the QA meter with the

return date of October 13, 1994, and that this was a willful

falsification (back-dating) of a nuclear record; (4) on November 17,

1994, an electrician co-worker was directed by their first-line

supervisor to willfully violate Procedure WC-8 by signing out his own

M&TE, and signed out his own M&TE although both the supervisor and co-

worker knew they were to have the custodian sign out the equipment; (5)

on November 21, 1994, his department manager instructed the custodian

to give a spare key for the QA locker to the Millstone Unit 1 control

room so the control room could sign out equipment at night; and (6) on

November 25, 1994, a mechanic signed out M&TE without a custodian.

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\2\ Quality Assurance comprises those quality assurance actions

related to the physical characteristics of a material, structure,

component, or system which provide a means to control the quality of

the material, structure, component, or system to predetermined

requirements.

\3\ This procedure had become effective on June 20, 1994. It

required that a ``designated custodian'' enter the date of issue and

date of return on the custody and usage record, and that the user of

the equipment return it to the custodian upon completion of work. In

Attachment 1 to the procedure, ``custodian'' was defined as the

individual designated by the department head to store, track, and

issue the department's M&TE.

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In addition, the Petitioner states that he believes that his

department manager was directly responsible for sharing the effects of

a new, revised, or rewritten procedure with the employees of his

department if the procedure directly affected day-to-day operations.

The Petitioner asserts that this individual's ``lack of

communications'' regarding the procedure has caused a ``widespread

problem of procedure noncompliance.'' 4

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\4\ NNECO Procedure DC-1 requires that the licensee select the

training requirements to be used in training employees whenever

procedures are revised, and indicate the type of training that would

be performed on Attachment 5 to Procedure DC-1. For Procedure WC-8,

Revision 0, the training required was marked as ``training to be

done by Department or Nuclear Training Department within 60 days of

the effective date and prior to performance of procedure.''

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In letters to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), licensee

for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, dated December 5 and 28, 1994, and

February 14, 1995, the NRC staff raised a number of maintenance-related

issues. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review these

issues and submit a written response. Among these issues, the NRC

requested NNECO to review two issues associated with Procedure WC-8

that are now presently being raised by the Petitioner. These were that:

(1) the Millstone Unit 1 QA test meter 1587 was signed out on October

13, 1994, to perform weekly battery readings, but as of October 19,

1994, the user had not returned the meter or signed in the meter; and

(2) many members of the Millstone Unit 1 Maintenance Department never

received training on Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, within 60 days of the

effective date of June 20, 1994, as required by the documentation of

training requirements form of NNECO Procedure DC-1.

In a letter dated March 6, 1995, NNECO responded to the issue

regarding failure to return the QA meter signed out on October 13,

1994. In its letter, NNECO stated that on October 13, 1994, a

maintenance electrician signed out QA test meter 1587 to perform weekly

battery surveillances and signed it back in on the M&TE log on the same

day. On October 19, 1994, a different

[[Page 7283]]

maintenance electrician signed out and returned QA test meter 1587.

Sometime later that day, QA test meter 1587 was signed out again and

subsequently returned the same day. NNECO stated that it was unable to

determine, based on interviews with the parties involved and a review

of the custody and usage record, the exact circumstances surrounding QA

test meter 1587. However, what was known was that QA test meter 1587

had been signed out once on October 13 and twice on October 19, 1994.

NNECO's review further concluded that strict compliance with Procedure

WC-8 was not being observed at all three Millstone units in that a

custodian was not being used to ensure that certain actions (i.e.,

signing in and out M&TE on the M&TE log) were being accomplished.

However, NNECO stated that it believed it met the ``intent of the

procedure'' in that the user of the M&TE stored, tracked, and issued

the equipment as required by the procedure, except that the custodian

was not involved. As a result of its review, NNECO undertook certain

corrective actions. Specifically, NNECO held a site-wide meeting for

all departments responsible for use or issuance of QA M&TE on February

21, 1995, to determine corrective actions necessary to ensure

procedural compliance. Subsequently, NNECO revised Procedure WC-8 on

April 27, 1995, to specifically allow the user of M&TE to sign QA test

equipment in and out. The custodian is still responsible for storing

and tracking M&TE. In addition, Millstone Unit 1 control room personnel

responsible for accessing QA M&TE were made aware of the logging

requirements.

The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through

June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the

staff reviewed a number of the concerns, including the concerns about

QA test meter 1587 and the other examples of noncompliance with

Procedure WC-8 alleged by the Petitioner, and issued its findings in

Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22 (95-

22), dated July 21, 1995.

During the inspection, the NRC staff reviewed the custody and usage

record sheets for QA test meter 1587 from September 27 to November 11,

1994. Based on this review, the staff was unable to determine whether

QA test meter 1587 was properly logged in and out in October 1994 or if

the custody and usage record sheet was back-dated. The NRC staff

discussed this issue with the workers involved who indicated that they

had no recollection of the exact circumstances surrounding QA test

meter 1587 and that, to the best of their knowledge, QA test meter 1587

was logged in and out properly. Therefore, the staff was unable to

determine whether QA test meter 1587 was controlled improperly and

whether the Petitioner's co-worker willfully falsified (by back-dating)

a nuclear record (M&TE log).

The staff also reviewed the original procedure and determined that

although Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, was not clear in specifying who was

responsible for the actual signing in and out of equipment, NNECO was

meeting the intent of the procedure in that M&TE was stored, tracked,

and issued in a controlled manner. The NRC staff further concluded that

NNECO's additional corrective actions (i.e., modifying the procedure)

were adequate in clarifying the procedure and should prevent

interpretation problems in the future.

Notwithstanding the findings of the inspection report, however, the

NRC has reconsidered this matter and determined that NNECO was not in

compliance with Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0. This determination is supported

by the fact that NNECO admitted in its March 6, 1995, letter that it

was not in compliance with Procedure WC-8. In addition, the NRC has

reviewed the custody and usage records for signing in and out M&TE on

November 17 and 25, 1994, and determined that an electrician and

mechanic had signed out their own M&TE, respectively, on those dates.

Accordingly, the Petitioner's assertions that the procedure was

violated when a co-worker electrician signed out his own M&TE on

November 17, 1994, and a mechanic signed out M&TE on November 25, 1994,

is substantiated. However, the NRC has been unable to confirm that

either of these individuals had been ``directed'' by supervision to

sign out the equipment.

In addition, NNECO's review, as described in its letter dated March

6, 1995, and verified by the staff in IR 95-22, determined that keys

had been available during this timeframe in all Millstone control rooms

and were in the possession of security personnel to allow access to QA

M&TE storage locations. These groups required access to these areas in

order to properly execute their duties. Therefore, since the custodian

did not sign in and out the equipment, the Petitioner's additional

assertion that the procedure was violated because security personnel

and personnel in the Millstone Unit 1 control room could sign out M&TE

at night is substantiated. However, the NRC has been unable to confirm

that the department manager had instructed the custodian to give a

spare key to the control room so the control room could sign out M&TE

at night.

Furthermore, the staff has determined that, since there were no

safety consequences as a result of these events, the noncompliances

with Procedure WC-8 did not constitute a violation that could

reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's

corrective action for a previous violation or a previous licensee

finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the inspection at

issue, adequate corrective actions were implemented regarding Procedure

WC-8, and the violation was not willful, the violation would have been

categorized in accordance with the enforcement policy in effect at the

time of the inspection as a non-cited Severity Level V violation and

would not have been the subject of formal enforcement action.5

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\5\ The staff has reconsidered this violation in accordance with

the current enforcement policy (NUREG-1600, ``General Statement of

Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Action'') and has

concluded that the violation is below the level of significance of

Severity Level IV violations. This determination is based on the

fact that NNECO was meeting intent of the procedure; there was

negligible impact on safety; NNECO's interpretation of the M&TE

custodian's responsibilities does not indicate a programmatic

problem that could have safety or regulatory impact; if the

violation recurred, it would not be considered a significant

concern; and the violation was not willful. Therefore, if considered

under the new enforcement policy, this violation would be classified

as a minor violation. Minor violations, as described in the current

enforcement policy, are not the subject of formal enforcement action

and are usually not cited in inspection reports. To the extent that

such violations are described, they are now noted as non-cited

violations.

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In addition, since the procedure was not clear in describing

specific responsibilities and NNECO believed it was meeting the intent

of the procedure, the NRC has concluded that the Petitioner's

department manager, his first-line supervisor, and two co-workers did

not deliberately violate NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1

operating license and, therefore, did not violate the provisions of 10

CFR 50.5. Moreover, NNECO revised Procedure WC-8 on April 27, 1995, and

the procedure now more clearly allows the user of the M&TE to sign in

and out QA test equipment. The custodian still is responsible for

storing and tracking M&TE. Therefore, the staff has determined that,

although the Petitioner is correct in that the procedure was not

revised as of December 1994, the procedure was subsequently revised, so

that Procedure DC-4 was not violated.

By letter dated April 26, 1995, NNECO provided its review of

whether members of the Maintenance Department received training within

60

[[Page 7284]]

days of Revision 0 of Procedure WC-8 (June 20, 1994). In its letter,

NNECO stated that no documentation indicating that training was

conducted for Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, had been found. While no training

records were located, NNECO stated that the Millstone Unit 1

Maintenance Manager recalled that the procedure was discussed at a

Maintenance Department meeting within 60 days of its effective date.

The NRC staff reviewed Procedure DC-1 and determined that since

NNECO could not locate the training records for Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0,

and that training by the Maintenance Department or the Nuclear Training

Department was not conducted within 60 days of the effective date for

Procedure WC-8, Rev. 0, NNECO was in violation of Procedure DC-1.

The staff's review of NNECO's April 26, 1995, response to the NRC

letter dated February 14, 1995, was documented in IR 95-22. The staff

has reviewed NNECO's corrective actions that included NNECO management

reemphasizing the importance of training on new or revised procedures

and following procedures, the revising of Procedure WC-8, and training

on the revised procedure. Based on that review, the staff has

determined that the corrective actions the licensee has taken are

acceptable. The staff has further determined that since there were no

safety consequences as a result of this event, it was not a violation

that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the

licensee's corrective action for a previous violation or a previous

licensee finding that occurred within the past 2 years of the

inspection at issue, adequate corrective actions were implemented, and

the violation was not willful, the violation would have been

categorized in accordance with the enforcement policy in effect at the

time of the inspection as a non-cited Severity Level V violation and

would not have been the subject of formal enforcement action.6

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\6\ The staff has reconsidered this violation in accordance with

the guidance in the current enforcement policy and has concluded

that the violation is below the level of significance of Severity

Level IV violations. This determination is based on the fact that

there was negligible impact on safety; the violation does not

indicate a programmatic problem that could have safety or regulatory

impact; if the violation recurred, it would not be considered a

significant concern; and the violation was not willful. Therefore

this violation is classified as a minor violation and, as previously

discussed, minor violations are not normally the subject of formal

enforcement action and are usually not cited in inspection reports.

To the extent that such violations are described, they are

characterized as non-cited violations.

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III. Conclusion

The institution of a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is

appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been

raised. See Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Units

1, 2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public

Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899,

924 (1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns

raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by

the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.

On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that,

although certain minor procedural violations occurred, no substantial

health and safety issues have been raised by the Petition regarding

Millstone Unit 1 that would require initiation of enforcement action.

Therefore, to the extent that the Petitioner requests that escalated

enforcement action be taken against individuals and NU for violations

of Procedure WC-8 or failure to train employees on the procedure, the

Petition has been denied. However, as described above, the NRC

conducted an inspection into the alleged violations of Procedure WC-8

from May 15 through June 23, 1995, and conducted an audit of the

custody and usage record sheets. Therefore, to the extent that the

Petitioner has requested an NRC ``investigation into the above

mentioned procedure violations'' and for the NRC to ``audit the Unit 1

maintenance department, M&TE folders,'' the Petition has been granted.

As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be

filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.

This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25

days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97-3888 Filed 2-14-97; 8:45 am]

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