Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 71

RIN 3150-AF58

Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its

regulations regarding the shipment of exempt quantities of fissile

material and the shipment of fissile material under a general license.

This emergency final rule restricts the use of beryllium and other

special moderating materials (i.e., graphite and deuterium) in the

shipment of fissile materials and consigns quantity limits on fissile

exempt shipments. These amendments are necessary to correct a recently

discovered defect in the current regulations which could permit, in

special circumstances, nuclear criticality to occur in shipments of

fissile materials which are permitted to take place without specific

Commission approval. The regulatory defect is not indicative of unsafe

fissile material shipments in the past. Rather, it was identified by

Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) during preparation for shipment of an

unprecedented type of fissile material that could result in nuclear

criticality under current requirements. This unique material is

produced as a waste product from processing of strategic material

resulting from operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable

fissile material from the former Soviet Union. Although this rule is

being issued as an immediately effective final rule, the Commission is

requesting public comment and will revise the rule if necessary.

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DATES: This final rule is effective on February 10, 1997. Comments must

be received by March 12, 1997. If public comments require changes in

the rule, timely notice will be published in the Federal Register.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or in

written form. Mail written comments to: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and Service

Branch. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD

between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. For information on

submitting comments electronically, see the discussion under Electronic

Access in the Supplementary Information Section. Copies of comments

received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Nuclear

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6103, E-mail: INTERNET:[email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On September 11, 1996, an NRC fuel cycle facility licensee, Babcock

& Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W), notified NRC by telephone

that it had discovered that the NRC and U.S. Department of

Transportation (DOT) regulations (10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453,

respectively) on fissile exempt shipments do not provide adequate

criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material \1\

(enriched uranium containing beryllium oxide.) Specifically, B&W

discovered through calculations, that a shipment, intended to be

shipped pursuant to Sec. 71.53(d), containing large amounts of an

exempt concentration of enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium,

could result in a nuclear criticality. \2\ B&W indicated that a

beryllium oxide-enriched uranium mixture would be produced as a waste

product from its processing of strategic material resulting from

operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable fissile material

from the former Soviet Union. B&W promptly notified the NRC of its

concern, provided its calculations to the NRC, and made commitments not

to make any such shipments. The NRC staff subsequently reviewed and

verified B&W's calculations and determined that expeditious revisions

to NRC regulations are needed to correct the deficiency because an

inadvertent nuclear criticality in the public domain could involve

fatalities, health effects from the resulting radiations, and extensive

clean-up costs.

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\1\ Fissile material is defined in 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR

Part 173 as: Plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-

233, uranium-235, or any combination of these radionuclides.

Packages used for shipment of materials containing these

radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits

designed to preclude nuclear criticality during transport, unless

expected by specific regulations (e.g. 10 CFR 71.53 or 49 CFR

173.453).

\2\ For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a

condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining and neutron-

multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is

generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of

fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a

favorable configuration. The neutron moderating material cannot

achieve criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration.

It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve

criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.

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The criticality safety problem brought to NRC's attention with

respect to Sec. 71.53 caused the NRC staff to review 10 CFR Part 71 to

determine whether any other provisions of this Part might be similarly

deficient. The general licenses in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22 provide for

criticality control by limiting the quantity of fissile material in a

single package (i.e., similar to the quantity-based fissile exemptions

in 10 CFR 71.53). Section 71.18 also assigns a criticality transport

index (pursuant to Sec. 71.4) to each package. These sections were

found to have deficiencies comparable to those discovered in Sec. 71.53

in that there are no restrictions placed on special moderating

materials (i.e., materials which would increase the number of neutrons

available to cause fission as compared with ordinary water), and

Sec. 71.22 has the additional deficiency of not limiting the total

amount of fissile material in a conveyance. During the NRC staff's

review, sections Sec. 71.20 and Sec. 71.24, which also provide general

licenses, were found to be adequate in that the moderators of concern

were excluded.

Packages for shipments made in accordance with a fissile material

exemption in Sec. 71.53 or the general license in Sec. 71.18 or

Sec. 71.22, are not required to be certified by NRC. The intent of

Secs. 71.53, 71.18, and 71.22 is that any materials packaged and

shipped in accordance with the limits in these sections (and the other

applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173) are

incapable of an inadvertent criticality. The B&W analyses demonstrated

that a deficiency exists in these requirements.

The NRC has already taken a number of actions to resolve the

potential safety problem identified by B&W. First, the NRC obtained a

commitment from B&W not to ship Be-U materials without prior NRC

authorization and confirmed this commitment in a Confirmatory Action

Letter (CAL) dated October 10, 1996. Subsequently, the CAL was

superseded by an immediately effective Confirmatory Order Modifying

License dated December 16, 1996, which imposed B&W's commitment as a

legally binding license condition. The NRC had no reason to doubt B&W's

earlier voluntary commitment because B&W had demonstrated its concern

for safety by bringing the problem in the first place to the NRC's

attention. However, the NRC staff also believed that, given the

significance of this issue for public health and safety, the NRC needed

to exercise its full authority to assure itself and the public that the

one licensee known to be in a position to make potentially unsafe

shipments was legally prevented from doing so pending completion of

this rulemaking.

On December 5, 1996, NRC also issued NRC Information Notice 96-63

to all NRC licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material.

The purpose of this information notice was to alert all such licensees

to this problem so that any of them who might be in a position to make

potentially unsafe shipments could take appropriate measures.

The NRC also brought this problem to the attention of the U.S.

Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.S. Department of Energy

(DOE). DOT is a co-regulator of fissile material shipments and is

currently revising its parallel regulations in 49 CFR Part 173 on an

expedited basis. DOE makes many shipments of fissile exempt material

each year.

Discussion

The safety problem uncovered by the B & W calculations, and

verified by the NRC, involves quantities, geometries, and

concentrations of fissile materials and moderators which could result

in criticality when shipped in compliance with sections of the

regulations for which criticality analyses are not required. The

current regulations (fissile exemptions in Sec. 71.53 and the general

licenses in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22) are based on the assumption that

water is the only moderator which might be present in fissile exempt

shipments. These rules are assumed to provide inherent criticality

safety without a need for shippers to perform separate analyses.

However, some moderators (herein referred to as special moderating

materials) can increase the number of

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neutrons available to cause fission as compared to ordinary water and

result in the potential for criticality in shipments where these

moderators are present, even though the shipments are in compliance

with 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453.

Until recently, the presence of special moderating materials in

significant quantities in NRC-regulated shipments of fissile exempt

materials was not anticipated. However, certain international

initiatives, including efforts of reduction in stockpiles of strategic

material by processing for commercial use, have resulted in the greater

likelihood of inclusion of these materials in NRC regulated shipments.

The materials proposed to be shipped by B&W, which prompted this final

rule, resulted from such a source. A recent contract was awarded to B&W

to process weapons-usable enriched uranium materials from the Republic

of Kazakstan. The waste product of the processing, a uranium-beryllium

filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53(d) and

49 CFR 173.453(d). However, B&W used a computer model of the enriched

uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, to demonstrate that if the

packages were loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at the

regulatory fissile exempt concentration limit, adequate confidence in

nuclear criticality safety would not have been provided. NRC has

verified through independent analyses that the concerns raised by the

B&W analysis are valid and apply to other geometries and moderating

characteristics as well. To guard against inadvertent criticality, this

final rule restricts shipments of fissile material with three special

moderating materials: beryllium, graphite, and deuterium.

However, limiting beryllium, graphite, and deuterium to trace

quantities would not completely eliminate the possibility of

criticality in fissile exempt or generally licensed shipments. There is

also a need to limit the quantity of material in a single consignment

(the B&W criticality model calculations were performed using 200 cm

high infinite slab configuration). The problem of a lack of control on

the total amount of fissile exempt material in an exempt shipment, was

originally identified during the revision process for the 1996 Edition

of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) ``Regulations for

the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material,'' Safety Series No. 6,

1996. The problem was addressed in Safety Series No. 6, 1996, by

adopting a consignment limit on the amount of fissile exempt material

that a shipper could transport as a private carrier or deliver to a

common carrier for shipment. The NRC cannot presently enforce a limit

on the total quantity of fissile material in a common carrier shipment

because the regulations do not require a transport index for each

package or require shipment by exclusive use. The latter would restrict

the ability to use common carriers, while requiring a transport index

would negate much of the advantage gained by the exemption. Consignment

limits are enforceable and represent a practical operating limit that

would prevent the potentially unsafe accumulation of fissile exempt

materials during shipment.

Therefore, this final rule restricts special moderating materials

and includes consignment limits on shipments of fissile materials under

the provisions of Secs. 71.22 and 71.53. This final rule also restricts

special moderating materials under the provisions of Sec. 71.18.

Together these changes will eliminate the possibility of inadvertent

criticality during shipments made in compliance with 10 CFR 71.18,

71.22, or 71.53. The NRC anticipates that DOT will issue parallel

revisions to 49 CFR Part 173. Accordingly, NRC and DOT are coordinating

the necessary revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173.

Compatibility With the IAEA Standards

On September 9, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved

the 1996 revisions to Safety Series No. 6. Among the changes in these

revised IAEA regulations are that consignment limits and limits on the

types of moderators were placed on the fissile exemptions in paragraph

672 of Safety Series No. 6, 1996. The changes to 10 CFR Part 71 made by

this rulemaking are generally compatible with the changes made to IAEA

Safety Series No. 6, 1996. Future revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49

CFR Part 173 are planned by NRC and DOT, respectively, to bring them

into general accord with other sections of IAEA Safety Series No. 6,

1996.

One area in which this final rule for 10 CFR Part 71 is not

compatible with IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996, paragraph 672 is that

graphite was added as a special moderating material in the 1995

revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 (60 FR 50248), but does not appear in IAEA

Safety Series No. 6, 1996. [Graphite is limited by the current general

licenses in 10 CFR 71.20 and 71.24.] The NRC believes that it is

appropriate to continue to limit graphite (being a special moderating

material) in domestic regulations for shipment of fissile material.

Therefore, the revisions to the fissile exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 and

the general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 71.20 provide for exclusion of

other than trace quantities of graphite.

Alternatives Considered

To determine the appropriate amendments to 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and

71.53, the NRC staff considered the following three alternatives:

1. The No-Action Alternative. This alternative is not acceptable to

the NRC. Shipments of fissile material (Be-U mixtures) meeting the

fissile material exemption requirements could be made in a

configuration that does not maintain criticality safety during

transport. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.

2. Eliminate the fissile material exemption. This alternative is

not acceptable to the NRC. Elimination of fissile material exemption,

while solving the criticality safety problem identified by B&W, would

create other problems. Many packages, such as those containing low-

level radioactive waste materials (e.g., ion-exchange resins), contain

only trace concentrations of fissile nuclides, which are incidental to

the overall radioactivity of the package contents, and criticality

events are not credible for shipments of these packages. The Sec. 71.53

fissile material exemptions are applied for these shipments, and there

is a continuing need to provide for this application. Elimination of

Sec. 71.53 would place an additional burden and cost on many shippers

whose shipments posed no criticality safety concerns. Therefore, this

alternative was not pursued.

3. Revise the fissile material exemptions in Sec. 71.53 and the

general licensees in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22 to exclude the presence of

special moderating materials such as beryllium, deuterium and graphite

in other than trace quantities, and place consignment limits on

shipments. Together these changes solve the criticality safety problem

identified by B&W and the related problem of the potential accumulation

of an unsafe quantity of fissile materials in a shipment. Given the

limited number of affected shipments and the small number of licensees

involved, some additional costs on shippers may be expected because

they can no longer use the fissile material exemptions and general

licenses for materials with beryllium, deuterium and graphite in other

than trace quantities, and because some shipments may have to be

divided to meet the consignment limits. It keeps the exemption and

general license provisions available for other shippers.

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This alternative was chosen by the NRC staff, and is the basis for the

following specific changes in Secs. 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53.

Changes in 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53

Section 71.18

The title of Sec. 71.18: General license: Fissile material, limited

quantity per package, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a), (b), and

(c) in Sec. 71.18 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) in Sec. 71.18

is replaced by three new paragraphs: (d), (e), and (f). The new

paragraph (d) covers general licenses for packages containing no more

than a type A quantity of radioactive material where fissile material

is mixed with substances having an average hydrogen density greater

than water (defined in Sec. 71.20). The new paragraph (e) restricts the

quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in

deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile material

mass. The new paragraph (f) is a modification of the old paragraph (d)

that includes a simplified formula for calculation of the minimum

transport index.

Section 71.22

The title of Sec. 71.22: General License: Fissile material, limited

quantity, controlled shipment, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a),

(b), and (c) in Sec. 71.22 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) is

modified with the addition of a new table and accompanying formula

which restrict the mass of uranium-235 and other fissile material in a

controlled shipment. The table gives both new limits of 290 g and 180 g

for uranium-235 and other fissile materials, when these materials are

mixed with substances having hydrogen density greater than water; the

table also gives the old Sec. 71.22 limits for shipments of U-235 and

other fissile material when mixed with substances having a hydrogen

density less than or equal to water. The new paragraph (e) restricts

the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched

in deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile

material mass. Paragraph (f) is the same as old paragraph (e).

Section 71.53

The title of Sec. 71.53 remains the same. The introductory

paragraph restates the old Sec. 71.53 language that packages are

exempted from the fissile material standards of Sec. 71.55 and

Sec. 71.59; however, the same paragraph restricts these exempted

packages to only situations when beryllium, graphite, or deuterium is

not present in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.

A new paragraph (a) is added which contains a formula and an

accompanying table to limit individual consignment, but also includes

the requirements in old paragraphs (a), (b)(1) and (2), and (d) . The

remainder of Sec. 71.53 (paragraphs (b), (c), and (d)) is essentially

the same as the old Sec. 71.53 (paragraphs (c), (f), and (e)).

Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

The Commission is promulgating this emergency final rule because

the problem of regulatory safety limits over quantities and

concentrations of fissile material and moderators, which has been

demonstrated to permit criticality in at least one proposed shipment,

is an important safety issue meriting immediate corrective action. An

accidental nuclear criticality in the public domain would very likely

involve fatalities, health effects from the resulting radiations, and

extensive clean-up costs.

Shipments of fissile exempt material are normally made without any

associated criticality analysis because in the past it has been assumed

that the regulations provide inherent criticality safety. However,

B&W's contemplated shipment demonstrates that this assumption is not

correct for all possible types of shipments. While the Commission

expects that B&W's commitment, as expressed in the NRC's Confirmatory

Order, not to undertake shipments without the prior approval of the

NRC, and the Information Notice issued to all licensees authorized to

possess special nuclear material, will prevent an unsafe shipment from

occurring pending revision of its rules, the Commission does not track

shipments by licensees made under the provisions of 10 CFR 71.18,

71.22, or 71.53. Moreover, the nature of the materials being imported

and shipped domestically has recently changed due to initiatives with

the States of the former Soviet Union to reduce weapons-usable material

such as high-enriched uranium. The materials B&W had intended to ship

were byproducts from processing this type of material. Shipments made

under 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22 or 71.53 are made without specific NRC

approval and the possibility exists that a licensee could unwittingly

make an unsafe shipment in reliance upon the present rules. Thus, the

Commission must amend its rules quickly to prevent unsafe shipments

from occurring.

For the reasons stated above, the Commission finds good cause,

pursuant to Section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

(5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B)), to dispense with notice and prepromulgation

public comment as being impracticable and contrary to the public

interest. Further, the Commission finds, pursuant to Section 553(d)(3)

of the APA (5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3)), that good cause exists for making

these amendments immediately effective because the need to have these

regulations in place outweighs the inconvenience, if any, to licensees

who may need to alter shipping plans.

Nevertheless, the Commission is providing a 30-day post-

promulgation public comment period during which interested persons are

invited to submit their comments to the Commission. Within a reasonable

time after the end of the comment period, the Commission will publish a

statement in the Federal Register containing an evaluation of the

significant comments received and any revisions of the rule to be made

as a result of the comments.

Electronic Access

Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or

WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC

Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be

accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly

available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.

Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as

practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.

If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking

subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free

number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set

as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).

Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem

can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the

``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's

Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also

have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the

particular subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial

phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using

Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact

FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld

menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State

Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that

point, a menu will be

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displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission''

that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. The NRC Online area

also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc'' at a FedWorld

command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main menu, you may

return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to FedWorld'' option from

the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access NRC at FedWorld by

using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full access to all NRC

systems, but you will not have access to the main FedWorld system.

If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and

menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download

documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or

upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files

can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you

will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).

An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with

descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP

access.

Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,

like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does

not display the NRC Rules Menu.

For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis,

Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-

0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected].

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined, under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in

Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal

action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,

and therefore an environmental impact statement (EIS) is not required.

The Commission's ``Final Environmental Statement on the

Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes,'' NUREG-

0170, dated December 1977, is NRC's generic EIS, covering all types of

radioactive material transportation by all modes (road, rail, air, and

water). The total limited quantity impacts were included in the overall

transportation risk assessment in NUREG-0170 and found to be

acceptable. The radiological safety impact estimates in this EIS

clearly bound the impacts for limited quantity shipments of fissile

material containing special moderating materials.

This final rule affects only a small subset of the limited quantity

shipments, i.e., those that contain both fissile material and special

moderating materials. NUREG-0170 does not specify the annual number of

limited quantity, fissile material shipments containing special

moderating materials, but does estimate that 50,000 NRC-certified

fissile material packages (used for larger quantities of, and/or more

highly enriched, fissile materials) would be shipped in 1985. The

number of shipments affected by this final rule is a small fraction of

the NRC certified fissile package shipments because fissile materials

containing special moderating materials are less common than moderately

enriched fissile materials.

The options available to licensees under this final rule include

shipping the material using different administrative controls (i.e.,

shipping it as a fissile material and not using the quantity-limited

exemption/general license) or reducing the special moderating material

concentration to specified limits. The NRC staff believes the first

option may prove more economical because the increase in cost in making

a single shipment under fissile material controls is less than that

involved in reducing or removing the special moderating material. Under

this option, the same number of shipments are made as before the rule

change, but shipments of fissile materials containing special

moderating material would be made in NRC certified packages. Under the

latter option, the concentration of special moderating material might

be reduced through additional processing, perhaps involving dilution or

extraction. This option may involve additional transportation, either

due to the increase in shipment volume due to dilution, or the

transportation of extracted materials. Since the quantities of affected

fissile materials are relatively small, staff believes the additional

transportation would also be small.

The two options provide the added nuclear criticality safety

control the rule seeks, either through the use of NRC-certified

packages, and the administrative controls associated with their use, or

through the reduction of the concentration of special moderating

materials to an acceptably low level. Thus, the ultimate environmental

impact of the rule is beneficial in that criticality safety is

increased.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule does not contain a new or amended information

collection requirement subject to requirements of the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information

collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and

Budget, approval number 3150-0008.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently

valid OMB control number.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a

major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required for

this final rule because these amendments do not involve any provisions

that would require backfits as defined in 10 CFR Part 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71

Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear

materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting

the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.

930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201,

2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242,

as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).

Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94

Stat. 789-790.

2. Section 71.18 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 71.18 General license: Fissile material, limited quantity per

package.

(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Commission

to transport

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fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a carrier for

transport, without complying with the package standards of subparts E

and F of this part, if the material is shipped in accordance with this

section.

(b) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a

quality assurance program approved by the Commission as satisfying the

provisions of subpart H of this part.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, this

general license applies only when a package contains no more than a

Type A quantity of radioactive material, including only one of the

following:

(1) Up to 40 g of uranium-235;

(2) Up to 30 g of uranium-233;

(3) Up to 25 g of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium, except

that for encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special

form, an A1 quantity of plutonium may be present; or

(4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the

ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximum

amounts in paragraphs (c) (1), (2), and (3) of this section does not

exceed unity.

(d) For packages where fissile material is mixed with substances

having an average hydrogen density greater than water, this general

license applies only when a package contains no more than a Type A

quantity of radioactive material, including only one of the following:

(1) Up to 29 g of uranium-235;

(2) Up to 18 g of uranium-233;

(3) Up to 18 g of fissile radionuclides of plutonium, or

(4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the

ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximum

amounts in paragraphs (d) (1), (2), and (3) of this section does not

exceed unity.

(e) Except for the beryllium contained within the special form

plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraph (c) of this

section, this general license applies only when beryllium, graphite, or

hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities

exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.

(f)(1) Except as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this section for

encapsulated plutonium-beryllium sources, this general license applies

only when, a package is labeled with a transport index not less than

the number given by the following equation, where the package contains

x grams of uranium-235, y grams of uranium-233, and z grams of the

fissile radionuclides of plutonium:

Minimum Transport Index = (0.25x + 0.33y + 0.4z).

(2) For a package in which the only fissile material is in the form

of encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form,

the transport index based on criticality considerations may be taken as

0.025 times the number of grams of the fissile radionuclides of

plutonium.

(3) Packages which have a transport index greater than 10 are not

authorized under the general license provisions of this part.

3. Section 71.22 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 71.22 General license: Fissile material, limited quantity,

controlled shipment.

(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Commission

to transport fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a

carrier for transport, without complying with the package standards of

Subparts E and F of this part, if limited material is shipped in

accordance with this section.

(b) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a

quality assurance program approved by the Commission as satisfying the

provisions of Subpart H of this part.

(c) This general license applies only when a package contains no

more than a Type A quantity of radioactive material and no more than

400 g total of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium encapsulated as

plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form.

(d) This general license applies only when:

(1) The mass of fissile radionuclides in the shipment is limited

such that the

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10FE97.000

where X and Y are the mass defined in the table following paragraph

(d)(2) of this section; or

(2) the encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources are in

special form and the total mass of fissile radionuclides in the

shipment does not exceed 2500 g.

Permissible Mass Limits for Shipments of Fissile Material

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fissile Fissile

material mass material mass

(g) mixed with (g) mixed with

substances substances

Fissile material having a having a

hydrogen hydrogen

density less density

than or equal greater than

to water water

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uranium-235(X).......................... 500 290

Other fissile material(Y)............... 300 180

------------------------------------------------------------------------

(e) Except for the beryllium contained within the special form

plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraphs (c) and (d) of

this section, this general license applies only when beryllium,

graphite or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present

in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.

(f) This general license applies only when shipment of these

packages is made under procedures specifically authorized by DOT, in

accordance with 49 CFR Part 173 of its regulations, to prevent loading,

transport, or storage of these packages with other fissile material

shipments.

[[Page 5913]]

4. Section 71.53 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 71.53 Fissile material exemptions.

Fissile materials meeting the requirements of one of the paragraphs

in (a) through (d) of this section are exempt from fissile material

classification and from the fissile material package standards of

Secs. 71.55 and 71.59, but are subject to all other requirements of

this part. These exemptions apply only when beryllium, graphite, or

hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities

exceeding 0.1 percent of the fissile material mass.

(a) Fissile material such that

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10FE97.001

for an individual consignment, where X and Y are the mass limits

defined in table following paragraph (a)(3) of this section,

provided that:

(1) Each package contains no more than 15 g of fissile material.

For unpackaged material the mass limit of 15g applies to the

conveyance; or

(2) The fissile material consists of a homogeneous hydrogenous

solution or mixture where the minimum ratio of hydrogen atoms to

fissile radionuclide atoms (H/X) is 5200 and the maximum concentration

of fissile radionuclides within a package is 5 g/liter; or

(3) There is no more than 5g of fissile material in any 10 liter

volume of material and the material is packaged so as to maintain this

limit of fissile radionuclide concentration during normal transport.

The Requirements for Packages Containing Fissile Material

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fissile Fissile

material mass material mass

(g) mixed with (g) mixed with

substances substances

having an having an

Fissile material average average

hydrogen hydrogen

density less density

than or equal greater than

to water water

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uranium-235(X).......................... 400 290

1Other fissile material(Y).............. 250 180

------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Uranium enriched in uranium-235 to a maximum of 1 percent by

weight, and with total plutonium and uranium-233 content of up to 1

percent of the mass of uranium-235, provided that the fissile material

is distributed homogeneously throughout the package contents and does

not form a lattice arrangement within the package.

(c) Liquid solutions of uranyl nitrate enriched in uranium-235 to a

maximum of 2 percent by weight, with a total plutonium and uranium-233

content not exceeding 0.1 percent of the mass of uranium-235, and with

a minimum nitrogen to uranium atomic ratio (N/U) of 2.

(d) Plutonium, less than 1 kg, of which not more than 20 percent by

mass may consist of plutonium-239, plutonium-241, or any combination of

these radionuclides.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February, 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 97-3175 Filed 2-7-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7950-01-P