FOX High Speed Rail Safety Standards

SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule of particular applicability that

establishes safety standards for the Florida Overland eXpress (FOX)

high speed rail system. The proposed standards are not intended for

general application in the railroad industry, but would apply only to

the FOX system that is planned for development in the State of Florida.

The FOX system will operate from Miami to Tampa, via Orlando on

dedicated track, with no grade crossings, at a maximum speed of 200

mph. The FOX equipment and track are patterned after the French TGV

high speed rail system, and will be used exclusively for passenger

service.

The proposed rule of particular applicability takes a systems

approach, and so includes standards that address all aspects of the FOX

high speed system, including system description, system safety, signal,

track, rolling stock, operating practices, system qualification tests,

personnel qualifications, and power distribution. In addition, the

proposed rule adopts and incorporates by reference many existing

standards that apply to all railroads, which are appropriate for

application to FOX, such as alcohol and drug standards, hours of

service requirements, and locomotive engineer qualifications.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or

before February 10, 1998. Comments received after that date will be

considered only to the extent possible without incurring substantial

expense or delay.

(2) Public hearing: A public hearing will be held if one is

requested by January 2, 1998. Anyone requesting a hearing must notify

FRA's Docket Clerk, Renee Bridgers, in writing and provide her with the

requesting party's name, telephone number, and address. If a hearing is

requested, FRA will notify the public of the date, time, and location

of the hearing, and provide instructions for those who wish to make an

oral statement at the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments must identify the docket number and be

submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel,

Federal Railroad Administration, Stop 10, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified that their

comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped, self-

addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will indicate

on the postcard the date on which the comments were received and will

return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be available

for examination, both before and after the closing date for written

comments, during regular business hours on the seventh floor of 1120

Vermont Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Bill Goodman or Mark Jones, Signal

Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

St., S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590, (telephone: 202-632-3353);

Bill O'Sullivan or Dave Jamieson, Track Division, at the same address,

(telephone: 202-632-3341); Ed Pritchard, Motive Power and Equipment

Division, at the same address, (telephone: 202-632-3348); Doug Taylor

or Laura Mizner, Operating Practices Division, at the same address,

(telephone: 202-632-3346); Bob Dorer, Volpe National Transportation

Systems Center, Kendall Square, Cambridge, MA 02142, (telephone: 617-

494-3481); or Christine Beyer, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,

FRA, 400 Seventh St., S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone:

202-632-3177).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Regulatory Structure

The State of Florida plans to develop a high speed rail system that

will run from Miami to Tampa, via Orlando. The system's trains will

travel on dedicated rail, with no public grade crossings, in exclusive

passenger service, at speeds not to exceed 200 mph. These operational

characteristics and the equipment that the State plans to use mark a

dramatic step forward for the development of regional high speed

passenger rail service in the United States. FRA announces in this

notice proposed safety standards for the system that will be developed

in Florida.

Through a public bid process, Florida has selected the Florida

Overland eXpress (FOX) to build and operate the high speed rail system.

FOX is a consortium of engineering and rail design and construction

entities. The system FOX proposes to build in Florida utilizes the high

speed technology and equipment currently in use in France, Holland,

Spain, and Belgium, which was developed in France and is known as the

French TGV (train a grande vitesse, or very high speed train). The

French TGV has been in service in Europe since 1981 and has safely

carried 450 million passengers. This is a traditional rail system, in

the sense that steel wheels operate over steel rails, powered by

electrical power that is carried and transferred to the equipment

through an overhead catenary system. However, the TGV equipment is

generally lighter than conventional rail vehicles, and utilizes

advanced computer and aerodynamic technology that facilitates travel at

very high speeds with minimal track and equipment degradation. (The

trainsets travel at maximum speeds of 186 mph in France.) In addition,

the TGV high speed trainsets are articulated into one long unit that

resists buckling or rolling in the event of an accident, which greatly

reduces the likelihood of serious injury for passengers. The

lightweight design of the equipment permits high speed travel, but also

lends itself to grave damage if involved in a train-to-train collision,

particularly where heavy freight vehicles are present. To counter this

aspect of the design, the TGV is operated with a focus on collision-

avoidance, in addition to collision-mitigation, a systems approach to

safety that has proven to be quite successful. (It is also important to

note here that the Florida system will not include any freight

traffic.) Newer generations of the TGV system include in-cab signal

systems and passenger stations that are customized to service high

speed trainsets only. The French TGV system has an exceedingly safe

record, which is discussed in greater detail below.

The federal railroad statutes apply to all railroads, as defined in

49 U.S.C. 20102, including the FOX system proposed to be built in

Florida. The only railroads excluded from FRA's jurisdiction are urban

rapid transit railroads that are not connected to the general railroad

system. The contemplated FOX system will clearly be intercity passenger

rail, not urban rapid transit. Accordingly, the Florida system will be

subject to FRA jurisdiction whether or not it is connected to the

general railroad system. Moreover, FRA would consider a stand-alone

intercity railroad line to be part of the general system, even though

not physically connected to other railroads (as FRA has previously

stated with respect to the Alaska Railroad; see 49 CFR part 209,

Appendix A).

[[Page 65479]]

FRA has a regulatory program in place, pursuant to its statutory

authority, to address equipment, track, operating practices, and human

factors in the existing, conventional railroad environment. However,

significant operational and equipment differences exist between the

system proposed for Florida and existing passenger operations in the

United States. In many of the railroad safety disciplines, FRA's

existing standards of general applicability do not address the safety

concerns and operational peculiarities of the proposed FOX system.

Therefore, in order to assure the public that this new system will

operate safely, minimum federal standards must be in place when FOX

commences operations.

FOX and FDOT discussed their plans for the system in a series of

meetings with FRA held throughout 1996. The purpose of the discussions

was to explain to FRA the system that they plan to build in Florida,

and for FOX and FDOT to understand more fully the applicable regulatory

framework that would govern their operations. On February 18, 1997, FOX

filed a petition for rulemaking (Petition) with FRA, which proposes

standards that would apply to their system safety program, track,

rolling stock, signal, operating practices, personnel qualifications,

and power distribution. Since February, FOX has supplemented the

Petition with additional information that is pertinent to the existing

French operation or the one planned for Florida. (A copy of the

Petition and supplemental submissions are available for public review

in the docket of this matter, which is docket number HST-1, previously

identified as docket number RM Pet. 97-1.) The FOX Petition attempts to

incorporate the French practice in each safety discipline listed in the

Petition, but also contains proposed standards that differ from

practices in France. FRA understands these differences to reflect

operational and environmental deviations between the system proposed

for Florida and the TGV lines in operation in France.

FRA analyzed the Petition and supporting documentation, gathered

background data that describe the French system, and now publishes this

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), based on consideration of the

available information and the expertise of the Agency's safety

specialists. This NPRM constitutes FRA's initial response to the

Petition and includes standards that are similar, but not identical, to

those in the FOX Petition.

It is important to note at this juncture that any new standards

which FRA adopts to address safety on the FOX high speed rail system

would apply only to that system, and therefore will be issued in the

form of a rule of particular applicability, rather than one of general

applicability. Such a rule of particular applicability would not

displace existing safety standards that apply to all other entities in

the railroad industry, and would be enforced only against the FOX

system. Also, it should be noted that FRA plans at this time to publish

any final standards that pertain to the FOX system in the Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR). For that reason, these proposed standards

have been assigned Part number 243, and are organized into Subparts for

each safety discipline.

Safety Characteristics of the French TGV System

As part of the process for determining appropriate rules for those

aspects of the FOX system that will duplicate the French TGV system, it

is logical to consider the safety record of the French high speed rail

system.

In preparation for filing the Petition, FOX and the Florida

Department of Transportation (FDOT) commissioned DLSF Systems, Inc. to

complete a risk assessment to evaluate the relative safety of the FOX

system vis-a-vis the French TGV system, and that predicted for the

Amtrak 150-mph trainsets in the northeast corridor (NEC). (A copy of

the Florida Overland eXpress Risk Assessment is available for public

review in the docket of this matter, docket number HST-1.) The analysis

set forth in the risk assessment provides a fairly extensive discussion

of the safety of TGV high speed rail in France, and the numbers

indicate an admirable safety record.

The risk assessment divides the analysis of the TGV system into two

categories: those that are exclusive high speed lines, which include

in-cab signaling, and passenger stations designed to service only high

speed trains; and those that consist of a mixed high speed/conventional

system in which high speed trains service conventional passenger

stations, and use conventional trackside signaling. For the most part,

the risk assessment deals with incidents that occurred between January

1, 1990 and June 30, 1996. The numbers are limited to post-1989 data

because the Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF), the

quasi-governmental agency in France that oversees and operates TGV,

does not have computerized records concerning events prior to 1990.

It is important to note that the accident figures discussed below

occurred in a system that maintains high traffic density and passenger

service: train-miles for this period totaled 204 million for all TGV

service and 111 million for the exclusive high speed lines; passenger-

miles on the high speed lines totaled 43,316,000; and the number of

passengers served on TGV trains totaled 249,696. The TGV system

operates at a maximum speed of 186 mph and runs approximately 184

trains per day.

On the exclusive high speed lines, only thirteen incidents have

been recorded from January 1, 1990 through June 30, 1996. There have

been no fatalities and no collisions between trains during this period.

Of the thirteen recorded incidents, only three resulted in passenger

injury. The first incident that caused injury did not involve

casualties on board a TGV trainset. This incident, which caused 27 of

the 30 total injuries, occurred when passengers waiting on a loading

platform were sprayed with ballast that was kicked up by a derailed

truck. The truck in this incident derailed due to a wheel slide failure

that resulted in a flat wheel. The second incident that resulted in

casualty involved two passengers who were slightly injured when a

trainset derailed. The derailment occurred while traveling at 150 mph,

due to track subsidence that was caused by heavy rains and a previously

unknown World War I trench. The third event, in which one passenger was

injured, was caused by human error. Fasteners were incorrectly

tightened after a maintenance procedure, which caused a fairing to fall

and break a window in a passenger coach.

The remaining ten incidents on the exclusive high speed lines did

not involve passenger injuries. Five of the incidents recorded involved

trainsets that struck an animal in the right-of-way. Two of the

incidents consisted of fire on moving equipment: In one event the fire

was located in the baggage compartment, cause unknown; and in the other

it was located in the rear locomotive, due to rolling stock failure.

Two of the thirteen incidents involved the operation of the passenger

compartment doors. In one of these events, a trainset door opened and

was pulled away by the force of the wind while the conductor was

checking an air leak, and in the second event a passenger compartment

door opened while the train was moving, due to rolling stock failure.

Finally, in the last incident a trainset hit concrete covers of

electrical cable conduits, which was attributed to vandalism.

In the second category, which includes all mixed high speed/

[[Page 65480]]

conventional lines, eight incidents have been recorded from January 1,

1990 to June 30, 1996. In this group of accidents, two fatalities

occurred. The first involved a passenger who boarded the trainset, and

then subsequently disembarked after departure was underway, and fell

under the train. The second fatality occurred when a conductor

attempted to board after train departure and fell between the train and

platform. In another incident reported in this group, ten injuries

occurred when a high speed trainset passed an absolute stop signal

during a switching movement and hit a local train. The injuries

occurred on the local, conventional train. In the final incident which

involved injuries, a passenger standing on a platform was injured when

a shock absorber between two passenger cars broke and kicked up

ballast.

The remaining four incidents on the mixed lines occurred due to

human error. In two instances, the locomotive engineer forgot to apply

an immobilization brake after a switching movement, and in each case

the trainset slowly hit another rail car. In one case, an engineer was

distracted by another individual in the cab and released the brakes.

The trainset slowly hit a bumper. In the last incident, a trainset

rolled from a rolling stock repair facility unattended and hit a

loading ramp.

Prior to 1990, one significant accident involving TGV equipment is

noted, in which two fatalities and forty-four injuries occurred. A

highway vehicle at a public grade crossing entered the railroad right-

of-way and was struck by a TGV trainset. The TGV engineer and a

passenger were killed and forty-four people were injured. (It is

important to note here that the FOX high speed rail system will not

contain any public grade crossings.) A second event is noted in the

risk assessment concerning a terrorist attack in 1983 in which

fatalities occurred, but no description of the incident is provided.

In summary, four fatalities have occurred on the TGV system from

1981 through June 1996, and none of these occurred on the exclusive

high speed lines. FRA and, undoubtedly, the SNCF believe that any loss

of life is one too many. However, given the traffic density, speed of

travel, and passenger load that the TGV system supports, these figures

are exceptional. The risk assessment calculates a TGV passenger risk of

less than 0.99 per billion passenger-miles traveled.

It is difficult to make many meaningful comparisons between the

French TGV system and existing passenger service in the United States

because the operating environment, technology, data collection, and

equipment differ in a variety of ways. However, the risk assessment

computes fatality rates based on available information for the TGV

system in France and the NEC, and those rates provide some context to

the accident data. According to the risk assessment, the normalized

passenger risk calculated in per billion passenger-miles for the TGV

system in France is 5.9% of that for the 1994 NEC.

FRA understands that differences of opinion may exist concerning

methodology or conclusions reached in the FOX/FDOT risk assessment.

Moreover, as explained below, FRA's safety determinations about the FOX

system are based on its own careful analysis of the proposed system and

the existing French system. However, the Agency believes the document

presents useful data concerning the general safety of the French TGV

system.

FRA, in conjunction with the Volpe National Transportation Systems

Center (Volpe), has studied the French TGV system extensively. FRA and

Volpe technical staff visited France and Belgium in order to examine

the TGV system in operation, to review the signal system testing as it

is conducted, and to pose questions to representatives of the SNCF

concerning details of the system.

FRA and Volpe staff visited a manufacturing plant in eastern France

where the equipment is constructed, and met with the plant's staff to

discuss equipment design, crashworthiness, operating characteristics,

and construction. FRA and Volpe staff visited a central train

dispatching center, and studied the practices and required procedures

that train dispatchers follow to prevent train collisions. FRA and

Volpe staff spent several days at the signal system test track in

Belgium to review the test procedures and test results with SNCF

personnel. In addition, FRA has maintained communications with

personnel at the test site to follow the progress of the signal testing

as it proceeds.

FRA and Volpe staff visited a TGV repair facility in order to

analyze the existing facility design, and employee practices at repair

facilities generally. At the repair site, Agency staff received

training from SNCF personnel on the operation of the major components

of the TGV rolling stock, and the inspection and maintenance

frequencies that have been established over time by the SNCF.

Agency and Volpe staff met with representatives of the French

government and the SNCF in a series of meetings, and discussed a

variety of questions concerning governmental oversight of the TGV

operation, annual safety reviews, the process by which the SNCF revises

the TGV system safety plan, personnel qualifications, operating rules,

track maintenance and repair, and the development of new equipment.

Personnel from Volpe have studied and prepared reports on the

French TGV, which not only provide a broad overview of the system, but

also examine individual components and operating practices of the

system. This, in combination with Volpe's broad expertise in the area

of high speed rail systems generally, aided the FRA team to make

effective and rapid comparisons and assessments of the relative safety

of all aspects of the French TGV as the comprehensive review proceeded.

Based on its own review of all of the information received, FRA

possesses a high level of confidence in the safety of many of the major

elements of the French system that will be duplicated in Florida.

Safety Characteristics of the FOX System

The FOX system planned for development in Florida contains safety

features that do not exist on the TGV system in France, and so

presumably, FOX has the potential to surpass the level of safety that

exists on the TGV high speed lines. The primary improvements include

lower traffic density, no opportunity for mixed traffic, an expanded

intrusion protection system, fewer underpasses and overpasses, an

advanced technology signal system, and the addition of protective

station platform doors. In addition, the FOX system includes several

attributes that do not exist on passenger lines in the U.S., which are

discussed below, that should also enhance the overall safety of the

program.

The traffic density will be lower in Florida than that of the TGV

system in France. FOX anticipates operating a maximum of eighteen

trains per day in the first two years of operation, at a rate of

approximately one train every thirty minutes. FOX plans to increase the

number to twenty-six per day afterward. In France, approximately 184

TGV trains run per day. Traffic density has generally been associated

with train accidents and incidents, and can impact the likelihood and

severity of train accidents. The expanded train departure intervals on

FOX are expected to reduce the risk of one train overtaking another or

train-to-train collisions.

FOX will operate over a dedicated right-of-way that will not

include freight

[[Page 65481]]

traffic or other types of passenger equipment. The high speed track in

France is connected directly to conventional lines and so the risk of

freight penetrating the high speed tracks exists. In Florida, the track

will not be connected to rail lines that carry freight traffic. The

only freight equipment that will be permitted on the FOX system is that

involved in FOX maintenance or rescue operations. This is a significant

factor that will eliminate or reduce a variety of risks. First, the

likelihood of a freight-to-passenger trainset collision, and the high

casualty rates that would accompany such a collision, will be nearly

eliminated. Second, the absence of freight traffic will minimize track

degradation that occurs with the transport of heavy loads, which in

turn will reduce the risk of track defects that cause train

derailments. Finally, train dispatchers will not manage districts that

carry mixed passenger and freight loads, and so the stress and

confusion that may result from freight and passenger route scheduling

will be eliminated.

There will no public at-grade crossings on the FOX system, and so

the risk of a highway-rail grade crossing accident will be eliminated.

There are no public at-grade crossings on the TGV high speed lines in

France, but highway-rail grade crossings are prevalent on the U.S. rail

system, and account for many human injuries and fatalities. This aspect

of the FOX system greatly reduces the risk of casualties to railroad

employees, passengers, and road travelers along the FOX right-of-way.

FOX will install fencing that runs the length of the right-of-way

to restrict unauthorized entry, which should minimize the risk of

accidents involving trespassers and animals. In addition, the FOX

system will include detection systems for intrusion, high wind, flood

conditions, and rolling stock that contains dragging equipment. These

detection systems will be connected to the signal system, and will

notify the main dispatching center when hazardous events occur. Some of

these features do not exist on the French TGV, and most do not

currently exist on American railroads. It is expected that they will

enhance safety for the FOX system.

The French TGV operates over a system that includes 490 overpasses

and 676 underpasses. Current plans for FOX indicate that there will be

approximately 100 overpasses and 60 underpasses. In addition, there

will be no moveable bridges on the Florida system, structures that,

like overpasses and underpasses, tend to increase the need for

maintenance and the risk of incident.

FOX will utilize a new signal and train control system that is not

currently in revenue service anywhere in the world. Trainsets in

Belgium are testing the system, which is a form of Positive Train

Control (PTC), and it is anticipated that before FOX commences revenue

operations, the system will be certified and in use in Europe. Although

FRA and others familiar with the system generally believe that this new

variety of signaling will increase railroad safety, there may be some

risk associated with the introduction of this new component to an

operative railroad system. The risk assessment prepared for FOX and

FDOT does not address this factor. However, FRA believes that this item

deserves significant attention, given the ramifications of a signal

system failure on high speed passenger lines. This issue deserves

particular concern in Florida because of the significant risk that

exists there of extreme weather conditions, i.e., lightning strikes,

hurricanes, and flooding which could require relatively frequent

exercise of the safety-critical features of this signal system. As the

risk assessment notes, these are conditions that do not exist in

France. FRA must be very cautious in establishing standards for a

system that has not been used in revenue service, and that will be

expected to function without fail in a location where catastrophic

weather conditions are not rare. Therefore, FRA proposes as a

requirement in this NPRM, a process in which an independent entity with

proven technical expertise will conduct a review of the safety of the

safety-critical hardware and software microprocessor-based elements of

the signal system, which will be submitted to FRA. The proposed

standards include a brief acceptance procedure that would follow this

submission and precede implementation of the signal system as finally

configured. FRA anticipates that this sort of process will accompany

certification of the system in Europe, which will likely predate FOX

operations. Given the risks presented by a signaling failure on a

passenger line traveling at speeds of 200 mph, the Agency believes it

is necessary to implement standards that formalize such a peer review

process for FOX in this country. This is very similar to procedures

that FRA has required other entities to follow concerning signal

systems. However, FRA invites comment on this and all other proposals

set forth in the NPRM from interested and expert parties, particularly

as to the criteria that should be addressed in the peer review, or

other avenues of achieving the same end.

Although FRA does not currently enforce safety standards concerning

passenger stations, it is important to note that the FOX system will

include protective doors on the station platforms to prevent the risk

of injury from loose equipment or flying debris. As the TGV safety

record discussed above points out, passengers waiting to board face the

risk of injury unless shielded by the sort of protection that will be

included in the FOX system.

There are certain advantages to building this new railroad system,

particularly relating to roadbed and infrastructure, that accrue simply

because construction will be designed to suit all components of the

system. For instance, the right-of-way may be selected to suit the

needs of the track and signaling system. Track curves will be minimized

during track layout and designed to accommodate speeds in excess of the

maximum revenue service speed of 200 mph. However, it is important to

acknowledge, as the risk assessment does, that unique system aspects

such as sink holes are an ever-present, potential problem in Florida,

and decrease the safety of the FOX system unless mitigated. FOX plans

to use geotechnical analysis to look for indicators of sinkhole

activity prior to installing the track infrastructure. FRA's proposal

includes a proviso that any abnormalities which arise in the

construction phase of development must be recorded, and that all

actions taken in response to the abnormality must be documented. Also,

this hazard must be accounted for in the FOX system safety plan, which

will be developed prior to commencing construction. FRA seeks comment

from interested parties and experts on this subject to determine other

methods for managing this risk effectively.

There are two other potential areas of risk that warrant particular

attention. Neither is fully addressed in the FOX/FDOT risk assessment.

The first involves the increase in TGV speed from a maximum of 186 mph,

which is currently used in French operations, to 200 mph, which is

proposed for Florida operations. The risk assessment states that French

TGV plans to increase the operating speed to 200 mph, and a safety

record will have developed in France prior to FOX operations in

Florida. Unfortunately, FRA finds itself in the position of writing

safety standards for the system at this juncture, when the appropriate

safety record concerning these enhanced speeds is unformed. As is also

noted in the risk assessment, higher train speed tends to

[[Page 65482]]

increase the severity of accidents. The FOX system safety plan must

address this issue, but we also seek comment from interested parties

and experts as to the enhanced risk involved, if any, and other viable

methods of addressing it.

Second, FRA believes that there is a risk, however intangible, that

arises from moving this European system to a new culture where the

pertinent institutional knowledge is not abundant and the role of the

government in supporting operations is quite different. For instance,

rolling stock maintenance personnel on FOX will be expected to inspect

and maintain equipment using unfamiliar tools, in dramatically

different repair facilities, on equipment that utilizes computers to

achieve what is traditionally done in the U.S. by visual and manual

means. No amount of training can achieve the level of professional

insight that fifteen years of experience on the equipment would

produce. The risk assessment alludes to this factor in passing, and

seems to indicate that so long as the TGV equipment, inspection

frequencies, and procedures are implemented on FOX, nothing is lost and

no risk ensues.

FRA agrees that it is very difficult to quantify the value of

institutional knowledge in a system as large as the French TGV or FOX.

However, this is not a factor that the Agency can or desires to

overlook. In discussions with FRA, FOX and FDOT have indicated that

they plan to bring TGV professionals into the training, maintenance,

and operation of the system. However, it is impossible to know at this

point whether or to what extent that participation will occur, as

revenue operations are not planned to commence until 2004. A variety of

events may occur between now and then to make those plans difficult or

impossible to achieve.

Also factored into this issue of risk, is the knowledge that the

TGV has a different cost accounting structure, in which the daily

safety of the operation is not compromised by short-term operating

costs and long-term capitol costs. The SNCF may be able to make

purchases and decisions that a private entity would be unable to

accomplish. FRA is certain that all reputable transportation companies

have as their first priority the safety of passengers and employees.

However, the need to be profitable in a privately financial context

undeniably plays a role in decision making that on occasion impacts

safety. FRA believes that there may be a connection between the TGV's

superb safety record and the degree to which the system is financially

supported that will not exist on the FOX system. There is no way of

knowing with certainty whether TGV safety is due in some measure to its

financial structure. Similarly, there is no way of ascertaining at this

point whether the loss of comprehensive institutional knowledge that is

bound to occur in Florida will impact the safety of the operation.

However, FRA believes that the potential for these safety risks is

sufficient to make preventative measures sensible.

In this proposal, FRA seeks to address these concerns with

standards that provide a very high level of safety in areas where FRA

believes French TGV safety cannot or will not be met in Florida. FRA

anticipates that the petitioner may object to the imposition of certain

of the proposed standards that require more than is currently the

practice in France. However, given the risk factors outlined above, the

grave potential for human loss in the event of an accident, and the

flexibility that is incorporated into the proposal, FRA believes at

this time that any perceived burdens are justified.

System Safety

System safety is the cornerstone of the French TGV, and as proposed

in these standards, the heart of the FOX high speed rail system. The

systems approach to safety is used pervasively in a variety of

industries to reduce the likelihood and occurrence of accidents and

injuries. FRA has discussed the need for this approach to safety in two

recent rulemakings, Passenger Train Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330

(February 24, 1996), and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 62 FR

49728 (September 23, 1997). This concept requires an organization to

identify, evaluate, and reduce or eliminate safety hazards that exist

in any portion of the organization's ``system,'' or may be caused by

interrelationships between various components of that system, and

create a system safety plan to reflect those evaluations. Where

possible, the development of a system safety plan precedes the design,

construction, and operation of the system, so that potential risks are

eliminated at the earliest possible opportunity. Once in place, system

safety plans are viewed as living documents, which should be updated as

circumstances change, new information becomes available, or goals

shift. Therefore, incremental changes may be made on a daily basis, if

appropriate, to reflect the safety needs of the organization.

Typically, system safety plans should be formally updated on an annual

basis, in order to maintain their utility in advancing safety with the

best information available.

The French TGV utilizes a system safety approach whose primary goal

or philosophy is to avoid collisions. This varies from an accident-

mitigation philosophy, which seeks to maximize protection for employees

and others at risk in the event of an accident. The FOX system, as

planned, will operate under the theory of collision-avoidance. Examples

of this philosophy at work in the design of the system are: the grade

separated right-of-way that excludes public at-grade crossings; double

track that will facilitate train movements side-by-side rather than

end-to-end; and the PTC-style signal system that will prevent trains

from being routed on collision courses, whether meeting or overtaking.

Subpart B of the NPRM requires FOX to prepare a system safety plan.

For the most part, these proposed standards parallel the FOX Petition,

and address every phase and component of the FOX system. However, FRA's

proposal also includes the proviso that FOX submit the system safety

plan to FRA for approval one year after the effective date of the final

rule in this matter, and that the plan be updated at least annually.

Based on the philosophy of systems planning, FRA believes that

initiating this process prior to design and construction is critical to

the development of a complete system safety plan and a safe high speed

rail system. FRA understands, however, that this rulemaking proceeding

predates much of the work involved in the Florida project, and so

filing a complete system safety plan within one year of the final rule

may be difficult. FRA seeks comment on this proposal, including

suggestions for other methods of addressing this issue. For instance,

perhaps the standard should impose a tiered completion date for

portions of the system safety plan. On the other hand, a tiered system

may undermine the purpose and philosophy of the system safety approach.

FRA would find it helpful to know exactly when FDOT and FOX plan to

initiate the final design, based on the specific right-of-way chosen,

and the construction of the system. This information would likely

inform the Agency's decision on the appropriate timing for submission

of the system safety plan. It is important to note, however, that while

FRA has not predetermined the specific outcome of this issue, the

Agency believes in general terms that a fairly comprehensive system

safety plan should precede the design and construction phases of the

FOX system.

[[Page 65483]]

FRA's Proposal

FRA has made every attempt in this NPRM to facilitate the transfer

of the excellence of the French equipment and operation, by proposing

standards that would permit the TGV equipment and procedures to operate

in the U.S. in the same fashion as is done in France. However, in

several areas, FRA has gone beyond or varied from the French standards

and practices where the Agency believed it necessary to do so in order

to ensure the highest level of safety. FRA's proposal includes

requirements, organized in chapters by subject matter, to address

general legal principles, system safety, signaling, track, rolling

stock, operating practices, system qualification testing, personnel

qualifications, and power distribution. In addition, the proposal

adopts and incorporates by reference several existing regulations that

apply generally to all railroads operating in the U.S. These are listed

specifically in Subpart A of the NPRM, and constitute areas in which

FOX needs no special treatment. In other words, for these safety

disciplines, FOX is so similar to the general railroad industry that no

new standards are necessary. For instance, FRA's alcohol and drug

regulations impose no burdens that are inherently impossible for FOX to

meet or that are inconsistent with the FOX operation, and so these

standards and any future amendments to them would apply to FOX.

FRA's proposal is similar in many ways to the Petition FOX filed.

The FOX consortium includes entities that have been involved with the

design, construction, and operation of the TGV equipment, and so FRA

has made every effort to study their submission and replicate it in

proposed standards where appropriate. Their assistance in this

rulemaking proceeding is, and will continue to be, quite informative

and helpful. However, it is important to note that railroads in the

U.S. operate under a different legal framework than exists in France,

and the differences are relevant in understanding why FRA changed some

standards in the NPRM that were not in the Petition.

The French government has issued laws which broadly call for a safe

railroad system, but which delegate that responsibility, in large

measure, to the SNCF. Therefore, the SNCF, or TGV operator, establishes

its own safety parameters and implements them. Each year, the SNCF

files a report with the government that outlines the safety record of

the previous year, emerging trends, and proposed changes to the

operation. However, there are no government-issued regulations that

mandate TGV activities or authorize enforcement of rules. There is no

relationship equivalent to this in the U.S. regulatory or

transportation system. There are political, legal, cultural, and

financial differences at work here, and the result is that the FOX

Petition omitted some internal SNCF guidelines that FRA believes would

or should be regulations in the U.S. system. For instance, some of the

FOX supplemental materials include a list of rolling stock components

that are inspected at specified intervals in France. These intervals

and items developed internally at SNCF over years of operational

experience. Although FOX has expressed the intention to follow the SNCF

internal guidelines in Florida, FRA believes that these guidelines

should be part of the minimum Federal standards for the FOX system.

Similarly, FRA has included a proviso in the Operating Practices

Subpart that requires FRA approval of the FOX safety-critical operating

rules prior to commencing operations. This was not part of the

Petition, but FRA proposes it in the interest of ensuring that the

internal, and at this time, undisclosed, SNCF-TGV operating rules will

be followed on FOX. FRA values the internal guidelines that have

developed in France over many areas, believes that they may be

equivalent to U.S. Federal safety standards, and desires to incorporate

them into the minimum Federal standards.

In addition to the reasons discussed above, the NPRM takes a

different approach on some issues from that found in the Petition,

based on the regulatory program that exists in this country, which has

governed railroad operations for decades. FRA has a mandate to devise

standards that protect the public, have a rational basis, and do not

impose needless cost. FRA's existing regulatory program achieves these

goals, and therefore, it would be unwise to vary from it greatly unless

the subject matter requires a substantially different treatment given

the nature of the FOX system. If FRA were to stray significantly from

the existing U.S. safety standards in this proceeding, despite the fact

that it will only apply to FOX, serious questions might be raised

concerning the appropriateness of this proposal.

It is important to note that this proposal and many individual

standards in it would be inappropriate for any other U.S. passenger or

freight operation. The safety features of the FOX system, taken as a

whole, do not exist in combination on any other railroad in this

country. This uniqueness is the basis on which the proposal is made,

and the treatment of any specific issue here should not be viewed as a

regulatory trend for passenger operations generally. In this proposal,

FRA has relied to a great extent on the operating environment in which

FOX will exist, and unless that environment is duplicated in identical

fashion elsewhere, these standards would not be suitable.

FRA believes that this proposal includes a reasonable and effective

blend of proven practices and procedures from both the French TGV

system and American railroading. However, with publication of this

NPRM, FRA invites comment from all interested parties on each standard

proposed. FRA requests comments on whether less or more permissive

standards should be adopted, with supporting rationale; whether

inspection frequencies should be increased or decreased, or are

sufficient as written, with supporting rationale; whether FRA should

widen or narrow the scope of subject matters covered by standards for

the FOX system, and the reasons for such a change; whether FRA has

assessed accurately the safety of French TGV and the risks that may

arise on the FOX system in Florida; and any other areas that commenters

deem necessary in order to produce final safety standards that are

effective.

* * * * *

Section-by-Section Analysis

Subpart A--General Requirements

Section 243.1 Purpose and Scope

Paragraph (a) states that the purpose of this proposal is to

prevent accidents, injuries, and property damage that could result from

operation of FOX, or ``Railroad,'' as the system is called throughout

the rule text. Also, this section explains that the scope of the Part

is to provide minimum Federal safety standards for the Railroad. The

Railroad may adopt more stringent requirements so long as they are not

inconsistent with this rule.

Section 243.3 Applicability

Paragraph (a) of this section explains that this Part would apply

only to the FOX system in Florida, and not to any other railroad

operating in the U.S. Also, this paragraph restricts the FOX operation

to the specific boundaries that are described in the system

description, Sec. 243.13 of the rule, unless FOX obtains prior approval

from FRA. Therefore, if FOX desires to build a new line in the future,

the Railroad would have to receive FRA approval prior to commencing

operations on that line.

[[Page 65484]]

(The term ``approval'' is used loosely here. Conceivably, FOX could

file a Petition for Rulemaking amending the system description to

include the new line, and FRA's issuance of the new section would

achieve the desired result.) FRA believes that such approval would be

necessary to ensure that the new line meets all of the appropriate

standards that exist in this Part. For instance, there could be no

grade crossings or mixed traffic on the line. The TGV equipment is

structurally different than passenger equipment currently in use in

this country, and would not respond to a collision with a freight train

in the same manner. The standards in this proposal permit 200 mph

travel with this equipment because of the other operating conditions

that exist on FOX, and FRA must ensure that those conditions also exist

on any new lines that develop. Paragraph (a) reflects the fact that the

standards in this proposed rule of particular applicability are

appropriate for the FOX system only when all of the system elements are

present; the systems approach demands this result. If an integral

portion of the system disappears, all of the standards would have to be

reevaluated.

Paragraph (b) of this section states that Part 243, rather than the

general safety standards currently found in Title 49 of the Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR), would govern the FOX system. However, in

recognition of the fact that the FOX system is similar or identical to

conventional railroad operations in certain areas, this paragraph also

states that some of the general standards, which are adopted and

incorporated in paragraph (c), shall apply to FOX. Paragraphs (b) and

(c) work in conjunction with one another, so that the two taken as a

whole constitute all of the railroad safety regulations that would

apply to FOX at this time. Therefore, any regulations found in Title 49

of the CFR that have not been adopted and incorporated in paragraph (c)

do not apply to FOX.

Paragraph (c) of this section lists the general railroad safety

standards found in Title 49 of the CFR that apply to the FOX system.

The subject areas are: Part 209, Safety Enforcement Procedures; Part

210, Railroad Noise Emission Compliance Regulations; Part 211, Rules of

Practice; Part 212, State Safety Participation Regulations; Part 214,

Railroad Workplace Safety; Part 216, Special Notice and Emergency Order

Procedures; Part 218, Railroad Operating Practices; Part 219, Control

of Alcohol and Drug Use; Part 220, Radio Standards and Procedures; Part

225, Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports, Classification, and

Investigations; Part 228, Hours of Service of Railroad Employees;

Sec. 135 of Part 229, Event Recorders; Part 235, except Sec. 235.7,

Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of a Discontinuance or

Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief from the

Requirements of Part 236; Part 240, except Secs. 240.227 and 240.229,

Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers; Part 215,

Railroad Freight Car Standards, Part 229, Railroad Locomotive Safety

Standards, Part 232, Locomotive Inspection, Part 231, Railroad Safety

Appliance Standards, and Part 232, Railroad Power Brakes and Drawbars

shall all apply to the FOX conventional equipment; and FRA's proposed

Passenger Train Emergency Standards, which will be codified when

finalized in 49 CFR Part 239. Because these standards are suitable to

apply to the FOX system as they are currently written, FRA is adopting

and incorporating them to avoid massive reprinting. As has been stated

earlier in this proposal, each of these standards address safety issues

in a manner that is consistent with the FOX operation.

While the relevance to FOX of most of the incorporated rules is

clear, the relevance of some CFR parts and the reasons that some

sections are specifically not adopted requires some discussion. First,

49 CFR 235.7 of the signal modification standards permits a railroad to

forego filing an application for approval concerning certain signal

modifications. FRA believes that the more prudent approach would be to

require FOX to apply for any modifications of its signal system for

several reasons. The system FOX plans to utilize does not possess a

long revenue service safety history for which future events are

predictable. As planned, the system will carry thousands of passengers

each year, and the cost in human lives for a signal failure could be

catastrophic. FRA believes that these factors point to the need for

Federal oversight concerning any modification of the FOX signal system.

Accordingly, 49 CFR 235.7 will not apply to FOX. Instead, any

modification of the Railroad's signal system must be accounted for in

the system safety plan and be done cautiously in order to enhance the

integrity of the system safety approach.

Second, the Petition did not include Part 240 in the list of

regulations to be incorporated by reference in this rule. As FRA

understands it, FOX plans to identify the personnel who will operate

the power cars on the system as ``enginemen'' and so they object to

Part 240 and its pervasive use of the term ``locomotive engineer.'' FRA

chose this term in Part 240 for a variety of reasons, none of which

relate to the gender, union status, or other extraneous background

details of the in-cab personnel who direct locomotive movements. The

term is a functional distinction that applies to the performance of a

locomotive engineer, power car driver, or engineman. Therefore, FRA

finds no merit in reissuing Part 240 in this proceeding in order to

change the title of a cadre of employees. FRA has no interest in

mandating the use of any occupational title on any railroad. However,

the Agency does have an interest in and obligation to use language that

is gender-neutral and consistent with existing terminology, to the

fullest extent possible.

It is also important to note that FRA's proposal does not

incorporate 49 CFR 240.227 and 49 CFR 240.229 for application to FOX.

These sections relate to joint operations with Canadian railroads, and

with other railroads in the U.S. Neither of these scenarios can occur

on the FOX system for reasons of geography and more importantly,

safety, and therefore, it is important to exclude these sections

explicitly from application to FOX.

Third, FRA's proposal includes the adoption of several existing

standards that govern the maintenance, inspection, and operation of

conventional freight equipment (Parts 215, 229, 230, 231, and 232). FRA

believes that these requirements must be included here in order to

protect employees and the public in instances where conventional

equipment must be used on the FOX operation. As FRA understands it, FOX

will likely have in its fleet conventional railroad equipment to

facilitate maintenance and rescue operations in yards and along the

right-of-way. FRA believes that where these limited operations arise,

the existing safety standards should apply. There is nothing in the

Petition or background information concerning FOX that would make

application of these standards inappropriate or deleterious to safety.

Moreover, the employees involved with the movement of conventional

equipment must possess all of the protections that accompany

conventional operations on other properties.

Fourth, FRA has adopted safety standards relating to emergency

preparedness for application on the FOX network. FRA does not

understand FOX to object to imposition of these standards, but because

they were in proposed, rather than final, form at the time of Petition

filing, FOX did not list them among the standards incorporated.

[[Page 65485]]

In this proposal, FRA adopts the emergency preparedness standards as

proposed at this time, and ultimately as they appear in final form. FRA

anticipates that these standards will be finalized in the very near

future and codified at 49 CFR part 239.

Finally, FOX expressed the desire to adopt and incorporate by

reference the existing general safety standards without also adopting

future amendments to these standards. FRA does not agree with this

approach to the general safety standards. By their very nature, these

standards address subject matters that present no need for special

treatment on FOX. Following this logic to its natural conclusion, FRA

presumes that amendments to these same subject matters will not present

the need for special proceedings or considerations for FOX. If proposed

amendments give rise to safety concerns on the FOX system, FOX will

have every opportunity, as a vital and responsible member of the U.S.

railroad system, to provide comments in the normal course of regulatory

process in those areas.

Paragraph (d) states that FOX is a railroad, pursuant to the

definition set forth by statute, which includes, in pertinent part

``high speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan

areas, without regard to whether those systems use new technologies not

associated with traditional railroads * * *'' Therefore, all of the

railroad safety statutes (including those pertaining to hours of

service) apply to FOX, except portions of the former Safety Appliance

Acts, from which FRA proposes that FOX be exempted due to the advanced

technology in use that makes those requirements unnecessary. (The issue

of new technology and safety appliances is discussed in detail in the

analysis of Sec. 243.15 below.)

Paragraph (e) states that the measurement values provided in the

rule are in metric form, which is due to the fact that the TGV

equipment was designed abroad according to metric standards. The NPRM

includes the U.S. equivalent to provide an adequate frame of reference

for interested parties. FRA has some concern that the American

workforce, which maintains and inspects conventional railroad equipment

using tools and measurements in U.S. standard values, may experience a

period of adjustment in converting to the metric system. The FOX

personnel qualification program, set forth in Subpart H, must address

this potential safety factor.

Section 243.5 Definitions

As a general rule of regulatory construction, definitions provide

clarity and understanding to the reader. Definitions should not include

legal requirements, and should not somehow hide the true meaning of a

standard. FRA's proposal makes changes to many definitions that were

provided in the Petition where those definitions were unclear,

contained legal requirements, or limited the scope of a standard's

application. In addition, FRA has added to the list of definitions

included in the Petition where necessary, and deleted those that

involved terms not used in the proposed standards.

Most of the definitions included in this section have been

published in other rulemaking proceedings, or have straightforward

meaning, and so additional discussion on them is unnecessary. However,

a few terms should be explained.

FRA would like to emphasize that the term ``employee'' used

throughout the proposed rule includes Railroad employees, as well as

the employees of contractors engaged by the Railroad. Therefore,

contractors must comply with the requirements of the rule, and FOX may

not avoid the Railroad's compliance with the standards through the use

of contracting entities.

The terms ``in passenger service'' and ``in revenue service'' have

identical meaning, and include all trains, trainsets, and passenger

equipment that are carrying or are available to carry passengers. The

determination as to whether a fare has been paid is not relevant to

establishing the status of the equipment. The term ``in service''

includes equipment that is in revenue or passenger service, as well as

other passenger equipment, unless the equipment falls into one of three

categories: it is being handled as defective under Sec. 243.15 of the

proposal; or it is in a repair shop or repair track; or it is on a

storage track without passengers. Generally, the Railroad will be

subject to civil penalty for any equipment that is ``in service'' in

noncomplying condition.

The term ``power car'' refers to a type of locomotive used on the

TGV system that is typically positioned at the beginning and end of a

passenger trainset. Power cars contain a cab in which the locomotive

engineer controls the train's movement. As proposed for FOX, every

passenger trainset will contain a power car at each end with eight

trailer cars between them. FOX proposed a definition that would have

set power cars apart from locomotives, but FRA finds no reason to

define the term in that way. Also, it is important to note that the

power cars and trailer cars are articulated and connected in such a way

as to resist buckling in the event of a derailment. The term ``semi-

permanent connectors'' describes the connections that exist among and

between the trailer and power cars of a TGV trainset. These connections

are significantly different from couplers that exist on conventional

equipment. These connections are designed so that they may be

disconnected only by use of special tools, and only in repair

facilities. Because of this design, employees will not be involved in

coupling or uncoupling at locations where they would face the risk of

injury that arises from working between rail equipment. Conventional

couplers will only be present on the leading or trailing ends of each

trainset, and will be used primarily for attachment during rescue

operations. Section 243.431 of the proposal sets forth the requirements

that govern the use of conventional couplers and semi-permanent

connectors.

FRA has revised the speed definitions that the Petition contained.

Many of the definitions appeared to be circular in their use of

terminology and so would not provide sufficient clarity and notice to

the public. As FRA understands it, some of the speed definitions would

be pertinent to a matrix that will be developed for use in the system

safety plan, concerning train speed and braking capacity. Until such

chart exists, the definitions serve no purpose and may ultimately be

erroneous or inconsistent with the signal system. Therefore, FRA

proposes a simplified approach. ``Maximum authorized speed'' is defined

as the maximum speed at which trains may operate safely, taking into

account all right-of-way, rolling stock, weather, and other operating

conditions. ``Maximum revenue service speed'' is 200 mph, which cannot

be exceeded under any circumstance. ``Maximum safe operating speed'' is

the maximum speed at which braking can occur without damage to the

discs or wheels. ``Slow speed'' is any speed less than 20 mph, and

``restricted speed'' is a speed that is less than 20 mph that will

facilitate stopping within half the range of vision of the locomotive

engineer.

FRA requests comments on these changes to the FOX proposed

definitions, as well as all definitions proposed in this NPRM. FRA also

requests comment on whether additional definitions should be provided

in the rule text that FRA may have overlooked in preparing this

proposal.

[[Page 65486]]

Section 243.7 Responsibility for Compliance

This section sets forth the compliance and liability requirements

that will govern FOX operations. Paragraph (a) proposes that the

Railroad will be strictly liable for all violations of the standards

set forth in this rule, except where equipment is not ``in use'' or

with respect to violations of the track standards. To establish a

violation of the equipment standards, FRA must demonstrate that the

equipment was in use, but need not demonstrate any level of knowledge

on the part of the Railroad or other violator. To establish a violation

of the track standards, FRA must show a failure to exercise reasonable

care.

Paragraph (b) states that passenger equipment will be considered

``in use'' before a train has departed, but after the equipment has

received or should have received the appropriate inspection. This

proposal mirrors the approach taken in FRA's proposed rule on Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards. 62 FR 49728, 49756. The result of this

language is that FRA need not wait for a train to depart a terminal

before issuing a citation for a defective condition. FRA believes that

this authority is consistent with the purpose of our safety program--to

reduce railroad accidents and injuries, and is prudent in its

application to FOX.

Paragraph (c) states that this rule is applicable to the Railroad

and to any person performing functions required by the rule. Although

the proposal expresses the duties imposed by the rule in terms of the

Railroad, FRA wishes to make clear that any person who performs on

behalf of the Railroad an action that is covered by the proposed rule

is required to perform that action in the same manner as required of

the Railroad.

Paragraph (d) relates to track and states that the Railroad

operator is responsible for compliance with all track safety provisions

set forth in Subpart D of the proposal. FRA proposes this language to

avoid any questions of track ownership, which are particularly

important here because FRA does not know at this juncture which entity

will purchase and own the right-of-way to be used for the FOX system.

This language is different from the approach taken in 49 CFR part 213,

FRA's existing track standards, which permit an owner to assign

responsibility for operation of the track system to another entity. FRA

obviates the need for the assignment process set forth in 49 CFR 213.5

by proposing that the Railroad operator, rather than the right-of-way

owner, shall be responsible for track safety requirements.

When the Railroad operator has knowledge, or a reasonable person

exercising reasonable care would have knowledge, that the track does

not comply with the regulations, the Railroad operator has four

options: it may bring the track into compliance; it may halt operations

over the track; it may continue operations over the noncomplying track

at 10 mph, for 30 days, under the authority of qualified personnel; or

it may operate under the operational limits established for track

classes 1-5, as set forth in 49 CFR part 213.

The Petition did not provide this level of flexibility for

operations when track noncompliance occurs, and on occasion was silent

or unclear concerning ameliorative action. For instance, the Petition

called for ``immediate remedial action'' for some defects, but failed

to specify the required actions. Also, the Petition established time

periods for certain defects, in which conditions could go uncorrected.

FRA believes that the options established in this section greatly

enhance safety, provide clarity, and increase flexibility for the

Railroad. There must be some provision in the standards for moving

equipment that carries passengers to their final destination when a

noncomplying event occurs on the Railroad track. FRA prefers to include

these options rather than dictate one response, in order to allow the

Railroad to choose the best alternative, given the existing operating

conditions. This proposed section grants the Railroad broader and more

comprehensive alternatives than were included in the Petition. FOX has

stated that the French TGV track rarely reaches the condition that

would warrant any of the measures discussed here. FRA is hopeful that

will also be the case in Florida, but the Agency must provide a

rational and safe response in the event of noncomplying track

conditions.

Section 243.9 Enforcement

This section describes the civil penalties that FRA may impose on

any person, including the Railroad or an independent contractor

providing goods or services to the Railroad, that violates any

requirement of this rule. These penalty provisions parallel the civil

penalty provisions in numerous other railroad safety regulations, and

are authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301, 21302, 21303, and 21304. Any person

who violates a requirement of this rule may be subject to a penalty of

$500 to $10,000 per violation. Individuals may be subject to penalties

for willful violations only. Where a pattern of repeated violations, or

a grossly negligent violation creates an imminent hazard of death or

injury, or causes death or injury, penalties of up to $20,000 may be

assessed. In addition, each day a violation continues constitutes a

separate offense. Finally, a person may be subject to criminal

penalties under 49 U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly and willfully falsifying

reports required by these regulations. FRA believes that inclusion of

the penalty provisions is important in ensuring that compliance is

achieved.

The final rule will include a schedule of civil penalties as

Appendix A. Penalty schedules are considered statements of agency

policy, and so notice and comment are not required prior to their

issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, FRA invites comment

on proposed penalty amounts.

Section 243.11 Preemptive Effect

This section informs the public as to FRA's views regarding what

will be the preemptive effect of the final rule in this proceeding. The

presence or absence of this does not, in itself, affect the preemptive

effect of a final rule, but it does inform the public concerning the

statutory provision which governs the preemptive effect of a rule.

Section 20106 of title 49 of the United States Code provides that all

regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to railroad safety

preempt any State law, regulation, or order covering the same subject

matter, except a provision necessary to eliminate or reduce an

essentially local safety hazard that is not incompatible with a Federal

law, regulation, or order and that does not unreasonably burden

interstate commerce. With the exception of a provision directed at an

essentially local safety hazard, 49 U.S.C. 20106 will preempt any State

regulatory agency rule covering the same subject matter as the

regulations proposed today when issued as final rules.

Section 243.13 System Description

This section describes the FOX system components. In addition, and

more importantly, this provision requires FOX to include all of the

elements and practices listed in this section when revenue operations

begin. FRA has determined that the items discussed in this section are

so integral to the overall safety of the FOX program, that all

standards contained in this NPRM would have to be reevaluated if FOX

failed to include, construct, or meet any of these system elements.

FRA's existing regulatory program does not include this sort of

requirement in any other safety

[[Page 65487]]

discipline or context. However, due to the nature of the system safety,

accident-avoidance philosophy that FOX has adopted in the design of the

system, which FRA reflects in the proposed standards, FRA believes that

it is necessary to include these requirements. It is important to note

here that many of the standards proposed for FOX, if adopted

separately, might lead to unsafe conditions in other operating

environments. In fact, many of these standards would be wholly

inappropriate on other railroads in this country where the full panoply

of accident-avoidant measures are not also present. Therefore, FRA must

ensure that the key system elements of this operating environment, on

which all of the standards are ultimately based, remain in the system

as finally configured. FRA's enforcement authority extends to this

section as it does to all others in the rule, and the Railroad's

failure to meet any condition specified in this section will be subject

to civil penalty or other appropriate remedy. The FOX Petition

contained a system description section, and it included most of the

components enumerated here in FRA's proposal. However, FRA has deleted

some unnecessary detail, and added a few proposals that were not

contemplated by the Petition.

Paragraph (a) sets forth the general parameters of the FOX system.

Paragraph (a)(1) establishes the geographic limits of the system, which

are Miami to Tampa via Orlando. Operations beyond these limits are

prohibited without prior FRA approval. FRA believes that it is

extremely important to restrict the high speed operations to the right-

of-way that is known at this time. For instance, if the Railroad

chooses to expand its operation to cover track that includes freight

traffic or grade crossings, many of the safety standards in this

proposal would not adequately protect passengers. If FOX decides to

increase the boundaries of the system, that should be accomplished

through a thoughtful, methodical process that includes FRA oversight

and public comment. FOX may accomplish this by filing a petition for

rulemaking to develop new standards, or a petition to amend this

section of the rule, if adopted in this form in the final standard in

this proceeding.

Paragraph (a)(2) states that trains may not under any circumstance

exceed a speed of 200 mph, and that the Railroad must operate at all

times in accordance with the requirements of the rule. This language is

meant to cover those situations in which conditions warrant certain

speeds that may not be at or near 200 mph. For instance, if severe

weather causes flooding or high wind, the FOX operating rules would

require significant speed restrictions. This language makes clear that

FOX must adhere to the speed restrictions, regardless of the maximum

system capability of 200 mph.

Paragraph (a)(3) prohibits the transport of any hazardous material

on the FOX high speed rail system. Although the Petition did not

contain this restriction, FRA believes that safety demands it. An

accident involving passengers at high speed would be catastrophic

alone; adding hazardous materials to the mix would greatly reduce

safety for the passengers, the surrounding environment, and local

residents.

Paragraph (a)(4) prohibits smoking on trains while they are used in

passenger service. FRA believes that fire safety is a key component for

any passenger operation, and by prohibiting smoking, the potential for

fire in passenger compartments is greatly reduced. In other sections of

this proposal, FRA requires passenger equipment to include flame-

retardant materials and fire detection systems, and FRA believes that

all requirements are necessary to protect the public from fire hazards

on passenger trains. Flame-retardent materials and detection systems

greatly minimize the risk of injury due to fire and smoke inhalation. A

ban on smoking further increases the level of passenger safety by

eliminating a prime causal factor from the equipment altogether. The

U.S. airline industry has adopted this approach with little or no

passenger complaint, and FRA believes that nonsmoking high speed rail

service will experience a similar outcome. Nonsmokers and employees

would be protected from the hazards and discomfort of second-hand

smoke, and smokers would have a relatively short trip--approximately

150 minutes from Miami to Tampa, without the opportunity to smoke. This

item was not included in the Petition, but FRA believes that its safety

interest in protecting employees and the traveling public makes this

proposal a valid and important one.

Paragraph (b) describes the proposed requirements for the FOX

right-of-way. This section requires FOX to operate over dedicated

track, and prohibits any joint operations with freight or other

passenger service. The Railroad would be permitted to operate

conventional vehicles of its own to facilitate maintenance and rescue

operations, but no other mixed freight or passenger service could

occur. Paragraph (b)(2) prohibits public at-grade crossings throughout

the right-of-way, and states that animal and equipment crossings not

controlled by the Railroad must be accomplished by an underpass or

overpass. As previously discussed, this characteristic of the FOX

system greatly enhances railroad safety, and must be a part of the

system as finally configured, if all other safety standards are to

remain in place. The right-of-way may include private grade crossings

that are for the exclusive use of the Railroad. FRA believes that this

is necessary for the Railroad to complete repairs, inspections,

construction, rescue movements, or other normal internal operations.

Paragraphs (b)(3), (4), and (5) require a permanent fence along the

entire right-of-way; require intrusion, flood, high wind, hot box, and

dragging equipment detectors along the right-of-way where deemed

necessary by the system safety plan and Chapter 3 of this proposal; and

limit access for Railroad employees to certain intervals along the

right-of-way. FRA expects that these aspects of the FOX plan will

enhance safety by reducing or eliminating the incidence of animals,

trespassers, highway vehicles, and undesirable or unexpected events

that could interrupt or impact safe train operation. However, FRA

requests additional information from FOX as to the type of fencing that

will be utilized along the right-of-way. Certain fences are designed to

eliminate entirely the risk of unathorized entry and would enhance

railroad safety greatly. However, these fences may be unnecessary along

portions of the right-of-way where the system safety plan determines

that the risk of entry from individuals, vehicles, or animals is

negligible. Fences used along highways are generally designed to

prevent cars from leaving the highway right-of way, rather than to

restrict intrusion from individuals or animals. Therefore, typical

highway fencing may not be effective in populated areas along the FOX

right-of-way. In short, there are a variety of factors that must be

considered in determining the appropriate design and strength for

fencing along the FOX right-of-way. As FRA understands the situation,

FOX has not yet finalized the location of the right-of-way, and so it

may be premature to dictate strict guidelines concerning fencing.

However, FRA will consider the risk factors presented and whether

establishing specific fencing requirements would be appropriate in this

proceeding. FRA requests a description from FOX as to what is planned

in the way of fencing, and

[[Page 65488]]

invites comment from interested parties on appropriate fencing

standards.

Paragraph (b)(6) provides that the Railroad will build walkways

along the right-of-way, which will be used primarily for inspection

activities or rescue operations. In order to ensure the safety of

workers and rescue personnel, the walkways must be built at a safe

distance from the track, which the proposed standard sets at a minimum

of 7.87 feet from the outside rail. This means that the Railroad's

walkways must be built at least 7.87 feet from the field side of the

rail, or in other words, the rail that is farthest from the Railroad's

double track. Due to the track centerlines that have been proposed in

paragraph (d) of this section and the requirement that any walkway be

at least 7.87 feet from the outside rail, the Railroad cannot build

walkways between the double track. Such a scenario could lead to

hazardous conditions for employees or rescue personnel forced to work

between the Railroad's two tracks, in close proximity to moving, high

speed equipment.

Paragraph (b)(7) requires the Railroad to design the right-of-way

so that it will accommodate high speed travel, meaning curves should be

avoided or large, so that the risk of derailment and excessive braking

is reduced. Paragraphs (b)(8) and (9) require the Railroad to record

all difficulties or abnormalities discovered during the construction

phase of this project, and make available to FRA the track layout

drawings that must include specified information. FRA believes that

this section is critical to the safety of the FOX infrastructure and

high speed operations. As discussed earlier, sink holes and other

potentially dangerous sub-grade formations and conditions are prevalent

in Florida, and create serious risks for FOX unless mitigated. One of

the most serious high speed accidents in France occurred because an

unknown, underground World War I trench collapsed under the weight of a

TGV trainset. FRA proposes in this section to eliminate the risk that

such an accident could occur in Florida. This section was also included

in the FOX Petition.

Paragraph (b)(10) proposes that all highway bridges that cross the

right-of-way be constructed so that drivers of motor vehicles will have

a clear view of the right-of-way, and so that the potential for

vehicles falling into the right-of-way are minimized to the fullest

extent possible. It is also important to note that this proposal is

bolstered by the fall intrusion detection systems that are required by

Subpart C. The detection systems will alert the Railroad to any

vehicles that enter the right-of-way, but this section requires an

additional level of safety by mandating highway overpass design that

will minimize the risk of a vehicle entering the right-of-way in the

first place. Similarly, paragraph (b)(11) requires the Railroad to

protect railroad bridges, if they are necessary, from impact. Railroad

operations are vulnerable to accident when railroad bridges are struck

by road or water transport. The track or signal systems on the bridge

may be disturbed to such an extent that a derailment or signal

malfunction occurs. This proposal seeks to avoid that by requiring FOX

to erect a barrier or other device that will protect the bridge

structure from a sudden strike or movement. If tunnels become necessary

on the FOX right-of-way, paragraph (b)(12) requires the Railroad to

design and construct them to minimize the safety hazards connected with

excessive air pressure in the tunnel created by the operation of

trains.

Paragraph(b)(13) restricts track crossings in areas where operating

speeds reach 100 mph to locations where designated track crossing

devices are installed. The track crossing devices must be installed

where frequent crossing by employees is anticipated, such as turnouts

and substations. Paragraph (b)(14) requires the Railroad to install

emergency traffic stop or slow devices at certain intervals along the

right-of-way, and at special locations such as turnouts, substations,

block section limits, or autotransformers. These devices will be

connected to the signaling system and create a communication link with

the Railroad's central traffic control. All of the proposals in

paragraph (b) were included in the Petition. However, FRA omitted one

of the Petition's paragraphs which related to roadway worker

protection. FRA has adopted and incorporated the existing roadway

worker protection standards, 49 CFR part 214, and so additional

language concerning this topic is unnecessary and potentially

conflicting. The FOX Petition also adopted 49 CFR part 214 for

incorporation on the FOX system.

In considering the appropriate standards for FOX to adhere to vis-

a-vis the system description and the Railroad's right-of-way, it is

important to determine whether the FOX high speed trainsets will travel

on lines that are parallel to freight or conventional passenger

operations, and if so, how close those lines will be to the FOX track.

The presence of heavy, conventional rail equipment on parallel track,

in close proximity to the FOX trainsets, would introduce risk factors

that greatly detract from the system's overall safety, and might

require a reevaluation of some of the standards in this proposal. A

derailment on the conventional line could result in an accident between

FOX trainsets and conventional equipment, which could bring about the

sort of grave damage that the system, as planned, is designed to

prevent. Therefore, FRA requests additional information from FOX

concerning the clearance distances that are required to maintain the

accident-avoidant systems approach that FOX has adopted, if the

Railroad ultimately utilizes a right-of-way that runs parallel to

conventional operations. FRA does not intend in this inquiry to

preclude altogether a FOX right-of-way that runs parrallel to

traditional rail operations. However, such a scenario may undermine the

safety of the system, as it has been described to FRA and as is

reflected in this proposal, and so, additional safety measures might be

warranted. Similarly, the proximity of a highway right-of-way and

traffic to the FOX lines is a matter that deserves attention. There is

a ``startle'' factor associated with the sudden appearance of high

speed trains next to highway traffic that should be minimized, to the

extent possible, in the design and location of the FOX right-of-way.

The Agency invites comment on all of the issues raised by this topic

from interested parties. Also, FRA asks FOX to provide additional

information that describes the proximity of conventional rail lines and

highway traffic to the FOX track, and any additional measures needed to

ensure the safety of the FOX right-of-way. Based on this information,

FRA will consider whether further appropriate measures are necessary in

order to ensure the integrity of the dedicated track system that FOX

has planned for Florida.

Paragraph (c) contains proposed requirements for all of the

Railroad's system components: system safety program; inspection,

testing and maintenance procedures and criteria; operating practices;

emergency preparedness plan; personnel qualification requirements; and

system qualification tests. These items are proposed in the system

description section of the proposal in order to underscore their

importance in the overall FOX system. Although the primary requirements

of these substantive areas are set forth in later Subparts of the

proposal, their presence in the FOX system is mandated by the

requirements of paragraph (c) of this section.

Paragraph (d) of this section sets forth the required primary

elements of the Railroad's track and infrastructure. This

[[Page 65489]]

paragraph works in conjunction with Subpart D of the proposal, which

contains the specific performance standards and inspection procedures

that the Railroad must adhere to concerning track and infrastructure.

This paragraph requires the Railroad to install and operate over

standard gage track (56.5 in.). Paragraph (d)(3) requires the Railroad

to install and operate over double track throughout its entire right-

of-way. FOX plans to use each track for a single direction, except

during certain maintenance operations, which will dramatically reduce

the risk of head-on collisions between trains. As planned, trains will

depart in 30-minute intervals, and so the risk of one train overtaking

another is also minimized. Crossover connections are to be installed at

each station, to facilitate change of direction for trains or the

removal of disabled trains. In addition, crossovers will be located

throughout the right-of-way in order to provide flexibility and

emergency rescue.

Paragraphs (d)(4) and (5) require the Railroad to install

continuous, shop-welded rail, and concrete ties. These items enhance

the stability of the track and add to the system's safety. Paragraph

(d)(6) requires the Railroad to use ballast that will support the track

structure, but that will not degrade in combination with concrete ties.

Some forms of ballast in use in the railroad industry are known to

deteriorate when used with concrete ties. FOX may not use any of these

forms of ballast. Paragraphs (d)(7)-(10) set forth standards for the

substructure layer. Paragraph (d)(11) states that FOX must utilize

moveable frog turnouts that are identical to those used along the TGV

lines in France. FRA proposes this to ensure that alternate devices,

which may decrease safety, are not substituted in Florida. Paragraph

(d)(12) proposes that the Railroad may reduce the thickness of ballast

in yards and maintenance facility operations, where speeds are

generally low. The proposed requirements of paragraph (d) were included

in the FOX Petition.

Paragraph (e) sets forth requirements for the integral portions of

the Railroad's signal system. This paragraph works in conjunction with

Chapter 3 of the rule, which sets standards for the specific

performance of the signal system components and procedures. Paragraph

(e)(1) explains that the Railroad's signal system shall include

automatic train control (ATC), interlocking equipment, wayside

detectors, and central traffic control. Paragraphs (e)(2)-(6) describe

the basic function and design that must exist with respect to the ATC

system. The system must interface with the interlocking system and

train braking systems. The on-board equipment must include multiple

processors, software for braking distance-to-go determinations, and

decoders that receive messages from track beacons and short cable loops

that provide notification of upcoming curves, gradients, speed

restrictions, and track occupancy. The on-board equipment will also

calculate braking curves, continuously monitor speed, and initiate

braking in the event the locomotive engineer exceeds maximum authorized

speed. The on-board computers are constructed on a two-out-of-three

voting architecture, which fails safe in the event of an equipment

failure. Paragraph (e)(7) requires the Railroad's braking profiles to

comply with speed restrictions and maximum authorized speed. Paragraph

(e)(9) sets basic requirements for the track circuits: those on main

line must provide jointless audio frequency, which reduces the chance

of intermittent of broken connections; those in crossovers may be

combined with sequential release logic in the interlocking controllers

to ensure protection against poor wheel-rail contact on the seldom-used

rail; those in yards and maintenance facilities may be jointed high-

voltage impulse.

Paragraph (e)(10) describes the function and design of the

Railroad's interlocking system. The interlocking must: Interface with

the wayside signal equipment, track circuits, switch machines, and

wayside signals; monitor all track circuits; interface with the ATC;

exchange supervisory control and status information with central

traffic control; provide back-up control at each interlocking; and

control switch machines and monitoring devices used to verify switch

positions. Paragraphs (e)(11) and (12) require that the interlocking's

vital logic processor shall utilize two processors that operate

simultaneously in a redundant fashion, and that all wayside detectors

interface with the train control system. Finally, paragraph (e)(13)

requires that the Railroad's central traffic control shall monitor and

regulate all train routes and movements. As FRA understands the

current, proposed configuration for the FOX central traffic control

system, there is no built-in redundancy for the CTC processors. The

wayside processors are built with a two-out-of-three architecture, but

it is presumed that the signal system will shut down and trains will

come to a safe stop if the CTC processors fail. FRA requests

clarification from FOX as to whether this is an accurate assessment of

the system's operation. If this is not the case, FRA may consider

further appropriate standards to ensure the safety of the system in the

event that the central traffic control system fails.

Paragraph (f) describes the key communication systems and

components for the Railroad. The Railroad must install a dedicated,

fiber-optic system along the right-of-way to transmit data, and

telephone and radio communications. In addition, the system must have

back-up systems in place in the event of failures. For train

operations, the system must include a dedicated telephone system with

fixed telephones and field sockets along the track, yards, and

platforms; a portable radio system; and a train radio to facilitate

communication among trainsets and central traffic control.

Paragraph (g) addresses the primary elements of the Railroad's

power distribution system. This paragraph works in conjunction with

Chapter 9 of the rule, which sets forth minimum standards for the

operation of the power distribution system. The system will include a

25 kV overhead catenary electrification system, which the Railroad must

protect from the potentially unsafe consequences of lightning strikes.

FRA anticipates that the Railroad's system safety plan will address

this potentially serious risk to the overall safety of the system, and

that the Railroad will devise protective measures in the design,

construction, and equipment used for the catenary system and power

distribution center. All power stations along the right-of-way will

include remote control operating features that facilitate operation

from a central control center. In addition, supervisory control

equipment at remote locations and power substations must have battery-

powered back-up capability in the event of a power system failure.

Paragraph (h) describes the primary elements of the Railroad's

rolling stock. This section works in conjunction with Subpart E of the

proposal, which sets forth equipment design, operation, and maintenance

standards. Much of this paragraph is self-explanatory, but it is

important to note that the FOX trainsets will mimic the basic elements

of French TGV design, and so will consist of articulated, fixed-consist

trains. This formation resists buckling and twisting, and tends to stay

in an upright position in the event of a derailment, which greatly

enhances passenger safety. The FOX trainsets will be capable of

traveling in either direction because a power car will be positioned at

either end of each trainset. The passenger cars and power cars will be

connected with

[[Page 65490]]

semi-permanent connections that can be disconnected only with special

tools and procedures. These semi-permanent connectors between each

trailer car, and between the power cars and trailer cars, are not

couplers. Therefore, the FOX trainsets will not and cannot be coupled

or uncoupled in yards or along the right-of-way, a process which

presents many safety risks for employees who work with conventional

equipment. As an additional safety feature, couplers will be present

and are required at the leading and trailing end of each trainset, in

case a rescue operation requires attaching disabled high speed

trainsets to operative equipment.

Paragraph (h)(3) requires each truck of the trainset to be

continuously monitored by the on-board computer system, which will

alert the locomotive engineer to any malfunction, including hunting

oscillations, brake defects and wheelslide. This feature will greatly

enhance the engineer's ability to prevent an accident or incident by

bringing the train into proper operating condition, if possible, or

slowing the train, as soon as possible. This may also restrict

potential brake system degradation, because the corrective action can

occur before the equipment deteriorates altogether. However, FRA is

uncertain about the redundant capabilities of the on-board computer

monitoring system. The system description section of the Petition

states that the main cab microprocessor is ``backed up by a separate

standby unit.'' It is unclear from the language provided as to whether

this unit is designed to work redundantly and will fail safe in

operation. Therefore, FRA requests additional information from FOX that

describes in detail how the power car microprocessor, which

continuously monitors the equipment, is supported by the other

``standby unit.'' For instance, FRA would like to know whether all

circuits are redundant, if two-out-of-three voting architecture is

employed, and all other pertinent information concerning the computer's

resistance to failure in operation. Section 243.425 of Subpart E,

Rolling Stock describes the requirements of the automated monitoring

system further. However, because FRA is unsure as to whether this

monitoring is redundant and will fail safe, FRA proposes in

Sec. 243.425 that the Railroad address a complete failure of the

automated monitoring system in the system safety plan, and through

appropriate operating rules. Based on the information that FRA receives

from FOX concerning this issue, FRA may determine that an alternative

method of addressing this risk would be preferable, or that the risk is

adequately covered by the design of the equipment.

Paragraph (h)(4) requires each trainset to possess operative

wheelslide control, independent trucks, and fault-tolerant braking.

These devices enhance the overall system safety by permitting trainsets

to stop within shorter distances, to slow or stop with certainty, and

to continue operating safely with defective conditions. The wheelslide

control system is designed to adjust the braking force on each wheel to

prevent sliding during braking, and prevents flat wheel conditions to

arise, which can occur when wheels lock during braking.

This proposal deals with fire safety in a variety of ways.

Paragraph (h)(5) requires all FOX trainsets to possess operative smoke

and fire detection systems, which will increase the likelihood that

passengers will know of the existence of fire and smoke in sufficient

time to exit the equipment. As stated earlier, FRA also proposes to

prohibit smoking on FOX trainsets, which further enhances passenger

safety. In addition, FRA proposes to adopt FRA's emergency preparedness

regulations, which address fire safety and fire protection for railroad

passengers. Finally, the system safety plan that FOX develops must

address the likelihood of fire, the risks presented, and effective

methods of eliminating or reducing those risks.

Paragraph (h)(6) permits FOX to operate vehicles other than the

high speed equipment on the right-of-way. However, these vehicles are

limited to maintenance and rescue equipment, such as a grinding train,

a tamping machine, a track stabilizing machine, track inspection

vehicles (Mauzin car and Melusine car), an ultrasonic test car to

measure the integrity of the rails, a ballast-plowing railway car, and

electric and diesel locomotives for shunting and rescue purposes. All

other rail vehicles are prohibited by the rule. If FOX believes that

other vehicles are necessary for the safe operation of the system,

those should be listed, with rationale, in any comments that FOX may

have to this proposal. FRA seeks to minimize the number and type of

vehicles that operate over the right-of-way, for a variety of reasons

that have been discussed previously. Unless required to advance safety

or move passengers to their final destination, FRA believes that the

operating environment would not support additional or mixed equipment

on the FOX lines.

Paragraph (h)(7) requires the Railroad to equip fully each repair

facility and employee with the appropriate tools needed to maintain the

equipment. Paragraph (h)(8) requires the power cars to incorporate

crash energy management that will protect the locomotive engineer to

the maximum extent possible. The TGV equipment that FOX will use

embodies this requirement. Additional, more specific structural

standards are set forth in Subpart E of the proposal.

Paragraph (h)(10) requires the locomotive engineer cab to

facilitate ease of movement, vision and access to all sensors,

controls, and indicators, and to control climate and noise. FRA

believes that these issues have an impact on employee performance and

railroad safety, and so proposes that the cab be designed to maximize

employee performance. The TGV equipment that FOX plans to use

incorporates this principle.

Paragraph (h)(11) describes the critical components of the

passenger equipment brake system. Each trainset must be equipped with

an electro-pneumatic brake system that maintains the independence of

each truck's response to a brake demand. The locomotive engineer's

automatic brake valve in the leading cab controls the brake pipe

pressure. Each of the following devices must be capable of initiating

an emergency brake application: the ATC, the deadman control, two

emergency brake valves located in the cab, and emergency brake valves

located in two trailer cars of each trainset. Each powered truck shall

be independently controlled by the brake pipe, and will have electric

braking that is battery-operated in the case of a main power failure.

The brake system will be arranged so that the electric brake has

priority over others. During emergency braking, relays will check the

level of electric braking, and will apply the friction brake if a

failure is detected. The locomotive engineer will have control of the

powered truck electric brake through the traction-braking master

controller to slow the trainset or maintain low speed. The braking

functions on each powered truck will be controlled by separate

microprocessors. Also, microprocessors will continuously monitor all of

the power brake systems. The microprocessors will store all brake

failures and notify the locomotive engineer of failures in any of the

following areas: reception of cab and train control signals, truck

hunting, electric brake, friction brake, fire detection system, head

end power system, alerter, horn, and wheel slide. The braking system

must be designed and operated in a failsafe manner, and include fault

tolerant redundancy and notification of failures as they occur.

[[Page 65491]]

Also, paragraph (h)(11) requires the Railroad to prepare, in

conjunction with its system safety plan, a matrix of authorized train

speed and braking reductions that correspond to potential brake

failures that may occur en route. This matrix is required by Subparts B

and E, and this section, and is an extremely important safety feature

of the FOX system. This document, and the planning it reflects, will

guide the movement of equipment in passenger service when brake

failures occur en route, after the daily inspection. Without this plan

in place, the Railroad may be forced to return to the more draconian

and less effective option of moving the defective equipment to the next

repair facility. (See full discussion below in Sec. 243.15 concerning

the movement of defective equipment for additional information on this

topic.) The French TGV operates under a braking matrix plan that is

devised specially for each route taken throughout their system. FOX

plans to replicate this process in Florida. FRA requires development of

and adherence to the matrix in this NPRM, but believes that it would be

unwise to dictate the specific speed reductions and corresponding brake

failures in this proposal. The right-of-way has not yet been chosen and

many subtle operating conditions are unknown at this time. FRA believes

that the most appropriate course is to require FOX to prepare and test

the braking matrix as part of the overall system safety planning and

development called for by the proposal. However, FRA seeks comment from

FOX and other interested parties on whether these safety standards

should require the Railroad to automate the enforcement of the braking

matrix. Given the technological capacity of the equipment and the

importance of the correct train speed in the event of brake failure,

FRA is considering imposing such a requirement.

Finally, paragraph (h)(12) states that the Railroad must install

and maintain hot box detectors throughout the right-of-way, which sense

journal bearing temperature and alert central traffic control of any

potentially defective equipment.

All of these provisions relating to the braking system were

included in the FOX Petition, and reflect the state of modern braking

systems for passenger equipment.

Section 243.15 Movement of Defective Equipment

This section requires the Railroad to meet certain conditions prior

to moving defective equipment or continuing with it in revenue service.

Paragraph (a) provides that any equipment containing a condition that

does not comply with Sec. 243.433(f)(1) of the proposal may be moved

only after the Railroad has completed a series of actions to ensure the

safety of the movement. In order for the movement to proceed, a

qualified person must determine that the equipment can be moved safely;

the qualified person must inform the locomotive engineer and crew of

the non-complying condition, the maximum authorized speed and other

appropriate restrictions; and the qualified person must affix a tag to

the control cab of the trainset that contains specified information

concerning the defect. Section 243.433(f)(1) is a daily inspection

requirement contained in the rolling stock chapter of this proposal,

which includes a list of several items that must be operating as

intended when the inspection is done in order for the equipment to

depart. Therefore, paragraph (a) covers any defect that occurs after

the daily inspection has been completed, and the trainset was

determined to be in compliance and released for revenue service.

Paragraph (b) provides that a trainset which develops a non-

complying condition en route, or in other words, after the daily

inspection required by Sec. 243.433(f)(1), may continue in revenue

service until the next inspection required by the rule, only if the

Railroad has accomplished the tasks required by paragraph (a).

Paragraph (b) also states that, if brake defects arise en route, the

requirements of Sec. 243.409 of the proposal apply. The pertinent

portions of Sec. 243.409 state that the Railroad must develop and

adhere to speed restrictions that correspond to varying levels of brake

defects or failure, and that the locomotive engineer must notify the

central traffic control of any brake failure that occurs within one

trip.

Paragraph (c) permits the movement of defective equipment in a

yard, so long as there are no passengers in the equipment, the movement

does not exceed a speed of 10 mph, and the movement is made solely for

the purpose of moving to a repair facility.

The movement of defective equipment is a topic that deserves

considerable discussion as it relates to power brakes and other safety

appliances, given the safety risks involved and the statutory

background implicated. FRA's proposed Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards, published on September 23, 1997 (62 FR 49728) provide a

thorough explanation of the factors and conclusions involved, which is

summarized here.

FRA's existing regulations do not contain requirements pertaining

to the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement

of equipment with these defects is currently controlled by a statutory

provision (originally enacted in 1910 as part of the laws formerly

known as the Safety Appliance Acts), which states:

(a) GENERAL--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this

chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless

may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being

imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which

the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest

available place at which the repairs can be made--

(1) on the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was

discovered;

or

(2) at the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the

railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the

place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the

number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,

FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a

minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA

bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement that permits

a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the vehicles

in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the engineer

is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on all other

vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those vehicles in

a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted in 1903,

section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the

authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC issued an

order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49 CFR

232.1, which codified the ICC order.

As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power

brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory

requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in

a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that

equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes constitute no more

than 15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the

equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,

the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on

the

[[Page 65492]]

railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made.

The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective

or insecure brakes noted above can create safety hazards and

operational difficulties in passenger operations. As the provisions

regarding the movement of defective brake equipment were written almost

a century ago, they do not address contemporary realities of these

operations. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of

causing major disruptions of service, which could create serious safety

and security problems. For example, requiring repairs to be made at the

nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made could result

in discharging passengers between stations where adequate facilities

for their safety are not available, or onto overcrowded station

platforms. In addition, strict application of the statutory

requirements could result in trains with defective brake equipment

moving against the current of traffic during high traffic hours.

Irregular movements of this type increase the risk of collisions.

Furthermore, like many passenger operations, FOX may operate trains

that include eight or fewer cars. Consequently, the necessity to cut

out the brakes on one or more cars can easily result in noncompliance

with the 85-percent requirement for hauling the car for repairs, thus

prohibiting train movement and resulting in the same sort of safety

problems noted above.

FRA has attempted to recognize the nature of passenger operations,

and the importance of passenger safety, and to avoid disrupting service

when applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with

defective brakes. FRA believes that speed restrictions can readily be

used to compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority of cars. FRA

believes that affirmatively recognizing appropriate movement

restrictions would actually enhance safety, because compliance with the

existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.

FRA recognizes that some of the proposed standards in Sec. 243.15

are not in accord with the requirement contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a)

that cars with defective or insecure brakes be moved to the ``nearest''

location where the necessary repairs can be made. However, FRA does

have authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled ``Exemption for

technological improvements,'' to establish the restrictions proposed in

Sec. 243.15. Section 20306 provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may exempt from the

requirements of this chapter railroad equipment or equipment that

will be operated on rails, when those requirements preclude the

development or implementation of more efficient railroad

transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under

existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as a part of the Rock Island

Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act to authorize the use of

certain trailers as freight cars. See Public Law 96-254 (May 30, 1980).

FRA believes that the use of the provision as contemplated in this

proposal is consistent with the authority granted the Secretary of

Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the statutory

requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective brakes

were written nearly a century ago, were focused largely on the

operation of freight equipment, and did not contemplate passenger train

operations currently prevalent throughout the nation and that will

exist on FOX. Since the original enactment in 1910 of the provisions

now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20303(a), there have been substantial changes

in the nature of the operations of passenger trains, and the technology

used in those operations.

Contemporary passenger equipment incorporates many types of

advanced braking systems; in some cases these include electrical

activation of brakes on each car (with pneumatic application through

the train line available as a backup). Dynamic brakes are also

typically employed to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces and

to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the

brake valves and brake components used today are far more reliable than

was the case several decades ago. In addition to these technological

advances, the brake equipment used in passenger train operations

incorporates advanced technologies not found with any regularity in

freight operations. These include:

The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which

provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the

brakes;

The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping

distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels;

The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the

brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits

more flexibility and more forgiving train control;

The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck

basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those

brakes that are operable;

The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car

which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system,

thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a

total loss of air in the brake system;

The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main

reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the

brake pipe train line; and

Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake

ratios of loaded freight cars.

Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for

several decades, most of the technologies did not become prevalent

until 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances have

been integrated into one efficient and reliable braking system only

within the last decade. Consequently, the technology incorporated into

the brake equipment used in contemporary passenger train operations,

including FOX equipment, increases the reliability of the braking

system and permits the safe operation of the equipment for extended

distances, even where a portion of the braking system may be

inoperative or defective.

In the face of these technological advances, FRA believes it is

appropriate to utilize the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. 20306 and

exempt certain passenger train operations from the specific restriction

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the movement of equipment

with defective or insecure brakes to the nearest location where

necessary repairs can be made. FRA proposes restrictions on the

movement of this type of equipment that are more conducive to safe

operations. Under this proposal, the Railroad could move such cars only

at reduced speeds and only until the next required inspection of the

equipment.

In utilizing the authority granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the

Secretary is required to make ``findings based on evidence developed at

a hearing,'' unless there is ``an agreement between national railroad

labor representatives and the developer of the new equipment or

technology.'' FRA is confident that, after notice and opportunity for

oral and written public comment, the record will support a finding that

the proposed provisions are ``in the public interest and consistent

with railroad safety,'' the test required in order to waive safety

requirements issued under other, general provisions of the code. See 49

U.S.C. 20103(d). It should be noted that the exemption granted to the

movement of equipment

[[Page 65493]]

on FOX with defective brakes would not include an exemption from 49

U.S.C. 20303(c), which contains the liability provisions attendant with

the movement of equipment with defective or insecure safety appliances,

including power brakes. Consequently, the liability provisions

contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(c) will be applicable to the Railroad when

hauling equipment with defective or insecure power brakes pursuant to

the requirements proposed by FRA in this notice.

FRA also proposes to exempt FOX passenger train operations from its

longstanding interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B) and 49

CFR 232.1 noted above, prohibiting the movement of a train if more than

15 percent of the cars in the train have defective, insecure, or

inoperative brakes. As discussed above, such a limitation is overly

burdensome and has the potential of creating safety hazards, due to the

short length of the trains commonly operated in FOX passenger service.

Based on the preceding discussion, FRA proposes in this NPRM to

permit FOX trainsets to move under speed restrictions if brake defects

occur en route. This proposal incorporates procedures used in France on

the TGV that will guide the establishment of those speed restrictions.

As is discussed above, the Railroad shall devise a matrix, in which

speed levels are established to correspond to certain brake defects

that will facilitate the safe movement of the equipment. The

development of this matrix must be accomplished in conjunction with the

development of the Railroad's system safety plan, which requires FRA

approval. FRA believes that this approach will ensure a high level of

safety by taking into account advanced technology, the proven TGV

procedure, and the system safety concept of planning to minimize or

eliminate hazards.

Subpart B--System Safety Program and Plan

Section 243.101 General System Safety Requirements

This Subpart proposes system safety program requirements that FOX

must develop and follow. System safety is the concept that forms the

foundation for the proposed rule, as it does for TGV operation in

France. As discussed earlier in this document, system safety means the

application of design, operating, technical, and management techniques

and principles throughout the life cycle of a system to reduce hazards

and unsafe conditions to the lowest level possible, through the most

effective use of available resources. In this process, FRA proposes

that the Railroad implement a system safety program to identify and

manage safety risks, and generate data for use in making safety

decisions.

The proposed requirements for the Fox system safety program are

very similar to the requirements proposed for high speed (Tier II)

passenger equipment, which were published on September 23, 1997 in the

Federal Register (62 FR 40728). However, the Tier II system safety

standards were developed to cover only the trainset, and not the

remaining railroad system elements. The system safety program proposed

for FOX covers the design, development, testing and operation of the

entire railroad system, which includes track, signal, rolling stock,

operating practices, power distribution, personnel qualification

requirements, and system qualification tests.

Paragraph (a) of Sec. 243.101 requires the Railroad to adopt a

system safety program using MIL-STD-882(C) as a guide. MIL-STD-882(C)

is a standard issued by the Department of Defense that describes system

safety planning and system safety programs used by the U.S. military

for procuring and operating weapon systems. This standard is often used

as a form or reference for system safety planning. FRA does not intend

in this proposal to dictate how the Railroad should apply this

guidance, but FRA believes that the Railroad should tailor application

of the guidance to FOX's unique safety needs and operating scenarios.

FRA envisions that the system safety plan will be a living document

that evolves as new information and knowledge become available.

Therefore, this section requires FOX to update the system accordingly

in the course of operations, and to change practices that prove to be

unsafe.

Due to the critical role that the system safety plan plays in this

rule, FRA proposes that FOX submit the initial plan for FRA approval,

and brief FRA annually on any changes made to it. The Petition

contained language that provided for FRA ``audits'' of the system

safety plan, rather than a clear approval process. However, given the

fact that so many safety features in the FOX system are controlled by

development of the system safety plan, FRA believes that anything short

of approval would be an abdication of the Agency's responsibility to

promulgate clear, enforceable, and effective safety standards. For

instance, one of the safety features relied upon in the FOX risk

assessment and Petition involve a series of wayside detection systems,

which will greatly enhance the safety of the system and have led to

standards in this proposal that permit 200 mph speeds and lighter

equipment. However, these detection systems, as proposed, will not be

placed at regular intervals throughout the right-of-way; rather, they

will be placed, for the most part, where the system safety plan

indicates safety risks exist. If FRA has no approval authority over the

placement of the detection systems and the thought process that

determined the placement, the detection system could conceivably be

used ineffectively, and ultimately have no impact on improving safety.

A similar analysis can be made concerning the braking system matrix

that will define operating procedures for passenger equipment with

defective brakes. Clearly, the Railroad braking system is key to the

safety of the high speed trainsets, and a matrix that establishes

rational speed restrictions is mandatory, for safety and statutory

reasons. FRA believes that the Agency must have an approval mechanism

in place to ensure that such a matrix is in place. FRA understands that

FOX has the desire and capacity to operate the system safely, and FRA

does not intend to interfere unnecessarily in the system safety process

that will be undertaken in Florida. However, FRA believes that the

basis of this rulemaking would be undermined if Federal oversight of

the FOX system safety plan does not take place.

This paragraph also requires FOX to submit the initial system

safety plan to FRA for approval no later than one year after the rule

takes effect. The Petition contained a less certain time frame, related

to the design and construction phases of the project. However, FRA

believes that the system safety plan must be used as a guide in the

earliest conceptual stages of the project. Thus, it should be available

earlier in the program than initially proposed by FOX. As discussed

previously in this document, FRA seeks comment from FOX and other

interested parties concerning alternatives to this proposal. Commenters

are asked to consider the relative merits of a tiered system safety

plan submission schedule, that would permit FOX to produce the system

safety plan in stages, rather than as one complete package. However,

commenters should also address the risk that such a tiered schedule

would lead to a system safety plan that is incomplete or inaccurate

because it does not address all potential hazards at the earliest

possible opportunity.

FRA also requires FOX to brief the FRA annually on the status of

the

[[Page 65494]]

system safety program and on any proposed changes to the system safety

plan. FRA believes this process will permit FRA to assess how

effectively the system safety plan works, and how FOX identifies and

resolves safety risks.

Paragraph (b) of Sec. 243.101 makes clear that the system safety

plan must address the design, construction, maintenance, operation, and

overhaul of the system as a unit. The plan must address how individual

components of the system operate, as well as how those components

operate once integrated into the system. For instance, a particular

appurtenance may perform well in tests or other operations, but that

same component may not perform suitably when integrated into the FOX

system. The plan must evaluate components in this light in order to

ensure the ultimate safety of the system. Also, this paragraph requires

FOX to consider safety at least as important as cost and performance in

assessing design, construction, operation, maintenance, and overhaul of

the Railroad system.

Paragraph (c) describes the various elements that must be included

in the plan. FRA proposes, at a minimum, that the system safety plan

specifically address fire protection; software safety; inspection,

testing, and maintenance; training and qualifications; emergency

preparedness; pre-revenue service qualification testing; hazard

identification and reduction; operating procedures for defective

equipment in passenger service; identification of safety-critical

subsystems; and relationships between safety-critical subsystems. FRA

places emphasis on these elements of the Fox system because they tend

to be overlooked when a less formal, non-systems approach to safety

analysis is taken. Each of these elements of the system safety program

is discussed in greater detail below.

Paragraph (d) sets forth the approach and process FOX must take in

order to develop the system safety program. FRA intends the program to

be a formal step-by-step process that includes: identification of all

safety requirements that govern the operation of the system; evaluation

of the total system to identify known or potential safety hazards that

may arise over the life cycle of the Railroad; identification of all

safety issues during the design phase of the process; elimination or

reduction of the risk posed by the hazards identified; resolution of

safety issues presented; development of a process to track progress;

and development of a program of testing and analysis to demonstrate

that safety requirements are met.

Paragraph (e) requires the Railroad to document how the system

design meets safety requirements, and to monitor how safety issues are

raised and resolved. This is very important in system safety

philosophy; if risks are not identified, eliminated or mitigated, the

system is inherently unsafe.

Paragraph (f) requires the system safety plan to describe how

operational limitations would be imposed if the FOX system design

cannot meet certain safety requirements. FRA anticipates that this

section would include an initial determination from FOX that

operational limits can effectively address the hazard, and if not, a

design change will be put in place to accommodate the risk. Operational

limits are considered the least desirable option in system safety

planning, and thus, the last means utilized to reduce a safety risk.

Paragraph (g) requires the Railroad to facilitate FRA inspection of

the system safety plan and documentation required by paragraph (e). FRA

must have access to this information in order to determine the

Railroad's compliance with the requirements of this Chapter.

Section 243.103 Fire Protection Program

As part of the system safety program, paragraph (a) requires the

Railroad to address fire safety considerations in the design stage of

the project, and to reduce the risk of harm caused by fire on the

equipment to a level established in MIL-STD-882(C) as acceptable.

Paragraph (b) requires the Railroad to make a written analysis of the

fire protection problem, and lists a series of factors that the

Railroad must complete and consider concerning fire protection. These

paragraphs require the Railroad to ensure that good fire protection

practice is used during the design and operation of the equipment.

FRA's primary concern is to protect passengers from the risk of fire

and smoke inhalation, and to ensure that they can evacuate quickly and

safely if a fire erupts.

Elements of this analysis correspond to required action under

Sec. 243.413 of the rolling stock provisions in the rule: Overheat

detectors; a fire or smoke detection system; a fixed, automatic, fire-

suppression system where the Railroad's written analysis determines

they are required; and compliance with the Railroad's written

procedures for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire safety

systems and equipment that the procedures designate as mandatory. [See

Sec. 243.413(c)-(f)].

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to exercise reasonable care to

assure that the design criteria are followed and that the tests

required by this program are performed. To fulfill this obligation in

part, the Railroad must include fire safety requirements in all

contracts for new equipment purchases.

Section 243.105 Software Safety Program

This section proposes requirements for the software portion of the

system safety program. Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to develop

and implement a software safety program to guide the design,

development, testing, integration and verification of FOX system

software. Software plays a key role in the overall performance of the

FOX system, and safety demands that the Railroad place a strong

emphasis on the system's software safety.

Paragraph (b) sets out the proposed required elements of the

software safety program. The program must treat software that controls

or monitors safety functions as safety-critical, unless a completely

redundant, failsafe, non-software means to provide the same function is

provided as part of the design. Paragraph (b) also specifies the steps

required to develop a comprehensive software safety program, which must

culminate in a demonstration of overall software safety as part of the

pre-revenue service system qualification tests of the FOX system.

Paragraph (b) also requires the Railroad to include a hazard

analysis in its software design and implementation that will, to the

fullest extent possible, prevent unauthorized penetration on all

computerized systems in use. As the railroad industry embraces new

technology and increases reliance on electronic information systems,

there must also be development and adherence to effective methods of

preventing intrusion from unauthorized railroad personnel and other

individuals or entities. The FOX system relies on many computerized

systems and sub-systems, the largest being the Railroad's signal

system. Clearly, any opportunity for infiltration of the signal system

by outsiders would expose the passengers, employees, and those along

the right-of-way to grave risk. Therefore, FOX must develop and

implement in its system safety program a method to prevent cyber

threats and alleviate these risks.

Paragraph (c) requires the Railroad to adhere to the requirements

of the software safety program. To fulfill this obligation the Railroad

must include software safety requirements in procurement contracts that

involve design or purchase of software components.

[[Page 65495]]

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to follow the process and

procedures of the software safety program.

Section 243.107 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Program

This section contains the requirements for the Railroad's program

for inspecting, testing, and maintaining the FOX system. FRA's goal is

a set of standards that will ensure that the Fox system remains safe as

it wears and ages, and will protect workers who perform the inspection,

testing, and maintenance tasks. These proposed requirements are based

on FRA's knowledge of inspection, testing and maintenance programs

generally, and the French TGV practices.

Paragraph (a) requires the Railroad to provide to FRA particulars

concerning the inspection, testing, and maintenance program for the

system, including: Safety inspection procedures, intervals and

criteria; testing procedures and intervals; scheduled preventive

maintenance intervals; maintenance procedures; and employee training.

In this proposal, FRA does not dictate specific program contents,

and so the Railroad retains much flexibility to tailor the program to

its needs and experience. However, FRA believes this provision is an

important element of the overall Railroad system, and should be

designed to maximize safe operations and protect safety-related

components of the system from deterioration over time.

Paragraph (b) defines broadly the conditions that can endanger the

safety of the crew, passengers, or equipment, which the inspection,

testing, and maintenance program should prevent, or detect and correct.

Paragraph (c) establishes a link between scheduled maintenance

intervals and the system safety program. Scheduled maintenance

intervals should be set so that worn parts are replaced before they

fail. Initial intervals should be based on manufacturer's

recommendations or operating experience. As more operating experience

is gained, FRA believes that accumulated reliability data should be

used as the basis for changing preventive maintenance intervals on

safety-critical components. This standard should encourage the Railroad

to keep reliability records on safety-critical components, which will

provide confidence that any safety or economic trade-offs have a firm

basis.

Paragraph (d) requires the Railroad to adopt standard operating

procedures, in writing, that explain how all safety-critical

inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks will be performed. This

provision is intended to provide protection to the workers who perform

maintenance and inspection duties, many of which are inherently

dangerous. FRA does not intend to prescribe how these tasks should be

performed. Rather, this proposal requires the Railroad to devise a

program that will ensure employee safety in each individual setting

that may arise in the maintenance of all of the Railroad's equipment.

FRA believes that standard operating procedures are often a key

component in a successful program to train employees to perform their

employment duties safely.

Section 243.109 Training, Qualification, and Designation Program

This section requires the Railroad to develop and implement a

training, qualification, and designation program for workers who

perform inspection, testing, and maintenance tasks. FRA believes that

employee training, qualification, and designation are central to

maintain safe railroad equipment and a safe workforce. Paragraph (a)

requires the Railroad to establish and comply with a training,

qualification, and designation program for employees and contractors

who perform safety-related inspection, testing, or maintenance tasks in

this rule.

Paragraph (b) lists the steps that must be followed in developing

the Railroad's training, qualification, and designation program. This

paragraph lists the general requirements that the Railroad's training,

qualification, and designation program must do to ensure that employees

know how to keep the system operating safely. The SNCF has a training

program in place for operation of TGV equipment in France that is

similar to these proposed requirements. The list of actions that FRA

proposes also compel the Railroad to evaluate its operation and focus

its training resources where the need is greatest.

The proposed rule grants the Railroad flexibility to focus and

provide training that is needed in order to complete a specific job

category. For instance, the proposal does not require ``checkers'' to

receive the same intensive training needed for ``maintainers.'' FRA

anticipates that this proposal will not require extensive changes to

the manner in which TGV employees in France are trained. However, the

proposal will prevent the Railroad from using minimally trained and

unqualified people to perform crucial safety tasks.

FRA believes that many benefits will be gained from the Railroad's

investment in a comprehensive training program. The quality of

inspections will improve, which will result in fewer instances of

defective equipment in revenue service and increased operational

safety. Equipment conditions that require maintenance attention are

more likely to be discovered while the equipment is in a maintenance or

yard site, where repairs can be completed safely and efficiently.

Trouble-shooting will take less time, and maintenance will be completed

correctly the first time, resulting in increased safety and decreased

costs.

Section 243.111 Emergency Preparedness Program

This section requires the Railroad to develop and adopt an

emergency preparedness program that meets the requirements set forth in

FRA's proposed Passenger Train Emergency Standards, 62 FR 8330,

(February 24, 1996) which will be codified at 49 CFR part 239 after

consideration of all comments received and adopted as final. FRA

believes that the FOX system should meet the same emergency

preparedness requirements imposed on every other passenger railroad

operating in the U.S.

Section 243.113 Pre-revenue Service System Qualification Plan

This section sets forth general requirements for pre-revenue

service testing of the FOX system, and works in conjunction with the

specific provisions set forth in Chapter 7 of this rule. Pre-revenue

qualification tests are extremely important because they represent the

culmination of all safety analysis and component tests conducted as

part of the system safety program, and will serve as a basis for all

passenger operations. The pre-revenue service system qualification

tests are intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system

safety program and to prove that the FOX system can operate safely in

its intended environment. FRA believes that these procedures and the

documentation required by the pre-revenue system qualification test

plan are necessary to ensure that all safety risks have been reduced to

a level that will facilitate safe operation in revenue service.

Section 243.115 Hazard Identification and Reduction

This section requires the Railroad to identify all hazards that may

arise in the course of operations and analyze methods available to

reduce or eliminate the hazards. The Railroad may consider remedies

that are based in design, construction, equipment, or operations.

However, operation-based solutions are not favored, and should be used

only when no other alternative

[[Page 65496]]

exists. Design and construction are the preferred methods to eliminate

risk in system safety philosophy, because they completely remove the

opportunity for simple human mistakes or errors in judgment that can

occur in the normal course of operations. This section is important

because operational hazards cannot be minimized or prevented until they

are first recognized as risks. This thought process is basic to system

safety, and so this proposal is an integral component to the Railroad's

system safety plan.

Section 243.117 Operating Procedures in the Event of Component Failure

This section requires the Railroad to consider and develop

operating rules that will protect passengers, employees, and the public

when portions of the system become defective. This section works in

conjunction with Subpart F of the rule, which requires the Railroad to

develop a comprehensive set of operating rules that must be approved by

FRA. It is extremely important to the overall safety of the system that

the Railroad deliberate over appropriate procedures that will

compensate for the loss of safety that malfunctioning equipment causes.

Aside from developing general operating rules, pursuant to the

requirements of Subpart F, this section obligates the Railroad to

engage in a slightly different thought process--to focus on defective

equipment and to mitigate the dangers that arise when equipment

malfunctions. FRA believes that this section is necessary to ensure

passenger and system safety, particularly as it relates to power brake

defects. Also, this section requires the Railroad to analyze and

describe the fault tolerant limits of each system that possesses fault

tolerant components, and develop a process by which the Railroad and

the engineer operating a trainset will be made aware that the system is

approaching its fault tolerant limits. This proposal requires the

Railroad to acknowledge the pre-determined limits of the system

equipment, and to prepare appropriately for instances when those limits

are exceeded, which is consistent with and critical to comprehensive

system safety planning.

Section 243.119 Safety-Critical Subsystems

This proposed section requires the Railroad to identify the safety-

critical subsystems that exist in the FOX system, and to prepare an

explanation of the relationship they have with one another throughout

the life cycle of the system. FRA anticipates that this requirement

reflects the thought that would occur in the normal course of system

safety analysis, and believes it is important enough, in terms of the

ultimate safety of the system, to incorporate in this Subpart.

Section 243.121 Approval Procedure

This section sets forth the system safety plan approval procedures

that the Railroad and FRA must follow. Paragraph (b) requires the

Railroad to file a petition for approval with FRA, and the petition

must include the Railroad's system safety plan, pertinent supporting

documentation, and the primary person to contact if questions arise.

This section also requires the Railroad to prepare a petition for

approval for safety-critical changes to the Railroad's existing safety

plan. FRA believes that such changes have the potential to alter the

overall safety of the FOX network, and therefore, Federal oversight

should be present. Also, pursuant to principles of administrative law,

FRA would notify the public of such changes. Paragraph (c) requires the

Railroad to submit the petition for approval with FRA's Associate

Administrator for Safety, and paragraph (d) describes the actions FRA

must take upon receipt of the petition.

FRA must review the petition, detemine if it complies with all

procedural requirements, and evaluate the substantive validity of the

petition or proposed changes to the petition. Under this proposal, FRA

may approve, approve with special conditions, or disapprove the

petition within ninety days. If FRA is unable to arrive at a

determination within ninety days, the petition remains pending until

FRA acts. Once a petition has been approved, FRA may reopen

consideration of the petition for good cause, which might include the

discovery of new information or new safety evaluations. FRA must

provide the Railroad with written notice of the disposition of the

petition. If FRA determines that changes to safety-critical standards,

criteria, or inspection frequencies are appropriate in the interest of

safety, FRA will publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing

those changes. Sixty days after the notice is published, the changes

become effective.

The FOX system safety program is the most important portion of the

Florida high speed rail project. Every safety discipline will be

governed by the design, construction, and equipment determinations made

in the process of developing the Railroad's system safety program. FRA

has no desire to meddle unnecessarily in the internal, nonsafety

matters of the Railroad's operation. However, due to the role that the

system safety plan plays in the FOX system, and the potential for human

casualty that exists on the system, FRA believes that the agency must

have approval authority over the final system safety plan that is

adopted by the Railroad, in order to ensure the safety of the public.

As stated earlier, FRA invites comment on alternatives to the timing

proposed for submission of the Railroad's system safety plan. In

addition, FRA invites commentary on the approval process that is

proposed in this NPRM, and any alternatives that may be more effective.

Subpart C--Signal System

Subpart C sets forth the safety standards for the Railroad's signal

system. This Subpart is similar to FRA's existing signal safety

standards, 49 CFR part 236, that apply generally to railroad operations

in this country. However, changes have been made to account for the

differences in the signal system that will be utilized in Florida and

the high speed train operations associated with the FOX system.

Section 243.201 Plans, Where Kept

This section requires the Railroad to keep plans that are necessary

for the proper maintenance and testing of the signal and train control

system at each interlocking and intermediate track circuit case. Plans

must be legible and accurate, in order to protect against errors in

circuitry connections. This is consistent with the Petition and current

U.S. practices.

Section 243.202 Grounds

This proposed section requires the Railroad to keep each circuit

that affects the safety of train operations, free from any ground or

combination of grounds that will permit a flow of current equal to or

in excess of 75 percent of the release value of any relay or other

electromagnetic device in the circuit. However, the following circuits

are not included in this requirement: circuits that include any track

rail; the common return wires of single-wire, single-break, signal

control circuits using a grounded common; and alternating current power

distribution circuits that are grounded in the interest of safety. This

is consistent with the Petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.203 Locking of Signal Apparatus Housings

This section requires the Railroad to protect signal apparatus

housings from unauthorized entry. The proposal requires the Railroad to

lock, seal, or secure all external housings of signal and track-side

automatic train control system apparatus. The purpose of this

[[Page 65497]]

section is to prevent vital components of the signal system from being

vandalized or tampered with, which could cause the system to

malfunction. The proposed rule is consistent with the Petition and

current U.S. practice.

Section 243.204 Design of Control Circuits on Failsafe Principle

This section requires that the failure of a safety-critical control

circuit will not cause a condition more permissive than intended.

Safety-critical circuits shall be designed on a failsafe principle.

This section includes all vital circuits and track circuits through

which signal control circuits are selected, including any failure of

the data link radio transmission system. Circuits should be designed so

that failure of any part or component of the circuit will cause the

most restrictive aspects to be displayed. The proposed rule is intended

to address the design of the FOX signal system, including electronic

and processor-based equipment.

Section 243.205 Power-operated Switch Use

This section requires all switch movements to be completed by

power-operated electric switch machines. Hand-operated switches are

prohibited in territory controlled by ATC. Each power-operated switch

will be controlled from the Railroad's central traffic control center.

This is consistent with the FOX petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.206 Yard Operations

This section requires the Railroad to control yard operations

through the traffic control center for the yard, and to complete all

movements in the yard at restricted speed. This section also states

that relevant portions of 49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 apply to signals

that are used in FOX yard operations. There are some requirements

presently in other sections of this proposed rule that would apply to

yard operations. However, since signals and switches used in yard

limits will be similar or identical to conventional signal systems

currently in use in the U.S., FRA believes that the applicable portions

of 49 CFR 236.1 through 236.109 would be more appropriate. These

address such items as design of control circuits, operating

characteristics, location of roadway signals, and shunting sensitivity.

Section 243.207 Timetable Instructions

The section requires the Railroad to designate all interlockings,

automatic train control territory, and yard limits in timetable

instructions. The designation may be published in timetable

instructions in any manner that the Railroad chooses. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Wayside and Cab Signals

Section 243.208 Location of Wayside Signals

This section requires FOX to position and align each wayside signal

so that its aspects can be visually associated with the track it

governs. The proposal grants the Railroad discretion to determine where

the wayside signals will be positioned. FRA's safety experts will

determine whether the location and alignment of each signal complies

with the intent of this section and that the signal aspect is

associated with the track governed. This section is consistent with the

Petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.209 Aspects and Indications

Paragraph (a) of this section requires that aspects of wayside

signals must be shown by the color of lights, position of lights,

flashing of lights, or any combination thereof. They may be qualified

by marker plate, number plate, letter plate, marker light, or any

combination thereof. Paragraph (b) states that the fundamental

indications of wayside signal aspects must conform to the following: a

red light or a series of horizontal lights will indicate stop; a yellow

light or a lunar light will indicate that speed is to be restricted and

stop may be required; and a green light or a series of vertical lights

will indicate proceed at maximum authorized speed. Paragraph (c)

requires that the names, indications, and aspects of wayside and cab

signals must be defined in the Railroad's operating rules or special

instructions, and all modifications must be filed with the FRA within

thirty days after the modifications take effect. Paragraph (d) states

that absence of a qualifying appurtenance or the failure of a lamp in a

light signal may not cause the display of a less restrictive aspect

than intended.

Paragraph (e) of this section relates to cab display and requires

all cab displays to include the maximum authorized speed, shown by a

bar graph or a needle in the periphery of the dial used for the

indication of train speed; the target speed, shown by numbers; and the

target distance corresponding to the indicated target speed, shown by a

continuously refreshed bar graph and numbers in case of overflow of the

bar graph. Paragraph (f) states that all bar graphs and numbers must be

illuminated so that they can be read easily in all lighting conditions

in which the equipment will be used. This proposed section is

consistent with the Petition and current U.S. practice.

Section 243.210 Markers

This section requires the Railroad to equip all high speed lines

with block section markers and route origin markers, and requires all

block section limits to be indicated by marker plates installed along

the right-of-way. These markers must be located at adjoining block

sections and must be illuminated during night operations and when

visibility along the line is limited. Paragraph (c) requires that route

origin markers must be positioned at the beginning of each route and

must be equipped with a proceed light. Paragraph (d) requires the

Railroad to provide special shunting markers at locations that are not

equipped with route origin markers and where turn-back operations may

be required. This marker must be equipped with a shunting light.

This section, as proposed by FRA, is very similar to portions of

the Petition, except that FRA requires the block section limits to be

illuminated and FOX proposed that the block section limits would be

indicated by retroreflective marker plates. FRA believes that, given

the speed trains will travel and the frequent storms that occur in

Florida, lighted markers enhance the safety of the system, and impose

little financial burden. This addition should ensure that locomotive

engineers recognize block sections, which is particularly important for

occasions when an engineer must rely on the block sections during any

interruption of the ATC system.

Section 243.211 Spacing of Beacons

This proposed section requires the Railroad to design the ATC

system and beacon spacing so that the locomotive engineer can comply

with any imposed speed restriction by initiating a service brake

application, and if the locomotive engineer fails to react, an

automatic brake application will occur. In ATC territory, the braking

distances must be designed in order to compensate for delay time, which

will ensure the trainset complies with the target speed and distance

through the brake application initiated by the system. An aspect that

mandates a stop at the next signal requires sufficient spacing so that

a stop can be achieved before reaching the next signal, without an

emergency brake application. These proposed sections apply to all

systems, including

[[Page 65498]]

the Railroad's high wind, flood, intrusion, and dragging equipment

protective devices. The section is consistent with the FOX petition and

U.S. practice.

Track Circuits

Section 243.212 Track Circuit Requirements

This proposed section sets forth a variety of track circuit

requirements. Generally, track relay controlling home signals or

beacons must be in the de-energized position, or a device that

functions as a track relay controlling home signals or beacons must be

in its most restrictive state. In addition, the track circuit must be

de-energized when a rail is broken or a rail or switch-frog is removed

or when a trainset occupies any part of the track circuit. It will not

be a violation if a track circuit is energized because a break occurs

between the end of rail and track circuit connector; within the limits

of rail-joint bond, appliance or other protective device, which

provides a bypath for the electric current; or, as a result of leakage

current or foreign current in the rear of a point where a break occurs.

This proposed section is consistent with the Petition and U.S.

practice.

Section 243.213 Track Circuit Shunting Sensitivity

This proposed section requires the Railroad to maintain each track

circuit controlling a home signal so that the track relay is in a de-

energized position, or a device that functions as a track relay will be

in its most restrictive state if, when the track circuit is dry, a

shunt is connected across the track rails of the circuit, including

fouling sections of turnouts. The electric resistance of the shunt must

be: 0.15 Ohm on open track and 0.25 Ohm in interlocking areas. These

values are given for use with a ballast of 8 Ohm per kilometer (0.62

mi) resistance and is consistent with the FOX petition.

The proposed signal system will utilize jointless audio frequency

track circuits on the main line. Typical track circuits on the FOX main

line will be center fed, using one transmitter at the center and a

receiver at each end of the circuit. In crossover areas, circuits will

be combined with sequential release logic in the interlocking

controllers to ensure protection against poor wheel-rail contact on

seldom-used rail. Jointed high-voltage impulse track circuits must be

used in the yards and maintenance facilities.

Section 243.214 Insulated Rail Joints

This section requires the Railroad to maintain insulated rail

joints so that the failure of any track circuit, caused by track

circuit current that flows between insulated rails, will be prevented.

This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.215 Fouling Wires

This section requires that fouling wires consist of at least two

discrete conductors, and that each be of sufficient conductivity and

maintained in such condition that the track relay will be in de-

energized position, or the device that functions as a track relay will

be in its most restrictive state, when the circuit is shunted. This is

consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.216 Turnout, Fouling Section

This section requires rail joints within the fouling section to be

bonded, and the fouling section to extend at least to a point where

sufficient track centers and allowance for maximum car overhang will

prevent interference with trainset movement on the adjacent track. It

is important that all rail joints are bonded to ensure continuity of

track circuits. The proposed rule is consistent with the FOX petition

and U.S. practice.

Wires and Cables

Section 243.217 Protection of Insulated Wire; Splice in Underground

Wire; Aerial Cable

This section requires insulated wire to be protected from

mechanical injury, any splice in underground wire to have insulation

resistance at least equal to the wire spliced, and all aerial cable to

be supported by messenger. This is consistent with the Petition and

U.S. practice. Insulated wire must be positioned in such a manner that

it cannot be damaged by the operation of apparatus, vehicles, tools,

workers, or by closing doors. Temporary installation of cable or wires

on top of the ground is prohibited by this section.

Section 243.218 Tagging of Wires and Interference of Wires or Tags

With Signal Apparatus

This section requires the Railroad to tag or otherwise mark each

wire so that it can be identified at each terminal. Tags and other

identifiers must be made of insulating material, arranged so that they

do not interfere with the moving parts of equipment, and correspond

with the circuit plans. The proposed rule is consistent with the FOX

petition and U.S. practice.

Standards

Section 243.219 Control Circuits; Requirements

This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to install each

signal or beacon that governs train movements into a block section so

that it will convey its most restrictive state as long as any of the

following conditions exist within the block: a trainset occupies the

block, points of a switch are not closed in proper position; a track

relay is in de-energized position or a device which functions as a

track relay is in its most restrictive state; or, when a signal control

circuit is de-energized. This section reflects the unique

characteristics of the FOX beacon and loop transmission signal system

(TBL) and is consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.220 Control Circuits for Signals, Selection Through Point

Detector Operated by Switch Movement

This section requires that control circuit(s) for each signal

aspect or beacon, which conveys an indication more favorable than

``proceed at restricted speed'' for signal governing movements over

switches, be selected through a point detector operated directly by

switch points for each switch, movable-point frog, and derail in the

routes governed by such signal or beacon. Circuits must be arranged so

that the signal or beacon can convey an indication more favorable than

``proceed at restricted speed'' only when each switch, movable-point

frog, and derail in the route is in proper position. This section

reflects the FOX TBL system and is consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.221 Time Locking; Where Required

This section of the proposal requires the Railroad to provide time

locking in conjunction with signal aspects or beacons that convey

indications more favorable than ``proceed at restricted speed.'' FRA

will expect that any signal that displays an aspect more favorable than

``proceed at restricted speed'' will have time locking. This

requirement would apply regardless of any speed restrictions that may

be placed on a stretch of track at any given time. The time locking

must be effective for the maximum authorized speed that is permitted on

each route. Also, this section requires the Railroad to provide locking

for all interlocking signals where route or direction of traffic can be

changed. FRA's proposal differs from the Petition by using the term

``interlocking signals'' rather than'controlled signals' because the

[[Page 65499]]

FOX system will consist of interlockings.

Section 243.222 Indication Locking

This proposed section requires the Railroad to provide indication

locking for switches, movable-point frogs, and derails. Indication

locking should prevent the clearing of signals governing movements over

switches, movable-point frogs, and derails until each operative unit

has completed its required movement. This is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.223 Electric Locking Circuits

This proposed section requires the Railroad to provide vital design

methods to prevent the system from displaying aspects that will result

in conflicting or unsafe movements. The operation of controlling

devices, logic, or apparatus are required to succeed each other in

proper sequence before a proceed aspect can be displayed. Vital design

methods in interlocking circuitry shall prevent ``proceed'' aspects

from being displayed for conflicting movements.

Section 243.224 Loss of Shunt Protection; Where Required

This section requires that loss of shunt protection not permit the

release of the route locking circuit of each power-operated switch. The

loss of shunt protection must be based on a sequential release logic.

Sequential release logic requires that when any track circuit becomes

occupied in logical sequence from a previous track circuit, in

combination with an established train route, its status will not be

allowed to return to unoccupied, even though the detected shunt may be

lost, until a specified safe time interval after the next track circuit

in the route becomes occupied. This section is consistent with the

Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.225 Signal Control Circuits, Selection Through Track

Relays or Devices Functioning as Track Relays

This section requires control circuits for signal aspects or

beacons, which convey indications more favorable than ``proceed at

restricted speed,'' to be selected through track relays, or through

devices that function as track relays, for all track circuits in the

route governed. This section would not apply to control circuits of

signals displaying aspects with indications of ``proceed at restricted

speed.'' This is consistent with the Petition and U.S. practice.

Section 243.226 Switch, Movable-Point Frog or Split-point Derail

This section requires the Railroad to equip switches, movable-point

frogs, or split-point derails with clamp locks on each switch or

movable point frog and to maintain it so that it cannot be locked when

the point is open 6 mm (.25 in) or more. Each high speed turnout on the

main line must be equipped with a pair of switch machines (one for the

points and one for the movable frog), clamp locks, and position

detectors.

Section 243.227 Point Detector

This proposed section requires the Railroad to maintain point

detectors so that when switch mechanisms are locked in normal or

reverse position, contacts cannot be opened by manually applying force

at the closed switch point. Point detector circuit controllers must be

maintained so that the contacts will not assume the position

corresponding to switch point closure if the switch point is prevented

by an obstruction, from closing to within 6 mm (0.25 in). This is

consistent with the Petition.

Section 243.228 Signals Controlled by Track Circuits

This section requires control circuits for aspects with indications

more favora

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