Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Docket No. 87-2, Notice. No. 5]

RIN 2130-AB20

Automatic Train Control and Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement

System; Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Proposed order of particular applicability.

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to issue an order of particular applicability

requiring all trains operating on the north end of the Northeast

Corridor (NEC) between Boston, Massachusetts and New York, New York, to

be controlled by locomotives equipped to respond to a new advanced

civil speed enforcement system (ACSES) in addition to the automatic

train control (ATC) system that is currently required on the NEC. The

proposed order also contains performance standards for the cab signal/

ATC and ACSES systems on the NEC. The order would authorize increases

in certain maximum authorized train speeds and safety requirements

supporting improved rail service.

DATES: Written comments must be received by January 20, 1998. Comments

received after the comment period has closed will be considered to the

extent possible without incurring additional delay. A request for a

public hearing must be received by December 22, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be submitted to Ms. Renee Bridgers,

Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E. Goodman, Staff Director, Signal

and Train Control Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C., 20590 (telephone (202) 632-3353), or Patricia

V. Sun, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone (202) 632-3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

FRA has both discrete and plenary legal authority to require that

all trains operating on the NEC be equipped with automatic train

control devices. FRA has broad legal authority to ``prescribe

regulations, and issue orders for every area of railroad safety * *

*.'' 49 U.S.C. 20103. Section 20502 of Title 49, United States Code

specifically provides that ``[w]hen the Secretary of Transportation

decides after an investigation that it is necessary in the public

interest, the Secretary may order a railroad carrier to install * * * a

signal system that complies with the requirements of the Secretary.''

As originally enacted and prior to formal codification, this provision

referred to ``automatic train stop, train control, and/or other similar

appliances, methods, and systems intended to promote the safety of

railroad operation * * *.'' This authority has been previously invoked

to require the installation of signal systems on 49 specific railroads

and to require all railroads desiring to operate at high speeds to

install signal systems of varying degrees of sophistication consonant

with those higher speeds.

Background--Development of the NEC

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) provides

service over the NEC from Washington, D.C., to Boston, Massachusetts.

Amtrak owns or dispatches most of the NEC, which it shares with several

commuter authorities and freight railroads. Maximum track speeds on

certain segments of the NEC south of New York City (the ``South End'')

are limited to 125 miles per hour (mph) for Metroliner equipment.

Current speeds north of New York City (the ``North End'') range up to

110 mph.

Amtrak is currently undertaking a major improvement project on the

NEC, with particular emphasis on completion of electrification,

installation of concrete ties and high-speed turnouts, elimination of

some remaining highway-rail crossings, and other modifications

concentrated between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston. These

improvements are designed to facilitate service utilizing high-speed

trainsets (HST's) at speeds up to 150 (mph). Similar service would also

be implemented on the south end of the NEC, with the initial increase

in maximum speed expected to be from 125 mph to 135 mph. During 1999,

Amtrak will begin taking delivery of HST's expected to qualify for

operation through curves at higher levels of

[[Page 62098]]

unbalance (and thus higher speeds) than conventional trains.

Increases in operating speeds would be accomplished during a period

of continued traffic growth. Commuter and intercity trains are expected

to increase in number over the next 20 years. Local freight traffic is

expected to increase on the North End, and recent proposals for the

sale of Consolidated Rail Corporation have given rise to the

possibility that freight operations on the South End, particularly in

Maryland, might increase.

In its planning for implementation of high-speed service between

New Haven and Boston, FRA recognized that a more secure train control

system would be required to address the increased potential for

collisions associated with increased traffic density. As planning for

South End service growth matures, similar conclusions are likely.

Although this proposed order does not address territory owned and

dispatched by the MTA Metro-North Railroad between New Rochelle, New

York, and New Haven similar concerns may arise in that territory as

intercity service increases.

FRA is concerned that planning for high-speed service not occur in

isolation from measures that can reasonably address increased traffic

densities. Future increases in traffic is one factor that will drive

future innovative technology.

Proposed Signal and Train Control Enhancements

Providing signalization for high-speed intercity service will

require implementation of an enhanced cab signal/speed control system.

The new system must allow for higher train speeds while providing

sufficient gradations of intermediate speeds to allow efficient

movement of other scheduled trains operating in the conventional speed

range. Reasonable interoperability of existing and new on-board

equipment is also desirable to provide for the continued use of

existing on-board equipment which will be used only at conventional

speeds.

Amtrak presently uses a four-aspect continuous cab signal/speed

control system. Amtrak proposes to replace this system with a new nine-

aspect continuous cab signal/speed control, referred to in this order

as ``cab signal/ATC,'' and an intermittent transponder civil speed

enforcement system providing for train operations of up to 150 mph;

intermediate speeds of 125, 100, 80, 60, 45, and 30 mph; and a positive

stop feature. Amtrak calls the new transponder-based portion of this

system, which would provide positive stop and civil speed enforcement

capability, the ``Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System'' (ACSES).

9-Aspect Cab Signal System

The cab signal/ATC portion of the new system will employ two

carrier frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible with existing equipment, and

250 Hz. Both frequencies will be coded at standard rates of 75, 120,

180, and 270 cycles per minute. Upgraded equipment will be able to take

advantage of the 150 mph code rate for maximum authorized speed, the 80

mph code rate for high speed diverging moves, and separate 45/40 and 30

mph speed commands for limited and medium speed turnouts.

Although existing four-aspect equipment will not be able to take

advantage of these additional features, it can continue to operate as

it does today. Instead of diverging through a high speed turnout at 80

mph, this equipment will diverge at 45 mph (passenger trains) or 40 mph

(freight). In addition to the conventional diesel-electric and straight

electric trains currently traveling on the NEC, FRA anticipates that

new HST's will be used to minimize the run time between Boston, New

York, and Washington. The first stage of the installation of the 9-

aspect system involves conventional electronic coded track circuits.

The next stage involves the conversion of these electronic track

circuits for use in electrified territory. No civil speed restrictions

will be reflected in this cab signal/ATC system. There will be no

positive stop aspect or indication associated with the cab signal/ATC

system other than a stop signal displayed at home signal locations. The

cab signal/ATC system provides control based on track and route

conditions ahead. It will operate as a stand alone system with an

interface to the brake valve to enforce speed control.

ACSES

In contrast to the modified cab signal system, the ACSES will

provide new safety functions that--with limited exceptions--are not

currently provided. For purposes of civil speed control, permanent

wayside transponders would be placed in sets (normally two to a set) at

convenient, accessible locations in the center of the track approaching

speed restriction zones. The transponders would be passive devices

requiring no energy source other than that transmitted from a passing

train. Each permanent transponder set would contain encoded information

about speed restrictions ahead, including: (i) The distance to the

beginning of the speed restriction; (ii) the target speed; (iii) the

type of speed restriction; (iv) the average grade between the location

where the speed reduction must begin and the location where the reduced

speed must be reached; (v) the distance to the next permanent

transponder set location; and (vi) necessary sync and check bytes to

allow for message verification. Since the number of discrete codes

available is large, it would be possible to provide speed and distance

information for more than one speed restriction at a time.

The two transponders in a set are used to determine which message

the train should accept, determined by the direction of the train as

follows: the train would receive the appropriate message from the order

in which the transponders in the set are read, e.g., if ``A'' is

encountered first, the message for movement in the direction from ``A''

to ``B'' would be received; if ``B'' is encountered first, the message

for the opposite direction, from ``B'' to ``A,'' will be received.

At distant signals prior to interlocking home signals and control

points in high-speed territory, dynamic transponders would be provided.

These transponders would communicate the status of the home signal

providing for positive stop enforcement.

Each locomotive, power car, and non-powered control car would be

equipped with a transmitter/receiver, an antenna mounted under the

vehicle, an axle generator (to measure speed and distance traveled), an

on-board computer, and an aspect display unit. The vehicle would

continuously transmit a signal which, when received by a wayside

transponder, would cause the transponder to transmit back its encoded

message. The on-board equipment would then decode this message and the

on-board computer would calculate the braking distance based on the

present speed of the train, the information received from the

transponder set, and the standard Amtrak reduction braking curves with

a 12.5% safety factor compensated for grade together with an 8-second

reaction time. When the train reaches the calculated distance from the

speed restriction, an audible alarm would sound and the new speed would

be digitally displayed in the cab of the vehicle. The engineer must

acknowledge the alarm. If the train is above the speed required by the

profile generator inside the on-board computer, the engineer would be

required to bring the train down to the required speed. Failure to do

so would result in an automatic penalty application of the brakes which

can only be released when the train is below the required speed.

[[Page 62099]]

The on-board computer would be programmed to calculate speed and

braking distance based on the type of equipment it is mounted on. A

high performance train, such as a tilt body train, would be allowed to

run at a higher speed around a curve than conventional passenger

equipment if consistent with allowed unbalance. A safe default speed

would be provided in the railroad operating rules in the case of tilt

body equipment failure or ACSES failure.

Temporary speed restrictions would be entered into the civil speed

enforcement on-board computer at the beginning of the run. Normally the

speed restrictions would be entered by a data radio located at

strategic entrances and locations along the NEC. In the event that the

data radio is inoperative, the engineer would be able to enter the

information from the paper Form D he or she receives that lists all

temporary speed restrictions.

In the fully deployed system, data radio transmitters would be

provided at all interlockings in equipped territory, permitting

updating of temporary restrictions and verification that on-board

information is complete. Crews would continue to receive paper Form

D's, and temporary speed boards would be provided. An alternative

approach to enforcement of temporary restrictions has also been posited

by Amtrak. Under this approach, portable speed restriction transponder

sets would be utilized to enforce temporary speed restrictions.

Temporary transponder sets would be placed at braking distance for the

worst case trains. All trains operating at maximum authorized speed

that encounter a temporary transponder set would immediately begin to

reduce to the speed called for on the transponder so distance to go,

ruling grade, or distance to the next transponder information will not

be necessary. When a temporary transponder set is encountered, it would

not reset the ``next transponder location window'' information in the

on-board computer, and the on-board equipment would continue to look

for the next permanent transponder set. All permanent transponder sets

are ``linked'' in that each set identifies the location of the next set

in the chain, but temporary transponders are not part of this linkage.

For the immediate future, only some Amtrak power units will respond

to all of the new frequencies of the cab signal/ATC system. Those units

would receive a maximum 125 mph speed indication where the signal

system permits. Recently, Amtrak has indicated that some changes to on-

board equipment would be required for other users where Amtrak

introduces the high-speed cab signal/ATC array (in particular, use of

the 270 pulses per minute at both 100 and 250 Hz as a new 100 mph code

and use of 270 pulses per minute at 100 Hz as a code allowing movement

over #26.5 turnouts at 60 mph). Although the changes in the cab signal

code rates and carrier frequencies form an important backdrop for this

proceeding, no approval for these changes is required or implied in

this proposed order. At the same time, FRA is conscious that existing

requirements for cab signal/ATC are implicated in Amtrak's migration

strategy; accordingly, FRA holds open the possibility of resolving any

necessary issues in the final order should it become apparent that they

are so interrelated as to defy separate resolution. Further, to the

extent the proposed changes in code rates and associated arrangements

may otherwise be considered material modifications subject to approval

under 49 CFR Part 235, FRA proposes to resolve any related issues in

this proceeding. (See 49 CFR 235.7(c)(1).)

Improvements that Amtrak would gain with the new systems are:

--Train speeds of up to 150 mph;

--A high speed diverging aspect (80 mph);

--The efficient handling of both high speed and conventional trains;

--New intermediate speeds between 45 mph and 150 mph;

--The capability for headway improvement in congested commuter areas;

and

--Practical staging from present wayside and on-board equipment

Commuter and freight railroads would obviously benefit from

enhanced safety of Amtrak operations, given the common operating

environment. Amtrak's implementation of the 9-aspect cab signal system

would provide increased flexibility to schedule high speed intercity

service in a way that does not conflict with commuter operations. In

addition, as the ACSES is implemented on commuter and freight trains,

the safety of those operations would be enhanced, ensuring that those

trains do not pass absolute stop signals or operate at excessive speed

approaching stations or bridges. To the extent equipment design

permits, commuter operators would also be able to take advantage of

higher speeds on curves without diminished safety margins if

flexibility for operation at higher cant deficiencies contained in

FRA's proposed revisions to its Track Safety Standards in 49 CFR Part

213 (62 FR 31638; July 3, 1997) is adopted in the final rule.

Implementation

In order to obtain the maximum benefit from the positive stop and

civil speed enforcement system prior to its installation on the entire

NEC, Amtrak has developed a strategy to phase-in installation. The

initial installations would protect entry to and operations along the

high speed territory. During the initial phase, the transponders would

not be installed on non-high speed tracks where flanking protection

protects against possible encroachment into the adjacent high speed

tracks. After all installations are in place on high speed tracks and

on adjacent tracks where flanking protection does not exist, the

transponder system would be extended to the balance of the NEC. This

phased-in installation would also allow users of the NEC to defer

installation of the ACSES system on some of their rolling stock while

they obtain the necessary internal or external financing.

A specific application of this interim installation staging

strategy being considered between New York and Washington, D.C. is to

operate the new HST's up to 135 mph in specific areas where Metroliners

currently operate at 125 mph and where signal spacing, catenary and

track structure are adequate for 135 mph operation of HST's. For

example, 135 mph operation is possible on Tracks 2 and 3 between

``County'' Interlocking (MP 32.8, west of New Brunswick, New Jersey)

and MP 54.0 east of ``Ham'' Interlocking east of Trenton, New Jersey.

Consideration is being given to initially installing the ``ACSES''

transponder based civil speed and positive stop enforcement system only

on Tracks 2 and 3 between ``County'' (MP 32.8) and ``Ham'' (MP 55.7),

depending on flanking protection at ``Midway'' (MP 41.3) to divert any

possible stop signal ``overruns'' away from the path of an HST

operating over 125 mph on Track 2 or 3.

In addition to the use of flanking and phased installation, freight

trains that are not equipped with ACSES will be allowed to operate on

the NEC at off-peak times when no high speed passenger trains are

operating in the area. These operations would be within windows that

have been verified and strictly adhered to. This exception would be

created to allow the smaller entities to continue to operate prior to

the equipping of all their equipment.

This strategy would allow Amtrak to take advantage of some of the

new HST's capability before the ACSES system is fully installed and

before all other vehicles can be equipped. These initial installations

would also give

[[Page 62100]]

operating personnel some solid experience with the new system before it

is extended throughout the entire NEC.

Other areas being considered for 135 mph operation with initial

ACSES installation in this same manner are ``Morris'' (MP 58.4) to MP

74.0 east of ``Holmes'' (MP 77.2), ``Ragan'' (MP 29.9) to ``Bacon'' (MP

51.0) with No. 3 track only extended on through ``Bacon'' to MP 56.7

north of ``Prince'' (MP 57.3), and ``Grove'' (MP 112.6) to ``Landover''

(MP 128.8). Taken together as an initial installation in the New York

to Washington portion of the NEC, 171 track miles of ACSES could

provide up to 80 route miles of 135 mph operation on the 225 mile run.

This strategy would provide initial valuable operating benefits and

experience without sacrificing any of the higher level of safety

required for trains operating over 125 mph, and without (initially)

equipping any vehicles other than those trains operating over 125 mph.

Between New York City and Washington, D.C., Amtrak proposes for the

present to install the ACSES system only in territory where train

speeds will exceed 125 mph. Since freight trains do not operate on the

NEC at speeds over 50 mph, and none of the existing commuter equipment

operating on the NEC can operate at speeds exceeding 125 mph, Amtrak

does not view installation of ACSES on freight and commuter equipment

operating between New York City and Washington, D.C. to be necessary

during the initial phase. The installation of ACSES between New York

and Washington, D.C. would provide transponder-based positive stop

enforcement on all main tracks where speeds exceed 125 mph, and on all

tracks leading to high-speed tracks where flanking protection is not

provided.

Between New Haven and Boston, the ACSES would be installed on all

main tracks where speeds exceed 110 mph. Ultimately, plans call for

installation of this system on all main tracks along the NEC where

speeds currently exceed the 60-80 mph range except for New Rochelle to

New Haven, a segment controlled by the MTA Metro-North Railroad where

speeds will not exceed 110 mph.

Another interim installation concerns the use of #26.5 straight-

frog turnouts. These turnouts are only good for diverging moves at 60

mph. Amtrak intends to install these turnouts at limited locations

where there is insufficient space to install the #32.7 turnouts needed

for diverging moves at 80 mph. Using the 60 mph aspect in the 9-aspect

cab signal/ATC system requires all equipment to be able to receive and

decode 270 code.

To allow for the installation of these 60 mph turnouts in territory

where all users have not yet upgraded to the full 9-aspect system,

Amtrak proposes an interim procedure. Until all users have been

equipped, Amtrak proposes that the cab signal/ATC system will display

an 80 mph aspect for diverging moves over these turnouts. The ACSES

passive transponder sets approaching this location and at this location

would enforce a 60 mph civil speed restriction for all routes through

the interlocking where the #26.5 turnout is located. An active

transponder would be located at the distant signal prior to the

locations where trains must begin to reduce to 60 mph. This active

transponder would override the 60 mph civil speed command when the

signal system logic determines that the interlocking is cleared for a

non-diverging move at a higher speed than 60 mph.

This scheme requires that all vehicles equipped with the 9-aspect

cab signal/ATC system also be equipped with ACSES. Existing 4-aspect

cab signal/ATC systems would enforce 45 mph for passenger trains and 30

mph for freight trains. This interim arrangement would also be backed

up by a site specific instruction and an appropriate reflectorized sign

on the distant signal requiring 60 mph with the display of the ``Cab

Speed'' aspect. When all vehicles operating in the area are equipped,

the active transponder can be removed and the 270 code for 60 mph

installed.

Under Amtrak's design, the ACSES system would be required to have a

minimal database for the entire NEC which would enable a train to

always know where it is within the NEC, which track it is on, what

permanent speed restrictions apply, and where the next temporary speed

order would need to be executed. With this capability, the ACSES system

would be able to perform certain auxiliary functions required by HST's.

Regulatory Approvals Required

In general, new signal and train control systems must comply with

FRA's Rules, Standards and Instructions Governing the Installation,

Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control

Systems, Devices, and Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will implement

any exceptions on a case-by-case basis through the waiver process as

provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train operations in excess of 110 miles

per hour must be authorized by FRA after examination of pertinent

safety considerations in accordance with 49 CFR 213.9(c). Metroliner

service on the NEC is conducted in accordance with such an

authorization.

In addition, NEC operations are subject to special requirements of

the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, which mandated that all NEC

trains be equipped with ``automatic train control systems designed to

slow or stop a train in response to external signals.'' Sec. 9, Public

Law 100-342, implemented at 52 FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433

(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct. 12, 1988).

Safety Performance Standards

On May 29, 1992, Amtrak informed FRA of its intention to implement

a proposed 9-aspect cab signal/speed control system supplemented with

an intermittent transponder civil speed enforcement system on the NEC.

On June 23, 1992, FRA notified Amtrak that the proposed system would

have to comply with Part 236. FRA also suggested the following specific

performance standards for the ACSES components:

1. The system must enforce permanent and temporary civil speed

restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders).

2. All trains operating over the trackage of the proposed system

must be equipped to respond to the continuous cab signal/speed control

system and intermittent transponder civil speed enforcement system.

3. Conflicting aspects or indications may not be displayed in the

locomotive cab.

4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any

location associated with either the civil restriction or cab signal

aspect.

5. The system shall include a restricted speed command or code rate

to permit the train to continue at restricted speed only if this

command is received. The system shall be arranged so that if the speed

command is not received the train will be brought to a stop and cannot

be moved again until some type of apparatus interconnected with the

train control system and controlled by the dispatcher is used. The

train may then only travel at restricted speed until a valid speed

command is received by the on-board train equipment.

In a September 17, 1992 letter, Amtrak responded to technical

issues raised at an earlier meeting between Amtrak and FRA. Amtrak

agreed with performance standards 1, 3, and 4, but had reservations

concerning performance standard 2 because of the funding needed to

upgrade commuter and freight corridor users' train control systems.

Amtrak also questioned the

[[Page 62101]]

need to equip certain user vehicles with a full microprocessor scanning

system if the user trains did not operate at speeds in excess of 100

mph, civil speed reductions in the territory operated were relatively

few, and civil speeds could be controlled by the continuous cab signal

enforcement system without adversely impacting train schedules or on-

time performance.

Amtrak also requested relief from performance standard 5, which

requires an enforced stop at interlocking signals with an advance track

configuration that would not establish high speed track fouling, where

the maximum authorized speed does not exceed 45 mph through an

interlocking arrangement or terminal. The system would still contain a

recurring 15 second audible warning and a 20 second acknowledge

requirement while operating at restricted speed.

At a meeting on September 20, 1994, the Northeast Corridor Safety

Committee, a federal advisory committee chartered pursuant to the Rail

Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, considered the issue of an

enhanced NEC train control system and agreed with draft performance

specifications similar to those set forth above. The draft performance

standards placed before the Committee included equipping of all

movements in high-speed territory. However, the issue of increased

speeds south of New York City was not discussed, since Amtrak had not

proposed to increase speeds on the South End at that time. The

Committee was in general agreement that the current cab signal/ATC

system should be supplemented, as proposed by Amtrak, in connection

with NEC improvements.

Discussion

Safety Need

Increases in train speed, in the traffic density planned for both

intercity and commuter service, and in the potential for increased

freight operations over a portion of the NEC territory would increase

the risk of a severe accident on the NEC unless compensating measures

are taken. These risks fall into four general categories requiring

separate analysis, three of which are pertinent here.

The first risk is of a train-to-train collision. Although the

existing cab signal/ATC system on the NEC provides a very high level of

safety, some risks remain. The cab signal/ATC system currently in use

on the NEC does not enforce a positive stop at signals displaying a

stop aspect, nor does it require acknowledgment of the restricting

aspect every 20 seconds. Instead, the engineer receives one warning

that must be acknowledged when a ``zero'' code rate is experienced.

Thus, the principal hazard is not that a train operating under a

restricted speed code could strike another train. Rather, it is that a

slower train could move through the control point into the path of a

high-speed train. This could happen if the engineer of the train

subject to the stop signal experienced an incident of micro sleep,

accompanied by a conditioned response of acknowledging the warning, was

distracted, or was impaired. Less likely to occur, but still possible,

is a scenario where an engineer or a third party acts recklessly. This

scenario must be taken seriously in light of recent acts of domestic

terrorism.

Clearly, equipping only high-speed trains with on-board equipment

responsive to the ACSES system is insufficient by itself to prevent

collisions at key control points. Only by equipping all trains can the

safe movement of high-speed trains be reasonably ensured. Amtrak's

observation that positive stop capability need only be provided at

locations providing access to high-speed track appears to have merit,

however.

The second risk is of an overspeed derailment which may result in

direct harm or harm flowing from a resulting impact with other trains

or fixed objects. Currently, locations on the NEC where signal speed

restrictions are higher than the overturning speed of the curve are

protected by special speed control features specific to those

locations. As speeds rise for both intercity and commuter trains, the

number of track segments requiring special control will increase.

Allowances for higher levels of unbalance (implicit in the

flexibilities proposed in the July 3 Track Safety Standards Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)) would also create potential exposure that

does not currently exist. The speed control features of the ACSES will

deal effectively and economically with this potential safety exposure,

while providing all passenger operators on the corridor with the

potential for reduced trip times.

The third risk is of an impact with track forces or their

equipment. This risk is endemic to all rail operations, but increased

speed drives up potential severity and reduces the warning time of a

train's approach. Unlike revenue rolling stock, many pieces of

maintenance-of-way equipment will not reliably shunt or activate a

signal system. Further, although great care is taken to ensure that

workers and their equipment are protected from train movements, human

error in issuing or executing such authorities can occur.

Although the recently published final rule for Roadway Worker

Safety will help to control this risk (61 FR 65959; December 16, 1996

), a train control system with the capability to provide automatic

warning to the train of the presence of workers or equipment prior to

visual sighting could significantly drive down the risk of harm to both

roadway workers and train occupants. This is of particular concern on a

high-speed railroad with very dense operations and close track centers,

conditions that prevail on much of the NEC.

The ACSES system incorporates portable transponder technology that

can provide a second layer of safety for roadway workers and their

equipment. Further, temporary speed restrictions would be entered into

the on-board ACSES computer, providing for automatic enforcement even

if temporary transponders are misplaced or vandalized. These features

should increase the safety of those conventional and high-speed trains

that are equipped with on-board computers.

A fourth risk accentuated by higher speeds is increased severity of

an accident resulting from an undetected incursion into the right of

way or clearance envelope, including possible displacement or

undermining of track structure. This fourth risk is not addressed in

this proceeding since the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee will

evaluate this issue in a separate ``system safety'' proceeding to be

held at a later date. However, the data radio element of the ACSES

system provides a possible communication path for hazard detection

information (in addition to the cab signal system).

Technical Issues

In Amtrak's proposed system, the brake and propulsion interface

between the ACSES and the locomotive would be similar to that utilized

in conventional cab signal/ATC systems. The interface would be separate

and distinct from the interface used by the cab signal/ATC system. The

failure of either the cab signal/ATC system or the ACSES would not

prevent the remaining functioning system from performing its intended

operation and displaying the proper on-board aspect. Both the signal

speed and the civil speed would be displayed with the lower of the two

speeds to be enforced.

FRA questions the need or prudence of displaying both speeds and

continues to gather information on this design. Comment is requested

regarding the

[[Page 62102]]

appropriate means of displaying system information to the locomotive

engineer.

The new transponder-based system would provide for enforcement of

permanent civil speed restrictions (curves, bridges, etc.) and

temporary speed restrictions (slow orders) in five MPH increments, as

well as enforcement of stop aspects at interlocking home signals. Once

the train is stopped, current plans call for the system to require the

train to remain stopped for 30 seconds at which time the engineer will

operate a stop override button and allow movement of the train, with

the audible alarm requiring acknowledgment every 20 seconds. FRA is

aware that some locomotive engineers may find repetitive acknowledgment

of this feature distracting during low-speed movements through terminal

areas and requests comments regarding possible alternative

arrangements.

FRA discussed with Amtrak a feature under which a controlled

release would be encrypted into the on-board computer at the time of

departure to ensure that movement could not be made past stop aspects

at home signals without a secure means of authorization. Amtrak opposed

this approach, arguing that the train should remain under the control

of the engineer, who may have a more complete and current understanding

of considerations pertinent to the safety of the train movement. For

instance, if a structure or vehicle adjacent to the wayside was on

fire, it would be necessary to move the train to avoid a hazard to the

passengers and crew. Nevertheless, FRA believes operation of a train

where a positive stop is required should occur only after the engineer

cuts out or overrides the ACSES through a mechanism located away from

the engineer's console, the location and/or operation of which would

require special knowledge available only to a person authorized to

operate the override. Amtrak has endeavored to respond to this concern

in designing the ACSES.

Text and Analysis of Proposed Orders

For purposes of clarity and convenience, the text of the proposed

order is interspersed with explanations and analysis. The text of the

proposed order is printed in italics. FRA reserves the right to revise

and augment the proposed order upon final issuance and invites comments

on all issues relevant to the subject matter of the order.

Proposed Effective Date

As discussed above, Amtrak anticipates beginning receipt of the new

HST's in 1999. FRA proposes to make this Order effective on October 1,

1999, to enable Amtrak to rapidly utilize the new system's improvements

while allowing other users of the NEC to phase-in installation.

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and

existing orders for automatic train control on the Northeast Corridor

(NEC). This order applies in territory where Amtrak has installed

wayside elements of the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System

(ACSES), permitting high-speed operations under the conditions set

forth below. All railroads operating on high-speed tracks in such

equipped territory, or on tracks providing access to such high-speed

tracks, shall be subject to this order, including the following

entities operating or contracting for the operation of rail service--

Connecticut Department of Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); and

Providence and Worcester Railroad Co.

Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak has undertaken the planning and

installation of the ACSES as part of its capital program for intercity

service on the NEC, consistent with legislation providing for improved

rail service in the region. The proposed order would require all

carriers operating in ACSES territory to equip their controlling

locomotives with operative on-board equipment. This equipment would

consist of a transponder scanner, an on-board computer, a display unit

for the locomotive engineer, and appropriate interface with the cab

signal/train control apparatus.

The exception would be trackage on the South End where access is

barred to non-ACSES-equipped trainsets and where increases in the

maximum speed will be from 125 mph to 135 mph. In this instance, only

Amtrak trains would be required to be equipped.

FRA views the distinctions between required signal and train

control features on the north and south portions of the NEC to be

temporary. The proposed order would allow increases in train speeds

without any reduction in safety. Over time, the ACSES system should be

completed and used by all operators throughout the NEC for routes where

speeds exceed 110 mph on any segment, enhancing safety throughout the

NEC. In fact, New Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJT) has indicated

its intention to equip its controlling locomotives with an Advanced

Speed Enforcement System (ASES), deriving safety advantages both on the

NEC and on certain of its lines where the ASES system can be used as an

intermittent train stop system. As Amtrak, North End operators and NJT

demonstrate the benefits and reliability of the system, progress toward

universal upgrading of the NEC signal and train control system will be

fostered. At a later date, FRA may amend this order to require more

extensive use of this new safety technology. This will be determined by

increases in traffic and types of equipment used on the NEC.

Definitions. For Purposes of This Order--

``High-speed track'' means (1) a track on the main line of the

Northeast Corridor (NEC) between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston,

Massachusetts (``North End'') where the maximum authorized train speed

for any class of train is in excess of 110 miles per hour or (2) a

track on the main line of NEC between Washington, D.C., and New York

City, New York (``South End''), where the authorized train speed for

any class of train exceeds 125 mph.

Explanation and Analysis. Operations on the North End are conducted

on two main tracks, while additional main tracks are available on

portions of the South End. Operations are already highly dense on the

North End, and projections for the future indicate significant

increases in traffic, both freight and passenger. Track curvature on

the North End exceeds the average curvature on the South End, resulting

in greater potential concern for compliance with civil speed

restrictions. Accordingly, FRA proposes to distinguish between the two

operations for purposes of determining applicability of new performance

requirements.

``Signal and train control system'' refers to the automatic cab

signal/automatic train control system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the

NEC at the date of issuance of this order, as supplemented by

``ACSES,'' together with such modifications as Amtrak shall make

consistent with this order.

Performance Standards

The following performance standards and special requirements apply:

[[Page 62103]]

1. Except as provided in paragraph 10(b), the signal and train control

system shall enforce both permanent and temporary civil speed

restrictions (e.g., track curvature, bridges, and slow orders) on all

high-speed tracks and immediately adjacent tracks.

Explanation and analysis. The ACSES system can prevent derailments

and collisions with fixed structures or on-track personnel or equipment

that might result from overspeed operation. Accordingly, permanent

civil speed enforcement and temporary speed enforcement are proposed.

Existing features of the cab signal/ATC system on the NEC provide

intermittent civil speed enforcement at key locations where signal

speeds exceed overturning speeds or where station operations require

special protection. However, as speeds are increased, civil speed

enforcement will become an issue at additional locations. The ACSES

would permit higher operating speeds while maintaining a high level of

safety.

The existing signal system would not enforce temporary speed

restrictions, such as slow orders over defective track or protections

for roadway workers. By using temporarily placed transponders, and by

entering restrictions into the on-board computer by milepost, the ACSES

could provide excellent protection for train movements and workers and

equipment on or adjacent to live tracks. All trains equipped with on-

board ACSES units would benefit from this feature.

The proposed order suggests that this requirement should be

extended to tracks adjacent to high-speed tracks. The effective

operating envelope for high-speed tracks includes immediately adjacent

tracks. Derailments on those tracks could endanger high-speed

operations.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 10(b), all trains operating on high-

speed track, immediately adjacent track, or track providing access to

high-speed track shall be equipped to respond to the continuous cab

signal/speed control system and intermittent transponder civil speed

enforcement/positive stop system. Freight trains that are not equipped

with ACSES will be allowed to operate on the NEC at off-peak times when

no high-speed passenger trains are operating in the area.

Explanation and analysis. As noted above, the ACSES system could

provide potential benefits for all users of the NEC. However, this

proposed order would only require equipping trains on the North End,

where trains are operated on high-speed tracks, or on immediately

adjacent tracks providing access to high-speed tracks.

The benefits of equipping high-speed trains are obvious. The

benefits of equipping conventional speed trains that operate on high-

speed tracks include enforcement of civil speed restrictions, temporary

speed restrictions, and positive stop features. The benefits of

equipping conventional speed trains that operate on immediately

adjacent tracks providing access to high-speed tracks may derive

primarily from enforcement of positive stop features. If a train is

prevented from inappropriately proceeding through a junction and onto a

high-speed track, the safety of the subject train and the safety of the

oncoming high-speed train are equally assured. As a practical matter,

FRA believes that few trains required to be equipped under this

proposal would not make use of high-speed tracks. Again, comment is

specifically requested regarding whether any circumstances exist under

which trains would be required to be equipped exclusively because they

operate on adjacent tracks or on tracks providing access to high-speed

tracks. (See, also, paragraph 10(b), below.)

3. No conflicting aspects or indications shall be displayed in the

locomotive cab.

Explanation and analysis. The proposed order would require that

consistent information be displayed to the locomotive engineer. Amtrak

plans to implement this principle, while providing information from

both the cab signal/ATC system and the ACSES, by displaying both of the

resulting maximum speeds. The controlling (most restrictive) limit

would be displayed at twice the brightness of the other speed. The cab

signal aspect would also be displayed.

FRA believes that Amtrak's proposed display (details of which are

contained in the program description placed in the docket of this

proposed order) is appropriate for a hybrid system such as this.

However, it should be noted that the amount of apparently conflicting

information provided to the locomotive engineer may be substantial. In

particular, the engineer (who may operate non-equipped trains on

certain days and equipped trains on other days) will have to contend

with 9-aspect cab signal information that differs from the wayside

signal and potentially the wayside or overhead speed boards, ACSES

information, and at least two systems requiring acknowledgment of

audible warnings (the alerting device and the combined cab signal/ATC/

ACSES unit). Is this information excessive? Should a simpler display of

the most safety critical information be provided as the default

condition?

4. The system must enforce the most restrictive speed at any location

associated with either the civil/temporary restriction or cab signal

aspect.

Explanation and analysis. This requirement states the obvious

requirement that the most restrictive of the limitations indicated by

the cab signal/ATC or ACSES system must be enforced.

5. At interlocking home signals and control points on high-speed tracks

or protecting switches providing access to high-speed tracks, the

signal and train control system shall enforce a positive stop short of

the signal or fouling point when the signal displays an absolute stop.

The system shall function such that the train will be brought to a

complete stop and cannot be moved again until the first of the

following events shall occur: (1) The signal displays a more permissive

aspect; or (2) in the event of a system malfunction, or system penalty,

at least 30 seconds shall have elapsed since the train came to a

complete stop, the engineer has received verbal authority to proceed

from the dispatcher, and the engineer has activated an override or

reset device that is located where it cannot be activated from the

engineer's accustomed position in the cab. The train may then only

travel at restricted speed until a valid speed command is received by

the on-board train equipment.

Explanation and analysis. Providing for normal and extraordinary

movements past a signal that previously required an absolute stop using

a hybrid cab signal/ATC/ACSES arrangement has proven to be one of the

most challenging issues in the design of the new system. As originally

conceived by Amtrak, in the normal case ACSES would enforce a positive

stop by use of an active transponder near the distant signal that would

read the cab signal code (``0''), recognize that the home signal is

capable of displaying an absolute stop, and enforce a positive stop

even if the home signal actually displayed a restricting indication

(permitting movement through the location at up to 15 mph), unless a

greater than zero code rate was detected upon reaching the ``cut

section'' in which the home signal was located. This arrangement

appeared to have several disadvantages. First, stops would be required

where presently none are required. This could be a significant issue in

freight

[[Page 62104]]

operations, since enforcement of unnecessary stop commands could in

some cases result in unacceptable in-train forces. Second, movements

past a stop signal that became restricting after the stop would have to

be made by overriding the positive stop. Third, these arrangements

would inevitably lead to demands for release of the positive stop from

the engineer's position in the cab, potentially defeating the concept

intended to be implemented by FRA when conversations with Amtrak were

initiated on this subject in 1992.

To avoid distracting or fatiguing the engineer, and to ensure that

the override function is not regarded as a feature to be casually

employed, it appears to be more appropriate to restrict the use of the

reset or override button to that of instances of system failures, on-

board or wayside. Efficiency also suggests permitting the train to

proceed when a train receives an indication more favorable than

absolute stop (a consideration of interest particularly to those

commuter authorities that would be subject to the proposed order).

Accordingly, FRA proposed that the train control system function in

greater harmony with the wayside signals. This could be accomplished in

a number of ways.

First, it should be possible to place one or more additional

transponders that derive information directly from the circuits

controlling the home signal. Amtrak indicates that this approach could

be complicated by the varying stopping distances of trains using the

NEC, but in principle the approach seems feasible. If this approach

were to be employed, these transponders should be placed to control

speed approaching the signal while providing information concerning

more favorable aspects as a means of releasing the absolute stop

automatically. Second, it should be possible to use a steady 250 Hz to

release the stop when the signal upgrades to restricting. This would

require modifications to the signal system at each home signal and

control point. Third, data radio could be used on the wayside to

provide precise signal status (notwithstanding the zero code read by

the cab signal system) when the signal is at ``Stop and Proceed,'' or

``Restricting.'' Any of these options would allow the movement past a

restricting signal without the use of a reset or override button by the

engineer.

Amtrak agreed, at a June 4, 1997 meeting, to accelerate the

development of the ACSES data radio feature to reduce the need to

operate the ``Stop Override'' button to only those instances in which

some sort of system failure has occurred and the train must be moved.

The data radio feature located at the interlocking and known as a

Mobile Communication Package (MCP) would broadcast a message to the

approaching train that is track specific, direction specific, and

location specific that would automatically release the stop-override

feature without the engineer having to operate the ``Stop Override''

button when the home signal displays ``Stop and Proceed.'' The message

would only be transmitted and only be effective when the train is

between the distant signal and the home signal of the interlocking. If

the signal displays ``Restricting,'' the MCP data radio would broadcast

a similar message to the approaching train that would relieve the train

from actually having to stop. While the additional time frame and cost

to develop the data radio encoder and to install these encoders along

with the MCP radios at all interlockings in ACSES territory is not yet

known, it is clear that this is the only method, among those that have

been proposed, with long-range potential to truly enhance the future

operation of ACSES on the Northeast Corridor. As the additional time

frame to develop the data radio/encoder override release feature is not

yet known, and as the schedule to begin high speed rail operations in

1999 is very tight, FRA recognizes that some relief concerning

operation of the ``Stop Override'' button may be required, particularly

should Amtrak seek approval for limited operations to 135 mph on the

south end during 1998. FRA feels that a clear plan for migration with

timetables should be submitted prior to the granting of increased

speeds.

6. Failure modes of the system will allow for train movements at

reduced speeds, as follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the event of failure of the

cab signal/ATC system on board a train, the cab signal/ATC system will

be cut out; however, the ACSES system shall remain operative and

enforce the 79 mph speed limit. If intermediate wayside signals are

provided, the train will continue to operate at speeds not exceeding 79

mph subject to indications of the wayside signal system. In territory

without fixed automatic block signals, trains will run on special

``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signals. When failure occurs after a

train has entered such a block, it will proceed at restricted speed to

the next interlocking and may not pass the home signal, regardless of

the aspect displayed, until the flashing lunar ``Clear to Next

Interlocking'' signal is displayed. The train may then pass the signal

and proceed at 79 mph. The speed limit shall be enforced by the

Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). At the next distant

signal the train must begin braking, preparing to stop at the next home

signal unless a flashing lunar signal with the letter ``N'' is

displayed indicating that the ``Clear to Next Interlocking'' signal is

already displayed ahead.

Explanation and analysis. The cab signal/ATC portion of the system

would be cut out under operating rules which meet Sec. 236.567

requirements. The operation of trains when the cab signal/ATC portion

of the system was failed and/or cut out would be enhanced by the ACSES

still being in operation. The ACSES central processing unit (CPU) would

receive a message from the cab signal/ATC CPU through a vital link that

the cab signal/ATC is cut in and not failed. If the ACSES does not

receive this message, a speed of 79 mph is locked in and the display is

dark, other than the 79 mph displayed in the civil speed portion, which

is enforced. Temporary and permanent speed restrictions and positive

stop at home signal locations would continue to be enforced by the

ACSES system.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES fails en route, it must be cut

out in a similar manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The engineer will

be required to notify the dispatcher that the civil speed/positive stop

enforcement system has been cut out. When given permission to proceed,

the train must not exceed 125 mph (South End) or 110 mph (North End).

All trains with a cut out ACSES system will operate at conventional

train speeds.

Explanation and analysis. After considering how to proceed when the

ACSES must be cut out on a train, the proposed order specifies minimal

requirements, which would require that trains fall back to existing

maximum speeds in the territories. However, this approach cannot

provide positive stop capability or compensate for higher curving

speeds that may be allowed using tilt HST's. All trains with a cut out

ACSES would operate at conventional train speeds whether they are tilt

train equipment or conventional equipment. The vital link between CPUs

mentioned in 6.(a) above would inform the signal CPU that the civil

speed CPU was cut out or failed. FRA has inquired whether a default

speed limit could be ``enforced'' through the signal speed enforcement

system when the ACSES is failed and/or cut out, and Amtrak responded

that this could be accomplished. The maximum speed to

[[Page 62105]]

be enforced by the cab signal system if ACSES is cut out is 125 mph.

This places a premium on compliance with operating rules developed

specifically for this purpose (copies of which are available in the

public docket). Comment is requested regarding appropriate measures,

recognizing that electronic failures and damage to scanners from refuse

on the track structure will result in ACSES failures.

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the cab signal/ATC system and

the ACSES both fail en route, the systems shall be cut out and the

train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR Sec. 236.567.

Explanation and analysis. When the signal and train control system

fails and/or is cut out en route, Sec. 236.567 sets forth the

procedures and restrictions that shall be followed.

Where an automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal

device fails and/or is cut out enroute, train may proceed at

restricted speed or if an automatic block signal system is in

operation according to signal indication but not to exceed medium

speed, to the next available point of communication where report

must be made to a designated officer. Where no automatic block

signal system is in use train shall be permitted to proceed at

restricted speed or where automatic block signal system is in

operation according to signal indication but not to exceed medium

speed to a point where absolute block can be established. Where an

absolute block is established in advance of the train on which the

device is inoperative train may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles

per hour.

These procedures are used with present train control systems, both on

the NEC and throughout the Nation and have proven to be a reliable and

safe method when the signal and train control system fails and/or is

cut out.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If the wayside signal system fails,

train operation will be at restricted speed to a point where absolute

block can be established in advance of the train. Where absolute block

is established in advance of the train, the train may proceed at speeds

not to exceed 79 mph.

Explanation and analysis. The carrier's operating rules shall

effect these requirements. In the case of a wayside signal system

failure the ACSES would still be functioning, giving trains an added

portion of safety, but it would still be necessary to establish an

absolute block and proceed not to exceed 79 mph. The ACSES would

enforce the 79 mph speed, as well as civil and temporary speed

restrictions and positive stops.

e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is not detected where the

equipment expected to find the next transponder, the train must not

exceed 125 mph (North End) or 110 mph (South End) until the next valid

transponder is encountered. The 125/110 mph speed restriction will be

enforced by the system and ``--'' will be displayed to indicate that

the civil speed is unknown. The audible alarm for civil speeds will

sound and must be acknowledged. Speed restrictions previously entered

into the system, whether temporary or permanent, will be displayed at

the proper time and continue to be enforced. If the missing transponder

is a positive stop enforcement transponder at the distant signal to an

interlocking, then the system will treat the missing transponder as if

it were present and a stop will be required. Since the previous

transponder will have transmitted the distance to the stop location,

the stop shall be enforced unless a cab signal is received that

indicates the interlocking signal is displaying an aspect more

favorable than ``Stop,'' ``Stop & Proceed,'' and ``Restricting.'' The

125/110 mph speed restriction will also be enforced regardless of

whether the cab signal aspect is being received.

Explanation and analysis. Permanent transponders would be

programmed with information that includes distance to the next

transponder. Wheel rotations would be logged to determine train

position between transponders. If a transponder is missing (or is not

successfully read), speeds would be slowed to 125 or 110 mph, depending

upon the territory involved, until the next valid transponder is

detected.

8. When it becomes necessary to cut out the cab signal/ATC system,

the ACSES, or both, these systems shall be considered inoperative until

the engine has been repaired, tested and found to be functioning

properly. Repairs shall be made before dispatching the unit on any

subsequent trip.

9. Other requirements applicable to the system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one indication and one name and

will be shown in such a way as to be understood by the engine crew.

These aspects shall be shown by lights and/or illuminated letters or

numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be protected by electrically locked

derails if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder set shall

cut in the ACSES prior to movement through the derail and onto the main

line. If the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a positive stop will

be required. At entrances from a signaled track, the ACSES shall be cut

in prior to the distant signal and a positive stop enforced at the home

signal.

c. An on-board event recorder shall record, in addition to the required

functions of Sec. 229.5(g) [of FRA's Railroad Locomotive Safety

Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which each transponder is

encountered, the information associated with that transponder, and each

use of the positive stop override. These functions may be incorporated

within the on-board computer, or as a stand alone device, but shall

continue to record speeds and related cab signal/ATC data, even if

ACSES has failed and/or is cut out. The event recorder shall meet all

requirements of Sec. 229.135.

Explanation and analysis. FRA has determined that event recorders

enhance railroad safety. Whether they are used to aid accident

analysis, to monitor locomotive engineers' performance, or to monitor

equipment performance, event recorders provide data that are free from

bias, free from the inconsistent powers of human observation, and free

from the possible taint of self-interest. There has been no question of

the cab signal/ATC events being recorded; what FRA is ensuring is that

the ACSES portion of the system is recorded and made available as well.

10. The following maximum speeds apply on the NEC in territory

subject to this order:

[[Page 62106]]

a. In ACSES territory where all trains operating on high-speed tracks,

adjacent tracks, and tracks providing access to high-speed tracks are

equipped with cab signal/ATC and ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped

trainsets otherwise so authorized may operate at maximum speeds not

exceeding 150 mph. The maximum speed over any highway-rail crossing

shall not exceed 80 mph.

b. In ACSES territory between Washington, D.C., and New York City, New

York, where access to any high-speed track is barred by switches locked

in the normal position and a parallel route to the high-speed track is

provided, at crossovers from adjacent tracks, and where no junctions

providing direct access exist, qualified and ACSES-equipped trainsets

otherwise so authorized may operate to a maximum speed not exceeding

135 mph on such track; and provisions of this order requiring other

tracks and trains to be equipped with the ACSES do not apply.

Explanation and analysis. Currently maximum speeds for trains on

the general rail system are limited to 110 miles per hour. Under a

waiver, Amtrak operates Metroliner service between New York and

Washington at speeds up to 125 miles per hour. This proposed order

would allow Amtrak to increase its speeds on the South End of the NEC

to 135 miles per hour by installing the ACSES transponders on the

wayside and equipping new high-speed trainsets with on-board scanners

and computers. Other users of Amtrak's South End high-speed tracks

would not be required to be equipped for the present, but would benefit

from the higher level of safety associated with Amtrak operations. As

noted above, other users have already begun to recognize the value of

the ACSES technology, and eventual equipping of all NEC users is

expected (but would not be required under this order).

On the North End, maximum speeds top out at 110 mph. No waiver

exists for high-speed service. This order would authorize operation of

qualified trainsets at up to 150 miles per hour in territory where

Amtrak has installed ACSES on the wayside, provided Amtrak and other

users are equipped. This authority would apply equally to the North and

South Ends provided the specified conditions are met.

Speeds over highway-rail crossings would be limited to 80 mph, the

maximum speed planned under the NEC program until very recently. This

limit is lower than the 110 mph cap included in current guidelines for

high-speed corridors (absent barrier and presence detection systems

tied into the signal system). Density of NEC operations and the

increased possibility that a collision with a motor vehicle might cause

a secondary collision between trains operating at combined very high

closing speeds suggests the need for appropriate caution. FRA reserves

the right to allow higher speeds over individual highway-rail crossings

after demonstration by Amtrak that appropriate safety measures have

been implemented.

The phrase ``otherwise authorized,'' as applied to trains, refers

to equipment qualified for higher speeds in track/vehicle interaction

limits proposed in FRA's Track Safety Standards NPRM. Metroliner

equipment is currently authorized to operate up to 125 miles per hour.

FRA anticipates that the new American Flyer trainsets will be qualified

to operate up to 150 miles per hour. It is possible that other

equipment presently operating on the NEC might be qualified to operate

at higher than conventional speeds under the procedures of the proposed

Track Safety Standards revisions.

At present, specific regulatory action applicable only to the NEC

includes conditional waiver authority for operation of Metroliner

equipment to 125 miles per hour and requirements for use of the cab

signal/ATC system by all operators. FRA reserves the right to merge

some or all of these provisions in the final order. Comment is

requested regarding the appropriateness of doing so.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 was enacted by Congress to

ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily and disproportionately

burdened by Government regulations. FRA certifies that this proposed

order would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. As explained below in the Regulatory Impact

Analysis, the proposed order would limit its hours of application to

minimize impact on the only small entity affected, the Providence and

Worcester Railroad.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law No.

104-13, section 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44

U.S.C. 3501-3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part 1320,

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not need to approve

information collection requirements that affect nine or fewer

respondents. FRA has determined that information collection

requirements in this proposed order would affect only five railroads,

and that therefore OMB approval is not required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing policies

and procedures. It is believed that the rule will be determined to be

non-significant under both Executive Order 12866 and DOT policies and

procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979). FRA has prepared and

placed in the docket a regulatory analysis addressing the economic

impact of the proposed rule. Document inspection and copying facilities

are available at 1120 Vermont Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C.

Photocopies may also be obtained by submitting a written request to the

FRA Docket Clerk at Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590.

FRA has analyzed the benefits and costs of upgrading the signal

systems in the NEC to the ACSES system. The NEC has many unique

aspects, and many of the economic issues arising in analysis of this

proposal are extremely complicated. It appears that there would be

significant safety costs were FRA not to order significant upgrades to

the signal systems in the NEC.

Amtrak and NJT have sound business reasons for adopting the

proposed transponder-based system, but safety benefits will also accrue

in large measure to society. FRA estimates that societal direct safety

benefits will be more than $200,000,000. The system will cost

approximately $95,000,000 (an amount which will accrue over several

years, approximately $36,000,000 of which will be imposed directly by

this order, implementing the first phase) so the net benefit will be

approximately $105,000,000. There will also be benefits beyond the

direct safety benefits, such as the ability to improve traffic flow and

to divert traffic from modes with greater societal costs. There will

also be benefits from the improvement and demonstration of advanced

signal technology.

This proposed order would facilitate the orderly introduction of

enhanced passenger rail service on the NEC, consistent with Congress'

statutory direction. The order would recognize Amtrak's investment in

development and deployment of advanced technology that will enforce

civil speed restrictions and positive stops at key locations along the

railroad. Amtrak is also making significant investments in a new 9-

[[Page 62107]]

aspect signal system and improvements in track and structures that

will benefit all NEC users through more efficient operations and

improved safety.

The proposed order would require that controlling locomotives

(including electrical multiple-unit vehicles and cab cars) on the NEC

be equipped with on-board ACSES equipment. This burden would fall on

commuter railroads, freight railroads, and Amtrak, in proportion to the

number of trains those entities operate on the NEC. A risk assessment

study conducted for Amtrak and discussed with other NEC interests in

the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee illustrated the importance of a

more secure train control system in avoiding any increase in system

risk as train movements and speeds increase on the North End over the

coming decades.

One on-board ACSES unit is expected to cost approximately $40,000.

North End users exclusive of Amtrak are expected to require

approximately 450 units, for a total cost of about $18,000,000. Each of

these users will experience direct benefits in safety and liability

avoidance. Potential benefits could result from higher average train

speeds if the proposed higher levels of unbalance in the Track Safety

Standards NPRM are adopted.

FRA has considered the proposed system's effect on small entities.

Only one small entity, the Providence and Worcester Railroad (PW), will

be affected. To minimize the impact on this small freight railroad, FRA

will limit the hours of application of the proposed order to allow the

PW to continue operations without equipping most of its fleet with new

ACSES units.

Proceedings on This Proposed Order

FRA seeks public comment on this proposed order and related

matters, including any authorization that may be required for Amtrak to

implement a modified cab signal system on the NEC. FRA has placed in

the docket of this proceeding copies of Amtrak's program description

for the ACSES system, proposed operating rules for use in conjunction

with the system, and other related information, including current

Amtrak projections for operating speeds over highway-rail crossings on

the North End.

No public hearing is presently planned in this proceeding. However,

FRA will convene such a hearing if a request is received within 45 days

from publication of this notice. FRA does intend to convene the

Northeast Corridor Safety Committee following the close of the comment

period to consider public comments received and provide advice for

resolving remaining issues. FRA will provide notice of this meeting,

which will be open to the public, and will include the minutes of the

meeting in the docket of this proceeding.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501-20505 (1994); and 49

CFR 1.49 (f), (g), and (m).

Issued in Washington, D.C. on November 17, 1997.

Donald M. Itzkoff,

Deputy Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.

[FR Doc. 97-30505 Filed 11-19-97; 8:45 am]

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