Remotely Controlled Valves on Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 192

[Docket No. RSPA-97-2879; Notice 1]

Remotely Controlled Valves on Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

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SUMMARY: The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)

invites representatives of industry, state and local government, and

the public to an open meeting on the use of remotely controlled valves

(RCVs) on natural gas pipeline facilities. Congress mandated the use of

RCVs on interstate natural gas pipeline facilities if it is determined

as a result of a survey and assessment that the use of RCVs is

technically and economically feasible and would reduce risks associated

with a rupture of a natural gas pipeline facility. The purpose of this

meeting is to gather information and discuss issues relevant to the

survey and assessment.

DATES: The public meeting will be held on October 30, 1997, beginning

at 9:00 a.m. Persons who want to participate in the public meeting

should call (202) 366-4046 or e-mail their name, affiliation, and phone

number to [email protected] before close of business October

17, 1997. The public meeting is open to all interested parties, but

RSPA may limit participation because of space considerations and the

need to obtain a wide range of views.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held in Houston, Texas at the Adam's

Mark Hotel, 2900 Briarpark Drive at Westheimer. The hotel's telephone

number is (713) 978-7400.

WRITTEN COMMENTS: Anyone may submit written comments. Persons who are

unable to attend the public meeting may submit written comments on or

before the deadline of November 28, 1997. Interested persons should

submit as part of their written comments all material that is relevant

to a statement of fact or argument. Late filed comments will be

considered so far as practicable.

Send written comments to the Docket Facility, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street SW, Washington, DC 20590-

0001. Comments should identify the docket number (RSPA-97-2879).

Commenters should submit an original and one copy. Commenters wishing

to receive

[[Page 51625]]

confirmation of receipt of their comments must include a stamped, self-

addressed postcard with their comments. The docket clerk will date

stamp the postcard and return it to the commenter. Comments will be

available for inspection at the Docket Facility, located on the Plaza

level of the Nassif Building in Room 401. The Docket Facility is open

from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except on Federal

holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lloyd W. Ulrich, telephone: (202) 366-

4556, FAX: (202) 366-4566, e-mail: [email protected] regarding

the subject matter of this notice or the Dockets Unit, (202) 366-5046,

for copies of this notice or other material in the docket.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Accountable Pipeline Safety and

Partnership Act of 1996 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 60102 (j)) required

that, ``Not later than June 1, 1998, the Secretary [of Transportation]

shall survey and assess the effectiveness of remotely controlled valves

to shut off the flow of natural gas in the event of a rupture of an

interstate natural gas pipeline facility and shall make a determination

about whether the use of remotely controlled valves is technically

feasible and economically feasibility and would reduce risks associated

with a rupture of an interstate natural gas pipeline facility.''

``Not later than one year after the survey and assessment are

complete, if the Secretary has determined that the use of remotely

controlled valves is technically and economically feasible and would

reduce risks associated with a rupture of an interstate natural gas

pipeline facility, the Secretary shall prescribe standards under which

an operator of an interstate natural gas pipeline facility must use a

remotely controlled valve. These standards shall include, but not be

limited to, requirements for high-density population areas.''

RSPA is aware of the consequences when a natural gas pipeline that

has experienced a rupture is not isolated quickly by closing valves on

either side of the ruptured section. A high pressure gas transmission

pipeline failure occurred in Edison, New Jersey on March 23, 1994. The

failure of the 36-inch pipeline resulted in the escaping gas igniting

and creating a fireball 500 feet high. There was one death and

approximately 50 injuries. Radiant heat from the fireball ignited the

roofs of buildings located more than 100 yards from the failure,

destroyed 128 apartments and resulted in the evacuation of 1,500

people. The casualties were limited because the few minutes between the

time of the failure and the explosion allowed residents to vacate the

area. The gas company using a manually operated valve took 2\1/2\ hours

to isolate the ruptured section of pipeline, which contributed to the

severity of the damages.

The experience in New Jersey resulted in the adoption of a set of

new rules by the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (BPU) covering

the installation, operation, and maintenance of intrastate natural gas

pipelines in the state of New Jersey. These rules became effective

March 17, 1997.

One of the new BPU rules requires each operator to submit a

Sectionalizing Valve Assessment and Emergency Closing Plan for

sectionalizing valves in class 3 and class 4 locations 1.

All valves in class 3 and class 4 locations are to be evaluated and

prioritized as to the need for installation or retrofitting of a RCV or

automatically controlled valve (ACV). Each plan is to include training

of appropriate personnel on emergency plans and procedures. An

emergency closing drill that simulates shutting down a selected section

of the pipeline is required once each year. Reports of the closing

drills are to be submitted to the BPU. RSPA is unaware of similar

requirements in other states.

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\1\ A ``Class 3 location'' is defined in 49 CFR 192.5 as any

class location unit (an area that extends 220 yards on either side

of the centerline of any continuous 1-mile length of pipeline) that

has 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, or any area

where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building of

small well-defined area that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at

least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month period.

A ``Class 4 location'' is defined in 49 CFR 192.5 as any class

location unit where buildings with four or more stories above ground

are prevalent.

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RSPA is also aware of a comprehensive report sponsored by the Gas

Research Institute (GRI) on ACVs and RCVs 2. The report

addresses the evolution of ACVs in the natural gas industry. The report

specifically addresses the risk of false closures, line section

blowdown duration, and typical valve spacings. The report stresses the

unreliability of ACVs because the pipeline failure detection systems

used to trigger the closure of ACVs often mistake normal operating

transient conditions as a pipeline failure. The report concludes that

the installation of ACVs or RCVs will not prevent gas ignition because

ignition usually occurs within ten minutes of a rupture, long before a

line section could be blown down, even if it was isolated immediately

after the rupture. However, early closure can reduce the duration of

burn down and radiant heating of the area.

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\2\ Southwest Research Institute, ``Final Report, Remote and

Automatic Main Line Valve Technology Assessment,'' July 1995,

Sponsored by the Gas Research Institute (GRI-95/0101).

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Consistent with the President's Regulatory Reinvention Initiative

(E.O. 12866), RSPA wants to explore this congressional requirement with

the maximum stakeholder involvement. Toward this end, RSPA is seeking

early participation in the survey and assessment process by holding

this public meeting at which participants, including RSPA staff, may

exchange views on relevant issues concerning remotely controlled valves

(RCVs). This public meeting is in partial satisfaction of the ``survey

and assess'' portion of the Congressional requirement. RSPA hopes the

public meeting will enable government and industry to reach a better

understanding of the problems and potential solutions before proposed

rules are considered.

RSPA will use the data accumulated as a result of this public

meeting along with any state experience disclosed during the public

meeting, and the GRI report on ACVs and RCVs to determine the technical

and economic feasibility of using RCVs on natural gas pipeline

facilities.

Participants at the public meeting are encouraged to focus their

remarks on the following issues, but may address other issues as time

permits and in supplementary written comments:

A. What is the potential value of early detection and isolation of

a section of pipeline after a failure in terms of enhanced safety and

reduced property damage?

B. What are the technical and economic advantages of installing

RCVs?

C. What are the technical and economic disadvantages of installing

RCVs?

D. What states in addition to New Jersey have adopted regulations

concerning RCVs on intrastate natural gas pipeline facilities?

E. If RCVs were required in only high risk areas, what would

constitute high risk areas and what would be criteria for prioritizing

from highest to lowest risk?

F. Document cases where RCVs have malfunctioned causing them to

close unexpectedly or to not close when commanded by the dispatcher.

G. Document cases where RCVs operated after an accident to reduce

the consequences of the accident.

H. Provide documentation to support or refute the impression that

when the escaping gas from a failed gas pipeline ignites, it normally

occurs shortly after the accident, usually less than 10 minutes after

the accident.

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Issued in Washington, D.C., on October 24, 1997.

Richard B. Felder,

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

[FR Doc. 97-26123 Filed 10-1-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P