Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 and Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423 and Docket No. 50-213]

Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2,

and 3 and Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision

Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with regard to a

Petition dated November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996,

filed by Ms. Deborah Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter on behalf of the Citizens

Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource

Service (NIRS), hereafter referred to as ``Petitioners.'' The Petition

pertains to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and

the Haddam Neck Plant.

The Petitioners requested that the NRC: (1) Immediately suspend or

revoke Northeast Utilities' (NU's or Licensee's) licenses to operate

its nuclear facilities in Connecticut; (2) investigate possible

Licensee material misrepresentations to the NRC; (3) continue the

shutdown of the Licensee's facilities until the Department of Justice

completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by the NRC;

(4) continue the shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves the

Licensee's remedial actions; (5) continue listing the Licensee's

facilities on the NRC's ``Watch List'' should any facility resume

operation; (6) bar any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity

at any of the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut until the

Licensee and the NRC take certain identified steps to assure that such

activities can be safely conducted; (7) initiate an investigation into

how the NRC allowed the asserted illegal situation at the Licensee's

nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist and continue for more than a

decade; and (8) immediately investigate of the need for enforcement

action for alleged violation of 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, with

respect to nitrogen calculations.

The bases for the assertions are Licensee and NRC inspection

findings and Licensee documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS

videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. The videotape

records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory Commission televised

interview of a former Millstone Station employee expressing his views

on Licensee management. Areas identified in the Petition include

inadequate surveillance testing, operation outside the design basis,

inadequate radiological controls, failed corrective action processes,

and degraded material condition. The Petition asserts that this

information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance

programs at the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that the

Licensee has made material false statements regarding its Millstone

units, and that safe decommissioning of the Haddam Neck facility is not

possible because of the deficiencies in the design and licensing bases

of the facility.

The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

partially granted the Petition. The reasons for this partial grant are

explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR

2.206'' (DD-97-21), the complete text of which follows this notice and

is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, at the

local public document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, New London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at

the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,

Waterford, Connecticut, for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3; and at the

Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut, for the

Haddam Neck Plant.

A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the

Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance

with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for

by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of

the Commission (for Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after the date

of issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a

review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206

[DD-97-21]

I. Introduction

On November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996, Ms. Deborah

Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter filed a Petition on behalf of the Citizens

[[Page 49035]]

Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource

Service (NIRS), hereafter, referred to as Petitioners. These two

submittals will hereafter be referred to as the Petition. The Petition

was filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the NRC

Executive Director for Operations pursuant to Sec. 2.206 of Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206).

The Petitioners requested that the NRC take the following actions:

(1) Immediate suspension or revocation of Northeast Utilities' (NU's or

Licensee's) licenses to operate its nuclear facilities in Connecticut;

(2) investigation of possible NU material misrepresentations to the

NRC; (3) continued shutdown of the NU facilities until the Department

of Justice completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by

the NRC; (4) continued shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves NU

remedial actions; (5) continued listing of the NU facilities on the

NRC's Watch List should any facility resume operation; (6) prohibition

of any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity at any NU nuclear

facility in Connecticut until NU and the NRC take certain identified

steps to assure that such activities can be safely conducted; (7)

initiation of an investigation into how the NRC allowed the asserted

illegal situation at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist

and continue for more than a decade; and (8) an immediate investigation

of the need for enforcement action for alleged violation of 10 CFR part

50, Appendix B.1

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\1\ Petitioners requested copies of the Licensee's calculations

performed in response to the event at the Haddam Neck Plant that

resulted in the introduction of a nitrogen bubble into the reactor

vessel. The calculations requested were discussed during a

predecisional enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996. The

calculations were provided to the Petitioners on July 21, 1997.

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The bases for the Petitioners' assertions are NU and NRC inspection

findings and NU documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS

videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. No new

information regarding Licensee activities was provided by the

Petitioners except for the alleged violation referred to in Request 8.

The Petitioners assert, in Request 8, that NU relied partly on draft

calculations in its presentation at a public predecisional enforcement

conference with the NRC staff, which included a discussion of an event

at the Haddam Neck Plant. The Petitioners further assert that the

calculations had not been reviewed and approved in accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.

The areas of concern identified in the Petition include inadequate

surveillance testing, operation outside the design as specified in the

updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), inadequate radiological

controls, failed corrective action processes, and the degraded material

condition of the plants. The Petitioners also assert that this

information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance

programs at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that NU has made

material false statements regarding its Millstone units, and that safe

decommissioning of the Haddam Neck Plant is not possible given the

defective nature of the design and licensing bases for the facility.

The videotape records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory

Commission televised interview of a former Millstone Station employee

expressing his views on NU management. The tape has been transcribed

and placed on the dockets of the facilities cited. The videotape

interview included the former employee's views relating to NU's poor

management in allowing degradation of the material condition of the

plant; poor radwaste practices resulting in potential radiation

exposure to employees; and harassment, intimidation, and subsequent

illegal termination of employees raising safety concerns.

On January 23, 1997, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition

and informed the Petitioners that the Petition had been assigned to the

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to prepare a response and that

action would be taken within a reasonable time regarding the specific

concerns raised in the Petition. The Petitioners were also informed

that the requests for immediate action were denied. The Petitioners

were further informed that copies of the Petition and videotape were

sent to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in response to

Petitioners' Request 7 and parts of Requests 5, 6, and 8.

II. Discussion

The NRC staff has reviewed the Petition and, with the exception of

Request 8, has not identified any new information regarding either the

Millstone or the Haddam Neck facilities. Both of the facilities have

been the subject of close NRC scrutiny for several years.

Millstone Facility

With regard to the Millstone units, the NRC staff has been

concerned for the last several years about the number and duration of

violations at the Millstone site in the broad programmatic areas of

design and licensing bases, testing, and radiological controls.

Programmatic concerns in these areas, along with concerns in other

areas, were major contributors to the decline in performance at the

Millstone site. In the most recent systematic assessment of licensee

performance (SALP) report of August 26, 1994, the NRC staff stated in

the cover letter that it had noted several performance weaknesses,

common to all three Millstone units. Among these were continuing

problems with procedure quality and implementation, the informality in

several maintenance and engineering programs (contributing to instances

of poor performance), and the failure to resolve several longstanding

problems at the site. In addition to these programmatic problems, the

Licensee has had significant problems in dealing with employee concerns

involving safety issues at the site.

On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for a

scheduled refueling outage. The NRC sent a letter to the Licensee on

December 13, 1995, requiring the Licensee, before restarting Millstone

Unit 1, to inform the NRC, pursuant to section 182a of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10 CFR 50.54(f), of the

actions taken to ensure that in the future the Licensee would operate

that facility according to the terms and conditions of the unit's

operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the unit's FSAR.

In January 1996, the NRC designated the three Millstone units as

Category 2 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants on the Watch List in this

category have weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the

licensees demonstrate improved performance for an extended period of

time.

On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when

it declared both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI)

system inoperable because of a design issue. There was a potential that

the HPSI throttle valves could become plugged with debris when taking

suction from the sump during recirculation mode.

On March 30, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 3 after

finding that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary feedwater

turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did not meet NRC

requirements. In response to a Licensee root cause analysis of

inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 FSAR, identifying the potential

for similar configuration control problems at Millstone Units 2 and 3

and the existing design configuration issues identified at these units,

the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to the Licensee on March 7 and

April 4, 1996. These

[[Page 49036]]

letters required that the Licensee inform the NRC of the corrective

actions taken regarding design configuration issues at Millstone Units

2 and 3 before the restart of each unit.

In June 1996, the NRC designated the three units at Millstone as

Category 3 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants in this category have

significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining them in a shutdown

condition until the Licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that it has

both established and implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure

substantial improvement. This category also requires Commission

approval before operations can be resumed.

On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order directing

the Licensee to contract with a third party to implement an Independent

Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) to confirm the adequacy

of its efforts to reestablish the design basis and configuration

controls for each of the three Millstone units. The ICAVP is intended

to provide additional assurance, before a unit restart, that the

Licensee has identified and corrected existing problems in the design

and configuration control processes for that unit.

On April 16, 1997, the NRC issued another 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter,

which superseded the previously mentioned 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and

consolidated its requests for information and periodic updates. The

information requested included: (1) The identification of significant

items needed to be accomplished before restart; (2) identification of

items to be deferred until after restart; (3) NU's process and

rationale for deferring items; and (4) a description of the actions

taken by NU to ensure that future operation will be conducted in

accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating licenses, the

Commission's regulations, and the FSARs. The Licensee provided the

initial information requested by letter dated May 29, 1997. Additional

information and updates will be provided in accordance with the time

intervals specified in the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter.

During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and

August 1996, more than 60 apparent violations of NRC requirements were

identified at the Millstone site. These apparent violations were

discussed at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the

Millstone site on December 5, 1996. During the meeting, the Licensee

stated that management failed to provide clear direction and oversight,

performance standards were low, management expectations were weak, and

station priorities were inappropriate. The NRC staff is nearing

completion of its evaluation of potential enforcement action to address

these apparent violations and their overall impact on the safe

operation of the Millstone units.

Additionally, the Licensee has had a chronic problem of not dealing

effectively with employee concerns at the Millstone site. On December

12, 1995, the NRC established a review group to conduct an independent

evaluation of the history of the Licensee's handling of employee

concerns related to licensed activities at the Millstone facility. The

review group determined that, in general, an unhealthy work

environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not

welcome or promote questioning attitudes, has existed at the Millstone

facility for the last several years. To address this problem, the NRC

issued an Order on October 24, 1996, that directed NU to devise and

implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by

Millstone employees and to ensure an environment free from retaliation

or discrimination. In addition, the Order required NU to have an

independent third party oversee its employee concerns program. The

third party is responsible for providing periodic reports to NU and the

NRC detailing its findings and recommendations. The third-party

findings and the NU responses to them will be assessed by the NRC staff

for any restart issues.

The NRC regards compliance with regulations, license conditions,

and Technical Specifications (TSs) as mandatory. However, the NRC also

recognizes that plants will not operate trouble-free.2 This

is clearly articulated in Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50, ``Quality

Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power plants and Fuel Reprocessing

plants.'' Criterion XVI states that ``measures shall be established to

assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,

malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and

equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.''

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\2\ The NRC's approach to protecting public health and safety

includes the philosophy of defense-in-depth, which supports the

identification and correction of degraded or nonconforming

conditions discussed above. Briefly stated, this philosophy (1)

requires the application of conservative codes and standards, to

establish substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear

plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and

operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of

malfunctions, and promotes the use of automatic safety system

actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and

operators can make mistakes and therefore requires redundancy in

safety systems and components to reduce the chances that

malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission

products from the fuel; and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these

precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and therefore

requires containment structures and safety features to prevent the

release of fission products. In the unlikely event of an offsite

fission product release, emergency plans are in place to provide

reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be taken

to protect the population around nuclear power plants. These

emergency plans are coordinated with local and State officials and

the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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The appropriate response to an identified deficiency can and should

vary, depending on the safety significance of the deficiency. For

example, for rapidly developing situations, when prompt action is

required to assure plants are not in an unsafe condition, automatic

safety systems are in place to shut down the reactor. In other, less

time-critical situations, TSs relating to structures, systems, and

components (SSCs) vital to the safe operation of a nuclear plant

require that specific actions be taken within a predetermined time

period when the SSC is determined to be inoperable. The time period is

dependent on the safety significance of the SSC. NRC Generic Letter 91-

18, ``Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual

Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on

Operability,'' provides guidance for licensees to determine what

actions are required and when they need to be taken for identified

degraded or nonconforming conditions.

The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the Millstone site is

based on the recognition that it is the Licensee's primary

responsibility to demonstrate that corrective actions have been

effectively implemented. Thus, the Licensee must determine that a unit

is in conformance with applicable NRC regulations, its license

conditions, and its FSAR and that applicable licensing commitments have

been met before the NRC staff can recommend that the Commission approve

the restart of any unit. The Licensee's conformance with NRC

regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is

fundamental to NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed activities.

In short, the Licensee has the primary responsibility for the safe

operation of its facilities.

In a June 20, 1996, letter to the NRC, the Licensee described its

Configuration Management Plan (CMP), which is its principal program to

provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at the Millstone units

have been effectively corrected. The CMP includes efforts to understand

and correct the licensing

[[Page 49037]]

and design bases issues that led the NRC to issue the 10 CFR 50.54(f)

letters and Order actions to prevent recurrence of those issues. The

Licensee stated that the objective of the CMP was to document and meet

the licensing and design bases requirements of each unit and to ensure

that adequate programs and processes are in place to maintain control

of these requirements.

The Licensee's CMP must either correct each FSAR deficiency or

evaluate it to ensure that the change to the facility does not involve

any unreviewed safety question or change to the facility TSs. NU has

documented a large number of deficiencies, which vary in scope and

safety significance for each unit. These lists contain significant

deficiencies that must be corrected before restart and others that the

Licensee is planning to correct after the restart. In its continuing

reviews of the deficiency lists, the NRC staff will determine whether

the Licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for

completion before restart and whether those items that the Licensee

will defer until after restart are appropriate for each unit. The

results of these efforts will be documented in NRC inspection reports.

The NRC's regulatory oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions

requires extensive planning and program integration. To focus more

regulatory attention on all of the restart issues related to the

Millstone units, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office

(SPO) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee these

activities. The SPO has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted

oversight program to verify the adequacy of NU's corrective actions,

programs, and processes. The breadth and significance of the problems

identified at the Millstone site require this program. The SPO has

developed a Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each of the

Millstone units, which includes: (1) the appropriate aspects of NRC

Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines For

Restart Approval''; (2) oversight of NU's ICAVP; and (3) oversight of

NU's corrective actions relating to employee concerns involving safety

issues. The activities associated with the Assessment Plan are in

addition to the normal inspection and licensing activities being

carried out at the Millstone site.

MC 0350 establishes the guidelines for approving the restart of a

nuclear power plant after a shutdown resulting from a significant

event, a complex hardware problem, or serious management deficiencies.

The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to ensure that

NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the individual

circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate NRC

management levels, and provide objective measures of restart readiness.

The Assessment Plan for each unit includes those issues listed in

MC 0350 that the NRC staff has identified as relevant to the shutdown

of the unit. Each Assessment Plan also includes additional issues

determined to be applicable to the specific situation. The Assessment

Plans include all actions the NRC expects NU to take before the NRC

staff recommends to the Commission that a unit be permitted to restart.

Accordingly, the staff will use the Assessment Plan for each Millstone

unit to track and monitor all significant actions necessary to support

a decision on restart approval of the unit.

The Assessment Plan for each Millstone unit includes the

requirement to review the NU Operational Readiness Plan, the deficiency

lists associated with the Assessment Plan, including restart and

deferred items, the corrective action program, work planning and

controls, the procedure upgrade program, the nuclear oversight function

(quality assurance), outstanding enforcement items, and a Significant

Issues List (SIL), which includes issues identified by both NU and the

NRC as issues requiring resolution before restart. NRC MC 93802,

``Operational Safety Team Inspection'' (OSTI), provides the framework

for a team inspection to be performed during the later stages of the

restart process. The inspection will be structured to focus on the

pertinent issues at each of the Millstone units.

Within the SPO, a Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) has been

formed in accordance with MC 0350. The RAP meets to assess the

Licensee's performance and its progress in completing the designated

restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO

(chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and

Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight; the

Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch

Chief; the Senior Resident Inspectors for the three Millstone units;

and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The RAP

holds periodic meetings with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's

corrective actions and schedules of each Millstone unit. These meetings

are noticed and are open to the public. An additional meeting with the

public is usually held that same day in the evening to summarize the

meeting with the Licensee, provide an update on NRC activities, and

address comments from the public.

The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated in the Confirmatory Order, is

to confirm that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are

in conformance with its licensing and design bases. The ICAVP audit

required by the NRC is expected to provide independent verification,

beyond NU's quality assurance and management oversight, that the

Licensee has identified and satisfactorily resolved existing

nonconformances with the design and licensing bases; documented and

utilized the licensing and design bases to resolve nonconformances; and

established programs, processes, and procedures for effective

configuration management in the future. NU has started programs to

identify and understand the root causes of the licensing and design

bases issues that led to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to

NU and to implement corrective actions that will ensure that NU

maintains the design configuration and that each unit is in conformance

with its licensing basis. NU has indicated that the scope of its

corrective programs will include those systems that it has categorized

as either Group 1 (safety-related and risk-significant) or Group 2

(safety-related or risk-significant). The ICAVP audit must provide

insights into the effectiveness of NU's programs so that the results

can be reasonably extrapolated to the structures, systems, and

components that were not reviewed in the audit.

As a practical matter, the NRC cannot do a 100-percent verification

of the Licensee's corrective actions, processes, and programs for each

Millstone unit. However, a comprehensive and multifaceted oversight

process has been developed by the NRC staff to provide a high level of

confidence that the Licensee has implemented required corrective

actions and that all of the issues on the SILs have been resolved. The

independent third-party evaluations required by the NRC will be used to

enhance NRC confidence that the Licensee's corrective action programs

have been effectively implemented at each unit.

NRC activities (including oversight of the ICAVP) to ensure that

effective corrective actions are being taken by the Licensee will

provide additional assurance that the Licensee's corrective action

programs have been effectively implemented. These activities will

include in-process reviews of the ICAVP contractor's activities,

reviews of the ICAVP results, and additional independent reviews of

compliance with the design and licensing bases of

[[Page 49038]]

selected systems. The State of Connecticut's Nuclear Energy Advisory

Council has provided input to the NRC staff for selecting the systems

which will be reviewed by the ICAVP contractor and has been invited to

observe the NRC staff's ICAVP inspections.

When the restart review process has identified, corrected, and

reviewed relevant issues regarding each Millstone unit, a restart

authorization process will be initiated for that unit. Upon receipt of

a staff recommendation and a briefing on any ongoing investigations,

the Commission will meet to assess the recommendation and vote on

whether to allow the restart of the unit. The same process will be

followed for the remaining units.

Haddam Neck Facility

With regard to the Haddam Neck Plant, the Licensee shut down the

plant on July 22, 1996, as required by the facility's TSs, because of

concerns that the containment air recirculation fans service water

piping may exceed design loads during certain accident scenarios. The

Licensee determined that these concerns and other hardware and

programmatic problems identified before and during the forced outage

should be resolved before restarting the plant. Thus, the Licensee

decided to begin Refueling Outage 19 on August 17, 1996. On October 9,

1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that a permanent

shutdown of the plant was being considered by the Board of Trustees

based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the cost of

replacement power. Subsequently, all fuel assemblies were removed from

the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool.

From November 21, 1995, to November 22, 1996, the NRC conducted

numerous inspections at the Haddam Neck Plant to review several facets

of plant performance. These inspections included a Special Team

inspection by NRC headquarters staff focused on engineering

performance; a special Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection of a

reactor vessel nitrogen intrusion event in late August and early

September 1996 that lowered the reactor vessel water level; a special

radiation protection inspection of a significant contamination event in

November 1996; an emergency preparedness inspection to observe the

Licensee's response during an emergency exercise held in August 1996;

and several resident inspections. Numerous violations, as well as

several significant regulatory concerns, were identified during these

inspections. Most of the violations were discussed at a transcribed

public predecisional enforcement conference at the Millstone training

building in Waterford, Connecticut, on December 4, 1996. The December 4

conference was open to the public and focused on the broader

programmatic deficiencies underlying the violations that contributed to

the problems at Haddam Neck. A Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 was issued on

May 12, 1997, and subsequently paid by the Licensee.

The restart process described for the three Millstone units is not

applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant. By letter dated December 5, 1996,

the Licensee certified to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i)

and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it had decided to permanently cease

operations at the Haddam Neck Plant and had permanently removed the

fuel from the reactor. The Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) and a site-specific

decommissioning cost estimate would be submitted in accordance with 10

CFR 50.82, ``Termination of License.''

It is important to note that the NRC continues to identify problems

at both the Millstone site and the Haddam Neck Plant, as documented in

inspection reports issued after this Petition was filed. These findings

indicate that the corrective actions required to restart the Millstone

units have not yet been fully implemented. The NRC staff will not

recommend that the Commission allow the restart of a Millstone unit

until the Commission has determined, in accordance with the Assessment

Plan, that the necessary corrective actions have been effectively

implemented for the unit.

As for Haddam Neck, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued

to the Licensee on March 4, 1997, concerning radiological-control

problems at the Haddam Neck Plant. This CAL is an example of the type

of action that the NRC takes to assure that the limited activities at

the site will be conducted in a safe manner and in accordance with

regulatory requirements. The CAL prohibits the Licensee from performing

any radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a

safe configuration until the corrective actions identified in the CAL

have been implemented.

III. NRC Response to Requested Actions

In summary, the Licensee's implementation of its Configuration

Management Plan (CMP) for each Millstone unit, response to the elements

in the NRC staff's Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each

Millstone unit, implementation of actions to improve programs to

address employee concerns at the Millstone site, and the implementation

of the decommissioning process specified in 10 CFR 50.82 for the Haddam

Neck Plant, as discussed above, are the bases for the NRC staff's

responses discussed in this Partial Director's Decision to the specific

actions that the Petitioners requested be taken against NU. The

Petitioners' requested actions and the NRC staff's responses are

discussed below.3

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\3\ In this Partial Director's Decision, Petitioners' Requests

have been identified as Requests 1 through 8. These requests

correspond to Requests A.1 through 5, B and C in the initial

Petition, and Request II.A in the amendment to the Petition.

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1. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend or revoke

NU's license to operate Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) and the

Millstone Nuclear reactors due to chronic, negligent management of the

reactors which, for over a decade, has endangered and continues to

endanger occupational and public health and safety and the environment

due to resultant and cumulative major safety problems and violation of

NRC regulations.

The Petitioners base their request to suspend or revoke the

operating licenses of Haddam Neck and the three Millstone units on NU

reports and NRC inspection findings referred to in the Petition and on

a videotape in which a former Millstone Station employee expresses his

views on NU management and plant conditions. As previously noted, based

on the NRC staff review of these materials, the Petitioners have

identified no new information.

With regard to the Millstone units, the units are currently in an

extended shutdown and significant management changes at NU have been

made in the past year. The NRC's focus is on evaluating improved

performance, hardware and programmatic upgrades, and corrective

actions. Specifically, NRC review and inspection emphasis will be

directed toward the results of NU's actions to correct identified

weaknesses in areas such as design controls, radiological controls,

quality assurance, work control practices, corrective action processes,

and the handling of employee concerns.

The previous discussion provides an overview of the Assessment

Plans that the SPO has developed for assessing the adequacy of NU's

corrective actions being taken prior to Commission approval of restart

for any of the Millstone units. The NRC staff will have to reach a

determination that the

[[Page 49039]]

corrective actions taken by NU provide reasonable assurance that future

operation will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions

of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the design

basis, as documented in the FSAR, of each unit before recommending that

the Commission approve the restart of any one of the units. Upon

receipt of an NRC staff recommendation and a briefing on ongoing

investigations, the Commission will hold a meeting to assess the

recommendation and then vote on whether to approve the restart of each

unit.

The restart process discussed for the Millstone units does not

apply to Haddam Neck. The Licensee has certified to the NRC that

operations at the facility have permanently ceased and that fuel has

been permanently removed from the reactor.

The Petitioners' request to take immediate action was denied in the

letter of January 23, 1997, which acknowledged receipt of the Petition.

The request to suspend or revoke the licenses for the three Millstone

units is denied based on the NRC staff's conclusion that such action is

not warranted by the facts. Programmatic and review efforts are in

place. If these efforts are successful, the NRC would allow the

Millstone units to resume operation. The request to suspend or revoke

the license to operate the Haddam Neck Plant is moot since the Licensee

has certified to the NRC that the plant has permanently ceased

operation and the fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.

2. The Petitioners request that the NRC investigate the possibility

that NU made material misrepresentations to the NRC concerning

engineering calculations and other information or actions relied upon

to assure the adequacy of safety systems at the Haddam Neck and

Millstone reactors. The Petitioners said NU made possible material

misstatements either through lack of rigor and thoroughness or by

providing intentionally misleading information.

The NRC has ongoing investigations related to alleged wrongdoing by

NU personnel. The investigative results will be reviewed for possible

enforcement action. Depending on the results of the ongoing evaluations

of inspections and investigations, both NU as an organization and NU

employees found to have engaged in deliberate misconduct will be

subject to appropriate enforcement action. Consistent with the General

Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (NUREG-

1600), some enforcement action is normally taken against a licensee for

violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees.

Such action could include a civil penalty or an order. In deciding

whether to also take action directly against the responsible employees,

the NRC considers a number of factors such as the employee's level in

the organization, the employee's training and experience, the degree of

supervision, the employee's attitude, and the degree of management

responsibility or culpability. A decision to take action directly

against an individual is significant and normally will be taken only

when the NRC is satisfied that the individual has engaged in deliberate

misconduct. The action taken could include prohibiting the individual

from involvement in licensed activities for a period of years.

As the NRC is currently evaluating alleged wrongdoing by NU

personnel, the Petitioners' request is granted.

3. Petitioners request that the NRC revoke NU's operating licenses

for the Haddam Neck and the Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors if an

investigation determines that NU deliberately provided insufficient

and/or false or misleading information to the NRC. If the NRC chooses

not to revoke NU's licenses, the Petitioners specifically request that

the reactors remain off-line until a United States Department of

Justice (DOJ) independent investigation is complete and the NRC reviews

the conclusions and recommendations contained therein for potential

consequences to the Licensee and its agents under NRC regulations. The

Petitioners note in a footnote that a DOJ report will likely produce

information essential to the NRC's evaluation of NU's management

problems. The Petitioners further stated that such information should

influence any NRC decision concerning NU's future operation of nuclear

reactors in Connecticut.

Since the NRC investigations are ongoing, the NRC cannot respond to

the first portion of the request to revoke the licenses of the three

Millstone units at this time.

The response to the Petitioners' Request 1 applies to the part of

Request 3 asking that the reactors remain off line until the

investigations are complete. As noted, the Commission will consider the

status of all ongoing investigations, including any referrals to DOJ,

in its deliberations before voting on the restart of any of the

Millstone units.

The part of the request relating to revoking the licenses of the

three Millstone units is deferred until all investigations are

complete. The request that the reactors remain off line until the

investigations are complete is denied.

This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant, which has

already permanently ceased operation.

4. The Petitioners request that, if NRC chooses not to revoke NU's

licenses to operate the Haddam Neck Plant and the Millstone Units 1, 2,

and 3 reactors and allows the reactors to return to operation, the

reactors remain on the NRC's Watch List to oversee reactor operations

until NU management demonstrates to the NRC that:

a. NU is able to fulfill NRC regulatory requirements;

b. NU has met all prior commitments concerning the repair,

modification, maintenance, and documentation of the nuclear power

stations;

c. NU has retrained all staff in the application and interpretation

of NRC's regulations; and

d. NU has removed from any positions of responsibility for

operation and/or management of the reactors all persons whom DOJ, NRC,

or other government investigators and/or civil or criminal prosecutions

find to have made material misrepresentations to the NRC during the

past decade of mismanagement.

Due to the significance and programmatic nature of the concerns

evolving from the various NRC reviews and inspections at the Millstone

Station and the fact that each unit is shut down pending resolution of

these issues, the Commission put the Millstone units in Category 3 of

the Watch List. Accordingly, restart of any of the units is subject to

Commission approval. SIL issues, which require resolution for safe

operation, will have been addressed and a process will be in place to

resolve any deferred items. If the Commission approves restart of any

unit, that unit will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch List, where

it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that satisfactory

operational performance can be sustained at the unit.

The restart process, as previously discussed, will assure that the

management attributes identified by the Petitioners in Request 4.a, b,

and c, will be adequately considered within the context of the SPO's

Assessment Plans before the NRC staff recommends that the Commission

allow the restart of any unit. Request 4.d will be considered in the

restart process when the Commission is briefed regarding investigation

efforts and recommendations.

The request to retain the Millstone units on the NRC's Watch List,

if the Commission approves restart, is granted.

[[Page 49040]]

Any unit permitted to restart will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch

List, where it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that

satisfactory performance can be sustained at the unit. Request 4.a, b,

c, and d will be considered as set forth above.

This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant because the

Haddam Neck Plant has permanently ceased operation. The NRC will

continue its oversight of the defueled facility.

5. Petitioners request that, as a minimum, the NRC keep Haddam Neck

and the Millstone 1, 2, and 3 nuclear reactors off line until NU's

chronic mismanagement has been analyzed, remedial management programs

have been implemented, and the NRC has evaluated and approved the

effectiveness of the Licensee's actions. As a minimum, NU should:

a. Thoroughly analyze root causes for deficiencies in NU's FSARs,

its documentation of licensing and design bases, its safety analysis,

its engineering, its quality assurance, its as low as reasonably

achievable (ALARA) programs, and other necessary or required

documentation.

b. Create a complete, accurate FSAR-mere ``reform'' is impossible

when the basic document is inadequate and inaccurate;

c. Reevaluate of any of its activities initiated under (or which NU

should have initiated under) 10 CFR 50.59 in order to confirm the

validity of such activities, particularly to determine the extent to

which the FSAR does not match ``as built'' configurations. This

reevaluation requires more than a paper audit; it requires checking

actual physical plant against the existing documentation, component by

component and system by system and creating correct documentation where

it is lacking and/or inadequate;

d. Institute and document an effective ALARA review of all

operational and nonoperational activities that expose workers and/or

the public to radiation;

e. Thoroughly document the root causes of NU's chronic and systemic

mismanagement including, documentation of the NRC Region I inspection

program's staff and management failures over the past decade to detect

and deal with this problem;

f. Demonstrate, over a substantial period of time to the

satisfaction of the NRC, NU's commitment to respect NRC regulatory

requirements and consistently follow them;

g. Retrain all personnel involved in day-to-day operations so that

they are thoroughly conversant with NRC regulations; and

h. Update and document Plant Design Change Requests (PDCRs) to

include all changes to the reactor's design, and verification by the

NRC staff of these design changes, with closeouts of PDCRs receiving

the highest priority.

As previously noted, NRC regulatory oversight programs at the

Millstone Station are based on the recognition that the Licensee is

primarily responsible for demonstrating that corrective actions have

been effectively implemented. Before the NRC staff can recommend that

the Commission approve the restart of a Millstone unit, the Licensee

must determine that the unit conforms with applicable NRC regulations,

license conditions, and the FSARs and that applicable licensing

commitments have been met. The Licensee's conformance with NRC

regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is

fundamental to the NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed

activities.

The significant actions that the NRC is taking to monitor the

Licensee's activities have been discussed in detail earlier in this

Decision. Based on that discussion, the actions requested in Request

5.a through h, with the exception of the part of 5.e relating to NRC

staff performance, will be adequately addressed within the context of

the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the Millstone units.

With regard to Request 5.e, the part of 5.e relating to the

performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process

and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this

Petition. This issue has been referred to the NRC's OIG for action as

appropriate.

The request to keep the Millstone units off line until the items

identified in Request 5.a through h, with the exception of the part of

Request 5.e relating to NRC's previous actions in dealing with the

Licensee, is granted to the extent that the issues will be considered

within the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the units.

This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck facility, which has

permanently ceased operation.

6. Petitioners request that, if NU decides to shut down any or all

of the nuclear power reactors at issue herein with the intent to

commence the decommissioning process, the NRC not permit any

decommissioning or predecommissioning activity to take place until:

a. All the documentation mentioned in earlier requests is available

to the NRC and on site at the reactors;

b. All personnel involved in the decommissioning process have been

retrained (or trained) in the use and interpretation of the applicable

NRC regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations;

c. The NRC has appropriately evaluated and replaced personnel and

has restructured the NRC Region I inspection program, its management,

and the supervising NRC directorate to eliminate the regulatory anarchy

that plagued the Connecticut nuclear reactors during the past 10 years;

and

d. The NRC makes certain that NU does not employ any persons in

management or operations who made material misrepresentations to the

NRC about the status of operations, repairs, modifications, or

maintenance of NU's Connecticut reactors.

On October 9, 1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that

the Board of Trustees was considering a permanent shutdown of the

plant, based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the

cost of replacement power. All fuel assemblies were removed from the

reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool for temporary storage. By

letter dated December 5, 1996, the Licensee certified to the NRC,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it

had determined to permanently cease operations at the Haddam Neck Plant

and that the fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor. The

Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities

Report (PSDAR) and the site-specific decommissioning cost estimate

would be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82, ``Termination of

License.'' The PSDAR will be submitted to the NRC and a copy sent to

the affected state(s) within 2 years after operations have permanently

ceased. The report must include, among other things, a description of

the planned decommissioning activities and a schedule for their

implementation. No major decommissioning activities may be performed

until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR.

The current activities at the site include the operation,

monitoring, and maintenance of the spent fuel pool; radioactive waste

management; radiological protection; and fire protection. These

activities, including any activities relating to decommissioning, must

be in compliance with the current license requirements, which apply

when the reactor is defueled.

The degree of regulatory oversight required during decommissioning

of a nuclear power reactor is considerably less than during its

operational phase. When the reactor is operating, the fuel

[[Page 49041]]

in the reactor core undergoes a controlled nuclear fission reaction

that generates a high neutron flux and large amounts of heat. Safe

control of the nuclear reaction involves the use and operation of many

complex systems, adherence to operational limits, testing of components

and systems to assure their operability, specified procedure adherence,

and operator actions. Once the fuel has been permanently removed and

temporarily stored in the spent fuel pool, the fuel is still highly

radioactive and generates heat caused by radioactive decay. However, no

neutron flux is generated and the fuel slowly cools as its energetic

decay products diminish. Since the spent fuel is stored in a

configuration that precludes the nuclear fission, no generation of new

radioactivity can occur. However, the same areas of the facility

contain radioactive contamination and those areas must still be

controlled to minimize radiation exposure to personnel and to control

the spread of radioactive material.

The NRC staff continues to be concerned about the failures of the

Haddam Neck radiological controls program (which recently resulted in

the unplanned exposure of two individuals), long-standing discrepancies

in the calibration of several radiation monitors that are used to

monitor and control radiological effluent releases, and the inadequate

control of radioactive material that resulted in the undetected release

of contaminated equipment to a nonlicensed vendor.

In response, the NRC has taken comprehensive and significant

actions to resolve concerns in the area of radiological controls,

including the issuance of a CAL on March 4, 1997, confirming the

Licensee's commitment to respond to the findings in Inspection Reports

50-213/96-12, dated December 19, 1996, and 50-213/97-02, dated March

21, 1997. The CAL restricts the Licensee from performing any

radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a safe

configuration. The CAL identifies four significant activities required

of the Licensee to bring its management and implementation of radiation

control programs up to a standard acceptable to the NRC. The activities

are to (1) identify, in writing, specific compensatory measures that

the Licensee will establish to assure sufficient management control and

oversight of ongoing or planned activities that require radiological

controls; (2) engage the services of an independent assessor to assess

the quality and performance of the Licensee's radiological control

programs and their implementation; (3) by May 30, 1997, based on the

results of that independent assessment, (a) identify problems,

determine root causes, and develop broad-based and specific corrective

actions; (b) identify performance measures that may be used to

determine the effectiveness of radiological control programs; and (c)

submit a plan and schedule to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,

for implementing improvements in the radiological control programs; and

(4) before eliminating any interim compensatory measures, meet with the

Region I Administrator to describe program implementation and

performance improvements achieved or planned.

In summary, the NRC is following the decommissioning process as

specified in 10 CFR 50.82, which requires that no major activities may

be performed until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR. The

Licensee must comply with all the applicable operating license

requirements in effect for the defueled reactor relating to activities

currently being performed at the Haddam Neck Plant. Further, the NRC

will take appropriate actions for any defueled reactor to assure

compliance with its license and license conditions, such as the actions

described above for the failure of adequate radiological controls at

Haddam Neck. The Haddam Neck Plant is the only reactor that the

Licensee has determined to permanently shut down and decommission.

The request to forbid decommissioning activities or

predecommissioning activity at any NU nuclear power reactor until all

the requested actions identified in the Petition, including items a, b

and d, of Request 6, have been completed is denied for the reasons

stated above. The NRC staff has determined that the NRC requirements

that govern decommissioning and the activities being undertaken by the

Licensee in response to the CAL are sufficient to assure that the

activities at the Haddam Neck facility are being conducted in a safe

manner. Request 6.c, relating to the performance of the NRC staff, is

beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and will not be addressed in the

Director's Decision relating to this Petition. This issue has been

referred to the NRC's OIG.

7. The Petitioners request that the NRC commence an investigation

into how it allowed the illegal situation at NU's Connecticut reactors

to exist and to continue over a decade. Particularly, Petitioners

request that the Commission order its staff (directors of the

responsible directorates, managers, and Region I management and staff)

to answer the following questions, and hold these persons accountable

for their answers and actions regarding the past 10 years at NU's

Connecticut nuclear power reactors:

a. What documents did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and

NRC Project Directors and Project Managers review during 10 years of

NU's out-of-compliance operation?

b. If NU provided documents that somehow deceived the Region I

inspector, how does the information in these documents relate to the

everyday workings and activities conducted during the otherwise

undocumented decade of operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck

plants?

c. How did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC Project

Directorates and Managers find that NU was conducting operations in a

way that keeps worker and public exposures to radiation ALARA when NU

was not adequately documenting either its licensing basis or the basis

of reactor operations?

d. Knowing, as Region I inspectors must have known, of excessive

worker exposures (for example, due to a long standing problem with

leaking pipes as documented by an NU worker in the video tape provided

with this Petition Exhibit A), how did the Region I inspectors certify

that operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants were being

conducted ALARA? How did the supervisors, and those in the NRC Project

Directorate, make the same certifications?

e. During the undocumented decade, how did Region I inspectors,

their supervisors, and NRC Project Directors and Managers manage to

track NU's activities at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants under 10

CFR 50.59?

f. To what extent have NRC Region I inspectors, their supervisors,

and NRC Project Directors and Managers allowed the same type of

problems to develop at other nuclear power reactors in New England

(i.e., Maine Yankee, Pilgrim, Seabrook, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee

Rowe)?

g. Is there any connection between licensees employing Yankee

Atomic Electric Company's consulting and engineering services and the

serious problems with documentation and lack of compliance with the

licensing and design bases nuclear power stations in New England or in

other parts of the country?

This request is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process. It concerns

the performance of the NRC staff and will not be addressed in the

Director's

[[Page 49042]]

Decision relating to this Petition. This request has been referred to

the NRC's OIG.

8. In the amendment to the Petition, the Petitioners request that

the NRC take the following actions to enforce its regulations against

NU. As part of the 2.206 process, the NRC should provide copies of

Haddam Neck's nitrogen calculations to the Petitioners and conduct an

independent review to see if the calculations meet the requirements of

10 CFR part 50, appendix B. If appendix B requirements were violated,

the Petitioners are concerned that the Licensee cannot safely

decommission the Haddam Neck Plant. Accordingly, NU's operating

licenses for its Connecticut reactors should be revoked, and NU should

not be permitted to commence decommissioning until it has complied with

the conditions outlined in the main body of the original Petition.

Finally, the Commission should inquire into the NRC staff's failure to

discern this situation and its continuing failure to enforce the terms

and conditions of NU's license and NRC regulations.

As noted above, the assertion by the Petitioners that the

calculations performed by the Licensee violated NRC requirements is a

new issue not previously considered by the NRC staff.

The subject calculations were performed subsequent to an event at

the Haddam Neck Plant that resulted in the formulation of a nitrogen

bubble in the reactor vessel. The results of the calculations, which

were one of several methods used to confirm the water level during the

event, were discussed by the Licensee during a public predecisional

enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996.

By letter dated July 3, 1997, the Licensee provided information,

including the requested calculations, relating to the different methods

used for determining the reactor vessel water level resulting from the

nitrogen intrusion event. This information has been placed in the NRC's

Public Document Room and the Local Public Document Rooms. The

Petitioners were provided a copy of the calculations as an enclosure to

a Petition status letter dated July 21, 1997, since the calculations

are relevant to the Petitioners' concern, are not proprietary, and are

in the public domain.

On September 5, 1996, while investigating the root cause of the

undetected accumulation of nitrogen gas in the reactor vessel, the

Licensee performed a special test (ST 11.7-197, ``Determination of

Reactor Vessel Level'') to verify reactor vessel level. This test was

necessary because the reactor vessel level indication system and the

core exit thermocouples had been removed from service in accordance

with the Licensee's refueling procedures. The reactor level measurement

problem had been exacerbated by the nitrogen gas intrusion, which

displaced water from the reactor vessel into the pressurizer, resulting

in an unquantified decrease in reactor vessel inventory. During the

course of the event, the shift manager had requested that the worst-

case (lowest) reactor vessel level achieved during the event be

determined. As noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/96-80, ``NRC

Augmented Inspection Team Review of the Undetected Introduction of

Nitrogen Gas into the Reactor Vessel During Plant Shutdown,'' the plant

staff completed a preliminary analysis on September 4, 1996. It was

further noted that, at the end of the onsite inspection activities, the

Licensee had yet to complete a final volumetric inventory balance

calculation. In the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of

Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 issued on May 12, 1997, the

Licensee was cited for failure to take timely corrective actions

following the nitrogen intrusion event, including the failure to timely

establish the actual lowest reactor vessel level resulting from the

event.

Subsequently, the Licensee completed two calculations: (1)

Calculation 96-MDE-1515-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,''

prepared on October 2, 1996, independently reviewed on November 1,

1996, and approved on November 5, 1996; and (2) Calculation 96-MDE-

1536-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,'' prepared on October 4,

1996, independently reviewed on November 22, 1996, and approved on

December 1, 1996. These calculations were performed consistent with the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.

Also, during the December 4, 1996, predecisional enforcement

conference, the Licensee presented the results of reactor vessel water

level simulations, which were calculated using the RELAP5/MOD3 code.

These simulation results were presented by the Licensee to corroborate,

with a diverse methodology, the lowest reactor vessel water level

determined by Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. The

results of the RELAP5/MOD3 reactor vessel water level simulations

presented by the Licensee during the predecisional enforcement

conference were only used to corroborate and provide additional insight

into the reactor vessel water level that had been determined through

Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. These two calculations

had been independently reviewed and performed consistent with the

applicable provisions in the Licensee's 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B,

``Quality Assurance Program,'' and are considered by the NRC staff to

suffice to demonstrate the reactor vessel water level.

Under these circumstances, the RELAP5/MOD3 simulations were not

required to have been independently verified.

Thus, the assertion by the Petitioners that the calculations

discussed during the predecisional enforcement conference violated 10

CFR part 50, appendix B, requirements is unfounded and no further

actions by the NRC are required. The part of Request 8 relating to the

performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process

and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this

Petition. This part of Request 8 has been referred to the NRC's OIG.

IV. Conclusion

The NRC staff has determined, for the reasons provided in the above

discussion, that: Request 2 is granted for both the Millstone units and

the Haddam Neck Plant; Requests 4 and 5 are partially granted for the

Millstone units; Request 1 and parts of Requests 3, 4, 6, and 8 are

denied for the three Millstone units; Requests 6 and 8 are partially

denied for the Haddam Neck Plant; Request 3 is partially deferred for

the three Millstone units; Requests 1, 3, 4, and parts of Request 5 are

not applicable to Haddam Neck; and Request 7 and parts of Requests 5,

6, and 8 are beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and are not

addressed. The deferred parts of Request 3 will be addressed in a Final

Director's Decision after any possible wrongdoing is fully considered

by the NRC staff.

As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Partial Decision

will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's

review. This Partial Decision will constitute the final action of the

Commission (for Petitioners Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after

issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of

the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.

[[Page 49043]]

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia Jr.,

Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97-24807 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P