Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 216, 223, 229, 231, 232, and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1, Notice No. 2]

RIN 2130-AA95

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing a rule establishing comprehensive Federal

safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The proposed rule

contains requirements concerning equipment design and performance

criteria related to passenger and crew survivability in the event of a

passenger train accident; the inspection, testing, and maintenance of

passenger equipment; and the safe operation of passenger train service.

The proposed rule is designed to address the safety of passenger train

service in an environment where technology is advancing, and equipment

is being designed for operation at higher speeds. The rule would amend

existing regulations concerning special notice for repairs, safety

glazing, locomotive safety, safety appliances, and railroad power

brakes as applied to passenger equipment.

The proposed rule does not apply to tourist and historic railroad

operations. However, after consulting with the excursion railroad

associations to determine appropriate applicability in light of

financial, operational, or other factors unique to such operations, FRA

may prescribe requirements for these operations that are different from

those affecting other types of passenger operations.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or

before November 24, 1997. Comments received after that date will be

considered by FRA and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working

Group to the extent possible without incurring substantial additional

expense or delay. The docket will remain open until the Working Group

proceedings are concluded. Requests for formal extension of the comment

period must be made by November 7, 1997.

(2) Public hearing: FRA intends to hold a public hearing to allow

interested parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues

addressed in the NPRM. The date and location of the hearing will be set

forth in a forthcoming notice that will be published in the Federal

Register. Anyone who desires to make an oral statement at the hearing

must notify the Docket Clerk by telephone (202-632-3198), and must

submit three copies of the oral statement that he or she intends to

make at the hearing. The notification should also provide the Docket

Clerk with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the right to

limit participation in the hearings of persons who fail to provide such

notification. The date by which the Docket Clerk must be notified about

the oral statement and receive copies of it will be set forth in the

notice announcing the hearing.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should identify the docket number and must

be submitted in triplicate to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief

Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590. Persons desiring to be notified

that their comments have been received by FRA should submit a stamped,

self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk will

indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were received

and will return the card to the addressee. Written comments will be

available for examination, both before and after the closing date for

written comments, during regular business hours in Room 7051 of FRA

headquarters at 1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Edward Pritchard, Acting Staff

Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety

Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail Stop 25,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3362); Daniel Alpert, Trial

Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Mail

Stop 10, Washington, D.C. (telephone: 202-632-3186); or Thomas

Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-

3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

To enhance rail safety, the Secretary of Transportation convened a

meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry in

September, 1994. As one of the initiatives arising from this Rail

Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would begin developing

safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period.

In November, 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for

implementing rail passenger equipment regulations and included it in

the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub.

L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Section

215 of the Act, as now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133, requires:

(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.--The Secretary of Transportation shall

prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for the safety

of cars used by railroad carriers to transport passengers. Before

prescribing such regulations, the Secretary shall consider--

(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;

(2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,

and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;

(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;

(4) Emergency response procedures and equipment; and

(5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect

safety not otherwise governed by regulations.

The Secretary may make applicable some or all of the standards

established under this subsection to cars existing at the time the

regulations are prescribed, as well as to new cars, and the

Secretary shall explain in the rulemaking document the basis for

making such standards applicable to existing cars.

(b) INITIAL AND FINAL REGULATIONS.--(1) The Secretary shall

prescribe initial regulations under subsection (a) within 3 years

after the date of enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety

Authorization Act of 1994. The initial regulations may exempt

equipment used by tourist, historic, scenic, and excursion railroad

carriers to transport passengers.

(2) The Secretary shall prescribe final regulations under

subsection (a) within 5 years after such date of enactment.

(c) PERSONNEL.--The Secretary may establish within the

Department of Transportation 2 additional full-time equivalent

positions beyond the number permitted under existing law to assist

with the drafting, prescribing, and implementation of regulations

under this section.

(d) CONSULTATION.--In prescribing regulations, issuing orders,

and making amendments under this section, the Secretary may consult

with Amtrak, public authorities operating railroad passenger

service, other railroad carriers transporting passengers,

organizations of passengers, and organizations of employees. A

consultation is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5

U.S.C. App.), but minutes of the consultation shall be placed in the

public docket of the regulatory proceeding.

The Secretary of Transportation has delegated these rulemaking

responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49(m).

Consistent with the intent of Congress that FRA consult with the

railroad industry in prescribing these regulations, FRA invited various

organizations to participate in a working

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group to focus on the issues related to railroad passenger equipment

safety and assist FRA in developing Federal safety standards. The

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group (or the ``Working

Group'') first met on June 7, 1995, \1\ and continues to meet in

support of this rulemaking. This proposed rule was developed by FRA in

consultation with the Working Group, and FRA will again convene the

Working Group to consider comments received in response to this Notice

and develop the final rule. Notice of any Working Group meetings will

be available through the FRA Docket Clerk.

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\1\ This date was incorrectly identified as June 6, 1995, in the

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (61 FR 30672, June 17, 1996).

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The Working Group has evolved since its initial meeting, and its

membership currently includes representatives from the following

organizations:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners, Inc. (AAPRCO),

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

(AASHTO),

American Public Transit Association (APTA),

Association of American Railroads (AAR),

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE),

Brotherhood Railway Carmen (BRC),

FRA,

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) of DOT,

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak),

National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP),

Railway Progress Institute (RPI),

Safe Travel America (STA),

Transportation Workers Union of America (TWU), and

United Transportation Union (UTU).

The Working Group is chaired by FRA, and supported by FRA program,

legal, and research staff, including technical personnel from the Volpe

National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) of the Research

and Special Programs Administration of DOT. FRA has included vendor

representatives designated by RPI as associate members of the Working

Group. FRA has also included the AAPRCO as an associate Working Group

member. The National Transportation Safety Board has designated staff

members to advise the Working Group.

In developing proposed safety standards for passenger equipment

operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph, FRA

formed a subgroup (the ``Tier II Equipment Subgroup'') of Working Group

members representing interests associated with the provision of rail

passenger service at such high speeds. FRA invited representatives from

organizations including Amtrak, the BLE, BRC, RPI, and UTU to

participate in this effort.

In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20133(d), the evolving positions of

the Working Group members--as reflected in the minutes of the group's

meetings and associated documentation, together with data provided by

the members during their deliberations-- have been placed in the public

docket of this rulemaking.

On June 17, 1996, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety

standards for railroad passenger equipment (61 FR 30672). The ANPRM

provided background information on the need for such standards, offered

preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented

questions on various topics including: system safety programs and

plans; passenger equipment crashworthiness; inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements; training and qualification requirements for

mechanical personnel and train crews; excursion, tourist, and private

equipment; commuter equipment and operations; train make-up and

operating speed; tiered safety standards; fire safety; and operating

practices and procedures.

FRA's commitment to developing proposed regulations through the

Working Group necessarily influenced the role and purpose of the ANPRM.

FRA specifically asked that members of the Working Group not respond

formally to the ANPRM. The issues and ideas presented in the ANPRM had

already been placed before the Working Group, and the Working Group had

commented on drafts of the ANPRM. As a result, FRA solicited the

submission of written comments that might be of assistance in

developing a proposed rule from interested persons not involved in the

Working Group's deliberations.

FRA received 12 comments in response to the ANPRM, including a

request from a member of the Working Group to extend the ANPRM's

comment period. In addition, the United States Small Business

Administration (SBA) commented that the length of the comment period

was inadequate for the industry, especially small railways, to prepare

a thorough response to the ANPRM. FRA had closed the comment period on

July 9, 1996, so that all comments could be shared with the Working

Group before its meeting on July 10, 1996.

Although FRA did not formally extend the comment period, comments

received after the closing date of the comment period have been shared

with the Working Group at subsequent meetings. Such comments have been

considered (and identified in this Notice) to the extent possible

without incurring additional delay in preparing this Notice. Moreover,

the Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved in

the provision of intercity and commuter rail service nationwide, and

its members had the opportunity to comment on the issues raised in the

ANPRM before the document's publication, as noted above.

Need for Safety Standards

Effective Federal safety standards for freight equipment have long

been in place, but equivalent Federal standards for passenger equipment

do not currently exist. The AAR sets industry standards for the design

and maintenance of freight equipment that add materially to the safe

operation of this equipment. Industry standards for the safety of

railroad passenger equipment have been in place since the early part of

this century, as noted by the AAPRCO in comment on the ANPRM. However,

over the years, the AAR has discontinued the development and

maintenance of passenger equipment standards.

Passenger railroads do offer the traveling public one of the safest

forms of transportation available. In the five-year period 1991-1995,

there were 1.07 passenger fatalities for every billion miles a

passenger was transported by rail. However, accidents continue to

occur, often as a result of factors beyond the control of the passenger

railroad. Further, the rail passenger environment is rapidly changing.

Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing. Several

passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been proposed

for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general, these

trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that are

common practice for current North American equipment. FRA believes that

adherence to such standards by the nation's passenger railroads has in

large measure contributed to the high level of safety at which rail

passenger service is currently operated. However, these standards do

not have the force of regulation.

In general, the North American railroad operating environment

requires passenger equipment to operate commingled with very heavy and

long freight trains, often over track with frequent grade crossings

used by heavy highway equipment. European passenger operations are

intermingled with freight equipment of lesser weight than in North

America. In many cases, highway-rail grade crossings also pose

[[Page 49730]]

lesser hazards to passenger trains in Europe due to lower highway

vehicle weight. European passenger equipment design standards may

therefore not be appropriate for the North American rail environment.

FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains

continue to be designed, built, and operated with a high level of

safety. A clear set of Federal safety and design standards for

passenger equipment tailored to the nation's operating environment is

needed to provide for the safety of future rail operations and to

facilitate sound planning for those operations.

Passenger Train Safety Hazards

Passenger trains are exposed to a variety of safety hazards. Some

of these hazards are endemic to the nation's rail passenger operating

environment, as noted above, and result from the operation of passenger

trains commingled with freight trains, often over track with frequent

grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment.

Collisions with a wide range of objects may occur at various speeds

under a number of different circumstances. In addition to freight

trains and highway vehicles, these objects include maintenance-of-way

equipment and other passenger trains. Although most of these collisions

occur only in the normal running direction of the train, impact into

the side of the train can occur, especially at the junction of rail

lines and at highway-rail grade crossings.

A passenger train collision with another train concerns FRA because

of the potential for significant harm demonstrated in actual accidents.

On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred

between Maryland Rail Commuter Service (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak

train 29 on track owned by CSX Transportation, Inc., (CSXT) at Silver

Spring, Maryland. The MARC train was operating with a cab car (a car

which provides passenger seating, as well as a location from which the

train is operated) as the lead car in the train, followed by two

passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The collision

separated the left front corner of the cab car from the roof to its

sill plate, and tore off much of the forward left side of the car body.

Three crewmembers and eight passengers were fatally injured, and 13

other occupants of the MARC train sustained injuries. (FRA Accident

Investigation Report (Report) B-3-96.)

On February 9, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred

between New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., trains 1254 and 1107

on the borderline of Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two

crewmembers and one passenger were fatally injured, and 35 other people

sustained injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the nonfatal

injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was operating with

the cab car forward, followed by four passenger coaches and a

locomotive pushing the consist. (FRA Report B-2-96.)

On January 18, 1993, Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District (NICTD) trains 7 and 12 collided corner-to-

corner in Gary, Indiana. The left front corners and adjacent car body

sidewall structures were destroyed on both of the lead cars in each

train. Seven passengers died, and 95 people sustained injuries. (NTSB/

Railroad Accident Report (RAR)-93/03.)

The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with sharing

common rights-of-way with freight trains has been demonstrated in

recent accidents, and a past disastrous accident.

On February 15, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 58 mph

struck a shifted load of steel ``I'' beams extending from a Union

Pacific Railroad Company freight train stopped in a siding at Borah,

Idaho. The Amtrak train's six passenger coaches were raked with a steel

beam which penetrated the outer layer of the car bodies at various

points. Although no passengers were injured, the Amtrak train's two

locomotives were significantly damaged, and two crewmembers were

injured. (FRA Report C-14-95.)

On May 16, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed after striking

an intermodal trailer which had fallen or was falling from a CSXT

freight train travelling northbound on an adjacent track at Selma,

North Carolina. The lead locomotive of the Amtrak train rolled over,

and the assistant engineer was killed. The engineer sustained serious

injuries, and 120 other occupants of the Amtrak train reported

injuries. (NTSB/RAR-95/02.)

On January 4, 1987, an Amtrak train collided with the rear

of a Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) train near Chase,

Maryland, when it unexpectedly entered the track ahead of the Amtrak

train, which had been travelling between 120 and 125 mph only a few

seconds earlier. The Amtrak train's two locomotives and three front

passenger cars were destroyed in the collision. The engineer and 15

passengers aboard the Amtrak train were fatally injured, and 174 other

persons aboard the train were injured. (NTSB/RAR-88/01.)

The exposure of passenger trains to hazards associated with

operating over frequent highway-rail grade crossings, used by heavy

highway vehicles, has also been demonstrated in numerous accidents.

On January 16, 1996, a Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA) train being operated by Amtrak struck a loaded

tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing in

Wakefield, Massachusetts. Twenty-two passengers were taken to hospitals

by ambulance or air. (FRA Report C-4-96.)

On October 3, 1995, a Metro-North Commuter Railroad

Company (Metro-North) train with a cab car in the lead struck a loaded

tractor-trailer which had become lodged in a grade crossing near

Milford, Connecticut. Two crewmembers and 24 passengers were injured.

(FRA Report C-60-95.)

On September 21, 1995, an Amtrak train traveling at 81 mph

struck a loaded tractor-trailer at a highway-rail grade crossing near

Indiantown, Florida. The assistant engineer was killed, and five other

persons onboard the train were injured. (FRA Report C-56-95.)

On November 30, 1993, an Amtrak train derailed after

striking an 82-ton turbine being transported by a 184-foot long vehicle

which was fouling a grade crossing near Intercession City, Florida.

Fifty-eight of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.

(NTSB Highway Accident Report 95/01.)

In addition to collisions involving passenger trains striking

highway vehicles, highway vehicles may also strike passenger trains.

According to FRA's Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident

database, 13.8% of all highway-rail grade crossing collisions involving

passenger trains from 1986 through 1995 occurred when the highway

vehicle struck the passenger train. This accounts for 388 such

occurrences out of 2,820 highway-rail grade crossing collisions

involving passenger trains in this period. In commenting on the ANPRM,

the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) had asked

that FRA clarify the statement that 25 percent of all highway-rail

grade crossing accidents involve a highway vehicle striking the side of

a train. See 61 FR 30692. Though this higher figure does include

accidents involving both freight and passenger trains, the potential

for a highway vehicle to strike a passenger train is real.

The WSDOT also requested that FRA document how many ``heavy''

highway vehicles were involved in highway-rail grade crossing accidents

in which highway vehicles struck passenger trains. Over the same ten-

year period from 1986 through 1995, 52 of the 388 occurrences in which

a highway vehicle

[[Page 49731]]

struck a passenger train involved a heavy highway vehicle. For purposes

of this analysis, FRA considered the number of heavy highway vehicles

which struck passenger trains to consist of all those vehicles

identified as a ``Truck-Trailer'' (12) and one-half the number of those

vehicles identified as a ``Truck'' (79), as specified according to Form

FRA F 6180.57--Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accident/Incident Report.

Passenger trains are also vulnerable to accidents caused by

defective railroad track structure and vehicle interaction with the

rail structure.

On August 3, 1994, an Amtrak train derailed while

travelling at approximately 79 mph on Conrail trackage near Batavia,

New York, because of the dynamic interaction between a material

handling car and a flattened rail head. Five of the derailed passenger

cars descended a railroad embankment and came to rest on their sides.

One-hundred-and-eight passengers and ten crewmembers were injured.

(NTSB/RAR-96/02.)

On July 31, 1991, an Amtrak train derailed while

travelling at 80 mph over CSXT trackage in Lugoff, South Carolina, when

a switch point leading to a parallel auxiliary track unexpectedly

opened under the Amtrak train. The derailed passenger cars collided

with the first of nine hopper cars stored on the auxiliary track. The

collision caused the wheel set from the first hopper car to penetrate

the last passenger car. Eight passengers were fatally injured, and 12

passengers sustained serious injuries. (NTSB/RAR-93/02.)

Moreover, passenger trains are vulnerable to accidents caused by

vandalism and sabotage.

On October 9, 1995, an Amtrak train derailed near Hyder,

Arizona, while operating at 50 mph on Southern Pacific Transportation

Company trackage because the railroad track structure had been

sabotaged. The derailment killed an Amtrak employee who occupied a

passenger car which had rolled over onto its side. Seventy-eight

passengers were also injured. (FRA Report C-62-95.)

On May 21, 1993, an Amtrak train traveling at

approximately 45 mph derailed after striking two pieces of steel pipe

which had been lodged between the rails of a turnout near Opa-Locka,

Florida. Six of the train's passengers and crewmembers were injured.

(FRA Report C-34-93.)

On August 12, 1992, an Amtrak train traveling at 79 mph

derailed at Newport News, VA, after being unexpectedly diverted into a

railroad siding because of a vandalized track switch. Seventy of the

train's passengers and crewmembers were injured. (FRA Report C-52-92.)

Regardless of the cause of an accident, the occupants of a

passenger train may risk harm caused by the crushing of the occupant

compartment, in which the occupants themselves are crushed, and local

penetration into the occupant compartment, where an object intrudes

into the occupant compartment and directly strikes an occupant, as

demonstrated in the Amtrak accident in Lugoff, South Carolina.

Passenger train occupants are also vulnerable to harm from collisions

within the train's interior, including loose objects inside the train,

such as baggage. For example, the NTSB determined that at least two

passengers in a lounge car were injured when they were struck by

displaced pedestal seats as a result of the Intercession City, Florida,

grade crossing collision on November 30, 1993. The seat columns on four

pedestal seats had separated from their floor attachments, allowing

them to be projected forward.

A variety of threats to passengers are also posed by fire, broken

glazing, electrical shock, and submergence. These dangers may arise

following a train derailment or collision, with potentially

catastrophic results.

On September 22, 1993, an accident occurred when an Amtrak

train travelling at approximately 72 mph derailed after striking a

girder that had been displaced when a towboat, pushing six barges,

struck a railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. The train's three

locomotives, the baggage and dormitory cars, and two of its six

passenger cars fell into the water. Forty-two passengers and five

crewmembers were killed. All passengers died from asphyxia due to

drowning, and the train's three locomotive engineers died from asphyxia

and blunt force trauma while inside the lead locomotive that became

filled with mud. Two other employees died from smoke inhalation inside

the dormitory coach car which had caught on fire. (NTSB Railroad-Marine

Accident Report 94/01.)

Further, in the 1996 Silver Spring, Maryland, train collision

between the MARC and Amtrak trains, fire erupted after the fuel tank of

one of the Amtrak locomotives was breached. Fuel oil spilled into the

MARC train's cab car through the openings in the torn car body. The

forward section of the cab car was incinerated.

Some dangers to passenger train occupants, such as fire and smoke,

may also arise independently without being associated with a train

collision or derailment.

On June 23, 1982, a fire started onboard an Amtrak

passenger train in a sleeping car travelling en route to Los Angeles,

California. As a result of the fire and smoke, two passengers died, two

passengers were seriously injured, and 59 other occupants of the train

were treated for smoke inhalation. (NTSB/RAR-83/03.)

Development of Passenger Train Safety Program

This rulemaking is part of several related and complementary

efforts by FRA that will contribute to rail passenger safety. FRA has

proposed regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency

response procedures for rail passenger service in a separate rulemaking

proceeding, designated as FRA No. PTEP-1. See 62 FR 8330, Feb. 24,

1997. In addition, FRA has formed a separate working group (the

Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group) to assist FRA in

the development of such regulations. This related proceeding is also

addressing some of the issues FRA identified in the ANPRM on passenger

equipment safety. Persons wishing to receive more information regarding

this other rulemaking should contact Mr. Edward R. English, Director,

Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone number: 202-632-3349), or David

H. Kasminoff, Esq., Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400

Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-3191).

Further, in response to the New Jersey Transit and MARC train

accidents in early 1996, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (Notice No.

1) on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately enhance

passenger train operating rules and emergency egress and to develop an

interim system safety plan addressing the safety of operations that

permit passengers to occupy the leading car in a train. 61 FR 6876,

Feb. 22, 1996. Both the New Jersey Transit and MARC train accidents

involved operations where a cab car occupied the lead position in a

passenger train. The Emergency Order explained that in collisions

involving the front of a passenger train, operating with a cab car in

the forward position or a multiple unit (MU) locomotive, i.e., a self-

propelled locomotive with passenger seating, presents an increased risk

of severe personal injury or death as compared with locomotive-hauled

service when the locomotive occupies the lead position in the train and

thereby acts as a buffer for the trailing passenger cars. This risk is

of particular

[[Page 49732]]

concern where operations are conducted at relatively higher speeds,

where there is a mix of various types of trains, and where there are

numerous highway-rail crossings over which large motor vehicles are

operated. Accordingly, the Emergency Order required in particular that

``railroads operating scheduled intercity or commuter rail service * *

* conduct an analysis of their operations and file with FRA an interim

safety plan indicating the manner in which risk of a collision

involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.

The Emergency Order also noted that there is a need to ensure that

emergency exits are clearly marked and in operable condition on all

passenger lines, regardless of the equipment or train control system

used. Although FRA Safety Glazing Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require

that passenger cars have a minimum of four emergency window exits

``designed to permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis

situation,'' the Silver Spring accident raised concerns that at least

some of the occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to

exit through the windows. The Emergency Order requires ``that any

emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the

inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of

all such windows be examined to ensure operability.'' 61 FR 6880. On

February 29, 1996, FRA issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order No. 20 to

refine three aspects of the original order, including providing more

detailed guidance on the emergency egress sampling provision. 61 FR

8703, Mar. 5, 1996.

In addition, FRA submitted a report to Congress on locomotive

crashworthiness and working conditions on September 18, 1996, and

subsequently referred the issues raised in the report to the Railroad

Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). FRA established RSAC in March of

1996, to provide FRA with advice and recommendations on railroad safety

matters. See 61 FR 9740, Mar. 11, 1996. RSAC consists of 48 individual

representatives, drawn from 27 organizations representing various rail

industry perspectives, and two associate nonvoting representatives from

the agencies with railroad safety regulatory responsibility in Canada

and Mexico. RSAC will make recommendations as to the best way to

address the findings of the report to Congress, including voluntary

initiatives, and regulatory standards where appropriate. As a result,

FRA may initiate a separate rulemaking proposing equipment safety

requirements for both conventional freight and passenger locomotives.

In the context of improving railroad communications, RSAC has

established a working group to specifically address communication

facilities and procedures, with a strong emphasis on passenger train

emergency requirements. FRA expects that group will report

recommendations to RSAC early in 1997. FRA anticipates that those

recommendations will address the issue of whether there should be

redundant communications capability on all passenger trains.

Scope of the Proposed Rule

Through this Notice, FRA proposes to establish a comprehensive set

of necessary safety regulations for railroad passenger equipment. These

safety standards will improve the safety of rail passenger service.

In commenting on the ANPRM, the General Railway Signal Corporation

(GRS) expressed concern that FRA has focused on equipment

crashworthiness without sufficiently addressing crash avoidance. GRS

noted that the underlying systems which can provide crash avoidance and

the related systems safety elements involving a vitally integrated

crash avoidance control system include much more than the elements

onboard a train.

As explained in the ANPRM (61 FR 30683), and as is evident in

Emergency Order No. 20, FRA recognizes that rail passenger safety does

involve the safety of the railroad system as a whole, including the

track structure, signal and train control systems, operating

procedures, and station- and platform-to-train interface design--in

addition to passenger equipment safety. To that end, FRA has active

rulemaking and research projects in a variety of contexts that address

non-equipment aspects of passenger railroad safety, including signal

and train control systems. Nevertheless, this proposed rule is designed

to address the specific statutory mandate that minimum safety standards

be prescribed for the safety of cars used to transport railroad

passengers. Signal and train control systems are not the focus of this

rulemaking.

FRA received comments from the SBA and on behalf of the Minnesota

Transportation Museum, Inc., about this rulemaking's effect on tourist,

scenic, historic, and excursion railroads. The proposed rule does not

apply to these railroads. Instead, the proposed rule applies to

railroads that provide intercity passenger and commuter service. A

joint FRA/industry working group formed under RSAC is currently

developing recommendations regarding the applicability of FRA

regulations, including this one, to tourist, scenic, historic, and

excursion railroads. After appropriate consultation with the excursion

railroad associations takes place, passenger equipment safety

requirements for these operations may be proposed by FRA that are

different from those affecting other types of passenger train

operations. Any such requirements proposed by FRA will be part of a

separate rulemaking proceeding.

Approach

The proposed regulations are principally designed to apply to two

groups of equipment. The first group is identified as Tier I equipment

and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds not

exceeding 125 mph. The second group is identified as Tier II equipment

and consists of railroad passenger equipment operated at speeds greater

than 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph. FRA is not proposing a rule of

general applicability for railroad passenger equipment operated at

speeds exceeding 150 mph. FRA believes that the safety of such

passenger equipment must be addressed in a rule of a particular

applicability for an individual railroad.

The speed break points between Tier I and Tier II equipment have

been chosen because most of the nation's intercity passenger and

commuter rail equipment has demonstrated an ability to operate safely

at speeds up to 125 mph. Nevertheless, FRA recognizes that most of this

same equipment is currently operated only at speeds of 110 mph or less.

As a result, the proposed rule contains particular suspension system

safety requirements for passenger equipment operating at speeds above

110 mph but not exceeding 125 mph, near the transition range from Tier

I to Tier II requirements.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20133(a), FRA may apply some or all of the

proposed standards to passenger cars existing at the time the

regulations are published, as well as to new cars, but FRA must explain

the basis for applying any such standards to existing cars. FRA

believes that passenger railroad equipment operating in permanent

service in the United States has established a good safety record,

proving its compatibility with the operating environment. Moreover, FRA

seeks to maximize the benefits resulting from the passenger railroad

industry's investment in any safety requirements which FRA may impose

through this rule. Accordingly, to be cost effective, most of the

proposed requirements would apply only to new or rebuilt equipment.

[[Page 49733]]

However, certain features routinely incorporated in existing designs

would be required at an earlier date than the more innovative features

proposed by this rule. Further, where appropriate, rebuilt equipment

would be required to comply with specific requirements.

FRA intends that the rules proposed in this NPRM lead to the

issuance of initial passenger equipment safety regulations, which are

required by statute to be issued by November 2, 1997. See 49 U.S.C.

20133(b)(1). FRA will propose additional rules for passenger equipment

in a second NPRM principally when the results of further research are

available. FRA intends that the second NPRM lead to the issuance of

final regulations by November 2, 1999, thereby completing the

rulemaking within the five-year period required by law. See 49 U.S.C.

20133(b)(2). To that end, FRA convened a meeting of the Working Group

on December 10-11, 1996, at the Volpe Center in Cambridge,

Massachusetts, to determine and set priorities for the research

necessary to address unresolved safety issues identified in prior

Working Group meetings. Moreover, FRA hopes that the establishment of

final regulations in 1999 will be furthered by APTA's own initiative to

develop and maintain recommended industry standards for rail passenger

equipment. APTA's effort is being carried out through the Passenger

Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Task Force, and APTA has

invited FRA, FTA, the NTSB, equipment manufacturers, engineering and

consulting firms, rail labor, and others with an interest in rail

passenger equipment to work with it in developing and effectuating the

recommended standards. This represents a substantial and continuing

investment by member commuter authorities in the safety of rail

passenger service.

System Safety

FRA believes that passenger railroads should carefully evaluate

their operations with a view toward enhancing the safety of those

operations. The importance of formal safety planning has been

recognized in Emergency Order No. 20 and the proposed rule on passenger

train emergency preparedness. As noted, Emergency Order No. 20, Notice

No. 1, required that ``railroads operating scheduled intercity or

commuter rail service . . . conduct an analysis of their operations and

file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the manner in which

risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed.'' 61 FR 6879.

In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson,

President of Metro-North and Chairperson of APTA's Commuter Railroad

Committee, announced that commuter railroads are committed to seeking

additional opportunities to ensure the safety of their operations

beyond efforts such as those made to comply with the interim system

safety plan requirements of Emergency Order No. 20. Mr. Nelson

explained in particular that commuter railroads will examine and ensure

the safety of their operations by adopting a comprehensive system

safety plan that:

(a) Defines the overall safety effort, how it is to be implemented

and the staff required to maintain it;

(b) Establishes the safety interface within the railroad, as well

as with its key outside agencies;

(c) Clearly indicates Senior Management support for implementing

the safety plan and the railroad's overall commitment to safety;

(d) Establishes the safety philosophy of the organization and

provides the means for implementation;

(e) Defines the authority and responsibilities of the safety

organization and delineates the safety related authority and

responsibilities of other departments; and

(f) Incorporates safety goals and objectives into the overall

corporate strategic plan.

(APTA's Commuter Railroad Committee letter at pages 1 and 2.) Further,

the system safety plan is intended to be updated through periodic

safety reviews of all operations.

In a letter to FRA dated October 21, 1996, Mr. Donald N. Nelson

submitted for FRA's review APTA's ``Manual for the Development of a

System Safety Plan for Commuter Railroads'' (APTA Manual). The APTA

Manual is intended to assist commuter railroads in adopting a

comprehensive system safety plan by September 1, 1997. In addition,

Amtrak recently began a corporate system safety program initiative to

make system safety formally an integral part of Amtrak's operations.

The value of the system safety process is rapidly being recognized and

accepted by the passenger railroad industry.

The System Safety Society (the ``Society''), which provided

detailed comments in response to the ANPRM, observed that the use of

the systems approach to safety is very actively followed in many other

industries. The Society noted that the implementation of system safety

plans has been observed to improve safety by reducing accidents and

incidents. Further, the Society explained that safety plans are usually

updated annually to maintain their utility because of technological

improvements and other changed circumstances, including changes in the

operating environment, rules and regulations.

The proposed rule contains system safety requirements to be applied

to all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment. Although FRA

initially considered addressing system safety requirements for Tier I

and Tier II equipment separately, FRA decided to propose system safety

requirements which can be applied generally to all types of passenger

equipment. Each individual railroad would be required to develop a

system safety plan and a system safety program tailored to its specific

operation, including train speed. The plan required by this part would

be developed as part of a comprehensive system safety process to which

commuter railroads are already committed.

Through the system safety process, each railroad would be required

to identify, evaluate, and seek to eliminate or reduce the hazards

associated with the use of passenger equipment over the railroad

system. In particular, the proposed rule would require that each

intercity passenger and commuter railroad prepare a system safety plan

addressing, at a minimum:

Fire protection;

Software safety;

Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance;

Employee training and qualifications; and

Pre-revenue service acceptance testing of equipment.

However, because FRA is also proposing a comprehensive set of

mandatory, equipment safety standards in this rule, FRA is generally

not proposing to enforce every element of a railroad's system safety

plan. The section-by-section analysis identifies those portions of the

system safety plan that will be enforced by FRA. Commenters are

requested to address whether FRA should mandate the contents of system

safety plans, whether the areas identified by FRA are appropriate,

whether additional areas should be added, and whether FRA should

enforce other portions of the system safety plans and, if so, which

portions. Should the proposed rule require that system safety plans be

comprehensive and address the entire railroad system in which the

equipment operates? Should the emergency preparedness planning

requirements contained in proposed 49 CFR part 239 (See the Passenger

Train Emergency Preparedness rulemaking,

[[Page 49734]]

designated as FRA No. PTEP-1 (62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997)) be expressly

integrated with the system safety planning requirements contained in

this proposed part (49 CFR part 238)?

APTA, citing to the fact that the commuter railroads have

voluntarily agreed to adopt system safety plans, has objected to FRA

issuing any regulations governing such plans. Commenters are requested

to address APTA's suggestion that the commuter railroads be allowed to

regulate themselves in this area. FRA understands that APTA's system

safety approach will be more comprehensive than what FRA is proposing

and address each commuter railroad's system more as an integrated

whole, not focused principally on rail equipment. FRA will carefully

consider the comments received in deciding what approach to take in the

final rule with respect to system safety plans.

Passenger railroads should seek to employ all means necessary to

reduce the risks associated with the use of passenger equipment over

their systems such as by improving the crashworthiness of their

equipment or by imposing operational limitations on its use. Further,

because many passenger railroads operate at least in part as a tenant

on the right-of-way of another railroad and may not in themselves be

able to control some of the major system hazards, as demonstrated when

an intermodal trailer from a CSXT freight train struck an Amtrak train

operating on an adjacent track in Selma, North Carolina, all railroads

are encouraged to exploit ways to reduce the risks associated with rail

travel to their employees, passengers, and the general public.

Emergency Egress and Access

During the NTSB's investigation of the February 16, 1996, collision

between the MARC and Amtrak trains in Silver Spring, Maryland, that

agency identified unsafe conditions on MARC's rail cars that had been

manufactured by Sumitomo. Concerned that the unsafe conditions

identified on these rail cars may exist on other commuter lines subject

to FRA oversight, on March 12, 1996, the NTSB recommended that FRA:

Inspect all commuter rail equipment to determine whether it has:

(1) easily accessible interior emergency quick-release mechanisms

adjacent to exterior passageway doors; (2) removable windows or kick

panels in interior and exterior passageway doors; and (3)

prominently displayed retroreflective signage marking all interior

and exterior emergency exits. If any commuter equipment lacks one or

more or these features, take appropriate emergency measures to

ensure corrective action until these measures are incorporated into

minimum passenger car safety standards. (Class I, Urgent Action) (R-

96-7)

(In a letter to FRA dated June 24, 1996, the NTSB announced that it has

added ``Safety of Passengers in Railroad Passenger Cars'' to its list

of ``Most Wanted'' transportation safety improvements.)

In the discussion accompanying the safety recommendation, the NTSB

expressed concern that emergency quick-release mechanisms for the

exterior side doors on MARC's Sumitomo rail cars are located in a

secured cabinet some distance from the doors that they control, and the

emergency controls for each door are not readily accessible and

identifiable. Each cabinet door was secured by two fasteners, requiring

a screwdriver or coin to open. The NTSB believes that the emergency

quick-release mechanisms for exterior doors on MARC rail cars should be

well marked and relocated, so that they are immediately adjacent to the

door which they control and readily accessible for emergency escape.

Access to Emergency Door-Release for Power-0perated Doors

In response to the NTSB's recommendation, FRA inspected a total of

1,250 pieces of equipment in use on 16 commuter organizations. In

addition to MARC rail cars, FRA found that some commuter railroads

operate cars with power doors equipped with emergency door-release

levers located inside cabinets requiring special tools to enter. In

large part, these railroads have committed to the voluntary elimination

of latches requiring tools or other implements to access the emergency-

release levers on power-operated doors.

FRA convened a joint meeting of the Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards Working Group and the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness

Working Group on March 26, 1996, to discuss the NTSB's recommendations

and incorporate the Safety Board's findings, as appropriate, into each

working group's rulemaking. In accordance with the consensus of the

working groups, FRA is proposing in Secs. 238.237 and 238.441 of the

rule that train passengers and crewmembers be able to access door-

release mechanisms without the use of any tool or other implement.

Relocation of Emergency Door-Release

NTSB advisors to the Working Group clarified that the

recommendation to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms refers to

exterior side doors located in end vestibules partitioned from the

passenger compartment of the rail vehicle. If emergency door-release

mechanisms are located inside the passenger compartments of such

vehicles, exiting the vehicles in an emergency through side doors in

the vestibules may be complicated as passengers try to locate the

mechanisms and move between the vestibule and passenger compartment

areas.

In response to the NTSB's safety recommendation, passenger

railroads that operate rail equipment with end vestibules have agreed

to relocate emergency door-release mechanisms so that they are located

adjacent to the doors which they control. However, agreement could not

be reached on a time-table for retrofitting existing equipment. APTA

has proposed that the retrofit be required on all such passenger

equipment when it is overhauled in the course of each railroad's

equipment overhaul cycle. APTA anticipates that under this process

retrofitting the entire fleet of affected equipment will be

accomplished within 10 to 15 years.

FRA believes that the retrofit must be accomplished sooner to

ensure the safety of passenger train occupants. Consequently, FRA is

proposing in Sec. 238.237 that for equipment operated at speeds not

exceeding 125 mph (Tier I equipment), within two years of the effective

date of the final rule each powered, exterior side door in a vestibule

that is partitioned from the passenger compartment of a passenger car

be equipped with a manual override that is: (1) capable of opening the

door without power from inside the car; (2) located adjacent to the

door which it controls; and (3) designed and maintained so that a

person may access the override device from inside the car without

requiring the use of any tool or other implement.

FRA expects that railroads will expedite this retrofit program and

believes that this retrofit can be completed well in advance of the 2-

year deadline. APTA maintains that the supply industry cannot provide

the necessary materials to complete the retrofit in such time without

unreasonable increases in costs, and believes that a 3 to 5 year time

frame is needed. (Commenters are requested to address whether a shorter

or longer time period should be established and, if so, provide the

rationale for the time period that the commenter recommends. Railroads

are requested to identify the number of cars that are not yet

retrofitted.) Further, before any equipment may be introduced for

service at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 150 mph (Tier II

[[Page 49735]]

equipment), FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441 that each powered,

exterior side door on a passenger car be equipped with a manual

override meeting the above and additional requirements.

FRA believes that the cost of meeting the retrofit requirement will

be $3.7 million dollars, and recognizes that it is not clear whether

the occupants of the MARC train in the Silver Spring, Maryland,

accident could have opened the vestibule exterior side doors after the

collision, assuming that the emergency-release had been employed. The

NTSB did note that the left and right rear exterior side doors of the

first car and the front interior end door and the right front exterior

door of the second car on the MARC train were jammed. However, FRA

believes it must institute the retrofit requirement to decrease the

risk that passengers cannot rapidly exit a train in a life-threatening

situation.

FRA recognizes that passenger railroads have located door-release

mechanisms away from the doors which they control to discourage

passengers from exiting trains in non-emergency situations. When no

emergency is present, passengers exiting trains along the railroad

right-of-way unnecessarily risk exposure to oncoming trains, electrical

hazards, and other dangerous conditions. In consequence, the proposed

rule permits railroads to protect emergency door-release mechanisms

from casual or inadvertent use with a cover or a screen. However, the

cover or screen must be capable of removal by a 5th-percentile female

without the use of any tool or other implement. If the method of

removing the protective cover or screen entails breaking or shattering

it, the cover or screen shall be scored, perforated, or otherwise

weakened so that a 5th-percentile female can penetrate the cover or

screen with a single blow of her fist without injury to her hand.

Additional Egress Issues

The NTSB noted that none of the car doors on the MARC train

involved in the Silver Spring, Maryland, accident had removable windows

or pop-out emergency escape panels (``kick panels'') for use in an

emergency. In addition, the NTSB stated that several train passengers

were unaware of the locations of emergency exits, and none knew how to

operate them. The NTSB found that the interior emergency window decals

were not prominently displayed and that one car had no interior

emergency window decals. Also, the exterior emergency decals were often

faded or obliterated, and the information on them, when legible,

directed emergency responders to another sign at the end of the car for

instructions on how to open emergency exits.

Through the issuance of Emergency Order No. 20, FRA has addressed

on an interim basis the inspection of required emergency exits, and

emergency exit signage and marking. Further, FRA is proposing

requirements concerning the marking of emergency exits, as well as

instructions for their use, in the related rulemaking on passenger

train emergency preparedness. FRA shares the NTSB's concern about

passenger egress in an emergency; however, FRA believes that the NTSB's

suggestion to install kick panels is best limited to interior doors to

ensure passage through a train in an emergency--and not applied to

exterior doors.

To the best of FRA's knowledge, the concept of kick panels has not

been utilized in North American rail equipment. Installing kick panels

below the window levels in exterior doors was evaluated by FRA, with

concurrence from the joint working groups, as unacceptable for safety

reasons. Because passenger railroads have encountered recurring

situations in which passengers have inappropriately exited moving

trains, leading to death or serious injury, introducing kick panels in

exterior doors would create an unacceptable risk of inadvertent use,

particularly by children. Penetration of occupied areas by objects from

the outside is also a potential concern.

Use of kick panels to open passageways through a train has merit.

If panels can be made sufficiently large without decreasing the

functionality of doors in normal operation, such a feature may

facilitate evacuation through the length of the train if exterior side

doors are jammed. Evacuation throughout the length of the train is

often the safest route of egress in situations such as fires,

derailments in multiple track territory, and incidents in third-rail

powered commuter service. Accordingly, FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.441

of the rule that Tier II passenger car end doors be equipped with a

kick-out panel, pop-out window or other similar means of egress in the

event the doors will not open.

Unlike a Tier II passenger train which should operate as a fixed

unit, the interchangeable use of some cab cars and MU locomotives as

leading and trailing units on a Tier I passenger train will complicate

analyzing the efficacy of installing such panels on Tier I equipment.

It would be unacceptable to have a removable panel at the point of a

train where objects or fluids might enter the vehicle as a result of a

highway-rail grade crossing accident or other collision. As a result,

FRA will further examine the concerns involving the use of kick panels

on Tier I equipment in the second phase of this rulemaking.

Additional emergency egress and access topics addressed in this

proposed rule are discussed below in the Emergency Systems section of

this preamble. Emergency egress and access topics are also addressed in

the related rulemaking on passenger train emergency preparedness. See

62 FR 8330, Feb. 24, 1997.

Power Brake Inspection and Testing

In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding

certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. These

amendments specifically address the revision of the power brake

regulations and state in pertinent part:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a

review of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to

railroad power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall

revise such rules based on such safety data as may be presented

during that review.

* * * * *

Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141, superseding

45 U.S.C. 431(r).

In response to the statutory mandate, various recommendations to

improve power brake safety, and due to its own determination that the

power brake regulations were in need of revision, FRA published an

ANPRM on December 31, 1992, concerning railroad power brake safety. See

57 FR 62546. The ANPRM provided background information and presented

questions on various subjects related to intercity passenger and

commuter train operations, including: training of testing and

inspection personnel; electronic braking systems; cleaning, oiling,

testing, and stenciling (COT&S) requirements; performance of brake

inspections; and high speed passenger train brakes. Following

publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted a series of public workshops.

The ANPRM and the public workshops were intended as fact-finding tools

to elicit views of those persons outside FRA charged with ensuring

compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.

Furthermore, on July 26, 1993, the NTSB made the following

recommendation to FRA: ``Amend the power brake regulations, 49 Code of

Federal Regulations 232.12, to provide appropriate guidelines for

inspecting brake equipment on modern passenger

[[Page 49736]]

cars.'' (R-93-16). The recommendation arose out of the NTSB's

investigation of the December 17, 1991, derailment of an Amtrak

passenger train in Palatka, Florida. The derailed equipment struck two

homes and blocked a street north of the Palatka station. The derailment

resulted in eleven passengers sustaining serious injuries and 41 others

receiving minor injuries. In addition, five members of the operating

crew and four onboard service personnel received minor injuries. By

letter dated September 16, 1993, FRA told the NTSB that it was in the

process of reviewing and rewriting the power brake regulations and

would consider the NTSB's recommendation during the process.

Based on comments and information received, FRA published an NPRM

in 1994 regarding revision of the power brake regulations which

contained specific requirements related to intercity passenger and

commuter train operations. These specific requirements included:

general design requirements; movement of defective equipment; employee

qualifications; inspection and testing requirements; single car testing

requirements and periodic maintenance; operating requirements; and

requirements for the introduction of new train brake system technology.

See 59 FR 47722-47753, September, 16, 1994.

Following publication of the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47676), FRA held a

series of public hearings in 1994 to allow interested parties the

opportunity to comment on specific issues addressed in the 1994 NPRM.

Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois, on November 1-2; in

Newark, New Jersey, on November 4; in Sacramento, California, on

November 9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14, 1994. These

hearings were attended by numerous railroads; organizations

representing railroads; labor organizations; rail shippers; and State

governmental agencies. Due to the strong objections raised by a large

number of commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17,

1995, that it would defer action on the 1994 NPRM and permit the

submission of additional comments prior to making a determination as to

how it would proceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375.

Based on these considerations and after review of all the comments

submitted, FRA determined that in order to limit the number of issues

to be examined and developed in any one proceeding it would proceed

with the revision of the power brake regulations via three separate

processes. In light of the testimony and comments received on the 1994

NPRM, emphasizing the differences between passenger and freight

operations and the brake equipment utilized by the two, FRA decided to

separate passenger equipment power brake standards from freight

equipment power brake standards. As passenger equipment power brake

standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment safety standards,

FRA requested the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group to

assist FRA in developing appropriate power brake standards for

passenger equipment and then decided that they would be included in

this NPRM. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, a second NPRM covering

freight equipment power brake standards would be developed with the

assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. See 61 FR

29164, June 7, 1996. Furthermore, in the interest of public safety and

due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA determined that

it would separate the issues related to two-way end-of-train-telemetry

devices from both the passenger and freight issues. FRA convened a

public regulatory conference and published a final rule on the subject

on January 2, 1997. See 62 FR 278.

Beginning in December of 1995, the Passenger Equipment Safety

Standards Working Group adopted the additional task of attempting to

develop power brake standards applicable to intercity passenger and

commuter train operations and equipment. The Working Group met on four

separate occasions in the last six months, which consisted of ten days

of meetings, with a good portion of these meetings being devoted to

discussion of power brake issues. From the outset, a majority of the

members, as well as FRA, believed that any requirements developed by

the group regarding the inspection and testing of the brake equipment

should not vary significantly from the current requirements and should

be consistent with current industry practice.

FRA's accident/incident data related to intercity passenger and

commuter train operations support the assumption that the current

practices of these operations in the area of power brake inspection,

testing, and maintenance are for the most part sufficient to ensure the

safety of the public. Between January 1, 1990 and October 31, 1996,

there were only five brake related accidents involving commuter and

intercity passenger railroad equipment. No casualties resulted from any

of these accidents and the total damage to railroad equipment totaled

approximately $650,000, or $96,000 annually. In addition, between

January 1, 1995 and October 31, 1996, FRA inspected approximately

13,000 commuter and intercity passenger rail units for compliance with

49 CFR part 232. The defect ratio for these units during this period

was approximately 0.8 percent. Furthermore, during this same period FRA

inspected approximately 6,300 locomotives for compliance with 49 CFR

part 229. The brake defect ratio for these units was approximately 4.65

percent. Consequently, the defect ratio for brake related defects on

locomotives and other passenger equipment during this period was

approximately 2.08 percent.

The existing regulations covering the inspection and testing of the

braking systems on passenger trains are contained in 49 CFR part 232.

The current regulations do provide some requirements relevant to

passenger train operations, including: initial terminal inspection and

testing, intermediate inspections, running tests, and general

maintenance requirements. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13(a), 232.16, and

232.17. However, most of the existing regulations are written to

address freight train operations and do not sufficiently address the

unique operating environment of commuter and intercity passenger train

operations or the equipment currently being used in those operations.

Therefore, it has been necessary for FRA to provide interpretations of

some of the current regulations in order to address these unique

concerns.

Currently, all non-MU (multiple unit) commuter trains that do not

remain connected to a source of compressed air overnight and all MU

commuter trains equipped with RT-5 or similar brake systems must

receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system pursuant to

Sec. 232.12(c)-(j) prior to the train's first departure on any given

calendar day. All non-MU commuter trains that remain connected to a

source of compressed air overnight are permitted to receive an initial

terminal inspection of the brake system sometime during each 24-hour

period in which they are used. Furthermore, all intercity passenger

trains must receive an initial terminal inspection of the brake system

at the point where they are originally made up and must receive an

intermediate inspection in accordance with Sec. 232.12(b) every 1,000

miles.

As noted previously, most of the members of the Working Group

believed that any requirements developed by the group regarding the

inspection and testing of the brake equipment should not vary

significantly from the current requirements and should be consistent

[[Page 49737]]

with current industry practice. However, the Working Group was unable

to reach consensus on power brake standards, despite the positing of

multiple alternatives, use of a facilitator, and the foundation

provided by the 1994 NPRM. The Working Group identified and discussed

options with which the agency and labor can agree, and others with

which FRA and the railroads can agree. However, bridging the gap

between those various options proved elusive. Consequently, as the

Working Group could not reach any type of consensus on the inspection

and testing requirements, it was determined that FRA would address

these issues unilaterally, based on the information and discussions

provided by the Working Group and the information gathered from the

1994 NPRM. FRA is interested in receiving comments on the brake tests

that it has developed given the differences in the positions of the

various parties.

The Working Group discussed various options regarding the types of

brake inspections that should be required as well as when and how these

inspections should be performed. Labor representatives, particularly

the BRC, insisted that a comprehensive power brake inspection (i.e.,

something similar to the initial terminal brake inspections currently

required under Sec. 232.12(c)-(j)) must be performed prior to a train's

first run on a given calendar day. The BRC expressed concern that, as

equipment lays over between the evening commuter cycle and the first

trip of the morning, vandalism, weather changes, or other factors could

affect the integrity of the air brake system. The BRC also believes

that it is necessary for the first inspection of the day to determine

whether the brake shoes and the disc pads actually apply as intended.

The BRC further contends that in order to perform a comprehensive

inspection equivalent to an initial terminal inspection the train must

be walked or otherwise inspected on a car-to-car basis. In addition,

the BRC contends that these principal inspections should be performed

only by carmen or other qualified mechanical personnel as they are the

only employees sufficiently trained to perform these inspections.

Representatives of intercity passenger and commuter railroads

expressed the desire to have the flexibility to conduct a comprehensive

in-depth inspection of the train brake system sometime during the day

in which the equipment is utilized. These parties argued that safety

would be better served by allowing the railroads the flexibility to

conduct these inspections on a daily basis as it would allow the

railroads to conduct the inspections at locations that are more

conducive to permitting a full inspection of the equipment than many of

the outlying locations where trains are stationed overnight and where

the ability to observe all the equipment may be hampered. It is further

contended that, if trains are required to received the equivalent of an

initial terminal inspection at these outlying points, then many of

these inspections may be performed by individuals not as fully

qualified as a mechanical inspector. Whereas, if the railroads are

allowed some flexibility in conducting these type of inspections, then

the equipment can be moved to a location where a fully qualified

mechanical inspector can perform a detailed brake inspection under

optimum conditions, perhaps in conjunction with a daily mechanical

inspection.

Several parties also pointed out that, with proper maintenance,

``tread brake units'' and other friction brake components, commonly

used in commuter train operations, are highly reliable and that the

non-functioning of any individual unit would in no way compromise the

overall safety of the train. Furthermore, permitting the inspection of

these types of brake components in the middle of the day, rather than

at the beginning of the day, involves no greater safety risk to

passengers because friction brake systems and their components degrade

in performance based largely on use, and nothing short of a continuous

brake inspection can guarantee 100-percent performance at all times.

Railroad representatives suggested an inspection scheme that would

permit an in-depth, comprehensive brake inspection to be performed

sometime during the day in which the equipment is used with a brake

inspection being performed prior to the first run of the day verifying

the continuity of the trainline by performing a set and release on the

rear car of the train. In addition, one commuter railroad also

requested relief from performing Class I inspections on trains operated

in weekend service due to the shortage of mechanical inspectors

currently employed on those shifts.

Based on consideration of the discussions held in the Working Group

meetings, outlined above, as well as information obtained in relation

to the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposes to abandon the terminology related to

the power brake inspection and testing requirements contained in the

current regulations, which is generally based on the locations where

the inspections and tests are performed (i.e., initial terminal,

intermediate locations). In its stead, FRA proposes to identify various

classes of inspections based on the duties and type of inspection

required, such as: Class I; Class IA; and Class II. This is similar to

the approach taken by FRA in the 1994 NPRM. See 59 FR 47736-40. FRA

believes that this type of classification system will avoid confusion

with the power brake inspection and testing requirements applicable to

freight operations and will avoid the connotations historically

attached to the current terminology. FRA also believes this approach is

better suited for providing operational flexibility to commuter

operations while maintaining the safety provided by the current

inspection and testing requirements. Although FRA proposes a change in

the terminology used to describe the various power brake inspections

and tests, the requirements of these inspections and tests will closely

track the current requirements with some modifications made to address

the unique operating environment of, and equipment operated in,

commuter and intercity passenger train service. Members of the Working

Group appeared receptive to this kind of classification system and

discussed various options using some of this terminology. Consequently,

FRA proposes four different types of brake inspections to be performed

by commuter and intercity passenger railroads some time during the

operation of the equipment. FRA proposes the terms ``Class I,'' ``Class

IA,'' ``Class II,'' and ``running brake test'' to identify the four

types of brake inspections required by this proposal.

FRA also proposes to divide passenger train operations into two

distinct types for purposes of brake inspections and testing. FRA

recognizes that there are major differences in the operations of

commuter or short-distance intercity passenger trains, and long-

distance intercity passenger trains. Commuter and short-distance

intercity passenger trains tend to operate for fairly short distances

between passenger stations and generally operate in relatively short

turn-around service between two terminals several times in any given

day. In contrast, long-distance intercity passenger trains tend to

operate for long distances, with trips between the beginning terminal

and ending terminal taking a day or more and traversing multiple states

with relatively long distances between passenger stations.

Consequently, FRA proposes to use and define the terms ``commuter

train,'' ``short-distance intercity passenger train,'' and ``long-

distance intercity passenger train'' in order to identify the

inspection and

[[Page 49738]]

testing requirements associated with each. For the most part, commuter

and short-distance intercity passenger trains are treated similarly,

whereas, long-distance intercity passenger trains have slightly

different proposed inspection and testing requirements. In addition,

FRA proposes slightly different requirements with regard to the

movement of defective equipment in long-distance intercity passenger

trains (see the discussion below on the ``Movement of Equipment with

Defective Brakes'').

APTA, in its comments on a draft of the NPRM, expressed opposition

to the proposed Class IA brake test. APTA's position is that brake

tests prior to a train's first departure in any day should be limited

to a pre-departure set and release followed by a running test of the

brakes. APTA also expresses the belief that the proposed NPRM Class I

and Class II requirements go well beyond existing brake inspection

processes and that which is required for safety, and that these

requirements will increase costs dramatically.

A. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a

Class I Brake Test Sometime During a Day the Equipment Is Used

The proposed Class I brake test basically requires an inspection

similar to an initial terminal inspection as currently described at

Sec. 232.12(c)-(j), but is somewhat more extensive and specifically

aimed at the types of equipment being used in commuter and intercity

passenger train service. A Class I brake test would require an

inspection of the application and release of the friction brakes on

each side of each car as well as an inspection of the brake shoes,

pads, discs, rigging, angle cocks, piston travel, and brake indicators

if the equipment is so equipped. The Class I brake test would also

require testing of the communication signal system and the emergency

braking control devices. In addition, all supplemental braking systems

would be required to be inspected and be working. In recognition of the

advanced technology and various designs used in many of these

operations, which make observation of the piston travel virtually

impossible, FRA proposes to permit the inspection of the piston travel

to be conducted either through direct observation or by observation of

a brake actuator or the clearance between the brake shoe and the wheel.

Furthermore, FRA proposes to require a brake pipe leakage test only

when leakage will affect service performance.

Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor

representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of

the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not

agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test before

the first run in order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake

equipment. As FRA proposes that Class I brake tests be a comprehensive

inspection of the braking system, including the proper operation of

supplemental braking systems, FRA believes that commuter and short-

distance intercity passenger train operations must be permitted some

flexibility in conducting these inspections. Consequently, FRA proposes

to require that commuter and short-distance intercity passenger train

operations perform a Class I brake test sometime during the calendar

day in which the equipment is used. FRA believes that the flexibility

permitted by this proposed requirement will allow these railroads to

move equipment to locations that are most conducive to the inspection

of the brake equipment and would allow these railroads to combine the

daily mechanical inspections with this brake inspection for added

efficiency.

Furthermore, as FRA intends for these Class I brake inspections to

be in-depth inspections of the entire braking system which most likely

will be performed only one time in any given day in which the equipment

is used, FRA believes that these inspections must be performed by

individuals possessing not only the knowledge to identify and detect a

defective condition in all of the brake equipment required to be

inspected but also the knowledge to recognize the interrelational

workings of the equipment and the ability to ``troubleshoot'' and

repair the equipment. Therefore, FRA proposes that only qualified

mechanical inspectors be permitted to perform Class I brake tests.

Currently, initial terminal air brake inspections are conducted

prior to the first run of the day on 554 commuter train sets by

mechanical inspectors and on 168 commuter train sets by train crews or

other personnel who could not be fully qualified as mechanical

inspectors. Typically, commuter and short-distance intercity passenger

trains receive more than one initial terminal test each day, even if

this is not required due to the equipment being left ``off air.'' See

49 CFR 232.12(a). Often these additional tests are conducted sometime

during the middle of the day by train crews or mechanical employees.

Although most commuter and short-distance intercity operations

voluntarily perform an initial terminal brake inspection with

mechanical employees some time during the day, there is no requirement

to do so. In addition, there is a certain percentage of equipment where

the principal brake inspections are currently being performed strictly

by train crews rather than by mechanical employees. Consequently, FRA

believes that the proposed requirement incorporates the current best

practices of the industry and will, at a minimum, ensure that the

braking systems on all commuter and short-distance intercity equipment

will be inspected at least once each day by a fully qualified

mechanical inspector.

FRA has not proposed any special provisions for weekend operations

as suggested by some members of the Working Group. FRA recognizes this

is a difficult issue. Existing operations generally involve using

particular sets of equipment on only one day during the weekend to

avoid the need to refuel. On the one hand, there is no specific data

suggesting that existing weekend operations involving inspections

exclusively by train crew members have created a safety hazard. Yet,

the rationale for requiring daily attention by mechanical forces, a

proposition generally accepted by Working Group members, would appear

to apply equally to weekend periods. FRA believes that adjustments

might be made to weekend operations that might avoid significant new

expense while providing expert attention to inspection of the

equipment. Accordingly, FRA seeks additional information on the costs

and benefits of requiring that Class I brake inspections and daily

mechanical inspections be conducted by qualified mechanical inspectors,

as well as any suggestions for alternative means of addressing this

issue.

B. Commuter and Short-Distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require at

Least a Class IA Brake Test Prior to the Train's First Departure in Any

Given Day

Although FRA agrees with the position advanced by many labor

representatives that some sort of car-to-car inspection must be made of

the brake equipment prior to the first run of the day, FRA does not

agree that it is necessary to perform a full Class I brake test in

order to ensure the proper functioning of the brake equipment in all

situations. However, contrary to the position espoused by APTA, FRA

believes that something more than just a determination that the brakes

on the rear car set and release is necessary.

Currently, the quality of initial terminal tests performed by train

crews is likely adequate to determine that

[[Page 49739]]

brakes apply on each car. However, most commuter equipment utilizes

``tread brake units'' in lieu of cylinders and brake rigging of the

kind prevalent on freight and some intercity passenger cars. It is

undoubtedly the case that train crew members do not verify application

of the brakes by tapping brake shoes while the brakes are applied, the

only effective means of determining that adequate force is being

applied. This is one reason why the subject railroads typically conduct

redundant initial terminal tests at other times during the day.

Further, train crews are not asked to inspect for wheel defects and

other unsafe conditions, nor should they be asked to do so, given the

conditions under which they are asked to inspect and the training they

receive.

FRA proposes that, at a minimum, a Class IA brake test be performed

prior to a commuter or short-distance intercity passenger train's first

departure on any given day. FRA believes that the proposed Class IA

brake is sufficiently detailed to ensure the proper functioning of the

brake system yet not so intensive that it requires individuals to

perform an inspection for which they are not qualified.

The proposed Class IA brake test is somewhat less comprehensive

than a Class I brake test but includes a detailed inspection of the

brake system to verify the continuity of the brake system and the

proper functioning of the brake valves on each car. A Class IA brake

test would be similar to the intermediate brake inspection currently

required for freight trains prescribed at Sec. 232.13(d)(1). A Class IA

brake test would generally require a walking inspection of the set and

release of the brakes on each car; however, the proposal would allow

brake indicators to be used to verify the set and release if the

railroad determines that operating conditions pose a safety hazard to

an inspector walking along the train. The Class IA brake test would

also require a leakage test if leakage affects service performance, as

well as an inspection of: angle cocks; piston travel, if determinable;

brake indicators; emergency brake control devices; and communication of

brake pipe pressure changes at the rear of train to the controlling

locomotive. FRA believes that a qualified mechanical inspector or a

properly trained and qualified train crew member could perform a Class

IA brake test.

C. Long-distance Intercity Passenger Trains Require a Class I Brake

Test Prior to Departure From an Originating Terminal and Once Each

Calendar Day the Equipment Is Used or Every 1,500 Miles, Whichever

Occurs First

As noted above, FRA recognizes the differences between commuter or

short-distance intercity operations and long-distance intercity

passenger train operations. Long-distance intercity passenger trains do

not operate in shorter turn around service over the same sections of

track on a daily basis for the purpose of transporting passengers from

major centers of employment. Instead, these trains tend to operate for

extended periods of time, over long distances with greater distances

between passenger stations and terminals. Further, these trains may

operate well over 1,000 miles in any 24 hour period. Thus, the

opportunity for conducting inspections on these trains is somewhat

diminished. Therefore, FRA believes that a thorough inspection of the

braking system on these types of operations must be conducted prior to

the train's departure from an initial starting terminal. Consequently,

FRA will not permit the use of Class IA brake tests for these trains

and proposes to require that a Class I brake inspection be performed on

long-distance intercity passenger trains prior to departure from an

initial terminal. FRA does not believe there would be any significant

burden placed on these operations as the current regulations require

that an initial terminal inspection be performed at these locations.

Furthermore, virtually all of the initial terminal inspections

currently conducted on these types of trains are performed by

individuals who would be considered qualified mechanical employees

under this proposal.

FRA also recognizes that these long-distance intercity passenger

trains could conceivably travel over 3,000 miles if Class I inspections

were required only once every 24 hours the equipment is in service as

proposed for commuter and short-distance intercity passenger trains.

Thus, FRA believes that some outside mileage limit must be placed on

these trains between brake inspections. Currently, a passenger train is

permitted to travel no further than 1,000 miles from its initial

terminal, at which point it must receive an intermediate inspection of

brakes that includes application of the brakes and the inspection of

the brake rigging to ensure it is properly secured. See 49 CFR

232.12(b). However, in recognition of the improved technology used in

passenger train brake systems combined with the comprehensive nature of

the proposed Class I brake tests and mechanical safety inspections both

being performed by qualified mechanical inspectors, FRA proposes to

permit long-distance passenger trains to travel up to 1,500 miles

between Class I brake tests. Consequently, FRA proposes to eliminate

the 1,000-mile inspection for these trains and proposes to require that

the proposed Class I brake test be performed once every calendar day

that the equipment is used or every 1,500 miles, which every occurs

first.

D. The Brake Inspection and Testing Intervals for Long-distance

Intercity Passenger Trains Apply to All Tier II Equipment Regardless of

Whether the Equipment is Used in Short- or Long-distance Intercity

Trains

FRA also proposes to apply the brake inspection and testing

intervals proposed for long-distance passenger trains to all Tier II

equipment (i.e., equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph but

not exceeding 150 mph) regardless of whether it is used in short- or

long-distance intercity trains. As FRA proposes to permit operators of

Tier II equipment to develop inspection and testing criteria and

procedures, these operations will be required to develop a brake test

that is equivalent to a Class I brake test for Tier II equipment. Due

to the speeds at which this equipment will be allowed to operate, FRA

believes it is a necessity that an equivalent Class I brake test be

performed on Tier II equipment before it departs from its initial

terminal. Likewise, FRA proposes to require that the equivalent Class I

brake test be performed every calendar day in which the equipment is

used or every 1,500 miles, whichever comes first.

E. Class II Brake Test Required Where Minor Changes to a Train Consist

Occur

In addition to the proposed Class I and Class IA brake tests, FRA

also proposes a Class II brake test. The proposed Class II brake test

is an inspection intended to verify the continuity of the train brake

system and is similar to the intermediate terminal inspection currently

prescribed at Sec. 232.13(a). A Class II brake test would basically

require a set and release of the brakes on the rear car. The proposed

Class II test would be required in those circumstances where minor

changes to a train consist occur. These include the change of a control

stand, the removal of cars from the consist, the addition of previously

tested cars, and the situations in which an operator first takes

control of the train.

[[Page 49740]]

F. Running Brake Tests

FRA also proposes to require a running brake test as soon as

conditions safely permit it to be conducted after a train receives a

Class I, Class IA, or Class II brake test. FRA believes that this test

should be conducted in accordance with each railroad's operating rules.

The ``running brake test'' requirement is similar to the ``running

test'' requirements currently contained at Sec. 232.16.

Movement of Equipment With Defective Brakes

The current regulations do not contain requirements pertaining to

the movement of equipment with defective power brakes. The movement of

equipment with these types of defects is currently controlled by a

specific statutory provision originally enacted in 1910, which states:

(a) GENERAL.--A vehicle that is equipped in compliance with this

chapter whose equipment becomes defective or insecure nevertheless

may be moved when necessary to make repairs, without a penalty being

imposed under section 21302 of this title, from the place at which

the defect or insecurity was first discovered to the nearest

available place at which the repairs can be made--

(1) On the railroad line on which the defect or insecurity was

discovered; or

(2) At the option of a connecting railroad carrier, on the

railroad line of the connecting carrier, if not further than the

place of repair described in clause (1) of this subsection.

49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

Although there is no limit contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the

number of cars with defective equipment that may be hauled in a train,

FRA has a longstanding interpretation which requires that, at a

minimum, 85 percent of the cars in a train have operative brakes. FRA

bases this interpretation on another statutory requirement which

permits a railroad to use a train only if ``at least 50 percent of the

vehicles in the train are equipped with power or train brakes and the

engineer is using the power or train brakes on those vehicles and on

all other vehicles equipped with them that are associated with those

vehicles in a train.'' 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originally enacted

in 1903, section 20302 also granted the Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC) the authority to increase this percentage, and in 1910 the ICC

issued an order increasing the minimum percentage to 85 percent. See 49

CFR 232.1, which codified the ICC order.

As virtually all freight cars are presently equipped with power

brakes and are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory

requirement is in essence a requirement that 100 percent of the cars in

a train have operative power brakes, unless being hauled for repairs

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303. Consequently, FRA currently requires that

equipment with defective or inoperative air brakes makeup no more than

15 percent of the train and that, if it is necessary to move the

equipment from where the railroad first discovered it to be defective,

the defective equipment be moved no further than the nearest place on

the railroad's line where the necessary repairs can be made or, at the

option of the receiving carrier, to a repair point that is no further

than the repoint on the delivering line.

The requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective

or insecure brakes noted above can and do create safety hazards as well

as operational difficulties in the area of commuter and intercity

passenger railroad operations. As the provisions regarding the movement

of defective brake equipment were written almost a century ago, they do

not address the realities of these types of operations in today's

world. Strict application of the requirements has the potential of

causing major disruptions of service which result in the creation of

serious safety and security problems. For example, requiring repairs to

be made at the nearest location where the necessary repairs can be made

could result in passengers being discharged between stations where

adequate facilities for their safety are not available or in the

overcrowding of station platforms and trailing trains due to

discharging passengers from a defective train at a location other than

the passenger's destination. In addition, strict application of the

statutory requirements could result in the moving of trains with

defective brake equipment against the current of traffic during busy

commuting hours. Irregular movements of this type increase the risk of

collisions on the railroad. Furthermore, many of today's commuter train

operations often utilize six cars or less in trains and in many

instances operate just two-car trains. Consequently, the necessity to

cut out the brakes on one car can easily result in noncompliance with

the 85-percent requirement for hauling the car for repairs, thus

prohibiting the train's movement and resulting in the same type of

safety problems noted above.

FRA has attempted to recognize the nature of commuter and intercity

passenger operations and the importance of addressing the safety of

passengers, as well as avoiding disruption of this service, when

applying the requirements regarding the movement of equipment with

defective brakes on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the

representatives of commuter and intercity passenger train operations

participating in this proceeding have requested that the regulations be

brought up to date, recognizing that brakes will have to be cut out en

route from time to time (e.g., because of damage from debris placed on

the track structure or because of sticking brakes) and that

contemporary braking systems and established stopping distances provide

a very considerable margin of safety. Furthermore, speed restrictions

can readily be used to compensate for the loss of brakes on a minority

of cars. FRA believes that affirmatively recognizing appropriate

movement restrictions would actually enhance safety, since compliance

with the existing restrictions is potentially unsafe.

Representatives from APTA proposed a method of updating the current

requirements regarding the movement of commuter passenger equipment

with defective brakes to bring them more in line with the realities of

today's operations. The Working Group discussed the proposal at length,

making various revisions. Although the Working Group did not reach

consensus on the issue, FRA believes that the proposed requirements are

within the scope of options discussed by the group. FRA believes that

the proposed restrictions are very conservative and effectively ensure

a high level of safety in light of the reliability of braking systems

currently used in commuter and intercity passenger train operations.

FRA recognizes that some of the proposed restrictions are not in

accord with the requirement contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) that cars

with defective or insecure brakes be moved to the ``nearest'' location

where the necessary repairs can be made. However, FRA does have

authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306, entitled ``Exemption for technological

improvements,'' to establish the proposed restrictions. Section 20306

provides:

[T]he Secretary of Transportation may exempt from the

requirements of this chapter railroad equipment or equipment that

will be operated on rails, when those requirements preclude the

development or implementation of more efficient railroad

transportation equipment or other transportation innovations under

existing law.

This provision was originally enacted as a part of the Rock Island

Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act to authorize the use of

RoadRailer trailers as freight cars. See Pub. L. 96-

[[Page 49741]]

254 (May 30, 1980). Although it could be argued that the purpose of the

provision is too narrow to comprehend the instant application, FRA

believes that the use of the provision as contemplated in this proposal

is consistent with the authority granted the Secretary of

Transportation in 49 U.S.C. 20306. As noted previously, the statutory

requirements regarding the movement of equipment with defective brake

equipment were written nearly a century ago and, in FRA's opinion, were

focused generally on the operation of freight equipment and did not

contemplate the types of commuter and intercity passenger train

operations currently prevalent throughout the nation. Since the

original enactment in 1910 of the provisions now codified at 49 U.S.C.

20303(a), there have been substantial changes both in the nature of the

operations of passenger trains as well as in the technology used in

those operations.

Contemporary passenger equipment incorporates various types of

advanced braking systems; in some cases these include electrical

activation of brakes on each car (with pneumatic application through

the train line available as a backup). Dynamic brakes are also

typically employed to limit thermal stresses on friction surfaces and

to limit the wear and tear on the brake equipment. Furthermore, the

brake valves and brake components used today are far more reliable than

was the case several decades ago. In addition to these technological

advances, the brake equipment used in commuter and intercity passenger

train operations incorporate advanced technologies not found with any

regularity in freight operations. These include:

The use of brake cylinder pressure indicators which

provide a reliable indication of the application and release of the

brakes.

The use of disc brakes which provide shorter stopping

distances and decrease the risk of thermal damage to wheels.

The ability to effectuate a graduated release of the

brakes due to a design feature of the brake equipment which permits

more flexibility and more forgiving train control.

The ability to cut out brakes on a per-axle or per-truck

basis rather than a per car basis, thus permitting greater use of those

brakes that are operable.

The use of a pressure-maintaining feature on each car

which continuously maintains the air pressure in the brake system,

thereby compensating for any leakage in the trainline and preventing a

total loss of air in the brake system.

The use of a separate trainline from the locomotive main

reservoir to continuously charge supply reservoirs independent of the

brake pipe train line.

Brake ratios that are 2\1/2\ times greater than the brake

ratios of loaded freight cars.

Although some of the technologies noted above have existed for

several decades, most of the technologies were not in wide spread use

until after 1980. Furthermore, most of the noted technological advances

just started to be integrated into one efficient and reliable braking

system within the last decade. In addition to the technological

advances, commuter and intercity passenger train operations have

experienced considerable growth in the last 15 years necessitating the

need to provide more reliable and efficient service to the riding

public. Since 1980, the number of commuter operations providing rail

service has almost doubled and the number of daily passengers serviced

by passenger operations has more than doubled over the same time

period. Furthermore, commuter and intercity passenger train operations

conduct more frequent single car tests, COT&S, and maintenance of the

braking systems than is generally the practice in the freight industry.

Consequently, the technology incorporated into the brake equipment used

in today's commuter and intercity passenger train operations has

increased the reliability of the braking system and permits the safe

operation of the equipment for extended distances even though a portion

of the braking system may be inoperative or defective.

In the face of these technological advances, FRA believes it is

appropriate to utilize the authority granted by 49 U.S.C. 20306 and

exempt commuter and intercity passenger train operations from the

specific restriction contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(a) requiring the

movement of equipment with defective or insecure brakes to the nearest

location where the necessary repairs could be made and proposes various

restrictions on the movement of this type of equipment which FRA

believes are more conducive to safe operations.

In utilizing the authority granted pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20306, the

Secretary is required to make ``findings based on evidence developed at

a hearing,'' unless there is ``an agreement between national railroad

labor representatives and the developer of the new equipment or

technology.'' FRA is confident that, after notice and opportunity for

public comment, oral and written, the record will support a finding

that the proposed provisions are ``in the public interest and

consistent with railroad safety,'' the basic test for waiving safety

requirements issued under other, general provisions of the code. See 49

U.S.C. 20103(d). It should be noted that the exemption granted to these

operations does not include an exemption from 49 U.S.C. 20303(c), which

contains the liability provisions attendant with the movement equipment

with defective or insecure safety appliances, including power brakes.

Consequently, the liability provisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20303(c)

will be applicable to a railroad when hauling equipment with defective

or insecure power brakes pursuant to the requirements proposed by FRA

in this notice.

FRA also proposes to exempt commuter and intercity passenger train

operations from its longstanding interpretation, based on 49 U.S.C.

20302(a)(5)(B) and 49 CFR 232.1 noted above, prohibiting the movement

of a train if more than 15 percent of the cars in the train have

defective, insecure, or inoperative brakes. As discussed previously,

such a limitation is overly burdensome and has the potential of

creating safety hazards due to the short length of the trains commonly

operated in commuter and intercity passenger service.

Based on the preceding discussions, FRA proposes various

restrictions on the movement of vehicles with defective brake equipment

which allow commuter and intercity passenger train operations to take

advantage of the efficiencies created due to the advanced braking

systems these operations employ as well as the improvements made in

brake equipment over the years, while ensuring if not enhancing the

safety of the traveling public. FRA proposes to permit trains to be

operated with up to 50 percent inoperative brakes to the next forward

passenger station or terminal based on the percentage of operative

brakes, which may result in movements past locations where the

necessary repairs could be made. However, to ensure the safety of these

trains with lower percentages of operative brakes, FRA also proposes

various speed restrictions and other operating restrictions, based on

the percentage of operative brakes. FRA believes that the proposed

speed restrictions are very conservative and ensure a high level of

safety. In fact, test data establish that with the proposed speed

restrictions the stopping distances of those trains with lower

percentages of operative brakes are shorter than if the trains were

operating at normal speed and had 100 percent operative brakes.

Consequently, FRA believes that the proposed approach to the movement

of

[[Page 49742]]

equipment with defective brakes not only enhances the overall safety of

train operations but benefits both the railroads, by providing

operational flexibility, and the traveling public, by permitting them

to get to their destinations in a more expedient and safe fashion. (The

proposed restrictions on the movement of equipment with defective

brakes are discussed in detail in the section-by-section analysis

below.)

Although FRA proposes to exempt all commuter and passenger

operations from the specific statutory requirement contained in 49

U.S.C. 20303(a), it should be noted that in reality the exemption being

proposed is fairly limited. In FRA's view, many of the proposed methods

for moving defective equipment are consistent, if not in accordance,

with the current statutory requirement. For example, FRA proposes to

permit a passenger train with 50-75 percent operative brakes to be

moved at reduced speed to the next forward passenger station. Although

the percentage of operative brakes is lower than currently permitted by

FRA's longstanding agency interpretation (which FRA believes is fully

compensated for by the proposed speed restrictions), FRA believes that

the movement of the defective equipment to the next passenger station

is in accordance with the statutory requirement as the safety of the

passengers must be considered in determining the nearest location where

necessary repairs can be made. In addition, permitting passenger trains

to continue to the next forward location where the necessary repairs

can be performed is also consistent with the statutory requirement as

such movement is necessary to ensure the safety of the traveling public

by protecting them from the hazards incident to performing movements

against the current of traffic. Furthermore, the proposed movement

provisions related to long-distance intercity passenger trains and

long-distance Tier II equipment are consistent with the current

statutory requirements as the proposal permits the movement of

defective brake equipment on these trains only to the next passenger

station or the next repair location, with various speed restrictions

depending on the percentage of operative brakes. Due to the unique

technologies used on the brake systems of these operations and the

unique operating environments, the facilities and personnel necessary

to conduct proper repairs on this equipment are somewhat specialized

and limited. Thus, FRA proposes to require the operators of these

trains to designate the locations where repairs will be made to the

equipment.

Some of the members of the Working Group, particularly those

representing labor organizations, expressed concern that any alteration

of the movement for repair provisions made in the context of commuter

and intercity passenger train operations may have a spillover effect

into the freight industry. FRA wishes to make clear that it has no

intention, at this time, of exempting freight operations from the

requirements relating to the movement of defective equipment contained

in 49 U.S.C. 20303. As noted above, many of the advanced brake system

technologies currently used in passenger service are not used in the

freight context. Furthermore, even if freight operations were to make

similar advances in the braking equipment they employ, this development

on the freight side may not create the efficiencies created in the

passenger train context since the operating environments of freight

trains and passenger trains differ significantly. Finally, the special

safety considerations relative to passengers are not present in freight

operations.

Structural Standards

To help ensure the survivability of a passenger train accident, FRA

is proposing comprehensive, minimum safety standards for the structural

design of rail passenger equipment. Under current regulations, MU

locomotives must comply with minimum structural design requirements,

see 49 CFR 229.141; however, no comparable set of Federal structural

design requirements apply to other forms of passenger equipment.

Moreover, FRA believes that existing structural design requirements for

MU locomotives should be revised, particularly those concerning MU

locomotives operating in trains having a total empty weight of less

than 600,000 pounds, see Sec. 229.141(b), because train operation has

significantly changed since these requirements were first promulgated.

The requirements contained in the proposed rule for the structural

design of Tier I and Tier II equipment are specified below in the

section-by-section analysis. These requirements include safety

standards for the following:

Anti-climbers--to prevent vehicles in a passenger train

from overriding or telescoping into one another;

Collision posts--to protect against the crushing of a

passenger vehicle's occupied areas in the event of a collision or

derailment;

Corner posts--to protect passenger vehicles in corner-to-

corner collisions and impacts with objects intruding upon the clearance

envelope;

Rollover strength--to prevent significant deformation of

the normally occupied spaces of a vehicle in the event it rolls onto

its side or roof;

Side impact strength--to resist penetration of a passenger

vehicle's side structure from a side collision with an object such as a

highway vehicle or a freight car; and

Truck to car body attachment--to prevent separation of

trucks from car bodies during collisions or derailments.

Corner Posts

Requirements concerning corner posts on rail passenger equipment

have been the subject of an NTSB safety recommendation. Following the

January 18, 1993, NICTD corner-to-corner train collision in Gary,

Indiana, the NTSB expressed concern about the adequacy of the corner

post structure in self-propelled passenger cars (MU locomotives) that

allows significant inward car body intrusion and subsequent serious

injuries and fatalities in a corner-to-corner collision. The NTSB noted

that, while MU locomotives must comply with Federal structural design

requirements which include providing for the protection of vulnerable

areas of the car body in a head-on collision, Federal regulations do

not address structural requirements for corner posts which protect the

car body in a corner-to-corner collision. Based on its investigation,

the NTSB recommended that FRA:

In cooperation with the Federal Transit Administration and the

American Public Transit Association, study the feasibility of

providing car body corner post structures on all self-propelled

passenger cars and control cab locomotives to afford occupant

protection during corner collisions. If feasible, amend the

locomotive safety standards accordingly. (Class II, Priority Action)

(R-93-24)

The Working Group has recommended that minimum corner post

structural design requirements be proposed for both locomotives and

rail cars designed to carry passengers, regardless whether the rail

cars are self-propelled or have control compartments. FRA is proposing

such a requirement in this rule and thereby extending the scope of the

NTSB's safety recommendation, which is expressly limited to self-

propelled rail cars. This action recognizes passenger exposure in

accidents such as the one in Lugoff, South Carolina, on July 31, 1991.

There, eight passengers were killed following incursion of a freight

car into

[[Page 49743]]

the side of two Amtrak coaches beginning at the corner of each car.

For cab cars, material improvements in actual end structure design

with respect to corner posts must await completion of further research.

Research completed to date indicates that improvements in strength

alone will not prevent casualties in accidents at higher closing speeds

such as those in the Silver Spring, Maryland, and Secaucus, New Jersey,

accidents.

Fuel Tank Standards

Locomotive fuel tanks are vulnerable to damage from collisions,

derailments, and debris on the roadbed due to their location on the

underframe and between the trucks of locomotives. Damage to the tank

frequently results in spilled fuel, creating the safety problem of an

increased risk of fire and the environmental problem of cleanup and

restoration of the spill site. Although 49 CFR 229.71 does require a

minimum clearance of 2.5 inches between the top of the rail and the

lowest point on a part or appliance of a locomotive, which includes

fuel tanks, FRA regulations do not address the safety of fuel tanks in

particular.

In 1992, the NTSB issued a report identifying concerns regarding

safety problems caused by diesel fuel spills from ruptured or punctured

locomotive fuel tanks. Entitled ``Locomotive Fuel Tank Integrity Safety

Study,'' the NTSB report cited in particular a collision involving an

Amtrak train and an MBTA commuter train on December 12, 1990, as both

trains were entering a station in Boston, Massachusetts. (NTSB Safety

Study-92/04.) Fuel spilled from a tank which had separated from an

Amtrak locomotive during the collision. The fuel ignited. Smoke and

fumes from the burning diesel fuel filled the tunnel, increasing the

hazard level in the post-crash phase of the accident, and hindering

emergency response activity. As a result of the safety study, the NTSB

made several safety recommendations to FRA, including in particular

that FRA:

Conduct, in conjunction with the Association of American

Railroads, General Electric, and the Electro-Motive Division of

General Motors, research to determine if the locomotive fuel tank

can be improved to withstand forces encountered in the more severe

locomotive derailment accidents or if fuel containment can be

improved to reduce the rate of fuel leakage and fuel ignition.

Consideration should be given to crash or simulated testing and

evaluation of recent and proposed design modifications to the

locomotive fuel tank, including increasing the structural strength

of end and side wall plates, raising the tank higher above the rail,

and using internal tank bladders and foam inserts. (Class II,

Priority Action) (R-92-10)

Establish, if warranted, minimum performance standards for

locomotive fuel tanks based on the research called for in

recommendation R-92-10. (Class III, Longer Term Action) (R-92-11)

The NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation R-92-10 in a letter to FRA

dated August 28, 1997, conveying the NTSB's final safety

recommendations arising from the February 16, 1996, collision between a

MARC commuter train and an Amtrak passenger train. During the

collision, the fuel tank on the lead Amtrak locomotive ruptured

catastrophically. The fuel sprayed into the exposed interior of the

MARC cab control car and ignited, engulfing the car. (Letter at 12.)

As explained in FRA's report to Congress on locomotive

crashworthiness and working conditions, FRA believes that fuel tank

design has a direct impact on safety. Minimum performance standards for

locomotive fuel tanks should be included in Federal safety regulations.

Accordingly, FRA is proposing that AAR Recommended Practice RP-506 be

incorporated into Sec. 238.223 of the proposed rule for external fuel

tanks on Tier I passenger locomotives. FRA believes that RP-506

represents a good interim safety standard for Tier I passenger

locomotives. Further, FRA is proposing more demanding fuel tank safety

standards for Tier II passenger equipment in Sec. 238.423 of the

proposed rule. Additionally, it is anticipated that RSAC will address

the safety of locomotive fuel tanks used on freight equipment, thereby

furthering the safety of rail passenger trains which operate commingled

with freight trains.

FRA invites comments whether the proposed rule should also require

that locomotive fuel tanks be compartmentalized. The Working Group

specifically discussed requiring whether the interior of fuel tanks be

divided into a minimum of four separate compartments so that a

penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment results in loss

of fuel only from that compartment. The Working Group recommended that

such a requirement be addressed in the second phase of the rulemaking,

to allow for additional research to remedy fuel feeding disruptions

that may result from the compartmentalization of fuel tanks. Commenters

are therefore requested to provide the results of specific research and

operating experience showing how compartmentalization can be

practically accomplished. Commenters are also asked to explain why the

issue of compartmentalization should or should not be addressed in the

final rule of this first phase of the rulemaking.

Rim-Stamped Straight-Plate Wheels

On January 13, 1994, a Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus

(Ringling Bros.) train operating on CSXT trackage derailed while

passing through Lakeland, Florida. Two circus employees were killed,

and 15 received minor injuries. The NTSB determined that the probable

cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of a thermally damaged

straight-plate wheel due to fatigue cracking that initiated at a stress

raiser associated with a stamped character on the wheel rim. (NTSB/RAR-

95/01.)

Noting that tread braking is a significant source of wheel

overheating and thermal damage; straight-plate wheels are vulnerable to

thermal damage; and rim stamping provides a stress concentration for

crack initiation, the NTSB recommends as a result of its investigation

that FRA ``[p]rohibit the replacement of wheels on any tread-braked

passenger railroad car with rim-stamped straight-plate wheels.'' (Class

II, Priority Action) (R-95-1).

FRA agrees that rim stamping of straight-plate wheels can lead to

wheel failure when subjected to heat from tread braking. Rim-stamping

was banned by the AAR in 1978, and FRA does not believe that rim-

stamped straight-plate wheels are in use on Amtrak or the nation's

commuter railroads. Nevertheless, in the event such wheels are in fact

in use, FRA proposes to prohibit the use of rim-stamped straight-plate

wheels on all equipment, whether tread-braked or not, used in intercity

passenger or commuter service as of January 1, 1998. In a letter to the

NTSB dated February 21, 1995, Ringling Bros. itself announced that it

has removed all rim-stamped straight-plate wheels on tread-braked

passenger cars from its circus trains. (Appendix D, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)

At this time, FRA is not proposing to prohibit the use of rim-

stamped straight-plate wheels on private passenger cars hauled in

intercity passenger or commuter trains. Private passenger cars are

generally not highly utilized in comparison to intercity passenger or

commuter equipment. According to a comment received from the AAPRCO,

the average private car, qualified to operate on Amtrak, probably

operates less than 4,000 miles per year, and a few may exceed 50,000

miles per year. Further, in a letter to the NTSB dated December 2,

1994, Amtrak stated that it only operates private cars that are

registered with Amtrak and are subject to a regular inspection by

Amtrak-approved inspectors. Amtrak observed that it ``has not

experienced any

[[Page 49744]]

problems on the private cars that operate on Amtrak trains with wheels

that are rim-stamped.'' (Appendix E, NTSB/RAR-95/01.)

However, FRA is requiring that rim-stamped straight-plate wheels

not be used as a replacement wheelset on a private car. As part of this

rulemaking, FRA may further address the use of rim-stamped straight-

plate wheels on private cars hauled in intercity passenger or commuter

trains.

Fire Safety

In 1984, FRA published guidelines recommending testing methods and

performance criteria for the flammability, smoke emission, and fire

endurance characteristics for categories and functions of materials to

be used in the construction of new or rebuilt rail passenger equipment.

See 49 FR 33076, Aug. 20, 1984; 49 FR 44582, Nov. 7, 1984. The

guidelines mirrored fire safety guidelines developed by the Urban Mass

Transit Administration (UMTA) of DOT (now the Federal Transit

Administration).

The intent of the guidelines is to prevent fire ignition and to

maximize the time available for passenger evacuation if fire does

occur. FRA later reissued the guidelines in 1989 to update the

recommended testing methods. See 54 FR 1837, Jan. 17, 1989. Testing

methods cited in the current FRA guidelines include those of the

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA). In particular, the ASTM and FAA testing

methods provide a useful screening device to identify materials that

are especially hazardous.

FRA sought comments in the ANPRM on the need for more thorough

guidelines or Federal regulations concerning fire safety (61 FR 30696).

FRA noted that fire resistance, detection, and suppression technologies

have all advanced since the guidelines were first published. In

addition, FRA explained that a trend toward a systems approach to fire

safety is evident in most countries with modern rail systems. In

response, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) commented

that perhaps more thorough guidelines are needed, or at least should be

evaluated. A private citizen also responded that, at a minimum,

guidelines which are more in depth and ``well thought out''--based on

current system safety procedures and available fire safety engineering

techniques--are needed to address the fire safety concerns FRA raised

in the ANPRM. The commenter noted in particular that Federal

maintenance standards related to fire safety are necessary to ensure

that materials carefully qualified for use in rail passenger vehicles

because of their fire safety characteristics are not replaced with

either substandard materials or materials whose origin and fire

performance cannot be determined.

The proposed rule addresses fire safety by making FRA's fire safety

guidelines mandatory for the construction of new passenger equipment as

well as the refurbishing of existing equipment. In addition, the

proposed rule would require that fire safety be furthered through a

fire protection plan and program carried out by each operating

railroad. This effort would include conducting a fire safety analysis

of existing passenger equipment and taking appropriate action to reduce

the risk of personal injuries. In the second phase of this rulemaking,

FRA anticipates improving upon the safety standards contained in the

existing fire safety guidelines through ongoing research.

Currently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST) is conducting research under the direction of FRA and the Volpe

Center involving the fire safety of rail passenger vehicles. The NIST

project, scheduled for completion in 1998, will investigate the use of

alternative fire testing methods and computer hazard assessment models

to identify and evaluate approaches to passenger train fire safety. The

evaluation will examine the effects and tradeoffs of passenger car and

system design (including materials), fire detection and suppression

systems, and passenger egress time. A peer review committee has been

established to provide project guidance and review interim results and

reports. The committee includes representatives from FRA, the Volpe

Center, the NFPA, builders of rail passenger vehicles, producers of

materials, Amtrak and commuter railroads, and testing laboratories.

In the first phase of the NIST project, selected materials which

satisfy the testing methods referenced in FRA's fire safety guidelines

will be evaluated using a different testing instrument, the ASTM 1354

Cone Calorimeter. The Cone Calorimeter provides a measurement of heat

release rate (the amount of energy that a material produces while

burning), specimen mass loss, smoke production, and combustion gases.

For a given confined space such as a rail car interior, the air

temperature and risk of harm to passengers are increased as the heat

release rate increases. As a result, even if passengers do not come in

direct contact with a fire, they may likely be injured from the high

temperatures, high heat fluxes, and large amounts of toxic gases

emitted by materials involved in the fire.

The NIST testing will help develop performance criteria for

materials using the Cone Calorimeter in a context similar to that

provided in the FRA fire safety guidelines. In addition, unlike data

derived from the testing methods referenced in the current FRA

guidelines, heat release rate and other measurements obtained from the

Cone Calorimeter can be used in a fire modeling methodology to evaluate

the contribution of materials to the overall fire safety of a passenger

train. Data gathered from the NIST testing will be used in the second

phase of the project to perform a fire hazard analysis of selected

passenger train fire scenarios. The analysis will employ computer

modeling to assess the impact on passenger train fire safety for a

range of construction materials and system design. In the final phase

of the project, selected real-scale proof testing of assemblies

representing rail passenger equipment will be performed to verify the

bench-scale (small-scale) criteria and hazard analysis studies in

actual end use configurations. This research effort thus follows upon

FRA-sponsored studies by the National Bureau of Standards in 1984 and

the NIST in 1993 which noted among their findings that the performance

of individual components of a rail passenger car in a real-world fire

environment may be different from that experienced in bench-scale tests

due to vehicle geometry and materials interaction.\2\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ ``Fire Tests of Amtrak Passenger Rail Vehicle Interiors.''

(NBS Technical Note 1193, May 1984); ``Fire Safety of Passenger

Trains: A Review of U.S. and Foreign Approaches.'' (DOT/FRA/ORD-93/

23-DOT-VNTSC-FRA-93-26, December, 1993). The 1993 report is

available to the public through the National Technical Information

Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of both reports have been

placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The NFPA publishes a standard (NFPA 130) covering fire protection

requirements for fixed guideway transit systems and for life safety

from fire in transit stations, trainways, vehicles, and outdoor

maintenance and storage areas. (A copy of the 1995 edition of this

standard has been placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.)

However, this standard does not apply to passenger railroad systems

including those that provide commuter service (NFPA 130 1-1.2). An APTA

representative on the Working Group who is also an NFPA member has

initiated an NFPA-sponsored task force to revise the scope of NFPA 130

to cover all passenger rail transportation systems, including intercity

and

[[Page 49745]]

commuter rail, and revise other provisions as necessary. (Copies of the

correspondence concerning the establishment of this task force have

also been placed in the public docket.) FRA and the Working Group will

evaluate the results of this effort for application to this rulemaking.

Safety Glazing Standards

Existing regulations found in 49 CFR part 223 provide minimum

requirements for glazing materials in order to protect railroad

passengers and employees from injury as a result of objects striking

the windows of locomotives, cabooses, and passenger cars. Noting some

possible concerns with these requirements, FRA sought comment on

whether these standards should be revised and requested information on

any glazing-related injuries to passenger train occupants (61 FR

30696).

The Sierracin/Sylmar Corporation (Sierracin) commented that rail

glazing meeting much higher impact and ballistic requirements is

currently available, economically viable, and in fact in use by a few

rail agencies (mass transit and commuter rail) here in the United

States. Among its observations in particular, Sierracin noted that the

strength of the glazing frame could quite easily be tested. Further, it

explained that from its experience as a glazing manufacturer it is

aware of very few ballistic attacks on trains, and such attacks have

been limited to the side windows of locomotives or coach cars or both--

not to end-facing windows. In addition, Sierracin pointed out that

since the impact energy of an object is a function of velocity, an

object's destructive capability increases as the speed of the surface

it impacts increases.

FRA believes that existing safety glazing requirements have largely

proven effective in passenger service at speeds up to 125 mph. In fact,

FRA is concerned that less stringent requirements would create

vulnerability to objects thrown at trains as well as the risk of

ejection of passengers during train derailments. Because the safety

glazing standards do not address the performance of the frame which

attaches the glazing to the car body, FRA is proposing frame

performance requirements for all passenger equipment. Moreover, FRA

believes that more stringent glazing requirements are necessary or

passenger equipment operating at speeds greater than 125 mph because of

the increased destructive potential of an object impacting equipment

operating at such speeds. Additionally, improved marking and periodic

inspection of emergency windows are being addressed in FRA's emergency

preparedness rulemaking.

Train Interior Safety Features

A review of the accident/incident data, related to fatalities and

injuries on passenger trains for the period of 1972 to 1973, indicates

that collapse of the equipment structure and the loss of sufficient

space for the passengers to ride out the collision is the principal

cause of fatality in train accidents, resulting in approximately 63

percent of the fatalities and 27 percent of the serious injuries. Fire

and post-collision conditions result in 30 percent of the fatalities

and 16 percent of the serious injuries. Thus, collapse of the equipment

structure, fire, and post-collision conditions account for 93 percent

of the fatalities and 43 percent of the serious injuries. To address

these major causes of fatalities and injuries, FRA is proposing

comprehensive requirements related to structural design, fire

protection, and emergency exits. As discussed above, FRA believes these

proposed requirements will aid in reducing the number of fatalities and

injuries by minimizing the collapse of equipment, reducing the

likelihood of fire, and ensuring accessible and operable emergency

exits.

Prior research also indicates, however, that passengers striking

interior objects in trains, principally during collisions and

derailments, accounts for 57 percent of the serious injuries and 7

percent of the fatalities occurring on passenger trains. \3\ Therefore,

as an initial measure to reduce these numbers, FRA proposals include

requiring that:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ Rail Safety/Equipment Crashworthiness,'' M.J. Reiley, R.H.

Jines, & A.E. Tanner. (FRA/ORD-77/73, Vol. I, July 1978).''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Passenger seats and other interior fittings be securely

attached to the car body;

Interior fittings in a passenger car be recessed or flush-

mounted;

Overhead storage racks provide restraint for stowed

articles; and

Sharp edges be padded or otherwise avoided.

Overall, FRA's proposed requirements rely on ``compartmentalization''

or ``passive restraints'' (i.e., requiring no action to be taken on the

part of the occupant) as a passenger protection strategy. The proposed

requirements are based on the current available research, discussed in

detail below, which indicates that during a collision the interior

environment of a passenger coach is substantially less hostile than the

interiors of automobiles and aircraft. In fact, current research

indicates that the interior of a typical intercity passenger coach

without active restraints provides a level of protection to the

occupants that is at least as high as that provided to automobile and

transport aircraft passengers with active restraints.

Some research indicates that there may be a potential for even a

greater level of passenger protection if lap belts and shoulder

harnesses are utilized on passenger trains. In fact, FRA is proposing

that lap belts and shoulder harnesses be required in the cab of a Tier

II train, as recommended by the Tier II Equipment Subgroup. Due to the

high strength of the cab and its forward location near the expected

point of impact in many different collision scenarios, decelerations

experienced by crewmembers in the cab of Tier II trains may be high.

Accordingly, members of the subgroup believed that restraints for the

crewmembers could provide a significant benefit. FRA requests

information and comment from interested parties as to whether there is

any existing research or experience which would justify proposing

active seat restraints in the current stage of this rulemaking.

However, FRA believes more research is necessary in this area in order

to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of such active

restraints as well as the impact on seat design and strength. Although

FRA currently proposes a passenger protection strategy based on

compartmentalization, FRA will be undertaking an aggressive research

and testing program to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of

active restraints such as lap belts and shoulder harnesses. If this

research indicates that these types of active restraints are a viable

and feasible means of providing additional protection to the riding

public, then FRA will propose the use of such restraints in the second

NPRM on passenger equipment scheduled for development in 1998.

Discussion

The principal means of protecting occupants during accidents

include ``friendly'' (``delethalized'') interior arrangements and

occupant restraints, such as lap belts, shoulder harnesses and airbags.

Occupant protection devices which require some action on the part of

the occupant, such as buckling a seatbelt, are termed ``active

devices,'' while protection devices which require no action, such as

automobile door-mounted shoulder harnesses and airbags, are termed

``passive devices.'' Both active and passive occupant protection

strategies

[[Page 49746]]

act to limit the decelerations and to distribute the loads imparted to

occupants during an accident. Typical passenger protection strategies

in automobiles include airbags, lap belts and shoulder harnesses, and

friendly lower dashboard designs which limit thigh loads imparted

during a collision. Typical passenger protection strategies in

transport category aircraft, intended to protect passengers during

accidents occurring during takeoff or landing, include seatbelts and

friendly design of the seatback or bulkhead ahead of the occupant which

limit the decelerations of the occupant's head.

The passenger protection devices incorporated into a vehicle must

allow occupants to survive the deceleration of the volume within which

they are contained. The decelerations of the occupant volume of an

automobile in a collision can reach a peak of approximately 30 g's,

while the decelerations of transport-category aircraft during a landing

accident can reach 18 g's. In order to assure a high likelihood of

survival for such high decelerations, the use of occupant restraints

are required in automobiles and transport aircraft. The peak

deceleration of passenger rail coach equipment is 8 g's for a head on

collision. Figure 1 shows the time histories of the occupant volume

decelerations for a Ford Taurus colliding into a rigid barrier at 35

mph, 4 a transport category aircraft during a landing

accident, 5 and a rail passenger coach during a train-to-

train collision at 70 mph. 6 During a collision, the

interior of a passenger train is inherently a less hostile environment

than those of an automobile or aircraft, owing to the relatively low

deceleration of the occupant volume.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ New Car Assessment Program Test #2312. DOT/NHTSA, 1996. A

copy of this test has been placed in the public docket for this

rulemaking.

\5\ The Effect of Aircraft Size on Cabin Floor Dynamic Pulses.''

G. Wittlin, L. Neri. (DOT/FAA/CT-88/15, March 1990). The report is

available to the public through the National Technical Information

Service, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of the report has also been

placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

\6\ ``Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' (DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-

5, September 1996). The report has not yet been published, but a

copy of the report has been placed in the public docket for this

rulemaking.

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[[Page 49747]]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-C

Simulation studies of occupant impacts with interiors have been

conducted in support of this rulemaking effort, and have been placed in

the public docket for this rulemaking.\7\ Simulation results include

detailed time-histories of occupant motions and the forces imparted to

occupants during a collision. These motions and forces have been

evaluated for the potential for fatality using the criteria employed by

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the FAA

in their regulatory requirements for passenger protection in

automobiles and transport-category aircraft, respectively. The

principal criteria employed by NHTSA and the FAA are the Head Injury

Criteria (HIC), which relate the deceleration of the occupant's head to

the potential for fatality, and the Chest Deceleration, which relates

the deceleration of the occupant's chest (heart) with the potential for

fatality. The maximum limit prescribed by NHSTA and the FAA for the HIC

is 1000, and 60 g's for Chest Deceleration.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ ``Evaluation of Selected Crashwortiness Strategies for

Passenger Trains.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green, & B. Marquis.

National Academy Press, Transportation Research Record No. 1989,

July 1995; ``Analysis of Occupant Protection Strategies in Train

Collisions.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson, & B. Marquis. American Society

of Mechanical Engineers, AMD-Vol. 210/BED-Vol. 30, pp. 539-557,

1995; ``Crashworthiness Testing of Amtrak's Traditional Coach

Seat.'' D. Tyrell K. Severson. (DOT/FRA/ORD-96/08--DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-

11, October 1996); and ``Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' See

note 6.

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Passenger rail equipment interior configurations studied include

rows of forward-facing seats without passenger restraints, with seat

belts, and with seatbelts and shoulder harnesses. The seat design

employed in these studies is a typical intercity passenger coach seat,

for which the floor attachment is sufficient not to fail during the

simulated collision. (The occupant protection strategy in which

occupant motion during the collision is restricted by fixed equipment

such as seats and bulkheads is termed ``compartmentalization.'') Table

1 summarizes the results for passengers seated in the first coach of a

locomotive-led consist, initially traveling at 70 mph, which collides

head-on with a stationary locomotive-led consist. These data indicate

that without restraints, the interior of a typical intercity passenger

coach provides a level of protection to the occupants at least as high

as that provided to automobile and transport aircraft passengers with

restraints, while lap and shoulder belts provide the highest level of

protection.

Table 1.--Selected Results, Interior Simulation Studies

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No restraint Lap belt Lap and shoulder NHTSA and FAA Max.

(compartmenta- ----------------------- belts permitted values

lization) -------------------------------------------

---------------------- HIC Chest g's

HIC Chest g's HIC Chest g's HIC Chest g's

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

50th percentile male, Seat ahead Upright....................... 241 20 141 23 21 9 1000 60

50th percentile male, Seat ahead Reclined...................... 401 36 1428-2089 26 21 9 1000 60

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The data in Table 1 indicate that lap belts alone result in a

greater likelihood of fatal head injury for certain occupants if the

seat ahead of the occupant is reclined. This is owing to the lap-belted

occupant striking the top of the seatback ahead. Struck in this manner,

the seat is stiff and the head deceleration is large, resulting in a

high likelihood of head injury. The head of an unrestrained occupant

will strike the rear of the seatback ahead of the occupant, along with

the knees of the occupant. Struck in this manner, the seat is

relatively soft, the impact forces are distributed over the occupant's

body, and the decelerations experienced by the occupant are within

survivable levels. The head on an occupant restrained by a lap belt and

a shoulder harness will not strike an interior surface, and the

deceleration of an occupant so restrained is relatively low. The

motions of an unrestrained occupant, an occupant restrained by a lap

belt, and an occupant restrained by a lap belt and a shoulder harness

are sketched in Figure 2.

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[[Page 49748]]

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BILLING CODE 4910-06-C

The potential effectiveness of occupant restraints in protecting

passengers has been inferred from available information on what types

of injury occur during passenger train accidents and the equipment

involved in causing these injuries. Available criteria which relate

these forces and motions to the range of injuries resulting from rail

passenger accidents are limited in number and reliability. For example,

there is only one accepted criterion for evaluating back injury (an

axial load criterion employed by the FAA) while there are many

potential modes of back injury, including twisting and excessive

flexion. The two principal considerations in inferring the potential

effectiveness are the likelihood that the occupant is in a seat and is

able to use the restraint, and the potential that the type of injury is

prone to prevention or reduction in severity with an occupant

restraint.

Table 2 lists the types of injuries, their frequency of occurrence

from 1972 to 1973 (see note 3), and the potential effectiveness of

occupant restraints. The likely causes of back injury are the seats

becoming unlocked and swiveling during an accident and standing

passengers subject to falling. Leg, knee, and thigh injuries are

potentially caused by leg entrapment beneath the seat ahead of the

occupant. Neck injuries are likely the result of ``whiplash'' effects

of low seat backs during accidents. The potential effectiveness of

occupant restraints can be inferred from the type of injury. For

example, seat belts may reduce the occurrence and severity of back

injury owing to the longitudinal decelerations from collisions, but may

not reduce the occurrence and severity of back injury owing to the

lateral accelerations associated with derailment or for a standing

passenger falling.

Table 2.--Injury Types, Number of Occurrences, and Potential Effectiveness of Occupant Restraint

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Potential/effectiveness

Number of -----------------------------------------------------------------

Injury type Occurrences, No Restraints

1972-73 (Compartment- Lap Belts Lap belts and

alization) shoulder harnesses

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Back............................ 195 Medium.............. Medium.............. High

Leg/Knee/Thigh.................. 140 Low................. Medium.............. Medium

Neck............................ 126 Medium.............. Low................. Medium

Head............................ 94 Medium.............. Low................. High

Arm/Hand........................ 89 Low................. Low................. Low

Chest........................... 64 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium

Shoulder........................ 61 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium

Hip/Pelvis...................... 40 Medium.............. High................ High

Face/Nose....................... 38 Medium.............. Low................. High

Foot/Ankle...................... 27 Low................. Medium.............. Medium

Abdomen......................... 19 Medium.............. Medium.............. Medium

Side............................ 15 Medium.............. Medium.............. High

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3 lists the equipment involved in injury over this same

period (see note 3). The likelihood that an occupant was in a seat

immediately prior to the injury can be inferred from the type of

equipment. For example, the potential effectiveness of occupant

restraints protecting occupants from injury with food service and

lavatory equipment-- the most likely equipment to be involved with

injury--is low because such equipment is not located near passenger

coach seats. Appropriate measures to assure that such equipment is

``friendly'' during a collision may potentially reduce the severity of

injuries associated with food service and lavatory equipment. In fact,

since the time of the study, Amtrak has taken significant steps to

secure food service equipment and provides for better retention of

luggage in overhead storage racks. Further, lavatory design has also

been improved in the newer generations of Amtrak equipment.

[[Page 49749]]

Table 3.--Equipment Involved in Injury, Frequency of Occurrence, and Potential Effectiveness of Occupant

Restraint

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Frequency Potential effectiveness

of --------------------------------------------------------------------

Equipment involved in injury occurrence No restraints Lap belts and

(percent) (compartmentalization) Lap belts shoulder harnesses

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Food Service and Lavatory 27.5 Medium................... Low................ Low

Equipment.

Bulkheads, Doors, Window Frames 20 Medium................... Low................ Low

Seats.......................... 16 High..................... High............... High

Floor.......................... 10.2 Medium................... Medium............. Medium

Window Glass................... 10.2 Medium................... Medium............. Medium

Tables Counters................ 7.2 Low...................... Low................ Low

Hand Rail...................... 2.9 Low...................... Low................ Low

Entrance Platform.............. 2.9 Low...................... Low................ Low

Luggage........................ 1.5 Low...................... Low................ Low

Cabinets....................... 1.5 Low...................... Low................ Low

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusions from the research conducted to date on passenger

protection in train collisions are that lap belts alone may potentially

increase fatalities in train collisions; compartmentalization can

provide a level of protection for rail passengers at least as effective

as that provided by current regulations for automobile and transport-

category aircraft passengers; and that lap belts and shoulder

restraints provide the highest level of occupant protection of those

protection strategies studied.

Current FRA research plans include efforts for developing the means

of implementing seat belts and shoulder restraints in intercity and

commuter passenger rail equipment and efforts for optimizing

compartmentalization for a wide range of occupant sizes, from infants

to large adults, and a wide range of interior configurations, including

those of food service cars and lavatories in addition to coach car

seating configurations. Issues to be addressed in research on

implementing seat belts and shoulder restraints include:

The development of a seat structure design with sufficient

integrity to sustain the loads imparted by the restraints during

collisions;

The potential for increased injury of unrestrained

occupants striking such strengthened seatbacks and the hard points

necessary for lap and shoulder belt securement;

The potential for increased injury to occupants who misuse

the seat and shoulder belts (e.g., placement of the shoulder belt

behind the occupant), The development of mechanisms for adjusting the

height location of the shoulder restraint to prevent strangulation of

occupants of small stature, including children;

The overall effectiveness in reducing injury owing to

occupant impacts with the interior; and

The manufacturing costs for a seat which can support the

loads imparted by the restraints during collisions.

Although FRA's research and development budget is somewhat limited,

FRA is committed to completing the following items within approximately

the next 12 months:

Preliminary cost/benefit analysis on lap belts and

shoulder harnesses;

Preliminary hazard analysis; and

Preliminary qualitative engineering feasibility work on

new seat and belt designs, including cost estimates.

The results of this research will be followed by a final cost/

benefit review and will be available when FRA begins the development of

the second NPRM on passenger equipment standards.

Based on current research results, the proposed interior passenger

protection requirements for Tier I and II passenger equipment rely on

compartmentalization as a passenger protection strategy. Research

results indicate that during a collision the interior environment of a

passenger coach is substantially less hostile than the interiors of

automobiles and aircraft. Owing to this lower hostility of the

passenger collision environment, the interior of a typical intercity

passenger coach can provide a level of protection to passengers without

restraints at least as effective in preventing fatality as the

protection provided to automobile and transport aircraft passengers

with restraints. Such a strategy has the benefits of being passive,

requiring no action to be taken on the part of the occupants, of being

effective for a range of occupant sizes, and potentially being

effective in a wide range of interior configurations. If the results of

ongoing research indicate that lap belts and shoulder restraints can

provide a greater level of protection for passengers than

compartmentalization, while being cost-effective, then FRA will

consider requiring passenger restraints in the second NPRM.

Crash Energy Management

FRA is proposing that Tier II equipment be designed with a crash

energy management system. Crash energy management is an equipment

design technique to provide a controlled deformation and collapse of

designated sections of the unoccupied volumes of a passenger train to

absorb the energy from a collision. This allows collision energy to

dissipate before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volumes

of a passenger train and reduces the decelerations experienced by

passengers and crewmembers in a collision, thereby mitigating the force

of any collisions with objects in a train's interior, such as seats.

In a report prepared by the Volpe Center, the crash energy

management approach was found to offer significant safety

benefits.8 For example, the Volpe Center report found the

crash energy management approach significantly more effective in

preserving occupant volume in a head-on collision at a relative speed

above 70 mph between two trains propelled by power cars (locomotives)

than when the trains did not employ such an approach. Moreover, for the

full range of collision speeds, the crash energy management design

provided a significantly gentler initial deceleration of the passenger

train occupants than when the trains did not employ such an approach.

Further, the crash energy management designed power car train is more

compatible with existing equipment. It serves as a softer collision

surface to a conventionally designed train owing to the collision

energy absorbed as the

[[Page 49750]]

unoccupied volumes of the power car train intentionally crush.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains.'' (DOT-VNTSC-FRA-96-5,

September 1996). See Note 6.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Emergency Systems

In addition to the proposed requirements concerning emergency

egress and access discussed above, FRA is considering and proposing

other requirements to mitigate harm to passenger train occupants in

emergency situations.

Emergency Lighting

In a passenger train emergency, inadequate lighting may make it

difficult or impossible to read emergency information, to locate doors

and emergency exits, and to move about within the train's interior.

Rapid egress from the passenger train may be inhibited, and rescue

efforts hampered. Further, a private citizen commented in response to

the ANPRM that passengers can be very frightened when a train's head-

end power shuts down at night or in a darkened station, and there is no

onboard emergency lighting for the passengers' security. Accordingly,

the proposed rule requires in Sec. 238.123 that all new or rebuilt

passenger equipment be equipped with an emergency lighting system. FRA

is also considering requiring that auxiliary portable lighting be

available for assistance in a passenger train emergency. FRA may

prescribe requirements for such lighting in either the final rule of

this rulemaking or in the final rule of FRA's complementary rulemaking

on passenger train emergency preparedness.

Emergency Communication: To the Train Control Center

FRA is considering requirements for emergency communication

equipment on passenger trains. In Working Group discussions, the UTU

emphasized that passenger trains should be equipped with both a primary

and a redundant means to communicate with a railroad control center.

The UTU and BRC also stressed that both means of communication should

be required to operate properly before a passenger train is dispatched.

The ability to communicate in an emergency is important for all

trains--freight and passenger. For example, because passenger trains

operate commingled with freight trains, the ability of a freight train

crew to notify a railroad control center of an emergency involving its

train may prevent a collision with an oncoming passenger train. As

noted above, FRA is currently engaged in revising the Radio Standards

and Procedures in 49 CFR part 220 through the Railroad Communications

Working Group established under the RSAC. Although FRA anticipates that

this separate effort will establish minimum safety requirements with

respect to communications equipment for all train service, it should be

noted that intercity passenger and commuter railroads already make

extensive provision for ensuring communication capabilities during

emergencies.

Emergency Communication: Within the Train

FRA is proposing in Sec. 238.437 that Tier II passenger trains be

equipped with a means of emergency communication throughout the train.

This will enable crewmembers to provide passengers with information and

instructions in an emergency.

FRA has decided to limit this proposal to Tier II passenger trains,

however, because such trains are intended to operate as a fixed unit,

unlike Tier I passenger trains. Whereas an emergency system to

communicate throughout the train may be more easily provided for a

train which remains as a fixed unit, the interchangeability of

passenger cars and locomotives raises practical considerations about

the compatibility of communications equipment in a Tier I passenger

train. FRA will seek to address these considerations and further

examine requirements concerning emergency communication within a Tier I

train in the second phase of the development of passenger equipment

safety standards.

Emergency Window Exits

As noted, under 49 CFR part 223 equipment designed to carry

passengers must be equipped with a minimum of four emergency window

exits which permit rapid and easy removal during a crisis. FRA is

proposing in Secs. 238.235 and 238.439 to strengthen this requirement

by making certain, for example, that passenger cars be equipped with

four window exits on each main level of each car. FRA is also proposing

that each compartment in a sleeping car be equipped with at least one

emergency window exit. Above all, the proposed rule requires that each

emergency window exit be easily operable without requiring the use of

any tool or other implement to facilitate passenger egress in an

emergency.

FRA notes that Canadian passenger equipment typically contain more

than four emergency window exits, and that MARC is requiring that at

least half of all windows in each passenger car be available for use

during an emergency. Commenters are requested to address the issue of

whether the final rule should require additional emergency window exits

in a passenger car.

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