Notice of Safety Advisory

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-1 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of casualties from train derailments

caused by damage to tracks, roadbed, and bridges resulting from

uncontrolled flows of

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water and similar weather-related phenomena.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge

Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., RRS-15, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone

202-632-3340) or Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief

Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3186).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A recent derailment involving train number 4

of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on The

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) near Kingman,

Arizona, on August 9, 1997, has caused FRA to focus on the

effectiveness of railroad procedures for protection of trains and

personnel from hazards caused by severe weather conditions. The

investigation of that accident by the National Transportation Safety

Board (NTSB) and FRA continues. The facts and findings developed in the

investigation will be published when the investigation is complete.

Special Inspection Procedures

The Federal Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213) state, ``In

the event of fire, flood, severe storm, or other occurrence which might

have damaged track structure, a special inspection must be made of the

track involved as soon as possible after the occurrence.'' (49 CFR

213.239). This provision is purposely general in nature, because it is

not practicable to specify in a minimum safety standard all the

conditions which could trigger a special inspection, nor the manner in

which any particular special inspection must be conducted. However, in

accordance with the primary purpose of the Track Safety Standards and

associated railroad safety laws, these special inspections should be

conducted so as to effectively prevent derailments. In light of recent

occurrences and past experience, FRA now believes it necessary to issue

this safety advisory to provide railroads with recommended procedures

to further this objective.

FRA has investigated several train derailments in which damage from

unexpected moving water was a causal factor. Incidents reported to FRA

between January 1982 and March 1996 included 26 derailments caused by

washouts of bridges or bridge approaches, and 16 derailments caused by

washouts or water damage to culverts or subgrade not near a bridge. In

most cases, the railroad had some form of notification of the severe

weather conditions and either initiated or performed an inspection.

When the derailment occurred, either the inspector had not reached the

derailment site before the train, had inspected the track and not

recognized a hazardous condition, or had performed the inspection

before the damage had become detectible. FRA believes that more

specific measures can be taken by each railroad that conducts

operations on track subject to hazards from flowing water to reduce the

likelihood of future derailments caused by those hazards.

Vulnerable Structures and Track

FRA believes that several types of bridge and drainage structure

components should be identified as vulnerable and be given special

consideration in any decision related to the operation of trains both

during and following a severe rainstorm. In particular, bents, piers,

and abutments that rest directly on soil or degradable rock near the

surface might be rapidly undermined in a severe rainstorm. Similarly,

stream bed configurations in which the water course takes a bend or a

change in slope near the track are often unpredictable in times of

heavy flow. During such conditions, soil displacement can progress

rapidly in an unpredictable manner in locations that are not visible to

a person above the water surface. The size of a drainage structure, and

whether it is categorized as a bridge or a culvert, is not as important

as the vulnerability of the structure and its supported track to the

effects of flowing water.

Recommended Action

FRA believes that the chance of further derailments, such as

occurred near Kingman, Arizona, on August 9, 1997, would be greatly

reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into the

procedures for special inspections followed in the railroad industry in

the event of a threat of a severe rainstorm, at the level of a flash

flood. FRA has determined that each railroad that controls the

operation of trains on Class 4 or higher track, or passenger trains in

commuter or intercity service, should have in place a program to

protect its train operations from the effects of damage to tracks and

structures caused by severe weather conditions, particularly flash

floods. Therefore, FRA issues the following advisory to each affected

railroad:

1. The railroad should have in place a procedure that will assure

that all notifications issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) of

flash flood warnings will be received within 15 minutes of issuance

from the NWS, directly or through a contract weather forecasting

service, by the train dispatchers or other employees controlling the

movement of trains on all track of Class 4 or higher or upon which

passenger trains operate in commuter or intercity service, within the

warning area. In the case of such track located outside of the warning

area but subject to damage from water resulting from the storm, the

information should be obtained in time to permit timely response by the

railroad.

2. After the receipt of a warning of a flash flood which might

damage track or bridges, the railroad should notify train crews and

limit the speed of all freight and passenger trains to that which will

permit the train to operate safely, consistent with the potential water

levels and visibility conditions, on all track subject to damage from

the flood. The limitations should continue until a special inspection

in accordance with 49 CFR 213.239 has been performed of that track and

it is determined that a hazard no longer exists. In making that

inspection and determination, the time taken for the heaviest flow of

water to reach the track should be considered.

3. Each railroad affected by this advisory should identify its

bridges carrying track of Class 4 or higher or over which passenger

trains operate in commuter or intercity service, which are vulnerable

to damage from flash floods or similar weather-related phenomena.

Particular attention should be given to bridges which incorporate

piers, bents, or abutments, which are founded on soil or degradable

rock which could lose its integrity as a result of scour by moving

water, and which are commonly referred to as ``mud sills'' or ``spread

footings.''

4. The information developed in paragraph 3 should be compiled and

made available to each person who can be called upon to perform special

inspections on the subject track following a flash flood warning.

Consideration should be given to placing identifying marks on bridges

that need particular attention in special inspections, along with the

bridge number, to assist inspectors in locating them with certainty

during inclement weather. Consideration should also be given to the use

of automated high water detectors or similar sensing and warning

systems on specific bridges which could incur water damage that would

be hidden from or not otherwise detectible by a human inspector.

5. In addition to the bridge-specific information called for in

paragraph 3,

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each affected railroad should implement a training program for the

persons performing special inspections. The training should include

methods to recognize and protect the safety of railroad operations from

the damaging characteristics of flowing water in general, with

particular regard to the effects of a watercourse that takes a

significant change in horizontal direction or vertical profile near the

track; the effects of drift material accumulation on scour and the

capacity of the waterway opening; and the potential for damage by

impact of heavy floating objects.

6. Refresher training of track inspectors on the subjects addressed

in paragraph 5 should be conducted at least once each calendar year.

Where practicable, that refresher training should include a joint

inspection by a track inspector and a cognizant bridge maintenance or

engineering employee over the inspector's assigned territory. During

that joint inspection they should locate the vulnerable components in

the bridges identified in paragraph 3, discuss the precautions to be

taken in the event of indications of distress in those components,

observe drainage conditions on and adjacent to the right-of-way, and

note changes for inclusion in the revisions of information called for

in paragraph 9.

7. If a track inspector is assigned to perform a special inspection

in accordance with paragraph 2, and bridges identified as vulnerable

are in the track segment subject to damage from the flash flood, a

cognizant bridge maintenance or engineering employee should be readily

available by telephone or radio to assist in the interpretation of

findings by the track inspector.

8. Each affected railroad should brief all of its track and bridge

inspectors on the contents of this advisory. These briefings should

occur within 14 calendar days of the date of publication of this safety

advisory in the Federal Register.

9. FRA believes that the actions described in paragraphs 3, 4, and

5 should be completed within 60 calendar days of the date of

publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register. During

this period, each affected railroad should complete an initial review

of its bridges for vulnerability to high or rapidly flowing water and

provide that information to its inspectors. More detailed reviews

should be substantially completed and provided to inspectors during

calendar year 1998 and then maintained in a current status.

10. FRA requests a letter within 45 calendar days of the date of

publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register from each

affected railroad specifying the actions it has taken and will initiate

to enhance the safety of train operations in the event of a flood or a

high or rapid water condition. Such letters should be addressed to the

Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, RRS-1, Mail Stop 25, 400

Seventh Street S.W., Washington, DC 20590.

Paperwork Reduction Act Provisions

This advisory does not require that any records or reports be kept

or submitted. It merely recommends that railroads collect or provide

certain information. Nevertheless, because some might see these

recommendations as paperwork burdens, FRA will seek approval of them.

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law No. 104-13,

Section 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 U.S.C. 3501-

3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR 1320.13, FRA is

requesting the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct an

emergency review and approval of the information collection items

contained in this safety advisory. FRA is seeking OMB's approval of

these information collection items by September 5, 1997.

FRA invites interested respondents to comment on the following

summary of proposed information collection activities regarding (i)

whether the information collection activities are necessary for FRA to

properly execute its functions, including whether the activities will

have practical utility; (ii) the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the

burden of the information collection activities, including the validity

of the methodology and assumptions used to determine the estimates;

(iii) ways for FRA to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the

information being collected; and (iv) ways for FRA to minimize the

burden of information collection activities on the public by automated,

electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or

other forms of information technology (e.g., permitting electronic

submission of responses). See 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); 5 CFR

1320.8(d)(1)(i)-(iv). FRA believes that soliciting public comment will

promote its efforts to reduce the administrative and paperwork burdens

associated with the collection of information mandated by Federal

regulations. In summary, FRA reasons that comments received will

advance three objectives: (i) Reduce reporting burdens; (ii) ensure

that the agency organizes information collection items in a ``user

friendly'' format to improve the use of such information; and (iii)

accurately assess the resources expended to retrieve and produce

information requested. See 44 U.S.C. 3501.

Provided below are summaries of the seven information collection

activities FRA will submit for clearance by OMB as required by the PRA:

Title: Identify vulnerable bridges.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: Each railroad affected by this advisory should identify

its bridges carrying track of Class 4 or higher, or over which

passenger trains operate in commuter or intercity service, which are

vulnerable to damage from flash floods or other weather-related events

that may be included in its severe weather operating program.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads with 20,000 bridges.

Frequency of Submission: One time.

Total Responses: 25.

Average Time Per Response: 10 minutes per bridge.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,400 hours one time.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Compile and publish information to inspectors.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: The information developed in paragraph 3 should be

compiled and made available to each person who can be called upon to

perform special inspections on the subject track following a flash

flood warning.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: No submission.

Total Responses: 1,200.

Average Time Per Response: 2.5 hours initially, 1 hour annually

thereafter.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,000 hours one time, 1,200

hours annually thereafter.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Place identifying markings on bridges that need special

attention.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: Consideration should be given to placing identifying

marks on bridges that need particular attention in special inspections,

along with the bridge number, to assist inspectors in locating them

with certainty during inclement weather.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: No submission.

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Total Responses: 1,000.

Average Time Per Response: 3 hours initially, 15 minutes annually

thereafter.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,000 hours one time, 250

hours annually thereafter.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Training Program for Inspectors.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: Each affected railroad should implement a training

program for the persons performing special inspections.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: No submission.

Total Responses: 25.

Average Time Per Response: 441.6 hours one time, 88 hours annually

thereafter.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 11,040 hours one time, 2,200

hours annually thereafter.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Provide initial briefing to inspectors.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: Each affected railroad should brief all of its track and

bridge inspectors on the contents of this advisory. These briefings

should occur within 14 calendar days of the date of publication of this

safety advisory in the Federal Register.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: None.

Total Responses: 300.

Average Time Per Response: 4 hours.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 2,400 hours.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Review of bridges for vulnerability to high water, initial

and annual.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: FRA believes that the actions described in paragraphs 3,

4, and 5 should be completed within 60 calendar days of the date of

publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register. During

this period, each affected railroad should complete an initial review

of its bridges for vulnerability to high or rapidly flowing water and

provide that information to its inspectors. More detailed reviews

should be substantially completed and provided to inspectors during

calendar year 1998 and then maintained in a current status.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: None.

Total Responses: 1,000.

Average Time Per Response: 2 hours initially in 1998, 30 minutes

annually thereafter.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 2,000 hours initially in 1998,

500 hours annually thereafter.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

Title: Notify FRA of bridge safety inspection programs in place.

OMB Control Number: New.

Abstract: FRA requests a letter within 45 calendar days of the date

of publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register from

each affected railroad specifying the actions it has taken and will

initiate to enhance the safety of train operations in the event of a

flood or a high or rapid water condition. Such letters should be

addressed to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, RRS-1, Mail

Stop 25, 400 Seventh Street S.W., Washington, DC 20590.

Form Number(s): N/A.

Affected Public: Businesses.

Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.

Frequency of Submission: One time.

Total Responses: 25.

Average Time Per Response: 4 hours one time.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 200 hours one time.

Status: Emergency processing by OMB.

FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information

collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control

number, if required. Here, of course, FRA is not issuing information

collection requirements and has no intention of imposing penalties

under any provisions of this safety advisory. FRA intends to obtain

current OMB control numbers for any information collection items

contained in this Safety Advisory. The OMB control number, when

assigned, will be announced by separate notice in the Federal Register.

For further information please contact Ms. Gloria Swanson, Office

of Planning and Evaluation Division, RRS-21, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone: (202) 632-3318) or MaryAnn Johnson, Office of Information

Technology and Productivity Improvement, RAD-20, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone: (202) 632-3226). (These telephone numbers are not toll-

free.)

FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-1, issue additional safety

advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the

highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 2, 1997.

James T. Schultz,

Associate Administrator for Safety.

[FR Doc. 97-23618 Filed 9-3-97; 8:45 am]

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