Requirements for Shipping Packages Used To Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 71

RIN 3150-AF59

Requirements for Shipping Packages Used To Transport Vitrified

High-Level Waste

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend

its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level

waste (HLW) containing plutonium from the packaging requirement for

double containment. This amendment is being proposed in response to a

petition for rulemaking (PRM-71-11) submitted by the Department of

Energy (DOE). This proposed rule would also make a minor correction to

the usage of metric and English units to be consistent with existing

NRC policy.

DATE: The comment period expires July 22, 1997. Comments received after

this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the

Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received

on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff.

Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

For information on submitting comments electronically, see the

discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information

Section.

Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments

received and the environmental assessment and finding of no significant

impact, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be

viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board

established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under Electronic

Access in the Supplementary Information Section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8520, e-mail [email protected]

or Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-

6196, e-mail [email protected]c.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 10 CFR 71.63, the NRC imposed special requirements on licensees

who ship plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (20 curies). These

requirements specify that plutonium must be in solid form and that

packages used to ship plutonium must provide a separate inner

containment (the ``double containment'' requirement). In adopting these

requirements, the NRC specifically excluded plutonium in the form of

reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloys, and, on a case-by-case

basis, other plutonium-bearing solids that the NRC determines do not

require double containment.

On November 30, 1993, the DOE petitioned the NRC to amend

Sec. 71.63 to add a provision that would specifically remove canisters

containing plutonium-bearing vitrified waste from the packaging

requirement for double containment. The NRC published a notice of

receipt for the petition, docketed as PRM-71-11, in the Federal

Register on February 18, 1994 (59 FR 8143), requesting public comment

by May 4, 1994. On May 23, 1994 (59 FR 26608), the public comment

period was extended to June 3, 1994, at the request of the Idaho

National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Oversight Program of the State

of Idaho.

Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, the

DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administering

a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear

fuel. In the petition, the DOE proposes to ship the HLW from each of

its three storage locations at Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford,

Washington; and West Valley, New York; directly to the geologic

repository in casks certified by the NRC. Currently, this HLW exists

mostly in the form of

[[Page 25147]]

liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor

fuels. The DOE proposes to solidify this material into a borosilicate

glass form in which the HLW is dispersed and immobilized. The glass

would then be placed into stainless steel canisters for storage and

eventual transport to the geologic repository. DOE's purpose in

requesting an amendment to the rule is to allow the transportation and

disposal of HLW in a more cost-effective and efficient manner without

adversely affecting public health and safety.

The containers used to transport canisters of vitrified HLW will be

Type B packages certified by the NRC. These packages are required to

meet accident resistant standards. The HLW will also be subject to the

special transport controls for a ``Highway Route Controlled Quantity''

pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. In addition,

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires the DOE to

provide technical assistance and funds to train emergency responders

along the planned route.

The DOE asserts that shipment of vitrified HLW without double

containment will not adversely affect safety. This is because the

canistered, vitrified HLW provides a comparable level of protection to

the packaging of reactor fuel elements, which does not require double

containment. The DOE also noted that the plutonium concentrations in

the vitrified HLW will be considerably lower than the concentration in

spent nuclear fuel and that vitrified HLW is in an essentially

nonrespirable form.

Comments on the petition were received from three parties: the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Nye County, Nevada (the site for

the proposed spent fuel and HLW repository at Yucca Mountain); and the

INEL Oversight Program of the State of Idaho. EPA reviewed the petition

in accordance with its responsibilities under Section 309 of the Clean

Air Act and had no specific comments. Nye County agreed with the

rationale and arguments advanced by the DOE, and had no objection to

DOE's petition. The State of Idaho commented that the petition was

premature because it did not specify the parameters or performance

standards that HLW must meet.

On June 1, 1995, the NRC staff met with the DOE in a public meeting

to discuss the petitioner's request and the possible alternative of

requesting an NRC determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3) to exempt

vitrified HLW from the double containment requirement. The DOE informed

the NRC in a letter dated January 25, 1996, of its intent to seek this

exemption and the NRC received DOE's request on July 16, 1996. The DOE

requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held in abeyance

until a decision was reached on the exemption request.

In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission

paper (SECY-96-215, dated October 8, 1996) outlining and requesting

Commission approval of the NRC staff's proposed approach for making a

determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3). The determination would have been

the first made after the promulgation of the original rule, ``Packaging

of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive

Materials Under Certain Conditions,'' published on June 17, 1974 (39 FR

20960). In a staff requirements memorandum dated October 31, 1996, the

Commission disapproved the NRC staff's plan and directed that this

policy issue be addressed by rulemaking. In response, the NRC staff has

developed this proposed rule in response to the DOE petition.

Discussion

In the final 1974 rule, the NRC anticipated that a large number of

shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids could result from spent nuclear

fuel reprocessing and revised its regulations to require that plutonium

in excess of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) be shipped in solid form.

The NRC did so because shipment of plutonium liquids is susceptible to

leakage, particularly if a shipping package is improperly or not

tightly sealed. The value of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) was chosen

because it was equal to a large quantity of plutonium as defined in 10

CFR Part 71 in effect in 1974. Although this definition no longer

appears in 10 CFR Part 71, the value as applied to double containment

of plutonium has been retained. The concern about leakage of liquids

arose because of the potential for a large number of packages (probably

of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing and the

increased possibility of human error resulting from handling this

expanded shipping load.

The NRC treats dispersible plutonium oxide powder in the same way

because it also is susceptible to leakage if packages are improperly

sealed. Plutonium oxide powder was of particular concern because it was

the most likely alternative form (as opposed to plutonium nitrate

liquids) for shipment in a fuel reprocessing economy. To address the

concern with dispersible powder, the NRC required that plutonium not

only must be in solid form, but also that solid plutonium be shipped in

packages requiring double containment.

In the accompanying statement of considerations to the final 1974

rule, the NRC stated that the additional inner containment requirements

are intended to take into account that the plutonium may be in a

respirable form and that solid forms that are essentially

nonrespirable, such as reactor fuel elements, are suitable for

exemption from the double containment requirement. The Commission

further stated that:

Since the double containment provision compensates for the fact

that the plutonium may not be in a ``nonrespirable'' form, solid

forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be

exempted from the double containment requirement. Therefore, it

appears appropriate to exempt from the double containment

requirements reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloy, and other

plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines suitable for

such exemption. The latter category provides a means for the

Commission to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, requests for

exemption of other solid material where the quantity and form of the

material permits a determination that double containment is

unnecessary.

DOE's petition to amend Sec. 71.63, by adding a provision that

exempts canisters containing vitrified HLW from the packaging

requirement for a separate inner containment is partly based on the

rationale that the vitrified HLW meets the intent of the rule because

the plutonium will be in an essentially nonrespirable form. The DOE

petition contends that the vitrified HLW contained in stainless steel

canisters provides a comparable level of safety protection to that

provided by spent fuel elements.

Specifically, in the technical information supporting the petition

1, the DOE sought to demonstrate that the waste acceptance

specifications and process controls in the vitrification process and

the waste and canister characteristics compare favorably to spent

nuclear fuel in terms of the dispersability and respirability of the

contents during normal conditions of transport and after an accident.

The DOE maintained that impact and leak tests on the canisters,

chemical analysis of spent fuel and simulated HLW borosilicate glass,

design of the HLW canister, and other studies of the levels of

plutonium and other radioactive elements present in the borosilicate

glass demonstrate that vitrified HLW

[[Page 25148]]

canisters are more robust and contain less plutonium than spent reactor

fuel elements. During actual transport conditions, the HLW canister

will be enclosed within an NRC-certified shipping cask, further

reducing the potential for canister damage and for release of

respirable particles of HLW glass.

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\1\ Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to

Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b), dated September 30, 1993.

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The DOE petition refers to plutonium in the form of borosilicate

glass as being essentially nonrespirable. This is because a minute

quantity of respirable particles could result if the glass fractures

such as during cooldown processes after being poured into the HLW

canisters, normal handling and transport conditions, and accident

conditions.

In the technical information supporting the petition, the DOE

compared the physical and chemical characteristics of the vitrified HLW

glass mixture to spent nuclear fuel pellets. Because impact studies of

simulated waste glass from the DOE Savannah River site (Aiken, South

Carolina) have shown comparable levels of fracture resistance and

similar fractions of respirable particles when compared to unirradiated

uranium fuel pellets and other potential waste form materials, the

fracture resistance of HLW glass is expected to be comparable to that

of uranium fuel pellets.

The DOE also compared the concentration of plutonium present in a

HLW canister from the Savannah River site to that contained in a

typical spent reactor fuel element and concluded that the spent reactor

fuel element contains at least 100 times the concentration of plutonium

expected in a HLW canister. The DOE stated that the maximum

concentration of plutonium projected for the Hanford and West Valley

HLW canisters is much less than that of the Savannah River canisters.

The DOE also compared the integrity of the HLW canister to the

cladding of a reactor fuel element. The wall thickness of proposed HLW

canisters designs are substantially thicker than the cladding thickness

of a reactor fuel element. Additionally, the DOE noted that reactor

fuel elements have been exposed to high levels of radiation which

effects the cladding's material properties. Consequently, the DOE

concluded that the protection provided by the HLW canister would be at

least comparable to that provided by spent reactor fuel cladding.

Based on DOE documents, it is estimated that there will be 3,500

shipments of vitrified HLW by 2030. These shipments would not start

until a HLW repository or an interim storage facility becomes

available. However, the DOE's statement of 3,500 shipments is based on

loading two HLW canisters in each reusable shipping cask. If a separate

inner containment is required, the weight of the canister would be

increased. This would cause a corresponding decrease in the vitrified

glass payload to remain within allowable conveyance weight and/or size

limitations, potentially to the point that only one canister could be

transported per shipping cask. Consequently, the number of shipments

required to transport the existing quantity of waste would increase.

Therefore, the proposed rule would have the following benefits: (1)

Reducing the occupational dose associated with loading, unloading,

decontaminating, and handling the shipping casks; (2) reducing the dose

to the public during normal transport by decreasing the total number of

shipments; (3) decreasing total loading and unloading time (and

resultant expense); and (4) reducing the cost of the containment

system.

Proposed Regulatory Action

The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63 based on our evaluation

of the petition submitted by the DOE, its attachment, ``Technical

Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters

from 10 CFR 71.63(b),'' and the three public comments received on the

petition after its publication in the Federal Register. 10 CFR 71.63

specifies special provisions when shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74

TBq (20 curies) per package, including a separate inner containment

system, except when plutonium is in solid form in reactor fuel

elements, metal, or metal alloys. In proposing to amend Sec. 71.63, the

NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE,

for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.

In an accompanying statement of considerations to the 1974 rule on

shipping plutonium, the Commission stated that the additional inner

containment requirements are intended to take into account the fact

that the plutonium may be in a respirable form. The safety goal

achieved in Sec. 71.63 is the prevention of releases of respirable

forms of plutonium (when shipping over 0.74 TBq) during both normal

conditions of transportation and during accidents. The 1974 rule

considered both increased numbers of shipments of potentially

respirable forms of plutonium, as a result of commercial reprocessing

of spent nuclear fuel, and an increased potential for a human packaging

error associated with the larger shipping load. However, these large

numbers of plutonium shipments have not occurred, due in part to

policy, technical, and economic decisions to abandon commercial

reprocessing in the late 1970s.

Because of the material properties of the vitrified HLW, the sealed

canisters, and the approved quality assurance programs as described in

the petition, canisters of vitrified HLW packaged in accordance with 10

CFR Part 71 are highly unlikely to result in releases of dispersible or

respirable forms of plutonium under normal transportation conditions,

as identified under 10 CFR Part 71. Therefore, for normal

transportation, the vitrified HLW canisters meet the intent of the

Sec. 71.63(b) requirement without the need for double containment.

As for accident conditions, transportation packages for vitrified

HLW will be required to be certified by the NRC pursuant to Section 180

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10175),

and 10 CFR Part 71. Every package for vitrified HLW will be required to

meet the standards for accident resistant (i.e., Type B) packages as

set forth in 10 CFR Part 71. The shipping casks for vitrified HLW are

anticipated to be similar in design and robustness, and provide a

comparable level of protection to shipping casks for spent nuclear

fuel. Because spent nuclear fuel is excluded from the double

containment requirement, a favorable comparison of the canisters of

vitrified HLW to spent nuclear fuel would support removal of the

vitrified HLW forms from double containment.

The tests described in the technical justification demonstrate that

the canisters containing the vitrified HLW compare favorably to the

cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor assemblies. The

comparison is in terms of physical integrity and containment, based

upon the material properties, dimensions, and the effects of radiation

damage to materials.

The DOE analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of

plutonium in the HLW canisters than in spent reactor fuel elements.

However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium

concentration for these vitrified HLW canisters, and the NRC is not

basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double

containment requirement based on the plutonium's concentration.

In the technical justification, the DOE described the physical

characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified

HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capable of

withstanding a 7-meter drop

[[Page 25149]]

onto a flat, essentially unyielding surface, without breaching or

dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's

``Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD),'' Rev. 0,

which is referenced in the technical justification supporting the

petition. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test

onto an essentially unyielding surface, as required by the hypothetical

accident conditions in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9-meter drop test is performed

on the entire package under 10 CFR Part 71 certification review by the

NRC. The 7-meter drop applies to the canistered HLW, which is the

content of the NRC-certified Type B package.

The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant

to the demonstration that the canistered HLW represents an essentially

nonrespirable form for shipping plutonium. It is reasonable to expect

that the 7-meter drop test on the canister would be a more severe test

than the 9-meter drop test on an NRC-approved Type B package, due to

the energy absorption by the packaging and impact limiters. The WASRD

acceptance criterion of no ``breaching or dispersing radionuclides''

could be used to demonstrate that the waste is essentially

nonrespirable under accident conditions.

In some of these tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9

meters, 2 meters above the DOE 7-meter design standard, and portions of

the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in

the canisters' walls. In these drop tests, all the HLW canisters

remained intact. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes,

the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes was

less than 20 curies. This review has provided the NRC staff confidence

that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitrified HLW is

essentially non-respirable in the forms likely to be shipped.

However, the NRC does not control the requirements in, or changes

to, the DOE's WASRD. Many requirements in the WASRD are apparently

derived from, or are DOE's interpretations of, the NRC or other

applicable regulations. There are no NRC regulations or other

requirements specifying a 7-meter drop test onto an essentially

unyielding surface for canistered HLW. Accordingly, the NRC does not

have assurance that this test will be retained in future revisions to

the WASRD. Therefore, this test itself does not represent a sufficient

basis for removing the regulatory requirement in 10 CFR 71.63 for a

separate inner containment.

To address this concern, the proposed rulemaking provides

additional requirements beyond those presented in the petition for

rulemaking that requested exemption of ``Canisters containing vitrified

high-level waste.'' The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63(b) by

excluding sealed canisters containing vitrified HLW from the double

containment requirement if these canisters meet the specific waste

package design criteria in 10 CFR Part 60. The additional requirement

to meet 10 CFR Part 60 is responsive to the public comment received on

the DOE petition from the State of Idaho by establishing criteria

relevant to the intent of the double containment rule.

The design criteria for HLW forms in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c)

require that the waste be in solid form, in sealed containers, and that

particulate waste forms be consolidated to limit the availability and

generation of particulate. The basis for these technical requirements

under 10 CFR Part 60 is to limit particulates for reduced leaching

versus limiting particulate for respirability. Nevertheless, the bases

are generally consistent. The DOE WASRD, and its associated quality

assurance programs, are primarily based upon compliance with 10 CFR

Part 60 requirements.

In addition, the NRC is proposing to make a minor formatting change

in the language of the regulation and a minor correction to the usage

of units in this section to be consistent with existing NRC policy.

Metric units are reported first with English units in parenthesis.

Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

The proposed compatibility level for this rulemaking is Division 4

because the change only affects the DOE plutonium shipments. Division 4

rules pertain to those regulatory functions that are reserved solely to

the authority of the NRC pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended, and 10 CFR Part 150.

Electronic Access

Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or

WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC

Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be

accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly

available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.

Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as

practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.

If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking

subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free

number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set

as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).

Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem

can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the

``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's

Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also

have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the

particular subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FedWorld also can be accessed by a direct dial

phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using

Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact

FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld

menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State

Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that

point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu.

The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc''

at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main

menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to

FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access

NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full

access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main

FedWorld system.

If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and

menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download

documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or

upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files

can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you

will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).

An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with

descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP

access.

Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,

like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does

not display the NRC Rules Menu.

You may also access the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site

through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides the

[[Page 25150]]

same access as the FedWorld bulletin board, including the facility to

upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports

that function.

For more information on the NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur

Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC

20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected]. For

information about the interactive rulemaking site, contact Ms. Carol

Gallagher, (301) 415-6215; e-mail [email protected]

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in

Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a

major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment, and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not

required. The proposed rule change removes shipments of sealed

canisters containing vitrified HLW that meet the design criteria in 10

CFR 60.135 (b) and (c) from the double containment packaging

requirement. The additional design requirement supports consistency

with the intent of the original 1974 rule. The primary purpose for

double containment is to ensure that any respirable plutonium will not

leak into the atmosphere. Vitrified HLW is essentially nonrespirable,

and therefore, the packaging requirement for double containment is

unnecessary.

The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this

proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their

comments on the environmental assessment. The environmental assessment

and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is

based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room,

2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the

environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are

available from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,

telephone (301) 415-6196.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information

collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the

Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to

respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently

valid OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this

proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of

the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft analysis is

available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the draft analysis

may be obtained from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory

Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-

0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.

The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory

analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as

indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C.

605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not

have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small

entities. The rulemaking only affects the DOE shipments of vitrified

HLW. No other entities are involved.

Backfit Analysis

The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does

not apply to this proposed rule, and therefore, a backfit analysis is

not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions

that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71

Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear

materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to

adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.

930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201,

2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242,

as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846). Section 71.97

also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789-790.

2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.

(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be

shipped as a solid.

(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be

packaged in a separate inner container placed within outer packaging

that meets the requirements of subparts E and F of this part for

packaging of material in normal form. If the entire package is

subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.71 (``Normal conditions of

transport''), the separate inner container must not release plutonium

as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10-6 A2/h. If

the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.73

(``Hypothetical accident conditions''), the separate inner container

must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A2 in 1

week. The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to solid

plutonium in the following forms:

(1) Reactor fuel elements;

(2) Metal or metal alloy;

(3) Sealed canisters containing vitrified high-level waste that

meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c); and

(4) Other plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines

should be exempt from the requirements of this section.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of May, 1997.

John C. Hoyle,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 97-11834 Filed 5-7-97; 8:45 am]

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