Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices; Final Rule
Federal RegisterMar 26, 1996
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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 1500 and Part 1507
Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices; Final Rule
AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Commission is amending its fireworks regulations under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act. This final rule will require that
large multiple-tube fireworks devices that have any tube with an inner
diameter of 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or greater pass a performance test for
stability. Under the test, these devices may not tip over when inclined
at an angle of 60 degrees from the horizontal. This requirement is
intended to reduce the risk of injury posed when these fireworks
devices tip over during firing. If they tip over, subsequent tubes may
discharge in the direction of spectators or others in the vicinity.
DATES: The rule will take effect on March 26, 1997, and will apply to
multiple-tube fireworks devices in which any tube has an inner diameter
of 1.5 inches or greater and that first enter interstate commerce or
are imported on or after that date.
Adversely affected persons have until April 25, 1996 to file
objections to this rule, stating grounds therefor and requesting a
public hearing on those objections. Objections and requests for
hearings must be mailed to the Office of the Secretary, Consumer
Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C. 20207, or delivered to the
Office of the Secretary, Room 502, 4330 East-West Highway, Bethesda,
Maryland 20814 telephone (301) 504-6800.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel B. Hall, Office of Compliance,
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207-0001;
telephone (301) 504-0400, ext. 1371.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
A. Background
Multiple-tube mine and shell fireworks devices (also called
``display racks'' and referred to in this notice as ``multiple-tube
devices'') are non-reloadable devices that fire multiple aerial shells,
comets, or other effects into the air to produce visual and audible
effects. These devices consist of several vertical tubes with a common
fuse, either with or without a horizontal base. They are classified by
the Department of Transportation (``DOT'') as 1.4G explosive devices
(formerly Class C common fireworks devices) which are suitable for use
by consumers.
The devices are designed to fire sequentially. This creates the
danger that the device's reaction to one shot may cause it to tip over.
Subsequent shots may then fire horizontally or at an angle and hit the
operator or spectators. The Commission is aware of two deaths to
spectators involving multiple-tube devices that occurred in this
manner. Both of these incidents involved devices with tubes larger than
1.5 inches in diameter.
The Commission regulates fireworks devices under the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act (``FHSA''). 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278. Under its
current regulations, the Commission has declared certain fireworks
devices to be ``banned hazardous substances.'' 16 CFR 1500.17(a) (3),
(8) and (9). Other fireworks devices must meet specific requirements to
avoid being classified as banned hazardous substances. 16 CFR Part
1507. Commission regulations also prescribe specific warnings required
on various legal fireworks devices, 16 CFR 1500.14(b)(7), and designate
the size and location of these warnings. 16 CFR 1500.121.
On July 1, 1994, the Commission issued an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (``ANPR'') discussing the
[[Page 13085]]
hazard presented by multiple-tube devices of all sizes, but noted that
more severe incidents have occurred with large devices. 59 FR 33928.
The ANPR used 1 inch (2.54 cm) as the cutoff between small and large
devices. The ANPR explained that the Commission was considering the
following regulatory alternatives: (1) ban all multiple-tube devices;
(2) ban multiple-tube devices with an inside tube diameter of greater
than 1 inch; (3) require additional labeling on all multiple-tube
devices; (4) establish performance or design criteria to modify these
devices; (5) pursue individual product recalls; and (6) take no
mandatory action, but encourage development of a voluntary standard.
On July 5, 1995, the Commission issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (``NPR'') in which it proposed a performance standard for
multiple-tube devices with any tube inner diameter of 1.5 inches or
more. 60 FR 34922. The Commission found that 1.5 inches is a more
appropriate measure to distinguish between large and small devices than
is 1 inch, and decided not to propose any further regulatory
requirements for smaller devices.1 The proposed performance
standard provided that all large multiple-tube devices have a minimum
tip angle greater than 60 degrees. With this notice, the Commission
issues the performance standard as a final rule.
\1\ The Commission concluded that additional work would be
needed to develop a standard that adequately addressed the tip-over
hazard with small (less than 1.5 inch diameter) multiple-tube
devices. For example, the Commission would need to test small
devices to determine if the 60-degree tip angle is the proper
criterion for this size device. Further, smaller devices are likely
to produce less force on impact, and may be less likely to cause
fatal injuries. Because not many small devices are marketed and the
known incidents involve large devices, a performance standard for
small multiple-tube devices may not be necessary. Accordingly, the
Commission decided to apply the stability criterion only to large
devices.
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B. Statutory Authority
This proceeding is conducted under the FHSA. 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278.
Fireworks are ``hazardous substances'' within the meaning of section
2(f)(1)(A) of the FHSA because they are flammable or combustible
substances, or generate pressure through decomposition, heat, or other
means, and ``may cause substantial personal injury or substantial
illness during or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably
foreseeable handling or use * * *.'' 15 U.S.C. 1261(f)(1)(A).
Under section 2(q)(1)(B) of the FHSA, the Commission may classify
as a ``banned hazardous substance'' any hazardous substance intended
for household use which, notwithstanding the precautionary labeling
that is or may be required by the FHSA, presents such a hazard that
keeping the substance out of interstate commerce is the only adequate
way to protect the public health and safety. Id. at 1261(q)(1)(B). A
proceeding to classify a substance as a banned hazardous substance
under section 2(q)(1) of the FHSA is governed by sections 3(f)-(i) of
the FHSA, and by sections 701(e)-(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (``FDCA''), 21 U.S.C. 371(e)-(g). See 15 U.S.C.
1261(q)(2).
The July 1, 1994, ANPR was the required first step to declare the
specified multiple-tube devices to be banned hazardous substances under
section 2(q)(1). See 15 U.S.C. 1262(f). The proposed rule, published on
July 5, 1995, continued the regulatory process in accordance with 15
U.S.C. 1262(h). To fulfill additional statutory requirements, this
notice includes the text of the final rule and a final regulatory
analysis. Id. at 1262(i)(1). As required by the FHSA, the Commission
also makes findings here that: (1) compliance with any relevant
voluntary standard is unlikely to adequately reduce the risk of injury,
or substantial compliance by the industry with the voluntary standard
is unlikely; (2) the expected benefits of the regulation bear a
reasonable relationship to its expected costs; and (3) the regulation
imposes the least burdensome requirement that would adequately reduce
the risk of injury. Id. at 1262(i)(2).
C. Filing Objections Under Section 701(e) of the FDCA
The procedures established under section 701(e) of the FDCA also
govern this rulemaking. 15 U.S.C. 1261(q)(2). These procedures provide
that once the Commission issues a final rule, persons who would be
adversely affected by the rule have 30 days in which to file objections
with the Commission stating the grounds therefor, and to request a
public hearing on those objections. 21 U.S.C. 371(e). If objections are
filed, a hearing to receive evidence concerning the objections would be
held. The presiding officer would then issue an order, based upon
substantial evidence. Id. The Commission's procedural rules at 16 CFR
Part 1502 would apply to such a hearing.
Any objections and requests for a hearing must be filed with the
Commission's Office of the Secretary. They will be accepted for filing
if they meet the following conditions: (1) they are submitted within
the 30-day period specified; (2) each objection is separately numbered;
(3) each objection specifies with particularity the provision(s) of the
regulation to which the objection is directed; (4) each objection on
which a hearing is requested specifically requests a hearing; and (5)
each objection for which a hearing is requested includes a detailed
description of the basis for the objection and the factual information
or analysis in support thereof (failure to include this information
constitutes a waiver of the right to a hearing on that objection). 16
CFR 1502.6.
The Commission will publish a notice in the Federal Register
specifying any parts of the regulation that have been stayed by the
filing of proper objections or, if no objections have been filed,
stating that fact. Id. at Sec. 1502.7. As soon as practicable, the
Commission will review any objections and hearing requests that have
been filed to determine whether the regulation should be modified or
revoked, and whether a hearing is justified. Id. at Sec. 1502.8.
D. The Product
As explained in the proposed rule, this rulemaking only applies to
multiple-tube devices that have any tube equal to or greater than 1.5
inches in inner diameter (referred to below as ``large devices'').
Large devices were first introduced by domestic manufacturers around
1986. Generally, they consist of three or more tubes grouped together,
sometimes on a wooden base, and fused in a series to fire sequentially.
Bases, where used, come in a variety of sizes. The devices fire aerial
shells, comets, or other effects from the tubes, producing visual and
audible effects. These devices are among the largest fireworks
available to consumers. [13] 2
\2\ Numbers in brackets refer to documents listed at the end of
this notice.
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The tubes may be individually labeled or have a single label
surrounding them. Commission regulations require that all multiple-tube
devices display the following conspicuous label:
Warning (or Caution) Emits Showers of Sparks (or Shoots Flaming Balls,
if More Descriptive)
Use only under [close] adult supervision.3
\3\ The word ``close'' is optional.
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For outdoor use only.
Place on a hard smooth surface (or place upright on level ground, if
more descriptive).
Do not hold in hand.
Light fuse and get away.
16 CFR 1500.14(b)(7)(ix).
The National Fireworks Association (``NFA'') reports that retail
sales of large multiple-tube devices are between $24
[[Page 13086]]
and $36 million annually, with an estimated 400,000 to 700,000 units
sold per year. Prices range from $30 to $130 per unit, with most
devices in the $50 to $60 range. The NFA also reports that domestic
devices account for about 75 percent of the market by dollar volume and
somewhat less by unit sales. Imported devices are manufactured
primarily in China, and go through several wholesalers before reaching
the retail vendor. [13] Some devices have tubes that are imported from
China and then are inserted into larger tubes and assembled with bases
in the United States. CPSC considers such devices to be imported.
E. Risk of Injury
The devices fire sequentially, and under some conditions the force
from one shot can tip the device over, causing it to fall into a
horizontal position. A subsequent shot can discharge as the device is
falling or when it is horizontal. When this occurs, there is a risk
that one of the projectiles may strike the operator of the device or
spectators and cause serious injury, or even death.
The Commission is aware of two deaths involving large multiple-tube
devices. In both incidents, the device tipped over while functioning. A
projectile then fired horizontally from the device and struck the
victim. In each case, the victim was a spectator.
The first fatality occurred in July of 1991. A 3-year-old boy was
standing between his father's legs approximately 40 feet from an area
where fireworks were being set off at a family reunion. The device had
been placed on concrete blocks. The device tipped over after the third
shot, and the fourth shell fired horizontally in the direction of the
boy, striking him in the left ear. He died the next morning. [2, Tab A]
The second fatality occurred in July of 1992. The victim, a 65-
year-old grandmother, was sitting at the end of a picnic table watching
a family fireworks display approximately 40 feet away. Her son placed a
large multiple-tube device on a piece of wafer board that extended
about one foot over the end of a boat dock. He placed a 2x4 block of
wood under the end of the board so that the device would shoot out over
the lake. After lighting the device, he walked toward the shore and
noticed that the device had tipped over after the third shot. The
fourth shell discharged horizontally and struck his mother in the
temple and eye. She died the next morning. [2, Tab A]
CPSC's compliance testing indicates that the tip-over risk
evidenced by these two incidents continues to exist. In fiscal year
1994, all 24 samples of imported devices tested for the Commission's
routine compliance program, and 1 of 8 samples of domestic devices,
tipped over while functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27 imported
samples and 1 of 5 domestic samples tipped over. [19]
F. Commission Tests to Develop a Standard
1. Testing Prior to the ANPR
After the first fatality, several domestic manufacturers of large
multiple-tube devices began developing a test for the potential of
these devices to tip over while functioning. The test used a 2-inch (5
cm) thick block of medium-density (2 pounds per cubic foot or 0.032g/
cm\3\) polyurethane upholstery foam to simulate uneven surfaces. When
placed on this surface, if a device tipped over while functioning, it
was deemed too unstable.
The American Fireworks Standards Laboratory (``AFSL'') then began
work to revise its standard for these devices to incorporate such a
dynamic stability test. AFSL issued an interim revised voluntary
standard in January 1993 and adopted it without changes on September 5,
1995. The Commission also collected samples of large multiple-tube
devices and tested them for tip-over using the industry's dynamic
stability test. [1 and 14]
2. CPSC's Dynamic Stability Testing
After issuing the ANPR, the Commission staff attempted to develop a
dynamic stability test that could provide a reliable performance
standard for multiple-tube devices. The staff's objective was to
develop a test that could reliably distinguish between large multiple-
tube devices that are dangerously unstable and those that do not
present an unreasonable tip-over risk. The staff attempted to identify
a test surface that would simulate grass (the surface believed to be
commonly used for fireworks displays), and that would produce
consistent results in repeated tests.
To accomplish this goal, the Commission had to identify a surface
on which the devices would consistently tip over or remain upright in a
manner corresponding to how the devices perform on grass. If the tip-
over rate was substantially greater on the test surface than on grass,
the standard might be too stringent, causing unnecessary changes to
reasonably safe products. If the tip-over rate was substantially lower
on the test surface than on grass, the standard might not adequately
protect consumers.
As explained in detail in the Federal Register notice that
published the proposed rule, the staff's testing did not yield
sufficiently reliable results to propose a dynamic standard. 60 FR
34922, 34924. The staff tested devices on several types of foam. First
it tested with 2-inch thick foams of three different densities. This
thickness was chosen, in part, because the AFSL standard specifies 2-
inch thick medium-density foam. However, the tip-over rates with all
three densities of two-inch thick foam in this initial test were
significantly greater than with grass (39 to 50 tip-overs out of 50
devices on foam compared with 4 out of 50 on grass). The staff then
tested three high-density foams of smaller thicknesses (0.75, 1.0, and
1.5 inches), hoping to better match the tip-over rates on grass. [6, 8]
However, none of the these three foams agreed consistently with grass
for all three devices tested. The results of this phase of testing are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.--Phase I--Incidence and Percentage of Tip-Over With Large
Multiple-Tube Devices on Grass or High Density Polyurethane Upholstery
Foam
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polyurethane foam
-----------------------------
Device Grass 0.75
inch 1.0 inch 1.5 inch
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................... 4/50 4/50 14/50* 40/50*
8% 8% 28% 80%
2a.............................. 32/50 9/50* 25/50 43/50*
64% 18% 50% 86%
3a.............................. 27/50 2/50* 3/50* 7/50*
[[Page 13087]]
54% 4% 6% 14%
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* Significantly different from grass, Pa Device modified to increase tip-over rate.
Of the three foams, 1-inch foam appeared to offer the best overall
relationship to grass, even though it produced inconsistent results.
[6, 8] Therefore, the staff continued testing with this foam.
In phase II of the Commission's testing, six additional devices
were tested on grass and on 1.0-inch thick high density foam. The
results were then combined with the results from phase I. Once again,
however, there was not consistent agreement between the tip-over rates
on foam and on grass (see Table 2).
Table 2.--Phase II--Incidence and Percentage of Tip-Over With Large
Multiple-Tube Devices on Grass or 1.0-Inch High Density Polyurethane
Upholstery Foam
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Device Grass Foam
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 a................................................. 4/50 14/50 *
8% 28%
2 b................................................. 32/50 25/50
64% 50%
3 b................................................. 27/50 3/50 *
54% 6%
4 b................................................. 30/50 36/50
60% 72%
5................................................... 0/90 0/50
0% 0%
6 a................................................. 10/50 25/50 *
20% 50%
7................................................... 0/50 0/50
0% 0%
8................................................... 0/90 0/50
0% 0%
9................................................... 0/50 0/50
0% 0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Significantly different from grass, Pa Device has no base.
b Device modified to increase tip-over rate.
The staff concluded that the dynamic stability test it attempted to
develop could not reasonably form the basis for a standard addressing
the tip-over hazard with large multiple-tube devices. Particularly
problematic was the dynamic test's inconsistency. There were two cases
(devices 1 and 6) in which foam significantly overpredicted the tip-
over rate with grass. In another case (device 3) foam significantly
underpredicted the tip-over rate with grass. [6, 8] These tests showed
a highly significant ``interaction'' between the device and test
surface, so that one could not accurately predict, based on a device's
performance on foam, how the device would behave on grass. An accurate
test is needed to avoid unwarranted market disruption and, more
importantly, because a tip-over can lead to a fatality.
3. The Tip-Angle Test
Since the Commission's testing on foam did not yield a reliable
dynamic test, the staff looked to the physical properties of large
multiple-tube devices to develop a static test. The staff measured the
dimensions, mass, and static tip-over resistance (``tip angle'') of all
the devices tested. The angle at which a device will first tip over
depends on its base-height ratio, mass, and center of gravity. A
device's dynamic stability--its ability to remain upright when fired--
depends on its tip angle and other factors, such as its lift force, the
firing order, and the time between firings. The staff found that tip
angle could predict whether a device would tip over while functioning
and also be sufficiently sensitive for routine compliance testing. [9]
The staff measured the tip angle of devices by placing one edge of
the device against a mechanical stop approximately \1/16\-inch high (to
prevent sliding) at the edge of a horizontal hinged platform. The
platform was slowly raised from the horizontal until the device tipped
over. The tip angle was considered to be the angle at which the device
first tips over. The staff repeated the test for each edge of the
device to determine its minimum tip angle. In this manner, the staff
measured the tip angle for the nine large devices used in the dynamic
tests. The staff then compared these measurements and the results of
the dynamic tests to determine whether there was a relationship between
the minimum tip angle of a device and its dynamic stability on grass
(see Table 3). [9]
Table 3.--Static Tip-Over Resistance and Dynamic Tip-Over Rate of Large
Multiple-Tube Devices
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tip-over rate on
grass
Minimum tip angle (degrees) ---------------------- Device
Percent Incidence
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35, 42 b................................ 54 27/50 3 a
37...................................... 64 32/50 2 a
37...................................... 20 10/50 6
37...................................... 8 4/50 1
40...................................... 60 30/50 4 a
61...................................... 0 0/90 5
64...................................... 0 0/50 7
65...................................... 2.5 1/40 4
68...................................... 0 0/40 2
69...................................... 0 0/50 9
70...................................... 0 0/40 3
78, 80 b................................ 0 0/90 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Device modified to increase tip-over rate.
b Different samples of same device.
The staff also tested several large devices other than those it had
examined when considering a dynamic test. One device was a modified
form of device 1, that originally had no base. The staff glued a 12-
inch (30.5-cm) square particleboard base to the device. With this
modification, the tip angle increased from 37 degrees to 68 degrees.
The tip-over incidence on grass also decreased, from 4/50 to 0/50. This
additional test demonstrates that a device's stability can be improved
by adding a base. [9]
The second additional device that the staff tested, an imported
one, had a square plastic base. The tip angle of this device ranged
from 54 to 55 degrees (based on measurements of four individual
samples), and it did not tip over in 50 dynamic tests on grass. [16]
4
\4\ The staff had previously tested this type of device (tip
angle: 52-55 degrees and tip-over rate: 2/40), but the bases of some
of the devices in the earlier test were cracked. Therefore, the
Commission does not consider the earlier tests to be reliable and
has not considered them in determining an appropriate tip angle. [10
and 11]
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None of the seven devices originally tested had tip angles between
43 and 61 degrees. Therefore, the staff modified the base of a device
that had a large particleboard base in order to obtain a tip angle near
50 degrees. The staff
[[Page 13088]]
trimmed 2\1/16\ inches off each of the two long edges of the base. The
minimum tip angle of the device then ranged from 50 to 51 degrees
(based on measurements of eight individual samples). This modified
device tipped over in 33 out of 51 tests on grass. [16] Table 4 shows
the tip angles and tip-over rates of the three additional devices that
the staff tested.
Table 4.--Static Tip-Over Resistance and Dynamic Tip-Over Rate of Additional Large Multiple-Tube Devices a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tip-over rate on grass
Minimum tip angle (degrees) -------------------------- Description of device
Percent Incidence
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50-51 b............................. 65 33/51 Four-tube device with base. Base trimmed to
obtain 50 degree tip angle.
54-55 b............................. 0 0/50 Seven-tube device with plastic base.
68.................................. 0 0/50 Seven-tube device. Same as device 1, but with
added 12 inch base.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Does not include devices that the staff considered to present inconclusive results.
bRange of values for replicate samples.
The Commission proposed and now issues in final a standard
requiring that large multiple-tube devices must have a minimum tip
angle above 60 degrees. The Commission's data indicate that
substantially all of the devices measuring a tip angle above 60 degrees
did not tip over while functioning on grass. Among such devices, there
was only one tip-over in 450 tests. On the other hand, devices with tip
angles below 60 degrees had tip-over rates on grass as high as 65
percent. Among all devices tested with tip angles below 60 degrees,
there were 136 tipovers in 351 tests.
The Commission believes that requiring devices to have minimum tip
angles above 60 degrees offers an appropriate margin of safety. The
fact that the staff observed no tip-overs with one device that had a
tip angle of 54-55 degrees might appear to suggest that a tip angle of
54 degrees would be sufficient to protect against the tip-over hazard.
However, a device that had a tip angle of 50-51 degrees had a very high
incidence of tip-overs (33/51). This device had a small base, and would
have been even less stable if, like a number of other devices on the
market, it had no base extending outward from the tube configuration.
Thus, it is likely that some devices with 55-degree tip angles would
tip over when tested on grass. Furthermore, the tests were performed on
level ground, and in actual use there probably will be significant
variations from level in a number of cases. The Commission concludes
that in order to adequately protect the public, it is appropriate to
require that the minimum tip angle be above 60 degrees.
AFSL submitted comments on the NPR that included results from its
testing of 43 units (13 different devices). AFSL reported that 35
percent of the units it tested met a 60-degree tip-angle test and that
none of the devices it tested tipped in actual firing. As explained
below in Section G of this notice, this limited testing does not show
that a requirement for a tip angle above 60 degrees is too stringent a
measure of whether a multiple-tube device is unlikely to tip over in
use.
G. Comments Responding to the Proposed Rule
The Commission received eight comments in response to the proposed
rule. Some commenters stated that they support the proposed rule.
Significant issues raised by other comments, and the Commission's
responses, are summarized below.
1. Scope of the Rule
AFSL stated that it agreed with the Commission's decision to limit
the scope of the proposed rule to large multiple-tube devices and that
the Commission was correct in concluding that devices with inside
diameters greater than 1 inch, but less than 1.5 inches, are not
common.
2. Need for a Rule
Some commenters stated that the need for a rule had not been
demonstrated because the number of reported injuries is low or because
the injuries are caused by consumer misuse. As explained below, the
Commission disagrees with these contentions.
a. Injury Data
Comments: One commenter claimed that the number of multiple-tube
devices has increased, but that the number of injuries associated with
them has not. The commenter concludes that the small number of injuries
and deaths associated with multiple-tube devices or Class C fireworks
does not justify further regulation. This commenter also claimed that
multiple-tube fireworks devices are no different from other fireworks
with respect to the potential for injury.
One group of commenters stated that in their evaluation of injuries
recorded in the state of Indiana, multiple-tube devices and other
consumer fireworks either have not tipped over or have caused few or no
injuries.
Response: Mine and shell devices (both single and multiple shot)
are more powerful than most consumer fireworks. Although the number of
deaths and injuries associated with mine and shell devices is
relatively low, the severity of injuries is greater than with other
devices. Any tip-over of large multiple-tube devices has the potential
to cause death or serious injury. Two individuals are known to have
been struck by large multiple-tube devices. Both suffered fatal
injuries.
The yearly unit sales figures for fireworks are unknown. Therefore,
the Commission cannot accurately assess any possible trends in exposure
to large multiple-tube devices. However, the cases show that the
potential for tip-over and serious injury or death is high under
certain conditions of foreseeable use. Since, as explained below, there
is no voluntary standard that can adequately reduce this risk, the
mandatory standard proposed by the Commission is necessary.
Comment: The commenters on the Indiana data also requested that the
Commission survey dealers to inquire about reported cases or instances
of a problem with a multiple-tube mine and shell device.
Response: As noted above, a mandatory standard is appropriate
despite the low number of reported deaths and injuries. In view of
this, there is no need to perform the requested survey.
Comment: AFSL contends that the lack of any known serious injury
attributed to large multiple-tube devices since the adoption of the
AFSL standard in 1993 supports their view that the voluntary standard
is adequate.
[[Page 13089]]
Response: These devices had been on the market for 6 years by the
time the two known deaths occurred. Thus, the absence of any known
deaths since 1993 is not statistically significant. The adequacy of
AFSL's standard, and the extent to which it is adopted by industry, are
discussed below under the responses to comments favoring a dynamic test
and to comments favoring the alternative of a voluntary standard.
b. Possible Role of Misuse and Alcohol in Tip-Over Incidents
Comment: One commenter alleged that any increase in mortality
related to these items is the direct result of misuse and the failure
of consumers to follow the appropriate instructions. The same commenter
stated that the fireworks industry cannot be held accountable for all
injuries, particularly when the item is being blatantly misused. The
commenter also claimed that many fireworks-related injuries involve
some level of intoxication by the operator and that the correlation
between alcohol use and injury should be considered in the hazard
analysis for any product.
Response: The incident reports do not indicate that the fatalities
involving large multiple-tube devices were a result of misuse. Rather,
they appear to have occurred during reasonably foreseeable use of the
product. The two fatalities occurred during family gatherings a day or
two after the July 4th holiday.
The labels on multiple-tube devices generally state that the device
should be placed on a solid level surface prior to firing. In one
fatality, concrete blocks were stacked in the yard as a staging area.
In the other fatality, the fireworks device had been placed on a board
so that it would fire over a lake. The use of the devices on either of
these surfaces appears to indicate concern with the appropriate
placement of the fireworks device prior to firing.
Thus, the known cases involving fatalities support the conclusion
that the users were attempting to follow the instructions for proper
placement of the devices. In addition, there is no indication that
alcohol was a factor in either of the deaths. Accordingly, the
Commission disagrees with the commenter's contention that consumer
misuse or intoxication was the cause of these accidents.
Comment: One commenter claimed that, based on a 1992 CPSC study of
hospital emergency-room-treated injuries, ``a major problem with
fireworks injuries were the result of consumer misuse.''
Response: The study cited does not support this proposition for the
devices at issue here. In discussing the category of Shells and Mines
(the major two types of devices included in the this rulemaking), the
report states that ``little can be said to characterize this category
of fireworks due to the small sample size (five investigations).
However, it appeared that the flight path of the projectile,
particularly when tip-over was involved, may be a major concern.'' [23]
There may well have been misuse of the multiple shell devices
associated with some of the injuries in the study. However, nothing in
the report indicated that the injuries could be attributed to any such
misuse, as opposed to erratic flight path, tip-over, or other problems
with the devices.
c. Section 15 of the CPSA
Comment: One commenter stated that the proposed rule is unnecessary
because existing regulations and section 15 of the Consumer Product
Safety Act (``CPSA'') are adequate. 15 U.S.C. 2064. Section 15
authorizes the Commission to take corrective actions regarding product
defects that create a substantial risk of injury to the public. See 16
CFR 1115.4, 1115.12 (e) and (g).
Response: Existing fireworks regulations require only a base-to-
height ratio of at least 1:3. 16 CFR 1507.4. All the devices tested by
CPSC that tipped over during actual use complied with this standard.
Therefore, this requirement does not adequately address the tip-over
hazard.
In addition, the ongoing problem of numerous section 15 recalls of
multiple-tube devices under section 15 of the CPSA due to tip-over
indicates that existing regulations are not effective. Under these
circumstances, a performance standard that effectively addresses the
problem for all devices is more appropriate than case-by-case
investigation and recall.
3. Selection of the Tip-Over Angle
Comment: One commenter stated that there is no logical or
statistically valid reason for choosing any particular angle as the
minimum angle required by the static test.
Response: In developing the proposed rule, the staff considered
specifying minimum tip angles as low as 45 degrees. However, as noted
above, the Commission concluded that, to provide a margin of safety and
to address the likelihood that the devices will not be used on level
ground, the static test should require that a device not tip at an
angle of 60 degrees.
It is possible that a fireworks device might be constructed that
would not tip over in a static test at 60 degrees but would tip over
under foreseeable conditions on grass. In fact, 1 of the 450 devices
tested by the Commission with a tip angle over 60 degrees did tip over
when tested on grass. Increasing the stringency of the static test to
address such hypothetical ``outliers'' would make the requirement
unduly restrictive for the vast majority of designs that are likely to
be marketed. If such easy-to-tip designs are marketed in the future,
the Commission will consider action under section 15 of CPSA. 15 U.S.C.
2064.
Comment: One commenter suggested a more lenient tilt test for items
that do not present as much of a tip-over hazard as other available
designs. The commenter stated that a more lenient tilt test was
especially appropriate for devices with tubes clustered in the center
of the base. The commenter asserted that multiple-tube items with tubes
clustered close to the center of the base will more likely fail the
static test, but be more stable when tested on foam or grass than
multiple-tube items with tubes near the edge of the base. The commenter
provided sketches to illustrate this point, and also suggested a
formula to determine the tilt angle based on the geometry of the
devices relative to the geometry of the base:
T=45+15 (d/b), where:
T is the tip angle in degrees; d is the length of the diagonal of a
square (or diameter of a circle) enclosing the tubes; and b is the
length of the diagonal of a square base or diameter of a circular base.
The commenter stated that preliminary testing supports the formula,
but provided no data and admits that further tests are needed.
Response: The staff of the Commission's Engineering Laboratory
agrees that there are configurations that could provide greater or
lesser stability for a fired multiple-tube device. The commenter lists
base size, base thickness, lift charge, and size of the aerial load as
relevant factors affecting stability. However, firing order and rate,
as well as other variables, also affect the dynamic stability of
multiple-tube devices.
The commenter supplied no data on which to evaluate the suggested
formula. The Commission has very limited data on the tip-over
characteristics of devices with tip angles in the range of 45 to 60
degrees. As explained above, the Commission selected the 60-degree tip
angle criterion based on a device with a tip angle of 50 to 51 degrees
that tipped over a large proportion of the time (33/51) when tested
dynamically on grass. In addition, various combinations of the factors
that affect tip-over could cause a device with
[[Page 13090]]
a similar configuration to tip over more readily than the tested
device. The suggested formula does not account for these other
factors--such as load, firing rate, etc. The Commission's criterion
does account for these factors by correlating tip angle to dynamic tip-
over on grass.
The commenter's formula is intended to be applied to devices with a
square or circular base. The device with the 50-51 degree tip angle
that had a high tip-over rate had a rectangular base. It is not clear
how, if at all, the commenter would apply the formula in this case.
However, it can be expected that the formula will produce tip-angle
criteria ranging between 50 and 60 degrees, depending on the
configuration. Available data do not show that such criteria would
provide an adequate margin of safety. Accordingly, the Commission is
not adopting this commenter's suggestion.
Comment: As explained above, the Commission selected the 60-degree
criterion based on the performance on grass of a large number of tests
of various large devices. Some comments questioned the adequacy of this
testing. One commenter asked why the Commission did not test the
devices that were recalled as a result of failing the 2-inch foam test
and the device known to have been involved in the death of a 3-year-old
boy. The same commenter suggested that CPSC conduct additional tests
comparing the static test to the dynamic test with foam. Another
commenter questioned why the Commission did not test a larger sampling
of the various multiple-tube devices, including the W-800 inserts with
a wooden base and a tube around the insert.
Response: In developing the proposed standard, the Commission
selected devices that represented a cross section of the devices
available at the time and that provided a range of tip-over rates. The
Commission considered design characteristics such as base size, firing
order, internal fuse-burn time, lift charge, shell mass, device shape,
center of gravity, and quality of materials and construction. This
cross-section of devices is sufficient to ensure that the test selected
by the Commission is reasonable.
Devices that had been previously recalled--as well as the device
involved in the death of the 3-year-old boy--were not available at the
time that the CPSC conducted its tests. It is expected that had they
been available for testing, they would have been among those devices
found to be unstable. However, the Commission believes that it is more
reasonable to test currently available devices, rather than devices
that are no longer manufactured or available.
Comment: Some commenters stated that there are devices that are
stable in actual use even though they do not comply with the proposed
rule. AFSL submitted test data to support this view. These commenters
asserted that the proposed rule unfairly penalizes such devices.
Response: As explained above, AFSL presented limited test data on
12 large multiple-tube devices (one device included in AFSL's testing
was actually a small device). Seven of these did not meet the 60-degree
tip angle, but did not tip over in AFSL's dynamic tests.
AFSL's testing was very limited--only one sample of each device on
three surfaces (concrete, 2-inch foam, and grass), and one device was
not even tested on grass. A single test is not sufficient to establish
the dynamic stability of a device. For example, a device that tips over
1 in 10 times may present a serious risk of injury, but there is only a
1-in-10 chance of observing a tip-over in a single test. In CPSC's
tests, the staff tested from 40 to 90 samples of each device. The
Commission cannot conclude based on AFSL's limited data that the seven
devices it tested are stable when operated on grass.
4. Static v. Dynamic Test
Introduction. As noted above, the Commission's requirement involves
inclining the device at an angle of 60 degrees while it is prevented
from sliding by a stop on the inclined supporting surface. If the
device does not tip over further at that angle, it complies with the
requirement. This is a static test; it is affected only by the location
of the center of gravity of the device with respect to the edge of the
device that is against the stop.
Comments: A number of commenters would prefer a dynamic test, which
would involve actually firing the device while it rests on a specified
supporting surface to see if the device tips over. The American
Pyrotechnic Association (``APA'') and AFSL stated that, although they
support a requirement for static stability, a static requirement is not
sufficient by itself to address the tip-over hazard. These two
organizations and other commenters stated that, in addition to a static
test, the proposed rule should require dynamic testing, either for all
large devices or for those with tip angles between 45 and 60 degrees.
Response: Under the FHSA, manufacturers must consider whether their
products pose a hazard during ``reasonably foreseeable handling and
use.'' The Commission considers operation of multiple-tube devices on
grass to be ``reasonably foreseeable.'' Further, the resilient and
variable nature of grass makes it more likely that a device will tip
over when fired from a grass surface than from other common supporting
surfaces, such as dirt or pavement. Thus, an adequate test should
address the hazard of tip-over of these devices when fired while
sitting on grass as well as on more forgiving surfaces.
A substantial problem with dynamic testing of these devices is that
grass is not a reproducible test surface. Even patches of grass that
appear to be identical can react differently to the forces produced
when a device is fired.
Foams of various characteristics have been suggested as suitable
test surfaces for determining whether a device will tip over when
fired. AFSL uses 2-inch thick medium-density foam in its tip-over
testing.
The staff considered whether foam is an adequate surrogate for
grass--that is, whether there is a consistent relationship between the
tip-over behaviors on grass and foam for a variety of devices. Based on
the CPSC's tests, however, there was no consistent relationship between
the tip-over rates measured on grass and foam. In fact, the tests
suggested that there may be cases where devices that do not tip over
when tested on foam may tip over frequently on grass.
The Commission concludes that, because of the absence of any
suitable test surface, the use of dynamic testing for devices,
regardless of their tip angle, is not presently feasible. However, the
results of any voluntary dynamic tests by industry may provide valuable
information when considered in conjunction with a device's tip angle.
And, as explained above, the Commission will examine whether devices
that tip over when fired despite passing the 60-degree tip-angle test
present a substantial product hazard under section 15 of the CPSA.
5. Dynamic Variations in Tip-Over Potential
Comment: One commenter noted that the potential for tip-over from
multiple-tube mine and shell devices is not equal among all of the
various shapes, sizes, and configurations of devices.
Response: The Commission agrees that the potential for dynamic tip-
over from multiple-tube fireworks devices can differ among the various
shapes, sizes, and configurations of devices with the same static tip
angle. For example, devices that have larger or heavier bases or
smaller lift (propellant) charges are less likely to tip over.
Nevertheless, for
[[Page 13091]]
the reasons explained above, the 60-degree tip-angle test is the best
means available to determine whether a multiple-tube device is
unreasonably likely to tip over when fired.
Comments on specific factors that may affect tip-over potential are
discussed below.
Comment: One commenter stated that the rate of firing of the
projectiles from the tubes can affect dynamic stability and that this
should be examined.
Response: The Commission agrees that the rate of firing--the time
between the firing of individual tubes--may affect the dynamic
stability of multiple devices. A multiple-tube device can become less
stable as a result of rapid sequential tube firings. In compliance
testing, the Commission considers whether the firing rate may
contribute to tip-over. The staff has discussed with AFSL the
possibility of incorporating into their standard a minimum time between
the firing of successive tubes. However, the rate of firing is only one
of many variables that affect the dynamic stability of multiple-tube
devices. The 60-degree tip-angle test requirement, which takes into
account several factors, is the best known way to address the tip-over
hazard.
Comment: Several commenters stated that, in addition to the static
test, the proposed rule should limit the lift charge--i.e., the
propellant powder weight--to 12 grams per tube. AFSL presented test
data showing that increasing the lift charge above the 12-gram limit
may decrease the dynamic stability of multiple-tube devices. A
specially made device (not commercially available), with 20 grams of
lift charge per tube, tipped over in one test on 2-inch foam. A similar
device with 12 grams of lift charge did not tip over in one test on
foam. Another specially-made device did not tip over in one test on
foam, even though the lift charge was increased to 20 grams.
Several commenters asked why the CPSC did not study the effects on
stability of the amount of lift charge in devices.
Response: U.S. Department of Transportation (``DOT'') regulations
permit a maximum of 20 grams of lift charge per tube. The AFSL
voluntary standard limits the lift charge to 12 grams per tube. The
proposed rule did not separately address lift charge. The DOT mandatory
20-gram upper limit and AFSL voluntary 12-gram upper limit are
unaffected by this rulemaking.
The staff measured the lift charge in all the devices that were
tested. The lift charges in the two devices that tipped over on grass
(before they were modified) were 3.6 and 4.7 grams per tube. The lift
charges in devices that did not tip over ranged from 4.7 to 11.6 grams
per tube. [6] These results do not support limiting the lift charge.
Devices with a lift charge greater than 12 grams per tube were not
available to the staff.
The lift charge is only one of the variables that affect dynamic
stability. Other variables include firing order, firing rate, weight,
the configuration of the tubes, and base dimensions. Further, the lift
force (or propellant force)--rather than the lift charge--relates more
directly to dynamic stability. The lift force depends on factors in
addition to the lift charge, such as the type of powder and the design
of the product. Again, the staff's data show that the dynamic
performance of the device is better predicted by a static test.
It may be possible to construct a device that will tip over in
actual use, even though it passes the 60-degree static stability test.
AFSL's tests suggest this may be the case. But, the small number of
tests conducted by AFSL (two devices, one test each) and the mixed
results it reported (one device with 20 grams of lift powder tipped
over on foam while another did not) are not adequate to support a
mandatory 12-gram limit on the lift charge.
Manufacturers, importers, and distributors must see that their
products do not pose a substantial product hazard. Increasing the lift
charge might increase the tendency of multiple-tube devices to tip over
during operation. Devices developed in the future that exceed 12 grams
of lift charge will be tested by the Commission. Any device that tips
over while functioning, even though it complies with the static test,
may present a substantial product hazard. As explained above, the
Commission may take enforcement action in such a case under section 15
of the CPSA. Thus, although the Commission lacks data to warrant a
mandatory limit at this time, the Commission encourages manufacturers
and importers to continue compliance with the voluntary limit of 12
grams of lift charge per tube since the amount of lift charge may
affect tip-over.
6. Other Advantages of a Static Test
Comment: The AFSL and the APA stated that they favor a static test,
as in the proposed standard, because it is safer to perform than
dynamic testing. One commenter stated that it appears that the
Commission proposed a standard based on a static test, in part, because
it is easier to perform than dynamic testing.
Response: The Commission proposed a mandatory standard based on the
static test because it adequately addresses the hazard and a suitable
dynamic test is not available. That the static test is easier and safer
to perform are additional advantages.
7. Other Alternatives to the Proposed Rule
a. Additional Labeling
Comment: One commenter suggested requiring the warning label on
multiple-tube devices to include a phrase such as, ``PLACE UPRIGHT ON
HARD, SMOOTH LEVEL SURFACE BEFORE IGNITING. DO NOT FIRE ON GRASS OR
OTHER UNSTABLE SURFACE.''
Response: The Commission's current labeling requirement for mine
and shell devices includes the following statement: ``Place on hard
smooth surface (or place upright on level ground, if more
descriptive).'' 16 CFR 1500.14(a)(7)(ix). Except for the admonition not
to fire on grass, the commenter's suggested label is equivalent to the
Commission's current requirement. As to the statement ``do not fire on
grass,'' it is likely that users will place these devices on whatever
surface is at the desired location, including grass. Thus, the
Commission cannot conclude that there would be significant safety
benefits from a label advising against use on grass. Furthermore, the
longer label statement suggested by this commenter could reduce the
extent to which the basic message is noticed and read by users.
Although the Commission lacks the evidence to mandate the ``do not fire
on grass'' statement, and questions its effectiveness, the Commission
would not object if manufacturers voluntarily supply such a statement
after the required label.
In addressing a product hazard, the most effective approach is to
design the hazard out of the product. A warning does not remove the
hazard; it only informs the consumer of the hazard. Some users may read
and follow the information on a warning label. However, fireworks are
frequently used at night when it is too dark for the user to read a
warning label. Fireworks also are often used at a party or celebration
in which users are unlikely to take the time to read and follow warning
labels. And, spectators, like the two victims killed by multiple-tube
devices that tipped over, probably will not have an opportunity to read
the label.
Even if consumers read and follow a warning label, the device may
tip over. In the two death incidents, the fireworks devices were placed
on hard, smooth surfaces and they still tipped over. The Commission
believes that the proposed
[[Page 13092]]
tip-over performance requirement for multiple-tube devices will result
in less hazardous multiple-tube devices.
b. Defer to AFSL's Voluntary Standard
i. Adequacy of the Voluntary Standard
Comments: Several commenters supported AFSL's voluntary standard.
One group of commenters stated that they would prefer that the
Commission allow the industry to adopt a voluntary standard, rather
than issue a mandatory standard. Specifically, one commenter referred
to AFSL's standard--i.e., the 2-inch foam test--and asserted that foam
is a standard, reproducible test surface, even though it is not an
adequate surrogate for grass. Another commenter questioned CPSC's
conclusion that the AFSL standard did not adequately address the tip-
over hazard. AFSL commented that the foam test is intended to simulate
a worst-case scenario and that, even though the foam test may not be
suitable for a mandatory standard, it adequately addresses the tip-over
hazard.
Response: AFSL's foam test has many substantial shortcomings. AFSL
does not specify the properties of the foam--such as compressibility,
resiliency, and density--that are essential for a reproducible
test.5 Neither does AFSL specify the environmental conditions,
such as temperature and wind speed, that may affect the test results,
or the number of devices to be tested. All of these parameters must be
specified before the foam test could be considered a standard,
reproducible test. And, perhaps most significantly, there is simply no
evidence of a consistent relationship between tip-over rates on grass
and foam. Thus, a test on foam would not be appropriate even if all the
test parameters were specified.
\5\ Although AFSL specifies medium-density foam, the definition
of ``medium'' may differ among foam suppliers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFSL has never released test results showing that 2-inch foam is a
worst-case surface compared to grass. CPSC has only limited data from
tests of devices on both 2-inch foam and grass. The Commission's
initial tests showed that the 3 different densities of 2-inch foam
tested had considerably higher tip-over rates than did grass.
The more extensive tests that the Commission performed on other
thickness of foam show that, depending on the device tested, the tip-
over rate on foam may be greater than, equal to, or less than that on
grass. Furthermore, the Commission's compliance testing in 1995 showed
a domestic device that tipped over on grass (1 of 5 tested), but not on
2-inch medium-density foam. Therefore, the Commission concludes that
the currently available information does not support the conclusion
that 2-inch foam (or foam in other thicknesses) is a worst-case test
surface that is consistently more stringent than grass.
As regards tip angle, the AFSL standard requires a tip angle of
only 18 degrees, whereas CPSC tests show that a tip angle of 60 degrees
is needed to reasonably prevent tip-over. The Commission concludes that
the AFSL standard's tip-angle provision does not adequately address the
tip-over hazard with large multiple-tube fireworks devices.
ii. Likelihood of Compliance With the Voluntary Standard
Comment: AFSL commented that a domestic testing program to allow
manufacturers to obtain certification for their products has not been
established and that the decision to follow the voluntary standard
rests solely with individual manufacturers. However, AFSL states that
its recent testing of large multiple-tube mine and shell devices
indicated that products received from known manufacturers ``appeared to
comply with the stability provisions of the AFSL standard.'' According
to AFSL, under its China-based testing and certification program, all
large multiple-tube mine and shell devices (with tubes larger than 1''
inside diameter) from participating firms are tested for compliance
with the voluntary standard. Any devices that fail to comply are
``withheld from shipment to the participating U.S. importer.''
Response: Even if using 2-inch thick medium-density foam were
effective, the Commission concludes that AFSL's voluntary standard
would not adequately reduce the risk of tip-over because it is unlikely
that there will be substantial industry compliance with that standard.
The AFSL standard was adopted in January 1993. However, the results
of CPSC's compliance testing indicate that these devices still tip
over. In fiscal year 1994, all 24 imported devices tested by CPSC, and
1 of 8 domestic devices, tipped over on either grass or 2-inch thick
medium density foam. Of the 32 devices tested on the foam, 25 tipped
over, and 4 of these also tipped over when tested on grass. In fiscal
year 1995, 22 of 27 imported devices and 1 of 5 domestic devices tipped
over. Of the 32 devices tested that year on 2-inch medium-density foam,
21 tipped over, and 10 tipped over when tested on grass. If there were
substantial compliance with the AFSL standard, these high rates of tip-
over on foam would not likely occur.
There is no information to support a conclusion that the rates of
compliance with the AFSL standard will improve. The Commission
concludes, therefore, that there will not likely be substantial
compliance with the AFSL standard.
c. A Ban of Large Devices
The Commission also considered whether large multiple-tube devices
should be banned entirely.
Comment: The National Fire Protection Association (``NFPA'')
generally has taken the position that fireworks should be used only by
licensed professionals. However, in this case, NFPA agreed with the
Commission's conclusion that limiting multiple-tube devices to
professionals would not eliminate the tip-over hazard. Some commenters
stated that the performance standard is preferable to a total ban of
large devices.
Response: The Commission agrees that a performance standard is the
most appropriate option in this case.
8. Effective Date
Comment: One commenter stated that manufacturers need 1 year to
redesign devices, use up current inventory, order new packaging, and
obtain Department of Transportation (``DOT'') approval for that
packaging.
Response: The Commission proposed an effective date of 6 months
after publication of a final rule. The rule will apply only to devices
first introduced into commerce or imported on or after that date. The
vast majority of fireworks are ordered by dealers from July to December
and delivered from December to June. The Commission expects that most
of the devices currently not complying with the standard can be
modified to meet it--e.g., by adding a base. Consequently, any devices
still in manufacturers' or importers' inventories on the effective date
would not be rendered useless.
According to the DOT official responsible for enforcing regulations
on new packaging, it may take 6 to 12 months for firms to obtain DOT
approval of changes to the devices, order new packaging, and obtain DOT
approval for that packaging. Larger firms are likely to be the ones
that will need the full 12-month period, due to the larger number of
models that could be affected.
Therefore, a number of firms will need an effective date that is
longer than the proposed date of 6 months, and up to 12 months,
following publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.
Accordingly, the Commission is extending the effective date to 12
months following publication. The final
[[Page 13093]]
rule will thus become effective March 26, 1997.
As noted previously, fireworks deliveries are concentrated in the
period December through June. The effective date falls within that
period. Therefore, it is likely that some but not all large multiple-
tube devices sold at retail for the 1997 summer season will comply with
the tip-angle requirement.
9. The Costs of the Regulation
a. Portion of Existing Large Devices To Be Changed by the Rule
Comment: AFSL presented test data with large multiple-tube mine and
shell devices from what it claims are all five domestic
manufacturers.6 Based on these tests, AFSL claimed that only 35
percent of domestic devices complied with the proposed rule (60-degree
tilt test), although all were stable in dynamic testing. The
Commission's preliminary regulatory analysis assumed that almost all
domestic devices would comply with the proposed rule.
\6\ Although AFSL stated that all the devices tested were
``domestically manufactured,'' some contained imported inserts. CPSC
classifies these devices as imports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response: AFSL's results contrast with CPSC staff's tests, in which
all domestic large multiple-tube devices met the proposed 60-degree
tip-angle test. Several aspects of AFSL's testing lead the Commission
to question AFSL's conclusions about the anticipated level of
compliance with the 60-degree tip-angle test.
AFSL presented test results for 13 models of multiple-tube mine and
shell devices. Device number 7 had an inside tube diameter of only 1.25
inches, and is not subject to the rule (which applies only to devices
with tube inner diameters measuring 1.5 inches or more). The devices
numbered 1, 2, 3, 12, and 13 are essentially imported devices or
``inserts'' to which wooden bases have been added. Based on AFSL's test
data, 5 of 7 (71 percent) large domestic multiple-tube devices will
satisfy the rule. The only two domestic devices tested by AFSL that
would fail to comply with the rule are devices 8 and 11, since their
tip angles were about 57 degrees. Both are new devices that were not
available at the time that the CPSC tests were conducted. Combining
AFSL's test data with CPSC's, 11 of 13 (85 percent) of large domestic
multiple-tube devices would comply with the rule.\7\ Therefore, the
Commission disagrees with AFSL's claim that only 35 percent of domestic
devices will comply with the proposed rule.
\7\ It appears that one device was tested by both AFSL and
CPSC. In combining the data, this device was counted only once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Cost of Modifying Noncomplying Devices
Comment: One commenter argued that retail prices of the modified
devices would increase by 35 to 45 percent. The commenter did not
present any basis for this estimate.
Response: The Commission's cost estimates are based on an average
per-unit increase of 25-30 percent. These estimates were provided by
the National Fireworks Association (NFA). The NFA is the fireworks
trade association with the largest number of members, and the only one
with a large contingent of retailers. The NFA estimate is the best one
available to the Commission's staff.
10. Environmental Impact
Comment: One commenter stated that there would be a significant
environmental impact due to increased rubbish from the larger bases.
Response: The rule is expected to result in modifications to
devices representing sales of 100,000-to-175,000 items per year. [21]
Consequently, the rule will result in a similar number of larger or new
bases, and added packaging, being discarded. Most of these devices are
expected to be thrown away after use with other residential trash (as
is currently being done). The added costs of disposing of the bases and
packaging will be negligible. The environmental impact of disposing of
the relatively small amount of additional material required to provide
a base, or increase its size, will be negligible. The additional cost
to landfills of handling the extra rubbish also will be negligible.
H. The Standard
The Commission is issuing a standard requiring that multiple-tube
devices that have any tube measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in
inner diameter must have a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees.
Large multiple-tube devices that do not meet the tip-angle requirement
will be banned. The tip angle may be measured by placing the device on
a smooth, flat surface inclined at 60 degrees from the horizontal. The
device must not tip over at the 60-degree angle when tested at any edge
of the device.
An apparatus or ``testing block'' for testing multiple-tube devices
is illustrated in Figure 1 to Sec. 1507.12. The height and width of the
inclined plane (not including the portion of the plane below the
mechanical stop) must be at least 1 inch (2.54 cm) greater than the
largest dimension of the base of the device to be tested. The test
apparatus must be placed on a smooth, hard surface that is horizontal,
as determined by a spirit level or equivalent instrument. The
mechanical stop must be \1/16\ inch (1.6 mm) in height and
perpendicular to the inclined plane. The stop must be positioned
parallel to the bottom edge of the inclined plane in such a way that no
portion of the device to be tested or its base touches the horizontal
surface.
Any device that cannot be tested using the apparatus described
above, or that presents a tip-over hazard while functioning even though
it complies with the static test, may be examined to determine whether
it presents a ``substantial product hazard'' under section 15 of the
CPSA. 15 U.S.C. 2064. If the Commission determines that a substantial
product hazard exists, appropriate enforcement action may be taken. See
15 U.S.C. 2064.
J. Regulatory Analysis [22]
1. Introduction
The Commission is amending the FHSA fireworks regulations to
establish new stability requirements for multiple-tube fireworks
devices that have any tube with an inside tube diameter of 1.5 inches
or greater. These devices present a tip-over hazard when firing that
has resulted in an average of about one death every 3 years over the
period for which data are available.
The amendment will reduce the risk of injury and death from tip-
overs. Devices that do not remain stable at an angle 60 degrees or
below in prescribed tests will be banned hazardous substances under the
amendment. It is expected that devices that do not currently pass this
test will be able to comply by adding or enlarging a base.
In the Federal Register of July 1, 1994, the Commission issued an
ANPR to develop a mandatory requirement to address the tip-over hazard.
Although the ANPR addressed both large and small multiple-tube
fireworks devices, the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) published
July 5, 1995, covered only large multiple-tube devices.
To issue this amendment under the FHSA, the Commission is required
to publish preliminary and final regulatory analyses containing a
discussion of various factors. These factors include a description of
the potential benefits and potential costs of the rule, including any
benefits and costs that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and an
identification of those most likely to receive the benefits or bear the
costs. The FHSA also requires a description of any reasonable
alternatives to the rule,
[[Page 13094]]
together with a summary description of their costs and benefits, and a
brief explanation of why such alternatives were not chosen.
2. Background
Large multiple-tube devices became popular in the mid-1980's. These
devices typically consist of three or more tubes fused in a series to
fire sequentially; these tubes are grouped together, sometimes on top
of a wooden base. The devices are designed to fire aerial shells,
comets, or mines producing visual and audible effects from non-
reloadable tubes. They are among the largest fireworks available for
direct consumer use.
The National Fireworks Association (NFA) reports that retail sales
of these devices are between $24 million and $36 million annually, with
an estimated 400,000 to 700,000 units sold per year. Prices range from
$30 to $130 per unit, with most devices priced in the $50-$60 range.
The NFA reports that domestic devices account for about 75 percent of
the market by dollar value, and somewhat less by unit sales. There may
be hundreds of firms engaged in manufacturing, importing, and
distributing these fireworks. Imported devices are primarily
manufactured in China, and may go through several wholesalers before
reaching the retail vendor.
To comply with the standard, devices that do not have a base would
have to add one, and some currently used bases would have to be
enlarged. However, consumers are not likely to perceive any significant
loss of enjoyment as a result. While some devices may be discontinued,
loss of consumer choice would be minimized by the availability of
devices that do comply with the standard. Smaller (less than 1.5 inch
ID) multiple-tube devices are not covered by the rule and would
continue to be available without any change.
3. Regulatory Analysis of the Amendments
a. Potential Benefits. One of the potential risks of injury
associated with large multiple-tube fireworks devices results from the
tip-over hazard. The Commission's Directorate for Epidemiology and
Health Sciences reports two deaths associated with the tip-over hazard
from January 1, 1988, through December 1993. This averages to about 1
death every 3 years. The Commission has received no reports of injuries
with the product.
The Commission is issuing a performance standard that will require
these devices to have a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees.
According to the Commission's tests, devices that do not tip over at
this angle are not likely to tip while functioning. Thus, the
Commission believes that devices meeting this requirement are not
likely to fall over while firing, thereby minimizing this risk of death
and injury to operators or spectators. The avoidance of these deaths
and injuries represents the potential societal benefits of the proposed
amendments.
The costs per life saved of this rule are estimated to be between
$4.5 and $8 million. These costs are within the range of statistical
values of life suggested in the recent professional literature. [22]
Given that no significant substitution of more hazardous products is
expected, no offsetting reduction in these safety benefits is
anticipated. To the extent that nonfatal injuries are avoided, the
potential benefits would be somewhat higher.
b. Potential Costs. Most devices that already have bases will not
have to be modified to meet the amendments. The devices that are not
expected to need to be modified are generally manufactured domestically
and, according to the NFA, account for at least 75 percent of the
retail dollar volume of the market. It is expected that most of the
remaining devices (mainly imports) will be modified to meet the
amendments, with a resulting increase in cost of between 25 to 30
percent per modified unit.8
\8\ Trade and industry sources report that modifying the
devices would add about 25 to 30 percent to production costs
(although one commenter on the NPR stated that the per-unit cost
increase would be 35 to 45 percent). Various sales catalogs also
indicate that comparable devices without bases are significantly
less expensive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its comments responding to the NPR, AFSL reported that for the
43 units it examined, 65 percent did not meet the 60-degree tip-angle
test. The Commission is not using AFSL's estimate of 35 percent
compliance with the tip-angle test, since the Commission's staff raised
several questions about the accuracy of AFSL's estimate. Thus, the
Commission continues to use the industry-wide data provided by NFA to
estimate the portion of devices that would require modification (25
percent).
Assuming costs are passed on to consumers (as expected), the total
annual cost to consumers of modifying the affected devices would be
between $1.5 million and $2.7 million. While certain devices may be
discontinued, the loss of consumer choice would be minimized by the
availability of close substitutes--i.e., other large multiple-tube
devices that comply with the amendments. Additionally, since most
suppliers of currently noncomplying devices are expected to maintain
current sales levels and pass on costs to consumers, no significant
adverse impact is expected in the suppliers' competitive positions.
If the changes eliminate all deaths associated with these devices,
the cost per life saved would be between about $4.5 and $8 million.
This is within the range of statistical values of life suggested in the
recent professional literature. [22]
4. Alternatives to the Rule
The Commission considered several alternatives to the performance
standard issued below, including a product ban, deferral to the
voluntary standard, and additional labeling.
a. Product Ban. The expected benefits to society of banning all
large multiple-tube devices would be one life saved every 3 years, the
same as the potential benefits of the amendments. However, costs to
society of a ban (as opposed to the performance standard) in terms of
lost utility would be greater, because under a ban consumers would not
be able to use large multiple-tube devices.
Large multiple-tube devices are unique with respect to the height
and duration of their displays. There are no close substitutes for the
product. Single-tube devices are available, but they do not provide the
rapid sequential display of multiple-tube devices. The lost utility to
consumers of not being able to use large multiple-tube devices cannot
be measured precisely. However, the fact that consumers are willing to
spend $24-$36 million annually to buy these devices suggests that the
lost utility could be substantial.
The Commission believes that a ban of all large multiple-tube
devices is not necessary, because a performance standard will likely
achieve similar benefits with lower costs.
b. Defer to the Voluntary Standard. Another alternative is for the
Commission to take no mandatory action, and to depend on a voluntary
standard.
The AFSL revised its standard for mines and shells on an interim
basis on January 29, 1993, and adopted it on September 5, 1995. In
order to address the potential tip-over hazard associated with
multiple-tube fireworks devices, AFSL's Voluntary Standard for Mines
and Shells--Single or Multiple Shot requires that large multiple-tube
devices not tip over (except as the result of the last shot) when fired
on a 2-inch thick medium-density foam pad. [14] However, the Commission
has concerns about the adequacy of the provisions of, and the level of
conformance to, the AFSL standard.
[[Page 13095]]
The Commission also does not believe that AFSL's existing voluntary
standard adequately reduces the risk of injury due to large devices
tipping over while functioning. The Commission's tests using
polyurethane foam did not find sufficient agreement between tip-over
performance on foam and on grass. The Commission has no data that would
support AFSL's dynamic test. As explained in section G above, the test
results AFSL submitted in response to the NPR were limited and the
Commission does not believe they show that this dynamic test is
reliable.
In addition, even if the AFSL standard were effective, the
Commission concludes that compliance with the standard would not be
adequate. The majority of large multiple-tube devices are domestic. In
the NPR, the Commission stated that according to AFSL, not a single
domestically manufactured device has been certified as complying with
the AFSL standard. In comments responding to the NPR, AFSL stated that
their standards are voluntary ``and the decision to comply with the
standards rests solely with individual manufacturers.'' However, the
Commission must have assurance of an adequate level of compliance with
a voluntary standard in order to depend on that standard to reduce a
risk. AFSL's limited testing conducted in response to the NPR does not
substitute for an ongoing and comprehensive testing program.
AFSL reports that some shipments of imported large multiple-tube
devices have been tested and certified in China this year and that,
since January 1994, 30 percent of the lots it tested were rejected for
failure to comply with the AFSL standard. However, the results of
CPSC's compliance testing indicate that multiple-tube devices still tip
over while functioning in dynamic tests on grass. In fiscal year 1994,
all 24 imported devices the Commission tested, and 1 of 8 domestic
devices, tipped over while functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27
imported devices and 1 of 5 domestic devices tipped over. [19]
c. Additional Labeling
The current product has extensive labeling. The text of the labels
required by the Commission is quoted in section D above. One
alternative available to the Commission is to add further warning or
instructional labeling to large multiple-tube devices or to modify the
existing warning. Although this may have less impact on manufacturers
and importers than a performance standard, the Commission believes that
any additional or altered labeling is unlikely to be effective in
reducing the risk of injury.
Fireworks are frequently used at night, reducing the likelihood
that warning labels will be read. The fact that fireworks are commonly
used at parties or celebrations further reduces the likelihood that the
user will read and follow a warning label. Moreover, tip-over may occur
even if the user reads and follows the warning label. In both incidents
involving large multiple-tube devices, the victims were spectators who
were approximately 40 feet (12 meters) away from the device, which they
probably believed was a safe distance. The devices were placed on
smooth, hard surfaces, although one was angled to shoot over a lake. In
light of these facts, it is unlikely that a warning label would have
prevented these deaths. [1, Tab E]
K. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 601-612,
agencies generally are required to prepare proposed and final
regulatory flexibility analyses describing the impact of the rule on
small businesses and other small entities. However, these analyses are
not required if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not
have a significant effect on a substantial number of small entities. As
described below, the Commission has analyzed the potential effect of
the amendment on industry.
The Commission has determined that the proposed standard will not
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses.
The devices subject to the standard constitute less than 1 percent of
the overall fireworks market. The foreign firms that make the types of
devices subject to this rule that are likely to require modification in
order to comply also make other types of fireworks. Only a small
portion of the total production of these firms involves the large
multiple-tube devices subject to the rule. Thus, the Commission
certifies that no significant adverse impact on a substantial number of
small firms, or other entities, will result from the amendment issued
below.
L. Environmental Considerations
The Commission's regulations governing environmental review
procedures state that the amendment of rules or safety standards
establishing design or performance requirements for products normally
have little or no potential for affecting the human environment. 16 CFR
1021.6(c)(1). The Commission does not foresee that this amendment to
the existing fireworks regulations will involve any special or unusual
circumstances that would alter this conclusion. The Commission
determines, therefore, that no significant environmental effects will
result from the standard. Accordingly, no environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement is required in this proceeding.
M. Effective Date
The rule will take effect in 1 year and will apply to multiple-tube
fireworks devices with any tube measuring 1.5 inches or more in inner
diameter that first enter commerce or are imported on or after the
effective date. However, provisions may be stayed by the filing of
proper objections. Notice of the filing of any objections or lack
thereof will be given by publication in the Federal Register.
List of Subjects in 16 CFR Part 1500
Consumer protection, Hazardous materials, Hazardous substances,
Imports, Infants and children, Labeling, Law enforcement, and Toys.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, the Commission finds that cautionary
labeling required by the FHSA is not adequate for multiple-tube devices
having any tube 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or larger in inner diameter and
having a minimum tip angle larger than 60 degrees. Further, in order to
protect the public health and safety and due to the degree and nature
of the tip-over hazard presented by these devices, it is necessary to
keep them out of commerce if they fail to meet this standard. Thus, the
Commission amends Parts 1500 and 1507 Title 16 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 1500--[AMENDED]
1. The authority for Part 1500 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278
.2. Section 1500.17 is amended by adding a new paragraph (a)(12) to
read as follows:
Sec. 1500.17 Banned hazardous substances.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(12) (i) Large multiple-tube devices. Multiple-tube mine and shell
fireworks devices that first enter commerce or are imported on or after
[insert date that is 1 year after publication], that have any tube
measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in inner diameter, and that have
a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees when tested in accordance
with the procedure of Sec. 1507.12 of this part.
[[Page 13096]]
(ii) Findings. (A) General. In order to issue a rule under the
section 2(q)(1) of the FHSA, 15 U.S.C. 1261(q)(1), classifying a
substance or article as a banned hazardous substance, the FHSA requires
the Commission to make certain findings and to include these in the
regulation. These findings are discussed in paragraphs (a)(12)(ii)(B)
through (D) of this section.
(B) Voluntary standard. (1) One alternative to the tip-angle
requirement that the Commission considered is to take no mandatory
action, and to depend on a voluntary standard. The American Fireworks
Safety Laboratory (AFSL) has a standard for mines and shells intended
to address the potential tip-over hazard associated with multiple-tube
fireworks devices. AFSL's Voluntary Standard for Mines and Shells--
Single or Multiple Shot requires that large multiple-tube devices not
tip over (except as the result of the last shot) when shot on a 2-inch
thick medium-density foam pad. The Commission cannot conclude that
AFSL's existing voluntary standard adequately reduces the risk of
injury from large devices that tip over while functioning. The
Commission's tests using polyurethane foam did not find sufficient
agreement between performance on foam and on grass. No other data are
available to show that this dynamic test is reliable.
(2) In addition, even if the AFSL standard is effective, the
Commission does not believe that compliance with the standard will be
adequate. AFSL reports that it has been testing in accordance with its
standard since January 1994. However, the results of CPSC's compliance
testing indicate that multiple-tube devices still tip over while
functioning. In fiscal year 1994, all 24 imported devices the
Commission tested, and 1 of 8 domestic devices, tipped over while
functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27 imported devices and 1 of 5
domestic devices tipped over during Commission testing. The Commission
finds that there is unlikely to be substantial compliance with the
voluntary standard applicable to multiple-tube devices.
(C) Relationship of benefits to costs. The Commission estimates
that the 60-degree tip-angle standard will eliminate the unreasonable
tip-over risk posed by these devices. This will provide benefits of
saving one life about every 3 years, and preventing an unknown number
of nonfatal injuries. The annual cost of modifying affected devices is
estimated to be between $1.5 million and $2.7 million. The Commission
finds that the benefits from the regulation bear a reasonable
relationship to its costs.
(D) Least burdensome requirement. The Commission considered the
following alternatives: a ban of all multiple-tube devices with inner
tube diameters 1.5 inches or greater; a dynamic performance standard;
additional labeling requirements; and relying on the voluntary
standard. Although a ban of all large multiple-tube devices would
address the risk of injury, it would be more burdensome than the tip-
angle standard. The Commission was unable to develop a satisfactory
dynamic standard that would reduce the risk of injury. Neither
additional labeling requirements nor reliance on the voluntary standard
would adequately reduce the risk of injury. Thus, the Commission finds
that a standard requiring large multiple-tube devices to have a minimum
tip angle greater than 60 degrees is the least burdensome requirement
that would prevent or adequately reduce the risk of injury.
PART 1507--[AMENDED]
1. The authority for Part 1507 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 2(q)(1)(B), (2), 74 Stat. 374 as amended 80
Stat. 1304-1305; (15 U.S.C. 1261); sec. 701(e), 52 Stat. 1055 as
amended; 21 U.S.C. 371(e)); sec. 30(a), 86 Stat. 1231; 15 U.S.C.
2079(a)).
2. Part 1507 is amended by adding a new Sec. 1507.12 to read as
follows:
Sec. 1507.12 Multiple-tube Fireworks Devices.
(a) Application. Multiple-tube mine and shell fireworks devices
with any tube measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in inside diameter
and subject to Sec. 1500.17(a)(12) of this part shall not tip over when
subjected to the tip-angle test described in this section.
(b) Testing procedure. The device shall be placed on a smooth
surface that can be inclined at 60 degrees from the horizontal, as
shown in Figure 1 of this section. The height and width of the inclined
plane (not including the portion of the plane below the mechanical
stop) shall be at least 1 inch (2.54 cm) greater than the largest
dimension of the base of the device to be tested. The test shall be
conducted on a smooth, hard surface that is horizontal as measured by a
spirit level or equivalent instrument. The mechanical stop on the
inclined plane shall be 1/16 inches (1.6 mm) in height and
perpendicular to the inclined plane. The stop shall be positioned
parallel to the bottom edge of the inclined plane and so that no
portion of the device to be tested or its base touches the horizontal
surface. The device shall not tip over when the plane is inclined at
60-degrees from the horizontal. The procedure shall be repeated for
each edge of the device. Figure 1 to Sec. 1507.12
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
[[Page 13097]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR26MR96.011
BILLING CODE 6355-01-C
Dated: March, 18, 1996.
Sadye E. Dunn,
Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Reference Documents. (The following list of documents will not
be printed in the Code of Federal Regulations.)
The following documents contain information relevant to this
rulemaking proceeding and are available for inspection at the Office
of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Room 502, 4330
East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland 20814:
1. Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices: Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and Information,
59 Fed. Reg. 33928 (July 1, 1994).
2. Briefing Package: Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks
Devices, Consumer Product Safety Commission, May 31, 1994.
3. Briefing Memorandum on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks
Devices, from Ronald L. Medford, EXHR and Michael Babich, EHHE, to
the Commission, June 8, 1995.
4. Memorandum from Michael Babich, Project Manager, HSHE,
``Responses to Public Comments on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell
Devices,'' May 22, 1995.
5. Memorandum from Leonard Schachter, EPHA, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Annual Estimated Injuries Associated with Multiple-tube Mine
and Shell Fireworks Devices,'' June 1, 1995.
6. Memorandum from James Carleton and Jay Sonenthal, LSHS, to
Michael Babich, HSHE, ``Results for Dynamic Stability Testing of
Large Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' May 18, 1995.
7. Memorandum from Thomas Caton, ESME, to Michael Babich, HSHE,
``Fireworks Testing: Test Surface Roughness,'' May 22, 1995.
8. Report from Terry Kissinger, EPHA, to Michael Babich, HSHE,
``A Comparison of the Tip-over Performances of Multiple-tube Mine
and Shell Devices on Grass and Foam,'' January 1995.
9. Memorandum from George F. Sushinsky, LSEL, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Dimensional and Stability Measurements of Fireworks,'' March
10, 1995.
10. Memorandum from George F. Sushinsky, LSEL, to Michael
Babich, HSHE, ``Tip Angle Measurements of a Device with a Plastic
Base,'' April 13, 1995.
11. Memorandum from Jay Sonenthal, LSHL, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Test of a Device with a Plastic Base,'' May 22, 1995.
12. Memorandum from Sam Hall, CERM, to Michael Babich, HSHE,
``Acceptable Tipover Rate for Multiple-tube Devices,'' November 21,
1994.
13. Memorandum from Anthony Homan, ECPA, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices--Regulatory
Analysis,'' May 18, 1995.
14. Memorandum from Sam Hall, CERM, to Michael Babich, HSHE,
``AFSL's Interim Voluntary Standard for Large Multiple-tube Mine and
Shell Devices and Staff's Proposed Mandatory Static Performance
Standard, May 25, 1995.
15. Product and Performance Standard for Mines and Shells--
Single or Multiple Shot,'' Version 1.1, American Fireworks Standards
Laboratory, Bethesda, Maryland, January 28, 1993.
16. Memorandum from Neal Gasser, LSHL, to Michael Babich, HSHE,
``Additional Tests of Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' June
8, 1995.
17. Briefing Memorandum on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell
Fireworks Devices--Final Rule, from Michael Babich, EHHE, and Ronald
L. Medford, HIR, to the Commission, January 23, 1996.
18. Memorandum from Michael A. Babich, EHHE, ``Responses to
Comments on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' January 16,
1996.
19. Memorandum from Samuel B. Hall, CRM, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Compliance Tests of Large Multiple-tube Mine and Shell
Devices under FY 1994 and FY 1995 Fireworks Enforcement Programs,''
December 8, 1995.
20. Memorandum from Leonard Schacter, EHHA, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Annual Estimated Injuries Associated with Multiple-tube Mine
and Shell Fireworks Devices,'' November 1, 1995.
21. Memorandum from Anthony Homan, ECPA, to Michael Babich,
HSHE, ``Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices--Final
Regulatory Analysis,'' January 16, 1996.
22. Viscusi, W.K., ``The Value of Risks to Life and Health,''
Journal of Economic Literature, December 1993.
23. Kissinger, T.L., Fireworks Injuries--results of a 1992 NEISS
study. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC
20207. September 1993.
[FR Doc. 96-6857 Filed 3-25-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
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