Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K

Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice of Record of Decision (ROD).

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SUMMARY: DOE has prepared and issued a final environmental impact

statement (FEIS) on the ``Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the K

Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington'' (DOE/EIS-0245F,

January 1996). A notice of availability of the FEIS was published in

the Federal Register on February 2, 1996 (61 FR 3932). The FEIS

evaluates the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for

managing the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) located in the K-East (KE) and K-

West (KW) SNF storage basins at the Hanford Site located in

southeastern Washington State.

Based on the analysis in the FEIS and after careful evaluation of

environmental impacts, costs, compliance requirements, engineering

considerations, worker and public health and safety, and public, agency

and tribal comments, DOE has decided to implement the preferred

alternative evaluated in the FEIS with two modifications and is

documenting that decision in this ROD. The preferred alternative

consists of removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying,

conditioning and sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry

vault storage in a new facility, to be built at Hanford, for up to 40

years pending decisions on ultimate disposition. The K Basins will

continue to be operated during the period over which the preferred

alternative is implemented. The preferred alternative also includes

transfer of the basin sludge to Hanford's double-shell tanks for

management, disposal of non-SNF basin debris in a low-level burial

ground at the Hanford Site, disposition of the basin water, and

deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning. The two

modifications in the ROD are with respect to management of the sludge,

and the timing of placement of the SNF into the transportation casks.

The modification for management of the sludge is that should it not be

possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will

either continue to be managed as SNF, or disposed of as solid waste.

The modification regarding placement of the SNF into the transportation

casks would reduce the radiation exposure to the workers by placing the

multicanister overpacks (MCOs) inside the transportation casks before

the SNF is loaded into the MCOs, instead of loading the SNF into the

MCOs prior to placing them inside the transportation casks.

ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Requests for copies of the FEIS and

for further information on the FEIS or ROD should be directed to: Dr.

Phillip G. Loscoe, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, M/S S7-41,

Richland, Washington 99352-0550. Dr. Loscoe may be contacted by

telephone at (509) 376-7434 or at (800) 321-2008.

[[Page 10737]]

For further information on the DOE NEPA process please contact: Ms.

Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-

42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW.,

Washington, D.C. 20585-0002. Ms. Borgstrom may be reached by telephone

at (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

This ROD was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts

1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).

The ROD is based on the analysis of environmental impacts identified in

the FEIS, consideration of project costs, compliance requirements,

engineering considerations, worker and public health and safety, and

public, agency and tribal comments.

This ROD covers the management of approximately 2,100 metric tons

(2,300 tons) of U.S. Government-owned SNF stored in the KE and KW

storage basins at DOE's Hanford Site (about 80% of DOE's total

inventory). Most of the SNF is from the N Reactor at Hanford, which

operated from December 1963 until January 1987 producing materials for

the U.S. national defense program and also producing steam that was

used for generation of electricity. This SNF consists primarily of

metallic uranium, but also contains about five metric tons (six tons)

of plutonium and about one metric ton (1.1 ton) of radioactive fission

products within the uranium fuel elements.

The KE and KW storage basins are concrete basins constructed in

1951 to temporarily store SNF from the adjacent KE and KW Reactors

(nominally 0.5 to 1.5 years prior to reprocessing). The basins are

located in the 100-K Area at the Hanford Site about 420 m (1,400 ft)

from the Columbia River. The volume of each basin is about 4,900

m3 (1.3 M gallons) and each basin is filled to about 93% of

capacity with water. The water level in each basin is maintained at a

depth of about 5 m (16 ft) to absorb heat from the radioactive decay of

the fuel rods and to provide a radiation shield for protection of

facility workers. SNF from the N Reactor has been stored in the KE

Basin since 1975 and the KW Basin since 1981.

Prior to receiving N Reactor SNF the KW Basin was drained, cleaned

and refurbished. The bare concrete surfaces were given an epoxy coating

which helps keep radioactive elements such as cesium-137 from being

absorbed into the concrete. The KW Basin has remained relatively clean

because of this refurbishment and also because only sealed canisters of

SNF have been stored there. The KE Basin did not receive refurbishment

prior to receiving N Reactor SNF. In addition, the SNF in the KE Basin

is in open canisters which allows water to come in contact with the

fuel elements inside the canisters.

The principal environmental and safety concerns are associated with

the KE Basin and arise from the presence of broken and corroding SNF,

buildup of radioactive sludge on the bottom of the basin, deteriorating

concrete with vulnerability to earthquake damage, leakage of

contaminated water to the soil below the basin, and the presence of

cesium-137 contamination of the concrete at the water line which,

unshielded, can contribute to worker exposure to radiation. Conditions

in KW Basin are not as serious because the SNF stored there is in

sealed canisters.

In a November 1993 report entitled ``Spent Fuel Working Group

Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel

and other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Environmental,

Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities,'' DOE identified K Basins storage

problems as requiring priority attention. Similarly, the Defense

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in its recommendation 94-1 to the

Secretary of Energy dated May 26, 1994, recommended ``That the [DOE's]

program be accelerated to place the deteriorating reactor fuel in the

KE Basin at Hanford in a stable configuration for interim storage until

an option for ultimate disposition is chosen. This program needs to be

directed toward storage methods that will minimize further

deterioration.''

Purpose and Need

The purpose of and need for DOE's action to which this ROD applies

is to reduce risks to human health and the environment, specifically

(1) to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the air or the

soil surrounding the K Basins and the potential migration of

radionuclides through the soil column to the nearby Columbia River, (2)

to reduce occupational radiation exposure, and (3) to eliminate the

risks to the public and to workers from the deterioration of SNF in the

K Basins.

Alternatives Considered

Preferred Alternative

The preferred alternative is referred to in the FEIS as ``drying/

passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage''. In addition to

construction of a staging/storage building at the Canister Storage

Building (CSB) site, the proposed series of operations to achieve the

preferred alternative is presented below. The details of the processes

and perhaps their order are expected to change somewhat as the designs

evolve and as the results of ongoing testing become available. However,

the impacts of the following steps bound those necessary to place the K

Basins SNF in safe dry storage:

continue K Basin operations until the removal of SNF,

sludge and debris, and disposition of the water is completed. Make

modifications to the K Basins, as necessary, for maintenance,

monitoring and safety, and provide systems necessary to support the

activities described below

remove K Basin SNF from existing canisters, clean and

desludge

repackage the SNF into fuel baskets designed for multi-

canister overpack (MCO) dimensions, that would include provision for

water removal, SNF conditioning requirements, and criticality control

after loading SNF into the MCOs and draining the MCOs, dry

the SNF under vacuum at approximately 50 deg.C (120 deg.F), flood the

MCOs with inert gas, seal penetrations, and place in transportation

casks

transport the SNF (in MCOs) in these casks via truck to

the Canister Storage Building (CSB) site in the 200 East Area, and

provide for temporary vented staging, as necessary

further condition the SNF in MCOs, as soon as practicable,

heating the SNF in a vacuum to about 300 deg.C (570 deg.F) to remove

water that is chemically bound to the SNF and canister corrosion

products, and to dissociate, to the extent practicable, any reactive

uranium hydride present.

following conditioning, weld-seal the SNF in an inert gas

in the MCOs for dry interim storage in a vault for up to 40 years (a

storage period of 40 years was used in estimating impacts)

collect and remove the sludge from the basins and

disposition as waste in Hanford's double-shell tanks

collect the non-SNF debris from the basins and dispose of

as low-level waste in Hanford's existing low-level waste burial grounds

remove and transport basin water to the 200 Area Effluent

Treatment Facility

[[Page 10738]]

for disposal at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site.

prepare the K Basins for deactivation and transfer to

decontamination and decommissioning program

Principal advantages of the drying/passivation (conditioning) with

dry vault storage alternative are that it would accelerate removal of

SNF from aging facilities in proximity to the Columbia River, would

result in passive vault storage of dry SNF requiring only minimal

surveillance, would retard continued degradation of the SNF and would

reduce or eliminate reactive uranium hydrides in the SNF.

Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the

construction of new facilities would be required, and some uncertainty

exists in the chemical state of the SNF and sludge and, therefore, in

the extent to which drying and passivation processes would be required.

However, defense-in-depth measures will be engineered to assure safety

of the process. Moreover, characterization of K Basins SNF is presently

being conducted to address these uncertainties which may result in a

more cost-effective conditioning process.

Other Alternatives Considered

The FEIS analyzed six other alternatives for the management of SNF

from the K Basins at the Hanford Site. The other alternatives examined

in detail were:

No action alternative: Under this alternative DOE would

continue SNF storage in the KE and KW Basins for up to 40 years with no

modifications except for maintenance, monitoring, and ongoing safety

upgrades. Consideration of the no action alternative is required by CEQ

regulation [40 CFR 1502.14(d)].

The principal advantage of the no action alternative is that it

would require no movement of SNF and no construction of new facilities.

Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the K Basins

were not designed for an 80-year life (40 years to date and up to an

additional 40 years) and would require increasing maintenance of aging

facilities with associated potential for increased radiological impacts

on workers, would not place the SNF in a safer storage configuration,

would not preclude leakage of radionuclides to the soil beneath the

basins and near the Columbia River, and would fail to alleviate

concerns expressed by regulatory agencies, advisory bodies and the

public relative to environmental impacts induced by seismic events.

Enhanced K Basins storage alternative: Under this

alternative DOE would perform facility life extension upgrades for KW

Basin, containerize KE Basin SNF and sludge, and consolidate with KW

Basin SNF for up to 40-year storage.

Principal advantages of the enhanced K Basins storage alternative

are that it would remove degrading SNF from the KE Basin, permit

deactivation of the KE Basin, and would require no construction of new

facilities.

Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the KW Basin

was not designed for an 80-year life and would require increasing

maintenance of the aging facility. Despite completion of practical

upgrades, this alternative would not arrest continued fuel degradation,

might result in conditions favorable to the production of reactive

uranium hydrides in the repackaged KE Basin SNF transferred to the KW

Basin, and would fail to alleviate concerns expressed by regulatory

agencies, advisory bodies and the public relative to environmental

impacts potentially induced by seismic events.

New wet storage alternative: Under this alternative DOE

would remove SNF from the K Basins and provide for up to 40 years of

new wet storage in a new facility located on the 200 Areas plateau that

meets current design criteria.

Principal advantages of the new wet storage alternative are that it

would accelerate removal of SNF from aging facilities in the proximity

to the Columbia River, would make use of a proven storage technology

(at least for commercial fuel) coupled with design to modern seismic

criteria, and would maintain flexibility for preparing SNF for ultimate

disposition.

Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that it would

require construction expense and continued maintenance, would not

prevent the continuation of SNF degradation, and would not eliminate

the potential for further hydriding of the SNF.

Calcination with dry storage: Under this alternative DOE

would remove SNF from the K Basins, calcine it, and provide for up to

40-year dry storage of SNF-oxides in a new cask or vault facility.

The principal advantages of the calcination with dry storage

alternative are that it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near

the Columbia River and that it would convert the SNF into stable

oxides, which are readily storable in a dry form and may be suitable

without further processing for ultimate disposal in a geologic

repository.

The principal disadvantage of this alternative is the need to

construct and operate a relatively expensive calcining facility.

Onsite processing: Under this alternative the DOE would

remove and chemically process K Basins SNF and provide for up to 40-

year dry storage of the recovered uranium (as uranium trioxide) and

plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and manage fission product waste in

tanks with other wastes under Hanford's Tank Waste Remediation System

program.

Principal advantages of the onsite processing alternative are that

it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near the Columbia River,

convert uranium (the major constituent of SNF) into uranium trioxide

that is readily storable in dry form and for which future use

(constituent of power reactor fuel) might be found, convert plutonium

to a stable oxide for which a future use (constituent of power reactor

fuel) might be found or for which storage in a geologic repository may

be suitable without further processing, and convert fission products

into a form suitable for storage in a geologic repository.

Principal disadvantages of this alternative are the need to

construct and operate a relatively expensive separations facility, the

plutonium dioxide product would no longer be self-protecting and would

require special storage and accountability that in turn may require

construction of additional storage capacity, and no immediate need

exists for either the separated uranium or plutonium.

Foreign processing: Under this alternative, the DOE would

remove K Basins SNF, ship overseas for processing, provide for up to

40-year dry storage of returned uranium (as uranium trioxide) and

plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and store vitrified fission product

waste, pending ultimate disposition.

With the exception that foreign processing would obviate the need

for construction of additional processing facilities at Hanford, the

principal advantages of the foreign processing alternative are

essentially the same as those for onsite processing.

Principal disadvantages of the foreign processing alternative are

the need to transport the K Basins SNF to a U.S. shipping/receiving

port, transload the SNF to ocean vessels, ship the SNF to a foreign

port, transport the SNF to an operating reprocessing plant, and ship

the uranium and plutonium products and vitrified high-level waste back

to Hanford or elsewhere, as appropriate. Additional disadvantages

include issues associated with the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation

policy, unfavorable agency and public opinion regarding

[[Page 10739]]

shipping the degraded fuel off the Hanford Site, costs of new shipping

casks, and construction of a new head-end facility at the processing

plant. The need for special storage for plutonium product would be the

same as in the onsite processing alternative.

In all but the no action alternative, sludge, debris, and

contaminated water would be removed from the basins and managed

appropriately.

DOE considered, but did not analyze in detail, four additional

alternatives identified during the public scoping process. DOE

determined that these alternatives were not reasonable in the sense of

satisfying the purpose and need for this action. These alternatives,

which involved relocation of the K Basins SNF to existing facilities

that were in most cases adjacent to the Columbia River, would not meet

the Department's objectives of expeditious removal of K Basins SNF and

management of the SNF at a location away from the Columbia river.

Comments Received

DOE received comments on the draft EIS from six individuals and

representatives of BNFL, Inc., the State of Washington Department of

Fish and Wildlife, the State of Washington Department of Ecology, the

Oregon Department of Energy, the Nez Perce Tribe, the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of the

Interior (DOI).

Responses to individual comments are provided in the FEIS (which

consists of the draft EIS and an Addendum to the draft EIS).

Reproductions of the as-received comment letters and the transcript of

oral comments received are presented in Appendix A to the FEIS.

Comments from EPA and DOI were received after the close of the public

comment period and publication of the FEIS; these comments and DOE's

responses will be made available in the public reading rooms listed in

the FEIS.

Several representative comments and DOE's responses are paraphrased

below.

Comment. Some commentors voiced concern about the pyrophoricity of

the SNF, the potential for ignition and sustained combustion, and the

potential for releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere.

Response. The concern for uncertainties in the potential for

ignition of SNF is one of the principal drivers for both the DOE's

defense-in-depth approach, which includes conditioning of the SNF

followed by dry vault storage in sealed, inert-gas filled canisters,

and the SNF characterization effort which is currently underway. The

characterization work is intended to confirm the efficacy of planned

process steps to assure safe SNF management via laboratory analyses of

samples of the K Basins SNF.

Comment. Some commentors contended that SNF as packaged would not

meet geologic repository requirements, hence the SNF should be

processed so that the SNF and high-activity fission products could be

put in a form acceptable to repository disposal.

Response. Acceptance criteria for the proposed geologic repository

have not yet been determined. In the absence of the criteria for

accepting defense SNF or high-level waste into the repository, it is

not prudent to base currently needed SNF management decisions too

heavily on the criterion of suitability for ultimate geologic

disposition.

Comment. The EPA expressed concern that estimates of some accident

probabilities were given without describing how the probabilities were

derived.

Response. Except in a few instances, such as crane drops, there is

no actual experience on which to base estimates of the probability of

occurrence of accidents in SNF management as presented in the EIS. As a

consequence, engineering judgement is used to qualitatively assess the

likelihood of a postulated accident occurring. These qualitative

judgments are then expressed as a numerical range of annual frequency

of occurrence to permit development of some quantitative estimate of

accident impacts that may be compared among the alternatives. While

imprecise, these estimates represent the best information available to

DOE at this time.

Comment. DOI acknowledged that radiological and nonradiological

exposure risks to humans and consideration for special habitats

occurring on the Hanford Site were addressed, but expressed concern

that environmental impacts in terms of other biota were not addressed

in the EIS and thus comparison among alternatives was not complete.

Response. As may be noted in the EIS, impacts on humans (including

onsite noninvolved workers, which may be taken as representative of

other onsite biota) from normal operations associated with any

alternative were estimated to be very small. As a consequence,

exposures to other biota and the consequences therefrom are also

believed to be trivial to very small. Thus, while zero impact to other

onsite biota cannot be claimed, scrutiny of environmental impacts to

levels expressed by DOI is believed to be of minimal value in forming a

basis for making decisions among the alternatives.

Comment. EPA noted that contrary to Section 6.10 of the draft EIS,

DOE must apply for permission to construct any facility, regardless of

emission projections expressed in Appendix D of the regulation.

Response. It is DOE's intent to comply with the letter and spirit

of all applicable environmental requirements, and DOE will file for

permission to construct the facilities associated with the preferred

alternative. Although, as indicated by EPA, the requirement was

misstated in Section 6.10, the requirement and intent to comply was

correctly stated elsewhere in the EIS.

Comment. DOI commented that DOE should provide compensatory

mitigation for habitat lost in the initial development of the canister

storage building site.

Response. DOE does not plan to provide mitigation for the CSB site

per se. However, DOE is committed to implementing the Hanford

Biological Resources Management Plan (BRMP) when it is completed. This

plan is intended to provide for responsible management of the Hanford

ecosystem.

Environmentally Preferred Alternative

CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the

environmentally preferred alternative(s). Overall environmental impacts

under normal operating conditions were found to be neither large nor to

vary markedly among the alternatives. Since the no action alternative

would involve the least handling of SNF and require no new facilities,

under normal operating conditions it would have the lowest overall

impacts. Hence, the no action alternative is the environmentally

preferred alternative under normal operating conditions.

However, over the long term, implementation of the no action

alternative is not prudent because it does not address the continuing

degradation of the SNF, the increasing accumulation of radioactive

sludge, the further contamination of the basin water and the unlikely,

but not impossible, occurrence of an earthquake releasing substantial

quantities of radionuclides to the air, ground and possibly the

Columbia River.

Decision

Based on consideration of environmental impacts, costs, compliance

requirements, engineering practicability, worker and public health and

safety, and on comments received on the draft EIS, DOE will implement

the preferred alternative, as described

[[Page 10740]]

above, with two modifications. The preferred alternative will involve

removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, conditioning and

sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage for

up to 40 years pending decisions on its ultimate disposition. The

preferred alternative also calls for transfer of the basin sludge to

Hanford's double-shell tanks for management, disposal of non-SNF basin

debris in a low-level burial ground at Hanford, disposition of the

basin water at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site (SALDS),

and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning.

The first modification is with respect to sludge management. In the

preferred alternative, sludge is to be dispositioned as waste in

Hanford's double-shell tanks. However, while in the basins, the sludge

will continue to be managed as spent nuclear fuel. Should it not be

possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will

either continue to be managed and treated as SNF, or grouted and

packaged to meet the Solid Waste Burial Ground waste acceptance

criteria. The impacts of alternate sludge management were analyzed in

the FEIS and are small. By mass the sludge is about 0.5% of the SNF and

impacts of continuing to manage the sludge as SNF would be negligible

by comparison.

The second modification is with respect to the timing of the

placement of the MCOs into the transportation casks. In the preferred

alternative, the fuel baskets would be loaded into the MCO's, then

drained and vacuum dried prior to placement in the transportation

casks. However, placing the MCOs in the transportation casks prior to

loading the fuel baskets into the MCOs will reduce the exposure of the

workers to radiation during draining and vacuum drying.

The DOE selected the preferred alternative principally because it

will alleviate concerns for protection of workers, public health and

safety, and the environment (by expeditious removal of the SNF from the

vicinity of the Columbia River), will utilize a partially completed

existing facility (the CSB), will have few, if any, impacts on the

physical environment (minimal new construction) and will be implemented

at a cost on par with or substantially less than that of the other

alternatives.

Mitigation

Implementation of the preferred alternative, which is drying/

passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage at the CSB site, is

not expected to result in adverse impacts. As a consequence,

preparation of a Mitigation Action Plan (10 CFR 1021.331) in the event

of adverse impacts is not planned. Nevertheless, DOE is responding to

Executive Order 12856 (58 FR 41981) and associated DOE Orders and

guidelines by reducing the use of toxic chemicals, improving emergency

planning, response and accident notification, and encouraging the

development of clean technologies and the testing of innovative

pollution prevention technologies. The pollution prevention program at

the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization and

Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan. Moreover, DOE aggressively

applies the principle of reducing exposure to both radioactive and

toxic chemicals to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) throughout

its operations.

Issued

This Record of Decision for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel

from the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington is issued

by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland,

Washington on March 4, 1996.

John D. Wagoner,

Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.

[FR Doc. 96-6291 Filed 3-14-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P