Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a Train

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Emergency Order No. 20, Notice No. 1]

Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public

Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight

Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans

for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a

Train

Introduction

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States

Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that the safety of

passengers and railroad employees compels issuance of this Emergency

Order. Based on the historical record, rail passenger transportation in

the United States is an extremely safe mode of transportation. However,

recent train accidents in New Jersey and Maryland, which have claimed a

total of fourteen lives, have caused DOT, FRA, and the Federal Transit

Administration (FTA) (also part of DOT) to have very serious concerns

about the safety of certain aspects of rail passenger transportation.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the lead in

investigating both accidents. FRA is assisting in both investigations.

Although NTSB will not reach final conclusions as to probable cause of

either accident for some time, NTSB's preliminary conclusions and what

FRA has learned from the investigations (set forth in detail, below)

compel that certain steps be taken now to reduce the risks to

passengers and crew that apparently exist under certain operating

conditions.

Of particular concern are those operations that involve carrying

passengers in the lead car of a train over segments of track that do

not have either cab signal systems (which provide the engineer with an

on-board display of signal indications alongside the tracks) or

automatic train stop or automatic train control systems (which

automatically cause the train to stop or reduce speed where an engineer

fails to respond appropriately to a trackside signal). Both of the

recent accidents involved such operations. While thousands of such

operations occur daily without incident, the occurrence of two fatal

accidents in one week has caused DOT, FRA, and FTA to examine closely

the need for immediate enhancements in the safety of such operations.

Also of great concern, based

[[Page 6877]]

on the Maryland accident, is passenger and crew egress after an

accident.

In summary, this order requires that commuter and intercity

passenger railroads, including public authorities providing passenger

service through contracts with other railroads, and any other entities

(e.g., freight railroads with affected passenger service on their

lines) whose actions are necessary to effectuate this order, take

certain immediate steps with regard to any of their operations above 30

miles per hour that do not entail cab signal, automatic train stop, or

automatic train control protections and that permit passengers to

occupy the leading car (i.e., using either cab cars as the forward car

in the push-pull mode or self-propelled locomotives with passenger

seating (MU locomotives)). As set forth in detail below, those

railroads are required to: (1) adopt and comply with an operating rule

requiring that, when a passenger train stops for any reason, including

a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train

shall proceed under any speed limitations set forth in applicable

railroad operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop

before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed

speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal

displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear;

(2) adopt and comply with an operating rule requiring that a crew

member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab

car, or MU car, shall have a means to orally communicate and will

communicate to another crew member the indication and location of each

wayside signal affecting the movement of the train as soon as the

signal becomes visible, for all signals which require either that the

train be prepared to stop at the next wayside signal or that the train

be prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed; (3)

take certain measures to instruct and test employees on the

aforementioned operating rules; and (4) submit to FRA an interim system

safety plan for enhancing the safety of such operations that includes

(i) a description of circumstances in which the leading car is

permitted to be occupied by passengers; (ii) a review of operating

rules relevant to such operations; (iii) plans for any short-term

technology enhancements that would enhance train control; (iv) a review

of crew management practices to see what steps can be taken to improve

crew alertness; (v) a review of the hazards posed to passengers in the

forward car by vehicles using highway-rail grade crossings; and (vi) a

review of practices, in addition to marking exits, used by the railroad

to inform passengers of the location and operation of emergency exits,

specifying any plans for enhancing such information. In addition, each

of these commuter and intercity passenger railroads, regardless of the

speeds or equipment they use, is required to ensure that each emergency

window on every passenger car is clearly marked on the outside and

inside and that a representative sample has been inspected to make sure

they are operable.

FRA may amend this order at any time to require other actions to

ensure safety. For example, depending on what FRA learns from the

railroads' interim safety plans and other sources after issuance of

this order, it may decide that safety requires it to prohibit one or

more railroads from carrying passengers in the lead car in the absence

of a cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control

system.

Authority

Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been

delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad

Administrator. 49 CFR Sec. 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety

jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C.

Secs. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where

an unsafe condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation

involving a hazard of death or personal injury.'' 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104.

These orders may immediately impose ``restrictions and prohibitions

. . . that may be necessary to abate the situation.'' (Ibid.)

Background

New Jersey Transit Accident, Secaucus, NJ. On February 9, 1996, at

about 8:40 a.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey

Transit trains 1254 and 1107 at mile post 2.8, on the borderline of

Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Speed at the point of collision

was approximately 7 m.p.h. for train 1254 and 53 m.p.h. for train 1107.

Of the 325 passengers on both trains, one received fatal injuries and

162 reported minor injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the

nonfatal injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was

operating with the cab control car forward and the locomotive pushing.

In addition, the engineer was fatally injured. The cab control car

incurred substantial damage as a result of near-frontal impact with the

heavier locomotive of train 1107, operating in the ``pull'' mode. The

locomotive engineer on train 1107 was fatally injured as a result of

``cornering'' of the locomotive cab that bypassed the collision posts

in the short hood. Railroad property damage was estimated at more than

$3.5 million. Although the trains involved were equipped with cab

signal and automatic train control (ATC) apparatus, the wayside portion

of the signal system on the lines in question did not provide cab

signals. The method of operation was by wayside signal indication.

Based on preliminary information derived from the joint

investigation of the NTSB, FRA, and other parties, the accident appears

to have resulted from failure of train 1254 to observe signal

indications requiring that the train be stopped short of the junction

where the accident occurred. Agencies are investigating whether lack of

alertness on the part of the locomotive engineer, who was working the

second portion a night ``split shift,'' may have contributed to the

failure to observe signal indications. Since the accident, New Jersey

Transit has eliminated use of the night split shift, which had

previously been a longstanding practice on the railroad.

MARC accident, Silver Spring, MD. On February 16, 1996, at

approximately 5:40 p.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between

Maryland Rail Commuter Authority (MARC) train P28616 and National

Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train PO2916 on the CSX

Transportation line at Silver Spring, Maryland (milepost 8.3). The

Amtrak train consisted of two locomotives in the lead and 15 cars. The

MARC train consisted of a cab control car in the lead followed by two

passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist.

The accident resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crew

members and 8 passengers who were located in the MARC cab car. Non-

fatal injuries were sustained by at least 13 additional passengers of

the MARC train. As this order was prepared, one passenger remained in

critical condition.

Early investigative findings by staff of the NTSB and FRA indicate

that the MARC train, proceeding eastbound toward Washington Union

Station on Track No. 2, passed an intermediate signal conveying an

approach indication (proceed prepared to stop at next signal), made a

scheduled station stop immediately past the signal, accelerated to

approximately 63 miles per hour (maximum timetable speed 70 miles per

hour), and then applied the train's emergency brakes upon rounding a

curve and establishing sight distance for the home signal governing a

crossover between the two main tracks, which is believed to have

displayed a stop signal.

[[Page 6878]]

The MARC train proceeded past the signal and struck the midpoint of the

lead locomotive of the Amtrak train, which was diverging from Track No.

2 to Track No. 1 through the crossover. The initial impact sheared off

the left collision post of the MARC cab car, together with a

substantial portion of the front, side, and roof structure on the left

side approximately one-third of the way back along the length of the

car. The impact also ruptured the left diesel fuel tank of the Amtrak

lead locomotive, discharging an undetermined amount of diesel fuel into

the MARC cab car. The MARC train continued substantially in line,

apparently raking the second locomotive and coming to rest

substantially parallel with the Amtrak train. Diesel fuel present in

the cab car ignited.

Both of these accidents involved casualties in so-called ``push/

pull'' operations with the consist being pushed by a locomotive at the

rear. Control of such operations is conducted from the front of a cab

control car, or ``cab car,'' where an engineer compartment is located.

Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical lines

providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes throughout the

train.

Cab cars provide passenger seating, as well as providing a location

from which the train is operated. Cab cars are built with the same

minimum longitudinal strength as locomotives and with substantial

collision posts at each end to prevent incursion of other vehicles into

the occupied volume. However, cab cars are lighter than powered

vehicles, and no combination of structural measures can wholly prevent

harm to persons in collisions involving substantial forces. Occupants

of cab cars may incur a significantly higher risk of serious injury

when compared with occupants of a locomotive-hauled consist, if the cab

car collides with a heavier rail vehicle or any highway or rail vehicle

transporting hazardous materials. Similar risks may obtain in the case

of electric multiple-unit (EMU) service and diesel multiple-unit (DMU)

service, because those vehicles have a structure similar to that of a

cab car.

FRA recognizes that cab cars have provided hundreds of millions of

miles of safe transportation since they were introduced in the late

1950s. EMU and DMU service has been provided with a high degree of

safety since the early decades of this century. However, the recent

accidents noted above compel FRA to review the safety of these

operations to determine whether means can be found to further reduce

the risk of serious injury in the subject service.

Prior accidents further illustrate the potential risk. For

instance, on August 1, 1981, at Beverly, Massachusetts, a commuter

train engineer was killed and 28 passengers were injured when a

commuter train in the push mode collided head-on with a freight train

due to dispatcher error. On January 2, 1982, at Southhampton,

Pennsylvania, a single rail diesel car commuter train collided with a

gas truck at a highway-rail crossing due to malfunction of the

automated warning device at the crossing (loss of shunt). On November

12, 1987, at Boston, Massachusetts, a train in the push mode struck the

locomotive at the back of a train proceeding in the same direction on

the same track, resulting in injuries to 3 crew members and 220

passengers, due in part to a wayside signal malfunction. At Gary,

Indiana, on January 18, 1993, two EMU consists struck in a cornering

collision at the approach to a gauntlet bridge, resulting in 7

fatalities and 95 persons injured, due to failure of one of the

engineers to observe signal indications.

Related FRA Rulemaking Actions

FRA is engaged in a broad range of actions designed to further

enhance the safety of passenger operations. In September of 1994, the

Secretary of Transportation announced that FRA would develop passenger

equipment safety standards in two phases: initial regulations dealing

with the most critical issues in three years, and final regulations

dealing with all related subjects in five years. In November 1994,

Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994,

section 215 of which requires the Secretary to issue regulations under

the timetable the Secretary had previously announced, as measured from

the enactment of the statute. FRA has begun a rulemaking concerning

comprehensive passenger equipment safety standards. A Passenger

Equipment Working Group, including representatives of passenger

operators, employee representatives, rail passenger organizations, and

States, assisted by railway suppliers, began work last summer on

proposed rules. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking describing the

issues under consideration by the working group will be published this

spring, followed by one or more notices of proposed rulemaking on

issues such as the following:

Inspection, testing and maintenance of passenger

equipment;

Crashworthiness of passenger equipment, including cab car

and passenger coach structural strength;

Emergency features integral to the train (e.g., emergency

lighting, operation of doors, access points in the event equipment is

on its side);

Standards for high-speed equipment; and

Passenger car interiors.

The working group will also prepare a second Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM) for passenger power brakes (which may be combined

with other subject matter). FRA anticipates publication of an NPRM on

passenger equipment safety measures in 1996, followed by a final rule

in 1997, as required by law. Issues requiring further research and

technology development may be included in a subsequent NPRM.

Under the same statutory authority, FRA has also established an

Emergency Preparedness Working Group for rail passenger service that is

broadly representative of interested parties. This effort builds on a

process of research and consultation initiated in 1993. The working

group is presently preparing an NPRM addressing issues such as on-board

emergency equipment, availability of first aid, liaison with emergency

responders, communication capability, and advance planning. Publication

of the NPRM is anticipated in early summer.

The measures taken in this emergency order address matters of

immediate concern as identified in the investigation of recent

accidents. These measures will be integrated into the process of

dialogue and discussion already underway with respect to passenger

equipment safety and emergency preparedness. However, FRA believes that

public safety requires the actions called for by this order now rather

than waiting for the rulemaking process to run its course.

The Need for Action

Although definitive conclusions have not been reached, preliminary

indications are that both the Secaucus and Silver Spring accidents

could have been prevented had wayside signal indications been followed,

and the death tolls might have been reduced significantly had occupied

cab cars not been the lead cars. Additionally, the Silver Spring

accident indicates a need to ensure that emergency windows are clearly

marked and operable. FRA believes that certain immediate measures are

necessary to prevent a recurrence of these problems.

There is no evidence that push/pull or EMU operations are in any

way over represented in passenger train accidents. All rail passenger

operations, like other forms of transportation,

[[Page 6879]]

involve some risk of injury due to collision with other vehicles or

fixed structures. In certain accident scenarios (e.g., where the

passenger consist in question is impacted from the rear), push-pull

operations with the cab car forward actually offer greater protection.

However, in collisions involving the front of the passenger train, cab

car forward and MU operations do present an increased risk of severe

personal injury or death when compared with locomotive-hauled service.

This risk is of particular concern where operations are conducted at

relatively higher speeds, where there is a mix of various types of

trains, and where there are numerous highway-rail crossings over which

large motor vehicles are operated.

As the accidents of past two weeks illustrate, this potential for

accidents of greater severity warrants a review of measures taken to

prevent such accidents. Since most train collisions on the railroad

result from human factors, the most effective preventive measure is a

highly effective train control system. Cab signal systems serve an

important safety purpose because they provide a constant display of the

governing signal indication. This provides a corrective measure should

an engineer fail to note, forget, or misread a restrictive wayside

signal indication. Even greater security is provided by a train control

system capable of intervening should the engineer fail to observe

signals and operating rules for whatever reason (e.g., lack of

alertness due to fatigue, sudden incapacitation, loss of situational

awareness due to unusual events). Such systems are referred to as

automatic train control or automatic train stop systems. New

technologies currently under development and demonstration that can

prevent collisions and overspeed derailments are known as ``positive

train separation'' (PTS), ``positive train control'' (PTC), or advanced

train control (ATCS) systems.

1. Necessary Rule Changes

With regard to cab car forward and MU operations over territory

lacking at least cab signals, the immediate need is to ensure that

signal indications are followed. FRA believes that certain operating

rules, already in place on many railroads, will assist engineers in

remembering and adhering to signal indications. One rule will require

that signal indications for an approach or less favorable than an

approach be called out by the engineer as they are seen. A designated

crewmember elsewhere in the train will acknowledge the communication

and, in the absence of an appropriate response to a restrictive

indication that has been communicated, take action to ensure the

appropriate response. This will serve as a simple device to help the

engineer remember to abide by signal indications and will add safety

redundancy by involving other crew members in responsibility for safety

with regard to compliance with signals.

The second rule will require that, if a passenger train enters a

block on a signal indication and the train stops for any reason,

including a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the

train shall proceed under speed limitations set forth in existing

applicable operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop

before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed

speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal

displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear.

(For purposes of this order, a ``block'' is a length of track of

defined limits the use of which is governed by wayside signal

indications.) This will prevent situations where a signal displays an

aspect less favorable than ``clear'' prior to a station stop but the

engineer, after stopping and resuming movement, forgets that he or she

should be operating at a reduced speed. This very well may be what

happened in the Silver Spring accident. Under this rule, if the next

signal is clear, timetable speed may be resumed. However, if the next

signal requires a stop, the engineer will have the train under control

and be prepared to stop short of the signal. This rule will presumably

result in a certain amount of slowing of operations between station

stops and the next forward signal, but FRA believes such relatively

minimal delay is warranted to ensure safety.

2. Interim Safety Plans

FRA believes there is a broader need to have railroads carefully

evaluate their passenger operations with a view toward enhancing the

safety of those operations, with particular attention given to the

safety of operations where passengers are in the lead car and to ways

that train control systems might be upgraded. FRA has concluded that

the safety of such operations can be enhanced by having each railroad

develop an interim system safety plan addressing these subjects. This

will both focus the attention of those railroads on avoiding

occurrences similar to the recent accidents and provide FRA with

detailed information allowing it to determine what further action may

be necessary.

Therefore, this order will require railroads operating scheduled

intercity or commuter rail service to conduct an analysis of their

operations and file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the

manner in which risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed.

Railroads are encouraged to implement identified opportunities for risk

reduction immediately. Upon review of these plans and the subject

operations, FRA will determine whether further action is warranted.

Plans will be reviewed with the following factors in mind:

Railroads operating trains with the benefit of cab signals

incur reduced risk. Augmentation of cab signals with ATC or PTC further

reduces risk.

Lower speed operations (e.g., not to exceed 30 miles per

hour) involve less risk because of lower potential collision forces.

The presence of automated warning devices, particularly

flashing lights with gates, reduces risk of highway-rail crossing

accidents involving heavy vehicles, particularly if crossing surfaces

and approaches do not create a ``hump'' capable of hanging up a long,

low truck or trailer.

Moreover, each interim safety plan will address these specific

issues:

Passenger occupancy of cab/MU cars in lead. Each interim safety

plan must include a review of the use of leading cab cars and MU cars

for transportation of passengers. In the Silver Spring accident, most

train occupants were located in the cab car, even though two very

lightly loaded passenger coaches were available for occupancy. Some

operating authorities limit access to cab cars when seating capacity is

not required. This order asks other authorities to review this

potential for risk reduction. For instance, an operator whose service

gathers small numbers of passengers on branch lines, with heavier

loadings at stops on a cab-signal-equipped main line, might direct

passengers to trailing coaches until the train arrives on the main

line.

Operating rules. As noted above, this order requires early

amendment of operating rules to make passenger operations subject to

the ``delayed in block'' provisions of most existing rule books and to

require engineer-to-train crew communication of certain signals. These

steps will enhance safety by adding a layer of redundancy in safety

procedures where presently none exists. In addition to these steps, the

order requires passenger railroads to review other operating rules

applicable to their particular methods of operation to determine if

enhancements in safety can be achieved consistent with provision of

efficient rail passenger service.

[[Page 6880]]

Adverse operating conditions. Crew performance and other aspects of

operational safety can be affected by unusual conditions such as heavy

snow, fog, high water, and other unusual conditions. This order

requires a review of existing procedures to determine if reasonable

enhancements in safety can be made by compensating for the challenges

these conditions pose to system performance.

Short-term technology enhancements. Where the railroad and all

trains are not already cab signal/ATC-equipped, positive train control

systems will offer the most secure means of preventing train

collisions. However, PTC systems remain under development and will be

deployed over a period of several years. The order requires review of

possible technology enhancements that can be achieved over a short time

period. For instance, FRA believes that virtually all passenger

operations include the use of an alerting device that will stop the

train should the engineer become incapacitated. However, certain

freight operations on the same railroad may be conducted without such a

device. Depending upon the number of units involved, equipping

remaining trains with alerting devices (a readily available item) could

close a gap in accident prevention at relatively low cost.

Crew management. Following the accident of February 9, New Jersey

Transit found that it was able to eliminate night split shifts without

adversely affecting operations. Night split shifts present special

problems because of the effect of biological rhythms and fatigue on

human performance. This order requires other passenger operators using

cab car/MU forward trains to review their management of operating crews

to determine if opportunities exist for risk reduction similar to the

action taken by New Jersey Transit. FRA emphasizes that the issue of

on- and off-duty periods is governed by the hours of service law, as

codified at 49 U.S.C. 21102-21108, 21303-21304. The order requires

passenger operators to consider safety improvements that may be

undertaken voluntarily in a manner that is consistent with statutory

law. FRA is also authorized to approve pilot projects involving

variances from the periods specified by the statute upon petition by

the railroad and designated representatives of the employees involved.

Highway-rail crossings. Cab-forward and MU operations pose a

somewhat heightened risk of severe injury for passengers should an

accident occur, in comparison to locomotive-hauled passenger coaches.

Operators should give consideration to closer interface with private

crossing holders that use the crossings for truck access, give greater

attention to liaison with law enforcement authorities, and explore

other means that may reduce risk at both public and private crossings.

Accelerated application of locomotive alerting lights (already

authorized by regulation and required by statute) may offer another

opportunity for risk reduction. This order requires that each

railroad's interim safety plan address these grade crossing issues in

the context of cab-forward and MU operations. FRA is very concerned

about the safety of such operations in absence of a plan to address

grade crossing hazards.

Information on emergency exits. The Silver Spring accident has

raised serious concerns about whether the MARC passengers had

sufficient information about the location and operation of emergency

exits to enable them to find and use those exits in a crisis. FRA

believes it would be very useful for all commuter and intercity

passenger railroads to review their practices, in addition to marking

the exits, for providing this information.

3. Emergency Exits

Finally, there is a need to ensure that emergency exits are clearly

marked and in operable condition on all passenger lines, regardless of

the equipment used or train control system. FRA's regulations generally

require that all passenger cars be equipped with at least four

emergency opening windows, which must be designed to permit rapid and

easy removal during a crisis situation. The investigation of the Silver

Spring accident has raised some concerns that at least some of the

occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to exit through

the windows. Whether those same people eventually were among those who

exited safely, or whether those persons were attempting to open windows

that were not emergency windows is not known at this time. However,

there is sufficient reason for concern to require that measures be

taken to ensure that such windows are readily identifiable and operable

when they are needed. Accordingly, the order requires that any

emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the

inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of

all such windows be examined to ensure operability. (FRA Safety Glazing

Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require that each passenger car have a

minimum of four emergency window exits ``designed to permit rapid and

easy removal during a crisis situation.'')

Finding and Order

FRA concludes that certain current conditions and practices on

commuter and intercity passenger railroads pose an imminent and

unacceptable threat to public and employee safety. Of greatest concern

are push-pull and MU operations lacking the protection provided by cab

signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. I

find that the unsafe conditions discussed above create an emergency

situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104,

delegated to me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR Sec. 1.49),

it is hereby ordered that each commuter and intercity passenger

railroad, and any other entity (e.g., freight railroads over whose

lines affected passenger operations are conducted) whose actions are

necessary to effectuate the directives in this order, take the

following actions:

(1) Delayed in Block Rule.

Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations

unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control

is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or

terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.

(A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish

in its code of operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires:

If a passenger train enters a block on a signal indication and the

train stops for any reason, including a station stop, or its speed is

reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train shall proceed under speed

limitations set forth in existing applicable railroad operating rules,

and in addition, must be prepared to stop before passing the next

signal. The train must maintain the prescribed speed until the next

wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal displays a proceed

indication, and the track to that signal is clear. A copy of the rule

will be provided to the FRA Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance

in care of James T. Schultz, Staff Director, Operating Practices.

(B) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,

a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer

and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face

meeting of the requirements of that rule. Such briefing shall be

documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review

upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted,

and supervisor making the contact.

[[Page 6881]]

(C) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,

each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an

unannounced operational (``efficiency'') test on the rule which

requires a full stop at the signal ahead; and, within 90 days of rule

publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall be conducted

by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a complete

understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational monitoring

checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be available

for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location, crew

members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.

(D) The railroad's program of operational tests and

inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to

include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such

tests per year for each passenger engineer.

(2) Crew Communications Rule

Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations

unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control

is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or

terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.

(A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish

in its operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires: A crew

member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab

car, or MU car, shall have means to communicate orally and shall

communicate the indication and location of each wayside signal

affecting the movement of the train as soon as the signal becomes

visible, for all signals which require either (1) that the train be

prepared to stop at the next wayside signal, or (2) that the train be

prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed. In

multiple track territory, the crew member shall include the affected

track number. A copy of the rule shall be provided to the FRA Office of

Safety Assurance and Compliance in care of James T. Schultz, Staff

Director, Operating Practices.

(B) A designated crew member located on a trailing unit or

car shall immediately acknowledge the transmission, and confirm the

information to the crew member(s) on the controlling locomotive by

repeating the message. If the designated crew member fails to

acknowledge the communication, the engineer must ascertain at the next

scheduled stop why the message is not being confirmed. If necessary due

to radio equipment failure, alternative means shall be established by

the operating crew (e.g., via intercom, cellular telephone, etc.) to

accomplish the procedure.

(C) If the engineer fails to control the train movement in

accordance with either a wayside signal indication or other

restrictions imposed upon the train, the designated crew member in a

trailing unit or car shall at once communicate with and caution the

engineer regarding the restriction, and, if necessary, take appropriate

action to ensure the safety of the train, including stopping the

movement if appropriate.

(D) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,

a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer

and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face

meeting of the requirements of this rule. Such briefing shall be

documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review

upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted,

and supervisor making the contact.

(E) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,

each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an

unannounced operational ``efficiency'' test on the rule; and, within 90

days of rule publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall

be conducted by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a

complete understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational

monitoring checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be

available for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location,

crew members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.

(F) The railroad's program of operational tests and

inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to

include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such

tests per year for each passenger engineer.

(3) Emergency Egress: Marking and Inspecting Exits

(A) Within 60 days of this order, ensure that each

emergency exit location is marked both inside the car for passenger and

crew information and, with regard to emergency window exits, on the

exterior of the car as well for emergency responders. Markings for

egress from inside the car shall be accompanied by clear and legible

instructions for operation of the exit. Such markings must be clearly

visible and legible at egress locations. This paragraph does not

require action where reasonably conspicuous and fully legible markings

and instructions already exist.

(B) Immediately begin, and within 60 days of this order

complete, a program to test a representative sample of emergency window

exits on cars in its fleets to verify proper operation. Defective units

will be repaired before the car is returned to service. Additionally,

when a defective exit is discovered, all exits on that specific series/

type of car will be tested and every defective exit replaced. Railroads

must report to FRA when such action is necessary, and shall include a

timetable for window inspection and replacement on the car series to

remedy the problem in the most expedient manner.

(C) Records of the date, car number, and verification of

proper exit operation shall be maintained and available for FRA review

upon request. Each railroad shall also verify emergency exit operation

as part of routine vehicle maintenance cycles.

(4) Interim System Safety Plans

Each authority operating or contracting for the operation of push-

pull, EMU or DMU service (including Amtrak) shall, not later than 45

days from this order, submit to FRA an interim system safety plan for

the purpose of enhancing the safety of such operations. In developing

such plans, the authority shall provide opportunity for the riding

public and designated representatives of railroad employees to comment

on proposed actions that may affect the quality of service, including

passenger safety.

The plan shall address the following hazards associated with

passenger occupancy of lead units:

Train-to-train collisions.

Derailments giving rise to the hazard of impact with fixed

structures.

Collisions with heavy vehicles at highway-rail crossings.

The plan shall take into consideration the overall safety of all

passengers and crew members and shall, at a minimum, address the

following opportunities for risk reduction:

(A) Use of cab car/MU car. The authority shall specify the

circumstances under which occupancy of a cab or MU car in the lead

position is permitted, by route and train assignment. The authority

shall propose or report appropriate modifications in such practices,

taking into consideration service needs (e.g., equipment capacity,

passenger loadings) and safety issues (e.g., train densities, method of

operation, availability of cab signals and automatic control, issues

related to standing passengers, grade crossing exposure, and other

relevant factors).

(B) Operating rules. The authority shall review railroad operating

rules and

[[Page 6882]]

practices pertinent to the hazards listed above to determine if further

enhancements in safety are warranted and advise FRA as to what action

is necessary to enhance the level of safety. Changes in existing rules

shall be specified. In conducting this review, the operating authority

shall analyze the measures imposed in sections 1 and 2 of this order

and may propose alternative approaches that ensure the same

enhancements in safety associated with those measures.

(C) Adverse conditions. In conducting the review of railroad

operating rules and practices, consideration shall be given to adverse

or unusual operating conditions such as weather (e.g., fog, heavy rain

or snow, flooding, etc.).

(D) Short-term technology enhancements. The authority shall

consider short-term enhancements in technology that may improve the

safety of train operations, such as use of alerting devices, equipping

of additional locomotives with cab signal/ATC apparatus (where in

effect on the territory), or other available enhancements to enhance

engineer performance or provide warning of operation in excess of

authority provided by the wayside signal system. In addition, the

authority shall consider whether the installation of additional signals

on any particular line would appreciably reduce the risk of train

collisions.

(E) Crew management. The authority shall review crew management

practices in light of contemporary literature regarding shift work and

cumulative fatigue to determine if the alertness and performance of

employees can be promoted by changes in those practices. Special

attention shall be given to the issue of night split shifts.

(F) Highway-rail grade crossings. The authority shall review risks

to passengers associated with occupancy of cab or MU cars in the lead

while passing over highway-rail crossings, particularly crossings

utilized by heavy vehicles and vehicles transporting hazardous

materials, and shall address measures that can reduce these risks.

(G) Emergency exit notification. The authority shall review methods

it uses, in addition to marking emergency exits, to inform passengers

of the location and operation of those exits, such as flyers dropped on

seats, announcements to passengers, explanations on the face of

passenger tickets, etc. The authority shall specify any plans it has to

increase passenger awareness of the location and operation of emergency

exits.

Upon receipt of plans responsive to the above-referenced

requirements, the Administrator, in consultation with the FTA

Administrator, will determine whether other mandatory action appears

necessary to address hazards associated with the subject rail passenger

service.

Relief

Petitions for special approval to take actions not in accordance

with this order may be submitted to the Associate Administrator for

Safety, who shall be authorized to dispose of those requests without

the necessity of amending this order.

Penalties

Any violation of this order shall subject the person committing the

violation to a civil penalty of up to $20,000. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1301. FRA

may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to

enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m on February 21, 1996.

This notice will be published in the Federal Register as soon as

possible. Prior to publication, copies of this notice will be delivered

by overnight mail or facsimile to the affected passenger railroads,

public authorities, and railroad labor organizations.

Review

Opportunity for formal review of this Emergency Order will be

provided in accordance with 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104(b) and section 554 of

Title 5 of the United States Code.

Administrative procedures governing such review are found at 49 CFR

Part 211. See 49 CFR Secs. 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 20, 1996.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96-4204 Filed 2-21-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P