Power Brake Regulations: Two-way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 232

[FRA Docket No. PB-9, Notice No. 5]

RIN 2130-AA73

Power Brake Regulations: Two-way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).

ACTION: Notice of public regulatory conference.

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SUMMARY: FRA is scheduling a public regulatory conference to further

discuss issues related to two-way end-of-train telemetry devices (2-way

EOTs) previously developed in its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)

on power brakes published on September 16, 1994. By earlier notice, FRA

indicated that it would defer action on the NPRM for a short period;

however, FRA also stressed that it did not intend to defer

implementation of the requirement for 2-way EOTs beyond the effective

date contemplated by Congress. Consequently, FRA has decided to

separate proposals regarding 2-way EOTs from the rest of the proposed

power brake revisions and proceed with this public regulatory

conference in order to clarify and resolve those issues related to 2-

way EOTs and issue a final rule on this subject as soon as practicable.

FRA urges railroads to immediately begin acquiring and equipping trains

with 2-way EOTs to enhance the safety of their operations rather than

waiting until issuance of the final rule.

DATES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments must be received no later

than April 15, 1996. Comments received after that date will be

considered to the extent practicable without incurring additional

expense or delay.

(2) Public Regulatory Conference: A public regulatory conference to

discuss issues related to 2-way EOTs will be held March 5, 1996

beginning at 8:30 a.m. in Washington, D.C. Any person wishing to

participate in the public regulatory conference should notify the

Docket Clerk at the address provided below at least five working days

prior to the date of the conference. This notification should identify

the party the person represents and the particular issues the person

plans to address. The notification should also provide the Docket Clerk

with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the right to limit

participation in the conference of persons who fail to provide such

notification.

ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments should identify the

docket number and the notice number and must be submitted in triplicate

to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C.

20590. Persons desiring to be notified that their written comments have

been received by FRA should submit a stamped, self-addressed postcard

with their comments. The Docket Clerk will indicate on the postcard the

date on which the comments were received and will return the card to

the addressee. Written comments will be available for examination, both

before and after the closing date for comments, during regular business

hours in room 8201 of the Nassif Building at the above address.

(2) Public Regulatory Conference: The public regulatory conference

will be held at the following location and date:

Location: Nassif Building, Conference Room 2230, 400 Seventh Street

SW, Washington, D.C. Date: March 5, 1996. Time: 8:30 a.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Peacock, Motive Power and

Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA, 400

Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-9186),

or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-

0628).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding

certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C.

20141 (formerly contained in Section 7 of the Rail Safety Enforcement

and Review Act, Pub. L. No. 102- 365 (September 3, 1992), amending

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, formerly

codified at 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq.). In these amendments, Congress

instructed the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to promulgate

regulations requiring the use of 2-way EOTs. Congress' mandate sets out

various minimum requirements that any promulgated rule must contain and

specifically lists various types of operations that are to be excluded

from the requirements, leaving the Secretary with discretion to exclude

other types of operations if it is in the public interest and

consistent with railroad safety. See 49 U.S.C. 20141. Congress mandated

that the rules be promulgated by the end

[[Page 6611]]

of 1993, and envisioned a date for implementation of the requirements

of no later than December 31, 1997. In addition to the statutory

mandate, FRA received recommendations from the National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) and petitions from the United Transportation Union,

the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Oregon Public Utilities

Commission, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and

the Montana Public Service Commission to require 2-way EOTs on all

cabooseless trains operating in certain territories.

In response to the statutory mandate, the various recommendations,

and due to its own determination that the power brake regulations were

in need of revision, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 31, 1992 (57 FR 62546). A section of the

ANPRM was specifically designed to elicit comments, information, and

views on 2-way EOTs and a portion of the public hearings covered this

topic. See 57 FR 62550-62551. Based on the comments and information

received, FRA published an NPRM regarding revision the power brake

regulation which contained specific requirements related to 2-way EOTs.

See 57 FR 47700, 47713-14, 47731, 47734, and 47743.

Following publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register (59 FR

47676), FRA held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow

interested parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues

addressed in the NPRM. Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois

on November 1-2; in Newark, New Jersey on November 4; in Sacramento,

California on November 9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14,

1994. These hearings were attended by numerous railroads, organizations

representing railroads, labor organizations, and state governmental

agencies. Due to the strong objections raised by a large number of

commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 1995 that

it would defer action on the NPRM and permit the submission of

additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it would

proceed in this matter. 60 FR 3375. In the January notice, FRA also

stressed that it did not intend to defer implementation of the

requirement for 2-way EOTs beyond an effective date of December 31,

1997.

In the ANPRM and the NPRM, FRA identified eleven recent incidents

that might have been avoided had the involved trains been equipped with

2-way EOTs. See 57 FR 62550; 59 FR 47713-14. In addition, on December

14, 1994, in Cajon Pass, an intermodal train operated by The Atchison,

Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe) collided with the rear

end of a unit coal train operated by the Union Pacific Railroad Company

resulting in the serious injury of two crew members and total estimated

damages in excess of $4 million. After investigation of this incident,

the NTSB concluded that had the train been equipped with a 2-way EOT

the collision could have been avoided because the engineer could have

initiated an emergency brake application from the end of the train. On

December 15, 1995, based on the conclusion reached above, the NTSB made

the following recommendation to FRA:

Separate the two-way end-of-train requirements from the Power

Brake Law NPRM, and immediately conclude the end-of-train device

rulemaking so as to require the use of two-way end-of-train

telemetry devices on all cabooseless trains. (Class II, Priority

Action)(R-95-44).

Furthermore, on February 1, 1996, again in Cajon Pass, a westward

Santa Fe freight train derailed on a descending 3-percent grade. The

incident resulted in fatal injuries to two of the crew members, serious

injuries to a third, and the derailment of 45 of 49 cars and four

locomotives. Although investigation of this incident is currently in

progress, it appears as though it could have been avoided had the train

been equipped with a means for the train crew to have effected an

emergency brake application from the rear of the train. The two

aforementioned incidents resulted in FRA's issuance on February 6,

1996, of Emergency Order No. 18, 61 FR 5058, which requires the

affected railroad to ensure that its train crews have the ability to

effect an emergency brake application from the rear of the train on all

westward freight trains operating through Cajon Pass.

Consequently, based on these considerations and after review of all

the comments submitted, FRA has determined that in order to limit the

number of issues to be examined and developed in any one proceeding it

will proceed with the revision of the power brake regulations via three

separate processes. In light of the testimony and comments received on

the NPRM, emphasizing the differences between passenger and freight

operations and the brake equipment utilized by the two, FRA will

propose to separate passenger equipment power brake standards from

freight equipment power brake standards. As passenger equipment power

brake standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment safety

standards, the passenger equipment safety standards working group will

assist FRA in developing a second NPRM covering passenger equipment

power brake standards. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, it is FRA's

intention to have a second NPRM covering freight equipment power brake

standards developed with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory

Committee, which FRA is in the process establishing, subject to

Administration approval. Furthermore, in the interest of public safety

and due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA intends to

separate the issues related to 2-way EOTs from both the passenger and

freight issues, address them in the public regulatory conference being

announced by this notice, and issue a final rule on the subject as soon

as practicable. FRA feels that an informal public regulatory conference

would prove advantageous in the development of regulations related to

2-way EOTs. FRA also believes that the quality of the agency's final

rule will be improved by facilitating an exchange of ideas that may

lead to solutions acceptable to all interested parties.

Methodology

In accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure

Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.), the public regulatory conference is a

continuation of the power brake rulemaking proceeding. A court reporter

will take a verbatim transcript of the conference which will be placed

in the public docket for this rulemaking. The format of the discussions

will be informal and will employ a topical, interactive approach. The

public regulatory conference is currently scheduled for one day. FRA

believes the time allotted for this conference will prove more than

adequate. Of course, the conference will conclude earlier than planned

if, based upon advice from the participants in attendance the agency

concludes that the major issues have been adequately addressed.

Participants

FRA invites all affected parties, including small entities, to

participate in the public regulatory conference. FRA believes that

extensive comment from all interested parties is necessary to develop

the most effective and reasonable final regulation. For this conference

to be successful, participants should be prepared to discuss, at a

minimum, the issues identified below and provide reasonable

alternatives, if necessary. FRA also encourages participants to bring

supporting documentation where appropriate.

[[Page 6612]]

Issues for Discussion

In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding

specific statutory mandates related to 2-way EOTs which state:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.

* * * * *

(3)(A) The Secretary shall require 2-way end of train devices (or

devices able to perform the same function) on road trains other than

locals, road switchers, or work trains to enable the initiation of

emergency braking from the rear of the train. The Secretary shall

promulgate rules as soon as possible, but not later than December 31,

1993, requiring such 2-way end of train devices. Such rules shall at a

minimum--

(i) Set standards for such devices based on performance;

(ii) Prohibit any railroad, on or after the date that is one year

after promulgation of such rules, from acquiring any end of train

device for use on trains which is not a 2-way device meeting the

standards set under clause (i);

(iii) Require that such trains be equipped with 2-way end of train

devices meeting such standards not later than 4 years after

promulgation of such rules; and

(iv) Provide that any 2-way end of train device acquired for use on

trains before such promulgation shall be deemed to meet such standards.

(B) The Secretary may consider petitions to amend the rules

promulgated under subparagraph (A) to allow the use of alternative

technologies which meet the same basic performance requirements

established by such rules.

(C) In developing the rules required by subparagraph (A), the

Secretary shall consider data presented under paragraph (1).

(4) The Secretary may exclude from the rules required by paragraphs

(1), (2), and (3) any category of trains or rail operations if the

Secretary determines that such an exclusion is in the public interest

and is consistent with railroad safety. The Secretary shall make public

the reasons for granting any such exclusion. The Secretary shall at a

minimum exclude from the requirements of paragraph (3)--

(A) Trains that have manned cabooses;

(B) Passenger trains with emergency brakes;

(C) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of

the general railroad system;

(D) Trains that do not exceed 30 miles per hour and do not operate

on heavy grades, except for any categories of such trains specifically

designated by the Secretary; and

(E) Trains that operate in a push mode.

Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified with some differences in

language at 49 U.S.C. 20141 (formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. 431(r)).

FRA has already received a substantial number of comments on 2-way

EOTs, either through testimony provided or written comments submitted

in connection with the ANPRM and the NPRM that were previously issued.

This public regulatory conference is designed to afford interested

parties an opportunity to expand on those comments and further discuss

the issues related to 2-way EOTs. After review of the comments

received, FRA has identified seven major issues for discussion which

include: the definition of ``mountain grade territory''; the handling

of en route failures of the devices; the operations to which the

requirements will be applicable; initial terminal requirements; design

requirements; calibration requirements; and cost/benefit information.

The following discussion is intended to highlight FRA's proposals

regarding 2-way EOTs contained in the NPRM and to provide a brief

overview of some of the comments received on those proposals. For the

exact wording of any of the proposed requirements or for more detailed

discussion of the proposals, individuals should refer directly to the

NPRM. Furthermore, the listing of issues contained below is not

intended to be exhaustive; we solicit comments on all issues relevant

to 2-way EOTs.

A. Definition of ``Mountain Grade Territory''

In Appendix C of the NPRM, FRA proposed a definition of mountain

grade territory as a section of track of distance, D, with an average

grade of 1.5 percent or more over that distance which satisfies the

relationship:

(30/V)\2\G\2\D12

Where:

G=average grade x 100

D=distance in miles over which average grade is taken

V=speed of train

See 59 FR 47719,47753. FRA also provided a chart containing

mountain grade territory curves based on an application of the

definition. See 59 FR 47753. FRA developed this empirical relationship

based on most commenters' suggestions that some type of formula be

developed based on a variety of factors, including train tonnage,

speed, length of grade, percent of grade, and distance of grade. FRA

determined that the three most important variables in defining mountain

grade were: (i) The speed of the train (V); (ii) the steepness of the

grade (G); and (iii) the length of the grade (D).

According to the empirical relationship proposed by FRA, no one of

these variables determines mountain grade operating conditions; it

takes a combination of the three. The (30/V)\2\ term is the ratio of

the train's speed to the reference speed of 30 mph, and it is squared

because the speed of the train is a dominant variable in the

relationship. The V term is in the denominator because as the speed of

the train increases the ratio decreases, which makes satisfying the

overall inequality defining mountain grade operating conditions more

likely. The G term is squared because the steepness of the grade is a

dominant variable. The G term is in the numerator because a steeper

grade makes satisfying the overall inequality more likely. The D term

is not squared because the length of the grade is less dominant than

either the speed of the train or the steepness of the grade. The D term

is in the numerator because a longer distance of grade makes satisfying

the overall inequality more likely. The number 12 was selected because

it yields a range of reasonable results for the definition.

Many commenters stated that FRA's definition was confusing,

inaccurate, and impractical. These commenters suggested that the

definition would result in known mountain grades not being covered by

the 2-way EOT requirement, while other areas never before believed to

be mountain grades would fall within the requirement. Several

commenters also recommended that the definition be eliminated and that

the 2-way EOT requirements apply solely to trains operating in excess

of 30 mph. The California Public Utilities Commission suggested that

short of requiring the devices on every train, the fundamental

criterion should be the ability of the train to stop within a safe

distance. Other commenters suggested that other criteria be used to

define mountain grade territory and that the formula be simplified. One

commenter recommended that the proposed definition be eliminated, and

that the 2-way EOT requirements be applied to trains operating over 30

mph and to heavy tonnage and long trains as defined in the proposal.

(1) FRA recognizes that the definition contained in the NPRM may be

somewhat confusing and may lead to anomalous results. FRA also

recognizes that a definition of mountain grade that uses speed as a

variable may be inappropriate because if a significant portion of the

braking system becomes

[[Page 6613]]

inoperative on a long, steep grade a runaway can occur regardless of

the speed that the train started down the grade. Consequently, FRA is

open to alternate suggestions to simplify or clarify the definition of

mountain grade territory. However, FRA does not believe discarding the

concept of mountain grade territory would be consistent with the safety

objectives of the statute.

(2) FRA is interested in any alternative methods or formulas for

defining mountain or heavy grade territory. For example:

Mountain grade territory could be defined as: any portion of a

railroad with an average grade of 1% or greater where the product of

the average percent grade (as a decimal) and the distance over which

the grade persists (in miles) is greater than or equal to .03. Thus

a 1% (.01) average grade for 3 miles or a 2% (.02) average grade for

1.5 miles would meet the definition for mountain grade territory.

FRA encourages all interested parties to develop and be prepared to

discuss their alternatives for defining mountain grade territory.

(3) Several railroads include definitions of mountain grade

territory in their operating rules, for example, Burlington Northern

Railroad Company's Air Brake and Train Handling Rules define mountain

grade as 1.8 percent grades and greater. For what purpose do railroads

use these definitions of mountain grade, and could these definitions be

used as a basis for defining mountain grade territory in this rule?

B. En Route Failures

In the NPRM, FRA proposed that if a 2-way EOT or equivalent device

becomes incapable of initiating an emergency brake application from the

rear of the train while the train is en route, then the speed of that

train would be limited to 30 mph. See 59 FR 47714, 47743. FRA's

rationale for this limitation was that two-way EOT devices are not

required on trains that travel less than 30 mph. Thus, operating with a

non-functional two-way EOT device is the same as not having a device;

consequently, trains operating with failed two-way EOT devices should

be subjected to this same limitation. Furthermore, FRA suggested that

the concerns raised by several railroads regarding train delays, missed

deliveries, and safety were not justified. The Association of American

Railroads (AAR) as well as several railroads commented that these

devices are very reliable and have an extremely low failure rate, if

properly maintained. Consequently, FRA believed that the concerns of

the railroads were outweighed by the potential harm to both the public

and railroad employees caused by trains being allowed to operate

without the devices at speeds which Congress and FRA feel require the

added safety benefits provided by these devices.

Several railroads commented on FRA's proposal reinforcing the view

that such a limitation could cause serious train delays and missed

deliveries and would actually produce additional safety hazards due to

the bunching of trains. Commenters also suggested that FRA failed to

include the cost of this limitation in its analysis. Other commenters

noted that subsequent to the drafting of the NPRM, Canada eliminated

its speed restriction for failure of a 2-way EOT en route.

(1) Are there alternative operating limits that could be imposed

when a failure of a 2-way EOT occurs en route providing a degree of

safety similar to the proposed speed limitation?

(2) Can the costs of train delays and missed deliveries

attributable to the proposed speed limitation be quantified? What are

they?

(3) Has Canada's elimination of a similar speed restriction

resulted in a reduction in safety? What has been the result of the

elimination?

(4) To what extent should failures en route in mountain grade

territory trigger special restrictions?

C. Applicability

Based on the statutory mandate and after review of the comments

received and the accidents relied on for support of the use of 2-way

EOTs, FRA in the NPRM proposed that the devices be required equipment

on trains that operate at speeds in excess of 30 mph and on trains that

operate in mountain grade territories. See 59 FR 47743. (A discussion

of FRA's definition of ``mountain grade territory'' is contained in

Section A). In addition to those operations specifically excluded from

2-way EOT requirements by the statute (49 U.S.C. 20141), FRA found

sufficient safety justification for excluding two other types of

operations: (i) freight trains equipped with a locomotive capable of

initiating a brake application located in the rear third of the train

length; and (ii) trains equipped with fully independent secondary

braking systems capable of safely stopping the train in the event of

failure of the primary system. In order to provide the industry with

time to acquire a sufficient number of 2-way EOTs and to ease the

economic impact of acquiring the devices, FRA proposed that the

requirement that all road trains not specifically excepted be equipped

with either a 2-way EOT or an alternate technology device performing

the same function not become effective until December 31, 1996. See 59

FR 47713, 47743. FRA also proposed that all 2-way EOTs purchased prior

to the effective date of the final rule would be deemed to meet the

design requirements contained in the proposal. See 59 FR 47713, 47743.

Other than FRA's definition of ``mountain grade territory,'' there

were very few comments specifically addressing the applicability

requirements contained in the NPRM other than stylistic suggestions.

One commenter did recommend that the exception for trains operating in

a push mode be amplified to require that the control cab on the rear of

train be occupied, display a reading of the brake pressure, and be

capable of making an emergency application.

(1) Is there a safety justification for excluding other types of

operations not currently contemplated? What are they?

(2) As it has been over three years since Congress issued the

statutory mandate regarding 2-way EOTs and because the data relied on

by FRA in developing the NPRM is close to two years old, FRA would like

updated information regarding the number of 2-way EOTs currently in

use, the number currently on order with manufacturers, the current cost

of 2-way EOTs meeting the proposed design requirements, and the

reliability of the devices currently in use.

(3) Subsequent to the drafting of the NPRM, FRA has learned that

some traditional passenger operations are considering the operation of

mixed passenger and freight trains. How should these types of

operations be handled with regard to the use of 2-way EOTs? Is there a

safety justification for excepting these operations from the

requirements?

D. Initial Terminal Requirements

At the ANPRM stage, FRA received several comments regarding the

batteries used in 2-way EOTs. Several commenters suggested that the

most frequent cause of failure of 2-way EOTs is battery failure. These

commenters also indicated that this problem could be cured by replacing

batteries at initial terminals. Other commenters suggested that some

minimum charge be required at initial terminals and that inspections be

performed at all brake tests and crew change points. Several commenters

also suggested that interchangeable battery packs were necessary

because some railroads were unable to charge the devices that come onto

their lines from other railroads.

[[Page 6614]]

Based on these comments, FRA proposed that any train equipped with

a 2-way EOT or its equivalent shall not depart from the point where the

train is originally assembled unless (i) the device is capable of

initiating a brake application from the rear of the train and (ii) the

batteries of the device are charged to at least 75 percent of watt-hour

capacity. See 59 FR 47734. Although FRA did not receive any comments on

this provision subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM, FRA feels this

was due to most commenters focusing on some of the broader issues

contained in the NPRM.

Due to the period of time since hearings on the ANPRM were

conducted, FRA requests the following:

(1) Information regarding the operating life of batteries currently

used in 2-way EOTs;

(2) Information regarding the reliability and interchangeability of

these batteries; and

(3) Opinions on whether the proposed requirements are necessary

based on the experiences of those parties currently using 2-way EOTs on

a regular basis.

E. Design Requirements

In order to maintain uniformity in the performance of 2-way EOT

devices, FRA proposed basic performance and design requirements for

these devices in the NPRM. As 2-way EOTs that are currently in

production meet the design requirements already established for one-way

devices contained at 49 CFR 232.19, FRA intended to retain those

requirements, apply them to 2-way EOTs and establish other specific

requirements to ensure two-way communication and the ability to make an

emergency brake application from the rear of the train. The additional

proposed requirements include the following:

(a) An emergency brake application command from the front unit

shall activate the emergency air valve at the rear of the train within

one second.

(b) The rear unit shall send an acknowledgment message to the front

unit immediately upon receipt of a brake application command. The front

unit shall listen for this acknowledgment and repeat the brake

application command if the acknowledgment is not correctly received.

(c) The rear unit, on receipt of a properly coded command, shall

open a valve in the brake line and hold it open for a minimum of 15

seconds. This opening of the valve shall cause the brake line to vent

to the exterior.

(d) The valve opening and hose diameter shall have a minimum

diameter of 3/4 inch to effect an emergency brake application.

(e) Restoring of the braking function (recharging the air brake

system) shall be enabled automatically by the rear equipment, no more

than 60 seconds after it has initiated an emergency.

(f) The front unit shall have a manually operated switch which,

when activated, shall initiate an emergency brake transmission command

to the rear unit. The switch shall be labeled ``Emergency'' and shall

be protected so that there will exist no possibility of accidental

activation.

(g) The availability of the front-to-rear communications link shall

be checked automatically at least every 10 [seconds]*.

(h) Means shall be provided to confirm availability and proper

functioning of the emergency valve.

(i) Means shall be provided to arm the front and rear units to

ensure the rear unit responds only to an emergency command from its

associated front unit.

See 59 FR 47731. *(Section 232.117(g) of the NPRM inadvertently

contained ``10 minutes'' for this requirement; it should have read ``10

seconds.'' See 59 FR 47731). FRA recognizes that currently available

2-way EOTs have several optional features that could prove beneficial

to railroads and although FRA recommends that railroads obtain as many

of the optional features as they can when purchasing the devices, FRA

does not intend to mandate their use and feels each railroad is in the

best position to determine which features benefit its operation.

Several commenters suggested that the provision requiring the

automatic restoration of the brake function after 60 seconds should be

eliminated. These commenters stated that the brake function should not

be restored until the train has come to a complete stop and/or that the

locomotive engineer should retain control of the restoration. One

commenter recommended that a separate labeled and protected emergency

switch should not be mandated if the EOT's emergency application could

be integrated into the existing emergency brake controls.

(1) Are the proposed design requirements sufficient to ensure

uniformity in the devices' design? Do they unduly restrict

technological advances?

(2) FRA is interested in any information regarding any

technological advancements or design changes, that may have been made

in the area of 2-way EOTs in the last two years, that would necessitate

a change in or addition to the proposed design requirements.

(3) FRA is also interested in any information from railroads

currently using 2-way EOTs regarding the procedures or practices they

have adopted for testing and inspecting the devices to ensure that the

devices are armed and operational prior to a train's departure. Could

or should these practices and procedures form the basis of such

requirements in this rule?

(4) Based on information obtained in investigating the recent

accident near Cajon Pass, FRA is interested information regarding

problems with maintaining communication between the front and rear

units. What procedures or operations have been developed to overcome

these communication problems? Could or should these be incorporated in

this rule? Are there additional design requirements that could cure

these communication problems? Minimum wattage requirements? Requiring

repeater stations where necessary?

F. Calibration Requirements

In the NPRM, FRA proposed to extend the calibration period for all

EOTs from 92 days to 365 days. See 59 FR 47700, 47731. FRA based this

proposed extension not only on its own experience but also on the

comments received from several parties that the devices are fairly

reliable and can operate for years without calibration. Furthermore,

FRA believes that the 92-day calibration period was established at a

time when there was little experience with the devices. Since that

time, not only has calibration of the devices not proven to be a

problem, but technology has further improved the reliability of the

devices. Although several commenters, both at the ANPRM and NPRM stage,

commented on the unreliability of the devices, these comments generally

addressed either the failure of the railroads to properly perform the

calibrations or the misuse of the devices.

(1) FRA is interested in information and operating experiences

regarding the reliability and accuracy of recently manufactured EOTs.

G. Cost/Benefit Information

Based on information collected and additional research conducted

subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM, FRA has updated its Regulatory

Impact Analysis regarding 2- way EOTs. See FRA's Regulatory Impact

Analysis: Two-way End-of-Train Devices. (This document will be

distributed to all interested parties at the public regulatory

conference, or copies may be

[[Page 6615]]

obtained by contacting the individuals previously identified.) FRA

currently estimates that the proposed requirements regarding 2-way EOTs

would cost the industry approximately $214 million over 20 years at a 7

percent discount rate. This estimate is based on the following

assumptions: (i) unit purchase and installation cost of $7,000 per unit

(front and rear); (ii) annual maintenance and calibration cost of

Sec. 415 per unit; (iii) Class I railroads would be required to

purchase 16,375 units; and (iv) Class II and Class III railroads would

be required to purchase 1,096 units.

Although FRA did not quantify the safety benefits that would be

achieved by requiring 2-way EOTs in its original Regulatory Impact

Analysis of the NPRM, FRA is in the process of developing an analysis

to include safety benefits of the proposed requirements. See FRA's

Regulatory Impact Analysis: Two-way End-of-Train Devices. FRA currently

estimates that the quantifiable safety benefits from the proposal would

be approximately $46 million over 20 years at a 7 percent discount

rate. However, it should be noted that the benefits currently estimated

by FRA are extremely conservative and are based on a limited number of

cost factors arising as a result of an accident. FRA's conservative

benefit estimate does not capture many of the costs associated with an

accident such as: wreck clearance; damage to lading; train delay,

emergency response, or enviromental clean-up. FRA looks forward to

receiving information and suggestions from commenters on methods for

capturing or estimating these additional costs. FRA's Office of Safety,

Accidents Reports Division, has identified 26 accidents since 1990

which potentially could have been prevented had the trains been

equipped with 2-way EOTs. The accidents and railroad property damages

associated with the potentially preventable accidents are contained in

Table 1 below.

Table 1--Potentially Preventable Accidents*

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RR Property Accidents

Date Place Listed Cause** Injuries Fatalities updated to Rate of preventable

12/95 $ effectiveness Benefit

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

900429............................. Yardley, WA........... Automatic Brake, other 1 0 $46,560 0.9 $41,904

improper use.

901004............................. Devore, CA............ Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 7,857 0.9 7,071

901022............................. Esbon, KS............. use of brakes, other.. 1 0 90,016 0.9 81,014

900517............................. Nampa, WY............. Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 151,319 0.9 136,187

910918............................. Spague, WA............ Obstructed brake pipe. 0 1 4,275,873 0.9 3,848,286

910304............................. Waterfall, WY......... Use of brakes, other.. 2 0 980,075 0.5 882,068

910304............................. Waterfall, WY......... Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 646,407 0.5 581,767

911021............................. Vernon, IA............ Other brake defects, 0 0 24,755 0.5 22,280

cars.

920307............................. Kansas City, MO....... Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 430,432 0.9 387,389

920307............................. Kansas City, MO....... Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 61,875 0.9 55,688

920611............................. Money, MS............. Improper operation of 0 0 224,778 0.5 202,300

line air.

920611............................. Money, MS............. Improper operation of 2 0 452,334 0.5 407,101

line air.

920913............................. Benton, WY............ Other brake defects, 0 0 15,579 0.5 14,021

loco.

921016............................. Sterling, IL.......... Other brake defects, 0 0 148,998 0.5 134,098

loco.

921203............................. Hillcrest, ID......... Automatic brake, 2 0 7,071 0.5 6,364

insufficient.

921203............................. Hillcrest, ID......... Automatic brake, 0 0 71,819 0.5 64,638

insufficient.

931001............................. Keystone, NB.......... Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 10,572 0.9 9,515

931001............................. Keystone, NB.......... Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 2,642,466 0.9 2,378,219

931004............................. Faust, UT............. Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 14,801 0.9 13,321

931011............................. Fulton, KY............ Improper operation of 0 0 3,172 0.5 2,854

line air.

931011............................. Fulton, KY............ Improper operation of 0 0 11,418 0.5 10,276

line air.

931221............................. Wood, IA.............. Improper operation of 0 0 321,600 0.5 289,440

line air.

931221............................. Wood, IA.............. Improper operation of 0 0 106,936 0.5 96,242

line air.

931223............................. Grenada, MS........... Improper operation of 0 0 5,815 0.5 5,233

line air.

931223............................. Grenada, MS........... Improper operation of 0 0 5,286 0.5 4,757

line air.

940909............................. Cajon, CA............. Automatic brake other 0 0 73,331 0.9 65,998

improper use.

940909............................. Cajon, CA (San B)..... Automatic brake, 0 0 2,353 0.9 2,117

insufficient.

941214............................. Cajon, CA............. Obstructed brake pipe. 1 0 1,293,484 0.9 1,164,135

941214............................. Cajon, CA............. Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 2,765,060 0.9 2,488,554

950209............................. Nelsons, WI........... Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 25,025 0.9 22,522

950209............................. Nelsons, WI........... Use of brakes, other.. 1 0 5,702 0.9 5,132

950406............................. Argonne, MI........... Improper operation of 0 1 268,798 0.9 241,918

line air.

960201............................. Cajon, CA............. Unknown............... 1 2 Unknown ............. Unknown

TOTAL........................ ...................... ...................... 17 4 16,540,459 ............. 14,886,413

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* A double entry showing more than one accident on the same date and at the same location indicates that the equipment or other property of two

railroads were involved.

** Cause listed in the Rail Equipment Accident/Incident Report filed with FRA, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 225, by the railroad involved.

The accidents range in severity from those having very little

monetary damages to those involving death, serious injury, the release

of hazardous materials and the subsequent closure of a major federal

highway and evacuation of a nearby town. The values for railroad

property and track damages are shown updated to December 1995 dollars

using the Engineering News Record index for heavy machinery and

equipment.

[[Page 6616]]

Furthermore, there is a wide variety of qualitative safety benefits

which could be gained from prevention of accidents by using 2-way EOTs.

These types of qualitative benefits would include risk reduction of

accidents involving hazardous materials and the associated costs, as

well as reduced anxiety for residents of communities along railroad

tracks, a safer environment for their families, and improved quality of

life. Unfortunately, we do not have the type of information necessary

to quantify the safety impact of many of these elements.

(1) Are the assumptions used by FRA in its updated Regulatory

Impact Analysis valid?

(2) What is the current purchase and installation cost of a 2-way

EOT required by FRA's proposal?

(3) Are the estimated annual maintenance costs accurate?

(4) Is FRA's estimate of the number of units required to be

purchased accurate? How many 2-way units are currently in operation?

How many are currently on order with a manufacturer?

(5) What is the en route failure rate of 2-way devices currently in

use?

(6) What is the average useful life of currently available 2-way

EOTs? Front units? Rear units?

(7) What is the estimated cost per hour of delay for a given train?

(8) On average, how long does it take to calibrate newer (post-

1992) 2-way EOTs?

(9) Should any of the accidents/incidents identified in Table 1 not

be considered potentially preventable? Why? Are there other accidents/

incidents, not identified in Table 1, occurring since 1990 that should

be added to the list of potentially preventable accidents/incidents?

Provide specifics.

(10) FRA's ability to analyze accident/incident costs contained in

Table 1 has been limited to data supplied by the industry. This

information does not include costs such as wreck clearance, damage to

lading, train delay, emergency response, and environmental cleanup.

Consequently, FRA encourages commenters to provide any suggestions or

information they have for capturing, or estimating, these additional

costs.

H. Compliance Plans

Unlike most FRA safety rulemaking proceedings, this proceeding is

principally concerned with defining exceptions to an otherwise absolute

statutory command. Thus, whatever the final rule may provide, railroads

must plan well in advance of December 31, 1997 (the date by which the

statute requires all covered trains to be equipped with 2-way EOTs) to

procure large numbers of 2-way EOTs, equip their trains with them, and

train their employees to install, maintain, and use them. FRA,

therefore urges railroads to immediately begin acquiring and equipping

trains with 2-way EOTs to enhance the safety of their operations rather

than waiting until the issuance of the final rule. FRA is interested in

knowing in the greatest detail available what plans railroads currently

have in place for complying with the statute.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on February 15, 1996.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96-4017 Filed 2-20-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-06-P