Record of Decision Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

for Stockpile Stewardship and Management

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of

Decision for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the

program through which DOE carries out its statutory responsibility for

the United States nuclear weapons program. This Record of Decision is

based on the information and analysis contained in the Final

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Stockpile

Stewardship and Management (DOE/EIS-0236) and other factors, including

the mission responsibilities of the Department, and comments received

on the Draft and Final PEIS. DOE's decisions will continue the ongoing

Office of Defense Programs missions at eight DOE sites, making

appropriate adjustments consistent with post-Cold War national security

policies. Selected facilities for enhanced experimental capability will

be constructed and operated; manufacturing capability at existing

weapons industrial plants will be maintained; however, manufacturing

capacity will be appropriately downsized; plutonium pit component

manufacturing capability will be reestablished.

More specifically, for Stockpile Stewardship, the Department has

[[Page 68015]]

decided to: (1) Construct and operate the National Ignition Facility at

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; (2) construct and operate

the Contained Firing Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory; and (3) construct and operate the Atlas Facility at the Los

Alamos National Laboratory. Additionally, the Department has decided to

transfer a small amount of plutonium-242 material from the Savannah

River Site to the Los Alamos National Laboratory to support stockpile

stewardship activities.

With respect to Stockpile Management, the Department has decided

to: (1) Downsize weapons assembly/disassembly capacity at the Pantex

Plant; (2) downsize high explosive component fabrication capacity at

the Pantex Plant; (3) downsize weapons secondary and case component

fabrication capacity at the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation;

(4) downsize weapons nonnuclear component fabrication capacity at the

Kansas City Plant; and (5) reestablish pit fabrication capability, with

a small capacity, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Final

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, or this Record of

Decision, please call 800-776-2765, or write to: Jay Rose, Director,

Reconfiguration Group, Office of Technical and Environmental Support,

DP-45, United States Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW,

Washington, D.C. 20585.

The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program maintains an

Internet Home Page at http://web.fie.com/fedix/doeoor.html. This can

also be accessed by modem by dialing toll-free (800) 783-3349 or (301)

258-0953 in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.

For information on the DOE's National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of

NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, United States Department of Energy,

1000 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or

leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Since the inception of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, DOE and its

predecessor agencies have been responsible for the stewardship and

management of the nation's stockpile. Through the system of national

laboratories and industrial facilities known collectively as the

Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex), DOE has provided the nation with

nuclear weapons and ensured that those weapons remain safe and

reliable. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS analyzes the

potential consequences to human health and the environment if certain

changes to the Complex are implemented to support DOE's Stockpile

Stewardship and Management Program.

The term ``stockpile stewardship'' refers to core competencies in

activities associated with research, design, development, and testing

of nuclear weapons, and the assessment and certification of their

safety and reliability under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Historically, these activities have been performed at the three DOE

weapons laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico,

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and Sandia

National Laboratories in New Mexico and California) and the Nevada Test

Site. The term ``stockpile management'' refers to core competencies in

activities associated with the production, maintenance, surveillance,

and disassembly of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Historically,

these activities have been performed at the DOE nuclear weapons

industrial facilities (currently, the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, the

Kansas City Plant in Missouri, the Pantex Plant in Texas and the

Savannah River Site in South Carolina).

In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's

political regimes, the emphasis of the United States nuclear weapons

program has shifted dramatically from developing and producing new-

design weapons to dismantlement and maintenance of a smaller enduring

stockpile. In accordance with national security policy, including the

terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START) Treaties, the

nuclear weapons stockpile is being significantly reduced. The United

States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons, and DOE has

closed or consolidated some of its former weapons industrial

facilities. Additionally, in 1992, the United States declared a

moratorium on underground nuclear testing. President Clinton extended

this moratorium and decided, in August 1995, to pursue a ``zero-yield''

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that he signed in September 1996.

Even with these significant changes, however, DOE's

responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue. The

President and Congress have directed DOE to maintain the core

intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear

weapons and to maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring

nuclear weapons stockpile. In response to this direction, DOE has

developed a science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program

to provide a single, highly integrated technical program for

maintaining core competencies and ensuring the continued safety and

reliability of the stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management

Program has evolved from programs that served this mission over

previous decades.

With no new-design nuclear weapons production, DOE expects existing

weapons to remain in the stockpile well into the next century. This

means that the weapons will age beyond original expectations. Because

underground nuclear testing will no longer be available, alternative

means must be developed in order to assess and certify the weapons'

continued safety and reliability. To meet these new challenges, DOE's

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed to

increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear

weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of the safety and

reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong scientific and technical

basis for future United States nuclear weapons policy objectives.

DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations for implementing the procedural

provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR

Parts 1500-1508) and the Department of Energy regulations implementing

NEPA (10 CFR Part 1021). In making this Record of Decision for the

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the Department considered

the analysis from the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

(PEIS) for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (DOE/EIS-

0236), issued in November 1996, along with other factors such as DOE

statutory mission requirements, national security policy, cost,

schedule, and technical risks. Additional technical descriptions and

assessments of cost, schedule and technical risk are found in the

Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives (DOE/AL, July 1996), the

Stockpile Management Preferred Alternatives Report (DOE/AL, July 1996),

and the Technology Basis and Site Comparison Evaluation for the

National Ignition Facility (DOE/OAK, September 1996).

[[Page 68016]]

In February 1996, DOE published the Draft PEIS for Stockpile

Stewardship and Management, which evaluated the siting, construction,

and operation of proposed stockpile stewardship facilities and the

siting, construction, and operation of facilities proposed for

stockpile management at eight alternative sites within the Complex. The

60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 8, 1996,

and ended on May 7, 1996.

During the comment period, public meetings were held in Los Alamos,

Albuquerque and Santa Fe, New Mexico; North Las Vegas, Nevada; Oak

Ridge, Tennessee; Kansas City, Missouri; Livermore, California;

Washington, D.C.; Amarillo, Texas; and North Augusta, South Carolina.

In response to requests from the public, five of the public meetings

were joint meetings to obtain comments on both the Stockpile

Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS and the Department's Storage and

Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft PEIS, which were

being prepared concurrently. Two of the joint meetings (Amarillo and

North Augusta) also addressed issues associated with another EIS then

in preparation, the Site-Wide Draft Environmental Impact Statement for

the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of

Nuclear Weapon Components. In addition, the public was encouraged to

provide comments via mail, fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet),

and telephone (toll-free 800 number).

Volume IV of the Final PEIS, the Comment Response Document,

describes the public comment process in detail, presents comment

summaries and responses, and provides copies of all comments received.

The PEIS includes a classified appendix that provides additional

information about weapons physics as it relates to the proposed actions

for enhanced experimental capability, the stewardship need for

plutonium-242 and its transfer to a weapons laboratory, and a number of

the classified appendices to unclassified documents summarized or

referenced in the PEIS. Applicable regulations provide that

Environmental Impact Statements which address classified proposals may

be restricted from public dissemination; consistent with the

regulations, however, the Department has organized the PEIS so that

classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified

portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR 1507.3; 10 CFR

1021.340(a)].

For the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing Facility, and

the Atlas Facility, the PEIS included project specific environmental

analyses (Appendices I, J and K of the PEIS) to address the detailed

environmental impacts associated with siting, construction and

operation. Based upon this Record of Decision, the Department intends

to proceed with the construction and operation of these three

facilities with no further National Environmental Policy Act reviews.

Proposed Actions

Broadly stated, all of the existing basic capabilities of the

Complex continue to be required both technically and by national

security policy objectives established by the President and Congress.

The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS concentrates on three

major proposed actions that result from the national security policy

constraints placed on the Program. The three major proposed actions

are: (1) Providing enhanced experimental capability; (2) rightsizing

the industrial base; and (3) reestablishing manufacturing capability

and a small capacity for plutonium pit components (the pit is the

central core of a nuclear weapon containing plutonium and/or highly

enriched uranium that is surrounded by a layer of high explosive).

Additionally, the Department considered the transfer of a small amount

of plutonium-242 from the Savannah River Site to Los Alamos National

Laboratory or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of

stockpile stewardship activities.

1. Proposed Action (1)--Providing Enhanced Experimental Capability for

Stockpile Stewardship

Historically, nuclear testing provided the Department with an

unambiguous high confidence in the safety and reliability of weapons in

the stockpile. As described in Chapters 2 and 3 of the PEIS, without

underground nuclear testing, DOE must rely on experimental and

computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to assess

and predict the consequences of problems that may occur in an aging

stockpile.

DOE concluded that other approaches to stockpile stewardship would

not ensure nuclear weapon safety and reliability, and that such

approaches are therefore not reasonable. In addition, DOE concluded

that only the three facilities discussed below are sufficiently well

understood that they could be proposed and evaluated in detail in the

PEIS (see Section 3.1.2 of the PEIS, and the sections below entitled,

``Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship,''

and ``Other Considerations.'')

DOE has considered that there are differing opinions on the

technical merit of DOE's proposed actions with regard to enhanced

experimental capability. Nuclear weapons design information, including

the complex physics of nuclear weapon explosions, is generally

classified for reasons of national security and nonproliferation. Even

if this information were unclassified, the physics problems remain

extremely complex; hence, the reason why nuclear testing was so

important to the past program. Both the classification of information

and technical complexity of the issues form natural barriers to public

communication. The technical complexity, alone, engenders significant

debate among qualified experts, especially in the area of high energy

density physics.

The PEIS attempts to explain the weapon physics issues in an

unclassified, comprehensible manner regarding its relation to mission

purpose and need (Chapter 2), proposed actions and alternatives

(Section 3.3), and project-specific technical detail (Volume III). In

the absence of nuclear testing, there are two basic alternatives: (1)

Rely on existing facilities, as described by the No Action alternative,

as sources of experimental data; and (2) pursue the enhanced capability

of the proposed facilities to provide the sources of experimental data

needed.

The nuclear weapons phenomena involved in enhanced experimental

capability can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) Physics of

nuclear weapons primaries (the primary contains the main high explosive

and the plutonium pit); (2) physics of nuclear weapons secondaries (the

secondary contains highly enriched uranium, lithium deuteride and other

materials to produce a thermonuclear explosion); and (3) weapons

effects (the effects of radiation on nuclear weapons and military

systems). Because there are no proposed actions in the PEIS for new

facilities designed primarily for weapons effects testing, this issue

is not discussed further in this Record of Decision. The physics of

nuclear weapons primaries and secondaries are described below, as well

as alternatives that are assessed in the PEIS. More detail on the

physics of nuclear weapons can be found in Section 2.4.1, 3.3, and

Appendices I and K of the PEIS.

[[Page 68017]]

1.A. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries

With respect to the physics phenomena from the implosion of the

primary, experimental facilities provide physics and computational

model validation, material behavior information, improved understanding

of the implosion and the ability to assess the effects of defects.

Proposed new facilities and site alternatives considered, along with

the existing facilities which are part of the No Action alternative,

are discussed below.

1.A.1 Alternatives. 1.A.1.1 No Action. The principal diagnostic

tools DOE currently uses to study initiation of nuclear weapons

primaries are hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments (see Section

3.3 of the PEIS). Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue

to use the hydrodynamic and dynamic testing facilities currently

available at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Nevada Test Site (NTS), including

the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility currently

under construction at LANL (see Section 1.6.2 of the PEIS).

1.A.1.2 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Contained

Firing Facility (CFF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Under this alternative, the capabilities of the CFF would be added to

the existing facilities at LLNL used to study the physics of primaries.

Specifically, the CFF would be an addition to the existing Flash X-Ray

Facility (FXR) at LLNL Site 300, Building 801. The facility would

provide an enclosed blast chamber to contain debris from high explosive

experiments that support the stockpile stewardship program. The

containment enclosure would reduce the environmental, safety, and

health impacts of current outdoor testing. The enclosure would also

improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing by better

controlling experimental conditions. Because the CFF is an upgrade to

an existing facility, sites other than Building 801, at LLNL, would

have significant technical disadvantages, and were not evaluated in

detail.

1.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 1.A.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. The CFF addition to the existing FXR Facility would cost about

$50 million to construct and take about two years to complete. The CFF

would improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing.

Improving diagnostic capability to understand weapon primary behavior

is crucial to DOE's ability to continue to certify the safety and

reliability of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.

1.A.2.2 Environmental Factors. DOE prepared a Project Specific

Analysis (Appendix J of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts

associated with construction and operation of the CFF. Because the

proposal for the CFF involves modification to the existing FXR

Facility, construction impacts would be negligible. Very little land

would be disturbed (less than 1 acre) and the construction activities

would largely involve internal modifications to the existing facility.

Impacts associated with operation would also be negligible. The CFF

enclosure would reduce gaseous and particulate air emissions from

explosives testing, reduce the generation of solid low-level

radioactive waste, reduce testing noise, and improve the safety of

testing by controlling fragment dispersion. The CFF would not utilize

any significant quantities of natural resources, and would not cause

any significant socioeconomic impacts at LLNL. LLNL has adequate

existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of

wastes that would be generated by the CFF. Impacts to human health from

CFF operation are expected to be within regulatory limits, and

extremely small.

1.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally

preferable alternative is to construct and operate the CFF as an

addition to FXR, at LLNL. Although this alternative would require

construction and additional land utilization, the impacts associated

with the construction and operation of this facility are minor and

offset by the environmental benefits of the CFF. The CFF would contain

releases to the atmosphere from the conventional high explosive

detonations presently being conducted uncontained at the FXR Facility,

which would continue operation under the No Action alternative.

1.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to proceed with the

construction and operation of the CFF at Site 300, Building 801, at

LLNL. This action is consistent with existing operations at Site 300

and LLNL land-use plans and policies.

Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the CFF

construction and operation will be formalized in a CFF Mitigation

Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and monitored for

compliance by its representatives during construction and operation of

the CFF. Construction and operation of the CFF are not expected to

incur environmental impacts other than those associated with a

temporary construction lay-down area. Dust suppression and storm water

runoff mitigation technologies will be applied to reduce these impacts

to insignificance. A preconstruction survey monitoring for endangered

species will be conducted no more than 60 days prior to construction

start-up.

1.B. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries

The energy released by the fission of the nuclear weapons primary

activates the secondary assembly, creating a thermonuclear (fusion)

explosion. However, the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries deals

with the interaction of many dynamic physics processes, including

hydrodynamics, thermodynamics, fission, and fusion. Experimental

facilities provide improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition,

secondary physics and computational model validation, and material

behavior information. These facilities will also be useful for

investigating other physics phenomena related to the nuclear weapon

primary and weapons effects (see Appendices I and K of the PEIS).

1.B.1 Alternatives. 1.B.1.1 No Action. The No Action alternative

would limit DOE to the use of existing facilities. The principal

facilities currently available are the Nova Facility at Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Pegasus II Facility at

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

1.B.1.2 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the National

Ignition Facility (NIF). Under this alternative, the capabilities of

the NIF would add to the existing facilities used to study the physics

of secondaries. The NIF would house the world's most powerful laser,

focusing 192 laser beams onto a target containing isotopes of hydrogen.

NIF experiments are designed to address, to various degrees, certain

weapons issues connected with fusion ignition and boosting; weapon

effects; radiation transport; and secondary implosion, ignition, and

output. Most of these processes occur at very high energy density

(i.e., at high temperatures and pressures) and are relevant to a

weapon's performance. The NIF would achieve higher temperatures and

pressures, albeit in a very small volume, than any other existing or

proposed stockpile stewardship facility. The energy available to

conduct experiments with the NIF would be about 50 times that available

with Nova. Five alternative locations at four DOE sites were studied

for the NIF: LLNL, LANL, NTS--Area 22 main site location

[[Page 68018]]

and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), and Sandia National Laboratories

(SNL), New Mexico.

1.B.1.3 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Atlas

Facility. Under this alternative, the Atlas Facility would be added to

the existing facilities used to study the physics of secondaries. The

Atlas Facility, a pulsed-power experimental facility that builds upon

special equipment existing at LANL TA-35 (the technical area which

contains the existing pulsed-power infrastructure), would provide the

capability to create pressures and volumes necessary to accurately

benchmark weapon-related computational predictions. The need to perform

experiments with macroscopic pulsed-power targets, as well as with

lasers, exists not only because of the limits of measurement

diagnostics and improved ease of measurement at larger scale, but also

because some of the physical phenomena that must be investigated cannot

readily be scaled down to smaller sizes without affecting some

parameters of importance. Existing facilities are not adequate to

analyze some secondary physics issues.

1.B.2 Comparison of Alternatives. The capabilities that would be

provided by the two proposed facilities, the NIF and the Atlas

Facility, are independent components needed to improve the

understanding of the physics of nuclear weapon secondaries. As

explained in Section 3.3 and Appendices I and K of the PEIS, because

each facility responds to a different need and provides different

capabilities related to nuclear weapons secondaries, they are

complementary proposals.

1.B.2.1 Cost and Technical Factors. National Ignition Facility.

Total capital costs for construction of the NIF at LLNL would be

approximately $1.1 billion. The capital and life-cycle comparative cost

evaluation indicates the LLNL site will have the lowest capital and the

lowest overall costs (by about 5%) of the alternative sites considered.

Construction is anticipated to take about five years.

In regard to technical risk, LLNL has the most extensive experience

in developing, designing, constructing, and operating high power,

large-aperture, solid-state lasers and optical components. The

extensive solid-state laser infrastructure, equipment, and facilities

at LLNL exceed those of the alternative sites. LLNL has improved this

infrastructure continuously as it has built a succession of highly

sophisticated solid-state lasers. LLNL also has the most extensive

surrounding high-technology infrastructure.

The Inertial Confinement Fusion Program (ICF) and the NIF have been

supported by a succession of independent technical reviews conducted by

the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the Fusion Policy Advisory

Committee (FPAC), the Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee

(ICFAC), and the JASON Committee (a group of independent experts who

evaluated the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program).

These reviews enabled the Department to plan the next reasonable steps

to further the pursuit of ICF goals and to evaluate their relationship

to SBSS. In September 1990, the NAS concluded that a solid state glass

laser, as proposed for NIF, was the only driver capable of achieving

ignition within a decade. Also in September 1990, as part of the

Inertial Fusion Energy plan, the FPAC urged support for the ICF

ignition facility, driven by a solid state glass laser as recommended

by the NAS, as the most important next step in the investigation of

inertial fusion energy's potential. In May 1994, the ICFAC stated that

they believed that the ICF research and development program has a key

role to play in ``science-based stewardship.'' They continued by saying

that an essential ingredient in this role will be the achievement of

ignition of a fusion capsule in the laboratory. In February 1996, their

final report concludes that good progress in target physics continues

and that DOE should proceed with the next step in the NIF project. In

November 1994, the JASON Committee strongly endorsed the NIF, calling

it ``the most scientifically valuable of the programs proposed for

SBSS.'' They did not identify any other technologies that could provide

the technical capabilities of the NIF. In March 1996, the JASON

Committee reiterated their previous comment about the NIF and further

concluded, ``that the present ICF Program does make an important

contribution to SBSS, and that the NIF will substantially increase this

contribution * * *'' The committee recommended proceeding with the NIF.

Atlas Facility. Capital costs to build the Atlas Facility are

estimated to be about $43 million. Construction will take about four

years. Because LANL has more extensive expertise in microsecond pulsed-

power than any other DOE site, and because the Atlas Facility would

utilize the extensive existing infrastructure and special equipment

available at LANL, no other DOE sites were considered for the Atlas

Facility. Proceeding with the construction of the Atlas Facility is

also consistent with the November 1994 JASON Committee review mentioned

above.

1.B.2.2 Environmental Factors. National Ignition Facility. DOE

prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix I of the PEIS) to

address the environmental impacts associated with construction and

operation of the NIF. Potential environmental impacts were assessed for

the No Action alternative and two design capabilities (i.e., Conceptual

Design and Enhanced Design options) at all five candidate locations.

The analysis indicates that there would be few differences in the

environmental impacts between the candidate sites and little

environmental impact in any case. The maximum daily particulate matter

concentration in the air during site clearing would exceed applicable

air quality standards for suspended particles less than 10 microns in

diameter (PM10) at LLNL and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF).

However, the ambient air quality impacts would be localized and of

short duration. Land requirements would be greatest at NTS (45.0

acres), although this acreage is less that 1 percent of the uncommitted

land at NTS. Conversely, the least amount of uncommitted land that

would be required for NIF would be 7.9 acres at the NLVF. However, this

acreage represents the largest percentage of uncommitted land at a

candidate site (56 percent). Of greater significance would be the

quality of the habitat of the uncommitted land that would be affected

by NIF construction. The highest quality habitats that would be

affected are forest (9.9 acres) at LANL or desert (45 acres) at NTS. At

the other candidate sites, habitat disturbance would occur to

previously disturbed grassland (LLNL and SNL) or to an area of sparse

vegetation (NLVF). The risk to the public from a facility accident

involving the release of radioactive material would be greatest at NLVF

and SNL, although the potential for the actual occurrence of such an

accident would be extremely low.

Atlas Facility. DOE prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix

K of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts associated with

construction and operation of the Atlas Facility. Because the proposal

for the Atlas Facility involves modification to the existing facilities

within LANL's TA-35, construction impacts are expected to be small.

Very little land (0.1 acre) would be disturbed and the construction

activities would largely involve internal modifications to existing

facilities.

Impacts associated with operations would also be negligible. The

Atlas

[[Page 68019]]

Facility would not utilize any significant quantities of natural

resources, would not cause any significant socioeconomic changes at

LANL, and would not generate significant quantities of wastes. LANL has

adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and

dispose of wastes that would be generated by the Atlas Facility.

Impacts to human health from Atlas Facility operations are expected to

be small and within regulatory limits.

1.B.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. National Ignition

Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the No Action

alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear testing, it

is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to carry out

its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired without the

capabilities that would be provided by the NIF. For this reason, the No

Action alternative with regard to the NIF is not reasonable.

Based on the PEIS analysis of the action alternatives, siting the

NIF at LLNL would have low or no adverse environmental impacts for most

environmental resource categories (land use, air quality and noise,

water biota, cultural, paleontologic, socioeconomic, human health, and

waste management) and would have the highest beneficial socioeconomic

impacts, compared to other site alternatives. After balancing the

overall potential environmental impacts at the other candidate sites

against LLNL, DOE concluded that none of the alternative candidate

sites is environmentally preferable to LLNL for the NIF.

Atlas Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the

No Action alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear

testing, it is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to

carry out its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired

without the capabilities that would be provided by the Atlas Facility.

For this reason, the No Action alternative with regard to the Atlas

Facility is not reasonable.

Because the Atlas Facility would rely upon existing facilities and

special equipment already located at LANL, no additional site

alternatives were analyzed. As discussed above, the single action

alternative, to construct and operate the Atlas Facility at LANL TA-35,

would result in negligible environmental impact.

1.B.4 Decision. National Ignition Facility. DOE's decision is to

proceed with the construction and operation of the NIF (enhanced design

option) at LLNL. Without the improved experimental capabilities offered

by the NIF, DOE would lack the ability to evaluate significant weapon

performance issues, which could adversely affect confidence in the

nation's nuclear deterrent. Among the alternatives determined to be

reasonable, construction and operation of the NIF at LLNL is

environmentally preferable, the least cost and, due to LLNL's existing

infrastructure for laser technology, the least technical risk.

Mitigation. The NIF mitigation measures appropriate to the LLNL

site as identified in the PEIS (Appendix I, Paragraph I.4.7), will be

formalized in a NIF Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by

the DOE and monitored for compliance by its representatives during

construction of the NIF. Mitigation measures appropriate to NIF

operations will be incorporated in operating plans and procedures. A

brief summary of the mitigation actions that will be taken follows.

Construction materials will be stored in temporary laydown areas.

When construction is complete, a Reclamation Plan will be developed and

actions taken to restore the construction material laydown areas to

their original condition. To assure that the public is aware of the NIF

construction activities the public will be informed, through the local

news media, that elevated noise levels will occur for several months

during construction of the NIF. Visual monitoring will be done to

determine the effectiveness of conventional water-spraying dust control

measures to assure that air quality standards are not exceeded. A Storm

Water Pollution Prevention Plan will be developed and a Storm Water

Permit will be obtained from the San Francisco Bay Region Water Quality

Control Board for storm water discharges during construction. No more

than 60 days before the start of construction, a special status species

survey will be conducted for protected and sensitive biological

resources within the NIF site and laydown areas, and mitigation actions

taken as necessary. Exclusion or buffer zones will be established to

avoid any sensitive locations. Appropriate mitigation measures will be

implemented to avoid or minimize potential adverse impacts to protected

and sensitive resources, such as state and federally-listed threatened

and endangered species. Construction crews will be informed of any

environmental concerns that exist and requested to avoid sensitive

areas. An alternative construction entrance will be utilized to prevent

traffic congestion during major construction activities such as major

concrete pours.

For external combustion boilers, a permit will be obtained from the

San Francisco Bay Area Air Quality Management District to comply with

local area air quality standards. Hazardous materials will be

inventoried and moved out of the area during flood conditions during

NIF construction and operation. A Facility Safety Plan and Construction

Safety Plan will be developed that will identify safety requirements

for construction and operation of the NIF. A Waste Minimization Plan

will be developed for the operational phase to evaluate the potential

net reduction of hazardous, radioactive, and mixed waste streams. Other

mitigation measures, identified in Sections I.4.7.2.4 and I.4.7.2.5 of

Volume III of the PEIS, will be implemented to the extent practicable.

Atlas Facility. DOE's decision is to proceed with the construction

and operation of the Atlas Facility at LANL's TA-35. Without improved

experimental capabilities offered by the Atlas Facility, DOE would lack

the ability to evaluate significant weapon performance issues, which

could adversely affect confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent.

Among the alternatives determined to be reasonable, construction and

operation of the Atlas Facility is environmentally preferable, the

least cost, and the least technical risk.

Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the Atlas

Facility construction and operation will be formalized in an Atlas

Facility Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and

monitored for compliance by its representatives during construction and

operation of the Atlas facility. There is a potential for public

exposure to nonstatic magnetic fields from the Atlas Facility for short

periods when operated. Monitoring at various locations around the Atlas

Facility will be conducted to insure fields greater than 1 Gauss (a

measure of electromagnetism) do not cause adverse impacts. Warning

signs and other administrative controls, such as road closures, will be

put in place prior to the operation of the Atlas Facility, as

necessary.

1.C. Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship

Related to the proposed actions for enhanced experimental

facilities is the issue of next generation experimental facilities. In

commenting on the Draft PEIS, some commentors suggested that potential

next generation experimental facilities be analyzed as part of the

proposed action. The Final PEIS

[[Page 68020]]

includes a discussion of potential next generation experimental

facilities and the reasons why they are not proposed actions or

alternatives (Section 3.3.4). These facilities, while contemplated on

the basis of anticipated technical need, have not reached the stage of

design maturity through research and development for DOE to include a

decisionmaking analysis at this time.

However, the PEIS does describe, in general terms or by reference,

what is known today about their potential environmental impacts. The

environmental impacts from these facilities as contemplated today would

not be significantly different from existing ``similar'' facilities. By

characterizing the potential impacts in this way, the decisionmaker was

aware of the potential program-level cumulative impacts of the next

generation facilities when deciding whether to pursue a program of

enhanced experimental capability. If DOE were to propose to construct

and operate such next generation facilities in the future, appropriate

NEPA review would be performed.

1.D. Transport and Storage of Plutonium-242

As a result of the Record of Decision for the Interim Management of

Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site EIS (DOE/EIS-0220),

existing plutonium-242 in nitrate solutions at H-Canyon at SRS will be

stabilized by conversion to plutonium oxide in the HB-line. The

plutonium-242 oxide would then be stored. The PEIS evaluates the need

for plutonium-242 for stockpile stewardship activities and transport

and storage of this material.

1.D.1 Alternatives. 1.D.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action

alternative, the plutonium-242 material would remain at SRS and be

stored in existing facilities at either the FB-Line or Building 235F.

1.D.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Store Plutonium-242 at the Los

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Under this alternative, the

plutonium-242 would be transported to LANL and stored in an existing

plutonium facility.

1.D.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Store Plutonium-242 at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Under this alternative, the

plutonium-242 would be transported to LLNL and stored in Building 332.

1.D.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 1.D.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. Transporting the plutonium-242 material would only require a

fraction of one Safe, Secure Trailer shipment, and the costs are not

significant. Because there is existing storage capacity at all three

sites, the storage costs are comparable and not significant.

The programmatic need for shipment of this material is contained in

a classified appendix to the Final PEIS. If the plutonium-242 material

were not transported to LANL or LLNL, it could not be used for

stockpile stewardship purposes.

1.D.2.2 Environmental Factors. The small quantity of plutonium-242

material is within the quantities of materials historically stored at

all three sites. Regardless of the storage location for this material,

there would be negligible environmental impacts. A high-bounding case

analysis of the risk from the transport of this material (see Section

4.19 of the PEIS) indicates low risk for either LANL or LLNL.

1.D.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For plutonium

storage, the No Action alternative is the environmentally preferable

alternative because there would be no potential impacts associated with

transportation. However, the No Action alternative would not enable the

plutonium-242 material to be used as needed for stockpile stewardship

purposes, and is, therefore, not considered reasonable. For the action

alternatives, storage at LANL is the environmentally preferable

alternative because there is slightly less risk associated with

transportation from SRS (due to the shorter distance from SRS).

1.D.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to transport the plutonium-242

material to LANL and store this material in an existing plutonium

facility. LANL currently performs most of the plutonium activities for

the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and has the necessary

facilities for storing this material. LLNL, although a reasonable

alternative, is currently reducing its inventory of plutonium.

2. Proposed Action (2)--Rightsizing the Industrial Base

With a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile, the capacity to

manufacture nuclear weapons components and assemble or disassemble

nuclear weapons can be reduced. For each required mission capability,

the Department evaluated a No Action alternative, a downsize-in-place

alternative, and an alternative that would transfer the mission to a

weapons laboratory or to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). For pit component

fabrication (a capability which no longer exists due to the closure of

the Rocky Flats Plant in 1992), the Department evaluated reestablishing

this capability, with an attendant small capacity, at Los Alamos

National Laboratory (LANL) or the Savannah River Site (SRS), in

addition to the No Action alternative (see Proposed Action 3).

2.A. Weapons Assembly/Disassembly

Weapons assembly/disassembly provides the capability to disassemble

(dismantle) retired weapons, assemble nuclear and nonnuclear components

into nuclear weapons, and perform weapons surveillance. In addition,

this mission includes the capability to conduct nonintrusive

modification pit reuse (external modifications to the pit) at the

weapons assembly/disassembly facility. This mission also includes an

option to store strategic reserves of nuclear components (pits and

secondaries).

2.A.1 Alternatives. 2.A.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action

alternative, this mission would continue at Pantex in current

facilities, but Pantex would not develop the capability to perform

nonintrusive modification pit reuse. Currently, nonintrusive

modification pit reuse can only be performed at the plutonium research

and development (R&D) facilities at LANL and LLNL.

2.A.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Pantex Plant. This

alternative would downsize and consolidate assembly/disassembly

facilities and operations. Downsizing of the assembly/disassembly

operation at Pantex would consist of an in-place decrease in facility

footprint and relocation into modern existing facilities, mostly within

Zone 12. No new construction would be required at Pantex; however,

relocation and reinstallation of equipment would be required. The

capabilities for nonintrusive modification pit reuse would be

established in existing facilities within Zone 12. These facilities

would also have the capability to support pit recertification and

requalification operations.

2.A.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Nevada Test Site

(NTS). This alternative is based on the use of the existing Device

Assembly Facility and other plant infrastructure available at the NTS

site that is required to maintain the capability for underground

nuclear testing and experimentation. Because the Device Assembly

Facility is not large enough to meet assembly/disassembly mission

requirements, new construction would be required.

2.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.A.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant is the lower cost action

alternative. Significant capital construction (about $250 million in

1995 dollars) would be required if the mission were relocated to NTS.

[[Page 68021]]

Downsizing Pantex presents less technical risk than relocation to NTS

because of the need to relocate and requalify processes at NTS, the

uncertainty in availability of key personnel, and the one year gap in

operations that would be necessary while the transition occurred.

2.A.2.2 Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant would

have a net positive effect on environmental impacts compared to the No

Action alternative. No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals

would be reduced, and accident risks would also be less than the No

Action alternative because of the consolidation of the facility

footprint (smaller area) into Zone 12. Socioeconomic impacts at Pantex

would result because of reductions in workload that will occur when the

current weapons dismantlement backlog is eliminated in about three

years. The additional socioeconomic impacts due to facility downsizing

after this dismantlement is complete are relatively small.

Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would entail

upgrading and expanding the Device Assembly Facility. It is estimated

that 18.5 additional acres would be disturbed. Although cultural and

biotic resources are not expected to be impacted, the presence of a

federally listed endangered species (the desert tortoise) at NTS would

require a site survey to determine the potential for impacts. Water

requirements to support the assembly/disassembly mission at NTS would

amount to about 4 percent more than normal projected usage.

Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would create

positive socioeconomic impacts at NTS, and significant negative

socioeconomic impacts at Pantex.

Risks to worker health would be essentially the same at either

location. Worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal

for the NTS and the downsizing of Pantex alternatives. Radiation

exposure to members of the public from normal operation would be well

within regulatory limits at both sites. Although the remoteness of the

NTS site yields a lower potential accident risk, the risk to the public

from an accident at Pantex is very low. Relocation to NTS would also

eliminate the risk associated with the transport of low level waste

from Pantex to the NTS for disposal. These transportation risks,

however, are very low.

2.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally

preferable alternative is to downsize existing capabilities at Pantex.

No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals would be reduced

compared to usage under the No Action alternative, and accident risks

would also be less than under the No Action alternative because of the

consolidation of the facility footprint into Zone 12.

2.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing

assembly/disassembly facilities presently located at the Pantex Plant.

This is the environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the

least technical risk, and is also the least-cost alternative.

2.B. High Explosives Fabrication

The high explosives fabrication mission includes capabilities

required for manufacturing process development, formulation, synthesis,

main charge manufacturing and energetic component manufacture. The high

explosives fabrication mission also supports some high explosives

surveillance and some stockpile stewardship activities.

2.B.1 Alternatives. 2.B.1.1 No Action. Under No Action, Pantex

would continue fabrication and surveillance of high explosives

components for nuclear weapons. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) would continue to

perform weapon high explosives research and development, some

surveillance, and high explosives safety studies.

2.B.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize at the Pantex Plant. This

alternative would downsize and consolidate current high explosives

operations and facilities at the Pantex Plant. Only minor modifications

to existing facilities within Zones 11 and 12 would be required. This

alternative would be considered only in conjunction with maintaining

the weapons assembly/disassembly mission at Pantex.

2.B.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National

Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer high explosives

operations from Pantex to LANL. This alternative would use existing

LANL research and development facilities, which have sufficient

capacity for high explosives requirements. There would be no new

building construction and no significant modifications required.

2.B.1.4 Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer high

explosives operations from Pantex to LLNL, and would use existing LLNL

research and development facilities. It would also require construction

of one new facility for storage of high explosives at Site 300.

2.B.1.5 Action Alternative 4--Relocate to both the Los Alamos

National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

This option would involve splitting the high explosives mission between

the two laboratories to protect core competencies at both. Since its

impact is bounded by the previous two options, this option was not

analyzed further in the PEIS.

2.B.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.B.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. The costs to perform the high explosives mission are not

large, and are comparable for all site alternatives. The current high

explosives fabrication mission at Pantex costs about $17 million per

year. The future high explosives fabrication mission will be relatively

small, costing $2-3 million per year (assuming the selected site has

other missions to absorb site overhead).

Since the U.S. does not have plans to develop new-design weapons,

there is a concern that the laboratories will lose their core

competencies in the area of high explosives technology. However, these

competencies can be retained through greater teaming and integration of

plant and laboratory capabilities and activities. This approach would

attempt to protect core competence at the weapons laboratories in high

explosives technology while retaining the overall fabrication mission

at Pantex, the site with historical production experience.

2.B.2.2 Environmental Factors. Environmental impacts from facility

modification and operation are comparable for all alternatives, and are

less than current operations. However, relocation of the high

explosives fabrication mission to LANL or LLNL would result in minor

additional environmental impacts due to the increased level of

operations at those sites compared to the No Action alternative, and

the small construction required at LLNL (less than 2.5 acres).

Socioeconomic impacts are relatively small for all alternatives. There

are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated with the

high explosives fabrication mission. Risks to neighboring populations

from credible facility accidents would be small for all alternatives.

2.B.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For high explosives

fabrication, the environmentally preferable alternative is to downsize

existing capabilities at the Pantex Plant. Environmental impacts under

this alternative would be lower than under the No Action alternative.

2.B.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing high

explosives fabrication facilities at the Pantex Plant.

[[Page 68022]]

This is the environmentally preferable alternative, the least-cost

alternative and, when coupled with greater teaming and integration of

plant and laboratory capabilities, has low technical risk. This

decision is also consistent with Section 3140 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104-201), which

requires that the high explosives fabrication mission be performed at

Pantex.

2.C. Secondary and Case Fabrication

The secondary and case fabrication mission includes activities to

support fabrication, surveillance and inspection of secondaries and

components. Functional capabilities for these services include

operations to physically and chemically process, machine, inspect,

assemble, and disassemble secondary and case materials. Materials

include depleted uranium, enriched uranium, uranium alloys,

isotopically enriched lithium hydride and lithium deuteride, and other

materials.

2.C.1 Alternatives. 2.C.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action

alternative, DOE would continue secondary and case fabrication at the

Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The Y-12 Plant would maintain the capability

to produce and assemble secondaries, cases, and related nonnuclear

weapon components.

2.C.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak

Ridge. This alternative would downsize the existing secondary and case

fabrication facilities at the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The downsized

facilities would only require approximately 14 percent of the existing

Y-12 Plant floor space, and no new facility construction would be

needed to support the secondary and case fabrication mission.

Modifications to the existing buildings would be required, both to

implement the downsized mission and to upgrade the buildings to meet

natural phenomena requirements (e.g., seismic events).

2.C.1.3 Action Alternative 2-- Relocate to the Los Alamos National

Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer the secondary and

case fabrication operations to 11 existing buildings at LANL using

manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. Modifications to the

LANL facilities would be required to perform the secondary and case

fabrication mission.

2.C.1.4 Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer the

secondary and case fabrication operations to existing buildings at LLNL

using manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. The secondary

and case fabrication facilities at LLNL would principally involve

modifications to six buildings.

2.C.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.C.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge is the least-cost

alternative because of significant facility modification costs (about

$130 million at LANL and about $185 million at LLNL, both in 1995

dollars) that would be required if the mission were relocated.

Downsizing the Y-12 Plant also presents less technical risk than

relocation to the other sites because a production infrastructure for

secondaries and cases currently exists at the Y-12 Plant and processes

would not need to be relocated and requalified. In addition, downsizing

the Y-12 Plant provides greater program flexibility by allowing some

additional capacity to be maintained in a standby mode at minimal cost.

2.C.2.2 Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would not

impact land, cultural or biotic resources. Downsizing would improve the

efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural resource

requirements. Negative socioeconomic impacts associated with downsizing

would be somewhat mitigated by positive socioeconomic impacts

associated with the decontamination and decommissioning of facilities

no longer required.

Transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to either

LANL or LLNL would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at those

sites and a large negative socioeconomic impact at Oak Ridge due to the

phaseout of this mission. For the relocation to LLNL alternative, a

small area of land (less than one acre) would be disturbed, but impacts

to cultural and biotic resources are not expected. Transfer of the

secondary and case fabrication mission from Oak Ridge would entail

small, one time impacts associated with moving the strategic reserve of

highly enriched uranium to a new location.

Radiation exposure to workers is expected to be about equal for all

three action alternatives and well within regulatory limits. Potential

radiological impacts from accidents were determined to be about equal

for Oak Ridge and LANL, and slightly higher for LLNL due to its closer

proximity to populated areas.

2.C.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For secondary and

case manufacturing, the environmentally preferable alternative is to

downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would

not impact land, cultural, or biotic resources. Downsizing would

improve the efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural

resource requirements compared to the No Action alternative.

2.C.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing

secondary and case fabrication facilities located at the Y-12 Plant at

Oak Ridge. This is the environmentally preferable alternative, has the

least technical risk, and is the least-cost alternative.

2.D. Nonnuclear Fabrication

Nonnuclear fabrication consists of the fabrication of electrical,

electronic, electro-mechanical, and mechanical components (plastics,

metals, composites), the assembly of arming, fuzing, and firing

systems, and surveillance inspection and testing of nonnuclear

components.

2.D.1 Alternatives. 2.D.1.1 No Action. The No Action alternative

would maintain these activities at their present location at the Kansas

City Plant (KCP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos

National Laboratory (LANL). KCP manufactures nonnuclear weapon

components and conducts surveillance testing on them. SNL conducts

system engineering of nuclear weapons, designs and develops nonnuclear

components, conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear testing,

manufactures some nonnuclear weapons components, and provides safety

and reliability assessments of the stockpile. LANL also manufactures a

few nonnuclear weapons components and conducts surveillance on certain

nonnuclear weapons components.

2.D.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Kansas City Plant

(KCP). The downsized nonnuclear fabrication alternative consists of

three major factory segments designed around electronics, mechanical,

and engineered materials product lines, procuring some components from

outside sources, and reducing the KCP facility area. This alternative

consists of downsizing and consolidating existing facilities and would

require facility modification but no new construction.

2.D.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National

Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). This alternative would use the

existing expertise, capability, and infrastructure at LANL, LLNL, and

SNL to satisfy fabrication requirements for nonnuclear components. This

alternative would transfer the majority of current KCP missions to SNL,

except for nuclear system plastic components, which would go either to

LANL or LLNL, and high energy detonator inert components,

[[Page 68023]]

which would go to LANL. In addition, there is an option of moving the

reservoir mission to either SNL or LANL. This alternative would require

construction of a new stand-alone production site at SNL, consisting of

six new buildings and renovations or minor modifications to some

existing buildings.

2.D.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.D.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors. Because of significant facility construction or modification

costs to relocate the mission (about $235 million in 1995 dollars),

downsizing the KCP is the least-cost alternative. Downsizing KCP also

presents significantly less technical risk than relocation to the other

sites, because a production infrastructure for nonnuclear components

currently exists and processes would not need to be relocated and

requalified.

2.D.2.2 Environmental Comparison. For the alternative that would

downsize KCP, the construction activities would involve internal

modifications to the existing facility. No land would be disturbed. For

the alternative that would transfer the KCP mission to the

laboratories, construction impacts would involve internal facility

modifications at LANL and LLNL. At SNL, approximately 22 acres of land

would be disturbed to construct new facilities. This represents 6

percent of the undisturbed land at SNL. Potential impacts to cultural

and biotic resources could occur.

There are minimal air impacts for both alternatives. Water

requirements for a downsized facility at KCP would be reduced 31

percent compared to No Action. For the alternative that would transfer

the mission to the laboratories, groundwater use would increase by less

than 1 percent over No Action usage at LANL and LLNL, but would

increase by 64 percent over No Action usage at SNL. This would still

represent only 29 percent of the groundwater rights and thus, no

adverse impacts are expected. Transferring the nonnuclear mission to

the laboratories would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at

those sites, and a large negative socioeconomic impact at KCP due to

the phaseout of this mission.

There are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated

with the nonnuclear fabrication mission, and there are no significant

adverse impacts associated with normal operations. Accident profiles at

the sites would not change as a result of downsizing at KCP or

transferring the nonnuclear fabrication mission to the laboratories.

Risks to neighboring populations from credible facility accidents would

be small for all alternatives. All three sites have adequate existing

waste management facilities to treat, store, and dispose of wastes that

would be generated by this mission.

2.D.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally

preferable alternative is to downsize existing facilities at the KCP.

The relocation of this mission to SNL, LANL or LLNL would entail

additional environmental impacts associated with the construction and

operation of new facilities.

2.D.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing

facilities at the KCP. This is the environmentally preferable

alternative, it exhibits the least technical risk, and is also the

least-cost alternative.

3. Proposed Action (3)--Reestablishing Manufacturing Capability and

Capacity for Pit Components

This capability, hereafter referred to as pit fabrication, includes

all activities necessary to fabricate new pits, to modify the internal

features of existing pits (intrusive modification), and to recertify or

requalify pits.

3.A.1 Alternatives. 3.A.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action

alternative, DOE would continue to use existing capabilities at the Los

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL). LANL maintains a limited capability to fabricate

plutonium components using its plutonium research and development

facility, and performs surveillance to provide safety and reliability

assessments of the stockpile. In addition, less extensive capabilities

would continue at LLNL to support material and process technology

development.

3.A.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Reestablish Capability at the Los

Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would reconfigure

the plutonium facility at LANL to fulfill the pit fabrication mission.

This alternative would locate pit manufacturing in existing facilities.

Existing equipment would be retained as much as possible, but some

equipment would need to be upgraded.

3.A.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Reestablish Capability at the

Savannah River Site (SRS). This alternative would establish a pit

fabrication facility at SRS within existing facilities, but with new

equipment and systems. Facilities are available at the SRS, in F-Area

and H-Area, which could house all the process functions required for

the manufacture of plutonium pits. New equipment and systems would be

required for the pit fabrication facility.

3.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 3.A.2.1 Cost and Technical

Factors Technical risk associated with each alternative was assessed by

comparing the relative experience of each site in the pertinent

production capability areas. No pits are currently being produced for

the nuclear weapon stockpile, and neither site has done so in the

recent past. However, LANL has recently provided pits for nuclear

explosive testing, and is currently producing plutonium-238 heat

sources for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

programs. Also, LANL continues to perform pit surveillance and

technology development activities directly related to the required

capabilities for pit fabrication.

SRS is currently processing and shipping plutonium-238 to LANL to

support fabrication of NASA heat sources. Although SRS has a health,

safety, and security infrastructure for plutonium operations, the

historical mission for the site was separation and production of

plutonium metal for shipment to other sites for weapons program use.

Consequently, SRS has no experience with the kinds of capabilities

required for precision nuclear component manufacturing and the

ancillary supporting functions.

The required workload for the fabrication of new replacement pits

is small. DOE foresees only the replacement of pits destroyed in

routine surveillance testing unless a near-term, life-limiting

phenomenon is discovered in stockpile pits. Historical pit surveillance

data and pit life studies do not predict a near-term problem. However,

data are limited for weapons older than 25 years, and for the youngest

weapons in the stockpile.

The technological capability to manufacture all of the pit designs

in the enduring stockpile provides an inherent capacity to manufacture

about 50 pits per year in single shift operations. During weapon

refurbishment to replace other components, DOE expects most pits to be

requalified and reused. About 20 pits per year are expected to be

required to replace pits destroyed in routine surveillance testing. A

capacity of about 50 pits per year is, therefore, judged to be

sufficient for the next 10 or more years.

The construction costs for providing such a limited pit fabrication

capacity are less at LANL (about $310 million in 1995 dollars) than at

SRS (about $490 million in 1995 dollars). This is largely because the

capability would be additive to existing capabilities at LANL

[[Page 68024]]

while a completely new stand-alone capability would be required at SRS.

Both estimates include the costs of planned refurbishment of the LANL

plutonium facility for its ongoing pit surveillance and stockpile

stewardship missions. In addition, annual operating costs would be

considerably less at LANL (about $30 million versus $60 million at SRS)

because the mission would be additive to other existing missions and

would not have to carry all facility overhead costs.

The technical risk at LANL would be less, due to the existing

experience base for stockpile stewardship and pit surveillance

missions. The LANL capability would also be in place at least two years

earlier than the SRS alternative.

In reestablishing plutonium pit fabrication capability, DOE

considered establishing a larger fabrication capacity more in line with

the capacity planned for other manufacturing functions. Larger capacity

was rejected, however, because of the small current demand for the

fabrication of replacement pits, and the significant, but currently

undefined, time period before additional capacity may be needed.

3.A.2.2 Environmental Factors--Upgrades to existing facilities

would be required for each alternative, and no new land would be

disturbed. During operations, both alternatives would utilize similar

facilities, procedures, and natural resources. Therefore, both

alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts

for most natural resource areas. Impacts to air quality would be

minimal and well within established standards. At SRS, water

requirements would be provided from surface water, which is plentiful,

and no adverse impacts would be expected. At LANL, groundwater would be

used. Water requirements for this mission, which would be less than 1

percent of projected No Action usage, could be adequately met without

exceeding the groundwater allotment at LANL.

Socioeconomic impacts are comparable for either alternative,

although SRS would require more additional new workers. Worker exposure

to radiation would be larger at SRS due to the larger added workforce,

but within regulatory limits for both alternatives. Both sites have

adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and

dispose of wastes that would be generated by the pit fabrication

mission. Risks to neighboring populations from normal operations or

credible facility accidents would be small for both alternatives.

3.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For pit

manufacturing, the No Action alternative is the environmentally

preferable alternative. Under the No Action alternative, no new

construction would be required, and the Department would continue with

the existing pit research and development capability at LANL and LLNL.

However, DOE would not have the capability to replace the pit component

in stockpile weapons if necessary, nor protect against stockpile

attrition through surveillance testing. Thus, No Action is not a

reasonable alternative.

Of the two action alternatives, which would reestablish pit

manufacturing capabilities at either LANL or SRS, LANL is the

environmentally preferable alternative. Although overall environmental

impacts are projected to be similar between the two sites, LANL was

judged to be preferable due to the fact that the radiological risks to

workers during normal operations are projected to be less than at SRS.

3.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to reestablish the pit

fabrication capability, at a small capacity, at LANL. This is the

environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the least technical

risk, and is also the least-cost alternative. This decision limits the

plutonium fabrication facility plans to a facility sized to meet

expected programmatic requirements over the next ten or more years. It

is not sized to have sufficient capacity to remanufacture new plutonium

pits at the same production rate as that of their original manufacture.

DOE will perform development and demonstration work at its operating

plutonium facilities over the next several years to study alternative

facility concepts for larger capacity. Environmental analysis of this

larger capacity has not been performed at this time because of the

uncertainty in the need for such capacity and the uncertainty in the

facility technology that would be utilized. Should a larger pit

fabrication capacity be required in the future, appropriate

environmental and siting analysis would be performed at that time.

Mitigation. Specific mitigation measures are not addressed for the

stockpile management decisions of this ROD, although many potential

mitigation measures are identified in the PEIS. In accordance with the

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program's two-tiered NEPA

Strategy, these specific mitigation measures will be addressed, as

necessary, on a site-by-site basis, in any site-specific NEPA analyses

needed to implement the stockpile management decisions of this ROD.

Strategic Reserve Storage

The PEIS also evaluates storage alternatives for strategic reserve

material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium that has not been

declared surplus to national security needs). However, a decision on

storage of strategic reserve materials will be made later in the Record

of Decision on the Final PEIS for the Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials in conjunction with decisions on the

storage of surplus materials. The preferred alternatives for strategic

reserve storage described in both the Final PEIS for Stockpile

Stewardship and Management and the Final PEIS for the Storage and

Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are consistent. The

preferred alternatives are: (1) Highly enriched uranium strategic

reserve storage at Y-12; and (2) plutonium pit strategic reserve

storage in Zone 12 at Pantex.

Other Considerations

DOE has considered a wide range of views on alternatives for the

Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. However, it is national

security policy, as established by the President and Congress, that

must define the complex balance between U.S. national security policy

objectives for nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation.

Chapter 2 of the PEIS describes the national security policy

framework that defines the purpose and need for DOE's nuclear weapons

mission for the foreseeable future. That chapter also describes the

development of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives in response

to recent changes in national security policy, and puts those changes

in a broad technical perspective. Successive levels of technical detail

are provided in Volume I, Chapter 3 and Volumes II and III of the PEIS.

The discussions that follow refer to the appropriate sections of the

PEIS to avoid unnecessary repetition.

While the terms ``stockpile stewardship'' and ``stockpile

management'' are relatively new, the Program is not new when considered

in terms of its substructure capabilities. What the terms are meant to

convey is a post-Cold War change in Program focus away from large-scale

development and production of new-design nuclear weapons with nuclear

testing, to one that focuses on the safety and reliability of a

smaller, aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Even with this change

in focus, however, national security policies require DOE

[[Page 68025]]

to maintain the historical capabilities of the ongoing Program. The

actions selected in this Record of Decision flow logically from the

mission purpose and need, given the policy constraints placed on the

Program by the President and Congress. Enhanced experimental capability

(represented by the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing

Facility, and Atlas Facility) is needed because, in the absence of

nuclear testing, it will provide the surrogate source of experimental

data that are needed to continually assess and certify a safe and

reliable stockpile. Rightsized manufacturing capacities at the Y-12

Plant (Oak Ridge), the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex will most

efficiently conform to the reduced requirements of a smaller, aging

stockpile in the absence of new-design weapon production. A

reestablished pit manufacturing capability at LANL will restore a

required capability of the Program that was temporarily lost as a

consequence of the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant.

The question of alternatives for the Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Program is complex because maintaining a nuclear weapons

stockpile, whatever its size, requires a complete integrated set of

technical capabilities as well as an appropriately sized manufacturing

capacity. The technical capabilities are generally characterized as

research, design, development, and testing; reliability assessment and

certification; and manufacturing and surveillance operations (Section

2.2 and Figure 2.7-2 of the PEIS). From a technical point of view, none

of these capabilities can be deleted if DOE is to maintain a safe and

reliable stockpile (Section 2.4 of the PEIS). Indeed, DOE has been

directed by the President and Congress to maintain these capabilities

(Section 2.4 of the PEIS).

Commentors on the PEIS questioned the different treatment of

stewardship and management alternatives, mainly the lack of

programmatic alternatives to science based stockpile stewardship.

Stewardship and management alternatives were treated differently in the

PEIS because they address fundamentally different problems. Stockpile

stewardship capabilities form the basis of DOE's judgments about the

safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in a

larger context, U.S. judgments about the nuclear weapons capabilities

of others (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). DOE did not consider it

reasonable to propose stewardship alternatives that would diminish,

rather than enhance, stewardship capabilities, particularly given the

fact that historic confidence in the safety and performance of the

stockpile was derived from the nuclear testing that is no longer part

of the ongoing stewardship program. National security policy requires

DOE to maintain, and in some areas enhance, the stewardship

capabilities of the three weapons laboratories and NTS (Section 2.2 of

the PEIS). The PEIS explains the basis for this conclusion in a

technical context, including the need for two independent nuclear

design laboratories (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). Therefore, the PEIS

did not propose any actions that would otherwise diminish ongoing

stewardship missions.

In the PEIS, the Department determined that there is only one

reasonable programmatic alternative for stockpile stewardship: enhanced

experimental capability (see Section 3.1.2). This determination is

consistent with a previous review made in November 1994 by the JASON

Committee, a group of independent experts who evaluated the Science-

Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program. The JASON Committee

concluded that ``[a] strong SBSS program, such as we recommend in this

report, is an essential component for the U.S. to maintain confidence

in the performance of a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent under a

comprehensive test ban.'' The JASON Committee further concluded that

``[in] the absence of nuclear weapons testing, improved understanding

of the warheads and their behavior over time will be derived from

computer simulations and analyses benchmarked against past data and

new, more comprehensive diagnostic information obtained from carefully

designed laboratory experiments. Toward this goal, the SBSS calls for

the construction of a number of experimental facilities which have

applications both in basic scientific research and in research directed

towards strengthening the underlying scientific understanding in the

weapons program.''

Section 3.1.2.4 of the PEIS discussed four possible programmatic

stewardship alternatives to enhanced experimental capability and

concluded that none of them were reasonable stand-alone alternatives.

These included: denuclearization (eliminate nuclear weapons in the

relative near term); restoration (continue to rely on underground

nuclear testing); remanufacturing (reproduce exact replicas of proven

designs); and maintenance (rely on enhanced surveillance and

revalidation to detect and correct problems). Both denuclearization and

restoration are inconsistent with United States national security

policy. Furthermore, while remanufacturing and maintenance already are,

and will continue to be key components of the Program, neither would

provide sufficient technical assurance that problems that may arise in

the stockpile will be effectively diagnosed and corrected.

Prior to the issuance of the Final PEIS, some commentors expressed

concern that the Department had not considered other programmatic

alternatives for stockpile stewardship (i.e., remanufacturing). In

response to their concerns, the Department asked Dr. Sidney D. Drell,

of the JASON Committee, to review the issue of remanufacturing as a

reasonable alternative to enhanced experimental capabilities.

In an October 28, 1996, letter to the Secretary of Energy, Dr.

Drell and another member of the JASON Committee, Dr. Richard L. Garwin,

stated that ``we must not only maintain a cadre of first-class weapon

scientists and engineers. We must also expand the existing science

based understanding of the stockpile. The existing S&T [Science and

Technology] base, including existing above-ground experimental

facilities, is not adequate to the task of stewardship over the long

term for an aging deterrent in the absence of nuclear tests. These

requirements cannot be met if the SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship and

Management Program] as planned by the Department of Energy is replaced

simply by a program of remanufacturing or refurbishing existing weapons

without paying careful attention to the need of maintaining weapons

design capability, expanding our science based understanding of the

stockpile, and providing the sources of experimental data needed to

validate enhanced computer simulations.'' They concluded that ``[w]hile

remanufacturing is a necessary component of SSMP, it is not a

reasonable alternative to the pursuit of a science-based stockpile

stewardship or the need for enhanced experimental capability.''

National security policy also requires DOE to maintain a full

complement of stockpile management capabilities and appropriate

manufacturing capacity, albeit for a smaller post-Cold War stockpile.

Unlike stockpile stewardship capabilities, a smaller stockpile does

permit some reasonable siting alternatives for stockpile management

capabilities and capacities to accomplish the mission purpose and need

within the current national security policy framework (Section 2.4.2 of

the PEIS).

One important consideration in developing the PEIS was the

possibility

[[Page 68026]]

that future international treaties may lead to a smaller U.S.

stockpile, i.e., less than the currently defined START II protocol-

sized stockpile. The PEIS analyzed each of the two stockpile sizes

currently defined and directed by national security policy, a START I

Treaty stockpile (6000 accountable strategic weapons) and a START II

protocol-sized stockpile (3500 accountable strategic weapons). In

addition, the PEIS analyzed a hypothetical 1,000-weapon stockpile for

the purpose of providing a sensitivity analysis for decisions on

manufacturing capacity. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM)

process that specifies the types of weapons and quantities of each

weapon type in the stockpile is described in Section 1.1 of the PEIS.

The classified NWSM is developed based on Department of Defense force

structure requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence and

comply with existing arms control treaties while pursuing further arms

control reductions. The PEIS describes this complex process, and

explains why DOE does not believe it reasonable to speculate on

additional stockpile sizes, which would necessarily entail the use of a

large number of arbitrary assumptions (Section 2.2 of the PEIS).

Nevertheless, DOE has considered the possibility that future national

security policy could define a path to a smaller stockpile. Therefore,

the analysis in the PEIS is very flexible in its approach to potential

changes in stockpile size.

It is important to note in this regard that, just as stockpile

stewardship capabilities are currently viewed by the United States as

furthering U.S. nonproliferation objectives by making the ``zero-

yield'' Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty feasible, it is reasonable to

assume that confidence in U.S. stewardship capabilities would remain as

important, if not more important, in future negotiations to reduce the

stockpile further. The path to even a very small (tens or hundreds of

weapons) or a zero stockpile would require the negotiation of complex

international treaties, most likely with provisions that require

intrusive international verification inspections of nuclear weapons-

related facilities. Therefore, DOE believes it reasonable to assume

that complex treaty negotiations, when coupled with complex

implementation provisions, could possibly stretch over several decades.

On such a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile

size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or

alternatives in the PEIS as they relate to stewardship capabilities.

The issues of maintaining the core competencies of the United States in

nuclear weapons, and the technical problems of a smaller, aging

stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing, would remain the same.

With regard to stockpile management capability and capacity, the

PEIS evaluates reasonable approaches for a gradual path to a very small

or zero stockpile. At some point on this path, further downsizing of

existing industrial plants or the alternative of consolidating

manufacturing functions at stewardship sites would become more

attractive as manufacturing capacity becomes a less important

consideration. In the near term, however, the decisions to downsize the

existing industrial plants would still be reasonable because the

projected downsizing investment would be recouped within a few years

through reduced operating expense, and downsizing in the near term is

consistent with potential longer-term decisions regarding plant

closures. With regard to reestablishing pit manufacturing capability,

DOE does not intend to establish a greater manufacturing capacity than

is inherent in reestablishing the basic manufacturing capability. Thus,

on a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size

alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or

alternatives in the PEIS with regard to stockpile management

capabilities and capacities.

Conclusions

With the issuance of this Record of Decision, the Department is

making the decisions necessary to: (1) construct and operate three

enhanced experimental facilities (the National Ignition Facility at

LLNL, the Contained Firing Facility at LLNL, and the Atlas Facility at

LANL); (2) downsize the existing weapons industrial plants (Y-12 at Oak

Ridge, the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex); and (3) reestablish the

plutonium pit component manufacturing capability at LANL. Additionally,

the Department has decided to transfer a small amount of plutonium-242

material from SRS to LANL for stockpile stewardship activities.

During the 30 day period following the Environmental Protection

Agency's notice that the Final PEIS had been filed, the Department

received four letters from government organizations in response to the

Final PEIS. Two of the letters, from the Tennessee Historical

Commission and the State of Missouri Office of Administration,

expressed no objection or comment. A third letter, from the

Environmental Protection Agency, indicated that the Agency's prior

comments on the Draft PEIS had been adequately addressed in the Final

PEIS, and that the Agency had no objections to the project as proposed.

The fourth letter, from the New Mexico Environmental Department,

provided comments on the nomenclature used to describe water resources

in and around the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These comments do not

change the analysis in the PEIS, but they have been considered in

preparing this Record of Decision. In making these decisions, all

practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the

alternatives selected have been adopted.

These decisions will help enable the Department to assess and

certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons

stockpile, while also supporting a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty. These decisions will allow for the closing and ultimate

remediation of unnecessary industrial facilities, and reduce the cost

of existing manufacturing operations. These decisions reestablish the

required national security capability of plutonium pit fabrication.

These decisions are consistent with, and supportive of, national

security policy requirements established by the President and Congress

for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, including

the safeguards established for U.S. entry into the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty. Finally, these decisions will help enable the Department to

maintain the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United

States in nuclear weapons, and maintain a safe and reliable nuclear

weapons stockpile.

Issued in Washington DC, December 19, 1996.

Hazel R. O'Leary,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96-32759 Filed 12-24-96; 8:45 am]

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