Port Restrictions and Requirements in the United States/Japan Trade

Federal RegisterNov 13, 1996

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FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

46 CFR Part 586

[Docket No. 96-20]

Port Restrictions and Requirements in the United States/Japan

Trade

AGENCY: Federal Maritime Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Maritime Commission, in response to apparent

unfavorable conditions in the foreign oceanborne trade between the

United States and Japan, proposes the imposition of fees on liner

vessels operated by Japanese carriers calling at United States ports.

The effect of the rule will be to adjust or meet unfavorable conditions

caused by Japanese port restrictions and requirements by imposing

countervailing burdens on Japanese carriers.

DATES: Comments due on or before January 13, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send comments (original and 15 copies) to: Joseph C.

Polking, Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, 800 North Capitol

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20573, (202) 523-5725.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert D. Bourgoin, General Counsel,

Federal Maritime Commission, 800 North Capitol Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20573, (202) 523-5740.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Information Demand Orders

On September 12, 1995, the Federal Maritime Commission

(``Commission'' or ``FMC'') issued information demand orders to

carriers in the U.S./Japan trade,1 inquiring about certain

restrictions and requirements for the use

[[Page 58161]]

of port and terminal facilities in Japan. Four issues of concern were

addressed by the information demand orders: (1) The ``prior

consultation'' system, a process of mandatory discussions and

operational approvals involving port and terminal management, unions,

and ocean carriers serving Japan; (2) restrictions on the operation of

Japanese ports on Sunday; (3) the requirement that all containerized

cargo exported from Japan be weighed and measured by harbor workers,

regardless of commercial necessity; and (4) the disposition of the

Japanese Harbor Management Fund, which was the subject of Docket No.

91-19, Actions to Address Conditions Affecting U.S. Carriers Which do

not Exist for Foreign Carriers in the U.S./Japan Trade. The Commission

observed that these practices may result in conditions unfavorable to

shipping in the United States/Japan trade, and may constitute adverse

conditions affecting U.S. carriers that do not exist for Japanese

carriers in the United States.

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\1\ NYK Line (North America) Inc.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines

(America), Inc.; K Line America Inc.; Sea-Land Service, Inc.;

American President Line; Westwood Shipping Lines; Evergreen Line;

Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd.; Maersk Inc.; China Ocean Shipping Co.;

Hyundai Merchant Marine; Orient Overseas Container Line (``OOCL'');

Yangming Marine Line; Neptune Orient Lines; Senator Linie (USA)

Inc.; Mexican Line (TMM); Hapag-Lloyd (America) Inc.; Zim Container;

and Cho Yang Line.

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Prior Consultation

Many of the questions in the information demand orders centered on

the prior consultation system and how it is administered by the Japan

Harbor Transportation Association (``JHTA''). JHTA is an association of

companies providing harbor transportation services, including terminal

operators, stevedores, and sworn measurers. Under this system, carriers

serving Japan must consult with JHTA about operational matters

involving Japanese ports or harbor labor. After JHTA consults with a

carrier, it may conduct consultations with labor interests, then

approve or deny the line's request.

The responses to the Commission's orders indicated that virtually

all operational plans and changes made by carriers serving Japan must

be submitted for prior consultation. These include: any changes in

berth, route, or port calls; inauguration of new services or new

vessels; the addition of extra port calls (either permanently or

temporarily), or calls by non-container ships at container berths;

jumboization of vessels or changes in vessel technology which affect

stevedoring or terminal operations; temporary assignment of vessels as

substitutes (even if only for one voyage) or the renaming of vessels;

rationalization agreements between carriers involving vessel sharing or

berthing changes; the assignment of a stevedoring contractor or

terminal operator to a carrier and any subsequent change in assignment;

requests for Sunday work; changes in mandatory weighing and measuring

arrangements; or any other changes which affect stevedoring or terminal

operations.

The comments shed light on the complex and opaque procedural

aspects of the prior consultation system. According to several

respondents, if a carrier wants to take one of the above-described

actions, it first submits a draft written request for prior

consultation outlining its proposal to JHTA. If the matter is deemed to

be important, a meeting is then scheduled for a carrier representative

to explain its request to JHTA chairman Shiroo Takashima. Often, the

carrier executive is accompanied by an official of the stevedoring

company used by that line. At this stage, the JHTA chairman may refuse

to accept the request, or require changes or impose conditions for

acceptance.

According to several respondents, if the carriers' request is

acceptable to the JHTA chairman, it is taken up at a formal ``pre-prior

consultation'' meeting. These meetings, generally held monthly, are

attended by the JHTA chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, prior

consultation administrator, a representative from the carrier, and

often a representative of its affected stevedore or terminal operator.

If the request is accepted at this stage, the matter is deliberated at

formal prior consultation meetings between JHTA and union officials,

both in Tokyo and at the local level. Carrier representatives do not

attend the JHTA-union meetings.

A number of respondents suggested that the final prior consultation

meetings are simply formalities. It appears that if a carrier's request

is unacceptable to JHTA, this is conveyed early in the process, often

in the carrier's initial meeting with the JHTA chairman. If JHTA takes

an unfavorable view of a request, there is no formal rejection;

instead, it simply is not accepted for consideration at the formal

prior consultation meetings. In contrast, if a request has been

accepted by the JHTA chairman, it is almost assured to be approved at

the formal meetings.

Beyond the above-described procedures, JHTA's decision-making

process in prior consultation appears to be characterized by a total

lack of transparency. The respondents indicated that there are almost

no written rules, either substantive or procedural, nor are there

written reasons for decisions or an appeal process; JHTA appears to

have absolute discretion over the terms and conditions imposed in the

prior consultation process.

Many respondents suggested that JHTA uses prior consultation to

prevent competition and maintain an agreed-upon allocation of work

among the JHTA member companies. Several carriers recounted instances

where prior consultation requests were held up until the carriers

agreed to take on additional, unnecessary stevedoring companies or

contractors. A number of carriers observed that JHTA may require that,

when carriers consolidate terminal operations, the benefitting

stevedore must reach an agreement with the losing one to take on some

of the latter's workers, thereby insuring that there is still income

passing to the losing stevedoring company. These practices, according

to a number of commenters, prevent any real competition and undermine

attempts to increase the efficiency of port operations, with the result

that Japan has port costs that far exceed those of its Asian neighbors

and other major trading nations.

Much of JHTA's ability to compel participation in prior

consultation appears to stem from its relationship with, and support

of, organized labor. Some respondents explained that, if they did not

participate in prior consultation or comply with JHTA's requests, they

would be subject to retaliation, such as work stoppages or labor

disruptions. Some respondents recounted an instance in 1985 when JHTA,

in response to an investigation by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission

(``FTC''), announced that it was abandoning the carrier-JHTA component

of the prior consultation system. When the now-defunct Yamashita

Shiminon Kaisha Line attempted to go ahead with changes in its

operations, two of its vessels reportedly were boycotted by the unions,

on the grounds that there had been no prior consultation. In order to

prevent any further disruptions, respondents stated, carriers had no

choice but to request that JHTA reestablish its prior consultation

system.

Japanese Government Oversight

Respondents confirmed that the agency with direct authority over

harbor services is the Ministry of Transport (``MOT''). Persons wishing

to perform harbor transportation services must obtain a license from

MOT, in accordance with the Port Transportation Business Law. Also,

under the Law Establishing the Ministry of Transportation, MOT is

invested with authority over, inter alia, the development, improvement

and coordination of the harbor transportation business. MOT reportedly

can give oversight or guidance relating to the conduct of the Prior

Consultation System if a national

[[Page 58162]]

policy (i.e., the development, improvement and coordination of the

harbor transport business) is sought to be furthered. Respondents also

indicated that administrative guidance, or gyoseishido, is practiced by

governmental bodies in Japan, to secure cooperation of affected parties

to further an administrative purpose.2

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\2\ The Commission in its information demand orders described

further authority that MOT apparently maintains under the Port

Transportation Business Law. For example, MOT reviews rates based on

whether they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Art. 9. MOT must

approve operators' ``terms and conditions on port transportation,''

to determine that ``there is no fear that the terms and conditions

may impede the benefits of users,'' and also approve any changes in

operators' business plans. Art. 11 & 17. If MOT determines that the

port transportation businesses ``impede benefits of users'' it may

order changes in business plans, terms and conditions, or rates.

Art. 21.

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MOT appears to have given guidance or otherwise become involved

with prior consultation on at least a few occasions. In 1986, MOT

signed, as a witness, the Letter of Confirmation on New Prior

Consultation, an agreement between JHTA and carriers establishing the

current version of the system. More recently, in 1992, MOT reportedly

issued a ministerial view to JHTA and the Japanese Shipowners Ports

Council setting forth basic principles for prior consultation regarding

container terminal disputes.3 In that document (a translation of

which was provided by respondents), MOT directed that, if carriers make

changes to their operations, these changes must be submitted for prior

consultation. It was also stated in the Ministerial View that if a

shipping company changes the consortium with which it is affiliated, or

reorganizes its service, it will give explanations to JHTA and obtain

its understanding as early as possible. While the Ministerial View was

addressed specifically to the Japanese shipowners, it appears that its

principles are applied uniformly to all shipping companies.

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\3\ The Japanese Shipowners Ports Council (``JSPC'') is the

component of the Japanese Shipowners' Association that deals

directly with harbor service-related matters. JSPC often served as

the voice of the Japanese lines in prior consultation and other

dealings with JHTA. There is a similar association for non-Japanese

shipowners operating in Japan, the Japan Foreign Steamship

Association (``JFSA'').

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JHTA's operations also fall within the jurisdiction of the Japanese

Fair Trade Commission (``FTC''). The Japanese respondents explained

that Article 8 of the Law Relating to the Prohibition of Private

Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of Japan (``Antimonopoly

Law'') prohibits trade associations from engaging in certain

activities, including restricting competition, limiting the number of

entrepreneurs, restricting unduly the activities of constituent

entrepreneurs, and causing entrepreneurs to engage in unfair business

practices. As the agency responsible for administering the Antimonopoly

Law, the FTC has the authority to investigate JHTA and its activities.

This FTC authority has been invoked on occasion. In June, 1985, a

complaint was filed with the Fair Trade Commission against JHTA,

reportedly alleging that JHTA was restricting the activities of

carriers and the competition among terminal operators. However,

respondents stated that the complaint was later withdrawn and the FTC

suspended its investigation.

Another FTC complaint was filed late last year. Apparently, a

dispute erupted between JHTA and one of its members, Sankyu, Inc.

Sankyu filed a complaint with the FTC, alleging that JHTA was violating

Japanese antitrust laws, allocating work among operators. In response,

according to published reports, JHTA began exerting considerable

pressure on one of Sankyu's clients, OOCL. JHTA reportedly refused to

permit prior consultation and approve the carrier's space sharing and

terminal reorganization plans. In February, according to press reports

and other sources, Sankyu acquiesced to JHTA pressure and withdrew its

FTC complaint. While the FTC has not formally dismissed or terminated

its investigation, it does not appear to have taken any further action

in this area since Sankyu's withdrawal.

Mandatory Weighing and Measuring

The respondents uniformly confirmed that mandatory weight and

measure data for all cargo is not required for any administrative

functions or documentary procedures in Japan, nor do carriers require

measurement of export box load cargo. Some carriers stated that they

have attempted unsuccessfully to refuse sworn measurement services and

charges; however, JHTA and union representatives threatened work

delays, stoppages, and other retaliation if these efforts continued.

The majority of carriers have not attempted unilaterally to stop

weighing and measuring. Estimates of per-container weighing and

measuring costs ranged from $41 to $85 per TEU, with the majority of

responses in the $60-$68 range.

In December, 1995, and January, 1996, agreements were reached

involving JHTA, the sworn measurement companies, and JSPC and JFSA (the

Japanese and foreign carrier groups), to phase out mandatory weighing

and measuring over the course of five years. Reportedly, under the plan

agreed to by the parties, carriers will be required to make a lump-sum

payment to the sworn measurers each year from 1996 to 2000. The

payments will be based on the amount paid for weighing and measuring in

1994. The lump sum payments for the five years will be 83.3%, 66.6%,

49.9%, 33.2%, and 16.5% of the 1994 total.

Sunday Work

Because the earthquake that struck the Kobe region in January,

1995, disabled most of that port's facilities, the volume of cargo

moving through other Japanese ports increased substantially. According

to several of the respondents, harbor workers immediately began

operating on Sundays on an emergency basis to accommodate the

additional capacity. In May, 1995, a one-year agreement reportedly was

reached between JHTA and the unions to keep Sunday work in place in

Japan's six major ports (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and

Kanmon).

The one-year agreement (the text of which was provided by several

respondents) has several requirements and restrictions for Sunday work.

For example, Sunday work is limited to the moving of containers between

vessels and the carriers container yards. Therefore, cargo cannot

arrive at the gate on Sunday for loading that day, and cargo discharged

on Sunday cannot be released the same day to the consignee. Also, the

agreement provides that receipt of cargo on Saturdays should be

minimized as much as possible, as Saturday is a day off for most harbor

workers. Vessels may be loaded and unloaded on Sundays only between

8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.

According to the text of the agreement, a shipping company wishing

to work on Sunday must apply by the preceding Friday. An additional

charge is imposed for Sunday work. Sunday work is limited to shipping

companies that ``have fully implemented the MOT approved rates and

charges.'' Sunday work is also limited to carriers that ``have observed

the harbor industrial labor/management agreement'' concerning numbers

of hours and days that union laborers may work and amount of overtime

available.

The current restrictions on Sunday work apparently have had a

number of negative effects on the respondent carriers. Some pointed out

that restrictions on moving cargo into or out of the container yard

causes inefficiency and leads to gate congestion on

[[Page 58163]]

Saturday and Monday. Several noted that Sunday work surcharges result

in extra costs. Also, respondents noted that the requirement that lines

apply in advance for Sunday work, and the shortened working hours, can

be a burden and pose planning problems.

It appears that the uncertainty surrounding the one-year agreement

has also discouraged carriers from taking full advantage of Sunday

work. While more than half of the respondents indicated that they have

used Sunday work on occasion, virtually all of this use has been to

accommodate vessel delays or other exigencies. No respondent indicated

that it changed sailing schedules to use Sunday work on a regular

basis. Apparently, since a permanent shift in vessel schedules would be

complex and costly for an individual carrier, its alliance partners,

and its feeder services, carriers cannot switch to regular Sunday calls

without guarantees that Sunday work will continue to be available.

While it appears that Sunday work will continue to be provided for

the near term, there has been no discernable progress in reaching a

stable and permanent resolution of the Sunday work issue. The previous

one-year agreement for Sunday work expired in June 1996, and was

extended for one-month intervals for July and August. It has been

reported recently that JHTA and waterfront unions have reached an

agreement by which Sunday work would be continued for six months,

through March 10, 1997. However, beyond the March 10 deadline, the fate

of Sunday work appears uncertain.

Discussion

JHTA Dominance Through the Prior Consultation System

Of all the issues raised in the Commission's information demand

order, it is apparent that prior consultation is the most serious. The

prior consultation system is central to JHTA's dominance of the harbor

services market in Japan, as it is the mechanism by which JHTA

exercises control over the activities of individual carriers and

stevedoring companies. Other JHTA restrictions, such as those affecting

Sunday work and mandatory weighing and measuring, are also of serious

concern to the Commission; however, it appears that these matters are

symptoms rather than root causes of JHTA's dominant position.

By serving as intermediary in all negotiations and requiring, on

threat of labor disruption, that carriers submit virtually all planned

operational changes for approval, JHTA is able to assign and allocate

work among its member companies. This process is used to eliminate

competition among terminal operators and stevedores, obviating the need

for them to operate more efficiently, reorganize, downsize, or

otherwise cut costs to gain market share. It also puts JHTA in a

position to block any carrier initiatives to reduce terminal costs,

such as plans by various carrier alliances to share terminals and

reduce the number of stevedoring companies used, until plans are made

to protect the harbor workers' competitive status quo.

JHTA has pushed prior consultation far beyond its purported use as

a labor relations device. As numerous respondents pointed out,

virtually every operational change by a carrier, even those with no

apparent labor impact, must be submitted to JHTA. This all-encompassing

scope of prior consultation has given JHTA broad leverage to implement

programs that benefit its constituents. It can, for example, extract

unwarranted payments from carriers, such as the Harbor Maintenance Fund

and the mandatory weighing and measuring fees. JHTA also appears to

have unchecked authority to punish its detractors.

JHTA has shown little regard for public accountability in its

administration of prior consultation. There are virtually no written

rules and no public records, decisions, or appeals. This lack of

transparency makes it almost impossible for government, industry, or

media critics to scrutinize the workings of the system.

The Role of the Government of Japan

Prior consultation and JHTA dominance do not, however, appear to be

an entirely private sector problem. Prior consultation and JHTA enjoy a

substantial amount of support from Japanese authorities. Under the Port

Transportation Business Law and the Law Establishing the Ministry of

Transportation, MOT has broad authority to oversee and regulate the

activities and business practices of JHTA and its members. In

exercising this authority, however, MOT officials have chosen to permit

JHTA to wield unchecked authority through the prior consultation

process, rather than requiring JHTA to be less anticompetitive, less

arbitrary, and more transparent.4

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\4\ We would also note that the FTC has repeatedly discontinued

investigations into JHTA's activities without taking measures to

curb the anticompetitive effects of JHTA's actions.

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Further Government of Japan support for prior consultation was

evinced clearly by the 1992 Ministerial View issued to carriers by MOT.

This document, on its face, mandates that carriers submit changes in

their business plans to JHTA for prior consultation. This would appear

to be an unequivocal validation and endorsement of JHTA's prior

consultation activities.

However, the most significant example of government support for

JHTA is the MOT licensing of harbor service companies. The Japanese

Port Transportation Business Law directs that, if a person seeks to

begin performing harbor services, MOT shall evaluate, inter alia,

whether the business in question ``has an appropriate plan to perform

the business,'' and whether it would ``cause port transportation supply

to be excessively over transportation demand.'' Art. 5 & 6. It appears

that MOT uses this authority to restrict entry and to shield JHTA and

its members from foreign competition. U.S. carriers have stated that

they have been shut out of the market entirely, and advised by Japanese

authorities that they should not even bother to apply because such

certificates would not be granted.

It appears that, by preventing foreign lines from providing

terminal services for themselves and by blocking new entrants from the

market, the Government of Japan virtually guarantees that JHTA's

monopoly over harbor operations will continue unabated. The licensing

requirement ensures that JHTA is insulated from pressure to reform,

either from outside competitors or new members. Carriers remain captive

in an increasingly unworkable port system, and their customers are

forced to absorb the resultant costs, which are among the highest in

the world. Moreover, the Government of Japan's licensing practices

appear blatantly discriminatory against U.S. carriers. There are no

legal restrictions on the ownership of terminal operations by Japanese

companies in the United States.

It is our conclusion that the Government of Japan's support for the

prior consultation system, through its discriminatory and restrictive

licensing requirements for persons wishing to perform harbor services,

appears to constitute conditions unfavorable to shipping in the U.S./

Japan trade. Accordingly, we are proposing the imposition of

countervailing sanctions, pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant

Marine Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b) (``Section 19''). To avert

the imposition of these sanctions, we would urge the Government of

Japan to

[[Page 58164]]

afford U.S. carriers relief by making available to them all necessary

licenses, permissions, or certificates to perform, for themselves and

third parties, stevedoring and terminal operating services, or to

establish subsidiaries or related ventures to do so, as Japanese

carriers are permitted to do in the United States.

In addition, we remain concerned about the long term resolution of

the Sunday work issue. We are encouraged, however, that some progress

appears to have been made in this area, as well as with regard to

weighing and measuring. Therefore, we are not proposing sanctions in

these areas at this time. However, the Commission will continue to

monitor progress on these issues, and on the disposition of the yet

undisposed balances in the Harbor Management Fund, and will take

further remedial action if appropriate.

Section 19 authorizes and directs the Federal Maritime Commission

to

make rules and regulations affecting shipping in the foreign trade

not in conflict with law in order to adjust or meet general or

special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade,

whether in any particular trade or upon any particular route or in

commerce generally, including intermodal movements, terminal

operations, cargo solicitations, forwarding and agency services,

non-vessel-operating common carrier operations, and other activities

and services integral to transportation systems, and which arise out

of or result from foreign laws, rules, or regulations or from

competitive methods or practices employed by owners, operators,

agents, or masters of vessels of a foreign country * * *.

The measures authorized under Section 19 include limitation of

sailings, suspension of carriers' tariffs or rights to use conference

tariffs, suspension of carriers' rights to operate under FMC-filed

terminal and other agreements, fees of up to $1,000,000 per voyage, or

any other action deemed necessary and appropriate to adjust or meet the

unfavorable condition. 46 U.S.C. app. 876(9).

After giving consideration to all available countervailing

sanctions, including limitations of sailings and suspension of carrier

tariffs or terminal or other agreements, the Commission has determined

to propose a primary remedy of a $100,000 fee, assessed on Japanese

carriers when their liner vessels enter U.S. ports. However, the

Commission specifically solicits comment on the feasibility of

additional or alternative sanctions. The Commission reserves the right

to adjust the level of the fee or add additional or alternative

sanctions at any time if the subject adverse conditions are not

remedied. In the event that the presently prescribed fees are not paid,

the Proposed Rule provides for the denial of clearance or entry to or

detention at U.S. ports.

In order to provide proper notice and a fair opportunity to respond

to the proposed action, the Commission is giving all interested parties

sixty days to file comments. Factual submissions, where relevant,

should include evidence or statistics showing commercial loss and to

the extent possible be supported by sworn documents and affidavits.

List of Subjects in 46 CFR Part 586

Cargo vessels; Exports; Foreign relations; Imports; Maritime

carriers; Penalties; Rates and fares; Tariffs.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the FMC proposes to

amend 46 CFR Part 586 as follows:

Therefore, pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act,

1920, 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b), as amended, Reorganization Plan No. 7

of 1961, 75 Stat. 840, and 46 CFR Part 585, it is proposed to amend

Part 586 of Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 586--ACTIONS TO ADJUST OR MEET CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO

SHIPPING IN THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE

1. The authority citation for Part 586 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b); 46 U.S.C. app. 876(5)

through (12); 46 CFR Part 585; Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 26

FR 7315 (August 12, 1961).

2. Section 586.2 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 586.2 Conditions unfavorable to shipping in the United States/

Japan trade.

(a) Conditions unfavorable to shipping in the trade. (1) The

Federal Maritime Commission (``Commission'') has determined that the

Government of Japan has created conditions unfavorable to shipping in

the U.S.-Japan trade, by discriminatorily restricting the licensing of

persons wishing to offer harbor and terminal services in Japan.

(2) Through its discriminatory and restrictive licensing practices,

the Government of Japan has protected the dominant position of the

Japan Harbor Transportation Association (``JHTA''), an association of

Japanese waterfront employers. Benefitting from this protection and

from a lack of oversight by the Government of Japan, JHTA has virtually

eliminated competition in the Japanese harbor services market. JHTA

effectively controls competition through the use of the prior

consultation system, by which carriers are required to submit virtually

all operational plans and requests for JHTA review.

(3) JHTA has used the leverage afforded by the prior consultation

system to force carriers, inter alia, to change terminal and

stevedoring arrangements, to take on unnecessary stevedoring companies

or contractors, and to make unwarranted payments to JHTA and its

members. This has resulted in detrimental excess costs for carriers and

shippers engaged U.S.-Japan oceanborne trade.

(4) The Government of Japan has discriminated against U.S. carriers

by refusing to make licenses to perform port services available to

them. This has left U.S. carriers with no choice but to submit their

shoreside planning and operations to JHTA control. In contrast, there

are no legal restrictions on the ownership of terminal operations by

Japanese carriers in the United States.

(b) Definitions. (1) Japanese carrier means Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha,

Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd, and Nippon Yusen Kaisha.

(2) Designated vessel means any container-carrying liner vessel

owned or operated by a Japanese carrier (or any subsidiary, related

company, or parent company thereof).

(c) Assessment of fees. A fee of one hundred thousand dollars shall

be assessed each time a designated vessel is entered in any port of the

United States from any foreign port or place.

(d) Report and payment. Each Japanese carrier, on the fifteenth day

of each month, shall file with the Secretary of the Federal Maritime

Commission a report listing each vessel for which fees were assessed

under paragraph (c) of this section during the preceding calendar

month, and the date of each vessel's entry. Each report shall be

accompanied by a cashiers check or certified check, payable to the

Federal Maritime Commission, for the full amount of the fees owed for

the month covered by the report. Each report shall be sworn to be true

and complete, under oath, by the carrier official responsible for its

execution.

(e) Refusal of clearance by the collector of customs. If any

Japanese carrier subject to this section shall fail to pay any fee or

to file any quarterly report required by paragraph (d) of this section

within the prescribed period, the Commission may request the Chief,

Carrier Rulings Branch of the U.S. Customs Service to direct the

collectors of customs at U.S. ports to refuse the clearance required by

46 U.S.C. app. section 91 to any designated vessel owned or operated by

that carrier.

[[Page 58165]]

(f) Denial of entry to or detention at United States ports by the

Secretary of Transportation. If any Japanese carrier subject to this

section shall fail to pay any fee or to file any quarterly report

required by paragraph (d) of this section within the prescribed period,

the Commission may request the Secretary of Transportation to direct

the Coast Guard to:

(1) Deny entry for purpose of oceanborne trade, of any designated

vessel owned or operated by that carrier to any port or place in the

United States or the navigable waters of the United States; or

(2) Detain that vessel at the port or place in the United States

from which it is about to depart for another port or place in the

United States. By the Commission.

Joseph C. Polking,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96-28943 Filed 11-12-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6730-01-W

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