Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-245, License No. DPR-21]

Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1;

Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated

December 30, 1994, by Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petition for action under 10

CFR 2.206). The Petition pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,

Unit 1.

In the Petition, the Petitioner asserted that (1) the licensee does

not adequately control work and procedure compliance at Millstone, as

evidenced by the use of standard commercial-grade lugs in a gas turbine

fuel forwarding pump and motor that are quality assurance (QA)

subsystems of the emergency gas turbine generator and which had

apparently been crimped using diagonal pliers; improper Raychem

splices, cable bend radius, and connections in the connection boxes of

major safety-related QA equipment; and installation of non-QA lugs and

improperly performed crimping in fire protection QA emergency lights

and (2) the Petitioner was subjected to ridicule by the gas turbine

system engineer for raising concerns regarding the lugs on the gas

turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor. The Petitioner requested that

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (1) ``force'' Northeast

Utilities (NU) to review all existing work orders for the past 10 or 12

years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that quality assurance motor and

connection work does not have certain deficiencies; (2) assess a

Severity Level I violation against NU and its managers for apparent

violations of 10 CFR 50.7 and a Severity Level III violation against a

gas turbine system engineer at Millstone for his apparent violation of

10 CFR 50.7 and NU's ``Code of Conduct and Ethics;'' and (3) institute

sanctions against the system engineer and NU and its managers for

engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

determined to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are

explained in the ``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-

96-17), the complete text of which follows this notice and is available

for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the

Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three

Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,

Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at

the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,

Waterford, Connecticut.

A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the

Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this

regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on

its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ashok C. Thadani,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[DD-96-17]

I. Introduction

On December 30, 1994, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a

Petition with

[[Page 57924]]

the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). In the Petition, the Petitioner

asserted that (1) inadequate work control and procedure compliance

exist at Millstone Unit 1, as evidenced by the use of standard

commercial-grade lugs in a gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor

that are quality assurance (QA) 1 subsystems of the emergency gas

turbine generator and which had apparently been crimped using diagonal

pliers; improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and connections in

the connection boxes of major safety-related QA equipment; and non-QA

lugs installed, and improperly performed crimping, in fire protection

quality assurance (FPQA) emergency lights, and (2) he had been

subjected to ridicule by the gas turbine system engineer for raising

concerns regarding the lugs on the gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and

motor and that the system engineer willfully violated 10 CFR 50.5 and

50.7.

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\1\ Quality Assurance comprises those quality assurance actions

related to the physical characteristics of a material, structure,

component, or system which provide a means to control the quality of

the material, structure, component, or system to predetermined

requirements.

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The Petitioner requested that the NRC (1) require Northeast

Utilities (NU) to review all existing work orders for the past 10 or 12

years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that QA motor and connection work

does not have certain deficiencies; (2) assess a Severity Level I

violation against NU and its managers for apparent violations of 10 CFR

50.7 and a Severity Level III violation against the gas turbine system

engineer at Millstone for his apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7 and

NU's ``Code of Conduct and Ethics;'' and (3) institute sanctions

against the system engineer and NU and its managers for engaging in

deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

By letter dated February 23, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioner

that the Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations.

The NRC also informed the Petitioner that the staff would take

appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific

concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues

raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that the

actions sought by the Petitioner are not warranted.

II. Discussion

A. Inadequate Work Control and Procedural Compliance Issues

The issues raised by the Petitioner regarding the improper crimping

and use of commercial grade lugs in the gas turbine fuel forwarding

pump and motor; improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and

connection issues, and improper crimping and use of non-QA lugs in

emergency lighting, have been addressed in correspondence between the

NRC and NNECO, and have been the subject of evaluations by NNECO and an

NRC inspection. Specifically, by letters dated December 5 and 28, 1994,

and February 14, 1995, and during a phone conversation on December 15,

1994, the NRC raised these issues and requested NNECO to submit written

responses. By letters dated March 6 and April 26, 1995, NNECO responded

to these requests and submitted information regarding its evaluation of

these issues. On May 15 through June 21, 1995, the NRC conducted a

special safety inspection, which focused on these and other maintenance

issues. The inspection findings are contained in Inspection Report (IR)

50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22 (IR 95-22), dated July 21,

1995. Finally, NNECO provided further information regarding these

issues in its August 31, 1995, response to the Petition. A broad

summary of the resolution of these issues is set forth below.

1. Gas Turbine Fuel Forwarding Pump and Motor Issues

The Petitioner asserts that the licensee inadequately controls work

and procedural compliance at Millstone, as evidenced by the use of

standard commercial-grade lugs (instead of QA lugs) in a gas turbine

fuel forwarding pump and motor that are QA subsystems of the emergency

gas turbine generator and which the Petitioner asserts had been crimped

with diagonal pliers (instead of the proper crimping tool). In its

response to the Petition dated August 31, 1995, NNECO stated that, when

the supervisor examined the lugs in question, he concluded that

although the lugs were somewhat discolored as a result of age, and may

have had an indented crimp, they appeared to the supervisor to be the

type of lug that had been installed in the 1971-1972 time-frame, when

no procedures were in place with respect to the type of lug required or

the method of crimping. NNECO further stated that these lugs are

considered acceptable where they have already been installed (i.e.,

meet original electrical standards); however, when maintenance is

performed requiring re-lugging, the lugs are upgraded and installed in

accordance with current procedures.

NNECO further stated that the fact that the lugs in question were

commercial grade and may have been crimped with diagonal pliers is not

indicative of a work control or procedural compliance problem. The lugs

appeared to the NNECO supervisor to be the type of lug that had been

installed at or near the time of initial plant start-up in accordance

with the appropriate electrical standards that existed at that time.

Moreover, once the concern was raised about the proper type and

crimping of the lugs by the Petitioner, NNECO took prompt action by

initiating a work order to replace all the lugs.

The NRC staff discussed the issue of defective lugs with the

maintenance department manager and the worker who replaced the lugs

during the special safety inspection. Neither individual could remember

the work in detail but stated that to ensure reliability, the lugs were

replaced.

Based on NNECO's conclusion that (1) the lugs in question had been

installed in the 1971-1972 time-frame when no procedures were in place

with respect to the type of lug required or the method of crimping, (2)

these lugs are considered acceptable where installed, and based on

NNECO's prompt action to initiate a work order and replace all the

lugs, the NRC concludes that this issue does not indicate an inadequate

work control or procedural compliance problem.

2. Improper Raychem Splices, Cable Bend Radius, and Connection Issues

The Petitioner asserts that the licensee is inadequately

controlling work and procedural compliance at Millstone, as evidenced

by improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and connections in the

connection boxes of major safety-related QA equipment (low pressure

coolant injection (LPCI) and core spray (CS) pumps). In its letter

dated April 26, 1995, NNECO informed the NRC that an operability

determination had been completed on the issue of the Raychem splice

installation, and whether Raychem splice bend radii on the LPCI and CS

pumps were less than the recommended limits (five times the Raychem

diameter). The operability determination concluded that the motor

splices were operable and that an immediate inspection to verify bend

radii was not warranted. In addition, NNECO stated that 50 percent of

the Raychem splices on the LPCI and CS pump motors had been inspected

at that

[[Page 57925]]

time with no problems identified. In its followup letter dated August

31, 1995, NNECO stated that a visual inspection of all the LPCI and CS

pump motors had been completed and none of the connections exceeded the

minimum bend radius. Further, NNECO did not identify any discrepancies

in the connection boxes for the LPCI and CS pump motors. NNECO's

evaluations validated the determination that the splices are

operable.2

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\2\ In addition, NNECO (1) performed a review of all the work

orders for the current Raychem splice installation and verified that

the procedure specified that a minimum bend radius of five times the

Raychem diameter not be exceeded, (2) verified that the training the

electricians receive on Raychem splices discusses the requirement of

not exceeding five times the minimum bend radius, and (3) requested

that Raychem determine what the consequences of exceeding the

minimum bend radius would be. The results of the Raychem testing

showed that even if one or more splices exceeded the minimum bend

radius, a tighter bend radius was acceptable.

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As a result of its evaluation of NNECO's response and supporting

documentation and its independent verification of two of the pump

motors in question, the NRC found NNECO's response acceptable and that

no further NRC review was needed. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes

that the Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and the connections in the

connection boxes of major safety-related equipment (LPCI and CS motors)

are acceptable.

3. Emergency Lighting Issue

The Petitioner asserts that the licensee does not adequately

control work and procedure compliance at Millstone, as evidenced by

non-QA lugs and improperly performed crimping in FPQA emergency lights.

The NRC staff requested NNECO to review the use of improper lugs for

emergency lighting at Millstone Unit 1. Specifically, the NRC requested

NNECO to review the concern that all four lugs on emergency light unit

(ELU) 1-ELU-21 had Thomas and Betts lugs (non-QA) rather than the

required QA AMP lugs, and all four lugs were not crimped properly. In

addition, the NRC staff asked NNECO to review the concern that one lug

on the emergency light 1-ELU-29 was a Thomas and Betts lug and that

three of the four lugs were not properly crimped.

NNECO responded that a review of the revision history for Procedure

MP 790.2, ``Emergency Light Inspection,'' determined that the procedure

made no reference to a specific lug prior to April 1993. NNECO stated

that because the safety classification of these ELUs is FPQA, the lugs

utilized in the ELUs must be FPQA. NNECO noted that Thomas and Betts

lugs are only stocked as FPQA.

NNECO stated further that an evaluation was performed to determine

the consequences of Thomas and Betts lugs in lieu of AMP lugs and to

determine if all lug crimps on 1-ELU-21 and 29 were adequate.

Additionally, NNECO's evaluation verified the ability of 1-ELU-21 and

29 to perform their design function. NNECO has determined that the lug

manufacturer is not a critical issue as long as the lug is compatible

with the battery terminal and the wire used. In this case, the Thomas

and Betts lug is similar to the AMP lug, and both lugs are compatible

with the battery terminals and wire used. A compatibility study has

been completed and documented in a Replacement Item Evaluation (RIE).

NNECO performed a review of previous ELU surveillances to determine

whether a degraded condition had been observed for the battery terminal

lugs in these ELUs; this review did not reveal any degraded conditions.

The Millstone Unit 1 Engineering Department inspected the crimping of

the battery terminations, and the eight crimps were found to be

adequate. Although all battery termination lugs are insulated on these

ELUs, one splice on 1-ELU-29 appeared to be crimped by a die for

noninsulated lugs. However, this crimp did not affect operability of

the ELU since a high-resistance connection was not present, and the

insulation was not damaged. Satisfactory completion of a battery

discharge test confirmed the adequacy of the crimps. Nonetheless, the

lug that appeared to be crimped by a die for noninsulated lugs on 1-

ELU-29 has been replaced.

During its special inspection, the NRC staff reviewed the concern

about emergency lighting lugs and NNECO's process for lug replacement.

The NRC staff verified that specific lugs were not called for in

earlier versions of the lug replacement procedure and, therefore, as

long as the lug was compatible and classified as FPQA, it could be

used. Since Thomas and Betts lugs are stocked as FPQA and are

compatible, they could have been used in ELUs. In addition, since AMP

lugs are stocked as non-QA, the plant staff would have had to fill out

Form SF 486, ``Upgrading FPQA Parts,'' to justify the upgrade of the

lugs to FPQA standards.

The NRC staff reviewed an example of a lug changeout with an AMP

lug and verified that Form SF 486 was included in the package to

properly document the upgrade.

The NRC staff reviewed the RIE form that documented the

acceptability of Thomas and Betts lugs as an alternate for AMP lugs.

The RIE indicated that the Thomas and Betts lugs are acceptable as an

alternate item and that they will not degrade or compromise the

original design basis. The NRC staff found the RIE to be properly

documented and adequate. The NRC staff reviewed procedure MP 790.2,

which was revised on April 12, 1995, and now requires that AMP lugs be

used or an equivalent as evaluated and indicated by an RIE. Since an

RIE has been completed documenting Thomas and Betts lugs as an

alternative, they are acceptable. The NRC staff found the procedure

adequate and also verified that the one questionable lug on 1-ELU-29

was replaced. The NRC staff concluded that the lugs on 1-ELU-21 and 29

were adequately designed and qualified and that the ELUs were fully

operable.

Based on NRC's findings that (1) the use of standard commercial-

grade lugs in a gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor that are QA

subsystems of the emergency gas turbine generator and which had

apparently been crimped with diagonal pliers does not constitute an

inadequate work control or procedural compliance problem; (2) the

Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and the connections in the

connection boxes of major safety-related equipment (LPCI and CS motors)

are operable; and (3) the lugs on 1-ELU-21 and 29 were adequately

designed and qualified and the ELUs were fully operable, the NRC staff

has determined that the licensee adequately controls work and procedure

compliance within these areas at Millstone. Therefore, the Petitioner's

request to require NU to review all existing work orders for the past

10 or 12 years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that QA motor and

connection work does not have certain deficiencies, is not warranted.

B. Harassment and Intimidation Issue

The Petitioner alleges that he was ridiculed by the gas turbine

system engineer for raising safety concerns regarding the lugs on the

gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor and that the system engineer

willfully violated 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.7. In addition, the Petitioner

alleges that NU and its managers violated 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.7 and NU's

``Code of Conduct and Ethics.''

As indicated in a letter to the Petitioner dated November 28, 1995,

from the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

Regional Operations and Research, the Petitioner has raised several

complaints since 1993 with the NRC or the Department of Labor (DOL)

concerning harassment, intimidation, or discrimination by individuals

at NU because the Petitioner

[[Page 57926]]

raised safety concerns to NU or the NRC. As explained in the letter,

the NRC conducted investigations into some of the harassment and

intimidation allegations that the Petitioner had raised. The NRC did

not substantiate that the Petitioner suffered discrimination for

raising safety concerns. Further, of the complaints of harassment and

intimidation that the Petitioner raised that were investigated by the

DOL, none have been substantiated.

The staff has, in addition, reviewed the Petitioner's remaining

allegations of harassment and intimidation, including those in the

Petition, and has concluded that they do not present sufficient

information warranting further investigatory effort. Accordingly,

absent a finding of discrimination by the Secretary of Labor or an

Administrative Law Judge on any pending complaints, or significant new

evidence from the Petitioner that would support the allegations that NU

has harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against him, the NRC staff

plans no further followup of the harassment and intimidation

complaints. Based on the above, no further action is warranted.

III. Conclusion

The licensee evaluated the technical issues and provided the

results to the staff for review. The staff also conducted inspections

to independently determine if the licensee's conclusions and corrective

actions were acceptable. As explained above, none of the technical

issues reflect a lack of procedural compliance or warrant additional

action by the staff. Also, as explained above, the Petitioner's

assertion of harassment and intimidation does not warrant any action.

On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no

issues have been raised regarding Millstone Unit 1 that would require

initiation of enforcement action. Therefore, no enforcement action is

being taken in this matter.

The Petitioner's request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is

denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be

filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.

This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25

days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,

institutes review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ashok C. Thadani,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96-28741 Filed 11-7-96; 8:45 am]

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