Northeast UtilitiesMillstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

Federal RegisterJan 9, 1996

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-245]

Northeast Utilities--Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1;

Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

In notice document 95-31255 beginning on page 66807, in the issue

of Tuesday, December 26, 1995, the complete text of the ``Director's

Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-23) was not included. The

complete text follows this correction notice.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of January 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

James W. Andersen,

Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor

Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

I. Introduction

On January 8, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a

Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. In the Petition,

the Petitioner raised concerns regarding the site paging and site siren

evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

maintenance shop.

The Petitioner alleged that on numerous occasions since January

1994, his department manager had instructed the Petitioner's coworkers

to shut off or turn down the volume on the site paging and site siren

evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop, and

the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and coworker had complied with

this request in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and

NUREG-0654. The Petitioner requested that the NRC impose at least three

sanctions against his department manager, and impose sanctions against

the Petitioner's coworker and maintenance first-line supervisor for

engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.

On February 23, 1995, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition

had been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's

regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take

appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific

concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues

raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that no

substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would

warrant the action requested by the Petitioner.

II. Discussion

In the Petition, the Petitioner raised a concern that on numerous

occasions since January 1994, his department manager had instructed the

Petitioner's coworkers to shut off or turn down the volume on the site

paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1

maintenance shop, and the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and

coworker had complied with this request in violation of TS 6.8.1 and

NUREG-0654.

Licensees for nuclear power plants are required to have emergency

plans that meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements

of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), adequate

emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response

must be provided and maintained. Appendix E of Part 50 establishes

minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an

acceptable state of emergency preparedness. Section IV.E.9, in part,

requires at least one onsite communications system.

NUREG-0654, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of

Nuclear Power Plants,'' provides guidance for developing radiological

emergency plans and improving emergency preparedness. Section II.F.1.e

states that each emergency plan shall include provisions for alerting

or activating emergency personnel in each response organization.

Section II.J.1 states that each licensee shall establish the means and

time required to warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who

may be in areas controlled by the licensee. Technical Specification

6.8.1, in part, requires that procedures be established, implemented,

and maintained covering emergency plan implementation.

The topic of this Petition was one of the maintenance-related

issues the NRC staff raised to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

(NNECO), licensee for Millstone Unit 1, in letters dated December 5 and

28, 1994. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review the

issues and submit a written response. Specifically, the NRC requested

NNECO to review the following: (1) That NNECO management had shut off

the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system or directed

workers to shut off the system in the Unit 1 maintenance shop during

morning meetings, (2) that on several occasions the system was not

turned back on for hours, and (3) that the on/off switches for the

speakers in question had been installed without a work order.

The licensee's investigation into this matter, which was described

in its January 26, 1995, response to the NRC request, confirmed that

the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system had been

routinely turned off at one of the two speakers located in the

Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop area during meetings, and that this

practice was not consistent with Emergency Preparedness Department

guidance and NUREG-0654.1 However, NNECO management stated that it

was confident that personnel could still hear the other speaker. This

configuration was also tested during a special test conducted by NNECO.

The results of the test verified that one of the two speakers had

sufficient capacity to support event notification in the maintenance

shop area. Since the single speaker could be heard, personnel in the

maintenance area would be alerted if an emergency existed. NNECO's

investigation also concluded that the on/off switches were installed

without a work order in 1973 consistent with work performance processes

at that time.

\1\ NUREG-0654, paragraph J.1, states that each licensee shall

establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite

individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the

licensee. Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (Emergency Plan

Administrative Procedure [EPAP] 1.15), at the time, required that

the unit services director monitor and maintain emergency

preparedness facilities and equipment. In Attachment 2 of EPAP 1.15,

the Unit 1 public announcement speakers and evacuation alarm were

included as emergency preparedness equipment.

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NNECO's corrective actions to address this concern included

prohibiting the use of any switch that disables any feature of the site

paging and site siren evacuation alarm system, removing the two speaker

switches, and performing a walkdown of all other system speakers to

verify that no other similar switches existed in the system.

The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through

June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the

staff reviewed a number of the concerns, the topic of this Petition

being one of them, and issued the findings in Inspection Report (IR)

50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-

[[Page 672]]

22, 50-423/95-22 (95-22), dated July 21, 1995.

The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the monthly page and

siren tests, which were done in accordance with Procedure C-OP-605, and

the separate test conducted in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop

area. The review of the last two monthly tests showed that the site

alarm was audible over ambient noise in all the tested areas. The

review of the separate Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop test showed

that either switch, when in the off position, would not disable the

system and that with one of the speakers turned off, the other speaker

had sufficient capacity to support event notification.

Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (EPAP 1.15) required

that emergency preparedness equipment be maintained. The purpose of the

guidance, as it related to the speakers, was to warn or advise onsite

individuals. Since the single speaker could still be heard, the

Petitioner's department manager stated in a meeting with the NRC

inspectors that he believed the Emergency Preparedness Department

guidance was still being met. Therefore, the Petitioner has not

supported his assertion that the department manager and, indirectly,

his first-line supervisor and coworker, deliberately violated Millstone

procedures or technical specifications, 10 CFR 50.47(b), or 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix E, or failed to meet the guidance in NUREG-0654.

The inspector reviewed NNECO's corrective actions and confirmed

that a work order had been processed to disconnect and remove the

cutoff switches and that this work was completed. The inspector

reviewed several Millstone site daily news articles (``To the Point'')

that reinforced the message of not adjusting speaker volume. The

articles clearly stated that management expectations and emergency

preparedness guidance were that personnel were not to tamper with

emergency preparedness equipment. The inspector also discussed the

results of a walkdown of the entire system with a licensee

representative. The representative stated that one additional speaker

on/off switch had been found in the Unit 3 instrumentation and controls

area. This speaker's on/off switch was subsequently removed.

NNECO's investigation had also concluded that the switches were

installed in 1973 without the use of a work order. The work control

process has been enhanced significantly at Millstone Unit 1 since 1973.

Performing modifications to equipment important to safety, such as the

site paging and site alarm siren evacuation system, would now require

engineering and operations department review. It would also require

consideration of relevant regulatory requirements. During these reviews

it would be expected that modifications of this type (i.e., done

without such a work order) would be rejected and not implemented. The

NRC inspector concluded that NNECO's current work control practices

would require an automated work order for this type of modification and

that these switches could not have been installed without such a work

order under the current work control procedures. Therefore, since a

work order for this modification was not required in 1973, no

enforcement action is warranted.

The NRC inspector concluded in the Inspection Report that turning

off the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system speaker was

in violation of the licensee's emergency preparedness plan (and thus a

violation of TS 6.8.1) and not in conformance with the guidance in

NUREG-0654. Therefore, this issue, and three others were collectively

cited as a Severity Level IV violation.2 However, the Inspection

Report stated that since the operators in the maintenance shop were

still able to hear information provided by the other speaker in the

maintenance area, this event was of low safety significance and that it

appeared NNECO had taken effective corrective action to correct the

problem.

\2\ The three other issues involved violations of Millstone

Procedure ACP-QA-4.02B, ``Receipt, Control and Identification of QA

Material,'' ACP-QA-4.01A, ``System and Component Housekeeping,'' and

DC-1, ``Administration of Millstone Procedures and Forms.'' (NRC

Inspection Report 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22, dated

July 21, 1995)

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The NRC staff has concluded that the enforcement action already

taken is sufficient in this case and, therefore, no additional

enforcement action is warranted. The NRC staff has also concluded that

although the Petitioner's department manager turned off or had the

Petitioner's coworkers turn off one of the speakers, the Petitioner has

not supported his assertion that his department manager and coworkers

deliberately violated NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1 operating

license and, thereby, violated the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5.

III. Conclusion

The institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is

appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been

raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 1,

2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public Power

Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899, 924

(1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns

raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by

the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.

On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no

substantial health and safety issues have been raised regarding

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, that would require initiation

of additional enforcement action as requested by the Petitioner.

The NRC has taken appropriate enforcement action for the events

referenced in the Petition. The Petitioner's request for additional

action is denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this

Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the

Commission's review. This Decision will constitute the final action of

the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 96-286 Filed 1-8-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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