Northeast UtilitiesMillstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Federal RegisterJan 9, 1996
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]
Northeast Utilities--Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1;
Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
In notice document 95-31255 beginning on page 66807, in the issue
of Tuesday, December 26, 1995, the complete text of the ``Director's
Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-23) was not included. The
complete text follows this correction notice.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of January 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James W. Andersen,
Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I. Introduction
On January 8, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a
Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. In the Petition,
the Petitioner raised concerns regarding the site paging and site siren
evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
maintenance shop.
The Petitioner alleged that on numerous occasions since January
1994, his department manager had instructed the Petitioner's coworkers
to shut off or turn down the volume on the site paging and site siren
evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop, and
the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and coworker had complied with
this request in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and
NUREG-0654. The Petitioner requested that the NRC impose at least three
sanctions against his department manager, and impose sanctions against
the Petitioner's coworker and maintenance first-line supervisor for
engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
On February 23, 1995, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition
had been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's
regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take
appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific
concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues
raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that no
substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would
warrant the action requested by the Petitioner.
II. Discussion
In the Petition, the Petitioner raised a concern that on numerous
occasions since January 1994, his department manager had instructed the
Petitioner's coworkers to shut off or turn down the volume on the site
paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1
maintenance shop, and the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and
coworker had complied with this request in violation of TS 6.8.1 and
NUREG-0654.
Licensees for nuclear power plants are required to have emergency
plans that meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), adequate
emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response
must be provided and maintained. Appendix E of Part 50 establishes
minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an
acceptable state of emergency preparedness. Section IV.E.9, in part,
requires at least one onsite communications system.
NUREG-0654, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of
Nuclear Power Plants,'' provides guidance for developing radiological
emergency plans and improving emergency preparedness. Section II.F.1.e
states that each emergency plan shall include provisions for alerting
or activating emergency personnel in each response organization.
Section II.J.1 states that each licensee shall establish the means and
time required to warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who
may be in areas controlled by the licensee. Technical Specification
6.8.1, in part, requires that procedures be established, implemented,
and maintained covering emergency plan implementation.
The topic of this Petition was one of the maintenance-related
issues the NRC staff raised to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
(NNECO), licensee for Millstone Unit 1, in letters dated December 5 and
28, 1994. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review the
issues and submit a written response. Specifically, the NRC requested
NNECO to review the following: (1) That NNECO management had shut off
the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system or directed
workers to shut off the system in the Unit 1 maintenance shop during
morning meetings, (2) that on several occasions the system was not
turned back on for hours, and (3) that the on/off switches for the
speakers in question had been installed without a work order.
The licensee's investigation into this matter, which was described
in its January 26, 1995, response to the NRC request, confirmed that
the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system had been
routinely turned off at one of the two speakers located in the
Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop area during meetings, and that this
practice was not consistent with Emergency Preparedness Department
guidance and NUREG-0654.1 However, NNECO management stated that it
was confident that personnel could still hear the other speaker. This
configuration was also tested during a special test conducted by NNECO.
The results of the test verified that one of the two speakers had
sufficient capacity to support event notification in the maintenance
shop area. Since the single speaker could be heard, personnel in the
maintenance area would be alerted if an emergency existed. NNECO's
investigation also concluded that the on/off switches were installed
without a work order in 1973 consistent with work performance processes
at that time.
\1\ NUREG-0654, paragraph J.1, states that each licensee shall
establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite
individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the
licensee. Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (Emergency Plan
Administrative Procedure [EPAP] 1.15), at the time, required that
the unit services director monitor and maintain emergency
preparedness facilities and equipment. In Attachment 2 of EPAP 1.15,
the Unit 1 public announcement speakers and evacuation alarm were
included as emergency preparedness equipment.
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NNECO's corrective actions to address this concern included
prohibiting the use of any switch that disables any feature of the site
paging and site siren evacuation alarm system, removing the two speaker
switches, and performing a walkdown of all other system speakers to
verify that no other similar switches existed in the system.
The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through
June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the
staff reviewed a number of the concerns, the topic of this Petition
being one of them, and issued the findings in Inspection Report (IR)
50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-
[[Page 672]]
22, 50-423/95-22 (95-22), dated July 21, 1995.
The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the monthly page and
siren tests, which were done in accordance with Procedure C-OP-605, and
the separate test conducted in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop
area. The review of the last two monthly tests showed that the site
alarm was audible over ambient noise in all the tested areas. The
review of the separate Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop test showed
that either switch, when in the off position, would not disable the
system and that with one of the speakers turned off, the other speaker
had sufficient capacity to support event notification.
Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (EPAP 1.15) required
that emergency preparedness equipment be maintained. The purpose of the
guidance, as it related to the speakers, was to warn or advise onsite
individuals. Since the single speaker could still be heard, the
Petitioner's department manager stated in a meeting with the NRC
inspectors that he believed the Emergency Preparedness Department
guidance was still being met. Therefore, the Petitioner has not
supported his assertion that the department manager and, indirectly,
his first-line supervisor and coworker, deliberately violated Millstone
procedures or technical specifications, 10 CFR 50.47(b), or 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E, or failed to meet the guidance in NUREG-0654.
The inspector reviewed NNECO's corrective actions and confirmed
that a work order had been processed to disconnect and remove the
cutoff switches and that this work was completed. The inspector
reviewed several Millstone site daily news articles (``To the Point'')
that reinforced the message of not adjusting speaker volume. The
articles clearly stated that management expectations and emergency
preparedness guidance were that personnel were not to tamper with
emergency preparedness equipment. The inspector also discussed the
results of a walkdown of the entire system with a licensee
representative. The representative stated that one additional speaker
on/off switch had been found in the Unit 3 instrumentation and controls
area. This speaker's on/off switch was subsequently removed.
NNECO's investigation had also concluded that the switches were
installed in 1973 without the use of a work order. The work control
process has been enhanced significantly at Millstone Unit 1 since 1973.
Performing modifications to equipment important to safety, such as the
site paging and site alarm siren evacuation system, would now require
engineering and operations department review. It would also require
consideration of relevant regulatory requirements. During these reviews
it would be expected that modifications of this type (i.e., done
without such a work order) would be rejected and not implemented. The
NRC inspector concluded that NNECO's current work control practices
would require an automated work order for this type of modification and
that these switches could not have been installed without such a work
order under the current work control procedures. Therefore, since a
work order for this modification was not required in 1973, no
enforcement action is warranted.
The NRC inspector concluded in the Inspection Report that turning
off the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system speaker was
in violation of the licensee's emergency preparedness plan (and thus a
violation of TS 6.8.1) and not in conformance with the guidance in
NUREG-0654. Therefore, this issue, and three others were collectively
cited as a Severity Level IV violation.2 However, the Inspection
Report stated that since the operators in the maintenance shop were
still able to hear information provided by the other speaker in the
maintenance area, this event was of low safety significance and that it
appeared NNECO had taken effective corrective action to correct the
problem.
\2\ The three other issues involved violations of Millstone
Procedure ACP-QA-4.02B, ``Receipt, Control and Identification of QA
Material,'' ACP-QA-4.01A, ``System and Component Housekeeping,'' and
DC-1, ``Administration of Millstone Procedures and Forms.'' (NRC
Inspection Report 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22, dated
July 21, 1995)
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The NRC staff has concluded that the enforcement action already
taken is sufficient in this case and, therefore, no additional
enforcement action is warranted. The NRC staff has also concluded that
although the Petitioner's department manager turned off or had the
Petitioner's coworkers turn off one of the speakers, the Petitioner has
not supported his assertion that his department manager and coworkers
deliberately violated NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1 operating
license and, thereby, violated the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5.
III. Conclusion
The institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is
appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been
raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 1,
2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public Power
Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899, 924
(1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns
raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by
the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.
On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no
substantial health and safety issues have been raised regarding
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, that would require initiation
of additional enforcement action as requested by the Petitioner.
The NRC has taken appropriate enforcement action for the events
referenced in the Petition. The Petitioner's request for additional
action is denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this
Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the
Commission's review. This Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-286 Filed 1-8-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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