Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final

environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential

environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials

[[Page 48475]]

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until

decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some

of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present

environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage

condition.

On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and

Notice of Preferred Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim

management of several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS,

including a narrowing of alternatives under consideration for the

stabilization of plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions in H-Canyon,

and obsolete neptunium targets in K-Reactor.

On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for

the stabilization of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad

targets. DOE also indicated that it was considering a DOE staff

operations study, Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River

Site Chemical Separation Facilities (December 1995) before making a

decision on the stabilization of the remaining two categories of

nuclear materials at the SRS evaluated in the Interim Management of

Nuclear Materials EIS--plutonium-239 solutions, and neptunium-237

solution and obsolete targets.

After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy

study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments

from interested parties, DOE is now issuing the following decision

concerning these materials:

Neptunium-237 Solution and Targets

DOE has decided to dissolve, chemically separate and process in F-

Canyon the neptunium-237 contained in nine (9) obsolete reactor targets

and the existing neptunium-237 in solution currently in the H-Canyon.

The resulting glass will be stored in canisters inside the shielded

canyon facility in F-Canyon or the new Actinide Packaging and Storage

Facility, when constructed, until DOE implements programmatic decisions

on long-term storage, use or disposition of the material.

Plutonium-239 Solutions

DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions stored in

the H-Canyon facility to a metal, using the F-Canyon and FB-Line

facilities. The plutonium solutions will be converted to metal using

the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities. The plutonium

will be packaged in accordance with DOE's storage standard for

plutonium and stored in an existing SRS vault until the Actinide

Packaging and Storage Facility is available. The plutonium will be

stored at the SRS until DOE implements long-term storage and

disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of plutonium. The

plutonium from this stabilization action will be prohibited from use in

nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE is pursuing options for placing this

material under international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.

By stabilizing these materials in the F-Canyon DOE can avoid both

start up and decontamination costs associated with a portion of the HB-

Line that has never been operated. Moreover, this course of action will

effect the expeditious completion of actions necessary to stabilize and

convert these materials into forms suitable for safe storage and

prepare the facilities for potential shutdown and deactivation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim

management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the

Final EIS, the initial ROD and Notice, the first supplemental ROD, or

this second supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA

Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River

Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031,

(800) 242-8259, Internet: [email protected]

For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of

NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave

a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final

environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential

environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until

decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some

of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present

environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage

condition.

The Final EIS identified processing to oxide using the H-Canyon and

HB-Line facilities as the preferred alternative for the neptunium-237

solution and targets and the plutonium-239 solutions.

On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a ROD and Notice of Preferred

Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim management of several

categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. In addition, DOE indicated

that neptunium-237 solution and targets would be stabilized either by

processing to oxide or vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions

in H-Canyon would be stabilized through processing to metal, processing

to oxide, or vitrification. DOE stated that it would select and

implement one stabilization method for each of these material

categories, and that the stabilization method chosen would be dependent

upon further reviews of costs, schedules, and facility utilization

options.

On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for

the stabilization of two of the remaining categories of nuclear

materials (Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets)

analyzed in the Final EIS.

On February 29, 1996, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the

Department's management and operating contractor for the Savannah River

Site, advised DOE that, while engaged in a scheduled upgrade of safety

authorization basis documentation, it had discovered that seismic

(earthquake) analyses performed in the early 1980s were based on

assumptions that are inconsistent with the as-built condition of the

canyon facilities. As a result of this discovery, the transfer of

nuclear materials into the canyon facilities was suspended while

detailed analyses and reviews were conducted to ensure the safety of

the canyon facilities and to determine if the information contained in

the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Final EIS was sufficient.

The F-Canyon analyses have been completed; the H-Canyon analyses are

expected to be completed in September 1996. The completed F-Canyon

analyses indicate that the ability of the F-Canyon facilities to

withstand a severe earthquake is equal to or better than that predicted

in existing Safety Analysis Reports and the EIS. Based on a Supplement

Analysis, DOE determined that a Supplemental EIS for nuclear materials

stabilization in F-Canyon is not required.

After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy

study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments

from interested parties, DOE is now issuing its decisions for the

stabilization of neptunium-237 solution and obsolete targets, and

plutonium-239 solutions, the remaining two categories of nuclear

materials at the SRS evaluated in the

[[Page 48476]]

Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS.

II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the

neptunium-237 solution and obsolete reactor targets, and the plutonium-

239 solutions at the SRS: (A) Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No Action''

within the context of NEPA), (B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Processing

and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility

(DWPF), and (D) Vitrification (F-Canyon). In addition, Processing to

Metal was also evaluated for the plutonium-239 solutions. The following

is a brief description of the alternatives evaluated.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store the materials

in their current physical and chemical form. DOE would relocate or

repackage materials stored in vaults or tanks to consolidate the

material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic

sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual

inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor

the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Chemicals

would be added to existing solutions in order to maintain concentration

and chemistry within established parameters. Repackaging would include

removing materials from damaged storage containers and placing them in

new containers or placing the damaged containers in larger containers.

A variety of activities could be required to maintain the materials

in their current physical and chemical form. For example, DOE would

maintain facilities in good working condition and would continue to

provide utilities (water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and

services (security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each

facility. Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the

skills necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would

continue with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related

vulnerabilities associated with storage of the materials and projects

to upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).

B. Processing to Oxide

DOE would convert existing solutions of neptunium-237 and

plutonium-239 to an oxide in HB-Line. Additional neptunium-237 solution

would be generated in the processing of the obsolete reactor targets.

After conversion of the plutonium and neptunium solutions to oxides,

the oxides would be packaged and stored in accordance with applicable

criteria in an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and

Storage Facility is available.

C. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF

DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method

for chemically adjusting existing solutions and solutions that would

result from the dissolution of the obsolete neptunium-237 targets in

order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in H-Area. The

research and development work would be done to ensure nuclear

criticality safety due to the amount of plutonium-239 in the existing

solutions, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear materials on the

systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level

waste.

Upon completion of the studies, existing solutions of neptunium-237

and plutonium-239 would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the

high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. DOE would transport

the obsolete targets from the K-Reactor area to F- or H-Canyon where

they would be dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting solutions would

be chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks

via underground pipelines. The solutions would be mixed with the

existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- or H-Area tanks.

The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be

immobilized in borosilicate glass in the vitrification process at the

DWPF. The glass would be contained within stainless steel canisters

that would be stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending

geologic disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized

by the Saltstone Facility into a grout containing very low levels of

radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults located

at the Saltstone Facility.

D. Vitrification (F-Canyon)

For this alternative, DOE would utilize the vitrification

capability that it decided in the December 12, 1995, ROD to install in

F-Canyon for the stabilization of the americium and curium solution.

The existing solutions of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239, currently

stored in H-Canyon, would be transported to F-Canyon for vitrification

upon development or procurement of a suitable shipping container. The

obsolete neptunium-237 targets would be transported from K-Reactor area

to F-Canyon, dissolved in nitric acid, and the neptunium chemically

separated from other materials (principally aluminum). The resulting

neptunium would be vitrified in conjunction with the existing neptunium

solution. Neptunium separated from the processing of the Mark-16 and

Mark-22 fuels pursuant to the February 8, 1996 ROD would be vitrified

in conjunction with the existing neptunium materials. For the

plutonium-239 this vitrified form would not meet the requirements of

the storage standard (DOE Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals

and Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-94)), which prescribes stable oxide or metal.

Furthermore, the vitrified form would require additional processing to

prepare its disposition.

E. Processing to Metal

This alternative applies only to the plutonium-239 solutions. Under

this alternative, DOE would transport the plutonium-239 solutions from

H-Canyon to F-Canyon using the same container described above to

transport the neptunium-237 solution. In F-Canyon, the plutonium

solutions would be converted to plutonium metal using the FB-Line

facility. After conversion, the metal would be packaged and stored in

accordance with DOE's plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) in

an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility

is available. A new glove box is being installed in FB-Line to provide

the equipment necessary to meet the storage standard criteria for the

packaging of plutonium metal. The plutonium metal would be stored at

the SRS until programmatic decisions are made and implemented by DOE on

long-term storage or disposition.

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials

analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from

implementation of the above management alternatives. DOE has concluded

that there would be minimal environmental impact from implementation of

any of these alternatives in the areas of geologic resources,

ecological resources (including threatened or endangered species),

cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land

use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility

modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within

existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE

[[Page 48477]]

anticipates that the existing SRS workforce would support any

construction projects and other activities required to implement any of

the alternatives. As a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic

impacts from implementing any of the alternatives.

Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical

separations facilities would have greater environmental impacts (e.g.,

radiological, waste generation) during the actual dissolving,

processing or conversion activities than simply storing these materials

in the F- and H-Canyon facilities. After dissolving, processing and

conversion activities have stabilized these materials, however, impacts

of normal facility operations related to management of these materials

would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated with these

materials would be reduced, with certain kinds of accidents eliminated

(e.g., solution spills or releases). Potential health effects from

normal operations from any of the alternatives, including those

involving the operation of the canyon facilities, would be low and well

within regulatory limits. All of the alternatives require some use of

the canyon facilities.

Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents

associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after

material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Since actively

operating facilities have potentially larger environmental impacts,

stabilization alternatives requiring longer periods of time to complete

are estimated to have relatively higher impacts than alternatives

requiring less time to complete.

Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives would result in

low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an

indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives would be expected

to result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ``No

Action'' in the near-term, but would result in lower environmental

impacts upon completion of the stabilization action. Under Continuing

Storage alternatives, although chemicals would be added to existing

solutions in order to maintain concentrations and chemistry within

established parameters, no actions would be taken to chemically or

physically stabilize the storage conditions. All of the stabilization

alternatives, upon completion of the actions required, would reduce the

potential for accidents and associated consequences. Several of the

stabilization alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the

risks from accidents until the required actions are completed.

Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous

liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable

federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS

facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste,

mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by

implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing

waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are

within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities

for storage, treatment or disposal.

SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear

materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential

impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the

environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls

are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the

facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified;

therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

IV. Other Factors

In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing

the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the

decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors

included: (1) The need to construct and operate modified or new

facilities (e.g., a vitrification facility) and the reliability of

older facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential

impacts to United States nonproliferation policy as affected by both

the operation of certain facilities and the attractiveness of the

managed nuclear materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation

schedules, (4) technology availability, (5) labor availability and core

competency, (6) level of custodial care for the continued safe

management of the nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget

considerations, (8) technical uncertainty (e.g., radiation and

chemically induced changes to solution chemistry, criticality concerns

for undeveloped processes), and (9) comments received during the

scoping period for the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials, and comments received on the Draft and Final EISs.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in

lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative

was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental

factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an alternative might be expected

to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water

than other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts of

radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated for

the alternatives evaluated for the neptunium-237 solution and targets,

and plutonium-239 solutions, and identified the following as the

environmentally preferable alternative for each material. The health

and environmental effects from any of the alternatives are all low and

well within regulatory limits.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable

alternative for stabilizing solutions and targets containing neptunium.

Although vitrification in F-Canyon is estimated to result in slightly

higher radiological doses to the SRS workers, it is estimated to result

in the lowest potential radiological doses to the offsite public.

Similarly, although it could result in higher airborne emissions of

hazardous pollutants than the other alternatives, the levels of liquid

effluent emissions would be comparable to the other alternatives.

Vitrification (F-Canyon) would generate the least amount of high level,

transuranic and mixed waste, and would generate comparable amounts of

low level waste to the other alternatives.

Plutonium-239--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable

alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-

Canyon. Of the stabilization alternatives, vitrification in F-Canyon is

estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite

public and the SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous

pollutant emissions to the air and water; and result in the least

amount of transuranic, mixed, and low level waste with comparable

amounts of high level waste. However, as indicated above, this

alternative would require additional processing of the vitrified

plutonium to prepare it for disposition.

[[Page 48478]]

VI. Decision

After careful consideration of the issues and public comments

received concerning the stabilization and management of SRS nuclear

materials, the analyses of environmental impacts (including the ability

of the F-Canyon facilities to withstand severe seismic events) and

other factors, DOE has made the following decisions for the interim

management of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239:

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

DOE has decided to stabilize the neptunium-237 solution and

obsolete reactor targets by vitrification in F-Canyon (the

environmentally preferable alternative). The neptunium solution will be

transported from H-Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order

0460.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of

the package will be subjected to management controls, such as

restrictions on vehicle speed, route specifications, and escort

requirements. The nine obsolete reactor targets will be transported

from K-Reactor to F-Canyon. At F-Canyon, the targets will be dissolved

and processed to separate the neptunium from other materials

(principally aluminum). These other materials will be sent to the high

level waste tanks for eventual treatment through the Saltstone and DWPF

facilities. The existing neptunium solution and those generated from

the obsolete reactor targets will be placed in a glass matrix, using

vitrification equipment to be installed in F-Canyon (as announced in

the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice for the vitrification of the

americium and curium solution). In addition, neptunium separated from

the stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels (as announced in the

February 8, 1996 supplemental ROD) will be stabilized in conjunction

with these other solutions. The resulting stainless steel canisters

containing the neptunium glass will be stored in the F-Canyon or a new

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, when constructed, until DOE

implements programmatic decisions on the future use or disposition of

the neptunium.

DOE selected vitrification in F-Canyon for several reasons.

Although the SRS has an existing facility (HB-Line, Phase II) designed

to purify and convert neptunium (and plutonium-239) to an oxide, it has

never been operated. DOE can avoid both the costs to start up this

portion of the HB-Line facility and the future decontamination of the

facility by vitrifying the solution in F-Canyon. DOE could transfer the

neptunium solution in H-Canyon to the adjacent high level waste tanks

and eventually vitrify them in the DWPF. However, the physical form of

glass produced by the DWPF would render any future recovery and use of

the neptunium impractical due to cost and technical complexity.

To maintain the neptunium in a concentrated physical form, thus

preserving the potential for future use (for the potential production

of plutonium-238), DOE evaluated alternatives for converting the

neptunium to either an oxide or glass. Either form could support future

use of the material, if required. DOE has found that the glass form

offers significant advantages over the oxide form for future storage

and handling. The glass matrix produced by the vitrification process

provides some ``self-shielding'' compared to oxide. This reduces the

radiation levels associated with the neptunium, thereby reducing

exposure to workers. The glass matrix is also a much less dispersible

form of radioactive material compared to the oxide in the event of a

severe facility- related accident, such as a major fire. DOE has

decided to dissolve and process the nine obsolete reactor targets

because it would be advantageous to recover and consolidate the

neptunium-237 into a single physical form for continued safe storage.

The amount of material to be dissolved and processed is very small and

can be done at minimal cost.

Potential waste generation impacts are lower for the selected

vitrification alternative than for the processing to oxide alternative.

Potential safety and health impacts to workers and the public, and

potential impacts to air and water resources are comparable between the

two alternatives. Potential safety, health and environmental impacts

are low and well within regulatory and management control limits.

Plutonium-239--Processing to Metal

DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions by

processing them to metal in the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-

Line facilities. Plutonium-239 solutions will be transported from H-

Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order 0460.1, PACKAGING

AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of the package will

be subjected to management controls, such as restrictions on vehicle

speed, route specifications, and escort requirements. The plutonium-239

solutions will undergo processing as necessary to remove impurities

that would interfere with the conversion to metal process in FB-Line.

The resulting stabilized plutonium metal will be packaged in accordance

with DOE's storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) and stored in an existing

vault at the SRS until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility is

available. The plutonium will be stored until DOE implements long-term

storage and disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of

plutonium.

As indicated above, the SRS could use a never-before operated

portion of the HB-Line to stabilize the plutonium-239 to an oxide.

Startup and future decontamination costs associated with this facility

will be avoided by processing the plutonium to metal in the F-Canyon

and FB-Line facilities. DOE evaluated transferring the plutonium-239

solutions to the adjacent high level waste tanks for storage and

subsequent vitrification in DWPF. This alternative would be more

technically complex and potentially more expensive, and added

criticality controls would be needed for tanks and facilities used for

storage and treatment of the high level liquid waste.

DOE also considered vitrifying the plutonium in F-Canyon (the

environmentally preferable alternative) using the same equipment in F-

Canyon as planned for the vitrification of the americium/curium and

neptunium solutions. This would produce a glass matrix with similar

safe storage characteristics as described above for the vitrified

neptunium. Demonstration and research activities are currently ongoing

concerning vitrification of surplus plutonium pursuant to the

Department's Materials Disposition program, but those activities focus

primarily on stable forms of plutonium that are not in solution.

Additional research and analytical work would be required for

vitrification of plutonium solutions which may pose a health, safety or

environmental concern in the next 10 years to ensure adequate

criticality controls for the conversion process and for the safe

storage of the product. It is expected that vitrification equipment

modifications would be required to ensure adequate criticality control.

Thus, while vitrification is not as viable as processing to metal in

the near term, the decision to stabilize the plutonium to metal is

compatible with all alternatives being considered for disposition of

surplus weapons-useable plutonium.

Potential waste generation impacts from processing to metal are

comparable to the vitrification (environmentally preferable)

alternative for high level waste, but greater for transuranic and

[[Page 48479]]

low level wastes. Potential safety and health impacts to workers and

the public, and potential impacts to air and water resources for the

conversion activity are comparable for the processing to metal, oxide,

or vitrification alternatives. Potential safety, health and

environmental impacts are low and well within regulatory and management

control limits.

The selected stabilization action will result in plutonium metal, a

weapons-usable product. However, the quantity produced (including the

metal to be produced as a result of decisions made in the December 12,

1995 ROD and Notice) will be a small fraction of DOE's existing

inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE believes this small amount does

not present nuclear proliferation concerns. None of the stabilization

alternatives would denature the plutonium in a way that would preclude

its recovery and use in nuclear weapons manufacture. The stabilized

plutonium will not be used for nuclear explosive purposes. In addition,

DOE is pursuing options for placing surplus plutonium-239 under

international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.

Finally, as noted above, the H-Canyon seismic analyses are expected

to be completed in September 1996. A decision now to move neptunium and

plutonium solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon is permissible and

appropriate prior to the completion of the H-Canyon analyses because

removal of the materials from H-Canyon would not involve operation of

the HB-Line, but would result in reducing the amount of nuclear

materials present in H-Canyon. No additional nuclear materials will be

introduced into H-Canyon until the on-going seismic analyses are

complete.

VII. Conclusion

The Final EIS analyzes interim management alternatives for nuclear

materials at the SRS. Those alternatives and the decisions associated

with the safe management of these materials directly affect the

operational status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the

Site. The decisions in this supplemental ROD, as in the December 12,

1995 ROD and Notice and February 8, 1996 Supplemental ROD, are

structured to effect the completion of actions necessary to stabilize

or convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and

prepare the facilities for potential subsequent shutdown and

deactivation. The actions being implemented will support efficient,

cost-effective consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and

will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation

of associated vulnerabilities within the time frame recommended by the

DNFSB.

The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and

processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected

budget constraints and with minimal additional training for involved

personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach

considering a multiplicity of factors; and represent the optimum use of

facilities to stabilize the materials in the shortest amount of time.

Only minor modifications of the canyon facilities will be required

(loading and unloading stations, and modification to the vitrification

equipment to be installed for the americium/curium solution

stabilization as announced in the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice).

Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the

nuclear materials within the scope of this and the previous RODs.

Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials will entail the

operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities and,

consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, will preserve DOE's

capabilities for the management and stabilization of other nuclear

materials until programmatic decisions are made.

Issued at Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.

Alvin L. Alm,

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

[FR Doc. 96-23352 Filed 9-12-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P