Supervisory Committee Audits and Verifications

Federal RegisterAug 8, 1996

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NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION

12 CFR Part 701

Supervisory Committee Audits and Verifications

AGENCY: National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) is amending

its regulations governing credit union supervisory committee audits and

verifications. The final amendments clarify existing audit scope;

expand audit scope and reporting requirements for compensated auditors

only; require a comprehensive engagement letter setting forth minimum

contracting terms and conditions; clarify existing working paper access

requirements; expressly state available administrative sanctions for

failure to comply with supervisory

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committee audit requirements and working paper access requirements; and

add relevant definitions of accounting/auditing terms use throughout

the regulation.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 31, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karen Kelbly, Accounting Officer,

Office of Examination and Insurance (703) 518-6360, or Michael McKenna,

Attorney, Office of General Counsel (703) 518-6540, at 1775 Duke

Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Background

Section 701.12 of NCUA's Regulations sets forth the supervisory

committee's responsibility in meeting the audit and verification

requirements of section 115 of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C.

Sec. 1761d. A supervisory committee audit is required at least once

every calendar year covering the period since the last audit. The scope

of the audit must be sufficient, at a minimum, to test the federal

credit union's assets, liabilities, equity, income, and expenses for

existence, proper cut off, valuations, ownership, disclosures and

classification, and internal controls. Section 741.202 of NCUA's Rules

and Regulations, 12 CFR 741.12, make these requirements applicable to

federally insured state-chartered credit unions.

NCUA continues to have concerns with the scope of the supervisory

committee audit and with access to working papers supporting such

audits. The Board felt there was a need to amend the regulation

because:

Many supervisory committee audits have been inadequate;

Examiners have been placed in the position of brokering

disputes between external auditors and supervisory committees relative

to audit inadequacy;

The standards supervisory committee have been held to are

not definitive;

Examiner access to ``proprietary working papers'' has been

limited;

Greater uniformity in audit scope is needed; and

The addition of definitions is needed to enhance clarity.

Consequently, on October 19, 1995, the Board issued proposed

amendments to the regulation governing credit union supervisory

committee audits and verifications (Section 701.12 of NCUA's

Regulations) 60 F.R. 55663 (November 2, 1995). On December 19, 1995,

the Board extended the comment period to January 18, 1996. 60 F.R.

66952 (December 27, 1995). The proposed amendments: (1) clarified

existing audit scope; (2) expanded audit scope and reporting

requirements for compensated auditors only; (3) required a

comprehensive engagement letter setting forth minimum contracting terms

and conditions; (4) clarified existing working paper access

requirements; (5) expressly stated available administrative sanctions

for failure to comply with supervisory committee audit requirements and

working paper access requirements; and (6) added relevant definitions

of accounting/auditing terms used throughout the regulation.

B. Comments

One hundred and eighteen comments were received. Comments were

received from sixty-nine federal credit unions, nine state chartered

credit unions, twenty-one state leagues, four national credit union

trade associations, eleven certified public accounting firms, one

internal auditor, one certified public accountant trade organization,

and one government agency. NCUA also received one anonymous electronic

mail.

Eight commenters express complete support for the proposal. Fifteen

commenters oppose the entire proposal. Twelve of these commenters

believe that the current system is working well and that the proposed

amendments will simply result in increased costs without any increased

service. Ninety-seven commenters express varied levels of support for

the proposal; however, most of these commenters had one or more

objections to the proposal. A recurring theme among these commenters

was that the proposal would hurt small credit unions. Another recurring

theme was that the proposed amendments, in effect, require an opinion

audit. Finally, a number of commenters believe the proposed amendments

would increase costs to credit unions.

The Board believes the final regulation reasonably balances the

concerns of those opposing additional burden for small credit unions

with the need for complete and reliable credit union audits. The Board

appreciates the obstacles small credit unions face when operating in

today's environment and does not wish to add to that burden

unnecessarily. The amendments to this regulation will not have a

significant impact on a credit union which meets its supervisory

committee audit obligations in any of the following ways:

The credit union's supervisory committee performs the

audit itself.

The credit union's internal auditor performs the audit.

The supervisory committee recruits a member or volunteer

who performs the audit (i.e., the member or volunteer is not in the

business of performing compensated audits for credit unions).

The supervisory committee obtains an opinion audit.

If the supervisory committee itself or its uncompensated designated

representative performs the supervisory committee audit as prescribed

in Sec. 701.12(c)(5)(i)(D), the following portions of the proposed

regulation will not apply to the supervisory committee audit:

Sec. 701.12(c)(4)--Increased scope requirements in

designated areas;

Sec. 701.12(c)(5)(i)(A-C)--Opinion audits and agreed-upon

procedures in relation to compensated auditors; and

Sec. 701.12(d)--Engagement letter requirements.

Additionally, NCUA will revise its Supervisory Committee Guide for

Federal Credit Unions for targeted release prior to December 31, 1996.

The revised Guide will provide guidance to assist a supervisory

committee itself or its uncompensated designated representative in

meeting the applicable requirements of this regulation.

If the supervisory committee employs an auditor who is defined as a

``compensated auditor'' to perform (or assist in performing) the audit,

the following additional requirements will be necessary:

An engagement letter between the credit union and the

compensated auditor;

Expanded audit scope in certain areas if the compensated

auditor is engaged to address, and agrees to take on, these areas; and

Notification in writing of reportable conditions or errors

and irregularities, if any, discovered in the normal course of the

audit.

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SC Audit performed by

---------------------------------------

Supervisory

Requirement addressed committee or

designated non- Compensated

compensated auditor

auditor

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Engagement Letter............... No engagement Engagement letter

letter required.

requirement.

[[Page 41314]]

Scope........................... As exists under As exists under

current current

regulation. regulation, plus

expanded scope in

identified

areas.1

Testing/Procedures Performed in Regulation Regulation

Accordance With. identifies identifies

specific specific

standards which standards which

apply. apply.

Reporting Standards............. As exists under As exists under

current current

regulation. regulation, plus

``reportable

conditions,'' if

any, and ``errors

and

irregularities,''

if any, simply

``reduced to

writing''.1

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1 Distinguishable from an opinion audit because the following are not

required: full scope of opinion audit, financial statements, related

disclosures, auditor's opinion, or negative assurance.

Comments Relating to Current Sec. 701.12. Throughout the comment

letters of accounting/auditing professionals were a series of comments

addressing conditions which apply equally to the current and to the

revised Sec. 701.12. These include:

1. Auditing work should not be performed by lay individuals; CPAs

alone have the professional proficiency to perform audits.

2. The proposed regulations put CPAs at an economic disadvantage to

compete in the credit union marketplace. A CPA performing a supervisory

committee audit would be bound by the professional auditing standards

promulgated by AICPA and the State Board of Accountancy, while a non-

CPA is not so burdened. CPA would not be able to charge fees

competitive with (i.e., as low as) that of non-CPA.

3. CPAs are concerned about the ability of non-CPA examiners to

review CPA's work.

4. CPAs may limit themselves to performing only opinion audits for

credit unions. A new auditing standard, Statement of Auditing Standard

(SAS) No. 75, governing agreed-upon procedures engagements requires

users of agreed-upon procedures reports to acknowledge the sufficiency

of such procedures in satisfying the requirements of the specified

user. If the CPA cannot get the specified user to do this (in advance

of the engagement), then the only work a CPA could perform for a

specified user would be an opinion audit. The thrust of this comment is

that NCUA would qualify as a ``specified user'' and would, therefore,

have to acknowledge the sufficiency of the procedures prior to each

credit union's engagement of a CPA.

Each of these comments applies equally to the current regulation

and the amended version being issued as a final rule; they are not

exacerbated by the amendments. The source of some of the conditions

addressed in the comments is not, if fact, any action by NCUA, but

rather, exists due to the actions of others. The first three

conditions, which we will address first, are relatively straight-

forward; the SAS No. 75 issue is more complex and is addressed in

section K.

The first condition will exist as long as NCUA allows auditors

other than licensed, independent certified public accountants to

perform supervisory committee audits. Since the NCUA Board is committed

to allowing credit union supervisory committees the option to engage

non-CPA accounting/auditing professionals, there can be no ready

resolution of this concern either under the current or the amended

final regulation.

As to the second area of concern, that CPAs are bound by

professional standards imposed by state licensing authorities and by

the AICPA (e.g., education, proficiency, peer review, AICPA

professional ethics, GAAS, etc.), while non-CPAs are not, this is not

the result of any additional requirements imposed by NCUA. The NCUA

Board has no jurisdiction over the imposition of auditing standards

governing the work of CPAs. The only way to ``regulate away'' the

purported ``economic disadvantage'' the CPAs would be to limit the

performance of supervisory committee audits to licensed, independent

certified public accountants. This would create an ``economic

disadvantage'' as to all other types of auditors, particularly those

who audit small credit unions. The NCUA Board does not believe this is

a viable solution.

Third, examiners review the work of compensated auditors for

compliance with this section. Wherein such examination requires the

non-CPA examiner to review compensated auditor's work for compliance

with GAAS and a deficiency is suspected, NCUA recognizes it is not an

authority on GAAP or GAAS. Referral to state accountancy licensing

authorities or the AICPA Ethics Division, where applicable, will be

NCUA's means of seeking assistance to make such determinations. NCUA is

sympathetic to the argument that non-CPAs do not have the knowledge and

proficiency necessary to determine the extent of substantive testing

required under GAAS, but it believes they can do so under this section

which is a lesser, and regulatory defined, standard.

As to the fourth area of comment, this area is somewhat more

perplexing. We have discussed SAS No. 75 and related issues in section

K. Suffice it to say here that this condition exists as a result of the

new auditing standard promulgated by auditing standards-setters which

became effective May 1, 1996. The condition exists under the current

regulation and was not created or aggravated by any NCUA effort to

amend this regulation. The timing of the SAS No. 75 effective date and

NCUA's efforts to revise this part are coincidental.

Areas Seemingly Misunderstood. The comment relative to ``burden on

small credit unions'' are believed to have resulted primarily from a

misunderstanding of the proposed amendments. Such comments made

include:

The regulations essentially require an opinion audit.

Audit scope will have to be expanded substantially to

generate the two additional reports required.

Working paper access requirements will generate increased

travel and credit union staff costs.

Each of these areas are discussed at length below.

C. Definitions

The proposal added a set of definitions for terms used in the

regulation. Many of these terms, while familiar to accounting/auditing

professionals, may be less well know to supervisory committee

volunteers. The proposed definitions included: (1) Agreed-upon

procedures; (2) Applicable generally accepted auditing standards

(GAAS); (3) Audit or Opinion audit; (4) Compensated auditor; (5)

Financial statements; (6) Generally accepted

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accounting principles (GAAP); (7) Generally accepted auditing standards

(GAAS); (8) Independence or Independent; (9) Independent, licensed,

certified public accountant; (10) Internal controls; (11) Other

comprehensive basis of accounting; (12) Related party transactions;

(13) Reportable conditions; (14) Substantive testing; (15) Supervisory

committee; (16) Supervisory committee audit; and (17) Working papers.

The NCUA Board also requested comment on whether any additional terms

should be defined in the regulation.

Eight commenters believe no further terms should be defined while

three commenters believe the final amendments should define additional

terms. One commenter requests a definition of ``verifications.'' One

commenter requests NCUA define ``summary of operations'' One commenter

believes NCUA should define ``internal auditor'' and ``Standards for

the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.'' Thirteen commenters

believe that the proposal adequately defined the terms listed. Three of

these commenters state that the definitions are valuable to credit

unions. Four commenters believed that the proposal does not adequately

define the listed terms.

Generally, if several commenters suggested redefinitions along the

same lines and the suggested language was technically correct, the

final regulation reflects the revised language. Definitions for

``internal auditor'' and ``Standards for the Professional Practice of

Internal Auditing'' were not added as neither of these terms are used

anywhere in the regulation. A definition for ``verifications'' was not

added since it is defined and discussed fully in the existing

regulation, Sec. 701.12(e). ``Summary of operations'' is simply a

phrase which was used within the ``financial statements'' definition

which is not critical to an understanding of the definition or the

regulation; this phrase was dropped. One definition was added and that

was the SAS No. 75 definition of ``specified elements, accounts or

items of a financial statement.''

The definition of ``applicable GAAS'' and the use of that term was

dropped throughout the regulation. In the proposed regulation, we had

defined ``applicable GAAS'' as GAAS excluding the second general

standard and the standards of reporting. In the final regulation, we

dropped the term ``applicable GAAS'' and instead spelled out five

specific standards, contained in paragraph (c)(2). The five standards

were adopted with modifications from the AICPA's ten generally accepted

auditing standards, again excluding the second general standard and the

standards of reporting. The Board believes that the use of the term

``applicable GAAS'' may intimidate laymen; spelling out the specific

standards intended should help eliminate any apprehension. The Board

believes these standards are reasonable and attainable.

The proposal defined ``audit or opinion audit'' in part, as an

examination of the financial statements performed by an independent,

licensed, certified public accountant in accordance with generally

accepted auditing standards. One commenter believes that this

definition must be modified. This commenter states that an ``audit''

and an ``opinion audit'' are not the same thing, and not all credit

unions need an opinion audit which is performed by an ``independent,

licensed, certified public accountant.'' One commenter states that

since the definition applies to the word ``audit'' alone it is unclear

if this requirement applies everywhere in the regulation where the term

is used. For example, this commenter states that ``Supervisory

Committee Audit'' could mean an ``audit'' by a CPA, which the commenter

believes is beyond the scope of what NCUA is requiring with this

proposal. This commenter suggests restricting the definition to only

``opinion audits.'' One commenter states that there is an inconsistency

between the definition of ``audit'' or ``opinion audit'' and the

proposed supervisory committee audit in Section 701.12(c). This

commenter states that the definition states an audit is to be performed

by an independent, licensed, certified public accountant; whereas

Section 701.12(c) provides other alternatives in the completion of an

audit and specifically provides that someone other than a certified

public accountant such as the supervisory committee may conduct audits.

Within the accounting profession and as represented in GAAS,

``audit'' is the term used for an ``opinion audit''. In fact, ``opinion

audit'' is jargon for ``audit''; the terms are synonymous. However,

since the use of the term ``audit'' in the regulation without an

accompanying adjective such as ``opinion'' or ``supervisory committee''

was confusing to some of the commenters, we have eliminated the

definition of ``audit,'' narrowed the definition to ``opinion audit''

and use only the term ``audit'' (when used as a noun) throughout the

regulation preceded by descriptive terms, e.g., opinion audit, or

supervisory committee audit. As to the alternatives set forth in

Sec. 701.12(c), these relate to the performance of a supervisory

committee audit. The scope of an opinion audit exceeds that a

supervisory committee audit. Thus, an opinion audit which complies with

GAAS, would exceed the requirements of the regulation.

The proposal defined a ``compensated auditor'' as any accounting/

auditing professional who is compensated for performing the supervisory

committee audit and/or verification services. Thirteen commenters

believe that the term ``compensated auditor'' should be revised so as

to distinguish between the credit union's internal auditor and the

credit union's contracted external auditor. These commenters believe

the proposal could be interpreted so that a compensated auditor is

defined as an accounting or auditing professional who is employed

directly by the credit union. Two commenters believe that the term

``compensated auditor'' should not include someone who simply lends a

hand to the supervisory committee in completing the audit. Two

commenters believe that external auditors should be licensed

professionals (such as CPAs) to ensure that audits are detailed and

reflect the actual financial condition of the institution.

The Board found the comments in this area helpful and has amended

the definitions in response to some of the suggestions. It is not the

Board's intent to include credit union employees acting in the course

of their employment (internal auditors) or someone who simply lends a

hand (volunteer). Nor is the Board comfortable with restricting the

performance of supervisory committee audits to licensed professionals.

The definition has been changed to exclude employees and to exclude

individuals who perform no more than one compensated supervisory

committee audit per calendar year. The later provision was added to

ease the burden for small credit unions who may benefit through the

assistance of a volunteer, someone who simply lends a hand, e.g., the

local bookkeeper who, while compensated, performs the supervisory

committee audit (one per calendar year) for a minimal and reasonable

remuneration.

The proposal defined generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS)

in part as the standards approved and adopted by the American Institute

of Certified Public Accountants which apply when ``independent,

licensed certified public accountants'' audit financial statements. One

commenter believes this definition will substantially increase the

costs of audits for smaller credit unions that do not use a CPA. One

commenter believes that the definition implies that a CPA is bound

[[Page 41316]]

by GAAS but non-CPAs are exempted from certain provisions and that this

is unfair to the CPA. One commenter states that the definition does not

identify which items of GAAS do not apply to the supervisory committee

or its uncompensated auditor.

In the final regulation, the Board has eliminated the use of the

term ``applicable GAAS'' and refers to GAAS only once in the final

regulation--in paragraph (c)(4), in conjunction with expanded scope for

compensated auditors. The term ``applicable GAAS'' appeared to

intimidate many commenters. The Board has replaced this approach by

listing five relevant standards in the body of the regulation. The

standards were adopted with modifications from the AICPA's ten

generally accepted auditing standards, again excluding the second

general standard and the standards of reporting. Procedures and testing

performed consistent with the five identified standards are required

for credit union supervisory committees, whether they hire a

compensated auditor or not. Scope of work within the guidelines of the

regulation, and degree of substantive testing (nature, extent and

timing), are set by the supervisory committee or its designated

representative based on its assessment of inherent risk, after gaining

an understanding of the internal control environment. This approach

does not bind a supervisory committee or its designated representatives

to those requirements of GAAS which are definitionally unattainable,

e.g., certain GAAS provisions a non-CPA cannot meet by virtue of the

fact that he is not a CPA.

There is no additional burden imposed in redefining the standard

supervisory committees must meet in the performance of procedures and

testing. By eliminating the term ``professional auditing procedures and

standards'' which is non-specific, and replacing it with a listing of

the five specific, relevant standards, the Board is issuing clearer

standards. The amendment will not substantially increase burden on

small credit unions because the regulation clearly does not require a

CPA opinion audit, neither in scope of work nor reporting burden. There

is no requirement for financial statements to accompany the report; no

opinion is necessary; and negative assurance is not required. Since

many of the commenters misunderstood certain provisions of the proposed

regulation, their estimates of burden were based on a scope of work and

reporting requirements substantially greater than what was actually

proposed and/or intended. An additional burden exists only in the area

of audit scope (not reporting) when the work is performed by a

compensated auditor. While there is increased burden to some credit

unions resulting from this requirement, the Board believes it is

necessary and minimal.

The proposal defines ``independence and independent'' as ``without

bias with respect to the credit union so as to maintain the

impartiality necessary for the reliability of the compensated auditor's

findings. Independence requires the exercise of fairness toward credit

union management, members, creditors and others who may rely upon the

independent, compensated auditor's report. Auditors must be independent

in fact and in appearance.''

Eighteen commenters believe that this definition may pose problems

for state leagues because some leagues are owned by credit unions for

which the league provides audit services. These commenters request that

the definition be clarified because they believe if the proposed

definition of ``independence'' is strictly applied it could put league

audit services out of business. They request that the preamble to the

final amendments specifically state that league auditing programs are

considered independent under the regulation. Seven commenters believe

that a league audit is considerably cheaper than an audit by an

accounting firm and if the state league was prohibited from doing the

audit it would result in increased costs to credit unions. Some

commenters also believe this definition should not be construed to mean

that only CPAs could perform audits for credit unions. Several

commenters recommend deleting the following sentence from the

definition: ``Auditors must be independent in fact and in appearance.''

NCUA has revised the definition for ``independence'' to exclude the

following: ``without bias with respect to the credit union'' and

``Auditors must be independent in fact and in appearance.'' Further, it

is not the Board's intent to exclude league auditing services from

performing supervisory committee audits or to require such services to

use report terminology reserved by state laws specifically for CPAs.

The Board is persuaded, however, that to be considered independent,

league auditors must be independently managed. League auditors will not

be considered independent in providing supervisory committee audits for

a credit union if the credit union to be audited has an executive/

employee on the affiliated league board who influences board decisions

relative to the league auditing service. League auditors would be

considered independent if the executive/employee on the affiliated

league board recuses himself from all discussions, decisions, or

actions directly or indirectly related to the league auditing service/

department/function and/or meeting any requirements of this section.

Additionally, the recusal must be documented in the written board

minutes. Another alternative would be for reciprocity of league

auditing services between leagues and credit unions subject to this

restrictive interpretation. A third alternative would be for the league

auditing service to periodically obtain a peer review from another

league auditing service, similar to current practice for AICPA-

affiliated, CPA firms in public practice. Such a peer review would

provide a reasonably independent quality review of the league auditing

service's compliance with required auditing standards in the

performance, documentation, and reporting of auditing services provided

to federally-insured credit unions. The written peer review report

would be available to NCUA, upon request, in conjunction with the

examination of a particular credit union's supervisory committee audit

and verification.

The proposal defined ``internal controls'' in part as the process,

established by the credit union's board of directors, officers and

employees designed to provide reasonable assurance of reliable

financial reporting and safeguarding of assets against unauthorized

acquisition, use or disposition. Furthermore, this definition stated

that a credit union's internal control structure consists of five

components: control environment; risk assessment; control activities;

information and communication; and monitoring. One commenter states

that this definition could result in a decrease in testing of internal

control structures.

The supervisory committee's responsibilities with regard to

internal controls is clearly set forth in Sec. 701.12(b)(2)(i) and

(c)(2). The compensated auditor's further responsibility with regard to

internal controls is set forth in Sec. 701.12(c). The proposed and

final regulation does not decrease the amount of testing of internal

control structures than is required in the existing regulation, nor

does it drastically expand required testing. The Board intends that the

supervisory committee attain an understanding of the internal control

structure; assess the level of control risk; and based thereon,

determine the nature, timing, and extent of substantive testing

necessary to comply with the

[[Page 41317]]

minimum supervisory audit scope. The materiality level the supervisory

committee chooses to govern scope and testing must encompass reasonable

tests of the internal control structure commensurate with the size and

complexity of the credit union under audit. Choosing a materiality

level which results in no reasonable testing of internal controls would

not be acceptable. Expanding audit scope to achieve a complete audit of

the credit union's system of internal controls (commenter terms this

``full compliance audit'') is not intended. The Board is simply seeking

the extent of internal control testing which is normal in the audit of

financial statements. The distinction would be clear to accounting/

auditing professionals; it may be less so to supervisory committee

member volunteers.

The proposal defined ``related party transactions'' as transactions

among or between parties where one party controls or can significantly

influence the management or operating policies of the other so as to

prevent the other party from pursuing exclusively its own interests.

The proposals provided the following examples of related parties:

credit union members and their families, and credit union officials and

their families. The proposal also stated that examples of ``related

party transactions'' include: interest-free loans or loans at below

market rates; sale of real estate significantly below appraised value;

nonmonetary exchange of property; and making of loans lacking scheduled

terms for repayment. Three commenters believe the definition of

``related party transactions'' should include examples of related

parties similar to those used in the preamble rather than those

provided in the proposed definition. Two commenters believe that the

examples of related parties in the definition is vague and obscures the

meaning of the term.

The definition of related parties has been changed to eliminate

credit union members and their families and to add examples of related

parties to include: executive management, board members, supervisory

committee members, credit committee members, employees and their

families.

The proposal defined ``supervisory committee audit'' in part as an

examination of the credit union's financial statement in accordance

with applicable GAAS, which is performed by the supervisory committee

or its designated representative as required by the regulation.

Furthermore, the last sentence of the definition stated that an opinion

audit as defined by this regulation satisfies the definition of

``supervisory committee audit.'' One commenter states that the

supervisory committee responsibilities need to be specifically defined,

as well as any sanctions or penalties, if any, that may be assessed and

how they will be determined. One commenter states that the last

sentence of this proposed definition should be eliminated. One

commenter states that this definition implies that a supervisory

committee audit must be undertaken by a certified public accountant.

This commenter suggests NCUA use ``supervisory committee review''

instead of ``supervisory committee audit'' to clarify this issue.

The Board changed the definition of ``supervisory committee audit''

to drop the ``applicable GAAS'' reference, consistent with the addition

of paragraph (c)(2) detailing five specific standards which must be met

in the conduct of the supervisory committee audit. We continue to

include the last sentence in the definition but have revised it to

indicate that an opinion audit is one of several ways to satisfy the

requirements of the regulation. It is a misinterpretation of the

proposed regulation to conclude that a supervisory committee audit must

be undertaken by a certified public accountant. The Board continues to

use the term ``supervisory committee audit'' because this is how the

function is identified in the Federal Credit Union Act. The Board is

satisfied that the final regulation clearly defines the supervisory

committee responsibilities, short of providing a written audit program.

Available sanctions and penalties are those that are normally available

to NCUA in dealing with regulatory non-compliance as granted throughout

the Federal Credit Union Act and administered through the NCUA's

Regulations.

The proposal defined ``working papers'' in part as the principal

record, in any form, of the work performed by the auditor and/or

supervisory committee to support its findings and/or conclusions

concerning significant matters. The definition provided the following

examples of documents that meet this definition: the written record of

procedures applied, tests performed, information obtained, and

pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement, audit programs,

analyses, memoranda, letters of confirmation and representation,

abstracts of credit union documents, reviewer's notes, if retained, and

schedules or commentaries prepared or obtained by the independent,

compensated auditor. One commenter specifically supports this

definition. Several commenters believe that although they agree with

the ``working papers'' definition, they do not agree that all of the

examples of working papers cited therein meet the definition. They

believe that all of the auditors' memoranda, personal notes, and

commentaries do not make up the principal record of the work performed.

They suggest references to these items be eliminated from the list of

examples provided in the definition of working papers. One commenter

believes the definition is so extensive that it may discourage the

compilation of notes and other internal memoranda, to the detriment of

the credit union having a thorough audit.

The Board believes that, in the past, accounting/auditing

professionals have afforded themselves broad license in determining

what they will provide to NCUA staff in the way of working papers. This

situation has resulted through a wide interpretation, by some

compensated auditors, of what constitutes ``proprietary information.''

The Board is persuaded that such discretion needs to be limited. NCUA

staff needs access to a complete set of working papers. The Board

believes much of what compensated auditors have held back as

``proprietary'' is integral to NCUA staff in assessing if the audit

meets regulatory requirements. Requiring full access to existing

working papers should in no way discourage the compilation of notes and

other internal memoranda, to the detriment of the credit union having a

thorough audit. The standards requiring working paper documentation is

not changed, lessened or strengthened by this final regulation which is

simply seeking full disclosure to NCUA staff of existing working paper

information. Photocopies are not required.

D. Expanded Audit Scope

The proposed amendments expanded the required audit scope when a

supervisory committee employs the services of a compensated auditor.

The Board proposed the changes to address practical enforcement

problems in the existing regulation, some of which have arisen through

the examination process as a matter of course and others of which have

arisen in litigation and in negotiating settlements. Additionally the

changes were intended to eliminate vagueness regarding the required

audit scope as well as improving supervisory committee audits. The

vagueness of audit scope has been the subject of complaints from both

credit unions and examiners.

The Board proposed that the supervisory committee audit shall be

made by the supervisory committee or

[[Page 41318]]

its designated representative using applicable GAAS. Furthermore, the

Board proposed that for the compensated auditor, audit testing of the

following areas must satisfy applicable GAAS for expressing an opinion

on the financial statements taken as a whole: internal controls, cash,

loans and interest thereon, shares and dividends and/or interest

thereon, related party transactions, and the detection and reporting of

errors and irregularities with regard to each of these areas.

Three commenters specifically support the new audit scope. Two

commenters believe the clarification eliminates any possible confusion

regarding the overall requirements of the audit. One commenter

recommends that this section be revised to state that the supervisory

committee shall determine whether the established internal controls are

sufficient to identify/detect material errors and fraud. The Board does

not believe it is necessary to revise this section to include the

suggested language because the responsibilities of the supervisory

committee with regard to ``internal controls'' and ``error,

carelessness, conflict of interest, self-dealing and fraud errors and

irregularities'' are already set forth.

Seventeen commenters believe a compensated auditor should follow

GAAS. Two of these commenters believe credit union auditors should be

held to the same high standards as auditors in other industries. One of

these commenters stated that GAAS is the acceptable standard for all

audits. One of these commenters believes that a compensated auditor

should be required to follow GAAS but it should not be required by

regulation. One supporting commenter believes that this amendment will

have numerous unintended consequences, one of which will result in

requiring any audit performed by a CPA to be an opinion audit. This

commenter also believes the proposal could harm small credit unions by

having them seek less qualified individuals.

As addressed above, the Board does not wish to require an opinion

audit for credit unions. To require compensated auditors to meet GAAS

in scope of work, audit testing and reporting would be to require an

opinion audit by a licensed, independent certified public accountant.

The Board believes adopting the five specific standards set forth in

the final regulation is preferable to the existing rule's reference to

``professional auditing procedures and standards''; the former is

specific while still allowing for reasonable judgment, the later is too

vague. And while the expanded audit scope may slightly increase costs

to some credit unions, the Board believes this burden is reasonable and

necessary in light of the substandard audits NCUA found in some credit

unions.

Twenty commenters believe compensated auditors should not be

required to follow GAAS. One of these commenters believes that it

appears to have the practical effect of requiring the performance of an

opinion audit, except the actual issuance of an opinion, whenever an

outside auditor is used. Six of the commenters believe such a

requirement will increase credit union costs. Three commenters believe

this requirement will hurt small credit unions. One commenter believes

that the proposed GAAS requirements could result in small credit unions

employing CPAs to perform the audit and could discourage members from

volunteering to serve on the supervisory committee. In the final

regulation, a standard far short of GAAS is being required. Five

specific standards governing performance of the work are set forth in

the final regulation. Financial statements are not necessary, an

opinion or attestation is not required, negative assurance is not

sought, and GAAS reporting standards do not have to be met, paragraph

(c)(4). Only compensated auditors are being held to GAAS-level scope

and testing (not reporting), and then, only in selected risk areas. We

continue to believe that the increased burden estimates were based on a

misunderstanding of proposed regulatory requirements.

One commenter states requiring non-CPA auditors to meet CPA

standards is tantamount to requiring CPA audits. Another commenter

states that league auditors are not allowed by AICPA rules to use the

terms GAAS and GAAP in their audit reports. Furthermore, the commenter

states that if these terms are required it will mean that only CPAs

could audit credit unions which would prohibit league audits as well as

increase credit union costs. The proposed and final regulations do not

require non-CPAs to use GAAS and GAAP references or language in

supervisory committee audit reports. In the proposed regulation the

definition of ``applicable GAAS'' excluded the ``standards of

reporting.'' The final regulation continues to exclude these reporting

standards. The relevant standards governing performance of work have

been more specifically identified in the final regulation in paragraph

(c)(2).

One commenter believes that NCUA should determine what additional

procedures should be performed, if any, on a credit union by credit

union basis, rather than requiring all compensated auditors to complete

an expanded scope. Another commenter also states that NCUA should not

require expanded scope for all credit unions. It is not practical for

NCUA to determine what additional procedures should be performed, if

any, on a credit union by credit union basis, thus this alternative of

requiring the supervisory committee or its designated representative to

attain an understanding of the internal control environment, assess

control risk, and based thereon, determine the extent of substantive

testing necessary to meet the requirements of this section. The

guidelines NCUA primarily will use in assessing the adequacy of the

expanded scope under paragraph (c)(4) will be the AICPA's guide,

``Audits of Credit Unions'', relevant chapters, subheading ``Audit

Objectives and Procedures'' where discussions are provided on audit

objectives, planning considerations, internal control structure, tests

of controls, and substantive tests. The expanded scope in selected,

identified areas for all credit unions that employ a compensated

auditor should contribute to improved consistency and uniformity.

One commenter believes the proposed amendments impose different and

higher standards for supervisory committee audits conducted by

compensated auditors than those performed by supervisory committees or

uncompensated auditors. Two commenters believe the proposed amendment

is an attempt to permit non-CPAs to perform the work of CPAs when

auditing credit unions. Both commenters believe that this poses an

increased risk of substandard audits which will fail in detecting

serious accounting deficiencies and internal control weaknesses.

Another commenter believes a non-licensed accountant attempting to

comply with the regulation may be violating state accountancy law by

performing duties which can only be performed by a licensed CPA.

Another commenter does not believe it is realistic or feasible to

require volunteer supervisory committee members to comply with a

complex body of standards that require significant education and

training to understand.

While the Board appreciates the seemingly unfairness of imposing a

different and higher standard for supervisory committee audits

conducted by compensated auditors than for those performed by

supervisory committees or uncompensated auditors, the Board must be

realistic in

[[Page 41319]]

recognizing that imposing an expanded scope requirement for supervisory

committee audits performed by layman would be to invite certain

disappointment. NCUA will need to review supervisory committee audits

for thoroughness and sufficiency, and recommend needed supplemental

procedures and testing to enhance the effectiveness of the audit

process. Furthermore, for those supervisory committees that continue to

perform the audit and/or verification themselves, where the credit

union's sophistication and complexity have grown beyond the

capabilities of the resident supervisory committee and its staff, it

will be incumbent upon NCUA to recognize the deficiencies in the audit

which diminish the committee's usefulness in the oversight process

assigned it under Sec. 701.12. NCUA has significant flexibility under

Sec. 701.13 of NCUA's Regulations, through FIRREA, to call for the

conduct of a second audit, one which will fulfill the intended

objectives of this regulation. The requirement for a second audit would

add burden since it must be performed by an independent public

accountant.

E. Engagement Letter Requirement

The Board proposed to require credit unions which employ

compensated auditors to memorialize the terms and conditions of the

engagement in a comprehensive engagement letter, which constitutes an

enforceable contract between the compensated auditor and the

supervisory committee. The proposal also set forth the minimum

requirements of an audit engagement to be addressed in such a letter.

The Board made this proposal to further reduce the confusion for

required scope components that are excluded from the audit engagement.

Thirty-eight commenters support this proposal. Fourteen of these

commenters believe the requirements for an engagement letter should

adequately protect the interests of the supervisory committee. Five

commenters believe the engagement letter will formalize the

expectations of the supervisory committee. Four commenters believe that

this proposal would eliminate any misunderstandings between the

supervisory committee and the auditing firm. One commenter supports the

requirement to provide an appendix to the engagement letter specifying

the procedures to be performed.

Seven commenters believe it should be left to the discretion of the

credit union to determine what specific details should be included in

the engagement letter. Conversely, two commenters believe that NCUA

should produce a form engagement letter in the final rule. In current

practice, the engagement letter has been written primarily by the

compensated auditor, for the compensated auditor. Many credit unions

have signed the engagement letters thus drafted without a real

knowledge or understanding of what specific details should be included.

Through the engagement letter requirement, the Board hopes to help

credit unions in its business dealings with the professional auditor.

The regulation sets forth minimums; the credit union has full

discretion to include other provisions.

The compensated auditor has the option to exclude from his scope of

work any areas for which he is uncomfortable/unwilling to perform the

expanded audit scope, if such exclusion is agreeable to his credit

union client. He is obligated then only to caution the supervisory

committee in the engagement letter that the supervisory committee will

remain obligated to perform or have performed this required but

excluded work. As concerns areas excluded from the audit engagement,

simple, general statements, such as is demonstrated in the current

AICPA Guide, Audits of Credit Unions, illustrative engagement letter,

with the added caution required in the rule, Sec. 701.12(d)(3)(i)(C),

is the minimum NCUA is seeking. For example, ``The scope of this audit

* * * does not include an evaluation of all areas that generally are of

higher risk in the credit union industry, such as securities held or

the collectibility of loans, the adequacy of collateral thereon, or the

reasonableness of the allowance for loan losses,'' plus cautionary

language required consistent with this section.

Five commenters stated that the requirement in the proposal that

the engagement letter specify a date of delivery of the written audit

report is unrealistic. They believe that the auditor can not complete

the audit if the required information is not available. One commenter

believes this requirement puts undue pressure on the auditor. One of

these commenters stated that we should not require an exact delivery

date but rather a ``target'' delivery date. The Board agrees with this

commenter. Delivery date has been changed to ``target date of

delivery.'' The intent is to provide the auditor with flexibility in

dealing with unforeseen events while providing NCUA with a target date

for receiving the report.

Nine commenters do not believe NCUA should require a formal

engagement letter. One commenter believes that the requirement for an

engagement letter will not adequately protect the interests of the

supervisory committee. One commenter states this should not be a

regulatory requirement since most credit unions already use an

engagement letter. One commenter states that the use of an engagement

letter is a management decision. One commenter believes the additional

cost for this separate letter far outweighs the perceived benefit. Two

commenters believe regulating the content of an engagement letter is

unnecessary. One commenter states that the criteria and the matter to

be included in the engagement letter as outlined by SAS 75 address

questions concerning the conditions for engagement preference, the

sufficiency of procedures, the nature, timing and extent of procedures

and will address issues that may arise between the auditor and the

supervisory committee.

The NCUA Board believes the engagement letter requirement will

protect the credit union, will compel communication concerning the

audit engagement, and will provide all parties with an enforceable

contract and a documented record of accountability which hopefully will

preclude NCUA from brokering disputes between the credit union and the

compensated auditor. Credit unions are free to include any additional

criteria, conditions, terms in the engagement letter beyond those

required (such as those additionally outlined in SAS No. 75); again,

the regulation is suggesting the minimum requirements. The final

amendment reflects engagement letter requirements, generally as

proposed, with the addition of target date of delivery, and working

paper retention requirements for 3 years from the date of the audit

report.

F. Requirement for a Written Report of Internal Control Exceptions or

Reportable Conditions and a Written Report of Irregularities or Illegal

Acts

The proposed amendments required written reports of any internal

control exceptions or reportable conditions noted and of any

irregularities or illegal acts noted. Eighteen commenters support the

requirement to report on internal controls and possible illegalities.

Ten commenters state that requiring these reports will not increase the

cost of a supervisory audit. Two commenters, although supporting the

requirement, believe it will increase credit union costs. Three

commenters state that the information in the reports is already

available in some form of report. We agree the information is already

available as a result of performing the supervisory committee

[[Page 41320]]

audit, but current requirements do not mandate written communication.

Thirty-seven commenters oppose this requirement. Twenty-six

commenters state that requiring these reports will increase the cost of

supervisory committee audits. Five commenters wondered why the auditor

cannot simply report any such findings in their normal report to the

supervisory committee instead of creating two new reports. This option

is agreeable to NCUA; we are simply seeking such information be

``reduced to writing.'' Three commenters believe that no report should

be required if no internal control exceptions, reportable conditions or

irregularities or illegal acts were noted. This is also agreeable to

NCUA; we are not seeking negative assurance. One commenter states that

auditors that find problems during the scope of their normal audit

already comment on internal controls and fraud when appropriate in the

audit report to the credit union. Not necessarily; CPAs are not

required to communicate such matters in writing. One commenter states

that one report should be able to handle both issues. The Board agrees

and the final regulation reflects this.

Two commenters believe this requirement will hurt smaller credit

unions since they usually have weaker controls due to small staffs.

This requirement was not added to ``hurt smaller credit unions,'' but

often these are the very credit unions where efforts are needed to

bolster internal controls. One commenter states that the requirement to

have the compensated auditor report on internal control and fraud may

not be valid for all credit unions. This commenter believes that credit

unions having an internal audit function should be exempted from this

requirement to avoid duplication of efforts and costs. The internal

audit function could be the means by which the supervisory committee

chooses to comply with this section.

This was one of the most misunderstood proposed amendments to the

regulation. NCUA is simply asserting that any instances of reportable

conditions or errors and irregularities which are identified in the

normal course of a supervisory committee audit, be reduced to writing.

Currently, while such information must be reported, GAAS does not

require this information to be in writing. Without written

communication of these items, NCUA has limited assurance of gaining

knowledge of the auditor's observations in these areas, unless the

credit union provides notification voluntarily.

NCUA does not expect or require any negative assurance; no report

is required if internal control exceptions, reportable conditions or

irregularities or illegal acts were not noted. In many supervisory

committee audit reports prepared by compensated auditors other than

CPAs under existing guidelines, such internal control and fraud

problems/weaknesses uncovered during the scope of their normal audit

are already commented upon, when appropriate, in the audit report to

the credit union. This practice continues to meet regulatory

requirements under the final regulation.

NCUA has no preference whether the auditor prepares one report

including this information, two reports or three; what matters is that

the information is reduced to writing. NCUA does not expect supervisory

committees to direct audit scope at discovering such problems. Nor is

NCUA seeking a specific report on the control structure and any

breaches of that structure or to specifically note the absence or

presence of any irregular or illegal act; NCUA recognizes this would

require a substantially different level of audit than heretofore has

been required. The NCUA Board believes it is possible that those who

argued ``burden to small credit unions'' in this reporting aspect

misunderstood the intended reporting requirements in this instance, and

mistakenly magnified cost estimates accordingly.

G. Clarification on Access to Original Working Papers

The proposal clarified that NCUA has unconditional access to a

complete set of original working papers including all the existing

documentation relative to the audit. Such access would be either at the

offices of the credit union or at a mutually acceptable location.

Thirty-four commenters provide varying support for the clarification.

Sixteen commenters believe that unconditional NCUA access to original

working papers is not overly burdensome and intrusive. Six commenters

do not believe unconditional access to working papers will cause an

increase in administrative and other expenses. One commenter believes

that such access to original working papers will assist NCUA in its

exams and that the clarification makes good business sense. Five

commenters state that it is important to maintain the confidentiality

of the working papers. NCUA appreciates the auditor's concerns about

maintaining the confidentiality of working papers and will cooperate

reasonably with auditors to achieve this end.

Two commenters believe this section should be clarified to provide

that copies, certified copies or electronic formatted data are

``originals'' for the purpose of this section. Relevant to the most

recent audit completed and awaiting NCUA review, the Board rejects the

notion that ``copies, certified copies or electronic formatted data are

``originals'' for the purpose of this section.'' Subsequently, and for

purposes of meeting the three year working papers retention

expectation, accessible alternative electronic storage is acceptable.

One commenter, although supporting the proposal, believes this proposal

may increase credit union costs. NCUA does not believe this

clarification to the existing regulation will increase the costs to

credit unions. This requirement would simply be included in the

engagement letter as a clarified condition of engagement.

Three commenters state that the location for viewing the working

papers must be flexible because the credit union may be located some

distance from the office of the auditor. Two commenters believe that

the location for NCUA access should include the external auditor's

place of business. The ``mutually agreeable location'' alternative does

provide for the external auditor's place of business. One commenter

recommends that working papers should be made available only at the

auditor's place of business for the NCUA to copy or review. This the

Board finds too restrictive and continues to prefer ``or at a mutually

agreeable location.'' One commenter requests that the final regulation

clarify that the working papers be available, either at the auditor's

or credit union's office with adequate notice and under the auditor's

supervision. The proposal stated that working paper access could be at

the offices of the credit union or at a mutually agreeable location. A

``mutually agreeable location'' could be at the credit union, at the

auditor's place of business, or other location agreeable to the

auditor. NCUA staff will be instructed to be reasonable in their

negotiation of ``mutually agreeable location.'' One commenter would

also put in the regulation that such access would be at an agreed upon

time and an agreed upon location. The Board believes this to be the

normal business practice. This commenter also believes that notes could

be made but not copies. Several other commenters state that copies of

the working papers should not be permitted. The Board did not propose

and will not incorporate in the final regulation any requirement for

NCUA to photocopy the working papers.

Twenty-seven commenters oppose the clarification on working papers.

Twelve commenters stated that complete access to the original working

papers is overly

[[Page 41321]]

burdensome and intrusive. Such access exists under the current

regulation. Eight commenters believe unconditional access to working

papers will cause an increase in administrative and other expenses.

This should not be the case since: such access exists under the current

regulation and such access will be a condition of engagement. Several

commenters believe that the working papers are the property of the

compensated auditor and not the credit union unless the papers are

prepared by the supervisory committee. NCUA recognizes that the working

papers prepared by a compensated auditor are the property of the

compensated auditor. Several commenters were concerned with an examiner

copying the working papers and then having the examiner retire and

compete with the auditor using the auditor's program. Examiners are

prohibited from copying audit programs for their personal use.

One commenter believes that the supervisory committee should not be

held accountable for making sure that an independent auditor makes his

or her original working papers available to NCUA since that provision

is already included in the engagement letter and, as a practical

matter, there is not much the supervisory committee can do to enforce

that provision beyond the confines of the engagement letter. NCUA

disagrees; the supervisory committee can enforce its audit contract.

Several commenters believe that original working papers are the

property of the auditor. NCUA acknowledges this. One of these

commenters states that while the auditor can and must agree to make

those papers available, NCUA has no role in enforcing that requirement

against an independent auditor over whom it has no regulatory powers.

NCUA acknowledges that enforcement lies with the supervisory committee.

One commenter states that the proposal puts the credit union in a ``no-

win'' situation. If the auditor fails to cooperate with the supervisory

committee by not making the papers available, rejection of the audit is

a possibility, which may result in additional expenses for a new audit

or the NCUA may seek formal administration sanctions against the

supervisory committee. This is true, but presently, without this

provision, NCUA is ``brokering disputes'' between compensated auditors

and supervisory committees. An enforceable contract should remove both

NCUA and supervisory committees from the middle. With an enforceable

contract, there will be a clearly defined line of responsibility and

thus, a business pressure, if not the possibility of litigative

pressure, for the honoring of contract terms. If a compensated auditor

does not wish for NCUA to review his working papers, he should not

agree to be engaged by a credit union.

One commenter believes NCUA should specify a working paper

retention policy to clarify how long the working papers must be

available for review. The Board agrees that an auditor should not have

to retain his/her working papers indefinitely. Therefore, the Board has

amended the regulation to require retention of working papers by

compensated auditors for a minimum of three years from the date of the

written audit report. The audit working papers for the most recent

audit would need to be retained in paper form; subsequently,

alternative, accessible storage would be acceptable.

H. Enforcement Mechanism

The Board proposed an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance

with this regulation by authorizing the regional director, as a first

step toward enforcement, to reject as deficient the supervisory

committee audit and the reports thereof. Two commenters support this

proposal. One commenter encourages the NCUA Board to ensure that all

regional offices use the same criteria for determining whether or not

to accept a supervisory committee audit (whether or not performed by a

compensated auditor). Two commenters oppose the proposal. One of these

commenters believes that only state credit union supervisory agencies

should initiate administrative sanctions against the supervisory

committee of a state chartered credit union. Furthermore, this

commenter notes that the proposed amendments bestow a great deal of

discretionary authority upon regional directors and suggests the Board

instruct regional directors not to reject audits which are flawed by

minor technicalities.

In the case of a federally-insured state chartered credit union,

the Board believes it is appropriate for the state regulator to first

attempt to resolve any problems concerning the supervisory committee

audit. The Regional Director will take action after the state regulator

has had a reasonable opportunity to reach a satisfactory result. The

Board will instruct its regional offices on the proper criteria in

determining whether to accept or reject a supervisory committee audit

to minimize differences among the regions and provide more consistency.

NCUA will not be rejecting supervisory committee audits for minor

technicalities.

I. Effective Date

Section 302 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory

Improvement Act of 1994 requires the federal regulators of banks and

savings associations to make all regulations that impose new

requirements take effect on the first date of the calendar quarter

following publication of the rule unless good reason exists for some

other effective date. Although NCUA is not formally subject to this

requirement, Letter to Credit Unions #158 stated that the requirements

would be beneficial to credit unions and that NCUA planned to implement

it whenever practicable. NCUA believes that delaying the effective date

to December 31, 1996 is necessary so that credit unions and individuals

conducting supervisory committee audits have sufficient time to

understand the regulation and determine what type of audit will best

serve their needs. Therefore, the regulation will be effective for

audits conducted for, and covering, the audit period ending on December

31, 1996, and thereafter.

J. Request for Comment on Whether Credit Unions Should Have an

Ongoing Internal Audit Function

The Board requested comment on whether it should mandate an

internal audit function and, if so, whether such a requirement should

be imposed on all or only some credit unions, and on what basis.

Seventeen commenters support mandating an internal audit function. Ten

commenters believe an audit function should be required based on some

combination of asset size and complexity of operations. Two commenters

believe it should be required for credit unions with assets in excess

of $100 million. Another commenter believes it should be required for

credit unions with assets over $150 million. Another commenter believes

asset size should be the basis for requiring an internal audit

function. One commenter believes the audit function should be based on

complexity of operations and not asset size.

Fifty-three commenters oppose requiring a credit union to have an

ongoing internal audit function. Thirty-three commenters believe the

decision to have an internal audit function should be made by credit

union management. Four commenters believe that many credit unions can

not afford an internal audit function. Two commenters believe the

internal audit function is costly and that the internal auditor may not

adequately scrutinize operations. Several commenters believe NCUA

should not require but instead

[[Page 41322]]

encourage large and complex credit unions to have an internal audit

function.

Three commenters believe that both compensated auditors and

internal auditors should be hired, report to and receive instructions

from the supervisory committee. They believe any other line of

reporting compromises the integrity of the communication. Sixteen

commenters believe it is not always feasible or desirable for the

auditor to report directly to the supervisory committee, especially if

the credit union is relatively large. Most of these commenters believe

that each credit union should decide to whom the auditor reports.

The Board is not requiring an internal audit function at this time

because it believes that the costs of mandating such a function for all

credit unions outweighs the perceived benefit. The Board, however,

continues to encourage credit unions to have an ongoing internal audit

function if management believes it would be helpful as well as

economically prudent. The Board also believes it is important to

minimize possible conflicts of interest when determining to whom the

internal auditor reports. Management should carefully consider whether

it is feasible for their credit union to have the compensated or

internal auditor report to the supervisory committee.

K. Relevance of SAS No. 75 to CPAs and Its Impact on Supervisory

Committee Audits

Effective May 1, 1996, the AICPA adopted SAS No. 75 which provides

in pertinent part:

b. The accountant and the specified users agree upon the procedures

performed or to be performed by the accountant.

c. The specified users take responsibility for the sufficiency of

the agreed-upon procedures for their purposes. (emphasis added)

In essence, SAS No. 75 requires the CPA to identify the ``specified

users'' of a ``report on agreed-upon procedures'' and, in advance of

such an engagement, to obtain an acknowledgment from all identified

specified users that the procedures the auditor will perform are

sufficient to satisfy the ``specified user's'' needs. There is no doubt

that a credit union's supervisory committee and its board of directors

are ``specified users'' because they will rely on the auditor's report.

However, some may contend that, in addition, NCUA itself is a

``specified user'' of each credit union's supervisory committee audit

report. This would put NCUA in the position of having to agree with the

CPA and each credit union as to the agreed-upon procedures the CPA will

use to ensure that each credit union's audit satisfies the requirements

of Sec. 701.12.

To expect NCUA to acknowledge the sufficiency of a set of

procedures in meeting this part prior to the credit union's engagement

of a CPA is both infeasible and would shift the responsibility for the

supervisory audit from the credit union's supervisory committee to

NCUA. The supervisory committee or its designated representative, not

NCUA, is uniquely able to ``attain an understanding of the internal

control environment, assess control risk, and based on the control

risk, determine the substantive testing (nature, extent, and timing)

necessary'' to comply with this section.

Many credit union supervisory committees hire a compensated auditor

because they do not have the expertise necessary to perform the

supervisory committee audit. Supervisory committees consisting

primarily of volunteers cannot be expected to acknowledge the

sufficiency of a set of agreed-upon procedures developed by accounting

professionals. In such cases, the supervisory committee would naturally

rely upon the assistance of a CPA to attain an understanding of the

internal control environment, assess control risk, and based on the

control risk, determine the substantive testing that is necessary.

Since 1985, NCUA's objective has been to place with the credit

union and its supervisory committee the responsibility for sufficiency

of audit procedures and testing. This approach was enunciated in the

preamble to the 1985 rule, as follows:

The supervisory committee must carry out its duties in a manner

responsive to each credit union's circumstances, i.e., the supervisory

committee must use good judgment in determining the scope, the

frequency, and the detail of the committee's activities. (Deregulation

efforts recognized that) * * * a credit union's audits and reviews must

reflect each credit union's business activities and financial and

operating condition. The committee's work requires judgment of each

credit union's needs based on an analysis of each institution's

strengths and weaknesses * * * Since the committee is responsible for

the audit, it should determine the scope of the work to be performed.

The scope of the work should be varied based on the nature of risk and

exposure for each transaction or account being audited within each

federal credit union. [50 CFR 8710, March 5, 1985] (emphasis added).

NCUA's approach is consistent with the approach of the auditing

profession today. In fact, SAS No. 75 is premised upon this same line

of reasoning, shifting this burden away from the independent accountant

to the specified user.

The issue created by AICPA's adoption of SAS No. 75 exists under

both the current, and this revised supervisory committee audit

regulation. Some compensated auditors suggest that SAS No. 75 limits

them to performing only opinion audits for credit unions. To the extent

that this claim is true, both the cause and the remedy for this

limitation resides with the accounting profession.

The NCUA Board continues to welcome the CPA practitioner in the

performance of supervisory committee audits as one of several favorable

options for credit union supervisory committees. It is the NCUA Board's

intent to allow credit unions a full range of options in whom they may

contract with to have their audit work performed. NCUA will continue to

work with the AICPA toward a practicable solution to this question to

enable CPA practitioners to perform non-opinion, supervisory committee

audits.

L. Comments Received on Regulatory Procedures

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The NCUA Board has certified that small credit unions (less than $1

million in assets) will not see a significant impact because of this

proposal. Fourteen commenters believe that NCUA's assessment of the

monetary costs of these changes is wrong. Two of these commenters

believe it will effect credit unions under $50 million in assets by

doubling the cost of the supervisory committee audit. Another commenter

states it will substantially increase the cost for small credit unions.

NCUA believes these burden estimates are based on a misunderstanding of

the proposed requirements as discussed above, especially in the areas

of scope of work and reporting.

In the final analysis, a cost of doing business as a credit union

or any other financial institution is the conduct of an audit to ensure

member confidence. The audit must be performed by persons with audit

skills commensurate with the complexities of the credit union. For

credit unions under $1 million who are already hiring a compensated

auditor to perform the supervisory committee audit, NCUA believes the

engagement letter requirement, the expanded scope requirement, and

``reducing to writing'' identified reportable conditions/errors

[[Page 41323]]

or irregularities may minimally increase costs. It is a normal business

practice for compensated auditors to obligate audit clients to sign

engagement letters and many of the affected credit unions are already

doing so. Merely ``reducing to writing'' identified and known

reportable conditions and/or errors and irregularities cannot be

significantly burdensome. The expanded scope requirements then require

examination.

Cost can be controlled or reduced by the credit union establishing

or strengthening its system of sound internal controls which serve to

contain control risk. Favorable control risk can mean the reduced

necessity for extensive substantive testing, thus, lower audit costs.

We estimate that approximately 64% of the credit unions under $1

million have supervisory committee audits which are performed by the

supervisory committee itself (not affected); receive opinion audits

(already meet expanded scope); or engage outside auditors who do not

meet the definition of ``compensated auditor'' (not affected). Thus,

few, if any, of these estimated credit unions will be significantly

affected by the expanded scope requirements of this section.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In the proposal the NCUA Board estimated that for most credit

unions the additional paperwork will require only one to three hours a

year of additional time. One commenter asks if NCUA has determined the

extra time needed for auditors to complete the additional reports

required by the proposed regulation. Another commenter believes the

paperwork requirements are much higher than stated in the proposal.

The additional paperwork burden to the credit union is only

relevant to credit unions hiring compensated auditors and lies

primarily in the engagement letter requirement and in ``reducing to

writing'' reportable conditions and/or errors and irregularities, if

any, NCUA did not include paperwork burden as to the compensated

auditor, simply additional paperwork burden as to the credit union.

NCUA continues to believe the paperwork burden to credit unions is in

line with original estimates.

M. Miscellaneous

One commenter requested that the final rule or its preamble

explicitly state that this rule does not apply to corporate credit

unions. Section 701.12 does not apply to corporate credit unions. One

commenter believes that the proposal unfairly singles out those credit

unions that are attempting to upgrade their operation by hiring an

independent auditor to do the annual supervisory committee audit. NCUA

encourages supervisory committes to avail themselves of the services of

compensated auditors when it is advisable and feasible to do so; this

regulation is in no way designed to discourage credit unions from doing

so. The Board is persuaded in all but the exceptional case, supervisory

committees will choose the auditor alternative which is best for its

credit union under the circumstances. Failing this, the Board is

confident that the annual examination process will identify those

credit unions in which evoking the FIRREA provisions of Sec. 701.13

will become necessary.

The Board is not issuing any changes to the current regulation

regarding the independence and verification of members' accounts but

they will be redesignated as Sec. 701.12(g) and (h), respectively. The

Board is adopting in final the one proposed change to Sec. 701.13 to

redesignate the current Sec. 701.12(e) as Sec. 701.12(h).

N. Regulatory Procedures

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires NCUA to prepare an analysis

to describe any significant economic impact a proposed regulation may

have on a substantial number of small credit unions (primarily those

under $1 million in assets). As noted above, NCUA determined in the

proposed rule that there was no significant economic impact on small

credit unions. Comments received are discussed above. Accordingly, the

NCUA Board determines and certifies that this final amendment does not

have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

credit unions and that a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is not

required.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Comments received on paperwork collection requirements are

discussed above. The information collection requirements in the final

rule have been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget. The

control number assigned for this rule is 3133-0059, approved for use

through April 30, 1997.

Executive Order 12612

Executive Order 12612 requires NCUA to consider the effect of its

actions on state interests. The final amendments will not have a

substantial direct effect on the states, on the relationship between

the national government and the states, or on the distribution of

rights and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 701

Credit unions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

By the National Credit Union Administration Board on July 24,

1996.

Becky Baker,

Secretary of the Board.

Accordingly, NCUA amends 12 CFR part 701 as follows:

PART 701--ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONS

1. The authority citation for Part 701 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1752(5), 1755, 1756, 1757, 1759, 1761a,

1761b, 1766, 1767, 1782, 1784, 1787, 1789, 1798 and Public Law 101-

73. Section 701.6 is also authorized by 31 U.S.C. 3717. Section

701.31 is also authorized by 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1981

and 42 U.S.C. 3601-3610.

2. Sec. 701.12 is amended by redesignating paragraphs (d) and (e)

as paragraphs (g) and (h), by revising paragraphs (a) through (c), and

by adding new paragraphs (d) through (f) to read as follows:

Sec. 701.12 Supervisory committee audits and verifications.

(a) Definitions. As used in this chapter:

(1) Agreed-upon procedures engagement refers to the performance by

an independent, licensed certified public accountant of an engagement

in which the scope is limited to applying specified agreed-upon

procedures to one or more specified elements, accounts or items of a

financial statement. Such procedures are insufficient to express an

opinion regarding either the financial statements taken as a whole, or

the specified elements, accounts or items under examination.

(2) Compensated auditor refers to any accounting/auditing

professional, excluding credit union employees, who is compensated for

performing more than one compensated supervisory committee audit and/or

verification of members' accounts, or opinion audit, per calendar year.

(3) Financial statements refers to a presentation of financial

data, including accompanying notes, derived from accounting records of

the credit union, and intended to disclose a credit union's economic

resources or obligations at a appoint in time, or the changes therein

for a period of time, in conformity with GAAP or RAP, as

[[Page 41324]]

defined herein. Each of the following is considered to be a financial

statement: a balance sheet or statement of financial condition;

statement of income or statement of operations; statement of undivided

earnings; statement of cash flows; statement of changes in members'

equity; statement of assets and liabilities that does not include

members' equity accounts; statement of revenue and expenses; and

statement of cash receipts and disbursements.

(4) GAAP is an acronym for ``generally accepted accounting

principles'' which refers to the conventions, rules, and procedures

which define accepted accounting practice. GAAP includes both broad

general guidelines and detailed practices and procedures, provides a

standard by which to measure financial statement presentations, and

encompasses not only accounting principles and practices but also the

methods of applying them.

(5) GAAS is an acronym for ``generally accepted auditing

standards'' which refers to the standards approved and adopted by the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants which apply when an

``independent, licensed certified public accountant'' audits financial

statements. Auditing standards differ from auditing procedures in that

``procedures'' address acts to be performed, whereas ``standards''

measure the quality of the performance of those acts and the objectives

to be achieved by use of the procedures undertaken. In addition,

auditing standards address the auditor's professional qualifications as

well as the judgment exercised in performing the audit and in preparing

the report of the audit. Copies of GAAS may be obtained from the AICPA,

Order Department, Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey

City, NJ 07311-3881, telephone (800) TO-AICPA or (800) 862-4272.

(6) Independence and Independent means the impartiality necessary

for the reliability of the compensated auditor's findings. Independence

requires the exercise of fairness toward credit union officials,

members, creditors and others who may rely upon the supervisory

committee audit report.

(7) Internal controls refers to the process, established by the

credit union's board of directors, officers and employees, designed to

provide reasonable assurance of reliable financial reporting and

safeguarding of assets against unauthorized acquisition, use, or

disposition. A credit union's internal control structure consists of

five components: control environment; risk assessment; control

activities; information and communication; and monitoring. Reliable

financial reporting refers to preparation of financial statements that

``present fairly'' the financial position of the credit union and

results of its operations and its cash flows, in conformity with GAAP

or RAP, as defined herein. Internal control over safeguarding of assets

against unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition refers to

prevention or timely detection of transactions involving such

unauthorized access, use, or disposition of assets which could result

in a loss that is material to the financial statements.

(8) Licensed, certified public accountant refers to an accounting/

auditing professional who has received a certificate and license from a

duly-appointed state licensing authority to practice accounting/

auditing, and is independent as defined herein.

(9) Opinion audit refers to an examination of the financial

statements performed by an independent, licensed, certified public

accountant in accordance with GAAS. The objective of an ``opinion

audit'' is to express an opinion as to whether those financial

statements of the credit union present fairly, in all material

respects, the financial position and the results of its operations and

its cash flows in conformity with GAAP or RAP, as defined herein.

(10) RAP is an acronym for ``regulatory accounting practices''

which refer to the conventions, rules, and procedures governing

accepted accounting practices, other than GAAP, for credit unions and

having the substantial support of either the NCUA or the applicable

state credit union supervisor.

(11) Related party transactions refers to transactions among or

between parties where one party controls or can significantly influence

the management or operating policies of the other so as to prevent the

other party from pursuing exclusively its own interests. Examples of

related parties include: executive management, board members,

supervisory committee members, credit committee members, and employees,

and their families. Examples of ``related party transactions'' include:

interest-free loans or loans at below market rates; sale of real estate

significantly below appraised value; nonmonetary exchange of property;

below market fees, and making of loans lacking scheduled terms for

repayment.

(12) Reportable conditions refers to a matter coming to the

attention of the independent, compensated auditor which, in his or her

judgment, represents a significant deficiency in the design or

operation of the internal control structure of the credit union, which

could adversely affect its ability to record, process, summarize, and

report financial data consistent with the representations of management

in the financial statements.

(13) Specified elements, accounts or items of a financial statement

refers to accounting information that is a part of, but significantly

less than, a financial statement. These may be directly identified in a

financial statement or notes thereto; or they may be derived from a

financial statement by analysis, aggregation, summarization, or

mathematical computation.

(14) Substantive testing refers to testing of details and

analytical procedures to detect material misstatements in the account

balance, transaction class, and disclosure components of financial

statements.

(15) Supervisory committee refers to a supervisory committee as

defined in Section 111(b) of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C.

1786(r). For some federally-insured state chartered credit unions, the

``audit committee'' designated by state statute or regulation is the

equivalent of a supervisory committee.

(16) Supervisory committee audit refers to an examination of

specified elements, accounts or items of the credit union's financial

statement to the full extent required in this part. An opinion audit as

defined herein exceeds the requirements of a ``supervisory committee

audit.''

(17) Working papers refers to the principal record, in any form, of

the work performed by the auditor and/or supervisory committee to

support its findings and/or conclusions concerning significant matters.

Examples include the written record of procedures applied, tests

performed, information obtained, and pertinent conclusions reached in

the engagement, proprietary audit programs, analyses, memoranda,

letters of confirmation and representation, abstracts of credit union

documents, reviewer's notes, if retained, and schedules or commentaries

prepared or obtained by the independent, compensated auditor.

(b) Supervisory committee responsibilities. (1) The supervisory

committee is responsible for ensuring that:

(i) The financial condition of the credit union is accurately and

fairly presented in the credit union's financial statements; and

(ii) The credit union's management practices and procedures are

sufficient to safeguard members' assets.

[[Page 41325]]

(2) To meet its responsibilities, the supervisory committee shall

determine whether:

(i) Internal controls are established and effectively maintained to

achieve the credit union's financial reporting objectives which must be

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the supervisory committee

audit, verification of members' accounts and its additional

responsibilities;

(ii) The credit union's accounting records and financial reports

are promptly prepared and accurately reflect operations and results;

(iii) The relevant plans, policies, and control procedures

established by the board of directors are properly administered; and

(iv) Policies and control procedures are sufficient to safeguard

against error, carelessness, conflict of interest, self-dealing and

fraud.

(c) Supervisory committee audit. (1) A supervisory committee audit

of each Federal credit union shall occur at least once every calendar

year and shall cover the period elapsed since the last audit period.

The supervisory committee audit shall be performed by the supervisory

committee or its designated representative, as prescribed in paragraph

(c)(5) of this section.

(2) Standards for Performing Supervisory Committee Audit. The

supervisory committee audit procedures/testing must be performed in

accordance with the following standards:

(i) The audit is to be performed by a person or persons having

adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor commensurate

with the level of sophistication and complexity of the credit union

under audit.

(ii) Reasonable care is to be exercised in the performance of the

audit and the preparation of the report.

(iii) The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any,

are to be properly supervised.

(iv) The person or persons performing the audit must attain a

sufficient understanding of the internal control structure to plan the

audit and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be

performed.

(v) The person or persons performing the audit must, through

inspection, observation, inquiry, and confirmation obtain sufficient

evidence to afford a reasonable basis for the financial statement

elements, accounts or items under audit.

(3) Scope of Supervisory Committee Audit. The scope of the

supervisory committee audit shall consist of:

(i) Attaining an understanding of the internal control structure;

(ii) Assessing the level of control risk; and

(iii) Based on the level of control risk, determining the nature,

timing, and extent of substantive testing necessary to confirm the

assertions made by management regarding each of assets, liabilities,

equity, income, and expenses for the following attributes:

(A) Existence or occurrence;

(B) Completeness;

(C) Valuation or allocation;

(D) Rights and obligations; and

(E) Presentation and disclosures.

(4) In addition to scope requirements set forth in paragraph (c)(3)

of this section, an audit performed by an independent, compensated

auditor which includes any of the following areas must, with respect to

audit scope but not with respect to reporting, satisfy GAAS for

expressing an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole:

(i) Internal controls;

(ii) Cash;

(iii) Loans and interest thereon;

(iv) Investments and interest thereon;

(v) Shares and dividends and/or interest thereon;

(vi) Related party transactions; and

(vii) The reporting of identified errors and irregularities with

regard to each of the items in paragraphs (c)(4) (i) through (vi) of

this section.

(5)(i) The requirements of the annual supervisory committee audit

may be satisfied by one of the following:

(A) An opinion audit of the credit union's financial statements

performed by an independent, licensed, certified public accountant;

(B) An ``agreed-upon procedures engagement'' performed by an

independent, licensed, certified public accountant, which by itself or

in combination with procedures performed by the supervisory committee,

fulfills the required scope of the supervisory committee audit;

(C) A supervisory committee audit performed by an independent,

compensated auditor other than an independent, licensed, certified

public accountant which by itself or in combination with procedures

performed by the supervisory committee, fulfills the scope of a

supervisory committee audit; or

(D) A supervisory committee audit by the supervisory committee or

its designated, uncompensated representative.

(ii) In all cases, an independent, compensated auditor is required

to contract directly with the supervisory committee for the audit

engagement and to deliver its written reports directly to the

supervisory committee.

(iii) For a supervisory committee audit performed by the

supervisory committee or its designated, uncompensated representative,

the supervisory committee shall prepare a written report of the

supervisory committee audit.

(d) Engagement letter. (1) The engagement of an independent,

compensated auditor to perform all or a portion of the scope of a

supervisory committee audit shall be evidenced by an engagement letter.

The engagement letter shall be signed by the compensated auditor and

acknowledged therein by the supervisory committee prior to commencement

of a supervisory committee audit. The engagement letter shall:

(i) Specify the terms, conditions, and objectives of engagement;

(ii) Identify the basis of accounting to be used, e.g., GAAP or

RAP;

(iii) Include an appendix setting forth the procedures to be

performed (if not an opinion audit);

(iv) Specify the rate of, or total, compensation to be paid for the

audit;

(v) Provided that the audit shall, upon completion of the

engagement, deliver to the supervisory committee:

(A) A written report of the supervisory committee audit; and

(B) Notice in writing, either within the report or communicated

separately, of any internal control reportable conditions and/or

irregularities or illegal acts which come to the auditor's attention

during the normal course of the audit (i.e., no additional duty is

imposed nor additional written communications beyond (A) is required if

none of these is noted);

(vi) Specify a target date of delivery of the written reports;

(vii) Certify that NCUA staff or its designated representative will

be provided unconditional access to the complete set of original

working papers either at the credit union or at a mutually agreeable

location, for purposes of inspection; and

(viii) Acknowledge that working papers shall be retained for a

minimum of three years from the date of the written audit report.

(2) In the case of a supervisory committee audit engagement which

addresses all of the financial statement elements, accounts or items

and attributes prescribed in paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) of this

section, the engagement letter shall certify that the contracted scope

of the audit satisfies the requirements of a complete supervisory

committee audit.

(3) In the case of a supervisory committee audit engagement which

excludes any financial statement elements, accounts or items and

attributes prescribed in paragraphs (c)(3)

[[Page 41326]]

and (c)(4) of this section, the engagement letter shall:

(i) Identify the elements, accounts or items and attributes

excluded from the audit;

(ii) State that, because of the exclusion(s), the resulting audit

will not, by itself, fulfill the scope of a supervisory committee

audit; and

(iii) Caution that the supervisory committee will remain

responsible for fulfilling the scope of a supervisory committee audit

with respect to the excluded elements, accounts or items and

attributes.

(e) Audit reports and working paper access. (1) Upon completion or

receipt of the written supervisory committee audit reports, the

supervisory committee shall provide the reports to the board of

directors. The supervisory committee shall ensure that the independent,

compensated audit and its reports comply with the terms of the

engagement letter prescribed in this section. The supervisory committee

shall, upon request, provide to the National Credit Union

Administration a copy of the written reports received from the auditor.

(2) The supervisory committee shall be responsible for preparing

and maintaining, or making available, a complete set of original

working papers supporting each supervisory committee audit. The

supervisory committee shall, upon request, provide NCUA staff

unconditional access to such working papers either at the offices of

the credit union or at a mutually agreeable location, for purposes of

inspecting such working papers.

(f) Sanctions. (1) Failure of a supervisory committee and/or its

independent compensated auditor to comply with the requirements of this

section, or the terms of an engagement letter required by this section,

is grounds for:

(i) The regional director to reject the supervisory committee

audit;

(ii) The regional director to impose the remedies available in

Sec. 701.13, provided any of the conditions specified in Sec. 701.13 is

present; and

(iii) The NCUA to seek formal administrative sanctions against the

supervisory committee and/or its independent, compensated auditor

pursuant to section 206(r) of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C.

1786(r).

(2) In the case of a federally-insured state chartered credit

union, NCUA shall provide the state regulator an opportunity to timely

impose a remedy satisfactory to NCUA before seeking to impose a

sanction permitted under (f)(1) of this section.

* * * * *

Sec. 701.13 [Amended]

3. Section 701.13 is amended in paragraph (a)(2) by revising

``Sec. 701.12(e)'' to read ``Sec. 701.12(h)''.

[FR Doc. 96-19511 Filed 8-7-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7535-01-M

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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