Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock Brake Systems

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

49 CFR Part 393

[FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31]

RIN 2125-AD42

Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock

Brake Systems

AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The FHWA is proposing to amend the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) to require that air-braked truck tractors

manufactured on or after March 1, 1997, and air-braked single-unit

trucks, buses, trailers, and converter dollies manufactured on or after

March 1, 1998, be equipped with antilock brake systems (ABSs) that meet

the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.

121. The FHWA is also proposing that hydraulic braked trucks and buses

manufactured on or after March 1, 1999, be equipped with ABSs that meet

the requirements of FMVSS No. 105. This rulemaking is intended to

ensure that the in-service brake standards of the FMCSRs are consistent

with the FMVSSs and to improve the safety of operation of commercial

motor vehicles (CMVs) by reducing the incidence of accidents caused by

jackknifing and other losses of directional stability and control

during braking. With regard to CMVs manufactured prior to the dates

previously mentioned, the FHWA is not proposing that motor carriers be

required to retrofit such vehicles with ABSs. However, the FHWA is

requesting comments on this subject.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 10, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit written, signed comments to FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31,

room 4232, HCC-10, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Highway

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. All

comments received will be available for examination at the above

address from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays. Those desiring notification of receipt of

comments must include a self- addressed, stamped postcard.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Larry W. Minor, Office of Motor

Carrier Research and Standards, HCS-10, (202) 366-4009; or Mr. Charles

E. Medalen, Office of the Chief Counsel, HCC-20, (202) 366-1354,

Federal Highway Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC

20590-0001. Office hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Section 4012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency

Act of 1991 (ISTEA) (Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 2157) directs the

Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking concerning methods

for improving the braking performance of new commercial

[[Page 36692]]

motor vehicles,1 including truck tractors, trailers, and their

dollies. Congress specifically directed that the rulemaking examine

antilock systems, as a means of improving brake compatibility, and

methods of ensuring effectiveness of brake timing.

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\1\ For the purposes of section 4012, the term ``commercial

motor vehicle'' means any self-propelled or towed vehicle used on

highways to transport passengers or property if such vehicle has a

gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 11,794 kilograms (kg) (26,001

pounds) or more. The NHTSA's final rule on ABS applies to medium and

heavy vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more.

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The NHTSA Rulemaking

In response to the ISTEA, the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) published a final rule amending Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, and

FMVSS No. 121, Air Brake Systems, to require that medium and heavy

vehicles be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS) to improve the

lateral stability (i.e., traction) and steering control of these

vehicles during braking (60 FR 13216, March 10, 1995). For truck

tractors, the ABS requirement is supplemented by a 48.3 kilometer per

hour (30-mph) braking-in-a-curve test on a low coefficient of friction

surface using a full brake application. By improving lateral stability

and control, these requirements will significantly reduce jackknifing

and other losses of control during braking as well as the deaths and

injuries caused by those control problems.

In addition, the NHTSA final rule requires all powered heavy

vehicles to be equipped with an in-cab lamp to indicate ABS

malfunctions. Truck tractors and other trucks equipped to tow air-

braked trailers are required to be equipped with two separate in-cab

lamps: One indicating malfunctions in the towing vehicle ABS and the

other in the trailer ABS. The requirement for the in-cab lamp to alert

the driver of malfunctions in the trailer ABS applies to trucks and

truck tractors manufactured on or after March 1, 2001 (61 FR 5949,

February 15, 1996). Trailers produced during an initial 11-year period

(March 1, 1998 through March 1, 2009) must also be equipped with an

external malfunction indicator that is visible to the driver of the

towing tractor (61 FR 5949).

The amendments to FMVSS No. 105 become effective on March 1, 1999.

With the exception of the in-cab indicator for trailer ABS

malfunctions, the amendments to FMVSS No. 121 become effective on March

1, 1997, for truck tractors, and on March 1, 1998, for air-braked

trailers, converter dollies, single unit trucks, and buses.

FHWA Notice of Intent

On March 10, 1995, the FHWA published a notice of intent to

initiate a rulemaking concerning requirements for ABSs on CMVs

operating in interstate commerce (60 FR 13306). The notice of intent

included an extensive discussion of the NHTSA's ABS fleet study

conducted between 1988 and 1993. A copy of the study has been placed in

FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31. The NHTSA tracked the maintenance performance

histories of 200 truck tractors and 50 semitrailers equipped with ABSs,

as well as the histories of a comparison group of 88 truck tractors and

35 semitrailers that were not equipped with ABSs, to determine the

incremental maintenance costs and patterns associated with installing

ABSs on these heavy vehicles.\2\

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\2\ ``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability,

Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS)

for Heavy Truck Tractors,'' DOT Report No. 807 846, March 1992, and

``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability, Maintainability, and

Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) for Semitrailers,'' DOT

Report No. 808 059, October 1993.

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The authors concluded that, based upon the data collected during

the fleet study, currently available ABSs are reliable, durable, and

maintainable. While an ABS is not a zero-cost maintenance item, its

presence on a vehicle did not substantially increase maintenance costs

(less than one percent for tractors, less than two percent for

trailers) or decrease vehicle operational availability.

The NHTSA data indicate that ABSs are neither difficult nor unduly

expensive to maintain. The fleet test results do not indicate that the

level of maintenance required to keep an ABS functional is unreasonable

relative to the safety benefits that will result from the use of these

systems.

The FHWA concluded that a rulemaking should be initiated to propose

amending the FMCSRs to include ABS requirements and solicited comments

on this decision.

Discussion of Comments

The FHWA received 11 comments in response to the March 10, 1995,

notice. The commenters were: Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety

(AHAS); AlliedSignal Truck Brake Systems Company (AlliedSignal); the

American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA); Mr. G. Frank Brda, a former

CMV owner-operator; Heavy Duty Brake Manufacturers Council (HDBMC);

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS); Midland-Grau Heavy Duty

Systems; National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII); Mack

Trucks, Inc.; National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA); and,

Rockwell WABCO Vehicle Control Systems (Rockwell).

Generally the commenters were in favor of the FHWA initiating a

rulemaking to require that motor carriers maintain the ABSs. However,

the ATA, NADA, and AlliedSignal expressed concern about the FHWA

proceeding with a notice of proposed rulemaking. The specific concerns

or issues raised by the commenters are discussed below.

Interpretation of Sec. 396.3

The ATA and AlliedSignal believe that Sec. 396.3, Inspection,

repair, and maintenance, would adequately cover the ABS requirement and

that a new provision may not be necessary. The ATA states that:

This language makes it clear that a system necessary for safety

must be maintained in proper condition. It also includes the

flexibility to hold that the system can be disconnected if, because

of existing circumstances, doing so is the safest policy. For

example, we can foresee a time when some failure in an ABS system

will imperil braking. Until a cure for that problem is developed,

unplugging the specific model involved may be the most prudent

course.

The ATA believes NHTSA's research shows serious operational

problems with ABSs and the failure warning lamp systems that were not

reflected in the FHWA's March 10, 1995, notice of intent. The ATA

suggests a review of the NHTSA reports ``to get an understanding of

both the reliability and safety limitations of ABSs which were

indirectly covered by the agency and point to serious concerns about

the technology.'' The ATA summarized its recommendation to the FHWA as

follows:

ATA believes that properly administered, FMCSR 396.3(a)(1) can

be used to assure that carriers provide appropriate maintenance for

ABS and recommends that this be the strategy the agency follows in

this matter. Given present experience and that NHTSA itself has

pointed to serious operational difficulties, we believe more about

its actual performance must be known before attempting to write a

detailed ABS in-use regulation.

AlliedSignal shared the ATA's views on Sec. 396.3 stating that

``[t]he current FMCSR 396.3(a)(1) assures that operators maintain brake

systems in good working order and therefore possibly negating the need

to change FMCSR 396.''

The FHWA does not agree with the ATA and AlliedSignal. Section

[[Page 36693]]

396.3(a)(1) requires that parts and accessories be in safe and proper

operating condition at all times. This includes parts and accessories

specified in part 393 and any additional parts and accessories which

may affect the safety of operation of the vehicle, including but not

limited to, frame and frame assemblies, suspension systems, axles and

attaching parts, wheels and rims, and steering systems. The FHWA has

historically interpreted Sec. 396.3(a)(1) as applying only to the parts

and accessories required by part 393. Parts and accessories that are

not required by part 393 are considered additional or optional

equipment which is not necessary for the safe and proper operation of

commercial motor vehicles. The applicability of Sec. 396.3(a)(1) to

optional equipment is limited to only those cases in which a failure or

defect in the equipment creates a hazard to the motoring public or

adversely affects the performance or function of any piece of equipment

required by part 393.

If the FHWA does not establish a requirement for ABSs under part

393, such systems could only be considered as optional equipment under

the FMCSRs. Since a failure of the ABS would not affect the foundation

brake system, a CMV could meet all of the current requirements of

subpart C of part 393 with an inoperative ABS. Therefore, the FHWA

could not require motor carriers to systematically inspect, repair, and

maintain ABSs unless part 393 is amended.

In response to the ATA's concern that motor carriers need the

flexibility to disconnect ABSs if, ``because of existing circumstances,

doing so is the safest policy,'' the FHWA does not foresee the

development of such problems. In the event that an ABS or vehicle

manufacturer, or the NHTSA determines that there is a safety-related

defect, the manufacturers are responsible for notifying purchasers of

the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge (49

CFR part 577, Defect and Noncompliance Notification). If a manufacturer

or the NHTSA indicates there is an ABS defect of the severity alluded

to by the ATA, the FHWA would immediately notify all Federal officials

responsible for enforcing the FMCSRs and State officials responsible

for enforcing compatible State regulations to ensure that carriers are

not unfairly penalized for inoperable ABSs. However, in the absence of

a notification from a vehicle or ABS manufacturer or the NHTSA, the

FHWA does not intend to allow motor carriers to disconnect the ABSs.

Research on ABS Operation and Failure Modes

The NADA and the ATA believe the FHWA should evaluate in-use ABS

operation and failure modes prior to establishing a requirement for

motor carriers to maintain the systems. The NADA indicated that

``[u]ntil such an evaluation is undertaken, an ABS maintenance rule

would be premature.'' The ATA states:

There are several problems with ABS which will impact its

inspection and repair.

As NHTSA's ABS studies showed and our follow up research

confirms * * * there are numerous troubles with this technology.

Many of the problems involve the failure warning system. False

warning signals are a daily occurrence in fleets with a large number

of ABS equipped vehicles. Examples of such problems are codes for

malfunctions which, when checked, didn't occur; alien codes not

defined in the maintenance manual and phantom codes which come and

go, typically disappearing before the vehicle gets to the shop and

hopefully unrelated to a serious problem.

In addition to lamps illuminating when no failure can be found,

electrical failures occur which do not cause either the warning lamp

to come on or a failure code to be set, sometimes because the

warning system itself has failed. Also, the warning lamp does not

signal all mechanical failures and, as FMVSS 121 is now written, it

is not required to do so.

The warning light system is not directly connected to each part

of the ABS. Typically it is coupled to the ECU which grounds the

lead when a failure is detected. The ECU makes its decision by

taking input from many sources and using electronic logic to

calculate whether all is well. The only thing one can say for sure

when the warning light is on is that the bulb filament is intact and

receiving electrical power.

Given the warning lamp limitations cited above, its use as an

enforcement tool to assess whether ABS is working properly is

questionable. As it is presently configured, there is no quick,

accurate, easy way to do a complete functional test of the total ABS

short of making a panic stop and watching for wheel lockup,

something impractical for roadside inspection.

In addition to concerns about research, the ATA believes the FHWA

should ensure that the availability of spare parts to keep ``any

vintage ABS acceptably functioning for 20 years'' prior to requiring

motor carriers to maintain the ABSs. The ATA states:

There is a very good possibility that in twenty years, there

will be no source of repair parts for today's ABS. Certainly there

is nothing available now with which to fix most of the 1970's

systems. While it can be argued that the deletion of the requirement

for ABS from FMVSS 121 eliminated the market, we are not convinced

that this was the only major factor impacting the aftermarket spare

component arena. Other influences were an extremely small market and

the need to retain antiquated processes to build outmoded parts.

The ATA further states that ``[i]f FHWA/OMC plans to require that

carriers keep systems in repair, then it is only fair that the agency

help assure the job can be done.''

The FHWA does not consider the issues raised by the ATA and NADA to

be sufficient reasons to delay issuing a proposal to require carriers

to maintain the ABSs required by the NHTSA. Neither the ATA nor the

NADA identify specific safety-related issues that would justify

postponing an in-service requirement for ABS. The NHTSA fleet study

provides a clear indication of how ABSs behave in a real-world

environment. Further, there is no documentation of an ABS defect or

malfunction contributing to an accident as the ATA suggests may occur

in the future.

The NHTSA studied the reliability, maintainability, and durability

of ABSs installed in 200 truck tractors that were operated in normal

revenue service by 17 fleets. All of the ABSs which were available in

1988 were included in the test and the antilock systems were installed

on truck tractors produced by all of the major United States truck

tractor manufacturers. During the two-year test, the ABS equipped

tractors accumulated approximately 40 million miles of in-service

revenue-producing operation. Maintenance activities for all 200 ABS-

equipped tractors as well as 88 comparable tractors without ABSs were

monitored and recorded. Each of the ABS-equipped tractors had on-board

data recorders to monitor each ABS operation and keep a record of truck

mileage, number of brake applications, brake pressure distribution, and

acceleration during braking. To verify that these records were

representative of normal non-ABS operation, 16 truck tractors out of

the 88 control trucks were also equipped with on-board data recorders.

All accidents involving the participating tractors were investigated,

with particular attention being given to those which might have

involved braking and/or ABS operation.

The NHTSA also conducted a two-year study of the performance,

reliability, maintainability, and durability of ABSs installed on 50

semitrailers that were operated in normal revenue service by five

fleets. All ABSs which were available in 1990 were included in the

test, and the ABSs were installed on semitrailers produced by three

different manufacturers. The ABS-equipped semitrailers accumulated

approximately four million miles of in-service revenue-producing

operation.

[[Page 36694]]

Maintenance activities for all 50 ABS-equipped semitrailers as well as

35 comparable semitrailers without ABS were monitored and recorded. The

on-board recorders kept a record of semitrailer mileage, number of

brake applications, brake pressure distribution, voltage, and

deceleration during braking.

The authors of the studies concluded that, based upon the data

collected during the fleet study, the 1988 ABSs used on the truck

tractors, and the 1990 ABSs used on the trailers, were reliable,

durable, and maintainable. The researchers acknowledge that

installation-related problems were encountered during the study. The

problems included adjustments, repairs, or, in some cases replacement,

of wiring cables, wiring connectors, sensors, modulator valves, or

other components. The researchers indicated that many of these problems

were related to the experimental nature of the ABS installations on the

test vehicles.

As the NHTSA indicated in its report on the truck tractor study,

only one U.S. heavy truck manufacturer (Freightliner Corporation)

offered ABS as a fully-engineered production option on its line of

trucks. In contrast, other manufacturers had only limited experience

installing small numbers ofcurrent-generation ABSs and, therefore, had

not worked out many of the detailed design aspects of installing the

systems. Some of the manufacturers had no experience with the systems

they agreed to install for the purposes of the fleet study. Many of the

ABS installations required a collaborative effort on the part of ABS

suppliers, truck manufacturers, wheel and hub suppliers, and wiring

harness suppliers. As a result, the quality of some of the

installations was not typical of what would be expected for production-

line installations.

The FHWA believes the NHTSA fleet study provides sufficient data

concerning the reliability, durability, and maintainability for ABSs

and that it is not necessary to conduct additional research. Although

the NHTSA experienced installation-related ABS problems, there is no

indication that production-line ABSs installed to meet the NHTSA

requirements would have problems of the proportion experienced in the

fleet study. Neither the ATA nor the NADA have identified flaws in

NHTSA's research methodology or explained what additional aspects of

ABS operation need to be studied.

With regard to the ATA's concerns about ABS malfunction indicators,

the FHWA does not anticipate widespread problems on vehicles

manufactured on and after the effective date of the NHTSA requirements.

If the ABS malfunction indicator is activated, it is a clear signal

that a repair or adjustment to the system is necessary. Either the

malfunction signal is correct (indicating a problem with one or more

ABS components (ECU, wheel sensors, etc.)) and the ABS is not fully

operational, or the malfunction indicator is faulty and the ABS is

fully operational. In either case, the cause for the malfunction signal

should be properly diagnosed and corrected. Establishing a requirement

under the FMCSRs will ensure that motor carriers take the appropriate

steps to have the problem diagnosed and corrected.

In response to the ATA's comments about the FHWA helping to assure

that motor carriers can maintain the ABSs for 20 years, the agency is

responsible for establishing safety regulations and does not have

authority to regulate the availability of spare parts. The FHWA notes

that most motor carriers do not keep CMVs for 20 years. Those that

choose to keep vehicles in service for such periods must take full

responsibility for ensuring, at a minimum, that the vehicles meet all

safety requirements that were applicable at the time the vehicles were

manufactured. Motor carriers have the option of upgrading or

retrofitting the vehicles brake systems to meet subsequent safety

standards. Therefore if parts are not available in 20 years to maintain

the ABSs with which the vehicles were originally equipped (in

accordance with the NHTSA requirements), motor carriers have the option

of retiring those vehicles from service in interstate commerce, or

retrofitting the vehicles with ABSs for which spare parts are

available. In any case, the NHTSA's ABS requirements will create a

permanent market for replacement parts.

Retrofitting

Several of the commenters discussed retrofitting of vehicles

manufactured prior to the effective dates of the NHTSA requirements.

Most of these commenters indicated that the FHWA should not require

retrofitting. The ATA indicated that manufacturers have made ABS an

integral part of vehicle design and that ABS is not a technology which

can safely and effectively be retrofitted. The ATA states:

Installation of this equipment requires additional wiring and

wheel sensor hardware that would be very costly and difficult or

impossible to install in some existing vehicles, especially on power

units.

To monitor the motion of wheels, ABS relies on some sort of

device to sense their speed. This equipment is either a part of the

axle hub or is internal to the axle itself. In either case, fitting

it to existing vehicles not so equipped is very difficult. Heat

treated axle housings may have to be drilled and the scrap ``chips''

generated kept from contaminating the axle lubricant, both of which

require special knowledge and equipment. Wheel end hardware may need

changing and this could require special, off-vehicle, welding and

machining of hub flanges and even fabrication of parts to assure

existing wheels and drums can be retained.

The ATA also indicated that wiring must be properly routed to avoid

electromagnetic interference with ABS signals and mandated warning

lamps. The ATA emphasized that none of these activities are within the

normal scope of work of either truck maintenance facilities or garages

specializing in air brake systems.

The ATA concluded:

FHWA/OMC (Office of Motor Carriers) has adopted the proper

strategy in not suggesting ABS retrofit and that stance should be

maintained. ATA requests that FHWA/OMC confirm it discourages

retrofitting because there are serious difficulties associated with

such installations on a broad scale and there are technical

considerations that have not been fully explored which could

introduce operational and safety problems.

With regard to comments in support of a retrofitting requirement,

the NAII, in its November 8, 1993, comments in response to the NHTSA's

NPRM on ABS (the NAII included a copy of its 1993 comments with its

response to the FHWA's notice of intent), stated:

Requiring ABS on all heavy vehicles would save among 379 and 600

lives annually, prevent between 19,825 and 34,517 injuries and save

approximately $541 million to $650 million in property damage, a

figure that does not include medical costs and lost time costs. With

the immediate benefit of saving lives and avoiding injuries, we go

beyond the NPRM to urge that antilock brakes be required to be

retrofitted onto existing medium and heavy vehicles and that the

implementation date for all vehicles be accelerated to two years

after final rulemaking.

The FHWA agrees with the ATA that it would be inappropriate to

propose an ABS retrofitting requirement. The FHWA believes the NHTSA

research provides a strong indication of the types of technical

problems that would be expected if motor carriers were required to

retrofit vehicles with ABS.

As noted earlier, at the time the NHTSA conducted its research on

ABS for truck tractors, only one heavy truck manufacturer offered ABS

as a fully- engineered production option on its line of trucks. In

contrast, most of the remaining truck tractor manufacturers had only

limited experience installing

[[Page 36695]]

small numbers of ``current-generation'' ABSs and, therefore, had not

worked out many of the detailed design aspects of installing the

systems. The retrofitting of ABSs on truck tractors required teamwork

on the part of ABS suppliers, truck manufacturers, wheel and hub

suppliers, and wiring harness suppliers. Even with this team effort,

some of the test vehicles were delivered to the participating motor

carriers with pre-existing problems that, for one reason or another,

prevented the ABS from functioning properly.

In all, 116 out of the 200 truck tractors (58 percent) experienced

installation/preproduction design related problems. The researchers

indicated that the relatively high percentage is indicative of the

``newness'' of the systems in North American applications. Table 1

summarizes the types of problems that were experienced in the truck

tractor portion of the fleet study. Table 2 summarizes installation-

related problems in the semitrailer portion of the fleet study.

Table 1.--Truck-Tractor ABS Installation/Pre-Production Design-Related

Problems by System Component Needing Work

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Number of

trucks Number of

requiring trucks

inspections, requiring

ABS component adjustments replacements

or repairs of this

of this component

component

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Wiring Cables............................... 12 \2\ 23

Wiring Connectors........................... 29 10

Sensors and Related Parts................... 5 10

Modulator Valves and Related Parts.......... 13 \3\ 50

ECUs........................................ 17 \2\ 20

Others \1\.................................. 7 0

Total No. Of Trucks per Column.............. 57 102

Overall No. of Trucks Involved in

Installation/Pre-Production Design Related

Problems

(1)116

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\1\ Others include: rewiring due to installation oversights; two

miscellaneous wire resecurements; and the addition of one ground strap

to adjust the ECU.

\2\ One problem represented all of these replacements.

\3\ One problem involved 40 of these trucks, while another involved 10

trucks.

Note: Individual column numbers are not additive since specific trucks

may have needed maintenance on more than one component.

Table 2.--Semitrailer ABS Installation/Pre-Production Design-Related

Problems by System Component Needing Work

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Number of

semitrailers Number of

requiring semitrailers

inspections, requiring

ABS component adjustments replacements

or repairs of this

of this component

component

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wiring Cables............................... 0 2

Wiring Connectors........................... 11 0

Sensors and Related Parts................... \2\ 3 10

Modulator Valves and Related Parts.......... 0 0

ECUs........................................ 0 5

Others \1\.................................. 0 26

Total No. of Semitrailers per Column........ 14 31

Overall No. Of Semitrailers Involved in

Installation/Pre-Production Design- Related

Problems

(1) 31

------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ Others include: Isolation diode installation and replacement of ECU

grommets.

\2\ Sensor adjustment resulted from incorrectly adjusted wheel bearings

on new semitrailers.

Note: Individual column numbers are not additive since specific

semitrailers may have needed maintenance on more than one component.

The NHTSA report on the truck tractor portion of the fleet study

indicates the percentage of installation-related problems is similar to

that observed by many of the participating fleets when they receive

newly-built vehicles. However, the FHWA believes the percentage of

malfunctions would be much greater if motor carriers were required to

attempt retrofitting innumerable configurations of air-braked vehicles.

The FHWA considers NHTSA's fleet study to be a best-case scenario for

retrofitting ABS in that the vehicle and brake manufacturers (as well

as wheel and hub manufacturers) worked together to complete the

installations of the ABS. Even with this collaborative effort of

experienced engineers, numerous problems related to the retrofitting

process surfaced during the fleet study.

Although many motor carriers have excellent maintenance programs

and talented engineering staff, the FHWA believes that the majority of

motor carriers could not retrofit their vehicles without a substantial

amount of technical assistance from vehicle and component

manufacturers. Without this technical assistance it is more likely than

not that many of the retrofitted ABS installations would not be

performed correctly, thereby creating the potential for a degradation

of the CMV's braking performance. It is unrealistic to expect

manufacturers to be able to help more than 300,000 motor carriers

complete the retrofitting of several million vehicles while working on

the design and installation of ABSs on newly manufactured vehicles.

Further, it is unlikely that a collaborative effort between vehicle and

component manufacturers and the motor carriers would result in better

installations than those experienced in the NHTSA fleet study.

The FHWA believes the cost of retrofitting a commercial motor

vehicle with ABS is likely to be higher than original equipment

manufacturer (OEM) installations because the vehicle will have to be

removed from revenue service during the retrofitting process. This is

not the case for brand new vehicles. Also, repeated adjustments or

repairs of the type described in the NHTSA research reports would mean

more down time for the retrofitted vehicles.

In addition, Sec. 396.25 of the FMCSRs, Qualifications of brake

inspectors, prohibits motor carriers from allowing their employees to

be responsible for ensuring that brake-related inspection, repair, and

maintenance tasks are performed correctly unless the employee has at

least one year of training and/or experience. This requirement was

issued in response to section 9110 of the Truck and Bus Safety and

Regulatory Reform Act of 1988 (49 U.S.C. 31137(b)). Therefore, motor

carriers that lack sufficient staff with at least one year of training

and/or experience at retrofitting ABSs prior to the effective date of a

retrofitting requirement would have to rely on commercial garages or

similar facilities to fulfill a retrofitting requirement. Since many of

these facilities would also have very little if any experience

retrofitting ABSs, there is no assurance that they could do a better

job than the motor carriers' employees. Therefore, most motor carriers

could not allow their employees to attempt the retrofitting of ABSs,

and would not have a practical means to satisfy a retrofitting

requirement.

Inspection Procedures

Several of the commenters discussed roadside inspection procedures

to determine if ABSs are in working order. The HDBMC recommends that

the FHWA ``provide for maintenance of

[[Page 36696]]

ABS systems by regulation and include a[n] ABS roadside inspection

procedure.'' The HDBMC recommends that the roadside inspection

procedure include a check of the ABS malfunction indicator.

Midland-Grau also recommends that vehicle inspections include

checking the operational status of the ABS. Midland-Grau states:

The majority of antilock systems on the market have an initial

startup check sequence along with on-board diagnostics which

monitors the operational status of the ABS. The startup sequence

consists of watching the malfunction indicator light on the dash to

flash along with listening to the ABS modulator valve to exhaust

(blow-down). This operation can be performed simply by having the

driver perform the following steps:

1. Shut down the vehicle's engine by turning off the ignition

switch[;]

2. Have the driver fully apply the brakes[; and,]

3. With the brakes fully applied have the driver turn on the

ignition switch[.]

When the driver follows the above sequence of steps the ABS

malfunction indicator lamp should flash once followed by the ABS

modulator valves exhausting (blow-down). If the ABS is not operating

properly then either the ABS malfunction light will remain on and/or

the ABS modulator valves will not exhaust (blow-down). This quick

check insures that the ABS is fully operational.

Rockwell recommends that the inspection procedure be simple and

straightforward. Rockwell states that ``[t]he inspections should: (1)

[b]e conducted in a short amount of time, (2) [p]rovide meaningful

information about the condition of the ABS[,] and (3) [u]tilize the

self-diagnostic system capabilities required by rulemaking.'' Rockwell

believes the inspection should consist of a basic bulb check of the ABS

indicator lamp followed by a verification that the ABS indicator lamp

deactivates at the end of the check function.

The FHWA appreciates the information provided by the brake

manufacturers and will share this information with the Commercial

Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)--the organization of Federal, State and

Provincial government agencies and representatives from private

industry in the United States, Canada and Mexico dedicated to

improvement of commercial vehicle safety. State agencies responsible

for conducting roadside inspections are members of the CVSA. The FHWA

will work with the appropriate committees within the CVSA to develop

the necessary training material to help inspectors identify ABS

components and determine if the ABS malfunction indicators are working

properly. However, the FHWA does not intend to include roadside

inspection procedures in the FMCSRs. The establishment of inspection

procedures for use by State officials is a non-regulatory function that

is best left to the CVSA with assistance from the FHWA, the NHTSA, and

brake manufacturers.

With regard to the responsibilities of motor carriers in

maintaining the ABSs required by the NHTSA, the FHWA intends to work

with industry groups and brake manufacturers to develop educational

material to help motor carriers understand how the ABSs operate

(including the malfunction indicators), and to identify appropriate

industry sources for information concerning ABS maintenance. The FHWA

does not believe that including detailed systematic, inspection,

repair, and maintenance requirements in part 396 of the FMCSRs would

benefit the industry. The FHWA requests comments on this issue.

Discussion of the Proposal

Creation of Section 393.55

The FHWA proposes to amend the FMCSRs by adding a new Sec. 393.55,

Antilock Brake Systems. This section would be added to subpart C of

part 393, Brakes. The provisions of paragraph (a) would require that

hydraulic braked trucks and buses manufactured on or after March 1,

1999, be equipped with an ABS that meets the requirements of FMVSS No.

105. Paragraph (b) would require indicator lamps on hydraulic-braked

vehicles to alert the driver of ABS malfunctions. Paragraph (c) would

require that each air-braked truck tractor manufactured on or after

March 1, 1997, be equipped with an ABS that meets the requirements of

FMVSS No. 121. Paragraph (c) would also cover air braked trucks, buses,

trailers, and converter dollies manufactured on or after March 1, 1998.

The requirement for ABS malfunction indicators on air braked vehicles

would be covered under paragraph (d). Paragraph (e) would cover the

requirement for the external indicator lamp on trailers and converter

dollies manufactured between March 1, 1998, and March 1, 2009.

Applicability to Canadian and Mexican Vehicles

The FHWA is not proposing an exemption for CMVs operated in the

United States by Canada- and Mexico-based motor carriers. Although the

Federal governments of Canada and Mexico have not indicated whether

they intend to require ABSs for CMVs operating in their countries, the

FHWA believes that it is appropriate to require ABS on foreign-based

vehicles manufactured on or after the effective dates of the NHTSA

requirements if those vehicles are operated within the United States.

This preliminary decision is consistent with the applicability of the

requirements of parts 393 and 396 of the FMCSRs and ensures that all

CMVs operating in interstate or foreign commerce within the United

States are required to meet the same safety standards.

Currently subpart C of part 393 cross references FMVSS No. 105

(Hydraulic Brake Systems), FMVSS No. 106 (Brake Hoses), and FMVSS No.

121 (Air Brake Systems) as well as several other CMV-related FMVSSs.

The FHWA's cross references have the net effect of requiring that

vehicles operated by Canada- and Mexico-based motor carriers be

equipped with safety features/equipment that are compatible with the

NHTSA requirements irrespective of where the vehicle was originally

manufactured, or whether the vehicle was manufactured for sale or use

in the United States. Commercial motor vehicles that do not meet all of

the applicable requirements of part 393 cannot be operated in the

United States. As such, commercial motor vehicles operated by foreign-

based motor carriers are currently required by the FHWA to have, at a

minimum, brake systems that comply with the applicable provisions of

FMVSS Nos. 105, 106, and 121 in effect on the date of manufacture.

On September 6, 1995 (60 FR 46236), the FHWA published its final

rule on automatic brake adjusters and brake adjustment indicators. The

final rule requires motor carriers to maintain automatic brake

adjusters on hydraulic- braked CMVs manufactured on or after October

20, 1993, and air-braked CMVs manufactured on or after October 20,

1994, the effective dates of NHTSA's requirement for automatic brake

adjusters. Further, air braked vehicles that have exposed pushrods and

are manufactured on or after October 20, 1994, must have brake

adjustment indicators. The preamble to the final rule states:

These provisions will apply to all CMVs operated in the United

States, irrespective of the country where the CMV is based.

Canadian and Mexican vehicles manufactured on or after the

effective dates of the NHTSA rules will be required to conform to

this regulation.

Although the FHWA does not have data on the extent to which CMVs

manufactured for sale in Canada and Mexico comply with the current

brake- related FMVSSs and FMCSRs, it is

[[Page 36697]]

unlikely that there are technical reasons that would preclude

manufacturers of these vehicles from offering ABS as an option. As

previously mentioned, foreign-based motor carriers are currently

required to operate commercial motor vehicles that comply with all of

the applicable requirements of part 393 while in the United States.

The FHWA contacted the Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) to

determine the availability of ABS on air braked vehicles sold in Canada

and Mexico. The TMA's membership includes the Ford Motor Company;

Freightliner; General Motors (GM); Mack Trucks, Inc. (Mack), Navistar

International Transportation Corporation (Navistar); PACCAR, Inc.

(Kenworth and Peterbilt); and, Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation

(Volvo).

The TMA indicated that five of the manufactures that sell medium

and heavy-duty trucks in Canada install ABS as standard equipment.

Another manufacturer offers ABS as optional equipment for the Canadian

market. With regard to the Mexican market, none of the TMA's members

installs ABS as standard equipment. Only two of the TMA's members offer

ABS as optional equipment. However, another member indicated it would

make ABS available on units manufactured in Mexico in the near future.

The FHWA also contacted Dina, a Mexican manufacturer of heavy

trucks, and determined that ABS is offered as optional equipment.

Based upon the information obtained from the TMA and Dina, the FHWA

believes that requiring Canadian and Mexican CMVs manufactured on or

after the effective dates of NHTSA's ABS requirements, is appropriate.

The FHWA notes that ABS is not yet commercially available for

hydraulically-braked medium and heavy vehicles in the United States,

Canada or Mexico. However, given the March 1, 1999, effective date of

the FMVSS No. 105 requirements for ABS, the FHWA believes these systems

will be commercially available in time for motor carriers to comply

with the FMCSRs.

The FHWA specifically requests comments from Canada and Mexico-

based motor carriers and original equipment manufacturers that sell

vehicles for the Canadian and Mexican markets.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

All comments received before the close of business on the comment

closing date indicated above will be considered and will be available

for examination in the docket room at the above address. Comments

received after the comment closing date will be filed in the docket and

will be considered to the extent practicable, but the FHWA may issue a

final rule at any time after the close of the comment period. In

addition to late comments, the FHWA will also continue to file in the

docket relevant information that becomes available after the comment

closing date, and interested persons should continue to examine the

docket for new material.

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

The FHWA has determined that this action is not a significant

regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866. No

serious inconsistency or interference with another agency's actions or

plans is likely to result, and it is unlikely that this regulatory

action will have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or

more. The FHWA's regulation would only require maintenance of ABSs; the

NHTSA final rule published on March 10, 1995, is the regulation which

actually requires installation of ABSs. The data collected by NHTSA

indicates that the level of maintenance required to keep an ABS

functional would only increase incrementally and would not be

unreasonable relative to the safety benefits that would result from the

use of these systems. Therefore it is anticipated that the economic

impact of this proposal would be minimal.

The preamble to NHTSA's March 10, 1995, final rule included

estimates of the increased costs of operating heavy vehicles equipped

with ABS. Three categories of operating costs were examined: Lifetime

maintenance costs; lifetime fuel costs due to the additional weight of

the ABS; and lifetime revenue loss due to payload displacement. The

range of the increase in total lifetime operating costs related to

equipping vehicles with ABS is from $201.47 for single-unit trucks and

buses to $786.65 for truck tractors. The NHTSA indicated that the total

estimated increase in lifetime vehicle operating costs associated with

ABS for all commercial motor vehicles is $232 million. A copy of the

NHTSA's final economic assessment is included in FHWA Docket No. MC-94-

31.

In addition, the FHWA has determined that this action is not a

significant regulatory action under the Department of Transportation's

regulatory policies and procedures because it does not concern a matter

about which there is substantial public controversy, it will not have a

substantial effect on State and local governments, or initiate a

substantial regulatory program or change in policy.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-

612), the FHWA has evaluated the effects of this rule on small entities

and has determined that it would not have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small entities. The FHWA finds that this

rule would not significantly increase costs for motor carriers because

FHWA regulations only require maintenance of brake systems and the data

collected by the NHTSA shows that the presence of an ABS on a vehicle

would not substantially increase maintenance costs (less than one

percent for tractors and less than two percent for trailers) or

decrease vehicle operational availability.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism Assessment)

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined

that this rulemaking does not have sufficient Federalism implications

to warrant the preparation of a Federalism assessment. These new safety

requirements would not directly preempt any State law or regulation,

and no additional costs or burdens would be imposed on the States as a

result of this action. Furthermore, the State's ability to discharge

traditional State governmental functions would not be affected by this

rulemaking.

Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.217, Motor

Carrier Safety. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372

regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and

activities do not apply to this program.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This action does not contain a collection of information

requirement for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44

U.S.C. 3501-3520.

National Environmental Policy Act

The agency has analyzed this rulemaking for the purpose of the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347) and has

determined that this action would not have any effect on the quality of

the environment.

[[Page 36698]]

Regulation Identification Number

A regulation identification number (RIN) is assigned to each

regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations.

The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda

in April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of

this document can be used to cross reference this action with the

Unified Agenda.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 393

Highway safety, Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety.

Issued on: July 8, 1996.

Rodney E. Slater,

Federal Highway Administrator.

In consideration of the foregoing, the FHWA proposes to amend title

49, Code of Federal Regulations, subchapter B, chapter III, as follows:

PART 393--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 393 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: Sec. 1041(b) of Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 1993

(1991), 49 U.S.C. 31136 and 31502; 49 CFR 1.48.

2. Section 393.5 is amended by adding the definition of antilock

brake system, in alphabetical order, to read as follows:

* * * * *

Antilock Brake System or ABS means a portion of a service brake

system that automatically controls the degree of rotational wheel slip

during braking by:

(1) Sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels;

(2) Transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular

rotation to one or more controlling devices which interpret those

signals and generate responsive controlling output signals; and

(3) Transmitting those controlling signals to one or more

modulators which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those

signals.

* * * * *

3. In subpart C, Sec. 393.55 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 393.55 Antilock brake systems.

(a) Hydraulic brake systems. Each truck and bus manufactured on or

after March 1, 1999, and equipped with a hydraulic brake system, shall

be equipped with an antilock brake system that meets the requirements

of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105 (49 CFR

571.105, S5.5).

(b) ABS malfunction indicators for hydraulic braked vehicles. Each

hydraulic braked vehicle subject to the requirements of paragraph (a)

of this section shall be equipped with an ABS malfunction indicator

system that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 105 (49 CFR 571.105,

S5.3).

(c) Air brake systems. (1) Each truck tractor manufactured on or

after March 1, 1997, shall be equipped with an antilock brake system

that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 121 (49 CFR 571.121,

S5.1.6.1(b)).

(2) Each air braked commercial motor vehicle other than a truck

tractor, manufactured on or after March 1, 1998, shall be equipped with

an antilock brake system that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 121

(49 CFR 571.121, S5.1.6.1(a) for trucks and buses, S5.2.3 for

semitrailers, converter dollies and full trailers).

(d) ABS malfunction circuits and signals for air braked vehicles.

(1) Each truck tractor manufactured on or after March 1, 1997, and each

single unit air braked vehicle manufactured on or after March 1, 1998,

shall be equipped with an electrical circuit that is capable of

signaling a malfunction that affects the generation or transmission of

response or control signals to the vehicle's antilock brake system (49

CFR 571.121, S5.1.6.2(a)).

(2) Each truck tractor manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, and

each single unit vehicle that is equipped to tow another air-braked

vehicle, shall be equipped with an electrical circuit that is capable

of transmitting a malfunction signal from the antilock brake system(s)

on the towed vehicle(s) to the trailer ABS malfunction lamp in the cab

of the towing vehicle, and shall have the means for connection of the

electrical circuit to the towed vehicle. The ABS malfunction circuit

and signal shall meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 121 (49 CFR

571.121, S5.1.6.2(b)).

(3) Each semitrailer, trailer converter dolly, and full trailer

manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, and subject to the requirements

of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, shall be equipped with an

electrical circuit that is capable of signaling a malfunction in the

trailer's antilock brake system, and shall have the means for

connection of this ABS malfunction circuit to the towing vehicle. In

addition, each trailer manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, that is

designed to tow another air-brake equipped trailer shall be capable of

transmitting a malfunction signal from the antilock brake system(s) of

the trailer(s) it tows to the vehicle in front of the trailer. The ABS

malfunction circuit and signal shall meet the requirements of FMVSS No.

121 (49 CFR 571.121, S5.2.3.2).

(e) Exterior ABS malfunction indicator lamps for trailers. Each

trailer (including a trailer converter dolly) manufactured on or after

March 1, 1998 and before March 1, 2009, shall be equipped with an ABS

malfunction indicator lamp which meets the requirements of FMVSS No.

121 (49 CFR 571.121, S5.2.3.3).

[FR Doc. 96-17785 Filed 7-11-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-22-P