Record of Decision for Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization Final Environmental Impact Statement, Hanford Site, Richland, WA

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision for Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization

Final Environmental Impact Statement, Hanford Site, Richland, WA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this Record

of Decision (ROD) pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality

regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR]

1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021). The ROD is based

on the analyses of environmental impacts identified in the Plutonium

Finishing Plant Stabilization Final Environmental Impact Statement

(DOE/EIS-0244-F); consideration of project costs; compliance

requirements for systems involved in stabilizing plutonium-bearing

material; and public and agency comments.

DOE has prepared the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to

provide an objective technical basis for evaluating alternatives to:

(1) Convert the plutonium-bearing materials at the Plutonium Finishing

Plant (PFP) Facility into a more stable, safer form; (2) reduce

radiation exposure to PFP Facility workers; and (3) reduce the cost of

maintaining the PFP Facility and its contents at the Hanford Site,

Benton County, Washington. The actions evaluated in the Final EIS would

stabilize PFP Facility materials that represent environmental, safety,

or health vulnerabilities in their current condition. Existing

vulnerabilities are the result of discontinuing nuclear material

production and processing operations following the end of the Cold War.

Although DOE has initiated programmatic environmental evaluations on

the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials in the DOE complex which

are now surplus to national defense requirements, the implementation of

decisions regarding ultimate disposition will take several years. In

the interim, DOE wants to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with

certain current nuclear material storage

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configurations in order to protect the environment and the health and

safety of workers and the public.

Reviews by DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

(DNFSB) have identified environmental, safety, and health

vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of certain

nuclear materials at the PFP Facility in their current location and

physical condition. The Final EIS evaluates alternatives for managing

these materials. In making the decisions announced in this ROD, DOE

considered environmental and health impacts, costs, engineering

feasibility, technology availability, and, to the greatest possible

extent, stakeholder concerns and preferences.

After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs,

engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has

decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives

identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the

preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other

stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the final EIS.

DOE is documenting this determination in this ROD. The action will

involve the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material

in hold-up at the PFP Facility, and the stabilization of this and other

plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility. Following

stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be in a form suitable

for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP Facility. Plutonium-

bearing material having low plutonium content (less than 50 weight

percent) and meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized

through a cementation process at the PFP Facility. All immobilized

material will be transferred to solid waste management facilities at

the Hanford Site and, as a consequence, will be removed from safeguards

control. In selecting these alternatives, DOE has identified the most

suitable strategy for reducing the long-term risk to the public,

workers, and the environment.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The actions set forth in this ROD are effective upon

being made public on June 28, 1996, in accordance with DOE's NEPA

implementation regulations (10 CFR 1021.315).

ADDRESSES: For further information on the stabilization of material at

the PFP Facility or this ROD or to receive a copy of the Final EIS,

please contact: Mr. Ben F. Burton, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland

Operations Office, Attn: PFP-EIS, P.O. Box 550, MSIN B1-42, Richland,

Washington 99352, (509) 946-3700.

For further information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact: Ms.

Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-

42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.

The ROD, Final EIS, and reference documents are available in the

public reading rooms and libraries identified in the Federal Register

Notice that announced the availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 26178)

or by calling (509) 946-3700.

I. Background

In 1943, the federal government selected the Hanford Site as part

of the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for national defense

needs. Metallic uranium fuel was irradiated in nuclear reactors at the

Hanford Site to produce plutonium. Chemical processing separated the

irradiated plutonium from the other elements in the irradiated fuel.

The product was plutonium nitrate, which needed further processing to

produce the metallic form used in nuclear weapons. Initially, the

plutonium nitrate was shipped offsite for this additional processing.

The post-war construction of the PFP Facility at the Hanford Site's 200

West Area eliminated this necessity.

Located approximately 51 kilometers (32 miles) northwest of

Richland, Washington, the PFP Facility includes production and recovery

areas, laboratories for routine analysis and research, and secure

vaults for storage of plutonium. Currently, about 240 employees are

physically located within the fenced area of the PFP Facility.

Additional staff is located outside the fenceline, bringing the total

number of employees to 592 people.

When PFP Facility production operations stopped in 1989, most of

the processing residues remained either in storage containers or on

surfaces in enclosed process areas as hold-up. DOE has recognized the

need for a plan that would result in the:

Stabilization of plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP

Facility to a form suitable for interim storage;

Removal of readily retrievable, plutonium-bearing

materials left behind in process equipment, process areas, and air and

liquid waste management systems as a result of historic uses; and

Placement of stabilized fissile material in existing

vaults at the PFP Facility for interim storage.

In June 1993, DOE announced its proposal to operate certain

processes in the PFP Facility to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials

and to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) pursuant to NEPA. As

part of the NEPA process for the EA, DOE conducted public meetings in

the summer and fall of 1993 to discuss the proposal to stabilize the

plutonium-bearing materials. As a result of the public comments

received, DOE decided that an EIS would be the appropriate level of

NEPA review.

On October 27, 1994, a Notice of Intent was published in the

Federal Register (59 FR 53969) that identified the purpose, scope, and

preliminary alternatives for the Draft EIS and invited the public to

participate in the scoping process. Public meetings on the EIS scope

were conducted in six Washington and Oregon cities. The public scoping

process ended on December 12, 1994. Both oral and written comments were

received during the Draft EIS scoping process.

The Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0244-D) was issued in November 1995. The

Draft EIS presented alternatives that would achieve the purpose and

need of the program and included analyses of the potential

environmental impacts that would result.

On December 5, 1995, a Notice of Availability was published in the

Federal Register (60 FR 62244) which formally announced the release and

availability of the Draft EIS. The public hearing date, time, and

location were also published and public comments on the Draft EIS were

requested. A public meeting on the Draft EIS was held in Pasco,

Washington, on January 11, 1996. While the comment period officially

ended on January 23, 1996, DOE decided to accommodate comments received

through February 15, 1996. Both oral and written comments were received

during the comment period.

Based on existing and draft DOE policy on plutonium disposition,

and a comment received during the public hearing, DOE decided to

evaluate another alternative not contained in the Draft EIS. This

alternative would involve the immobilization of materials that have a

low associated plutonium content and thus do not warrant stabilization

measures and vault storage as do the other plutonium-bearing materials

analyzed in this EIS. These materials would be immobilized through a

cementation process, packaged, and transported to a Hanford Site solid

waste management facility.

The plan to include this alternative in the Final EIS was announced

in the Federal Register on May 2, 1996. The announcement also opened

the alternative for public comment during a

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21-day comment period. Comments received are considered in this ROD.

The Final EIS was issued in May 1996. In addition to the analysis

presented in the Draft EIS, the Final EIS contained responses to

comments received on the Draft. On May 24, 1996, a Notice of

Availability was published in the Federal Register (61 FR 26178) which

formally announced the release and availability of the Final EIS.

II. Alternatives Evaluated in EIS

Preferred Alternative: The plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP

Facility can be separated into two categories: (1) Materials that are

stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) materials referred to as hold-

up. The preferred alternative identified in the Final EIS would involve

the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material in hold-

up and the stabilization of this and plutonium-bearing materials in

vaults and gloveboxes.

The PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-bearing

materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar. These

materials have been grouped into four inventory categories. The

preferred alternative includes the following stabilization process for

the four inventory groups:

(1) Plutonium-bearing solutions

--Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization;

(2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues

--Thermal stabilization using a continuous furnace;

(3) Metals and alloys

--Repackaging; and

(4) Polycubes and combustibles

--Pyrolysis.

The preferred alternative for stabilization would involve

processing the plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility into a

form suitable for interim storage in existing PFP Facility vaults. When

stabilized, the material would have minimal chemical reactivity and

would remain in solid form with a low water and organic content.

The preferred alternative would also involve removing and

stabilizing plutonium-bearing material currently in hold-up at the PFP

Facility. Hold-up is material that has accumulated or been retained in

PFP Facility gloveboxes, hoods, process equipment, piping, exhaust and

ventilation systems, and canyons as a result of 40 years of plutonium-

processing operations at the Facility. The removal activities would be

limited to substantive quantities of readily retrievable plutonium-

bearing material currently in hold-up. Due to the nature and location

of the material in hold-up, various technologies would be employed to

remove the material for subsequent stabilization. The removal methods

would include chemical and mechanical processes and disassembly. No

exterior construction or major internal modification to the PFP

Facility is planned for facility stabilization.

Alternatives: In addition to the preferred alternative, alternative

stabilization processes and an immobilization process have been

analyzed. These alternatives include:

Plutonium-bearing solutions

--Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization;

Oxides, fluorides, and process residues

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces and

--Immobilization;

Metals and alloys

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces; and

Polycubes and combustibles

--Batch thermal stabilization,

--Molten salt oxidation, and

--Immobilization.

No Action Alternative: Under the no action alternative, actions

would be limited to ongoing maintenance and security activities

necessary for safe and secure management of the PFP Facility. DOE would

not install processes to stabilize the plutonium-bearing materials at

the PFP Facility. However, plutonium-bearing materials stored in the

PFP Facility vaults that constitute an immediate safety hazard would

continue to be repackaged as necessary for interim storage. In

addition, the DOE would not remove plutonium-bearing materials in hold-

up at the PFP Facility. The plutonium-bearing materials would remain

within or on PFP Facility systems.

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

In the Final EIS, DOE evaluated each alternative to assess the full

range of potential environmental impacts.

The impact analysis showed that there would be no measurable

impacts to geology, seismology, and soils; water resources and

hydrology; air quality; noise and sound levels; ecosystems;

transportation; land use; or archaeological resources. No income or

population group would experience disproportionate health or

environmental effects under any of the alternatives. Environmental

categories where potential impacts were identified include population

and socioeconomics, historic resources, and anticipated health effects.

Preferred Alternative: Environmental effects identified under the

preferred alternative are primarily related to health, population and

socioeconomics, cost, and historic resources.

For the preferred alternative, the total PFP Facility worker

radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 930 person-rem.

The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 14 person-rem.

Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the

probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would

be 0.37 and 0.0070, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer

fatalities would be anticipated.

Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the preferred

alternative would be small. The estimated staff of 592 at the PFP

Facility would be temporarily increased by approximately 10 percent.

Following the completion of the preferred alternative, staff levels

would be reduced to approximately 250. There would be less than a 1

percent change to the area's population or economics from this

alternative. The anticipated change from the preferred alternative

would be too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin

County economies or impact the existing infrastructure.

The removal activities under the preferred alternative would be

intrusive and destructive, and would involve equipment removal. Impacts

to the Remote Mechanical A Line, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility,

and any of the PFP facilities currently eligible for the National

Register of Historic Places would require mitigation to preserve the

history of these historic resources. These mitigation measures have

been agreed to in a Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the

Washington State Historic Preservation Officer.

Alternatives: Environmental effects identified under the

alternative stabilization processes are primarily related to health,

population and socioeconomics, and historic resources. The

environmental effects associated with these alternative stabilization

processes to population and socioeconomics and historic resources are

similar to those discussed for the preferred alternative.

Environmental effects from implementing an immobilization process

are primarily related to waste storage capacity. It is anticipated that

the immobilization alternative would generate up to 1,600 drums of

transuranic waste, with each drum containing approximately 170 grams of

plutonium. Hanford Site solid waste management facilities would manage

all transuranic waste generated by this process over the six-year

period. There

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is currently space for approximately 500 drums at the Transuranic Waste

Storage and Assay Facility. Additional space would become available

when existing drums at the facility are transferred to other Hanford

Site solid waste management facilities.

No Action Alternative: For the no action alternative, the total PFP

Facility worker radiation dose would be 53 person-rem per year. The

total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 0.26 person-rem

per year. Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors,

the probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups

during an assumed 30 years operational life of the no action

alternative would be 0.64 and 0.0039, respectively.

Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the no action

alternative would be small. The existing staff at the PFP Facility

would be reduced by approximately 100 because ongoing cleanup and

stabilization activities would cease. The decrease in staff would be

too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin County

economies or impact the existing infrastructure. However, the PFP

Facility would be required to maintain this work force indefinitely.

Selected Alternatives: As with the preferred alternatives, the

environmental effects identified under the selected alternatives are

primarily related to health, population and socioeconomics, cost, and

historic resources.

For the selected alternative, the total PFP Facility worker

radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 1,120 person-rem.

The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 25 person-rem.

Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the

probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would

be 0.45 and 0.013, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer fatalities

would be anticipated.

Population and socioeconomic effects would be the same as the

preferred alternative. Impacts on historic resources and proposed

mitigations would also be the same.

IV. Environmentally Preferred Alternative

To determine the environmentally preferred alternative, the short-

term (six years or the time required to implement the selected

alternatives) and long-term (greater than six years) time frames are

considered.

Over the short-term, the no action alternative would not result in

increased PFP Facility worker or public radiation exposure, costs, or

loss of historic resources. These impacts would occur under all other

alternatives analyzed. Therefore, in the short-term, the no action

alternative could be considered preferable to the other alternatives.

However, implementation of the no action alternative would not resolve

the long-term health risks associated with the current form of the

plutonium-bearing material within the PFP Facility.

Implementation of the preferred alternative, identified in the

Final EIS, or the alternatives selected by this ROD would result in

increased exposure to Hanford Site workers and the public during the

anticipated six-year period of operation. However, following completion

of all proposed activities the radiation exposure to in-facility

workers would drop to 45 percent of its current level. Continued

exposure following the completion of stabilization and immobilization

would be the result of facility transition until final disposition of

the facility. Under the no action alternative the high background

radiation levels would continue indefinitely. In about 30 years the

radiation exposure to workers from the no action alternative would

exceed the radiation exposure from the preferred or selected

alternatives and would correspondingly result in greater health risk.

Therefore in the long-term, the environmentally preferred alternative

would be to stabilize and immobilize reactive plutonium-bearing

material in the facility.

The no action alternative does not address the continued

degradation of the PFP Facility and the containers in which the

plutonium-bearing materials are stored. Since the PFP Facility is over

40 years old, there is a higher likelihood in the long-term of a

release to the environment under accident conditions than would be

anticipated under the preferred alternative, other stabilization

alternatives, or the immobilization alternative.

V. Other Considerations

In addition to the assessment of environmental impacts provided by

the Final EIS, DOE considered the plutonium disposition criteria,

costs, the recommendations of the DNFSB, the Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D), and

comments received on the immobilization alternative and Final EIS in

determining a course of action to meet the need for interim management

of the plutonium-bearing material. Comments received on the

immobilization alternative and the Final EIS are discussed in Section

VI.

Plutonium Disposition Criteria: In January 1996, A DOE office

internally circulated for review and comment a draft policy for the

disposition of excess plutonium-bearing residues containing less than

50 weight percent plutonium. Under this draft policy, plutonium-bearing

material would be processed to one of two end-states: (1) Plutonium

packaged for storage in accordance with DOE storage standard; or (2)

waste suitable for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This

policy would require that a determination of which end-state is more

cost-effective be made by the responsible field office and approved by

the appropriate DOE Secretarial Officer. As a result, the Final EIS

included an alternative to immobilize candidate plutonium-bearing

material through cementation.

The cementation process was favored for immobilization because: (1)

The ingredients are inexpensive, safe, and readily available; (2) the

equipment needs are simple; (3) the final waste form has proven

stability; (4) it meets the safeguards and security requirements; and

(5) it meets the Hanford Site solid waste acceptance criteria and has

been used extensively at the Hanford Site for immobilizing wastes. In

contrast, immobilizing of materials in a glass (i.e., vitrification) or

a ceramic matrix was not considered desirable because of the cost,

specialized equipment required, lack of such equipment on the Hanford

Site, and lack of site experience. These factors would result in delays

in implementing these alternatives and additional health and safety

risks. Another alternative would be to mix the plutonium with uranium

to produce a mixed oxide fuel suitable for energy production in a

nuclear power reactor. Because of the relatively small quantity of

plutonium material being considered, it was not considered reasonable

to develop the technology at the Hanford Site to support this

alternative.

The Final EIS contains the statement, ``The * * * Record of

Decision will not include a decision on the immobilization alternative

unless this draft policy or a comparable policy has been finalized.''

This policy has not been finalized, therefore decisions to immobilize

plutonium-bearing materials will continue to be made in accordance with

factors and provisions contained in the April 1994 DOE memorandum from

Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Weapons

Management.

The Halsted memorandum provides evaluation factors for discard

decisions for plutonium-bearing material. These factors are: worker

safety, minimizing

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environmental impact, regulatory concerns, waste minimization, disposal

technical factors, technical risk, stakeholder interest, risk

assessment, implementation time and feasibility, proliferation

potential, cost, and interim storage feasibility. These factors will be

applied to the categories of plutonium-bearing material potentially

suitable for immobilization. Future policies of this nature will be

evaluated in connection with decisions to immobilize low concentration

materials.

Costs: In the long-term, cost savings would be achieved by

removing, stabilizing, and/or immobilizing the plutonium-bearing

material at the PFP Facility versus continuing to operate the Facility

in its current condition.

Implementation of the preferred alternative would result in a ten

percent increase in expenditures from the estimated fiscal year 1995

level of $80 million to approximately $89 million. Following completion

of stabilization and removal activities in about six years, the

expenditures at the PFP Facility would decline to approximately $34

million per year.

The cost of implementing the other alternatives would be comparable

to the cost of the preferred alternative.

Under the no action alternative, the cost of operating the Facility

would drop by approximately 17 percent from the fiscal year 1995 level

of $80 million to approximately $67 million in fiscal year 1997. This

reduction would result from a cessation of ongoing interim actions.

This expenditure would go on indefinitely and may increase as the

Facility ages and needs additional maintenance. In approximately 10

years, the cost of continuing to maintain the PFP Facility would exceed

the cost of stabilization.

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB): The DNFSB is

chartered by Congress to review and evaluate the content and

implementation of the standards relating to the design, construction,

operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities

(including applicable DOE Orders, regulations, and requirements). The

DNFSB recommended to the Secretary of Energy those specific measures

that should be adopted to ensure that public health and safety are

adequately protected. In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB noted that it

was concerned that the halt in production of materials to be used in

nuclear weapons froze the manufacturing pipeline in a state that, for

safety reasons, should not be allowed to persist unremediated.

In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB specifically advised: ``that an

integrated program plan be formulated on a high priority basis, to

convert within two to three years the materials'' plutonium metal that

is in contact with, or in proximity to, plastic ``to forms or

conditions suitable for safe interim storage;'' that the plan ``will

require attention to limiting worker exposure and minimizing generation

of additional waste and emission of effluents to the environment;'' and

finally, that the plan ``should include a provision that, within a

reasonable period of time (such as eight years), all storage of

plutonium metal and oxide should be in conformance with the DOE

standard on storage of plutonium.''

All alternatives evaluated in the Final EIS, with the exception of

the no action alternative would achieve the recommendation of the

DNFSB.

Fissile Material Programmatic EIS: The Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Programmatic Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D)

evaluates alternatives for the long-term storage and disposition of

plutonium and other special nuclear material. None of the alternatives

considered in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization Final EIS

would preclude alternatives considered in the programmatic EIS.

VI. Comment on Immobilization Alternative and Final EIS

DOE received three comments from individuals and organizations on

the Immobilization Alternative and the Final EIS.

1. Comment: Gordon Rogers provided the following comment:

I have no objection to the alternative for immobilization in

general. However, DOE should consider the additional security costs

associated with the relatively large amount of plutonium-bearing

material to be sent to the solid waste management facilities. The

security provisions in place at the PFP Facility are more stringent

than at the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities.

Response: According to DOE Order 5632.1C, Protection and Control of

Safeguards and Security Interests, protection and control shall be

provided in a graded, cost-effective fashion in accordance with the

potential risks to the national security and/or health and safety of

DOE and contractor employees, the public, and the environment. By a

graded approach, the DOE intends that the level-of-effort and magnitude

of resources expended for the protection of a particular security

interest are commensurate with the security interest's importance or

the impact of its loss, destruction, or misuse.

DOE Order 5633.3B, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials,

defines materials attractiveness levels for the purpose of applying

safeguards and security requirements. Prior to implementing the

immobilization of plutonium residues, DOE will ensure that the material

in its final form is placed in a category which will not impose

additional safeguards and security requirements upon the Hanford Site

solid waste facilities.

2. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington

State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:

The fact that U.S. Department of Energy has not made a decision on

whether this material has beneficial use seems inconsistent with the

proposal to immobilize and transfer it to the Hanford Site Solid Waste

Management Facilities. The new alternative addendum should fully

describe the applicability of the State of Washington Hazardous Waste

Management Act (HWMA) to the immobilization of the plutonium bearing

material being considered. The addendum should provide a regulatory

rationale that supports this new alternative. Please refer to our

letter to Mr. James E. Mecca, dated April 7, 1996, where we clearly

state the materials which contain Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at PFP

are regulated wastes under the HWMA, so long as 1) they classify as a

solid waste, 2) they classify as a mixed waste, and 3) they designate

pursuant to Chapter 173.303.070 WAC.

Response: The DOE has not classified any special nuclear material

(SNM) currently in storage at the PFP Facility as waste. The materials

stored at the PFP Facility have been determined to be excess to the

nuclear weapons program needs, but an ultimate disposition for the

material has not been determined.

There is currently existing guidance contained in a 1994 DOE

memorandum from Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear

Weapons Management, providing evaluation criteria for the economic and

other discard related approaches for these materials. Lacking updated

policy for these materials, the Final EIS provides an approach to

utilize the existing guidance to evaluate the SNM inventory at the PFP

Facility.

Before proceeding with the alternative to immobilize residues, DOE

recognizes that agreement upon an acceptable regulatory strategy will

need to be reached with the Washington State Department of Ecology

(Ecology). In the event that a regulatory path cannot be achieved, then

the economic factors in the evaluation of candidate residues

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will likely drive the residues to be thermally stabilized for storage

or result in a further evaluation of the alternatives for recovery of

the plutonium rather than it being immobilized for discard. The

discussion below assumes that a path forward can be achieved.

As the total inventory of material is evaluated, those items that

are determined to be suitable for discard will be immobilized to the

current Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) criteria and the Nuclear

Safeguards and Security criteria. The SNM material would be removed

from the PFP Facility inventory and transferred to a Hanford Site solid

waste management facility for future shipment to the WIPP disposal

area. The material would be defined as a waste at the point where the

DOE requirements for discard are met; i.e., the material form and

plutonium quantity are such that non-proliferation protection

(safeguards) are no longer required. At the point of solid waste

generation, DOE would designate the wastes as applicable under

Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-070, and would implement

any applicable requirements of WAC 173-303 for dangerous waste

accumulation, transportation, and storage to the extent that non-SNM

components are present which would require designation as dangerous

waste.

As discussed above, DOE is currently working with Ecology to

develop a regulatory path forward. Resolution of this issue will be

needed before DOE can implement plans to immobilize plutonium-bearing

material in vault storage and hold-up.

3. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington

State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:

The new alternative does not clearly compare or contrast the

difference between the description and quantities of plutonium-bearing

materials potentially suitable for immobilization under Section 3.1.3

of the PFP-EIS and the new alternative. Please provide further

clarification of the description and quantities between the two.

Response: The description and quantity of plutonium-bearing

materials potentially suitable for immobilization, discussed in Section

3.1.3 and Appendix E of the Final EIS, are equivalent. Because the

inventory of the plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility is of a

varied nature, the material was grouped into inventory categories.

These categories correspond to the inventory categories presented for

stabilization.

Up to 272 kg (599 lbs) of plutonium are candidates for

immobilization. This number includes approximately 222 kg (489 lbs) of

plutonium contained in 1,500 items that are currently stored in PFP

Facility vaults and 50 kg (110 lbs) of plutonium in hold-up. The

plutonium-bearing material in vault storage includes approximately 91

kg (200 lbs) of oxides with less than 50 weight percent of plutonium,

81 kg (178 lbs) of ash residues, 43 kg (95 lbs) of slag and crucible

residues, and 7 kg (15 lbs) of miscellaneous plutonium-bearing

material. The plutonium-bearing material in hold-up includes up to 4.5

kg (10 lbs) of plutonium from the E-4 ventilation system ductwork; up

to 4.3 kg (9.5 lbs) of plutonium from vacuum process piping; up to 28

kg of plutonium from gloveboxes and hoods; and up to 12.5 kg (27.5 lbs)

of plutonium from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon.

VII. Decision

DOE prepared the Draft and Final EIS to evaluate environmental and

human health impacts associated with operation of systems to continue

the safe management of plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility.

After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs,

engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has

decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives

identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the

preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other

stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS.

The action will also involve the removal of readily retrievable

plutonium-bearing material in hold-up at the PFP Facility and the

stabilization of this and other plutonium-bearing material at the PFP

Facility. Following stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be

in a form suitable for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP

Facility. Plutonium-bearing material having low plutonium content and

meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized through a

cementation process at the PFP Facility and transferred to a Hanford

Site solid waste management facility for storage. By selecting a suite

of alternatives, DOE anticipates that health impacts to workers, and

the cost to implement the action will be reduced. DOE is documenting

this determination in this ROD.

This action will reduce radiation exposure and risk to workers and

the public, and future resources needed to safely manage the PFP

Facility.

Since the PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-

bearing materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar,

various processes will be required to stabilize these materials. The

primary means to accomplish this will be through the implementation of

the stabilization processes described under the preferred alternative

in the Final EIS. However, stabilization of some portion of the

plutonium-bearing materials may be better accomplished through one of

the alternative stabilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS. For

this reason, DOE may implement these alternative processes on a case-

by-case basis. The primary stabilization processes which will be

implemented for each inventory category are:

(1) Plutonium-bearing solutions: For Plutonium-bearing solutions

two alternatives are selected.

--Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization. Most

plutonium-bearing solutions will be stabilized by thermal treatment

using a vertical calciner. For this application, the feed material will

include plutonium nitrate solutions, solutions containing chlorides,

caustic solutions, and dissolved plutonium fluoride.

In order to utilize the vertical calcination process, some of the

plutonium-bearing solutions will require pretreatment by ion exchange

to remove chemical constituents that are not compatible with the

vertical calcination process or the process equipment. In addition, the

calciner product may require further thermal stabilization in order to

meet DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides''

(DOE-STD-3013-94).

The combined ion exchange/vertical calciner/thermal treatment

process will be capable of processing most of the inventory of

plutonium nitrate and chloride solutions. It also will be able to

process the plutonium fluoride solids if they are first dissolved and

converted to the nitrate form using an acid dissolution pretreatment

operation. This will increase the quantity of material to be stabilized

from 335 kg (738 lb) plutonium to 338 kg (745 lb) of plutonium

associated with approximately 4,800 l (1,268 gal) of solution.

--Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization. Plutonium-

bearing solutions could be alternatively treated by a relatively simple

hydroxide precipitation process. The resultant plutonium precipitate

will then be thermally stabilized to an oxide form capable of meeting

DOE's ``Criteria for Safe

[[Page 36358]]

Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). This

alternative would be applied to the portion of the plutonium-bearing

solutions that are determined to be unsuited for vertical calcination.

An example would be material that could create a resinous residue or

cause corrosion within the vertical calciner. No more than 20 percent

of the plutonium solutions are anticipated to fall into this category.

Caustic or other hydroxide-forming reagents will be added to the

solution, gradually increasing the pH until insoluble plutonium

hydroxide is formed. The plutonium hydroxide and other metal

impurities, such as nickel, chromium, and iron, will precipitate out

and be filtered from solution. The filtered solids will then be

thermally processed into a stable oxide form.

(2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues: For oxides, fluorides,

and process residues one alternative was selected.

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. Although it would

result in additional radiation exposure to the PFP Facility worker,

over the preferred alternative, this alternative was selected because

development of the continuous process furnace has not proceeded as

anticipated and the continuous furnace may not be capable of producing

product that meets DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium

Metals and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). In addition, some of the

materials are not amenable to continuous process furnace due to their

size, moisture content, or high organic content. These materials,

however, can be processed through a batch thermal stabilization

process.

Under the batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces

process, the plutonium-bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace

which is elevated to a temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C

(1,832 deg.F). The high temperature air environment lowers the residual

moisture level and facilitates conversion of incompletely oxidized

plutonium to plutonium oxides.

Material that meets the DOE storage standard would not require any

additional thermal stabilization and will be directly repackaged.

Plutonium fluorides will pose problems in the muffle furnace due to the

corrosive nature of fluoride-bearing gases that could be liberated. The

plutonium fluorides may be pretreated using an acid dissolution process

and blended with the plutonium-bearing solutions. Alternately, a

corrosion control program may be established and the fluorides sent

through the muffle furnace.

This process may stabilize 2,417 kg (5,329 lb) of plutonium. The

resultant plutonium oxides will be tested in accordance with the DOE

storage standard. Product deemed acceptable may be packaged using

existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the vault(s) at

the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the DOE storage

standard will be recycled through the muffle furnace. The product may

be retrieved and repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage

standard specifying organic-free containers when a bagless transfer

system becomes available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the

material may go directly to an organic free container.

(3) Metals and alloys: For metals and alloys two alternatives are

selected.

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. The plutonium-

bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace and elevated to a

final temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high

temperature air environment facilitates conversion of the metal and

alloys to metal oxides (i.e., plutonium oxides).

A total of 770 kg (1,698 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized using

this process. The resultant product will be tested in accordance with

the DOE storage standard. Product deemed acceptable will be packaged

using existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the

vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. It is assumed that the metals

and alloys may require more than one thermal processing cycle to

achieve the desired oxide product. The product may be retrieved and

repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage standard specifying

organic-free containers once a bagless transfer system becomes

available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the material may go

directly to an organic-free container.

--Repackaging. Non-destructive testing could indicate that some

plutonium metals and alloys may safely be repackaged without thermal

stabilization. These materials would be repackaged using methods that

do not rely upon organic seals or plastic bags. The repackaged

materials will be stored in the vault(s) at the PFP Facility and

routinely monitored until final disposition.

(4) Polycubes and combustibles: For polycubes and combustibles,

because of technical uncertainties associated with the preferred

alternative, two alternatives are selected.

--Pyrolysis. This alternative is a thermal process involving

distillation and decarbonization, that separates the plutonium oxides

from the polystyrene. The product, stable plutonium oxides, will be

packaged and returned to the vaults at the PFP Facility.

The pyrolysis process has the capability for processing other

combustibles such as rags and polyethylene. If part of the inventory of

combustibles is not suitable for pyrolysis, those combustibles may be

sent to the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities for storage.

A total of 35 kg (77 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized by this

alternative. The resultant plutonium oxide will be thermally tested in

accordance with DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals

and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). Product determined to be acceptable

will be packaged using existing packaging capabilities and placed in

the vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the

DOE storage standard will be run through additional thermal

stabilization processes.

--Batch thermal stabilization. Alternatively, a process involving batch

thermal stabilization of the plutonium-bearing polycubes and

combustibles could be used. Although the thermal stabilization method

used for the two types of materials is the same, each type of material

will be processed separately. The polycubes or combustibles will be fed

into a muffle furnace, which is elevated to a temperature of

approximately 300 deg.C (572 deg.F). Initially, the furnace will be

purged with nitrogen gas to maintain an inert environment and prevent

combustion of the organic component. At 300 deg.C (572 deg.F), the

organic component of the feed will be driven off into a secondary

combustion chamber. The plutonium-bearing material remaining in the

muffle furnace will be exposed to air and elevated to approximately

1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high temperature environment facilitates

conversion of incompletely oxidized plutonium to plutonium oxides.

(5) Removal of holdup: This ROD will also implement the preferred

alternative for removal. The removal activities will be limited to

plutonium-bearing materials that are readily retrievable. Plutonium-

bearing material with a high quantity of plutonium will be stabilized

as described above. Material with a low plutonium content may be

immobilized and sent to a Hanford Site solid waste management facility

for storage. Due to

[[Page 36359]]

the nature and location of the material in hold-up, various

technologies will be employed to remove the material for subsequent

stabilization. All technologies analyzed in the Final EIS will be

utilized to some degree. Four areas of the PFP Facility have been

identified for removal of readily retrievable hold-up material:

ductwork, vacuum system piping, gloveboxes and hoods, and the Plutonium

Reclamation Facility canyon floor. These areas represent locations

where a high quantity of plutonium-bearing material exists as hold-up

and where removal actions will be beneficial in reducing the exposure

risk. Non-readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material with a low

quantity of plutonium will remain in hold-up at the PFP Facility. This

material will be addressed when DOE makes a decision to decontaminate

and decommission the PFP Facility.

(6) Immobilization: Candidate plutonium-bearing material with low

plutonium content may be immobilized and discarded. The plutonium-

bearing material will include: (1) Materials that are containerized and

stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) hold-up material.

The immobilization process will be applicable for up to 272 kg (599

lbs) of plutonium from selected quantities of the following plutonium-

bearing materials:

Oxides, fluorides, and process residues (not applicable for any

fluorides or for oxides greater than 50 weight percent plutonium)

--Immobilization of candidate materials

Polycubes and combustibles (not applicable for polycubes)

--Immobilization of candidate materials

Low plutonium content material removed from hold-up (less than 50

weight percent plutonium)

The immobilization process will include a cementation step which

will fix the plutonium-bearing material into a solid matrix, packaging

the cemented materials into appropriate shipping containers, and

transporting the containers to a Hanford Site solid waste management

facility for storage.

VIII. Mitigation

Since land use and water resources would not be impacted by the

preferred alternative or other stabilization alternatives analyzed in

the Final EIS, no mitigation measures would need to be taken in regard

to these resources. Mitigation measures in place for the PFP Facility

have been discussed in the Final EIS (e.g., High-efficiency particulate

air filtration of exhaust pathways).

To ensure that activities and consequences (e.g., radiological dose

to PFP Facility workers) for normal/routine activities would remain

within established requirements, and to ensure that the risk of

accidents would be minimized, numerous measures would be taken in

association with the preferred alternative. These measures include

adequate (engineered) design features for gloveboxes, systems, and

components; the development of safety analyses consistent with the

process established by DOE; and the implementation of numerous programs

that already exist at the Hanford Site. Examples of these programs are

as follows:

Maintenance program--Ensures that hardware performs as

expected when demanded

Fire protection program--Mitigates property loss and

minimizes human health impacts due to fire

Criticality prevention program--Mitigates potential human

health impacts of an inadvertent criticality

Radiological controls program--Mitigates routine and

accident-related doses

Industrial hygiene program--Mitigates routine and

accident-related chemical exposure

Training program--Minimizes and mitigates adverse impacts

to personnel by training them in proper ways to perform their job and

to respond during emergency events.

Certain removal activities will substantially alter or demolish

existing equipment and facilities at the PFP Facility which have been

found to be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic

Places. A Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the Washington State

Historic Preservation Officer has been accepted by the Advisory Council

on Historic Preservation. This agreement addresses the measures that

will be required to mitigate these adverse impacts. Because all

practical means to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts from this

removal action are incorporated in the PFP Facility and practices, DOE

has determined that there is no need to prepare a Mitigation Action

Plan in accordance with Section 1021.331(a) of DOE's regulations

implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021).

Issued: This ROD for PFP Stabilization EIS is issued by DOE,

Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington on June 25, 1996.

John D. Wagoner,

Manager, Richland Operations Office.

[FR Doc. 96-17561 Filed 7-10-96; 8:45 am]

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