Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Federal RegisterJun 17, 1996
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SUMMARY: FRA announces the initiation of rulemaking on rail passenger
equipment safety standards. FRA requests comment on the need for
particular safety requirements and the costs, benefits, and
practicability of such requirements. FRA anticipates this rulemaking
will address the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger
equipment; equipment design and performance criteria related to
passenger and crew survivability in the event of a train accident; and
the safe operation of passenger train service, supplementing existing
railroad safety standards. FRA also announces the formation of a
working group to assist FRA in developing this rule. FRA makes
available preliminary safety concepts that have been placed before the
working group. This notice is issued in order to comply with the
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, to respond to
concerns raised by the General Accounting Office and the National
Transportation Safety Board, to respond to public concerns, to respond
to petitions for rulemaking, and to consider possible regulations
derived from experience in application of existing standards.
DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or
before July 9, 1996. Comments received after that date will be
considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense
or delay.
(2) Public Hearing: Requests for a public hearing must be made on
or before July 9, 1996.
ADDRESSES: Address comments to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief
Counsel, RCC-30, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should identify the
docket and notice number and be submitted in triplicate. Persons
wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their comments should
include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The dockets are housed in
Room 8201 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20590. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours of 8:30
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Edward W. Pritchard, Acting Staff
Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0509 or 202-366-9252),
or Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0628).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
Mandate
FRA requests comment on possible regulations governing rail
passenger equipment. FRA believes such regulations are necessary for
several reasons. In particular, effective Federal safety standards for
freight equipment have long been in place, but equivalent standards for
passenger equipment do not currently exist. The Association of American
Railroads (AAR) sets industry standards for the design and maintenance
of freight equipment that add materially to the safe operation of this
equipment. However, over the years AAR has discontinued the development
and maintenance of passenger equipment standards.
Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing.
Several passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been
proposed for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general,
these trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that
are common practice for current North American equipment. The North
American railroad operating environment requires passenger equipment to
operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often over
track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment.
European passenger equipment design standards may therefore not be
appropriate for the North American operating environment. A clear set
of safety and design standards for future passenger equipment tailored
to the North American operating environment is needed to provide for
the safety of future rail operations and to facilitate sound planning
for those operations.
The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act),
Pub. L. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619 (November 2, 1994), requires FRA to
develop initial rail passenger equipment safety standards within 3
years of enactment and final regulations within 5 years of enactment.
The Act also gives FRA an important tool to be used to help develop
these safety standards: FRA is allowed to consult with the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), public authorities, passenger
railroads, passenger organizations, and rail labor organizations
without being subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.).
Approach
FRA established a Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working
Group (Working Group) comprised of representatives of the types of
organizations listed in the Act to provide the consultation allowed by
the Act. The Working Group first met on June 6, 1995, and continues to
meet to assist FRA in developing passenger equipment safety standards.
This ANPRM describes the issues before the Working Group, and seeks the
assistance of other interested persons in providing information and
views pertinent to this effort. FRA intends to use the Working Group
throughout this rulemaking. The minutes of the Working Group meetings
and the materials distributed at these meetings to date have been
placed in the docket. FRA intends to keep a current record of the
Working Group's activities and decisions in the docket.
Topics Covered
Specific topics discussed by this ANPRM include:
(1) System safety programs and plans;
(2) Passenger equipment crashworthiness;
(3) Inspection, testing and maintenance requirements;
(4) Training and qualification requirements for mechanical
personnel and train crews;
(5) Excursion, tourist and private equipment;
(6) Commuter equipment and operations;
(7) Train make-up and operating speed;
(8) Tiered design standards based on a system safety approach;
(9) Fire safety; and
(10) Operating practices and procedures.
FRA solicits suggestions for other matters related to passenger
train safety standards that should be considered in order to promote
safe and efficient train operations. FRA also solicits suggestions for
alternate approaches or ways to structure passenger equipment safety
standards.
[[Page 30673]]
Purpose of Notice
Section 215 of the Act (49 U.S.C. 20133) requires the Secretary of
Transportation to prescribe minimum standards ``for the safety of cars
used by railroad carriers to transport passengers.'' The Act
specifically requires the Secretary to consider--
(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) Emergency procedures and equipment; and
(5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect safety
not otherwise governed by regulations.
Given the breadth of the specific items listed in the Act, it is
clear that the Congress intended the agency to consider the safety of
rail passenger service as a whole, determining the extent to which
existing regulations should be supplemented or strengthened. Existing
regulations affecting the safety of rail passenger service include
standards for signal and train control systems, track safety, power
brakes, glazing, programs of testing and training for railroad
operating rules, and hours of service of safety-critical personnel,
among others. While existing locomotive safety regulations address the
structural characteristics of multiple-unit powered cars, non-powered
cars are not subject to the same standards. In addition, FRA has not
issued regulations addressing interior features of passenger equipment.
The Act requires issuance of initial passenger safety regulations
within 3 years and final regulations within 5 years. FRA intends to
establish a reasonably comprehensive structure of necessary safety
regulations for rail passenger service in initial standards. Where
further research is needed to develop a technical foundation for safety
improvements, rulemaking may be completed over the 5-year period
referred to in the Act.
The Act permits FRA to apply new requirements to existing passenger
cars, but requires FRA to explain why any such ``retrofit''
requirements are imposed. FRA believes that passenger equipment
operating in permanent service in the United States has established a
good safety record, proving its compatibility with the operating
environment. Many of the structural design changes identified during
preliminary analyses are likely to be cost effective only if
implemented for new equipment. Appropriate analysis should be conducted
to evaluate whether selected safety measures can be applied to existing
equipment or to rebuilt equipment on a cost-effective basis.
Collaborative Rulemaking and This Advance Notice
FRA is committed to the maximum feasible use of collaborative
processes in the development of safety regulations. As a means to allow
the industry to collaborate with FRA to develop this rulemaking, FRA
established the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, as
described earlier. FRA structured the Working Group to give a balanced
representation of the types of organizations listed in the Act.
A list of the private sector members of the Working Group is given
in Table 1.
Table 1.--Rail Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Working Group Membership List
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organization represented Representative Mailing address Telephone Fax
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak.......................... George Binns, National Railroad (215) 349-2731 (215) 349-2767
General Manager Passenger
for Compliance and Corporation, 30th
Standards. Street Station,
4th Floor South,
Philadelphia, PA
19104.
United Transportation Union..... David Brooks, 15200 Brooksview, (301) 888-1277 .................
Conductor. Brandywine, MD
20613.
National Association of Railroad Ross Capon, 900 Second Street, (202) 408-8362 (202) 408-8287
Passengers. Executive Director. N.E., Washington,
DC 20002-3557.
American Public Transit Frank Cihak, Chief 1201 New York (202) 898-4080 (202) 898-4049
Association. Engineer. Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, DC
20005.
Federal Railroad Administration. Grady Cothen, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0897 (202) 366-7136
Deputy Associate S.W., Washington,
Administrator for DC 20590-0002.
Safety Standards.
Electro-Motive Division, General Harvey Boyd, Senior 9301 West 55th (708) 387-6013 (708) 387-5239
Motors Corporation. Research Engineer. Street, La Grange,
IL 60525.
Federal Transit Administration.. Jeffrey Mora, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0215 (202) 366-3765
Office of S.W., Washington,
Technology. DC 20590-0002.
American Association of State William Green, New York State Dept (518) 457-4547 (518) 457-3183
Highway and Transportation Senior Railroad of Transportation,
Officials. Inspector. 120 Washington
Avenue, Albany,
New York 12232.
Safe Travel America............. Arthur Johnson, 10600 Red Barn (301) 762-7903 .................
Chairman. Lane, Potomac, MD
20854.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Leroy Jones, 400 North Capitol (202) 347-7936 (202) 347-5237
Engineers. International Vice Street, N.W.,
President. Suite 850,
Washington, DC
20001.
Brotherhood Railway Carmen...... Hank Lewin, Vice AFL/CIO Building, (202) 783-3660 (202) 783-0198
President. Suite 511, 815
16th Street, N.W.,
Washington, DC
20006.
Siemens Transportation Systems, Frank Guzzo, 700 South Ewing, (314) 533-6710 .................
Inc.. Director Rolling St. Louis, MO
Stock. 63103.
Bombardier Corporation, Larry Kelterborn, 1084 Botanical (905) 577-1052 (905) 577-1055
Transportation Equipment Group. Consultant. Drive, Burlington,
Ontario, Canada
L7T 1V2.
National Transportation Safety Russ Quimby, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, (202) 382-6644 (202) 382-6884
Board. Investigator. S.W., Washington,
DC 20594.
American Public Transit Dennis Ramm, Chief 547 W. Jackson (312) 322-6575 (312) 322-6502
Association. Mechanical Blvd., Chicago, IL
Officer, Metra. 60661.
[[Page 30674]]
Federal Railroad Administration. Brenda Moscoso, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0352 .................
Economist, Office S.W., Washington,
of Safety Analysis. DC 20590-0002.
Federal Railroad Administration. Thomas, Tsai, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-1427 .................
Program Manager, SW., Washington,
Office of Research. DC 20590-0002.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Passenger Train Occupant Casualties; Ten Year Period 1985-1994
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train accidents Grade crossing Non-accident Total passenger
---------------------- accidents passenger train train occupants
---------------------- incidents ---------------------
Killed Injured ----------------------
Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985............................................................ 0 287 0 30 3 424 3 741
1986............................................................ 1 409 0 72 4 269 5 750
1987............................................................ 17 258 0 20 1 261 18 539
1988............................................................ 2 160 0 39 2 246 4 445
1989............................................................ 1 103 2 123 8 253 11 479
1990............................................................ 0 238 1 41 3 280 4 559
1991............................................................ 9 61 0 29 0 333 9 423
1992............................................................ 0 48 1 114 3 299 4 461
1993............................................................ 54 171 1 86 9 402 64 659
1994............................................................ 3 129 0 96 3 343 6 568
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals........................................................ 87 1864 5 650 36 3110 128 5624
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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An FRA representative chairs the Working Group, and a
representative of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) serves as
associate member. Staff members from the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) also attend and assist the Working Group. In addition, the
Working Group is supported by FRA program, legal and research staff,
including technical personnel from the Volpe National Transportation
System Center (Volpe Center). Vendors of equipment to passenger
railroads constitute another essential source of information about rail
passenger equipment safety. Accordingly, FRA has included vendor
representatives designated by the Railway Progress Institute (RPI) as
associate members of the Working Group. As one of its first tasks, the
Working Group developed a statement of its charter and scope of effort.
The Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved
in intercity and commuter service nationwide. This service is regularly
scheduled, employs contemporary electric multiple-unit (MU) equipment,
electric or diesel electric power, is often intermingled on common
rights-of-way with freight movements, and often involves maximum speeds
in the range of 79 to 125 miles per hour (mph) with speeds up to 150
mph projected in the near future.
FRA also regulates approximately 100 additional railroads that
provide service often characterized as historic, excursion, or scenic.
These ``tourist'' or ``museum'' railroads often employ steam
locomotives or older generation diesel power, and historic coaches or
freight equipment modified for passenger use. Tourist and museum
railroads vary widely in the nature of their operating environment,
personnel, train speeds, and other characteristics. FRA intends to form
a small, separate working group comprised of tourist and museum
operators and freight or passenger railroads that host or provide this
type of service. FRA will request that the Tourist Railway Association,
the Association of Railway Museums, and AAR provide representation for
this effort.
Regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency response
procedures for rail passenger service will be covered by a separate
rulemaking and are being addressed by a separate working group. Persons
wishing to receive more information regarding this separate effort
should contact Mr. Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices Division,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, RRS-11, Room 8314, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0504)
or David H. Kasminoff, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-
0628).
FRA's commitment to developing a proposed rule through the Working
Group necessarily influences the role and purpose of this ANPRM. FRA
sets forth in this ANPRM numerous preliminary ideas regarding
approaches to safety issues affecting passenger service. These are
ideas that have already been placed before the Working Group as
concrete, illustrative approaches to possible improvements in the
safety of passenger service. They are provided in this ANPRM as
information to any interested person not involved in the Working
Group's deliberations. FRA wishes to emphasize, however, that these
concepts do not constitute specific proposals of the agency in this
proceeding, nor do they represent the position of the Working Group. In
addition, issuance of this ANPRM should not be considered a diminution
of FRA's intent to prescribe passenger equipment safety regulations
within the 5-year period required by the Act.
FRA expects that the Working Group will develop proposed rules
based on a consensus process. The proposals will be based on facts and
analysis flowing from the Working Group's deliberations. Accordingly,
FRA has requested that the Working Group's members and the
organizations that they represent refrain from responding formally to
this ANPRM.
Just as FRA will not prejudge the outcome of the Working Group
deliberations, FRA asks organizations represented on the Working Group
to avoid adopting fixed positions that could polarize the discussion
within the Working Group. Rather, the deliberations of the Working
Group should be permitted to mature through a careful, fact-based
dialogue that leads to appropriate recommendations for cost-effective
standards. The evolving positions of the Working Group members--as
reflected in the minutes of the group meetings and associated
documentation, together with data provided by the membership during
their deliberations--will be placed in the docket of this rulemaking.
FRA invites other interested parties to respond to the questions
posed in this ANPRM, submitting information and views that may be of
assistance in developing a proposed rule. All comments provided in
response to this ANPRM will be provided to the Working Group for
consideration in preparation of the proposed rule.
Working Group's Scope of Effort
The Working Group will focus on developing safety standards for
rail passenger equipment by applying a system safety approach--where
practical--to:
(1) Determine and prioritize safety risks;
(2) Determine steps or corrective actions to reduce risks; and
(3) Optimize safety benefits.
The Working Group will recommend future research or test programs
when a technology appears to have the potential for a safety benefit,
but is not yet mature enough to be applied with confidence.
The Working Group will provide advice to FRA on all phases of the
rulemaking process, to include:
(1) Recommending what issues or requirements must be covered by
Federal regulations, and what issues or requirements can be effectively
handled outside the body of Federal regulations by industry standards
or some other means;
(2) Reviewing the written comments in response to the ANPRM, and
recommending those comments that should affect a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM);
(3) Providing cost information to support FRA's economic analysis
of the proposed rule;
(4) Providing information and advice on the potential benefits of
the proposed rule and its individual elements;
(5) Providing advice regarding critical assumptions required for
the economic analysis;
(6) Reviewing and critiquing a draft NPRM prepared by FRA based on
Working Group guidance;
(7) Reviewing the oral and written comments to the NPRM and
recommending those comments that should affect a final rule;
(8) Reviewing and critiquing a draft final rule prepared by FRA
based on Working Group guidance; and
(9) If requested by FRA, recommending actions to take to respond to
any petitions for reconsideration received as a result of the final
rule.
The Working Group will also assist FRA in drafting a second NPRM
for passenger equipment power brake standards.
To ensure full development of the issues, the Working Group will
attempt to draw on all sources within the industry to collect
information necessary to conduct comparative analyses and reach
decisions.
The Working Group will establish a procedure for considering ideas,
approaches, and performance standards
[[Page 30677]]
for use as part of the safety standards. This procedure should be based
on the concept of reaching an overall consensus. Overall consensus
means represented organizations may object--even strongly--to
individual ideas, approaches, or standards, but the organization can
accept and ``live with'' the evolving set of standards as a whole. FRA
believes the success of this entire innovative approach to rulemaking
depends on the ability of the group to reach overall consensus.
The Working Group will consider whether to continue to meet on a
periodic basis after final rulemaking to consider changes necessary to
keep any rules or other standards current and responsive to the needs
of the industry.
Background
Need for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Rail passenger service is currently operated with a high level of
safety. However, accidents continue to occur, often as a result of
factors beyond the control of the passenger railroad. Further, the rail
passenger operating environment in the United States is rapidly
changing--technology is advancing; equipment is being designed for
ever-higher speeds; and many potential new operators of passenger
equipment are appearing. With this more complex operating environment,
FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains continue to
be designed, built, and operated with public safety foremost.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes this need in Report
GAO/RCED-93-196, entitled ``AMTRAK Should Implement Minimum Safety
Standards for Passenger Cars.'' In addition, NTSB has issued several
recommendations to FRA and to the railroad industry concerning the
crashworthiness of locomotives. Although the recommendations directly
apply to freight locomotives, the same concerns exist for passenger
train locomotives or power cars.
NTSB's Crashworthiness Concerns
NTSB's interest in locomotive crashworthiness dates to 1970, and
NTSB has made several safety recommendations to FRA and the industry
concerning increased protection for crew members in the cab based on
the following accidents:
On September 8, 1970, a collision between an Illinois
Central (IC) and an Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) train occurred at
Riverdale, Illinois. The collision caused the IC caboose to override
the heavy under frame of the IHB locomotive demolishing the control cab
of the locomotive. Two following cars continued in the path established
by the caboose, completing the destruction of the locomotive cab. The
IHB engineer was found dead in the wreckage. NTSB recommended that FRA
and the industry expand their cooperative effort to improve the
crashworthiness of railroad equipment (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-71-
44).
An accident on October 8, 1970, involving a Penn Central
Transportation Company freight train and a passenger train near Sound
View, Connecticut, again demonstrated the weakness of the locomotive
crew compartment. This collision caused NTSB to reiterate its
recommendation to improve the crash resistance of locomotive cabs (NTSB
Safety Recommendation R-72-005). This recommendation was ultimately
classified as ``Closed-No Longer Applicable'' following the issuance of
Safety Recommendation R-78-27 which addressed the same issue.
The investigation of the collision of three freight trains
near Leetonia, Ohio, on June 6, 1975, again prompted NTSB to recommend
increased cab crashworthiness, including consideration of a readily
accessible crash refuge (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-76-009). This
recommendation was classified as ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on August
6, 1978, following FRA's assurance that studies were continuing in this
area.
On September 18, 1978, a Louisville and Nashville freight
train collided head-on with a yard train inside yard limits at
Florence, Alabama. The lead unit of the yard train overrode the lead
unit of the freight train. The cab provided no protection for the head
brakeman and engineer, who jumped but were run over by their train.
On August 11, 1981, a Boston and Maine Corporation freight
train and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority commuter train
collided head-on near Prides Crossing, Beverly, Massachusetts. The lead
car of the commuter train overrode the freight locomotive, pushing
components of the locomotive into the cab killing three people.
NTSB's investigations of the above accidents resulted in
recommendations to FRA regarding crashworthiness protection to the
locomotive operating compartments (NTSB Recommendations R-77-37, R-78-
27, R-79-11, and R-82-34). As a result of the FRA-sponsored report
``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs,''1 NTSB classified these four
recommendations ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on November 24, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs.'' (Report No. DOT/FRA/ORD-81/
84, National Space Technology Laboratories, September 1982.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rear-end collision of two Burlington Northern (BN)
freight trains occurred near Pacific Junction, Iowa, on April 13, 1983.
The operating compartment of the lead locomotive on the striking train,
BN train 64T85, was overridden by the caboose of train 43J05 when the
trains collided. The locomotive operating compartment was crushed. (In
general, when a locomotive strikes a caboose or a light freight car,
the lighter vehicle overrides the locomotive, frequently with
devastating results.) As a result of this accident, NTSB issued a
recommendation that FRA initiate and/or support a design study to
provide a protected area in the locomotive operating compartment for
the crew when a collision is unavoidable (NTSB Recommendation R-83-
102). This recommendation was subsequently classified as ``Closed-
Unacceptable Action/Superseded'' based on a future investigation that
reiterated similar concerns regarding locomotive crashworthiness.
On July 10, 1986, Union Pacific (UP) freight train CLSA-09
struck a standing UP freight train near North Platte, Nebraska, at a
speed of approximately 32 mph. Three locomotives and eleven cars from
both trains derailed, and the accident resulted in one fatality and
three injuries. This accident, in which the locomotive cab section of
train CLSA-09 was destroyed on impact, probably would have resulted in
fatal injuries to the engineer and head brakeman of train CLSA-09 had
they not jumped from the cab prior to the collision. As a result, NTSB
issued Safety Recommendation R-87-23, which recommends that FRA:
Promptly require locomotive operating compartments to be
designed to provide crash protection for occupants of locomotive
cabs.
NTSB believes that locomotive collision investigations continue to
demonstrate that improvements are needed in the crashworthiness design
standards of locomotives.
As a result of investigations of numerous accidents involving
passenger trains over the past 20 years, NTSB has recommended that FRA
or the passenger railroad industry:
(1) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency means of escape from
railroad passenger cars;
(2) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency lighting for railroad
passenger cars;
(3) Initiate studies to determine the relationship between
passenger car design and passenger injuries;
[[Page 30678]]
(4) Prescribe regulations requiring passenger cars with secured
seats and luggage retention devices;
(5) Apply system safety principles to the acquisition, design,
construction and renovation of passenger cars;
(6) Prescribe regulations to require back-up power for emergency
lights and doors that can be opened in the event of loss of power;
(7) Require that rail passenger equipment be fitted with roof
escape hatches;
(8) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the
interior of commuter cars so that adequate crash injury protection and
emergency equipment will be provided;
(9) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the
design and construction of interiors of passenger cars so adequate
crash injury protection will be provided;
(10) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum safety standards
for the inspection and maintenance of railroad passenger cars; and
(11) Amend the power brake regulations to provide appropriate
guidelines for inspecting power brake equipment on modern passenger
cars.
Accident/Incident Data
FRA has compiled a 10-year history of passenger equipment
accidents/incidents that railroads have reported to FRA. FRA supplied
this information to the Working Group and placed it in the docket.
Table 2 summarizes the deaths and injuries reported to FRA by railroads
for occupants of passenger trains during this 10-year period. The
``train accidents'' column of Table 2 includes all collisions,
derailments, or fires involving passenger trains that resulted in more
than $6,300 damage to on-track equipment, signals, track, track
structure, or road bed. The ``grade crossing accidents'' column of
Table 2 includes all reported impacts of a passenger train with cars,
trucks, busses, farm equipment, or pedestrians at grade crossings. The
``non-accident passenger train incidents'' column of Table 2 includes
all reports of injuries or deaths of passenger train occupants not
caused by a train accident or grade crossing accident.
Figure 1 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of deaths to
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 2 shows the 10-year trend
for each of these causes of deaths.
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Figure 3 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of injuries to
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 4 shows the 10-year trend
for each of these causes of injuries to occupants of passenger trains.
(Amtrak has noted that the showing of only 10 years of accident data is
somewhat distorted in that two accidents account for over 80 percent of
the deaths, and one of the accidents had substantial intermodal
implications.)
Comment is requested regarding the significance of this data,
elements of societal and railroad cost not included in the reported
data, and factors to be considered in evaluating the risk of future
catastrophic passenger train accidents.
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Approach/Structure for Safety Standards
Scope and Context
FRA recognizes that safety standards that apply only to passenger
equipment provide only a partial solution to improving rail passenger
safety, and the best way to increase rail passenger safety is to keep
trains on the track and spaced apart.
Keeping trains on the track and apart requires a systems approach
to safety that includes railroad track, right-of-way, signals and
controls, operating procedures, station- and platform-to-train
interface design, as well as equipment. FRA has active rulemaking and
research projects ongoing in a variety of contexts that address non-
equipment aspects of passenger railroad system safety.
While reflecting the other aspects of passenger railroad system
safety, this rulemaking will focus on:
(1) Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance standards;
(2) Equipment design and performance standards;
(3) Platform- and station-to-train interface design and procedures
to promote safe ingress and egress of passengers; and
(4) Other issues specifically related to safe operation of rail
passenger service not addressed in other FRA regulations, proceedings,
or program development efforts.
Existing Rail Passenger Operations
FRA intends to structure any proposed actions to cause a minimum of
disruption to existing safe operations of passenger equipment. This
notice is designed to bring to FRA's attention the special situations
and problems confronting tourist and excursion railroads, private
passenger car owners, commuter railroads, and the existing operations
of Amtrak, which all have a long history of safe operation. FRA
believes the first objective of this rulemaking should be to construct
common sense minimum safety floors under these existing operations. To
the extent new technology or innovative approaches might offer
opportunities for improving safety performance on a cost- effective
basis, FRA seeks the appropriate means to exploit these opportunities.
A common sense safety floor under existing safe operations includes
a complete pre-departure (or daily) safety inspection of each departing
train conducted by skilled inspectors, and a well-planned test and
preventive maintenance program for safety-critical components of the
system triggered by time, mileage, or some other reliability-driven
parameter. (A ``safety critical component'' is a component whose
failure to function as intended results in a greater risk to passengers
and crew.) One of the main purposes of this ANPRM is to solicit
information concerning:
(1) The steps necessary to conduct a complete pre-departure or
daily safety inspection of the equipment;
(2) A means to demonstrate (e.g., training, testing, supervision,
certification) that safety inspectors have the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform effective inspections or tests;
(3) The minimum planned or periodic maintenance program required to
keep the equipment in safe operating condition;
(4) The frequency of required planned or periodic maintenance; and
(5) The costs and benefits associated with the requirements under
consideration.
Special Consideration for Tourist and Excursion Railroads
Tourist and excursion railroads generally provide passenger rail
service as entertainment or recreation, often at low speed on track
dedicated to that service alone. FRA recognizes the extensive service
provided by this growing sector of the railroad industry, and the need
to tailor appropriate safety requirements to the level of risk
involved. Accordingly, FRA will work to identify appropriate criteria
for creating relatively simple system safety plans and programs for
tourist and excursion railroads that recognize the special needs of
this sector of the industry.
Speed and distance limits may be helpful to define tourist and
excursion railroads excepted from many of the effects of any proposed
passenger equipment safety standards. For instance, less stringent
requirements might be applied to a railroad with a maximum operating
speed of 30 mph and a maximum trip distance of 250 miles. In addition,
operations segregated from the general railroad system may warrant
consideration for less stringent requirements. FRA seeks comment on
these proposed limits and, as noted earlier, will request assistance of
an appropriately representative working group to develop these issues.
Special Consideration for Private Passenger Cars
FRA recognizes private passenger cars as another segment of the
industry that may need special consideration. However, some important
differences between the two types of operations exist that need to be
taken into account. Private passenger cars often operate as part of
freight, Amtrak, and commuter trains at track speeds over long
distances. Providing regulatory relief to private passenger car owners
through speed and/or distance limitations could severely restrict
current operations. The host railroads often impose their own safety
requirements on the private passenger cars and have a strong interest
in any Federal safety standards that apply to private passenger cars.
FRA intends to fully involve Amtrak, the American Association of
Private Railcar Owners, and the American Public Transit Association
(APTA) as standards for private passenger cars are developed.
Does the simple system safety program proposed for tourist and
excursion railroads make sense for private passenger cars? If not, why?
Do alternate means exist to provide regulatory relief to private
passenger car owners without imposing restrictive speed and distance
limits? How should railroad business or observation cars be treated?
New Rail Passenger Service or Systems
FRA intends the main thrust of any proposed safety standards for
equipment design to be focused on new equipment and new rail passenger
service. New equipment and new service present the opportunity to
analyze the proposed equipment and its intended use to ensure that a
systematic approach is taken to design safety into the operation.
However, some of the safety enhancements that the final rule resulting
from this ANPRM deem necessary for new equipment may have the potential
to be applied to existing or to rebuilt equipment. Without such
consideration, opportunities to increase safety that stand up to a
cost/benefit analysis could be lost. In addition, not requiring rebuilt
equipment to meet the latest standards provides an incentive to rebuild
equipment rather than purchase new equipment, thus delaying the full
benefit of the new standards.
Passenger Equipment Power Brakes
On September 16, 1994, FRA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking on power brakes. 59 FR 47676. Much of the public testimony
received in response to the NPRM emphasized the differences between
freight operations and passenger operations, and the differences
between freight equipment brake systems and passenger equipment brake
systems. In light of this testimony, and because passenger equipment
power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment
safety standards,
[[Page 30684]]
FRA will separate passenger equipment power brake standards from
freight equipment power brake standards. The Working Group will assist
FRA to develop a second NPRM that covers passenger equipment power
brake standards. Since power brakes have already been the subject of a
recent ANPRM, NPRM, and supplementary notice, FRA is not seeking
additional information on passenger equipment power brakes, and they
will not be addressed in this ANPRM.
Regulatory Flexibility
FRA conducts this proceeding to determine how best to meet the need
to assure the public of continued safe operation of passenger trains in
a more complex operating environment. Although FRA is required by law
to issue minimum standards for passenger equipment safety, FRA
recognizes that the level of detail properly embodied in regulations
can and should be powerfully influenced by the presence of voluntary
standards adhered to by those participating in their development. FRA
encourages the formation of a rail passenger industry forum (similar to
AAR in some functions, but more representative of all segments of the
rail passenger industry) to establish supplementary safety standards
developed through industry consensus. Such an organization could reduce
the need for detailed Federal regulations beyond such basic
requirements as may be appropriate to provide for safety.
FRA desires to structure regulations to provide the flexibility
necessary for introduction of new technology or new operating concepts
that could improve service and safety. Use of performance standards--
where feasible--can best achieve this objective.
FRA desires this ANPRM to stimulate discussion focused on how FRA
can meet its responsibility to the public while imposing a minimum
regulatory burden on the rail passenger industry. Does the industry
have plans to establish a forum with the charter and authority to
develop safety standards by consensus for the industry, or can an
existing organization serve this function? If such a group can be
established, what safety concerns have a high potential of being
resolved through industry consensus and voluntary action? What time
frame would be required to develop industry safety standards by
consensus? What role could/should rail labor organizations, equipment
builders, component suppliers, and state agencies play in developing
these safety standards? What assurances could be provided that the
industry would adhere to these safety standards? What role could/should
FRA play to assist the industry in developing these standards? When
consensus cannot be reached or is not adequate, and Federal regulations
are required, how can the flexibility/adaptability of the regulations
to meet a dynamic operating environment and changing technology be
maximized? To what extent might development of voluntary industry
guidelines limit the need for highly detailed or prescriptive Federal
standards?
Discussion of Issues
An introductory discussion of several concepts--crucial to rail
equipment safety--may convey a better understanding of the approach FRA
is considering to develop safety standards for new passenger equipment.
These concepts are:
(1) system safety plan and program;
(2) rail vehicle crashworthiness;
(3) crash energy management;
(4) suspension system performance; and
(5) wheel thermal stress.
System Safety Plan and Program
The heart of the approach to new passenger equipment safety
standards will be a system safety program. A system safety plan is a
document developed by the operator--with a large input from the builder
of new equipment--to describe the system safety program. The plan
should lay out a top-down approach to how the system--including the
equipment, the inspection, the testing and maintenance program, the
routes over which the equipment will operate, and the operating rules
that will be applied to it--will be designed, tested, and verified to
meet all safety requirements and provide a safe operation.
A true and complete system safety approach begins at the top level
of the system--in this case, the ``system'' is the entire railroad
operation. For the purpose of risk analysis, the railroad system must
be broken down into its component systems. No one--or right--way exists
to perform this breakdown. It can be done many ways. Figure 5 is just
one logical example.
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 30685]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.014
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C
[[Page 30686]]
Many passenger railroads operate at least partially as a tenant on
the right-of-way and property of another railroad. In this case, the
passenger railroad may have little or no control under the contractual
terms of the tenancy arrangement, and little or no prospect of gaining
future control over some of the major risk components of the risk
analysis. The actions of the passenger railroad cannot change these
risk components, and for the purpose of performing a system safety
analysis, they must remain fixed and be accepted as a given unless
subject to separate changes in Federal standards.
For example, a passenger railroad that operates largely as a tenant
would have little or no control over the Interfaces (RC1) and Right-of-
Way (RC2) risk components. By holding these risk components fixed, the
system safety approach degrades to a systems approach applied to the
remaining two subsystems rather than to the railroad as a whole. The
``systems'' methodology still has considerable merit when applied to
the remaining subsystems, but a true system safety approach cannot be
applied to a system that has major risk components that are
constrained. This analysis could help define the equipment
crashworthiness features required for its intended purpose, or the
operational limitations needed to improve or retain safety levels.
What practical constraints must be taken into account when applying
a system safety approach to passenger railroads? When all practical
constraints are taken into account, how should the system safety
approach be applied to help develop passenger equipment safety
standards?
The system safety plan can range from a relatively simple
document--for conventional equipment being procured to continue an
existing service--to a detailed document laying out a comprehensive
approach for designing, testing, and operating state-of-the-art high-
speed passenger rail systems. The outline of the system safety plan
given in Appendix A applies to the procurements of new high-speed
trainsets. For the less complex procurements of replacement equipment
for existing service, the plan should be simplified and tailored to fit
the particular need. It should be emphasized that the purpose of the
system safety plan is to force a thorough thought process to ensure
safety is optimized.
The purpose of a formal system safety program, among other things,
is to ensure safety is adequately addressed during the design of
passenger trainsets and during the development of the inspection,
testing, and maintenance program that supports these trainsets. The
system safety program also permits other high risk components in the
system to be identified, including operational aspects and the
signaling and grade crossing technology employed. The system safety
program requires:
(1) Analysis of the trainset design for identification of safety
hazards (risk assessment) and systematic elimination or reduction of
the risk associated with these hazards (mitigating actions);
(2) Analysis of operational aspects for safety hazards and, where
feasible, systematic elimination or reduction of the associated risk of
these hazards; and
(3) Development of the inspection, testing, and maintenance concept
in a step-by-step process to determine the procedures and maintenance
intervals necessary to keep the trainset operating safely.
MIL-STD-882C defines the approach taken for system safety programs
used by the United States military. A copy has been placed in the
docket. This document is an excellent reference for how to plan and
conduct a system safety program.
FRA solicits comments from all segments of the rail passenger
industry on formal system safety programs. FRA is particularly
interested in ways to tailor the program to meet the multitude of
individual situations that exist in the industry. The purpose of the
program is to ensure that safety is planned into new systems. FRA is
searching for ways to ensure the system safety program is good
business--not a regulatory burden. FRA seeks to determine the process
necessary to ensure system safety is good business and allows
flexibility in tailoring the planning to the level of the safety need.
Are any system safety plans currently in use? How much would it
cost (in terms of time and effort) to update existing or develop new
system safety plans? On average, approximately how often would system
safety plans have to be updated? How would system safety plans improve
safety? Specifically, what areas of safety would be improved, by how
much, and why? Please provide copies of any studies, data, arguments,
or opinions which support your answer.
Rail Passenger Equipment Crashworthiness
Since vehicle crashworthiness is one of the means to reduce safety
risks, it is therefore a major subset of the system safety program.
``Rail passenger equipment crashworthiness'' means a system of
interrelated vehicle design features intended to maximize passenger and
crew survivability of collisions and derailments. Vehicle
crashworthiness is the last line of defense or protection in the event
all other precautions fail, and a serious accident occurs.
A risk assessment done by Arthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL) for Amtrak
regarding operation of high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor
points to the need for attention to passenger equipment crashworthiness
by showing that the following types of collisions could occur on the
Northeast Corridor:
(1) Loaded freight equipment or locomotives might derail on
adjacent track, overturning and fouling a high- speed main line. (The
derailment could be caused by defective freight equipment or
vandalism.)
(2) The braking system on a freight train or light locomotives
could fail to operate properly, causing that consist to split a switch
and occupy a high-speed main line immediately ahead of an oncoming
high-speed passenger train.
(3) A high-speed passenger train could derail on a curve due to a
track defect (e.g., a broken rail initiated by the last freight
movement) and strike a fixed object such as an abutment or pier.
Scenarios with substantially similar consequences are possible even
after the installation of an enhanced train control system. These are
the types of scenarios feared by freight railroads that allow passenger
trains to operate on their systems, and have led the freight railroads
to demand insulation from excessive tort liability.
To ensure crashworthiness, passenger equipment must:
(1) Maintain an envelope or minimum volume of survivability for
passengers and crew which resists extreme structural deformation and
separation of main structural members;
(2) Protect against penetration of the occupied compartments;
(3) Protect the occupants from being ejected from occupied
compartments; and
(4) Protect the occupants from secondary impacts with the interior
of the occupied compartments.
To make a passenger train accident survivable (1) the spaces
occupied by people must be strong enough not to collapse, crushing the
people; and (2) the initial deceleration of the people must be limited
so they are not thrown against the interior of the train with
unsurvivable force. Achieving these general objectives can be the most
difficult challenge facing equipment designers.
[[Page 30687]]
Crash Energy Management
Crash energy management is a design technique to help equipment
designers meet this challenge. The basic concept embodied by crash
energy management is that designated sections in unoccupied spaces or
lightly occupied spaces are intentionally designed to be weaker than
heavily occupied spaces. This is done so that during a collision,
portions of the unoccupied spaces will deform before the occupied
spaces, allowing the occupied spaces of the trainset initially to
decelerate more slowly and minimize the uncontrolled deformation of
occupied space.
The docket contains two technical papers 2 by the Volpe Center
that analyze the merits of crash energy management design techniques.
These studies evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies for
providing crashworthiness of passenger rail vehicle structures and
interiors at increased collision speeds by comparing them to a design
permitted by current standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for
Passenger Trains.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis, U.S.
Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation System
Center, January 20, 1995; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for
Occupant Survivability.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis,
U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation
System Center, April 7, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current regulations permit cars of essentially uniform longitudinal
strength. Simplified analysis done using a lumped-mass computer model
and an idealized load-crush curve predicts this type of design to be
effective in maintaining survivable volumes in coaches for train-to-
train collision speeds up to 70 mph. Further analysis needs to be done
using a more complex distributed-mass computer model and a widely
accepted load-crush curve to refine this prediction.
Using a simplified lumped-mass computer model, the assumed uniform
longitudinal strength causes the predicted structural crushing of the
train to proceed uniformly from the front to the rear of the train,
through both the unoccupied and occupied areas of the train. Using a
distributed-mass computer model, structural crushing of uniform
strength equipment tends to be predicted to occur at both ends of the
car, more in agreement with observations from actual accidents.
The crash energy management design approach results in varying
longitudinal strength, with high strength in the occupied areas and
lower strength in the unoccupied areas. This approach attempts to
distribute the structural crushing throughout the train to the
unoccupied areas to preserve the occupant volumes and to control and
limit the decelerations of the cars. The crash energy management
approach has been found to offer significant benefits. (Amtrak has
noted that while this concept seems to work well for single-level
equipment with vestibules at each end, its application to a bi-level
design--which is now Amtrak's long distance standard--was not
considered in these publications.)
The interior crashworthiness study evaluates the influence of
interior configurations and occupant restraints on injuries resulting
from occupant motions during a collision. For a sufficiently gentle
train deceleration, compartmentalization (a strategy for providing a
``friendly'' interior) can provide sufficient occupant protection to
keep widely accepted injury criteria below the threshold values applied
by the automotive industry.
The Volpe Center reports show that, if installed properly and used,
the combination of lapbelts and shoulder restraints can reduce the
likelihood of fatality due to deceleration to near-certain survival for
even the most severe collision conditions considered. However,
individual restraints may have limited practical value on a train,
where mobility within the vehicle is an important attribute of service
quality, and times of most significant risk cannot be predicted. The
most likely application of personal restraints could be in a control
compartment located at the front of the train.
The value of a crash energy management design is not in the energy
absorbed--only a few percent of the kinetic energy of a high-speed
collision can be absorbed in a reasonable crush distance. The real
safety benefit comes from allowing the occupied spaces to decelerate
more slowly, while decreasing the likelihood that occupied spaces will
fail in an uncontrolled fashion. If the occupied spaces are initially
decelerated more slowly, people will be pinned to an interior surface
of the trainset with less force, resulting in fewer and less severe
injuries. Once pinned against an interior surface, occupants can then
sustain much higher subsequent decelerations without sustaining serious
injuries. Also, since unoccupied space is intentionally sacrificed,
less occupied space will be crushed during the collision.
Crash energy management design involves a system of interrelated
safety features, in addition to controlled crushable space, that could
include: (1) design techniques to keep the trainset in line and on the
track for as long as possible during the initial impact;
(2) Interior design that eliminates sharp corners and that pads,
with shock absorbing material, surfaces that are likely to be struck by
people thrown about by a collision;
(3) Attachment of interior fittings and seats with sufficient
strength not to fail and thereby cause additional injuries; and
(4) A crash refuge for the vulnerable crew members in the cab.
To help maintain survivable volumes in passenger equipment,
particularly during collisions at higher closing speeds, minimum
standards for the following structural design parameters would be
needed:
(1) Anti-buckling to keep the train in line and on the track for as
long as possible after impact. (Prevention of buckling is not always
possible, but it can be delayed);
(2) End structures and anticlimbers to prevent override and
telescoping;
(3) Corner posts to deflect glancing collisions;
(4) Rollover strength;
(5) Truck to car body attachment; and
(6) A control cab crash refuge.
``Anti-buckling'' refers to trainset design techniques intended to
prevent to a certain force level or delay both vertical (override) and/
or lateral buckling. The current state-of-the-art in passenger rail
equipment design will impose limitations on the extent to which anti-
buckling can be achieved. (Devices that meet the anti-buckling
requirements have not been developed or tested. Those devices that have
been evaluated by the French National Railroad in actual crash testing
of their latest TGV bi-level design are intended to prevent override
similar to those devices currently required on North American
equipment.)
Standards would be necessary to address the general design
parameters to limit decelerations of passengers and crew, as well as
flying objects striking passengers and crew. One possible approach is
to define, under the dynamic conditions created by a specific collision
scenario:
(1) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of the crew in
the control cab for the first 250 milliseconds after impact (assuming
the crew had anticipated the collision and placed themselves in the
crash refuge);
(2) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of passengers in
passenger cars for the first 250 milliseconds after impact;
(3) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical seat attachment
strength;
(4) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical fitting attachment
and
[[Page 30688]]
luggage stowage compartment strengths; and
(5) Minimum padding requirements for seat backs and interior
surfaces. Achieving the second item requires careful design to create a
differential in structural strength between passenger seating areas
(``occupied volume'') and certain other areas that would be allowed to
fail before the occupied volume. By contrast, permitting uniform
rigidity throughout the trainset could result in unacceptably high
initial accelerations of the passenger compartments and possibly make
the accident non-survivable.
Suspension System Performance
A passenger train suspension system's purpose is to follow the
track at all speeds of operation and to minimize the vibrations and
motions transmitted to the passengers. An unsafe condition occurs
whenever the suspension system:
(1) Allows a wheel to lift from a rail;
(2) Allows a wheel to climb over a rail;
(3) Transmits excessive vibration or motion to the passengers;
(4) Exerts excessive force on a rail causing it to shift or roll;
or
(5) Allows unstable lateral hunting oscillations of a truck or
wheelset.
The vehicle no longer safely follows the track when a wheel either
climbs the rail or lifts from the rail. Wheel climb may occur in curves
where large lateral forces are generated as the truck negotiates the
curve. These lateral forces, particularly in combination with changes
in vertical wheel load caused by track surface variations, can cause
the wheel to climb the rail.
The ratio of lateral to vertical forces acting on a wheel (L/V
ratio) is generally taken as a measure of the proximity of the wheel to
derailment. If L/V remains less than Nadal's limit, which is 0.8 on
clean, dry, tangent track, then wheel derailment is remote.
Whenever insufficient vertical force exists to support the lateral
force acting on the rail, wheel climb can potentially occur under a
broad range of track alignment and surface geometry combinations. If a
wheel lifts due to excessive rolling, twisting, or other motions of the
car body or truck, it will likely return to the rail as long as no
excessive lateral forces exist to push it out of line with the rail.
However, wheel lift represents a potentially unsafe condition, because
there is no certainty of the absence of a strong lateral force that
prevents the wheel's return to the rail. To assure that the wheel
remains in contact with the rail, each wheel must maintain a minimum
vertical load of 10 percent of the nominal static wheel vertical load
on straight, level track.
Excessive lateral forces acting on a rail can cause the rail to
rollover and/or shift outward, allowing a wheelset to drop between the
rails. For this to happen, all wheels on one side of a truck must be
pushing outward on a rail. The railroad industry generally accepts that
if the ratio of the sum of the lateral forces to the sum of the
vertical forces exerted by all the wheels on one side of a truck on the
rail is less than 0.5, there is little danger of rail rollover or
shift.
Excessive lateral forces, induced by a car traversing the track,
can also cause the track as a unit to shift laterally on its ballast.
To assure that the track does not get pushed out of alignment by a
train, the ratio of the net lateral load exerted by each axle to the
net vertical load exerted by that axle must remain less than 0.5.
Passenger ride quality is generally a comfort rather than a safety
concern, unless ride quality deteriorates so that passengers are
injured by a rough ride. To provide minimum protection for passengers
from injuries due to being thrown about by excessive car body motions,
FRA believes that equipment should be designed such that car body
lateral accelerations are less than 0.30g peak-to-peak and the car body
vertical accelerations are less than 0.55g peak-to-peak, while the
square root of the sum of lateral accelerations squared plus the
vertical accelerations squared (the vector sum) is less than 0.604g
peak-to-peak. Compliance with this design standard would typically be
established as part of an equipment qualification program.
Sustained lateral oscillations of the truck (``truck hunting'') can
lead to derailment. Sensor technology allows the lateral accelerations
of the truck to be constantly monitored under service operating
conditions. FRA proposes that trucks be equipped with accelerometers to
monitor for hunting so that corrective action can be taken when hunting
is detected. FRA proposes to define ``hunting'' as a lateral
acceleration of the truck frame in excess of 0.8g peak-to-peak repeated
for six or more cycles.
Recent experience with the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority's
new bi-level commuter cars demonstrated the close relationship between
suspension system performance and track geometry. The suspension system
must be able to perform at low speed over track with relatively large
surface variations, such as 3-inch cross level deviation, while
maintaining stability and smooth ride quality at maximum service
speeds. FRA is concerned that suspension systems of all new passenger
equipment maintain passenger safety over their entire range of intended
operating conditions. The suspension system requirements, such as wheel
equalization, must therefore be established for all equipment and
service based on analysis from the system safety program. Compliance
with this requirement would typically be established as part of an
equipment qualification program.
Wheel Thermal Stress
FRA is concerned that frequent, repeated braking from high speeds
could induce thermal damage in wheels that can result in cracking and
potential wheel failure in service. New high-speed passenger equipment
may include blended brakes which combine dynamic and friction braking
(either on tread, disk, or both). Such blended systems typically
maximize the available dynamic brake portion at all speeds to minimize
wear and thermal input to the wheels, discs, and friction brake
components. Wheel slide detection and prevention is typically available
to minimize loss of wheel to track adhesion of individual wheelsets
during deceleration.
Thermal demand on wheels due to frictional heating by tread brakes
can be substantial when loaded cars are operated at high braking
ratios. This scenario may apply to blended systems which use tread
brakes more extensively to make up for the loss of failed dynamic
brakes. Recent research has shown that for wheels on some types of
passenger equipment operated at weights of 60 to 80 tons per car, at
speeds from 80 to 100 mph and retardation rates of 2 to 3 mph/second,
the brake horsepower which the wheel must absorb can flash-heat a
shallow layer of the rim to a temperature high enough to damage the
metal and possibly cause a change in its mechanical properties.
An operational test under simulated service conditions was
conducted in October 1992 using wheels instrumented with thermocouples
to measure temperatures in the rim. The test train was operated at
near-empty weight (61 tons per car) and at speeds up to 100 mph. Wheel
temperatures were measured during speed reductions and stops, at
retardation rates from 1.3 to 1.9 mph/second, with tread braking only.
Temperatures as high as 1000 deg.F. (538 deg.C.) were measured by the
thermocouple closest to the tread surface (approximately 0.1 inch below
the tread surface). The S-plate wheel
[[Page 30689]]
design common in commuter service was used to obtain these results.
Current Federal safety standards for locomotives, under which MU
cars are covered, define a defective wheel due to cracking as any wheel
with ``[a] crack or break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or hub.''
49 CFR 229.75(k). Although the AAR Manual of Interchange Rules (1980)
applies only to interchange freight service, it is often applied to
equipment in passenger service and defines a wheel to be ``condemnable
at any time'' if it contains ``thermal cracks: transverse cracks in
tread, flange or plate * * *'' (Rule 41--Section A). The 1984 edition
of the same manual adds a qualification as follows: ``Thermal or heat
checks: Brake shoe heating frequently produces a fine network of
superficial lines or checks running in all directions on the surface of
the wheel tread. This is sometimes associated with skid burns. It
should not be confused with thermal cracking and is not a cause for
wheel removal.''
Heat checking is recognized by experienced failure analysts as a
phenomenon distinct from thermal cracking. In the absence of other
effects, heat checks are believed--at worst--to progress to minor
shelling or spalling which can be detected and corrected well before
they cause a risk to operational safety. However, recent research has
shown that heat checks are unsafe if the affected wheel has also been
subjected to rim stress reversal.
Wrought wheels used in commuter service are rim-quenched after
forming to create a layer of residual compressive stress in the rim
extending inward from the tread. Depths of penetration of the
compressive layer are estimated at 1.2 inches (30 mm) by finite element
simulations of the quenching process. This residual compressive stress
is beneficial since compression tends to force cracks closed and retard
crack growth.
Repeated wheel excursions to high temperatures can result in stress
reversal in the wheel rim, especially in shallow layers near the tread
surface where cracks are likely to originate. Estimates of residual
stresses in new (as manufactured) wheels were obtained by application
of an advanced finite element-based technique which uses stresses due
to quenching as an input state and then calculates the final residual
stress state after repeated simulated stop-braking from 80 mph at 2
mph/second. The results of this simulation predict stress reversal
(reversal from circumferential compression due to quenching to residual
tension) in a layer approximately \5/8\-inch (16 mm) deep from the
surface of the wheel tread.
This research causes FRA concern regarding the possibility of wheel
failures due to cracking initiated in overbraked wheels. A visual
estimation of thermal damage is difficult in the absence of cracks.
Conventional practices based on wheel discoloration have been
discredited as being unreliable indicators of wheel thermal damage.
Within the limits of current sensor technology, the best means
available to prevent wheel failure resulting from thermal damage is
careful brake system design to limit the frictional heating of wheels
to within safe limits.
Ad hoc recommendations identify the onset of thermal damage at
wheel tread near surface temperatures of 600 to 700 deg.F. In order to
better quantify the effect of temperature on wheel integrity, several
metallurgical experiments of wheel material were done. The base
material condition of a non-thermally abused wheel rim is normally a
pearlitic microstructure hardened to approximately RC 35. Metallurgical
examination near the treads of thermally cracked wheels shows a
spheroidized microstructure with an increased hardness for a layer
approximately \1/2\-inch deep.
This microstructure form is usually associated with formation by a
sequence of heating to extremely high temperatures (above 1400 deg.F.)
followed by rapid quenching to produce martensite (an undesirable steel
microstructure), followed by tempering at high temperature (800 to 900
deg.F.) to transform martensite to spheroidite.
Since field data indicated that wheel temperatures were not
reaching the elevated levels necessary to produce the laboratory
material transformation, more work was done to try to explain this
inconsistency. This laboratory work involved testing of wheel steel
samples that were exposed to combined rapid heating and high
compression. The combination of heat and compression was used to
simulate the environment of material near a wheel tread surface that is
subjected to combined stop-braking (heat) and rail contact
(compression). The results of these laboratory tests showed that the
microstructure of the material can transform at temperatures below 1200
deg.F if the material is also compressed, and the transformed
microstructure can have an appearance similar to that of spheroidite.
Based on this research, FRA is concerned that passenger equipment
in service with frequent stops from high speeds can over brake wheels.
Of particular concern is equipment that utilizes a high percentage of
tread braking and blended brake systems that require a wheel tread
friction brake to carry a greater portion of the braking load when the
dynamic portion of the brake fails.
Disc brakes are commonly used on high speed passenger trainsets as
a companion to the dynamic brake system to avoid some of the thermal
problems that can be caused by tread brakes. Disc air brakes provide
fail-safe braking and high levels of retardation. Disc brakes offer
several advantages as opposed to tread brakes. Disc brakes are less
sensitive to moisture and have more uniform coefficients of friction at
high speeds. Disc brakes can also improve ride quality due to reduced
jerk and less noise. In addition, disc brakes require lower brake
forces than tread brakes, thus permitting smaller cylinders and lighter
rigging. But the main advantage of disc brakes is that they allow
braking heat to be dissipated using a heat sink other than the wheel.
Brake discs can be mounted directly to the wheel with bolts or can
be axle mounted. Axle mounted discs are installed on the axle between
the wheels. The disc consists of two friction rings interconnected by
cooling fins, which exist in several forms, including a vane design and
a ventilated design. The vanes and fins increase the convective cooling
of the disc as it rotates. Retarding force is provided by means of a
caliper--actuated by a pneumatic cylinder--that clamps brake pads
against the rotating disc.
Substantial research and development effort has gone into the
design of disc brakes, especially for European high-speed trains. While
disc brakes are well suited for high-energy dissipation and high-
temperature events, disc pad wear and thermally damaged discs are two
of the cost drivers in maintaining high-speed passenger trainsets.
One manufacturer of disc brakes has recommended limiting disc pad
temperatures to 750 deg.F. to prevent thermal damage to the wheels or
brake pads during stop distance tests of a European trainset to be
tested in the Northeast Corridor.
Based on these concerns and research, FRA wishes to explore
requiring each railroad establish the maximum safe speed that each type
of its equipment can be operated over a specific route, when the
dynamic portion of the brake has failed or is disabled. These speed
limits should be established as part of the system safety program.
Another possible concern involving disc brakes is wheel slide. Due
to the high retardation rate that can be achieved with disc brakes,
failure of the
[[Page 30690]]
wheel slide protection system can cause the formation of martensite in
the vicinity of the wheel/rail contact region. This can lead to wheel
mechanical damage similar to that caused by excessive tread braking.
What steps have the passenger rail industry taken to prevent wheel
damage due to over braking? What wheel thermal problems continue to
occur in the field? How should thermal limits on wheels and discs be
handled in safety regulations?
Tiered Equipment Design Standards Based on Risk Analysis
FRA believes there may be merit in a tiered approach to equipment
safety standards based on a risk analysis of the operating environment
in which the equipment will operate. (Tiers are levels of design
requirements determined by system safety considerations.) The advantage
of such an approach is that it takes into account system safety factors
other than equipment design that reduce safety risks. The tiered
approach also readily lends itself to amending the safety standards for
a new type of service--a new tier could be added without changing the
existing standards. The disadvantage is that such an approach can
rapidly become very complex. Further, when applied to design
performance criteria for new equipment, an excessively tiered approach
could result in purchases of equipment that might be severely limited
with respect to its future uses and marketability.
For simplicity, FRA had initially envisioned tiered safety
standards based on operating speed alone. FRA suggested the following
logical break points to the Working Group for tiered equipment
standards:
Level 1--up to 30 mph--Tourist and Excursion Railroads.
Level 2--up to 79 mph--Conventional Passenger Operations.
Level 3--up to 125 mph--Intermediate Speed Operations.
Level 4--up to 150 mph--High Speed Operations.
However, discussions with the Working Group highlighted several
objections to this approach based on tiering by maximum operating speed
alone. Conventional intercity passenger trains operated by Amtrak,
powered by diesel- electric locomotives, frequently operate at speeds
up to 90 mph, and commuter railroads provide ``conventional'' service
at speeds up to 110 mph. Both Amtrak and commuter railroads expressed a
strong opinion that their ``conventional'' equipment had proven itself
capable of operating safely at ``intermediate'' speeds.
The majority of the Working Group has expressed a preference for
only two tiers of equipment standards for intercity and commuter
service, and for basing the criteria for distinguishing between the
tiers on a system safety approach rather than solely on operating
speed. As a result, the discussion of tiered safety standards that
follows centers around a two-tiered approach. FRA recognizes that
approaches containing more than two tiers may be desirable.
Accordingly, FRA will carefully consider alternate approaches received
in response to this ANPRM that contain more than two tiers of safety
standards. Such alternate approaches should attempt to explain the
safety/economic advantages of safety standards based on more than two
tiers, and should attempt to define and state the logic behind the
criteria used to distinguish between these tiers. (A formal vote by the
Working Group on the number of tiers to use has not been taken. Amtrak
can envision the need for at least three tiers, as specified in the
introduction of Appendix B.)
The basic concept behind a system safety approach for tiering is
that safety risks can be reduced by controlling any number of operating
environment factors in addition to equipment design, inspection,
testing, and maintenance. Factors that should be considered when
performing a risk analysis to determine the correct tier of equipment
requirements include:
(1) Maximum operating speed;
(2) Presence of at-grade rail crossings;
(3) Type of protection at highway grade crossings;
(4) Number of at-grade rail crossings;
(5) Current and projected train traffic densities;
(6) Capabilities of current and planned signal systems;
(7) Tracks shared with freight trains;
(8) Shared rights-of-way with freight or light rail type
operations;
(9) Wayside structures; and
(10) Special right-of-way safety features such as track separation
distance, barriers or track obstruction detection systems.
If the risk analysis shows that the type of operation or non-
equipment safety features result in a very low risk operation, less
restrictive--or Tier I--equipment safety standards would be
appropriate. If the risk analysis shows a higher risk of operation due
to higher operating speeds, traffic densities, or some other factor,
Tier II equipment safety standards--which reduce risk more than Tier I
standards--would be used. A good example of a risk analysis of a
passenger railroad operating environment is provided in a report
prepared by ADL under contract to Amtrak, entitled ``Northeast Corridor
Risk Assessment'' (August 26, 1994). A copy of this report is included
in the docket.
One of the factors that will make an approach to equipment safety
standards based on risk assessment difficult to implement is that the
industry must quantify and make public the degree of risk that is
considered acceptable. Is the level of risk per billion highway
passenger miles the criterion? Is the level of risk per billion
passenger miles in scheduled air carrier service the criterion?
FRA seeks industry comments on a tiered approach or alternate
approaches to passenger equipment safety standards. Does the initial
approach of speed break points suggested by FRA make sense? What would
be the impact of imposing this set of break points? What existing
commuter operations would be caught between conventional and
intermediate speed standards? Should FRA grandfather the current
equipment providing this service and apply the more stringent standards
only to the new or refurbished equipment procured to provide service in
this speed range? Should FRA also grandfather all of Amtrak's equipment
providing service at speeds greater than 79 mph? Should other sets of
break points be considered? If so, which and why? What should be the
major change in equipment safety standards at each break point? What
problems could be caused by the approach to grandfathering current
equipment operating in each speed range?
Rather than the initial FRA approach, does the concept of tiered
standards based on the outcome of a risk analysis make sense? Would
such an approach be too complex? Is the industry willing to undertake
the thorough risk analysis process necessary to make such an approach
effective? What would the industry use as an acceptable level of risk
to determine break points between tiers of requirements?
The discussion of possible safety standards that follows is based
on a two-tiered approach. The question of exactly how to draw the line
between the two tiers of requirements is not answered. For purposes of
discussion, Tier I requirements are broadly applied to operations with
a known low risk or record of proven safe operation, e.g., passenger
equipment operating at speeds of 110 mph or less. Tier II requirements
are broadly applied to higher risk operating environments, e.g.,
Amtrak's planned operation at 150 mph in the Northeast Corridor or
perhaps
[[Page 30691]]
cab-car-forward operations under some sets of higher risk operating
conditions.
Although the discussion of possible safety standards that follows
is based on a two-tiered approach, this does not mean FRA assumes a
proposed rule will be based on two tiers. A discussion of a two-tiered
approach serves only as the simplest means to present the concept of
tiering. FRA remains open to alternate concepts based on more than two
tiers, or concepts that define the break point between two tiers
differently.
FRA recognizes the need to handle special equipment such as that
operated by tourist and excursion railroads and private passengers cars
outside this two-tiered system.
FRA also recognizes the possible future need for a third tier for
equipment intended to operate at very high speeds--in excess of 150
mph. However, operations at such speeds would be considered only on
dedicated rights-of-way with no at-grade highway or rail crossings. In
such instances, FRA will review equipment safety criteria as an
integral part of an overall system safety program, issuing a rule of
particular applicability.
Discussion of Possible Safety Standards
Basis for Safety Parameters Under Consideration
In preparation for rulemaking, FRA considered the service history
of general system railroads in the United States, research and
technical advice from the Volpe Center (incorporating learning from
human trauma studies in other modes of transportation), staff analysis,
and learning gleaned from extensive consultations with knowledgeable
persons (both within the United States and abroad) over several years
of study. In addition, FRA has worked with Amtrak to develop safety
features incorporated into Amtrak's specification for high-speed
trainsets.
Safety features suggested by FRA to Amtrak for high-speed
trainsets--intended for use in the mixed passenger/freight
environment--serve as the basis for sample safety parameters used by
FRA to evoke a discussion of Tier II equipment safety standards.
Current North American passenger rail safety practice, recent NTSB
recommendations, and selective use of requirements gleaned from
recommendations made to Amtrak for high-speed trainsets serve as the
basis for the sample safety parameters used to evoke a discussion of
safety standards appropriate for a less challenging operating
environment (Tier I equipment standards).
FRA made both Tier I and Tier II equipment safety concepts
available to the Working Group for discussion and consideration. The
safety parameters contained in these concepts draw upon AAR
Specification S-580 for locomotive crashworthiness, existing
regulations (49 CFR Part 229), NTSB recommendations, and an analysis of
the forces produced as a result of realistic collision scenarios.
Appendix B outlines safety parameters provided for consideration
for Tier I and Tier II equipment. Given that Tier II equipment is
intended to operate in an environment that can create a greater safety
risk than Tier I equipment, most Tier I parameters outlined in Appendix
B also become Tier II parameters. To simplify the task of responding to
this ANPRM, Appendix B contains only those Tier II requirements that
are in addition to, or different from, Tier I requirements.
It is emphasized that neither FRA nor the Working Group has
endorsed these safety parameters, except to the extent that they mirror
existing regulations. FRA is not proposing their adoption; rather, FRA
makes available for discussion the results of efforts by the technical
staff to identify safety risks and to suggest possible means to address
these risks.
While the basis for many of the safety parameters suggested for
discussion will be self evident, certain of the more novel concepts
warrant explanation. The following discussion addresses that need.
Limiting initial decelerations of passengers to 6g maximum and 4g
average--as suggested in Appendix B--is based on automobile
crashworthiness research. These decelerations are identified as levels
that unrestrained people are likely to survive if the interior of the
vehicle is designed to mitigate secondary impacts (i.e., the
compartmentalization design strategy). Analysis shows peak longitudinal
deceleration of the occupied spaces of coach cars protected by a
leading or trailing locomotive or power car is expected to be
approximately 8g for a train-to-train collision at a speed in excess of
30 mph. Greater collision speed does not significantly increase the
peak deceleration of the occupied coach volume, but it does increase
the time over which the occupied volume is decelerated.
During the collision, unrestrained occupants of such a coach will
be thrown into interior fixtures, such as seatbacks, with a force
substantially greater than that associated solely with the deceleration
of the train. This increase in force is due to the occupant striking
the interior at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. If the seat is to
remain attached during a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph,
simulation analysis indicates that coach seat attachment strength must
be able to resist the inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the
seat plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) being
decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph.
FRA believes that sufficient potential crush distance is available
in single-level equipment with end vestibules such that good crash
energy management design can achieve the 6g-maximum and 4g-average
limits for passengers (other than those riding in a leading control
cab) even for a high- speed crash scenario. Other equipment types (bi-
level, gallery, and food service with no vestibules) need to be studied
to determine the limits of potential crush distance.
On the other hand, FRA recognizes the difficulty in limiting the
initial deceleration of the crew in the cab to a survivable level
during a high-speed collision because little unoccupied crush space is
available forward of the control cab. As a result, Appendix B contains
a design goal of limiting decelerations on the crew in the cab to 24g
maximum and 16g average for the first 250 milliseconds of the crash
pulse. (The 250-millisecond duration was selected as the time required
for people to make their initial impact with an interior surface and be
pinned by inertia against that surface. After this time, the peak
deceleration can be greatly increased without causing extensive
injuries.) Based on analysis results, the peak deceleration of a
leading control cab is approximately 12g. Analysis indicates that this
peak deceleration does not increase as collision speed increases, but
it does increase the time over which this peak deceleration is exerted
on the cab. During the collision, unrestrained crew members may be
thrown against the interior of the cab with a force substantially
greater than that associated solely with the deceleration of the train.
This increase in force is due to the crew member striking an interior
surface or object at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. Decelerations of
this magnitude require restraint systems or a crash refuge to protect
the crew in the cab.
FRA believes that many crash survivability issues can be resolved
without great difficulty. However, protecting persons from secondary
impacts is a considerable challenge. To limit the decelerations of
people to survivable levels, high-speed trainsets
[[Page 30692]]
must be designed with a crash energy management feature.
The greater the crush distance that can intentionally be designed
into the trainset before reaching an occupied volume, the more
survivable a collision will be. In equipment operated with a cab car
forward, the control cab is necessarily near the leading surface of the
trainset, so very little crush distance is available to protect people
in the cab. As a result, the decelerations of people will be large,
resulting in more numerous and more severe injuries.
An argument presented against increases in structural strength
requirements for new passenger equipment is that the new equipment
would be a hazard to existing passenger equipment operating in the same
corridor. This argument is based, in part, on a 1972 rear-end collision
between two passenger trains in Chicago. In this collision, an older,
heavier car climbed over a newer car of lighter construction,
telescoping into the passenger compartment of the lighter car,
resulting in the deaths of many people.
Some have contended that increased structural strength for new
passenger equipment would create an equivalent incompatible situation
between new equipment and existing equipment. However, several
differences between the situation in 1972 and today refute this
argument. Today's passenger equipment has collision posts,
anticlimbers, and strong truck-to-car body attachments--all intended to
prevent climbing and telescoping. In addition, both existing equipment
and new equipment will have the same basic static end strength
(backbone). While new equipment may have a more substantial end
structure, the crash energy management system will cause this end
structure to be pushed back into the unoccupied space of the new
equipment rather than forward into the existing equipment.
Alternatively, some of the end structure strength characteristics might
be placed inboard of the crush zones.
Once the crash energy management system crush distance is consumed,
the full height of the collision posts and corner posts recommended for
the new equipment will likely deflect the older equipment up over the
new equipment rather than creating a telescoping situation. The fears
expressed are therefore unlikely to materialize.
The basis of the concern for side impact strength and the point of
application of side impact forces stems from two facts:
(1) Approximately 25 percent of all highway-rail crossing accidents
involve a highway vehicle striking the side of a train; and
(2) Designs of some passenger equipment have floor levels low to
the rail, creating the tendency for a heavy highway vehicle striking
the side of the train to climb into the occupied passenger volume
rather than being driven under the underframe of the passenger rail
car.
Analysis shows that current single-level intercity passenger coach
equipment is sufficiently strong, and will derail in collision
scenarios similar to that described above before a significant amount
of crushing of the occupied passenger volume occurs. FRA believes that
future equipment should perform at least as well as current equipment
in such collisions, and that a need exists to specify minimum side
impact protection for rail cars with low floor levels such as bi-level
equipment.
Other scenarios where reasonable side strength may be of value
include side impacts at switches and at railroad crossing diamonds
(when e.g., a single freight car rolls free during switching).
A proposed concept for a side impact strength design requirement
involves the ability of a car body to withstand--with limited
deformation of the car body structure--the load applied by a loaded
tractor trailer travelling at a selected speed which collides with the
side of the car over an area and at a height typical of tractor trailer
bumpers. What specific parameters should be used to implement this
concept, or what alternate concepts can be proposed for a side impact
strength design requirement?
FRA's concern for a minimum rollover strength requirement is based
on accidents such as that which occurred to Amtrak's Lakeshore Limited
in January 1994. The train derailed while travelling from Albany, New
York, to Chicago, and several cars rolled down an embankment. Very
little crushing of the occupied volumes of any of the cars involved
occurred. The current design of single-level intercity passenger cars
generally performs well when subjected to the impact loads associated
with tipping on a side or rolling onto its roof from an upright
position. While these loads may vary significantly depending upon the
nature of the wayside where the rolling occurs, FRA believes that
passenger cars should have minimum side strength and roof strength to
help minimize the loss of occupied volume should a rollover occur. FRA
also believes that locomotives and power cars should have sufficient
side and roof structural strength to minimize loss of volume in the
operator's cab under such conditions.
The sections of this ANPRM addressing design standards seek input
from the industry on how to take advantage of the safety improvements
offered by a crash energy management design approach for future
passenger equipment.
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements
Pre-Departure or Daily Safety Inspections
A pre-departure or daily safety inspection is an essential element
of a system safety program for all trains that carry passengers. The
pre-departure or daily inspection should include the steps necessary to
ensure the train departs without mechanical, electrical, or electronic
defects that could degrade the safe operation of the train.
Amtrak has voluntarily implemented a pre-departure safety
inspection of all passenger trains. Amtrak developed the inspection
procedures in close cooperation with FRA. The procedures combine a
power brake inspection and test, a mechanical inspection similar to
that required for freight cars, a safety appliance inspection, and spot
checks by supervisors. Amtrak has been using these procedures since
April 1994, and they do not appear to have an adverse impact on train
schedule. Appendix C contains a copy of the inspection procedures used
by Amtrak. These inspection procedures are offered as an example only.
They are not a general solution to how to conduct pre-departure safety
inspections of passenger trains.
Using the Amtrak procedures as a starting point, FRA solicits
comments on how these procedures need to be tailored to fit the needs
of each segment of the industry. What train schedule impacts will
result from implementing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection
program? Does FRA need to be made aware of any circumstances or reasons
for not performing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection? What
range of options should an operating railroad have when the safety
inspection uncovers a defect? How should any proposed safety standards
take into account and encourage the potential that technology provides
to automate pre-departure or daily inspections of future equipment? As
automated features are added to passenger trains, does a train
information system that records and logs inspection and test results
and maintenance status make sense?
[[Page 30693]]
In terms of labor, materials, etc., what additional resources would
each operator need to perform a pre-departure inspection equivalent to
Amtrak's? How many pre-departure or daily inspections are performed
annually by each operator? What potential safety benefits could result
from performing inspections equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain or
document estimates. For those currently performing inspections, what
additional benefits could be realized by modifying those inspection
procedures to meet Amtrak's? Please explain or document.
Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment
FRA recognizes that most tourist railroads are small businesses
operating older equipment on a limited budget. As a basis for
discussion, FRA postulates a simple system safety program for excursion
and tourist railroads based on:
(1) A pre-departure safety inspection that takes into account the
type of equipment being used;
(2) A periodic testing and maintenance program based on the type of
equipment and the extent of its use; and
(3) Minimum qualifications for inspectors and maintenance personnel
to ensure that they have the knowledge necessary to perform safety-
critical tasks.
FRA needs the tourist and excursion railroad industry to address
the following questions: What are the effects of such a simple system
safety program on tourist and excursion railroad operations? How can
the requirements for a pre-departure safety inspection be written so
they are enforceable but provide necessary flexibility?
Information available to FRA indicates that there are approximately
100 excursion railroads subject to FRA jurisdiction, operating about
250 locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information correct?
What size crews operate excursion and tourist trains? What is the
average annual passenger car mileage for tourist and excursion
railroads? What human and physical resources are available to these
railroads for inspection and maintenance of equipment?
What potential safety benefits are available from the proposed
standards for tourist and excursion railroads? To what extent will they
be realized under the proposal? Please explain.
FRA also solicits comments from the tourist and excursion railroad
industry on how passenger equipment safety standards may impact them in
unintended ways.
Private Passenger Cars
FRA believes a private passenger car should be held to the same
basic inspection standards as the other equipment being hauled in the
train hauling the private car. However, FRA intends to take into
account the financial burden imposed by requiring private passenger car
owners to modify their equipment to meet any new design standards
included as part of proposed passenger equipment safety standards.
FRA needs private passenger car owners to address the following
questions as part of their response to this ANPRM: What minimum set of
inspection requirements should host operators impose on private
passenger cars? How should these minimum standards be incorporated into
Federal regulations? What effects are foreseen from the proposed
passenger equipment safety regulations on the ability to operate this
equipment? Take care to point out all potential unintended impacts.
How many private passenger cars are in operation? On average, how
many miles do private passenger cars travel annually? What potential
safety benefits are available from the proposed standards for private
passenger cars operators? To what extent will they be realized under
the proposal? Please explain.
Tier I Equipment
FRA believes standards for pre-departure and daily inspections of
Tier I equipment should take into account the type of equipment being
used and the type of service. Pre-departure safety inspection and test
criteria implemented by Amtrak should be considered as a guide for
developing a set of core inspection criteria for incorporation into
Federal safety standards for Tier I equipment. These inspection
criteria are given as Appendix C.
FRA recommends that each operator of passenger equipment use these
criteria as a guide, and comment on how similar criteria could be--or
have been--implemented as part of its operation. Members of APTA are
encouraged to comment through the APTA members on the Working Group.
FRA recognizes that the pre-departure inspection need not be a
complete safety inspection. The combination of the daily and the pre-
departure inspections should be considered the complete safety
inspection of the train.
To what extent would daily and pre-departure inspections vary from
current practice? To what extent would these requirements impact
passenger operations? How can the requirements for pre-departure and
daily safety inspections be written so they are enforceable but provide
the flexibility required to meet service requirements, hold down costs,
and encourage innovation?
Tier II Equipment
Since Tier II equipment will be designed for operation in higher
risk and/or consequence operating environments, FRA believes the safety
inspection program to be used with the equipment should be developed
from a thorough risk analysis done as part of the system safety
program. This risk analysis should result in a set of inspection
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a safety
inspection program that reduces the overall risk of operation to an
acceptable level.
Planned Testing, Preventive Maintenance, and Personnel Qualification
Requirements
FRA believes planned testing and preventive maintenance
requirements of safety-critical systems or components-- triggered by
time, mileage, or some other key reliability/safety parameter--are also
an essential feature of a system safety program. A key step in the
system safety program is to perform a reliability analysis or use
accumulated reliability data to determine the planned tests and
preventive maintenance tasks--as well as what should trigger them--that
are required to maintain a safe operation. The system safety plan
should also include an approach to accumulate the data necessary to
justify changes in maintenance approaches or intervals for safety-
critical systems and components.
Most passenger equipment operators already have testing and
maintenance requirements for their equipment, though the extent to
which they are based on formalized risk analysis is not clear. FRA
searches for a means to ensure that all industry system safety programs
include preventive maintenance and planned testing requirements while
allowing the industry the flexibility needed to cope with various
operating environments. FRA also recognizes the desirability of
allowing maintenance or testing intervals to be changed based on
accumulated operating experience with the equipment.
Currently, what equipment is tested and maintained periodically?
How often (in terms of miles, time, or other parameters) is this
equipment tested and maintained? How can standards be structured to
allow testing or maintenance intervals to be changed based on either
good or bad operating
[[Page 30694]]
experience while maintaining adequate safety margins? What do periodic
tests and maintenance currently entail--labor, materials, etc.? What
benefit(s) would be associated with a periodic testing and maintenance
requirement? Please explain.
FRA views the skills and knowledge of the people responsible for
inspections, testing, and maintenance as one of the most important
requisites of an effective system safety program. FRA seeks a means for
passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people performing
crucial safety inspections and maintenance tasks--whether they be
mechanical forces or train crews--have the current knowledge and skills
necessary for their jobs. As equipment incorporating new technology--to
include remote sensing and automated testing--comes into widespread
use, a better trained inspection and maintenance workforce will be
required and minimum qualification standards will become more
important.
GAO Report RCED-93-68 ``Improvements Needed for Employees Who
Inspect and Maintain Rail Equipment'' highlights some of the concerns
regarding the knowledge and training of personnel performing safety-
critical tasks. GAO concludes that training programs for mechanical
employees and foremen have weaknesses that leave passenger railroads
vulnerable to skill shortfalls in the inspection, testing, and
maintenance workforce. GAO points out that the personnel who inspect,
test, and maintain European high-speed passenger trains receive much
more training and generally are more skilled than their American
counterparts. European railroads require mechanical employees either to
pass an examination or to demonstrate their proficiency. An internal
FRA assessment confirms the findings of this GAO report. Copies of both
the GAO report and the internal FRA report documenting this assessment
have been placed in the docket.
FRA seeks comment from all segments of the industry on how to
require passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people
(whether employees or contractors) performing safety-critical tasks
have the knowledge and skills to do so. FRA does not wish to mandate
specific training programs or experience requirements; FRA believes
that these details are the purview of each individual operator and that
each railroad should establish the minimum training and qualification
requirements based on the equipment being operated. However, an
important feature of proposed passenger equipment safety standards will
be a means to measure or to demonstrate the effectiveness of individual
training programs. Unless people with the necessary knowledge and skill
perform safety-critical tasks, passenger equipment operators cannot
have an effective system safety program.
How should the proposed safety standards be structured to ensure
that each operator meets this important responsibility to demonstrate
the skills and knowledge of personnel that perform safety-critical
tasks on passenger equipment? Currently, how many employees/contractors
are involved in inspecting, testing, and maintaining a passenger car or
locomotive? How many of these people are mechanical personnel? Are
there established minimum training and qualification requirements for
employees and contractors performing inspections, tests, and
maintenance? Approximately how many labor hours does each passenger
service operator spend each year on these activities?
What are the potential benefits of increased training in periodic
testing and maintenance? To what extent are expenditures on such
training cost effective? Historically, does this type of training
produce identifiable safety benefits? Please explain.
Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment
FRA believes that tourist and excursion railroads, museums, and
other operators of special or unusual equipment that carry passengers
should have:
(1) A planned testing program;
(2) A preventive maintenance program keyed to mileage, time, or
some other triggering parameter; and
(3) A means to demonstrate that the people carrying out these
programs have the knowledge and skills necessary to correctly perform
the safety-critical tasks identified as part of these programs.
FRA seeks to establish a minimum program for operators of special
or unusual equipment that takes into account the resource constraints
placed on these operators, and yet recognizes that even equipment
operated for short distances and at low speeds requires periodic
maintenance attention by skilled individuals to maintain safety.
What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance, and what crucial tasks need to be performed?
How should tourist and excursion railroads demonstrate to FRA that
personnel performing safety-critical tasks have the knowledge necessary
to do the job?
Private Passenger Cars
FRA believes that a private passenger car should be held to the
same basic planned testing and preventive maintenance standards as the
other equipment being hauled in the train hauling the private car.
However, FRA anticipates that since private passenger cars tend not to
be highly used equipment, the events that trigger planned tests or
preventive maintenance (mileage, time, etc.) will occur less frequently
than for equipment in regularly scheduled passenger or commuter
service.
Since private passenger cars tend to be vintage equipment with
parts, and testing and maintenance procedures that are no longer common
in the rail passenger industry, the knowledge and skills necessary to
conduct an effective planned testing and preventive maintenance program
are likely to be possessed by only a few individuals.
What minimum set of planned testing and preventive maintenance
requirements should host operators impose on private passenger cars?
How should these minimum standards be incorporated into Federal
regulations? What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance for private passenger cars, and what critical
tasks need to be performed? How should owners of private passenger cars
demonstrate to FRA that personnel performing safety-critical tasks have
the knowledge necessary to do the job? To what extent does any third
party monitor the quality of work performed on passenger cars by
contract shops? (Amtrak currently operates a certification process for
private passenger cars that desire to operate in Amtrak trains.)
Tier I Equipment
Since Tier I equipment will very likely be traditionally designed
equipment that operates in environments with which railroads have a
wealth of experience, planned testing and preventive maintenance
programs should be based on that experience with the type of equipment
and its extent of use. Operators of Tier I equipment should have a
planned testing and maintenance program based on operating experience
with the equipment. Changes to the program would also be based on
operating experience.
As part of the operating experience on Tier I equipment, railroads
need to identify the safety-critical maintenance tasks and the skills
required to perform them. Railroads must use this knowledge to develop
a training
[[Page 30695]]
program to ensure inspection and maintenance personnel have these
skills and are able to demonstrate them.
What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance for Tier I equipment? What critical tasks need
to be performed? How should railroads demonstrate to FRA that personnel
performing safety-critical tasks on Tier I equipment have the knowledge
necessary to do the job?
Tier II Equipment
Because Tier II equipment will be new equipment designed for
operation in higher risk operating environments, FRA believes the
planned testing and preventive maintenance program for safety-critical
systems and components should be developed from a thorough risk
analysis done as part of the system safety program. This risk analysis
should result in a set of planned testing and preventive maintenance
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a program
that reduces the overall risk of operation to an acceptable level. What
is an acceptable level of risk in developing risk-based performance
standards for this type of equipment?
Equipment Design Standards
Standards for Tier I Equipment
Current passenger equipment has certainly demonstrated its ability
to operate safely at speeds up to 125 mph. However, the design of this
equipment is largely based on loose industry standards that are no
longer actively maintained or enforced. The design of new Tier I
passenger equipment should not be left to a collection of similarly
loose standards. A practical approach to establish minimum safety
standards for new Tier I equipment would be to consolidate current
safety related design standards or industry practices directly into the
new regulation.
FRA believes train operation has significantly changed since the
design requirements in 49 CFR 229.141 for trains of total empty weight
of less than 600,000 pounds and AAR Specification S-034,``Specification
for the Construction of New Passenger Cars,'' were first promulgated.
Have these requirements outlived their usefulness, and should they be
eliminated? Would a regulation based on the compilation of current
North American industry structural design standards and practices
provide the ``minimum floor'' crashworthiness requirements for Tier I
equipment?
Initial analysis and computer modeling by the Volpe Center, using a
lumped-mass model and idealized force-crush characteristics, predicts
the conventional uniform longitudinal structural strength design
approach to be as effective as a crash energy management design
approach in providing protection for passengers and crew at speeds up
to approximately 70 mph. Although crash energy management design can
benefit passengers of equipment involved in lower speed collisions,
this analysis suggests that the additional expense of a crash energy
management design may not be justified for some new Tier I passenger
equipment, depending upon the upper speed limit in this tier.
The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No.
102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (September 3, 1992), requires FRA to report to
the Congress on the crashworthiness of locomotives and the
effectiveness of AAR Specification S-580, which is the current industry
standard regarding crashworthiness of locomotives. Much of the research
and analysis done to comply with this law can be applied to head-on
and, potentially, rear-end collisions of passenger trains.
This analysis shows AAR Specification S-580 provides a significant
increase in crashworthiness over locomotives built prior to
implementation of this specification. However, the locomotive collision
computer model developed to support the RSERA shows a weakness in the
way locomotive builders implement the S-580 anticlimber requirement.
The model shows--at all but very low collision speeds--that at the
onset of override, the anticlimber of the locomotive being overridden
is crushed and sheared or bypassed rather than loaded vertically by the
anticlimber of the opposing locomotive. Evidence from several collision
investigations tends to confirm this prediction. Examination of
locomotives and cars equipped with anticlimbers that have been involved
in collisions where override occurred shows evidence of bending of the
anticlimber shelf due to high coupler loads. This bending appears to
prevent the shelf from being capable of resisting a vertical load.
Couplers designed to break away or load some part of the structure so
that the anticlimber shelf is not deformed before being required to
resist a vertical load appear to be necessary to allow the anticlimbers
to function as intended.
FRA believes that if passenger equipment can be designed to fully
involve (bend but not collapse) the underframe to resist collision
forces before collision posts or end structures are loaded, the ability
to maintain uncrushed, survivable volumes will be maximized. Properly
designed anticlimbers can play an important role by allowing the
significant structural strength of the underframe to resist the full
collision forces during the initial phase of an impact. Bending the
underframe before the collision posts or end structures take over the
role of protecting the cab occupants can dissipate a large amount of
the collision's energy that might otherwise cause crushing of occupied
space.
Does other evidence exist to support or refute this computer model
prediction of anticlimber effectiveness? What design analysis has been
done on existing anticlimber designs under dynamic conditions
simulating a collision? Are anticlimber design changes necessary to
ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically as intended during
collisions? Are practical design concepts available that may improve
anticlimber performance during collisions? Can anticlimbers be designed
that make bending (but not collapse) of the underframe likely before
collision posts or end structures are required to bear significant
loads? What would be the likely costs associated with alternative
designs to ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically during
collisions?
The computer model also predicts collision post designs currently
used by North American manufacturers exceed the requirements of AAR S-
580 by a factor of two for freight locomotives--weight restrictions can
prevent such a large factor of safety in passenger locomotives--and
that this additional strength provides significant additional
protection to the crew in the cab. Should a modified version of AAR S-
580 specifying a more effective anticlimber, stronger and full-height
collision posts, and full-height corner posts be considered as part of
the safety standards for new conventional passenger locomotives? What
would be the likely impacts of such a standard on locomotive weight and
performance? What costs would be associated with specifying full-height
collision posts and full-height corner posts on conventional
locomotives?
Rather than a standard similar to AAR S-580, should a unitized type
of end structure with integral collision and corner posts that extend
to the roof line be considered for a design standard for conventional
passenger locomotives? Would it be feasible to develop a purer
performance specification for train end structural strength that allows
full flexibility in the design of structures? What collision scenarios
and forces should be considered in such an approach? Such an approach
could
[[Page 30696]]
provide weight and performance advantages.
Fuel spills are both an environmental and a safety problem. Fires
resulting from fuel spills can turn a minor accident into a major
event. What is the experience of passenger railroads with fuel spills?
What clean-up costs have been incurred? Should all diesel passenger
locomotives--including self-propelled diesel cars--be equipped with the
type of strengthened fuel tanks that meet the requirements in Appendix
B proposed for Tier II equipment? If not, what performance standard
should be used for Tier I diesel passenger locomotive fuel tanks?
How much would it cost to equip conventional passenger service
locomotives with the type of strengthened fuel tanks discussed in
Appendix B? What levels of safety benefits can be realized from
strengthened fuel tanks? Please explain.
Based on the findings of recent investigations of accidents
involving passenger trains, several factors have contributed to the
number and the extent of the injuries suffered. Among these factors
are:
(1) A lack of reliable backup emergency lighting for coaches;
(2) A lack of means to exit coaches and locomotives more easily--
from both ends and all compartments--especially when they are resting
on their sides;
(3) Seats that break loose from attachment points or that rotate;
and
(4) Luggage and other objects thrown about the interior of coaches.
Amtrak believes that existing industry standards for emergency
lighting are adequate and should become the Federal standard. NTSB
would like a requirement for securing the batteries that provide power
to emergency lights so connections to the emergency lights are not
knocked loose during a collision.
During Working Group meetings, Amtrak pointed out several potential
disadvantages of roof hatches in passenger equipment because they are
difficult to maintain and are often a source of leaks. The hatches
allow passengers or trespassers access to the roof which can be
particularly dangerous in electrified territory. Amtrak has suggested
inclusion of a clearly marked structural weak spot where properly
equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access to the interior of
the coach or locomotive through the roof as preferable to roof hatches.
Should Tier I equipment safety standards include provisions for:
(1) Emergency lighting?
(2) Roof hatches or a clearly identified structural weak point
where properly equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access
through the roof?
(3) Minimum strength of seat attachment?
(4) Minimum strength and enclosed luggage compartments?
To what extent does passenger equipment currently have backup power
systems in place? What would it cost to install a backup power system?
What safety benefits would result from backup power systems?
How many coach units have backup emergency lighting? What would it
cost to install a backup emergency lighting system? What rationale is
used to determine whether a unit will have backup emergency lighting?
To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized? Please
explain.
What would it cost to install roof hatches or access areas on cars?
What options exist for enclosing existing luggage compartments? At
what cost? To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized
from enclosing luggage compartments? Please explain.
Safety Glazing
One of the issues addressed by existing regulations that bears on
the safety of passenger train occupants is exterior glazing. Because of
the complexity of the issues in this proceeding, satisfaction with
existing standards, and the need for coordination with freight
interests not represented on the Working Group, the Working Group has
expressed a reluctance to address glazing in this proceeding. In order
to determine whether to renew its request to the Working Group or
another advisory body to examine this issue, FRA seeks information on
incidents of glazing shattering or spalling that caused injuries to
occupants of passenger trains. Some perceived problems with current 49
CFR Part 223 requirements that have come to FRA's attention include the
following:
(1) The witness plate used for testing is too thick, allowing
spalling of pieces of glass large enough to cause injury;
(2) The impact test using a 24-pound cinder block is not
repeatable;
(3) Vendors need to be periodically recertified by an independent
testing laboratory; and
(4) The strength of the framing arrangement securing the glazing is
neither specified nor tested. (Amtrak has noted that it currently
requires glazing to be tested in its intended framing.)
Should FRA revise the glazing standards for conventional passenger
equipment to:
(1) Require testing with a thinner witness plate?
(2) Require a more repeatable impact test? If so, what should the
impact test requirement be?
(3) Require periodic recertification of vendors by an independent
testing laboratory?
(4) Address the strength of the glazing frame? If so, how could
this be practically done?
(5) Require increased strength, impact resistance, or bullet
penetration resistance?
What would the impact on glazing thickness and weight be if FRA
were to modify Part 223 as suggested above? To what extent should
interior glazing be considered in this proceeding? Are appropriate
reference standards already available? What benefits could be derived
from modifying Part 223 as suggested? What would be the cost to realize
these benefits?
Fire Safety
FRA does not have regulations covering fire safety of passenger
equipment. Current industry practice is to follow FRA guidelines
published in the Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54 FR 1837,
``Rail Passenger Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting
Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety Characteristics.'') Fire
resistance, detection, and suppression technologies have all advanced
since these guidelines were published. Amtrak follows more stringent
specifications for fire safety than found in FRA's guidelines. A trend
toward a systems approach to fire safety is evident in most countries
with modern rail systems. Are Federal regulations or more in-depth
guidelines needed to:
(1) Prevent fire or retard its growth?
(2) Detect and suppress fire?
(3) Protect occupants from the effects of fire?
Appendix B
To stimulate thought and generate discussion on passenger equipment
design standards, FRA is providing for consideration the detailed set
of equipment design provisions contained in Appendix B. From experience
with past ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and
higher quality comments on the specific issues in the proceeding. FRA
does not intend to implement the requirements given in Appendix B
without significant change based on the deliberations of the Working
Group, supplemented by information and views received in response to
this notice. FRA strongly encourages comments on these
[[Page 30697]]
provisions and proposals for alternative standards.
Standards for Tier II Equipment
For the past several years, FRA has held discussions with
manufacturers of foreign high-speed rail equipment seeking a market for
their equipment in the United States. These manufacturers sought a
clear definition of the requirements that their equipment must meet to
be allowed to operate in the United States. Because FRA recognizes
existing North American passenger equipment standards were not intended
to apply to equipment operating at speeds significantly over 100 mph,
and because current Federal regulations do not cover such operations,
FRA could not provide clear guidance. This has caused confusion, and
has led to the perception that competition for the American market is
risky.
Amtrak has hosted test and revenue service demonstrations of two
foreign, high-speed trainsets in the United States. Operating
experience gained in Europe and in the United States with these
trainsets helped place Amtrak in a position to develop a system
specification to procure trainsets to operate at speeds up to 150 mph
in the Northeast Corridor. FRA reviewed drafts of the procurement
specification for these trainsets and made safety-related
recommendations. The resulting discussions between Amtrak and FRA
highlighted the technical issues that must be resolved as part of the
process for developing safety standards for high-speed trainsets.
Sample high-speed passenger trainset design requirements are
outlined in Appendix B. FRA compiled this set of design requirements to
prepare for the review of Amtrak's system specification for high-speed
trainsets. FRA developed this set of proposed requirements based on
discussions with manufacturers and operators of European equipment,
research done or sponsored by the Volpe Center, experience gained in
developing a concept for a proposed rule specifically applicable to the
Texas TGV System, and the results of tests conducted jointly with
Amtrak on high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor. FRA
recognizes that some of the requirements push the state of the art. Of
particular interest to FRA are comments on the technical limits of
crash energy management systems and on how best to define or specify
crash energy management in a set of performance requirements. FRA
attempted to specify a crash energy management system by placing limits
on the acceleration experienced by passengers during the initial phase
of a collision. To design to such a requirement requires a reference
collision scenario with defined collision parameters. The advantage of
such an approach is that it is tied directly to the parameter most
responsible for injuries due to secondary impacts. Can an approach to
designate crash energy management requirements tied to a specific
design collision scenario be adequately defined to serve as the basis
for trainset design?
An alternate approach, advocated as less complex, is to specify the
minimum energy to be absorbed at each location in the trainset designed
to crush before occupied space crushes. Such an approach has the
advantage of not being tied to a design based on a collision scenario.
However, FRA believes that the main value of a crash energy management
design is to increase the duration of the collision, allowing train
occupants to decelerate more slowly, and minimize the uncontrolled
collapse of occupied space. The amount of energy absorbed is of
secondary importance.
FRA also believes that using ability to absorb energy as a crash
energy management design parameter does not focus on the real purpose
of the crash energy management system. FRA invites comments in this
area. Is the amount of energy that can be absorbed in a collision
actually a secondary issue to slower decelerations and more controlled
collapse?
If ability to absorb energy is used as the crash energy management
system performance parameter, what are the limits on controlled crush
distance and energy absorbed that can reasonably be expected to be
achieved? What causes these limitations? How can a performance standard
based on an ability to absorb energy be tied to an ability to decrease
the initial acceleration of train occupants which is the key parameter
for a crash energy management design? What flexibility is needed in
end-strength requirements of occupied versus unoccupied volume to allow
effective crash energy management system design?
A second safety-critical design feature of key interest to FRA is
the strength and construction of the end frame (or end structure) of
both power cars and coaches. As noted above, a unitized or monocoque
end structure with vertical members (collision post(s) and corner
posts) that extend to the roofline, with significant structural
strength where they are tied into the roofline, may be capable of
protecting crew space more effectively and with less weight penalty
than more traditional designs. FRA believes such an end structure may
play a significant role when override occurs to prevent crushing or
penetration of the occupied volume that it protects. When combined with
an effective crash energy management design, such an end structure
would be pushed back as a unit (similar to being mounted on a spring)
through the volume designed to crush.
Through the Working Group, FRA will pursue a thoughtful technical
discussion of such an approach including suggestions on how best to set
performance requirements and reasonable limits for design strengths.
Should a monocoque end structure--or equivalent structure--that ties
together the floor, collision posts, corner posts and roof into a
single structure be required or authorized for high speed passenger
trains? FRA welcomes proposed alternative approaches designed to
provide equivalent protection. What costs would be associated with
alternative approaches designed to prevent crushing or penetration of
the occupied volume in power and coach cars? Please be specific in
defining the alternative approach and its cost elements.
A third safety feature that needs a thorough technical review is
how to design the trainset to stay in line and on the track during the
initial phase of a collision to give the crash energy management system
an opportunity to perform its intended function. If the trainset
buckles laterally and leaves the track too soon, volumes designed to
crush will not be crushed, resulting in higher decelerations of
occupants, and possibly negating the significant structural protection
provided by end structures. If the trainset buckles vertically causing
early override, the protection provided by the underframe may be
bypassed. A discussion of the design innovations necessary to delay
buckling of the trainset as long as possible is needed.
What practical design techniques exist to delay either lateral or
vertical buckling of passenger trainsets involved in collisions? How
much would installation of alternative buckling delay systems cost in
terms of labor hours and materials?
As train speed increases, the human decision and reaction time
necessary to avoid potential calamity decreases. Automatic control
techniques that briefly take the operator out of the control loop are a
means to eliminate the human decision and reaction delays in situations
where taking quick and positive action can be crucial. FRA believes
technology can allow safety-critical parameters pertaining to the
following high-speed trainset
[[Page 30698]]
subsystems or events to be monitored by remote sensors:
(1) Truck hunting;
(2) Dynamic brake status;
(3) Friction brake status;
(4) Fire detection;
(5) Head-end power status;
(6) Alerter;
(7) Horn and bell;
(8) Wheel slip and wheel slide control; and
(9) Tilt control system, if equipped.
FRA intends to require monitoring of dynamic brake status. If the
friction brake of the trainset is designed to be able to safely handle
the entire braking load without assistance from the dynamic brake, the
dynamic brake may not be considered a primary safety-critical system.
FRA considered including bearing overheat in the above list.
However, the Working Group cautioned FRA that on-board bearing sensors
have proven to be unreliable. In the Working Group's view, until on-
board bearing sensor technology matures, the industry will continue to
rely on wayside bearing overheat detection.
Should automatic monitoring for each of the above events/subsystems
be required? Do other safety-critical subsystems/events lend themselves
to monitoring by remote sensors? Could safety be enhanced by requiring
an automatic response from the train control system--such as slowing
the train--when a monitored parameter falls outside pre-determined safe
limits? Which events/subsystems are prime candidates for some form of
initial automatic response followed by a return to operator or manual
control?
Seat arrangement design and passenger restraint systems have a
potential to reduce the number and the extent of injuries in the event
of a passenger train collision. This potential is present at all
speeds, but becomes greater as speed increases. A copy of a technical
paper 3 published by the Volpe Center describes a study of the
occupant dynamics and predicted fatalities due to secondary impact for
passengers involved in train collisions with impact speeds up to 140
mph. The principal focus of the paper is on the effectiveness of
alternative strategies for protecting occupants in train collisions,
including ``friendly'' interior arrangements and occupant restraints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant Survivability.''
See note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three different interior configurations were analyzed: forward-
facing seats in rows, facing rows of seats, and facing rows of seats
with a table. Two of these three configurations--the forward-facing
consecutive rows of seats and the facing rows of seats--were evaluated
with the occupant unrestrained, restrained with a seat belt alone, and
restrained with a seat belt and shoulder harness.
The injury criteria used to evaluate interior performance included
Head Injury Criteria (HIC), chest deceleration, and axial neck load.
Based upon these criteria, the probability of fatality resulting from
secondary impacts was evaluated for each of the interior configurations
and restraint systems modeled.
In some configurations, such as seats in rows, compartmentalization
is shown to be as effective as a restraint system for the 50th
percentile male occupant simulated. (As noted earlier,
``compartmentalization'' is an occupant protection strategy that
requires seats or restraining barriers to be positioned in a manner
that provides a compact, cushioned protection zone surrounding each
occupant.) FRA intends to work closely with the Working Group to
structure requirements for the interior of new passenger equipment that
take advantage of the compartmentalization concept.
In cases where occupants are allowed to travel relatively long
distances before impacting the interior, such as the facing-seats
interior, restrained occupants have a much greater chance of survival.
Fatalities from secondary impacts are not expected in any of the
scenarios modeled if the occupant is restrained with a lap belt and
shoulder harness.
Design approaches for passenger coaches that exploit this potential
are needed. FRA briefed the Working Group on this research, and the
Working Group has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
passenger restraint systems (primarily lap belts) and coach interior
arrangement design to mitigate injuries. Effectiveness of restraint
systems can be dependent on the strength of the seat attachment to the
car body. A possible worst case scenario exists when a seat containing
a belted passenger is struck from behind by an unbelted passenger. Such
a situation can require the seat attachment design to carry a double
load.
If the seat is to remain attached under the above conditions during
a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph, analysis indicates that
coach-seat attachment strength must be able to resist the inertial
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat, plus the mass of the belted
passenger(s), plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) in
the following seat being decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph
against the seat back.
Should lap belts be required? Should all seating be rear facing?
Should facing seating be allowed? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of placing tables between facing seats? What are
reasonable performance requirements for padding materials? Where should
padding materials be located? What shock-absorbing characteristics
should be required of padding material? What padding thicknesses are
practical? What seat attachment strength can reasonably be expected to
be achieved?
What seat configurations do passenger cars operating at speeds
greater than 80 mph have? If configurations vary, please explain the
differences and the reasons for the variations. How many seats does the
average passenger car have? If there is no such thing as an average
passenger car, how many seats do the different types of passenger cars
have? How many cars of different types are there?
What costs would be involved with installing lap belts, shoulder
harnesses, and other safety restraints on passenger cars? To what
extent would safety benefits be realized from installing safety
restraints? Please explain. A review of the technical papers placed in
the docket may help with responses to some of these questions.
Due to the forward location of the operator of a high-speed
passenger train, he or she is often the person closest to the point of
impact and at most risk during a collision. Special provisions are
required to protect the operator. How much crushable space can
practically be located forward of the operator? Should a lap belt/
shoulder harness combination be provided for each crew member in the
cab? If lap belts/shoulder harnesses are provided for crew members,
will they wear them?
NTSB has long advocated special protective crash refuges (protected
areas) for locomotive crew members. ADL has done computer modeling to
predict the effectiveness of two types of crash refuge concepts under
dynamic conditions simulating locomotive collisions. One of these
concepts is a padded trench in the floor of the locomotive in front of
the electrical cabinets. Such a trench could be equipped with restraint
systems. The other concept is a seat equipped with a lap belt and
shoulder harness that rotates and locks in a reverse position allowing
the operator to ride out the collision in a rear-facing position. (A
report by ADL describing these concepts is part of the docket.4)
Advanced versions of some European trains
[[Page 30699]]
employ a concept where the operator's position is designed to be pushed
to the rear, relative to the rest of the cab, to provide the operator
additional protection during a collision. Could any of these concepts
be implemented into the design of new passenger equipment? Would they
be effective? Would they be used?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Research,'' Volumes 1-4,
DOT-VNTSC-FRA-95-4.1, Final Report July, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are some alternative concepts for the design of such
protective refuges? Are they likely to be effective? Are they likely to
be used? What impact would they have on locomotive or power car design?
Should FRA require them as part of high-speed trainset design
requirements? What other, perhaps more practical means exist to reduce
the vulnerability of the cab crew to collisions? In terms of time,
materials, and labor, what would installation of refuges in locomotives
cost?
Lack of an accepted, recognized design tool (computer model) to
predict changes in trainset performance as well as changes in the
ability to protect people as trainset design parameters are changed
inhibits exploiting new design techniques that could result in safer
trainsets. Research by the Volpe Center on the structural response of
portions of the vehicle to the extremely high loads associated with a
collision, and research by AAR to accurately predict the performance of
suspension systems to changing track conditions, have contributed
greatly toward the goal of developing accepted analytical tools.
However, efforts need to be increased and focused on a common goal.
Because full-scale crash testing of passenger equipment is
prohibitively expensive, the development of a design tool that is
widely accepted by the industry is essential. Such a tool could
accelerate investigations of composite materials that hold promise for
increased strength at less weight than current materials. A tool of
this type could aid research into utilizing high-strength, light-weight
composite materials and other technologies to provide operational and
safety benefits.
FRA seeks comment from the industry on what the current state of
the art is regarding modeling techniques for trainset collisions. Up to
what trainset speeds are current models capable of predicting the
collision mechanics of a trainset collision? What confidence levels can
be expected with these models to predict the onset of override and
train set buckling? Are these models capable of accurately predicting
the acceleration levels in the trainset throughout the collision,
particularly for the first 250 milliseconds?
FRA also seeks input from the industry on the potential for such
models to replace full-scale crash testing. Have the current models
that are being used been validated by full-scale, partial-scale or
component impact testing? Will it be necessary to validate new models
by test? Are there limitations as to what type of accident scenarios
existing models are capable of analyzing?
The accuracy of the modeling techniques employed is dependent on
the individual vehicle and trainset crush characteristics used as input
to the models. What means should be used to quantify large deformation
and dynamic crush characteristics of the various parts of a trainset?
Can this be achieved through simulation alone? Has the industry
developed dynamic force-deflection characteristics for existing North
American rolling stock that could be used as a reference in FRA
crashworthiness studies? If these characteristics are available, for
what speeds of collision would they be valid?
What are the essential features of such a modeling tool? How can it
be developed so it will receive wide acceptance, be credible and be
used within the industry?
FRA outlines a sample set of detailed design requirements for high-
speed passenger trainsets in Appendix B to provoke thought and
discussion on these and other technical issues that need to be resolved
to develop high- speed trainset safety standards. As with the
conventional equipment design standards, FRA is pursuing an intentional
strategy by providing this level of detail. From experience with past
ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and higher
quality comments. FRA does not intend to implement the requirements
given in Appendix B without significant change based on the
recommendations of the Working Group, supplemented by the information
and views obtained in response to this ANPRM. FRA strongly encourages
comments on these provisions and proposals for alternative standards.
Again, comments from interests represented on the Working Group should,
to the maximum extent possible, be expressed through those
representatives during the Working Group's deliberations.
FRA seeks comment from technically knowledgeable individuals on the
initial set of design standards for high-speed passenger trainsets
outlined in Appendix B. FRA recognizes that these standards would
preclude operation of several existing high-speed trainsets in the
United States without structural design changes. FRA believes that
because these trainsets were designed for a much less severe operating
environment, and because the American public demands and deserves the
safest possible transportation system, attention is warranted for
further development of North American standards. Do alternative
approaches exist to safety standards for high-speed trainsets that
could provide an equivalent level of safety at less cost?
Possibility of Design Standards for Other Tiers of Equipment
Amtrak and some commuter railroads have a long operating experience
safely running trains of existing equipment at speeds between 80 and
125 mph. Much of this equipment is the same equipment--designed to the
same standards--used for conventional service (herein defined as
service at speeds less than 80 mph.) This practice supports the notion
that the same set of design requirements used for conventional
equipment is adequate for intermediate-speed equipment (i.e., equipment
designed for service at speeds up to 125 mph). However, components wear
faster and are subject to higher dynamic, mechanical, and thermal
stresses at higher speeds. Perhaps more steps need to be added to the
pre-departure safety inspection for intermediate-speed equipment.
Perhaps maintenance intervals need to be more frequent and/or have more
tasks performed as part of the preventive maintenance program. FRA
seeks information on how inspection, testing, and maintenance programs
for intermediate-speed equipment should differ from those used for
conventional equipment.
If the designation between tiers were based solely on operating
speed, design or performance requirements for intermediate speed
equipment should logically fall between the requirements for
conventional equipment and the requirements for high-speed equipment
(i.e., equipment designed for service at speeds up to 150 mph).
Analysis by the Volpe Center shows a crash energy management design
provides significant benefits in terms of passenger and crew protection
over conventional designs as collision speeds increase to over 70 mph.
This suggests new intermediate- speed equipment would benefit from a
crash energy management design approach.
If standards based on more than two tiers are developed, FRA
currently believes design requirements for new intermediate-speed
equipment should include the requirements for conventional equipment
and some of the (possibly modified) requirements for high-speed
equipment. The following criteria suggested for consideration for
[[Page 30700]]
high-speed equipment may have applicability to intermediate-speed
equipment:
(1) Glazing requirements;
(2) Crash refuge for cab crew;
(3) Crash energy management system--perhaps to modified performance
standards;
(4) Interior arrangement or restraint systems to mitigate secondary
impacts; and
(5) Emergency systems.
FRA seeks comment from builders and operators of intermediate-speed
equipment as to where the design requirements for such equipment should
be placed on the spectrum between the design requirements for
conventional equipment and the design requirements for high-speed
equipment.
Design Standards for Systems with Dedicated Rights-of-Way and No At-
Grade Crossings
FRA recognizes that a system safety program that places emphasis on
the prevention of collisions is highly desirable. However, fundamental
changes are necessary in the North American railroad operating
environment before accident prevention provisions allow equipment
structural design standards to be relaxed. The main problem is North
American passenger trains generally share, or operate adjacent to, the
rights-of-way with an ever-increasing number of very heavy freight
trains, and most passenger rail routes include at-grade crossings used
by heavy highway vehicles. The risk to passengers and crew members in
this operating environment increases as passenger train speed
increases.
FRA encourages passenger systems to operate over dedicated rights-
of-way with no at-grade crossings. FRA believes such systems can
potentially provide the safest means of high-speed passenger
transportation. Should proposed vehicle crashworthiness standards be
modified for such operations? If so, to what degree? Should
consideration of equipment used exclusively on dedicated rights-of-way
be undertaken as part of this proceeding or through a system safety
approach in individual proceedings for rules of specific applicability?
Discussion of Operating Issues
Commuter Equipment and Operations
FRA is aware that unique features of some commuter equipment and
the unique operating cycle of commuter railroads may require specific
attention. Some commuter equipment is stored at outlying locations
overnight to be in position for the first morning trip into the major
city being served. Mechanical employees are generally not available at
these outlying locations to do pre-departure safety inspections. At
those outlying points where mechanical employees are not available, an
abbreviated initial daily safety inspection is generally performed by
train crew members.
During the middle of the day, the pace of commuter operations
generally slows, and the equipment is brought to a central location for
a more comprehensive inspection by mechanical personnel prior to being
dispatched for the evening rush hour. This reality of the commuter
operating cycle must be taken into account for any proposed rules
governing pre-departure safety inspections of commuter equipment.
However, where mechanical employees and facilities are available to
perform the pre-departure inspection, it must be performed by
mechanical employees. Equipment that receives an abbreviated inspection
by the train crew at outlying points at the beginning of the day must
receive a complete pre-departure inspection by mechanical employees at
the earliest opportunity during the day.
Some of the MU equipment operated by commuter railroads is very
different from intercity rail passenger equipment. FRA needs the help
of the operators of such equipment to identify the differences that may
require special regulatory treatment to avoid unintended impacts on
commuter operations. Through participation of APTA on the Working
Group, FRA anticipates that commuter railroads will make a special
effort to point out unique operating or equipment features that should
be taken into account to develop safety standards for commuter
equipment.
Information available to FRA suggests that nationwide there are
about 20 commuter railroads operating roughly 5,400 passenger cars, 400
cab cars, 2,000 multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400 conventional
locomotives. Are these estimates accurate? What size crews operate
commuter trains? Approximately how many people stand on each train? As
a result of implementing the proposed standards, would commuter
operators realize different levels of safety benefits than intercity
operators? Please explain.
Cab Car Forward and Risk
FRA is concerned regarding operation of passenger trains with cab
cars or MU locomotives positioned at the head of the train at high
speeds. Such operations place the train operator and the passengers in
the lead vehicle at inherently greater risk than operating the trainset
with a locomotive or power car leading. Current designs of cab cars and
MU locomotives provide little structural protection to the operator and
forward-most passengers in the event of a head-on or side-swipe
collision. Cab car locomotives and passenger MU locomotives are
structurally equivalent from a crashworthiness standpoint. (Amtrak has
noted that not all cab car locomotives should be considered equivalent
to MU locomotives when the cab cars are not equipped with stairway
traps in the leading end, such as in the X2000 train).
Computer modeling of passenger train collisions at high speeds by
the Volpe Center predicts a dramatic increase in casualties in head-on
collisions of trainsets operated with a cab car forward when compared
to the same collision with a power car or locomotive leading. This
prediction is based on a limited number of hypothetical accident
scenarios. The prediction is not based on accident statistics. The
technical papers 5 documenting these predictions are part of the
docket.
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5 ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for
Passenger Trains''; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant
Survivability.'' See note 2.
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Recent accidents involving trains operating with cab cars in the
forward position have heightened FRA's concern. On February 9, 1996, a
near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., (NJTR) trains 1254 and 1107 on the borderline of
Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two crewmembers and one passenger
were fatally injured, and an additional 162 passengers reported minor
injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the injuries occurred on
train 1254, which was operating with the cab control car forward and
the locomotive pushing. In addition, the engineer on train 1254 was
fatally injured.
On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred between
Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak train
29 on CSX Transportation, Inc., at Silver Spring, Maryland. The MARC
train consisted of a cab control car in the lead, followed by two
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The accident
resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crewmembers and 8 passengers
who were located in the MARC cab car, and at least 13 non-fatal
injuries to other passengers of the MARC train.
Following these accidents, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20,
Notice
[[Page 30701]]
No. 1, on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately
enhance passenger train operating rules and emergency egress, and to
develop a more comprehensive interim system safety plan addressing cab
car forward and MU operations that do not have either cab signal,
automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. 61 FR 6876,
Feb. 22, 1996. FRA subsequently issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order
No. 20 on February 29, 1996, to refine three aspects of the original
order. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
NTSB recommends that MU cars and control cab locomotives be
equipped with corner posts to provide greater structural protection
from a side-swipe collision. NTSB makes this recommendation based on
the findings of the investigation of a passenger train collision that
occurred on January 18, 1993, in which Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District (NICTD) eastbound commuter train 7 and NICTD
westbound commuter train 12 collided in a corner-to-corner impact in
Gary, Indiana, resu
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