Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems

Federal RegisterJun 4, 1996

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. 74-09; Notice 45]

RIN 2127-AF46

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule, and a companion rule issued by the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), address the use of child harnesses and backless

child restraints in aircraft. This document amends a provision in

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ``Child Restraint

Systems,'' that permits those restraints to be certified for use in

both motor vehicles and aircraft.

Under the current FAA regulations, aircraft-certified child

restraints may be used on aircraft. However, because testing has raised

FAA's concerns about the safety of using harnesses and backless child

restraint systems on the types of seats found in aircraft, FAA is

publishing a rule in today's Federal Register that prohibits the use of

booster seats, and vest- and harness-type child restraint systems on

aircraft during take off, landing and movement on the surface, even if

these restraints are certified for aircraft use.

In view of the FAA's determination that harnesses and booster seats

are unsuitable for use during significant portions of a flight, the

agency believes continuing to permit the certification of those

restraints for aircraft use would be inconsistent and likely confusing

to the public. Accordingly, this rule no longer permits those

restraints to be certified for aircraft use, and instead requires

manufacturers to label these restraints as not certified for use in

aircraft.

DATES: This rule is effective on September 3, 1996.

Petitions for reconsideration of the rule must be received by July

19, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should refer to the docket and

number of this document and be submitted to: Administrator, Room 5220,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, D.C., 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For nonlegal issues: Dr. George

Mouchahoir, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards (telephone 202-366-4919,

fax 202-366-4329). For legal issues: Ms. Deirdre Fujita, Office of the

Chief Counsel (telephone 202-366-2992, fax 202-366-3820). Both can be

reached at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street SW., Washington, D.C., 20590. For information on FAA's

rule, contact Ms. Donell Pollard (AFS-203), Air Transportation

Division, Flight Standards Service (telephone 202-267-3735), Federal

Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D.C.,

20591.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This document amends the provision in

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213, ``Child Restraint

Systems,'' that permits child restraint systems to be certified for use

in both motor vehicles and aircraft. This rule complements an FAA rule,

published elsewhere in today's Federal Register, that withdraws

approval for the use of booster seats and vest- and harness-type child

restraint systems on aircraft, and prohibits airlines from permitting a

child to be restrained in such a restraint during take off, landing,

and movement on the surface, even if the restraint is certified for

aircraft use. The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on which this

NHTSA rule is based was published at 60 FR 30696 (June 9, 1995).

Harnesses and booster seats are types of child restraint systems

regulated by Standard 213. A harness typically consists of a vest or a

series of straps that form a vest-like garment, that attaches at the

back of the harness to a vehicle seat's lap belt. Harnesses are

generally intended for children who weigh from 25 to 50 pounds. Some

require the use of a tether strap to supplement the lap belt. The

restraint that the FAA refers to as a ``booster seat'' is a ``backless

child restraint system'' under Standard 213. (See definitions of

``booster seat'' and ``backless child restraint system'' in S4 of FMVSS

213.) A ``backless child restraint system'' is one of two types of

booster seat.1 A backless child restraint has a structural element

(typically a shield) designed to restrain forward motion of the child's

torso in a frontal crash. Backless child restraint systems are

generally intended for children weighing from 30 to 60 pounds. Backless

child restraint systems are also known as ``backless booster seats'' or

``shield-type'' booster seats.

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\1\ The other type of booster seat is the ``belt positioning

seat,'' which is intended for use by children weighing from 30 to 60

pounds, and designed for use with a lap/shoulder belt system.

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Background

Standard 213 permits manufacturers to certify their restraints

2 for aircraft use if they are certified for use in motor vehicles

and meet an additional requirement, an inversion test. The provisions

permitting such certification were added to the standard in 1984 (49 FR

34357; August 30, 1984), partly in response to suggestions of the

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that DOT simplify its

standards for the performance of child restraints on aircraft by

combining all technical requirements into a single standard (NTSB

Safety Recommendations A-83-1, February 24, 1983). Prior to the

amendment, FAA had its own child restraint standard, Technical Standard

Order C100 (TSO C100). TSO C100 and FMVSS 213 had different performance

requirements, methods of certification and testing procedures.

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\2\ The ``belt positioning'' booster seat is not eligible for

such certification. FMVSS No. 213 does not permit these restraints

to be certified for aircraft use because aircraft passenger seats

typically lack shoulder belts. See amendment of FMVSS 213 to permit

manufacture of belt-positioning child seats (59 FR 37167; July 21,

1994).

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In the 1984 rulemaking, NHTSA and FAA concluded that the DOT child

restraint requirements should be consolidated in FMVSS 213 and that a

TSO C100 inversion test was the only performance requirement from the

FAA standard that needed to be incorporated into FMVSS 213. In the

inversion test, the combination of a child restraint, test dummy and

aircraft passenger seat is rotated forward at a specified speed to an

inverted position and held there, and later rotated sideways at the

same speed and held. During the test, the child restraint must not fall

out of the aircraft safety belt and the test dummy must not fall out of

the child restraint.

Prior to the 1984 rulemaking, a manufacturer wishing to designate a

child restraint model as suitable for use in aircraft had to submit

information to FAA to obtain its approval of the model. As a result of

this pre-1984 approval process, there was a disparity between the

number of child restraints available

[[Page 28424]]

for use in motor vehicles and the number available for use in aircraft.

In 1984, approximately 28 models of child restraints were produced

under FMVSS 213 for use in motor vehicles. The child restraint

manufacturers obtained TSO authorizations for only five of the 28

models, or only 16 percent of the total production of child restraints.

The lack of FAA approval of most motor vehicle child restraints for

use in aircraft aroused several safety concerns. One was that some

families traveling by air were discouraged from taking unapproved child

restraints with them and thus did not have them available for use at

their destination to protect their children while the family was

driving. The other concern was that those families who nevertheless

took their unapproved child restraints on trips had to stow the

restraints in the aircraft cargo compartment, and thus were not able to

use them to protect their children during the flight.

The effect of the 1984 rulemaking was to speed certification of

child restraints for use in aircraft, and thereby increase the

availability of aircraft-certified child restraints. Since then,

manufacturers have been able, under FMVSS 213, to certify their child

restraints for aircraft use by ensuring that they pass all of the

standard's motor vehicle requirements and the inversion test. As a

result, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of child

restraints certified for use in aircraft.

FAA complemented NHTSA's rulemaking by amending its Federal

Aviation Regulations (FARs)(14 CFR Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135) to

provide for the in-flight use of aircraft-certified child restraints.

The amendments required the air carriers to allow the use of any child

restraint having a label indicating that it is certified to FMVSS 213,

manufactured under the standards of the United Nations, or approved by

a foreign government, as long as the restraint can be secured to a

forward-facing passenger seat. An infant or child who is accompanied by

a parent, guardian, or properly designated attendant and who is

properly placed in a device that meets the labeling requirements of the

FARs and that, in turn, is properly secured in an approved aircraft

seat using the safety belt, has been considered by FAA to comply with

its regulations requiring each person to occupy an approved seat during

takeoff and landing.

There are currently many different types of child restraint systems

that are certified as complying with FMVSS 213's motor vehicle and

aircraft requirements, and thus permitted by FAA for use on aircraft.

In addition to harnesses and shield boosters, these systems included

``infant seats,'' which position an infant so that the baby faces

toward the rear of the motor vehicle or aircraft; and ``convertible''

child seats, which convert so that they can be used rear-facing with

infants and forward-facing with toddlers. In addition, there are

restraint systems that are certified for use in airplanes by foreign

countries.

FAA Withdrawal of Approval

Elsewhere in today's Federal Register, FAA is withdrawing approval

for the use of booster seats and vest- and harness-type child restraint

systems on aircraft, and prohibiting airlines from permitting a child

to be restrained in such a restraint during take off, landing, and

movement on the surface. The FAA is also emphasizing the existing

prohibition in all aircraft against the use of lap held child

restraints, such as belly belts.3

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\ 3\ Belly belts restrain a small child on the lap of an adult

and consist of a short loop of webbing with buckle hardware on the

ends. The belt is buckled around the child's abdomen and is secured

to the adult's safety belt by routing the adult's safety belt

through a small loop of webbing sewn on the belly belt. Belly belts

are certified for airplane use by the Civil Aviation Authority of

the United Kingdom. However, belly belts cannot meet the performance

requirements of FMVSS 213 and therefore have not been certified for

use in the United States.

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FAA's action responds to research by its Civil Aeromedical

Institute (CAMI). The CAMI research is discussed in a report entitled,

``The Performance of Child Restraint Devices in Transport Airplane

Passenger Seats,'' a copy of which has been placed in NHTSA rulemaking

docket 74-09, notice 41. (Persons wishing to obtain a copy of the

report should contact FAA at the address given in the ``For Further

Information'' section at the beginning of this final rule document.)

CAMI dynamically tested six types of restraining devices: child

harnesses, booster seats, rear-facing infant seats, convertible child

restraint systems, airplane seat lap belts, and belly belts. The first

four devices were evaluated for their ability to fit and adjust to an

airplane passenger seat and lap belt. The lap belt was evaluated for

its ability to secure test dummies representative of children two and

three years old. Fit and adjustment was not considered an issue for the

installation of the belly belt. All of the devices were evaluated for

their performance in aircraft seats with and without ``breakover'' seat

backs (a breakover feature allows the seat back to rotate forward

easily when impacted by an occupant from behind). They were also

evaluated, using anthropomorphic test dummies representing children,

for their ability to limit occupant head excursion, head and chest

accelerations and abdominal forces. In addition, the test program

evaluated the effect that the impact load of an ``aft row occupant''

had on the performance of a child restraint located in an aircraft seat

immediately in front of the aft row occupant. The aft row occupant

impact load was generated in tests called ``double row tests,'' using

an adult test dummy placed in the aft row seat.

Booster Seat Tests

CAMI tested four models of shield-type booster seats in six dynamic

tests, three of which involved single row tests, and the other three,

double row tests. With regard to fit and adjustment of the booster

seats to the airplane seat chosen for testing purposes, CAMI found that

three had fit and adjustment problems. One booster seat had problems

fitting an airplane seat because of the limited width between arm rests

on the passenger seat. This may have occurred because of the difference

in width between the representative aircraft seat (about 20 inches

wide) used in FMVSS 213 and the aircraft seat (17.25 inches wide) used

in the CAMI testing. Two booster seats had incompatibility problems

between the buckle/webbing path molded in the front shield and the

airplane web path and buckle position of the lap belt on the airplane

passenger seat used by CAMI. In fact, the webbing could not be

installed over the front shield in accordance with the positioning

instruction of the booster seats' manufacturers. CAMI also found that

one of the four booster seats failed structurally, and two of the

others allowed forward head excursion in excess of the 32-inch distance

permitted by FMVSS 213.

CAMI also found a problem with the loads that the child dummies

restrained in the tested booster seats experienced when the boosters

were on a seat with a breakover seat back and exposed to loads from the

aft row occupant. Its tests showed that loads from an aft row adult

occupant resulted in an increase in abdominal loading of the dummy in a

booster seat, as compared to the abdominal loading of a dummy in an

aircraft lap belt with an adult aft-row occupant. The CAMI study states

that, when placed in a seat with a breakover seat back, the booster

seat encounters problems because:

With no back shell, the typical booster seat does not provide

protection from the forces transmitted by the airplane seat back

during horizontal impact conditions. Traditionally, restraint

systems in airplanes have been designed to avoid loads transmitted

to the soft tissues of the abdomen. A child

[[Page 28425]]

restrained in a booster seat may be forced against the rigid shield

due to the seat back breakover action. For the intended size of

children in booster seats, the load path of these breakover forces

may include the abdominal region.

It is to be noted that CAMI also found that the abdominal loads on

a child dummy placed in a shield-type booster seat secured to an

airplane seat with a locked seat back were higher than on a child dummy

secured in a typical airplane seat lap belt with a locked seat back.

The FAA recognized, however, that there are no accepted criteria to

assess the relationship between differences in measured levels of

abdominal loadings and any resulting risk of abdominal injury, and the

type and severity of such injury.

Harness Tests

CAMI tested one type of harness restraint. The restraint consisted

of a torso vest with straps over the shoulders and around the waist,

and a crotch strap. The shoulder and abdomen straps were attached to a

rectangular metal plate on the back of the restraint. The airplane lap

belts were routed through a loop of webbing attached to the metal back

plate on the restraint.

The restraint was tested with a three-year-old test dummy in two

single row tests. CAMI found incompatibility problems between the

harness and the airplane seat lap belts:

With the lap belts adjusted to the minimum length, the [harness]

could be moved forward approximately 7 inches before tension was

developed in the belts. This was considered unsatisfactory for

testing.

CAMI also found grossly excessive excursion of the child

anthropomorphic test dummy (ATD) restrained in the harness:

The ATD moved forward and over the front edge of the seat

cushion and proceeded to submarine toward the floor. Elasticity in

the webbing of the harness and the lap belts then heaved the ATD

rearward. The force pulling the ATD back into the seat appeared to

be applied by the Gz [crotch] strap directly through the pubic

symphysis of the pelvic bone.

Based on this finding, CAMI concluded that a harness performs

poorly in protecting the child occupant.

Proposal and Comments

Based on these test results, the FAA proposed to withdraw approval

for the use of harnesses and booster seats on aircraft. 60 FR 30690,

June 9, 1995. At the same time, NHTSA issued an NPRM to amend FMVSS 213

to require manufacturers to label harnesses and backless booster seats

as not for aircraft use. The standard already requires that belt-

positioning booster seats be so labeled. The agency issued the proposal

on the basis that, in view of the FAA's determination that harnesses

and booster seats are unsuitable for use during significant portions of

a flight, continuing to permit the certification of those restraints

for aircraft use would be inconsistent and likely confusing to the

public.

NHTSA received one comment on its rulemaking proposal. The

commenter was the Air Transport Association of America (ATA),

representing its U.S. passenger carrying airline members. The ATA

comment responded to both the NHTSA and FAA proposals. FAA received

nine other comments on its proposal.

With regard to ATA's comment on the agencies' proposals, except as

noted below, ATA focused mainly on issues relating to the proposed FAA

provisions for implementing the contemplated ban. The commenter

particularly directed its comments toward what ATA believed were

potential difficulties the airlines (``carriers'') may experience in

enforcing it. ATA believed carriers should not be placed in the role of

``policing compliance'' with the proposed requirements, suggesting

instead ``a more informational role.'' ATA was concerned that some

passengers might insist on using a banned restraint, and might be

confused by the fact that their restraint might be certified for

aircraft use. (NHTSA's rule will affect restraints that are

manufactured on or after the effective date of the rule. Restraints

that were manufactured before the effective date and that were

certified for aircraft use bear a label that the restraint is so

certified.) ATA stated that,

It has been the practice of several airlines that when

confronted with an appropriately labeled device that is not actually

approved for use (e.g., belly belts) to advise the passenger of that

fact and to attempt to discourage the use of the device. For the

most part, these efforts are successful. In the unusual case,

however, where a passenger insists upon the use of the device (often

citing the ``appropriate label'' as allowing this use) the practice

is to avoid confrontation and permit the use if that is the only

remaining alternative. In light of the new increasing numbers of

devices with regard to which this type of experience is to be

expected, the rule obviously must take into account the

practicalities of this real world experience and provide for this

type of situation without threat of penalty to the carrier.

(Emphasis in text.)

For FAA's response to this and other comments from the ATA on

requirements proposed by FAA, readers should refer to the FAA final

rule (published concurrently with this rule, in today's Federal

Register). That document also discusses FAA's responses to the other

nine comments on its NPRM, including those from industry groups,

aviation authorities, air carriers and child restraint manufacturers.

ATA's comment was pertinent to NHTSA in two respects. First, it

provides support for NHTSA's rulemaking, in that it indicates that

confusion is not only likely, but has in fact resulted from a

discrepancy between a manufacturer's assertion about the suitability of

a restraint for aircraft and the FAA's determination that it is not. By

preventing manufacturers from labeling booster seats and harnesses as

appropriate for aircraft use, NHTSA's rule will reduce the potential

for confusion to the extent possible.

In addition, ATA also stated that it believed that ``before final

action is taken on this rulemaking,'' FAA and NHTSA must explain how

this rulemaking relates to a ``larger issue.'' While ATA was unclear

defining the ``larger issue,'' it appears that ATA is concerned about

possible fit and adjustment problems between the airplane seat and

restraint systems that can continue to be certified for and used in

aircraft, in the aftermath of today's rule. For example, the CAMI

report found that some forward facing convertible restraints could not

be secured satisfactorily in the airplane passenger seat used for

testing purposes.

FAA and NHTSA believe this issue was addressed in the NPRMs. As

discussed there, in view of the problems revealed by the CAMI testing,

NHTSA and FAA will consider a separate rulemaking to assess the need to

improve FMVSS 213's requirements for aircraft-certified child

restraints other than harnesses and booster seats. The agencies are

developing possible requirements and procedures that could improve the

assessment of the performance of child restraint systems in the

aircraft environment. Among other issues, the agencies will consider

whether the seat assembly used under FMVSS 213 in testing child

restraints for aircraft use sufficiently represents an aircraft

passenger seat.4 The agencies are proceeding with this assessment.

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\4\ Child restraints certified as complying with FMVSS 213's

aircraft requirements are currently tested on a ``representative

aircraft passenger seat'' (S7.3 of FMVSS 213). FMVSS 213 also

specifies that FAA approved aircraft safety belts are used to test

child restraints that are certified to the aircraft requirements.

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[[Page 28426]]

Other Issues

In undertaking the current rulemaking, NHTSA recognized that a rule

restricting the use of child restraints in aircraft could affect the

use of the restraints in motor vehicles. In the 1984 rulemaking that

allowed child restraints to be certified for use in motor vehicles and

aircraft, NHTSA recognized that parents might not use child restraints

to transport their children in a vehicle to and from the airport if the

child restraint could not be used on the aircraft. The data indicated

that child safety was not a critical issue for aircraft in terms of the

number of child deaths or injuries, but that it was a large problem for

motor vehicles. Many State laws that require the use of child seats in

motor vehicles do not cover all the ages of children that might use

booster seats. NHTSA was concerned that, if booster seats may not be

used on aircraft, and if parents are not willing to stow them with

their luggage, there is a possibility that the restraints could be left

home altogether and thus not used to restrain a child in the vehicle.

It was suggested that the number of child injuries in motor vehicle

accidents might increase because of this non-use.

In issuing the NPRM, NHTSA reached a tentative conclusion that

restricting the use of booster seats and harnesses on aircraft would

not adversely affect motor vehicle safety by increasing the numbers of

unrestrained children in vehicles. While NHTSA requested comments on

how it should assess this issue, no comment was received. The agency

has decided to proceed with this rulemaking in view of the lack of

information indicating that the rulemaking will reduce the use of child

restraints during the ground portion of a trip. However, the agencies

will monitor the situation for a possible degradation of motor vehicle

safety.

After considering ATA's comment on the rulemaking and other

pertinent information, NHTSA has decided to adopt the requirements

proposed in the NPRM, without change. This amendment to Standard 213

will remove the possibility that a restraint could be certified for

aircraft use despite the fact the FAA has prohibited such use of that

restraint. This amendment reduces the likelihood of confusion and

misunderstanding on the part of consumers, and makes the FAA and NHTSA

requirements consistent.

However, for clarification purposes, NHTSA emphasizes the following

points about the use and performance of child restraints. First, there

are significant differences between the seating environment of motor

vehicles and that of aircraft. Because of those differences, the

problems encountered with child restraint use in aircraft are not

encountered with child restraint use in motor vehicles. Therefore,

notwithstanding this rule, the use of harnesses and booster seats in

motor vehicles continues to be important for child safety.

The problems reported by CAMI, i.e., the combined effects of

aircraft seatback breakover designs and aft occupant impacts, are not

encountered in motor vehicles. The seat back in a motor vehicle is

designed to remain fixed in a crash and not ``breakover'' in the manner

of an airplane seat. Also, a vehicle seat containing a child restraint

is less likely to be impacted from the rear by an adult than is an

aircraft seat containing a child restraint. There are several reasons

for this. First, child restraints are recommended for use in the rear

instead of front vehicle seating positions. Thus, if a child restraint

is installed as recommended, there will not, in most cases, be any

passenger rearward of the child restraint who could impact and load the

seat containing the child restraint in the event of a frontal crash.

Exceptions would be in vehicles, such as vans and some station wagons,

which have three rows of seats. Second, if there were a passenger

seated behind the seat containing a child restraint, and that person

were sitting in an outboard seating position, the person most likely

would have a lap/shoulder belt system available for use. Most aircraft

lack shoulder belts. If the vehicle passenger were restrained by that

belt system, the person would not load the seat with the child

restraint in the manner observed in the CAMI study. Third, given the

number of persons typically carried in a motor vehicle, it is unlikely

there would be an adult seated behind a child in a child restraint,

regardless of the number or pattern of seats in the vehicle.

Further, harnesses and other child restraints are tested under

FMVSS 213 on a seat assembly that is representative of a motor vehicle

seat, and that is equipped with a safety belt representative of the lap

belt in the center rear seating position. In its compliance testing,

the agency has not found a problem between the vehicle lap belt and a

child harness such as that found by CAMI between an airplane lap belt

and a harness. In addition, NHTSA has not found in its compliance

testing the type of fit and adjustment problems between booster seats

and the vehicle seats that CAMI found between booster seats and the

aircraft seats.

Booster seats could fit better on motor vehicles than aircraft in

part because of the design of the belt restraints with which the

boosters are attached to the automobile. The position of the buckle for

an aircraft seat belt assembly is very different from that of a buckle

for a vehicle seat belt assembly. An aircraft seat belt assembly is

designed so that when it is buckled, the buckle is located midway

between the anchorages, in front of the user's abdomen. A motor vehicle

lap/shoulder belt or lap-only belt is designed so that the buckle is

located to the side of the user's torso, near the hip, when the belt is

buckled.

Another reason for believing that the problems reported by CAMI are

not indicative of the performance of child restraints in motor vehicles

is the difference between the crash pulse used by CAMI and the crash

pulse used in FMVSS 213 testing. In its testing of head excursion, head

and chest acceleration and abdominal forces, CAMI used a crash pulse

appropriate for aircraft. FMVSS 213 testing, by contrast, involves the

use of a motor vehicle crash pulse.

Compliance Date

The compliance date for this rule is in 90 days. There is good

cause for this short compliance date. It is the same as that of FAA's

rule that withdraws approval of boosters and harnesses for use on

aircraft. The effective date for the agencies' rules should be

identical since the two rulemaking actions complement each other. FAA

seeks to restrict the use of boosters and harnesses on aircraft as

expeditiously as possible to address what that agency has concluded to

be a possible safety problem. NHTSA's rule minimizes the potential for

confusion and misunderstanding on the part of consumers, by preventing

manufacturers from certifying boosters and harnesses for aircraft use

when in fact FAA does not approve of those restraints for such use.

Given the above, a 90-day effective date is in the public interest.

Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

NHTSA has evaluated the impacts of this rule and has determined

that it is significant within the meaning of the Department of

Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures. The rulemaking

action is significant because of the substantial public interest in

issues involving child seats on aircraft. Further, this rule is a

significant regulatory action under E.O. 12866.

[[Page 28427]]

While this action is significant because of the public interest

associated with it, NHTSA concludes that this rule will have minimal

impacts. In 1991, there were an estimated 1,200,000 booster seats

produced. The consumer cost of a label is estimated to be $0.09 to

$0.17, and total annual costs of a separate label range from $108,000

to $204,000.

However, adding a sentence to the existing label, most likely the

course of action taken in response to this rulemaking, would cost much

less. This cost might be $0.01 per label, resulting in a total annual

cost of $12,000. Fewer harnesses are produced than booster seats. The

label on a harness is typically cloth, and sewn on to the restraint.

Assuming that 10,000 to 50,000 harnesses are produced annually, the

cost of a label will probably be over $1.00. However, even with this

cost, the cost of the labeling requirement is minimal. Moreover, there

is a possible economic benefit of this rule. Since booster seats and

harnesses will no longer be permitted to be certified for aircraft,

there will be no need to perform the inversion test. Thus, testing

costs to the child restraint manufacturer will be slightly reduced.

Further, the agency believes sales of booster seats and harnesses

will be minimally affected, if at all, by the prohibition against their

certification for aircraft use. NHTSA believes almost all consumers

decide to purchase a child restraint based on their intent to use the

restraint in a motor vehicle, not in aircraft.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has considered the effects of this rule under the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. For the reasons noted above and below, I hereby

certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities. The agency knows of 13

manufacturers of child restraints (not counting vehicle manufacturers

that produce and install built-in restraints), 7 of which are

considered to be small businesses (including Kolcraft, which with an

estimated 500 employees, is on the borderline of being a small

business). This number does not constitute a substantial number of

small entities. Regardless of this number, NHTSA does not believe this

rule will have a significant impact on small businesses. As noted

above, this rulemaking will have a minimal effect on labeling costs and

no effect on child restraint sales.

Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

This rulemaking action has been analyzed in accordance with the

principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612. The agency

has determined that this rule will not have sufficient federalism

implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking action for the purposes of the

National Environmental Policy Act. The agency has determined that

implementation of this action will not have any significant impact on

the quality of the human environment.

Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice Reform)

This rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under section 49

U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in

effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable

to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal

standard, except to the extent that the state requirement imposes a

higher level of performance and applies only to vehicles procured for

the State's use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a procedure for judicial

review of final rules establishing, amending or revoking Federal motor

vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a

petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before

parties may file suit in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR Part 571 as

set forth below.

PART 571--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117 and 30166;

delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

2. Section 571.213 is amended by revising S5.5.2(n) to read as

follows:

Sec. 571.213 Standard No. 213; Child restraint systems.

* * * * *

S5.5.2 * * *

(n) Child restraint systems, other than belt-positioning seats,

harnesses and backless child restraint systems, may be certified as

complying with the provisions of S8. Child restraints that are so

certified shall be labeled with the statement ``This Restraint is

Certified for Use in Motor Vehicles and Aircraft.'' Belt-positioning

seats, harnesses and backless child restraint systems shall be labeled

with the statement ``This Restraint is Not Certified for Use in

Aircraft.'' The statement required by this paragraph shall be in red

lettering and shall be placed after the certification statement

required by S5.5.2(e).

* * * * *

Issued on May 20, 1996.

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 96-13772 Filed 6-03-96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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