Record of Decision for the Theater Missile Defense Extended Test Range Final Environmental Impact Statement

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

Record of Decision for the Theater Missile Defense Extended Test

Range Final Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).

ACTION: Record of Decision text is as follows:

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INTRODUCTION: This document records [BMDO Director's] decision for the

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to conduct tests at two of four

alternative test ranges. The potential for environmental impacts at

these ranges was analyzed and documented in the Theater Missile Defense

Extended Test Range Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and

the public was notified of its availability on January 13, 1995. The

following ranges were considered for extended range testing: White

Sands Missile Range (WSMR), New Mexico, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB)

Florida, Western Range, California, and Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR),

U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA), Republic of the Marshall Islands.

In September 1993, [BMDO] issued [BMDO's] Record of Decision (ROD)

for the TMD Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement which

analyzed potential environmental impacts over the life-cycle of the TMD

Program. That document addressed potential environmental consequences

of the proposed research, development, testing and production, basing,

and eventual decommissioning activities. It serves as the foundation

for the TMD Extended Test Range FEIS. [BMDO Director] have also

carefully considered the requirements of Executive Order 12898, Federal

Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and

Low Income Populations (Feb. 11, 1994), that this action not have a

disproportionate impact on minority or low-income populations.

Need

The proposed extended range testing arises from compelling national

security needs recognized by both the Congress and the Administration.

Effective Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is necessary to protect forward

deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United

States and U.S. friends and allies overseas. Extended range testing is

critical to the development of an effective theater missile defense.

Purpose

Extended range tests for TMD must realistically test missile

defense systems under circumstances similar to a theater of operations.

This includes construction of target launch facilities; development and

testing of sensors, Battle Management Command, Control, and

Communications components, and defensive missiles; and intercepts of

missiles over land and water areas. System operational needs require

conducting target and other missile system flight tests and intercepts

at altitudes and over distances, greater than can be accommodated by

current ranges. These tests validate system design and operational

effectiveness of ground-based interceptors to protect our forces and

allies overseas from theater ballistic missiles.

Decision

[BMDO Director's] decision is to proceed with the extended range

testing at the WSMR and the KRM. At WSMR, [BMDO Director] select the

option to launch target missiles from Fort Wingate Depot Activity

(FWDA) using Booster Drop Zone C, with intercepts over WSMR. It is part

of [BMDO Director's] decision to take action to reserve a portion of

FWDA for the proposed TMD activities. On February 28, 1994, the BMDO

notified the Secretary of the Army of its potential need for sufficient

property at FWDA to conduct missile launch activities, including

provision [[Page 16628]] for security, safety, and access. The BMDO

will confirm its need for property at FWDA and take other necessary

actions to ensure such property is not disposed of under the provisions

of the Base Realignment and Closure Act. [BMDO Director] have decided

not to select sea-based target missile launches at this time. [BMDO

Director] select only the land-based target launch option from Wake

Island for the KMR alternative. Missile intercepts will take place over

existing impact areas or open sea areas at KMR.

Proposed Action and Alternatives

Background: The proposed action analyzed in the TMD Extended Test

Range FEIS was to conduct extended range tests of target missiles,

defensive missiles, and sensor systems at one or more of four

alternative test range areas. The tests would involve target and

defense missile launches from existing test ranges and from off-range

locations with intercepts over existing ranges or open ocean areas.

Preparations and testing would begin in 1995 and continue into the next

century. The FEIS compared the impacts of alternative test range areas

and a no-action alternative.

As individual TMD system programs mature to the point of defining

specific flight/intercept test requirements, the most appropriate test

range area(s) capable of meeting test requirements will be identified.

The proposed action includes safety measures and standard range

operating procedures to ensure the safety of the public and the

environment. Some of these safety measures include (1) activating new

or existing restricted airspace, (2) the establishment and evacuation

of launch hazard areas and booster drop zones, including temporary

closure of associated roads, and (3) public notification of launch

activities, including Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners.

No-Action Alternative: Ongoing activities and operations would

continue to be performed at all locations. The development of ground

based TMD missile and sensor systems would continue, with missile

flight tests and target intercepts being conducted utilizing existing

test ranges. Testing for TMD would likely increase at WSMR and possibly

at the KMR. Ground-based TMD testing of missile and sensor systems at

Eglin AFB and the Western Range would not occur. The missile testing

restrictions associated with existing ranges, particularly with shorter

range missile flights conducted at WSMR, place artificial limits on

system test capabilities. This would make it impossible to fully

validate system design and operational effectiveness in a variety of

realistic theater environments. Although this alternative is the

environmentally preferable alternative, it was not selected because it

fails to meet BMDO's mission requirements. A comparison of the impacts

at the four ranges revealed the least impacts to resources at the KMR.

Impacts to resources at Western Range, Eglin AFB, are roughly

equivalent. The greatest potential impacts were identified for the WSMR

alternative and are primarily related to land use, cultural, and

transportation issues associated with the initial booster drop zones

analyzed in the Draft EIS.

White Sands Missile Range Candidate Test Area Alternative: This

alternative included defensive missile launches from WSMR, New Mexico,

and Fort Bliss, Texas, and off-range target missile launches from FWDA,

New Mexico, and the Green River Launch Complex (GRLC), Utah, with

intercepts over WSMR. Testing of TMD radars, positioned on WSMR, would

occur during these flight tests. This option also included Army

tactical missile launches from FWDA with impacts on WSMR. [BMDO

Director] anticipate approximately 6 to 8 launches per year from FWDA.

Two potential booster Drop Zones (A and B) were analyzed in the

Draft EIS for both the FWDA and GRLC target launch options. Substantial

concerns were raised over the use of these drop zones. Although a

number of mitigations could have been implemented to minimize the land

use and other impacts, they could have become significant. In addition,

[BMDO Director] am sensitive to general concerns about missile

overflight of substantial areas of Native American lands in Utah and

New Mexico. Accordingly, other booster drop zones were identified and

analyzed for both the FWDA and GRLC options in a supplement to the

Draft EIS. In both cases, these drop zones were further away from the

launch position and further along the flight path and required smaller

launch hazard areas at the launch site due to a less vertical

trajectory at launch. This enabled the respective launch hazard areas

to be reduced in size, responsive to the concerns about proximity to

schools, residences, and other potential users of surrounding areas at

FWDA. It also avoided the requirement to close Interstate 70 and

portions of the Green River during launches for the GRLC option.

In the case of the GRLC target launch options, both Booster Drop

Zones A and B would have created significant land use problems

associated with restricting access to Canyonlands National Park and

Dead Horse State Park. Use of either of these drop zones would also

have necessitated temporary closure of Interstate 70 and portions of

the Green River adjacent to the launch area, due to the requirement for

a large launch hazard area. The new Booster Drop Zones C1 and C2 for

GRLC included Bureau of Land Management (BLM) state of Utah, and

private land, as well as the Bridger Jack Mesa and Fish Creek Canyon

Wilderness Study Areas. Concerns included restrictions on public access

for recreation, and hunting. Booster impacts within the wilderness

study area could be avoided, and missile launches could be timed so as

to minimize impacts to recreation and avoid nesting and breeding

seasons of sensitive species. However, the authority to use BLM lands

for military purposes, including the proposed missile tests involving

booster drops, would require a lengthy process that would not be

responsive to current testing needs. Consequently GRLC options are not

under current consideration.

In the case of the FWDA option, use of either Booster Drop Zone A

or B would require a launch hazard area extending up to 4\1/2\ miles

from the launch site. This caused substantial safety concerns for the

local community about a nearby school and residences and other areas at

FWDA. In addition, Booster Drop Zone B included portions of the El

Malpais National Monument and the El Malpais National Conservation

Area, which encompassed wilderness and wilderness study areas. Use of

this drop zone would be considered significant because it restricts

access to recreational areas and conflicts with the statutory purposes

for these special use areas. Booster drop zones A and B will not be

used.

The new Booster Drop Zone C for FWDA includes U.S. Forest Service

and private land. Both the public land manager and private owner have

expressed their willingness to allow use of these lands for booster

drops. Use of this booster drop zone greatly reduces the launch hazard

area at FWDA and significantly improves safety for nearby schools and

residences, in keeping with the purpose of E.O. 12898 to avoid

disproportionate impacts on minorities, such as the Indian communities

in the Fort Wingate area. No significant environmental impacts have

been identified associated with this drop zone.

Kwajalein Missile Range, USAKA, Republic of the Marshall Islands

[[Page 16629]] Alternative: This alternative included missile launches

and sensor testing at KMR and Wake Island. USAKA would be primarily

used for launching defensive missiles, however, there is a possibility

that target missiles may be launched from USAKA. Wake Island would

primarily be used for target missile launches, however, it also could

be used for defensive missile launches. Technical difficulties with

launches and costs removed sea-based target missile launches from

consideration. Existing facilities at KMR and at Wake Island and

planned construction of Wake Island (analyzed in the Wake Island

Environmental Assessment, 1994) would be adequate for TMD interceptor

and target launching activities; therefore minimal environmental

impacts are anticipated. Issues of concern included potential impacts

on sensitive plant and animal species at the KMR and Wake Island,

particularly in undisturbed areas, the potential for damage,

destruction, or vandalism of cultural resources, and safety issues.

Mitigations included avoidance of areas of native vegetation and sea

turtle nesting areas. consultation with appropriate U.S. and

Marshallese officials to establish procedures to protect cultural

resources such as data recovery, and avoidance. Mitigations also

establish hazard areas and place operating restrictions on radars to

avoid significant impacts. No significant environmental impacts are

predicted with the use of KMR or Wake Island.

Eglin Air Force Base Candidate Test Area Alternative: This

alternative would include missile launches and sensor testing at Eglin

AFB on Santa Rosa Island and at Cape San Blas, Florida, with missile

launches from a sea-based platform in the Gulf of Mexico. No

significant impacts are predicted with the use of Eglin AFB. Health and

safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the issuance of Notices

to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring that the launch,

booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are clear of air and

water traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This alternative

is not selected at this time because test objectives could be met at

other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available, and

additional test instrumentation is needed.

Western Range Test Area Alternative: This alternative would include

missile launches and sensor testing at Vandenberg AFB, San Nicolas

Island of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, and San

Clemente Island of the Naval Air Station North Island, California, with

off-range missile launches from a sea-based platform in the Pacific

Ocean. No significant impacts are predicted with the use of Western

Range. Health and safety and airspace impacts would be avoided by the

issuance of Notices to Airmen and Notices to Mariners, and ensuring

that the launch, booster drop, and intercept debris impact areas are

clear of all air traffic before proceeding with the test flights. This

alternative is not selected at this time because test objectives could

be met at other ranges, sea-launch capabilities will not be available,

and additional test instrumentation is needed.

Alternatives Considered But Not Carried Forward: Initially eleven

candidate test range areas were considered for TMD testing. Criteria

used to evaluate candidate test ranges included weather, scheduling,

range instrumentation, range safety, and debris recovery. All but the

four ranges analyzed in the FEIS were eliminated by the criteria

established at the beginning of the selection process.

Mitigation, Monitoring, and Enforcement

All practicable means to avoid and minimize environmental harm will

be taken. [BMDO Director] direct BMDO Deputies and Program Executive

Officers to monitor extended range testing activities and ensure the

following mitigation measures described in the TMD Extended Test Range

FEIS are implemented. Specifically, at the WSMR, and the associated

FWDA, mitigations will include implementing the Evacuation Plan,

Booster Recovery Plan, and Emergency Response Plan. Launches will be

avoided during weather conditions that would have adverse effects on

air quality or on test safety. To the extent possible, launches will be

scheduled to avoid major events such as major military maneuvers (i.e.,

Roving Sand Operations), holidays, hunting seasons, cattle roundups, or

local festivities that could be effected by the testing activities.

Maximum advance notice of launch activities will be provided to local

communities, travelers, etc., as described in the FEIS. Prior to

conducting launches and starting construction, consultation with

appropriate Federal and state agencies, as discussed in the EIS will

occur concerning specific debris impact areas, debris recovery

activities, and prelaunch and preconstruction surveys in order to

protect cultural resources and threatened and endangered species.

American Indian concerns regarding access to and disturbance of sacred

lands will be addressed during consultation with each affected American

Indian group on a regular basis and prior to each missile launch.

Consultation with local community groups will establish the procedures,

and coordinate times for use of FWDA lands under BMDO control during

periods of launch inactivity.

At the USAKA, the existing USAKA mitigation plan will be followed.

Other mitigations include: International Notices to Airmen and Notices

to Mariners, timely coordination with the International Civil Aviation

Organization through the Federal Aviation Administration, adherence to

established procedures for keep-out zones, hazard areas, and

limitations on use of radars, and a scheduling plan will be implemented

to minimize airspace and health and safety impacts. Preconstruction

surveys and/or other mitigation measures will be accomplished in

coordination with the appropriate Federal agencies and the Republic of

the Marshall Islands Environmental Protection Authority to protect

cultural resources and threatened and endangered species. [BMDO

Director] will implement appropriate safeguards as subsequent decisions

are made regarding system components and basing locations, and as their

accompanying environmental documents elaborate specific requirements

for monitoring and enforcement.

Date and Signature

Record of Decision was signed March 21, 1995 by Malcolm R. O'Neill,

Lieutenant General, United States Army, Director, Ballistic Missile

Defense Organization.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Mr. Rick Lehner, BMDO/SRE, Washington,

DC 20301-7100, (703) 695-8743.

Dated: March 27, 1995.

Patricia L. Toppings,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 95-7892 Filed 3-30-95; 8:45 am]

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