Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Stopping Distance Requirements for Vehicles Equipped With Air Brake Systems

Federal RegisterMar 10, 1995

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 57l

[Docket No. 93-06; Notice 3]

RIN 2127-AD07

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Stopping Distance

Requirements for Vehicles Equipped With Air Brake Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This notice reinstates stopping distance performance

requirements in Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, for medium and

heavy vehicles that are equipped with air brake systems. The

requirements specify distances in which different types of medium and

heavy vehicle configurations must come to a complete stop from 60 mph

on a high coefficient of friction surface. The requirements are

designed to reduce the number and severity of crashes.

This notice is one part of the agency's comprehensive effort to

improve the braking ability of heavy vehicles. In another final rule

published elsewhere in today's Federal Register, the agency is adopting

identical stopping distance requirements for medium and heavy vehicles

that are equipped with hydraulic brake systems. In a third final rule

that responds to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act

(ISTEA) of 1991, the agency is requiring medium and heavy vehicles to

be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS) to improve the lateral

stability and control of these vehicles during braking.

DATES: Effective Dates: The amendments become effective on March 1,

1997. Compliance to Sec. 571.121 with respect to trailers and single

unit trucks and buses will be required as of March 1, 1998.

Petitions for Reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration of

this rule must be received by NHTSA no later than April 10, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this rule should refer to

Docket 93-06; Notice 3 and should be submitted to: Administrator,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. George Soodoo, Office of Vehicle

Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400

Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590 (202-366-5892).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Brake Related Crashes

B. Braking Devices

II. NHTSA Activities

A. Regulatory History

B. Agency Research

C. Heavy Vehicle Safety Report to Congress

III. Agency Proposal

IV. Comments on the Proposal

V. Agency Decision

A. Overview

B. Stopping Distance Performance

1. Stopping Distance Requirements

2. Stopping Distance Test Conditions

a. Test Surface Specification

b. Wheel Lockup Restrictions

c. Control Trailer

d. Vehicle Loading

e. Initial Brake Temperature

f. Emergency Stopping Distance Requirements

g. Burnish Procedure

h. Parking Brake Test

C. Threshold Pressure Requirement

D. Requirements for Brake Linings

E. Implementation Schedule

F. Intermediate and Final Stage Manufacturers/Trailer

Manufacturers

G. Costs

VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and

Procedures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

D. National Environmental Policy Act

E. Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

F. Civil Justice Reform

I. Background

A. Brake Related Crashes

Medium and heavy vehicles1 are involved in thousands of motor

vehicle crashes each year. One of the most important factors that

contributes to these crashes is brake system performance. Crashes in

which braking is a contributory factor can be further subdivided into

(1) crashes due to brake failures or defective brakes, (2) runaways on

downgrades, due to maladjusted or overheated brakes, (3) crashes in

which vehicles are unable to stop in time, and (4) skidding,

jackknifing, or loss-of-control crashes due primarily to locked wheels

during braking.

\1\Hereafter, referred to as heavy vehicles.

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This final rule, reinstating stopping distance requirements for

air-braked vehicles and the companion final rule specifying stopping

distance requirements for hydraulically braked heavy vehicles will

reduce the severity of or prevent crashes attributable to a heavy

vehicle's inability to stop in time.2 In these crashes, the heavy

vehicle's brakes function, but do not stop the vehicle quickly enough

to avoid a crash. One way to reduce the severity or number of such

crashes is to improve heavy vehicle braking performance by reducing the

distance needed to stop a vehicle. Even if crashes of this type were

not totally prevented by such improvements in performance, the

improvements would reduce collision impact speeds, and thus reduce

crash severity.

\2\Today's companion final rule to require heavy vehicles to be

equipped with antilock brake systems (ABS) will prevent braking-

induced loss-of-control crashes.

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The following estimates regarding heavy vehicle crashes are from

NHTSA's 1992 General Estimates System (GES) which is based on data

transcribed from a nationally representative sample of state police

accident reports (PARs) and the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS).

NHTSA estimates that in 1992 there were about 168,000 crashes involving

heavy combination vehicles (excluding truck tractors when operating

bobtail, i.e., without a trailer). These crashes resulted in about

13,600 injuries and 387 fatalities to truck occupants and about 51,500

injuries and 2,452 fatalities to occupants of other involved vehicles.

For bobtail truck tractors alone, the agency estimates that there were

about 8,400 crashes resulting in about 1,200 injuries and 39 fatalities

to truck occupants and about 2,600 injuries and 178 fatalities to

occupants of other involved vehicles. For heavy single-unit trucks, the

agency estimates that there were about 192,600 crashes resulting in

about 15,700 injuries and 165 fatalities to truck occupants and about

48,300 injuries and 891 fatalities to occupants of other involved

vehicles. In addition, crashes involving heavy vehicles result in more

expensive and severe property damage than crashes involving light

vehicles.

It is very difficult to quantify the number of crashes in which a

vehicle's brakes are unable to stop the vehicle in time. NHTSA

estimates that in 1992 there were about 18,000 crashes involving heavy

combination vehicles (excluding bobtail truck tractors). These crashes

resulted in about 1,800 injuries and 57 fatalities to truck occupants

and about 8,400 injuries and 754 fatalities to occupants of other

involved vehicles. For bobtail truck tractors alone, the agency

estimates that there were about 260 crashes resulting in about 100

injuries and 7 fatalities to truck occupants and about 240 injuries and

48 fatalities to occupants of other involved [[Page 13287]] vehicles.

For heavy single-unit trucks, the agency estimates that there were

about 30,100 crashes resulting in about 4,200 injuries and 17

fatalities to truck occupants and about 15,000 injuries and 276

fatalities to occupants of other involved vehicles. The Final Economic

Analysis (FEA) provides greater detail about how today's final rules

will reduce injuries and fatalities resulting from such crashes.

The agency emphasizes that not all inability-to-stop-in-time

crashes are preventable. Nevertheless, improvements to heavy vehicle

brake systems should prevent or reduce the severity of a significant

number of these crashes.

B. Braking Devices

In order to understand the discussion of braking in this preamble,

it is necessary to be familiar with several devices used in braking

systems. Therefore, the agency provides a brief explanation of those

devices below.

Automatic front axle limiting valves (ALVs) automatically limit the

amount of braking pressure applied at steering axle brakes. ALVs are

typically installed to allay the concern of some drivers about loss of

steering control due to front wheel lockup during hard braking and to

reduce steering pull due to unequal brake adjustment on the front wheel

brakes. However, these devices can actually increase the likelihood of

drive axle and trailer lockup because the brakes on the front axle do

less than their proportional share of the braking. Therefore, drivers

must apply brakes harder to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, stopping

distance performance could, in most cases, be improved by eliminating

the use of ALVs.

Bobtail proportioning valves (BPVs) automatically reduce brake

application pressure to the drive axles of a bobtail truck tractor,

thereby allowing greater use of the vehicle's steering-axle braking

power. Bobtail tractors demonstrate the worst stopping capability of

all vehicle types, primarily because the braking systems of tractors

are designed to optimize their stopping distance when they are towing a

loaded trailer. Without the trailer, the lack of load on the tractor

drive axles can cause premature wheel lockup and reduced stopping

capability. An agency study found that, on average, the stopping

distance of bobtail tractors is approximately 122 feet longer than that

of tractors when connected to loaded trailers.3 However,

significantly shorter stops have been obtained when bobtails are

equipped with BPVs.

\3\``NHTSA Heavy Duty Vehicle Brake Research Program Report No.

1, ``Stopping Capability of Air Braked Vehicles,'' (DOT HS 806 738,

April 1985) and Report No. 9, ``Stopping Distances of 1988 Heavy

Vehicles.''

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Load-Sensing Proportioning Valves (LSVs) reduce the likelihood of

premature wheel lockup by mechanically sensing drive-axle suspension

deflection that results from weight transfer during braking, and

adjusting brake proportioning based on different loading conditions.

However, LSVs cannot prevent lockup of a vehicle's brakes if they are

applied too hard, particularly on a low coefficient of friction

surface.

Antilock brake systems (ABSs) automatically control the amount of

braking pressure applied to a wheel so as to prevent wheel lock, thus

increasing stability and control in emergency stops by preventing

skidding, spinning, and jackknifing. Today's stability and control

final rule provides a detailed discussion of these devices.

II. NHTSA Activities

A. Regulatory History

In the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to reinstate stopping

distance requirements for air-braked vehicles, NHTSA provided a

detailed discussion of the regulatory and judicial history of the

stopping distance requirements for air braked vehicles. (58 FR 11009,

February 23, 1993). When last in effect, the stopping distance

requirements in Standard No. 121 required all heavy vehicles to stop

within 293 feet from a speed of 60 mph on a high coefficient of

friction surface (i.e., a nonslippery surface typical of dry concrete).

(41 FR 8783, March 1, 1976).

In response to a suit challenging Standard No. 121's stopping

distance requirements, the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th

Circuit invalidated the Standard's stopping distance and ``no lockup''

requirements for trucks, buses, and trailers in PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573

F.2d 632, (9th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978). The court

held that NHTSA was justified in promulgating a standard requiring

improved air brake systems and stability mechanisms. However, after

reviewing the record about reliability problems with antilock brake

systems then in use, the court held that the standard was ``neither

reasonable nor practicable at the time it was put into effect.''

The court further stated that:

* * * those parts of the Standard requiring heavier axles and

the antilock device should be suspended. The evidence indicates that

this can be accomplished if we hold, as we do, that the stopping

distance requirements from 60 mph are invalid * * * We hold only

that more probative and convincing data evidencing the reliability

and safety of vehicles that are equipped with antilock and in use

must be available before the agency can enforce a standard requiring

its installation.

The stability and control final rule contains a detailed discussion

about the PACCAR decision and how the agency has responded to the

findings in that decision. The Agency has decided to specify different

stopping distances for different configurations of heavy vehicles.

Today's requirements can further be distinguished from those

invalidated in the 1970s by the fact that manufacturers will not need

to significantly redesign their brakes or use overly aggressive

foundation brakes to comply with the requirements being established in

today's final rule.

Even though the stopping distance requirements being specified in

today's final rule are generally less stringent for some configurations

than those invalidated by the PACCAR decision, the agency believes that

the braking requirements in today's final rules, taken as a whole,

significantly enhance the overall braking performance of air-braked

vehicles given the agency's decision to require these vehicles to be

equipped with ABS.

B. Agency Research

As a part of its review of heavy vehicle braking, NHTSA has issued

two reports on the stopping distance capability of several different

types of heavy air-braked vehicles in various loading conditions.4

The agency also tested some vehicles equipped with ALVs, BPVs, and ABS,

thus allowing comparisons of stopping distances with and without these

devices. The tests were conducted on school buses, transit buses,

single unit trucks, tractor trailers in the loaded and empty conditions

and with various equipment (with ABS activated and deactivated, and

with and without ALVs and BPVs). Among the conclusions reached by the

agency on the basis of the test data were: (1) ALVs significantly

degrade straight line stopping performance, especially in the bobtail

configuration (with stopping distances as long as 531 feet); (2) BPVs

significantly reduce the stopping distances of bobtail tractors; (3)

ABSs are effective in providing short, stable stops in all operating

conditions; (4) ABSs provide the greatest performance gain in the

bobtail configuration, where stable stops as short as 233 feet were

obtained; (5) braking performance of bobtail tractors and empty single

unit [[Page 13288]] trucks could be improved by removing ALVs from both

vehicle types and installing BPVs on bobtails; and (6) a stopping

distance performance requirement for truck tractors with empty trailers

would not provide any additional performance benefits that could not be

achieved through specifying requirements for either the bobtail or

loaded condition.

\4\NHTSA Heavy Duty Vehicle Brake Research Program Report No. 1,

``Stopping Capability of Air Braked Vehicles,'' (DOT HS 806 738,

April 1985) and Report No. 9, ``Stopping Distances of 1988 Heavy

Vehicles.'' DOT HS 807 531, February 1990.

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C. Heavy Vehicle Safety Report to Congress

In response to section 9107 of the Truck and Bus Regulatory Reform

Act of 1988, NHTSA submitted a report to Congress titled ``Improved

Brake Systems for Commercial Vehicles.'' (DOT HS 807 706, April

1991.)5 After discussing crash data concerning heavy vehicle brake

systems, the report explained the factors that are related to braking

effectiveness, stability and control during braking, and braking system

compatibility. The report indicated that stopping distances and vehicle

stability could be improved by not equipping heavy vehicles with ALVs

and instead equipping them with BPVs, load-sensing proportioning

valves, and antilock brake systems.

\5\This report may be examined at the Agency's Technical

Reference Office, room 5108, at no charge. It is available from the

National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA 22161

for a small charge.

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III. Agency Proposal

On February 23, 1993, NHTSA proposed to amend Standard No. 121 to

reinstate stopping distance performance requirements for stops from 60

mph on a high coefficient of friction surface for trucks, truck

tractors, and buses that are equipped with air brake systems (58 FR

11009). Based on testing at VRTC, the Agency proposed different

stopping distances for different configurations of heavy vehicles.

Specifically, the Agency proposed that unloaded single unit trucks and

bobtail tractors stop within 335 feet, loaded single unit trucks stop

within 310 feet, and all buses stop within 280 feet. The Agency

proposed two alternatives for testing a truck tractor in the loaded

condition and stated that one of the alternatives would be chosen for

the final rule. The first alternative proposed that the truck tractor

be tested with a braked control trailer and stop within 280 feet, while

the second alternative proposed that the truck tractor be tested with

an unbraked control trailer and stop within 355 feet. The Agency

explained that its long-term objective is to upgrade the braking

efficiency of heavy vehicles to enable them to make controlled, stable

stops, under all loading and road surface conditions. The Agency

believed that the proposed requirements would reduce the disparity in

braking ability between heavy vehicles and passenger cars. On the same

day, the Agency proposed identical stopping distance requirements for

heavy vehicles equipped with hydraulic brakes (58 FR 11003). The Agency

stated that many vehicles were already able to comply with the proposed

requirements. The inadequate performance of those vehicles that were

not able to comply was due to either poor brake torque balance between

the vehicles' axles resulting in premature lockup of the wheels on the

vehicles' rear axles or a lack of sufficient total brake torque

capability. Those vehicles that exhibited poor brake balance could be

brought into compliance by installing ABS, or by adding BPVs and/or

eliminating ALVs. Those vehicles that lack sufficient total brake

torque capability could be brought into compliance by incorporating

relatively minor changes to their foundation brake components involving

the substitution of other currently available components.

NHTSA proposed that air-braked vehicles would have to come to a

complete stop within a 12-foot-wide lane with restrictions on which

wheels would be permitted to lockup during the stop. The proposal

requested comments about whether and to what degree wheel lockup during

testing would be permitted. Specifically, the Agency proposed to allow

unlimited lockup below 20 mph and defined two types of wheel lockup

allowed above 20 mph: ``permissible wheel lockup,'' which is defined as

100 percent wheel slip of one or more wheels for a duration of one

second or less6 for testing purposes, and ``limited lockup,''

which is defined as lockup of not more than one wheel per axle or two

wheels per tandem. In addition, NHTSA proposed test conditions related

to the road test surface, the use of a braked or unbraked control

trailer, and the initial brake temperature. NHTSA also proposed

specifying a threshold pressure to enhance brake force compatibility

between tractors and trailers.

\6\As explained below, the final rule refers to this concept as

``momentary wheel lockup.''

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IV. Comments on the Proposal

NHTSA received 49 comments in response to the NPRM. Commenters

included heavy vehicle manufacturers, brake manufacturers, safety

advocacy groups, heavy vehicle users, industry trade associations, and

other individuals. The American Automobile Manufacturers Association

(AAMA) submitted joint comments on behalf of the eight major domestic

manufacturers of heavy vehicles: Chrysler, Ford, Freightliner, General

Motors (GM), Mack Trucks, Navistar, PACCAR, and Volvo-GM.

All the commenters supported the Agency's decision to reinstate

stopping distance requirements for heavy vehicles equipped with air

brakes. However, they offered mixed views about the specific stopping

distances being proposed. GM, Navistar, Heavy Duty Brake Manufacturers

Council (HDBMC), and Rockwell WABCO stated that the proposed stopping

distance requirements are appropriate. In contrast, the Insurance

Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Coalition for Consumer Health,

and Advocates for Highway Safety (Advocates) believed that the required

distances should be much shorter for trucks and buses. Advocates stated

that the proposal did little more than ``grandfather'' existing braking

capabilities and therefore would not result in the best available

braking performance for large trucks.

The American Trucking Association (ATA), IIHS and several other

commenters suggested that the Agency should merge the proposed stopping

distance and stability requirements into a common rulemaking, thereby

allowing the industry to implement a more effective test program.

Commenters also addressed specific issues raised in the NPRM,

including vehicle test speed, the test surface specification, the

control trailer, wheel lockup restrictions, the initial brake

temperature, the failed system test, vehicle loading, the threshold

pressure requirements, the parking brake test, the burnish procedures,

and the implementation schedule for the requirements. More specific

discussions of these comments, and the Agency's responses to them, are

set forth below.

V. Agency Decision

A. Overview

Based on the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) and other crash

data, test data from the agency's heavy vehicle brake research program,

comments on the NPRM, and other available information, NHTSA has

decided to amend Standard No. 121 to reinstate stopping distance

performance requirements for heavy vehicles that are equipped with air

brake systems. Separate requirements for stopping from 60 mph on a high

coefficient of friction surface are specified for four different heavy

vehicle configurations. The requirements are designed to reduce the

[[Page 13289]] distance needed for these vehicles to come to a complete

stop, thereby reducing the severity and number of crashes.

As noted above, this notice is one part of the Agency's

comprehensive effort to improve the braking ability of heavy vehicles.

In a second final rule published elsewhere in today's Federal Register,

the Agency is adopting identical stopping distance requirements for

heavy vehicles that are equipped with hydraulic brake systems. The

Agency believes that it is appropriate to specify identical stopping

distance requirements for similar vehicles. In a third final rule, the

Agency is responding to the Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 by requiring each heavy vehicle to be

equipped with an antilock brake system to improve its lateral stability

and control during braking.

B. Stopping Distance Performance

1. Stopping Distance Requirements

Based on its testing at VRTC, NHTSA proposed different stopping

distances for various categories of vehicles when tested at a speed of

60 mph on a surface with a peak friction coefficient (PFC) of 0.9, as

follows:

Loaded and Unloaded Buses

280 ft.

Loaded Truck Tractors with Braked Control Trailer

280 ft.

Loaded Truck Tractors with Unbraked Control Trailer

355 ft.

Loaded Single-Unit Trucks

310 ft.

Unloaded Single-Unit Trucks & Truck Tractors (Bobtail)

335 ft.

The agency proposed different requirements, instead of a single

across-the-board requirement like the one invalidated by the PACCAR

court, because a single requirement for all heavy vehicles with fully

operational service brakes would be too stringent for bobtail tractors

and unloaded single unit trucks, but not stringent enough for buses and

for tractor trailers in the loaded condition.

AAMA and most other industry commenters agreed with the stopping

distance values proposed for the various vehicle configurations.

AlliedSignal commented that these requirements are compatible with its

view of using BPVs to achieve increased deceleration on air-braked

tractors, while maintaining lateral stability in the bobtail mode.

Nevertheless, it requested that ALVs not be prohibited since it

believed that these devices are appropriate on some vehicles,

particularly those with large front brakes. AlliedSignal recommended

that if an ALV is used on a vehicle, it should be automatically

deactivated when the tractor is in the bobtail mode. ATA agreed with

the proposal to specify different stopping distances for different

types and loadings of vehicles. It also agreed with specifying the same

stopping distances for air-braked and hydraulically-braked vehicles of

the same type and with the same loading.

Other commenters opposed some of the proposed stopping distance

values on the ground that they were too stringent. HDBMC stated that

certain vehicles would have difficulty complying with the proposed

stopping distances because they are over-braked when the rear axles are

unloaded, and under-braked during emergency system stops. Lucas was

concerned that the service brake stopping distances obtained during the

agency's testing do not have a 10 percent margin less than the proposed

280 feet from 60 mph. In order to obtain an acceptable margin, Lucas

stated that vehicle manufacturers will have to equip certain vehicles

with larger front brakes, which would represent a major change on some

vehicles.

In contrast, other commenters stated that the proposed stopping

distances were not sufficiently stringent. Advocates stated that the

proposed stopping distances simply ratify the braking distances

currently achieved by manufacturers and do not seek to improve real-

world braking performance. It stated that except for the 280-foot

requirement for buses and loaded tractors with a braked control

trailer, all of the other proposed stopping distances are longer than

the 293 feet established before PACCAR. Similarly, IIHS stated that the

proposals do not go far enough toward requiring the best available

braking for heavy vehicles.

Based on the comments and other available information, NHTSA has

decided to adopt the stopping distances proposed in the NPRM for the

following categories of vehicles when tested at a speed of 60 mph on a

surface with a PFC of 0.9:

Loaded and Unloaded Buses7

280 ft.

\7\The final rule amending Standard No. 105 discusses in detail

the stopping distances applicable to hydraulic-braked school buses.

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Loaded Truck Tractors with Unbraked Control Trailer8

355 ft.

\8\As explained in the section below titled ``control

trailers,'' the agency proposed but decided not to adopt a revised

braked control trailer test condition.

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Loaded Single-Unit Trucks

310 ft.

Unloaded Single-Unit Trucks & Truck Tractors (Bobtail)

335 ft.

As it stated in the NPRM, NHTSA agrees with HDBMC that a small

number of vehicles will have to be modified to comply with the

reinstated stopping distance requirements. The agency notes that the

companion final rule requiring heavy vehicles to be equipped with

antilock brake systems will improve the braking of those vehicles whose

braking performance is limited due to poor brake torque balance, and

will enable them to comply with the stopping distance requirements. For

those vehicles that will require changes to their foundation brakes, so

as to provide greater brake torque capability, the agency believes that

adequate leadtime is being provided to minimize the task of achieving

compliance with the requirement.

NHTSA notes that while the companion final rule requiring heavy

vehicles to be equipped with ABSs will reduce the need to eliminate

front axle ALVs on single unit trucks and truck tractors and to install

rear axle BPVs on truck tractors, the agency would still encourage

vehicle manufacturers to do so. Vehicles without ALVs and/or with BPVs

can be braked at higher levels of deceleration before the vehicle's ABS

is activated, which the agency believes will improve the vehicle's

driveability. The Agency is aware of at least one manufacturer of ABSs

that currently recommends the incorporation of BPVs on truck tractors

equipped with ABS.

2. Stopping Distance Test Conditions

a. Test Surface Specification

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that the 60-mph stopping distance tests

be performed on a test surface with a PFC of 0.9, which is typical of

dry concrete. In formulating the proposal, the agency considered

whether the proposed test surface specification raises practicability

or objectivity concerns in light of PACCAR. Based on its testing, the

agency tentatively concluded that specifying a test surface with a high

PFC would reasonably represent stopping on a dry surface and would not

be a significant source of variability in the stopping distance tests.

The Agency requested comments on the proposed test surface

specification.

Several commenters addressed the appropriate PFC for the test. AAMA

and Navistar commented that the test surface should be specified at a

PFC of 1.0 because that PFC value would remove the influence of test

road variability from compliance testing. AAMA provided data that

showed that in the course of six months, the PFC varied between 0.85

and 0.95, and averaged 0.90 over ten readings taken approximately twice

each month. According to Navistar, its data showed PFCs that ranged

from 0.91 to 0.98. [[Page 13290]] AAMA argued that since the majority

of actual test surfaces nominally exceed PFC 0.9, a specification of

0.9 would impose a cost burden on manufacturers trying to maintain the

test surface near, but below, the 0.9 value. AAMA stated that

``worldwide support'' has been expressed for specifying a test surface

with a PFC of 1.0. Volvo GM provided results of the Motor Vehicle

Safety Research Advisory Committee (MVSRAC) Antilock Brake System (ABS)

Task Force ``Round Robin'' testing, which showed that on high

coefficient of friction surfaces with PFCs ranging from 0.87 to 1.00,

the stopping distances of the three test vehicles remained relatively

constant when tested in the bobtail condition. This indicates stopping

performance on a dry surface is not significantly affected by

variability. Strait-Stop requested that a tolerance of 0.1

relative to 0.9 should be specified to accommodate real-world

limitations.

Based on the industry-government cooperative testing to evaluate

the effect of fluctuations of PFC on vehicle stopping performance,

NHTSA reaffirms its belief that a PFC of 0.9 reasonably represents a

typical dry surface and will not be a significant source of variability

in the stopping distance tests. (Public Files Docket PF88-01, MVSRAC

ABS Task Force, Round Robin No. 1). Testing indicates that the expected

minor variability of a high coefficient of friction surface appears to

have a negligible impact on vehicle stopping distance performance.

Variation of the average stopping distances for the six different

surfaces (with PFCs ranging from 0.89 to 0.94) was small, with the

deviation from the average being only 5 feet. Accordingly, the agency

believes that any variability in the stopping performance on a high

coefficient of friction surface is more likely due to variation in the

vehicle's performance rather than test surface variability. NHTSA has

decided that a test road surface specification of PFC 1.0 would result

in practicability problems for the agency, since it would have to

conduct compliance testing on a surface with a PFC higher than 1.0.

Such a surface is difficult to find. The agency also notes that General

Motors conducted an extensive survey of actual road surfaces, which

indicated that a PFC of 0.9 is fairly typical.

NHTSA notes that AAMA's claim that there is worldwide support for

specifying a PFC of 1.0 is incorrect. The agency notes that when the

issue was discussed by the ECE in the context of the international

harmonization of brake standards, the decision was to specify a PFC of

0.99. Moreover, when the Organization International des

Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA) proposed adopting a PFC of 1.0, no

country supported such a requirement.

\9\Eleventh Informal Meeting on Harmonization of Brake

Standards, August 26-27, 1991 and 29th Meeting of Experts on Brakes

and Running Gear, August 28-30, 1991.

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NHTSA has decided not to adopt Strait-Stop's request to specify a

tolerance for the test surface. The agency notes that in specifying the

test conditions applicable to the test surface, the agency does not

provide a range of permissible test surfaces. Instead, the braking

standards set forth specific, objective criteria for the test surface

according to which the agency conducts its compliance testing.

b. Wheel Lockup Restrictions

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that the straight line stopping

distance test be conducted without locking more than one wheel per axle

or two wheels per tandem at speeds greater than 20 mph. In addition,

the agency proposed to allow unlimited lockup at 20 mph or below, and

to allow permissible wheel lockup for testing purposes. NHTSA believed

that allowing limited wheel lockup combined with permissible wheel

lockup at speeds above 20 mph would ensure a safe and reasonably

repeatable test condition, while providing an indication of a vehicle's

stability up to the vehicle's braking performance limit. These

provisions addressing wheel lockup were based on the previously

mentioned stopping distance tests conducted at VRTC. NHTSA requested

comments about the degree to which lockup should be permitted and under

what circumstances, including whether to allow unrestricted wheel

lockup of test vehicles.

Commenters addressed four distinct issues with respect to the wheel

lockup restrictions: (1) Specifying various types of lockup that would

be allowed; (2) applying the wheel lockup restrictions to ABS equipped

axles; (3) applying the wheel lockup restrictions to certain other

axles; and (4) applying the wheel lockup restrictions to emergency

system stops.

AlliedSignal, ATA, AAMA, and Strait-Stop commented that the wheel

lockup restrictions were not clear. AlliedSignal suggested that

``permissible'' and ``limited'' be replaced by one term, and that wheel

lockup be defined as 100 percent wheel slip at both wheels on an axle

or more than two wheels on a tandem for a duration greater than one

continuous second. AAMA requested that ``wheel lock restriction'' be

defined ``as 100 percent wheel slip of both wheels of an axle, or more

than two wheels on a tandem, for a duration greater than one continuous

second.'' Strait-Stop requested that permissible wheel lockup be

defined as lockup of one or more wheels at 100 percent slip for a

reasonable time. ATA stated that the proposed regulatory language does

not clearly indicate whether unlimited wheel lockup is permitted at

speeds below 20 mph.

After reviewing these comments, NHTSA has decided to adopt the

proposed concepts pertaining to wheel lockup restrictions in the

stopping distance test, with some modifications to enhance the

provision's clarity. Aside from defining wheel lockup as 100 percent

slip, and renaming ``permissible wheel lockup'' as ``momentary wheel

lockup,'' NHTSA has decided that it is clearer to specify the concept

directly in the stopping distance requirement in S5.3.1 instead of

defining the various types of lockup (e.g., momentary (permissible)

lockup, limited lockup, unlimited lockup) and then referencing them in

S5.3.1. Accordingly, a vehicle is required to stop with wheel lockup

permitted under the following conditions. At vehicle speeds above 20

mph, one wheel on any axle or two wheels on any tandem may lock up for

any duration. At vehicle speeds above 20 mph, wheels on certain axles

(i.e., nonsteerable axles other than the two rearmost nonliftable,

nonsteerable axles) may lock up for any duration. At vehicle speeds

above 20 mph, any wheel not permitted to lock, as described in the two

conditions above, may lock up repeatedly, with each lockup condition

having a duration of one second or less. At vehicle speeds of 20 mph or

less, any wheel may lock up for any duration. These exceptions allowing

certain types of lockup are based on the above-mentioned tests

conducted at VRTC.

In establishing the requirements applicable to wheel lockup

restrictions, NHTSA examined the commenters' recommended definitions

for wheel lockup restriction. The Agency believes that these

definitions achieve only part of the Agency's objective in establishing

wheel lockup restrictions. The Agency interprets AAMA's definition as

allowing both wheels on an axle to lock up (100 percent slip) for up to

one second. However, AAMA's recommended definition is unclear about

whether one wheel is allowed to remain locked up for the duration of

the stop. NHTSA believes that it would be necessary to add additional

wording to AAMA's definition to achieve the same

[[Page 13291]] objective that is already achieved by the Agency's

requirements.

Several commenters stated that the wheels on any axle controlled by

ABS should be excluded from wheel lockup constraints. Rockwell

International stated that the proposed stopping distance regulation

will become obsolete soon, since the references to permissible and

limited wheel lockup will be superseded by the ABS regulation. Rockwell

WABCO stated that the proposed stability and control rulemaking will

resolve problems with respect to the wheel lockup definitions. AAMA

expressed its concern that imposing wheel lockup constraints on ABS-

equipped vehicles could pose practicability problems during tests. For

example, AAMA said that the test driver could be required to modulate

brake pressure in order to prevent wheel lockup on axles not equipped

with ABS, at the same time the ABS is cycling.

NHTSA believes that the requirements in S5.3.1 continue to be

necessary, notwithstanding the Agency's decision to require heavy

vehicles to be equipped with antilock brake systems. The Agency

believes that the limited lockup and momentary lockup restrictions will

not impose any unreasonable or currently unachievable performance

requirement on antilock systems during the stopping distance test,

since the amount of lockup allowed by these restrictions is

considerably greater lockup than allowed by any currently available

antilock system. The antilock requirement specifies that an ABS on a

truck tractor must control ``the wheels of at least one front axle of

the vehicle and the wheels of at least one rear axle * * *'' Therefore,

if a vehicle is equipped with ABS on only one axle of a rear tandem,

the limited and momentary lockup requirements ensure that the vehicle

can be braked without excessive wheel lockup of the wheels, including

those controlled by ABS. Even if both non-ABS-controlled wheels of the

tandem lock for the duration of the stop (they meet the limited lockup

requirement test), the ABS-controlled wheels would then be allowed to

lock for a duration of one second or less, at speeds above 20 mph. The

Agency, therefore, does not agree with the claims that the backup

restrictions would prohibit ABS on some vehicles, or that they would

pose practicability problems for test drivers.

NHTSA believes that AAMA's concern about problems with specifying

wheel lockup restrictions is unrealistic. The Agency is unaware of any

currently used antilock system that would allow wheel lockups that

would not comply with the above restrictions.

Rockwell WABCO further stated that the wheel lock issue can be

resolved by requiring the vehicle to remain in the 12-foot-wide lane

during testing to the stopping distance requirements.

NHTSA believes that Rockwell WABCO's suggestion that the sole

requirement be that a vehicle stay within a 12-foot-wide lane does not

adequately take into consideration that on a smooth, flat, and straight

surface, a vehicle with locked wheels might possibly stay within the

lane. Accordingly, such a stop would not fully demonstrate the

capability of a vehicle to provide stable stops at the limit of the

vehicle's braking performance.

Several commenters recommended that the wheel lockup restrictions

not be applicable to emergency system stops. AAMA recommended that

wheel lockup constraints only apply to full service stops ``to avoid

compromises to full system performance for the sake of partial system

wheel lock.''

NHTSA agrees with these comments. In its present form, the

restrictions on wheel lockup in Standard No. 121 appear in S5.3.1, and

thus do not apply to the emergency stops specified in S5.7.1. The NPRM

did not propose to extend those restrictions to emergency braking, and

the Agency is not making such a change in this final rule.

c. Control Trailer

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed two alternatives for testing a truck

tractor in the loaded condition. The first alternative proposed the use

of a braked control trailer, which would be similar to the current

braked control trailer. The second alternative proposed the use of an

unbraked control trailer.

AAMA, ATA, HDBMC and Rockwell WABCO supported the use of an

unbraked control trailer. They believed that its use would eliminate

many sources of test result variability and would produce test results

that are consistent, comparable, and useful. Rockwell WABCO stated that

a braked control trailer with ABS could lead to test performance

variations since there are many different trailer antilock systems now

available. It believed that it would be extremely difficult to define

the required performance of the control trailer and the antilock system

necessary to have a consistent ``test fixture'' for the stopping

distance standard.

Strait-Stop objected to the use of an unbraked control trailer,

stating that its use would render the stopping distance performance of

the combination vehicle meaningless. Trade International Corporation

(TIC) did not explicitly support either of the two control trailer

alternatives, but objected to the mandated use of ``electronically

controlled systems'' to the exclusion of any other type of system, for

the braked control trailer ABS.

NHTSA has decided to specify the use of an unbraked control trailer

to test a truck tractor in the loaded condition. The Agency notes that

this decision, which is consistent with the views of most commenters,

will eliminate test variability and produce test results that are

consistent, comparable, and useful. Contrary to Strait-Stop's

assertion, the Agency, along with most commenters, believes that the

test results on unbraked control trailers provide meaningful

comparative information. This is so because the stopping ability of all

tractors will be evaluated in the same relative context (i.e., all

tractors would be mated to a similar unbraked control trailer). An

unbraked control trailer is easier to standardize than a braked control

trailer since there is no need to specify the foundation brakes and the

antilock brake system. The section on control trailers in the stability

and control final rule provides a more extensive discussion of this

issue.

d. Vehicle Loading

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that tractors would be loaded with an

unbraked control trailer, which would be loaded above the kingpin only,

such that the tractor is at GVWR and the trailer's axle is at 4,500

pounds, with the tractor's fifth wheel adjusted so that the load on

each axle is proportional to the axle's respective GAWR. (See

alternative 2, S6.1.10.4.)

AAMA requested that the Agency add the phrase ``without exceeding

the GAWR of any tractor or trailer axle.'' AAMA stated that for some

vehicles, it is impossible to load the tractor to its GVWR through the

kingpin without exceeding the drive axle GAWR. Due to limited fifth

wheel adjustment on some vehicles, virtually all of the ballast added

at the fifth wheel is borne by the tractor's rear axle, with very

little transferred to the front axle.

After reviewing AAMA's comment, NHTSA has decided to amend

S6.1.10.4 to include the phrase ``without exceeding the GAWR of any

tractor or trailer axle.'' The Agency believes that this modification

is consistent with the proposal's intent to have the loading

proportional to each axle's respective GAWR. The Agency is aware that

this modification will result in some tractors being tested slightly

below their GVWR. However, since actual users will be similarly

incapable of loading the vehicle to its GVWR without exceeding

[[Page 13292]] GAWR, the reduced amount should not adversely affect

motor vehicle safety.

e. Initial Brake Temperature

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed an initial brake temperature of 250

deg.F to 300 deg.F. The Agency tentatively concluded that specifying a

high brake temperature would reduce cooling time between stops and

therefore allow vehicle testing to proceed faster. All the commenters

that addressed this issue opposed the proposed adoption of such a high

initial brake temperature.

Based on these comments and the available test data, NHTSA has

concluded that an initial brake temperature of between 150 deg.F to

200 deg.F range is more appropriate than the proposed temperature

range. As explained in detail in the stability and control final rule,

testing using the 150 deg.F to 200 deg.F temperature range is more

repeatable and results in less variation between runs, compared to

testing conducted at an initial brake temperature of 250 deg.F to 300

deg.F, particularly for the emergency brake stops.

f. Emergency Stopping Distance Requirements

Although the NPRM did not propose to change the current emergency

stopping distance requirements in Standard No. 121, several commenters

recommended changes. AMA, ATA, Allied Signal, HDBMC, and Rockwell

International recommended that the Agency eliminate the stopping

distance performance requirements for a loaded truck tractor's

emergency braking system when tested with an unbraked control trailer.

They stated that a failed primary or a failed secondary brake system

does not realistically simulate any real-world vehicle situation that

can occur during a single brake system failure. They further stated

that this requirement would impose extremely unrealistic loads on the

functioning truck tractor brakes. AAMA stated that the emergency brake

systems are not designed to stop a loaded unbraked control trailer, and

that Standard No. 121 already includes a requirement in S5.7.3(c)

stating that a loss of primary or secondary tractor brakes should not

result in a loss of trailer brakes. Test data submitted by AAMA and

Allied Signal showed stopping distances in excess of 2,000 feet for the

failed primary (rear) brakes on a tractor with a loaded unbraked

control trailer. The stopping test distances submitted for failed

secondary (front) brakes on the tractor with a loaded unbraked control

trailer were within the current requirement of 613 feet. Based on these

considerations, the commenters recommended that the tractor's emergency

brake system be tested in the bobtail configuration only.

After reviewing the comments and other available information, NHTSA

has decided to apply the emergency brake system test for truck tractors

only in the unloaded (bobtail) condition for both the failed primary

and failed secondary conditions. According to test data obtained

through the Agency's testing and provided by commenters, emergency

brake system testing presents a unique problem for a loaded truck

tractor with an unbraked control trailer. With either a primary or

secondary failure of the tractor's brakes, the loaded combination would

be braked only by the front axle or rear axle brakes, since the control

trailer is unbraked. As a result, the stopping distances would be

extremely long, particularly in the case of the failed rear brakes

system. In addition, such a situation does not realistically simulate

failed truck tractor systems since in real-world situations, the

trailer brakes are intact.

g. Burnish Procedure

Even though this rulemaking did not address burnish procedures,

AAMA and HDBMC requested that the Agency indefinitely allow using the

old or the new burnish procedure as an option.

The Agency believes that the effective date for the ``new'' burnish

procedure should be considered in Docket No. 70-27, Notice 33, and

Docket No. 83-07, Notice 5, independently from the stopping distance

effective dates.10 Given that the industry has been aware since

August 1993 that the new burnish procedures would be required after

September 1994, NHTSA believes that vehicle manufacturers have had

sufficient time to conduct any additional testing and to make any

necessary design changes in order to meet the requirements of Standard

No. 121 with the new burnish procedure. Moreover, since the new

procedures have been in effect since September 1, 1994, the issue of

extending the option formerly allowed is moot. Therefore, NHTSA has

decided to terminate the rulemaking on the burnish issue.

\10\ On August 30, 1993, NHTSA issued an interim final rule and

an NPRM addressing whether the old burnish procedures should be

allowed indefinitely (58 FR 45459). Optional compliance with the

``new'' procedures had been permissible since 1988 and was extended

to September 1994. The Agency also proposed extending optional

compliance until March 1996. The Agency requested comments about

whether the new burnish procedures should become the sole specified

procedures or whether the old burnish procedures should be allowed

for an additional period of time.

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h. Parking Brake Test

AAMA requested that the agency modify the parking brake procedure

in this rulemaking by specifying an initial brake temperature of 150-

200 deg.F, and a ``compounding technique'' for consistency of grade

holding and drawbar procedures. Compounding is described as a full

treadle service brake application preceding the application of the

parking brakes. AAMA claimed that during its testing to respond to the

stopping distance NPRMs, it realized that different manufacturers use

different parking brake test procedures. Therefore, its stated reason

for proposing a change is to avoid having compliance issues arise due

to alleged test procedure ambiguities.

NHTSA has neither addressed this issue in the NPRM nor conducted

research about compounding. Therefore, the Agency has determined that

it would be inappropriate at this time to modify the Standard to

specify such a compounding test procedure. If the Agency were to decide

in the future that it may be desirable to amend the Standard to require

this test condition, it would issue an NPRM to provide the industry and

other interested parties an opportunity to comment about such a

modification.

As discussed above, NHTSA has agreed to AAMA's request to specify

an initial brake temperature of between 150-200 deg.F for the service

brake performance tests. As so modified, the parking brake test

procedure explicitly specifies that the parking brake test be conducted

``under the conditions of S6.1,'' which specifies the initial brake

temperature for the test. Therefore, any ambiguity that allegedly

results from the higher initial brake temperature is no longer present.

C. Threshold Pressure Requirement

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed to establish a requirement for

threshold pressure11 levels of 6.00.5 psi for truck

tractors and trailers equipped with an air brake system. The Agency

tentatively concluded that such a requirement would improve the brake

balance on combination vehicles and reduce the potential for vehicle

instability when lightly loaded. The Agency requested comments about

the need for establishing threshold pressures and whether the proposed

threshold pressure and its range were appropriate and feasible.

\11\ ``Threshold pressure'' is the brake application pressure at

which the brakes actually begin to generate braking torque.

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All commenters recognized the need to improve tractor trailer

compatibility [[Page 13293]] and supported the intent of the proposed

threshold pressure requirement. However, AAMA, Midland-Grau, and

Rockwell opposed establishing a threshold pressure requirement until

additional research could be conducted.12 The commenters requested

that the Agency not issue such a requirement until a cooperative

industry and government effort can be conducted to better define the

performance and safety improvements of a threshold pressure and

tolerance requirement.

\12\ Only Mr. Robert Crail, a brake engineer, favored adopting a

requirement to improve pressure compatibility between tractors and

trailers.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Most commenters believed that selecting a target threshold pressure

value of 6.0 psi, which was approved by the SAE Brake Committee in

1985, would not be realistic for current combination vehicles. In

addition, HDBMC stated that small differences in threshold pressure are

irrelevant to whether a tractor trailer combination can achieve the

prescribed stopping distances. HDBMC noted that SAE Recommended

Practice J1505, ``Brake Force Distribution Test Code'' (May 1985) was

developed primarily to reduce maintenance costs by improving brake drum

and lining life and to enable fleets to standardize threshold

pressures. It further stated that the testing conducted to establish

SAE J1505 was limited to S-Cam brakes and vehicles with a GAWR of

16,000 to 20,000 pounds. S-Cam brakes on larger vehicles, wedge brakes

(which have higher threshold pressures) and disc brakes were not

tested.

Several commenters addressed the threshold pressure level that

should be established if the Agency decided to adopt a threshold

pressure requirement. Mr. Crail recommended that the tolerance range be

increased from 6.00.5 psi to 6.01.0 psi to

accommodate the variation in relay valves, brake chamber return springs

and foundation brake return springs. AAMA stated that a tolerance for

air brake components of 3.73 psi was appropriate. Lucas

suggested a tolerance of +3 psi and that the Agency should apply this

tolerance to only tractor drive axles and trailer axles with 16.5 inch

S-cam drum brakes. ATA recommended a tolerance of between 2 to 11 psi.

After reviewing the comments and other available information, NHTSA

has decided not to establish a pressure threshold requirement at this

time. The Agency notes that additional research and testing needs to be

conducted on this matter since there currently is insufficient

information to set a threshold pressure tolerance for combination

vehicles. The brake components that affect the threshold pressure, such

as internal friction in the relay valves and the return springs in the

brake chamber and foundation brakes, provide a tolerance close to 4

psi. Therefore, establishing a threshold pressure requirement, even

with a broad tolerance, could pose compliance problems for the

industry. In addition, additional research needs to be conducted on

brakes other than S-cam brakes.

NHTSA emphasizes that after additional cooperative testing is

completed, a threshold pressure requirement could be proposed that

would improve the braking performance of a combination vehicle,

particularly at low application pressures typical of normal stops.

D. Requirements for Brake Linings

ATA and Mack Trucks requested that NHTSA issue a rule requiring

replacement brake linings to be of the same quality and have the same

friction characteristics as the linings used by original equipment

manufacturers.

The issue of aftermarket brake linings is the subject of a separate

NHTSA rulemaking action, and will not be addressed by this notice. If

the Agency tentatively concludes that such requirements for aftermarket

brake linings are in the interest of motor vehicle safety, then it will

issue a proposal to adopt such requirements.

E. Implementation Schedule

In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that the stopping distance requirements

become effective two years after the final rule's publication.

AAMA supported the proposed effective date, provided that the

agency incorporated its recommended modifications in the final rule.

Rockwell recommended that the stopping distance requirements and the

stability performance requirements be combined so that the effective

dates for both rulemakings are concurrent. Several commenters on the

stability and control NPRM, including AAMA, made the same suggestion.

AAMA noted that since ABS can directly influence achievable stopping

distance, it is important to optimize brake system performance by

taking both stopping distance and stability into account.

On April 12, 1994, NHTSA published a supplemental notice of

proposed rulemaking that proposed the following implementation schedule

for both the stopping distance and lateral stability and control

requirements:

Truck tractors--2 years after final rule (1996)

Trailers--3 years after final rule (1997)

Air-braked single unit trucks and buses--3 years after final rule

(1997)

Hydraulic-braked single unit trucks and buses--4 years after final rule

(1998). (59 FR 17326).

The Agency reasoned that making the effective dates for the two

rulemakings concurrent would promote a more orderly implementation

process, avoid the need for manufacturers to redesign the brakes on

individual vehicles twice, and reduce the development and compliance

costs that manufacturers would face as a result of these regulations.

NHTSA requested comments about the implementation schedule proposed in

the supplemental notice.

As the stability and control final rule discusses in detail in the

section titled ``implementation schedule,'' NHTSA has decided to adopt

an implementation schedule similar to the one proposed in the SNPRM.

Specifically, truck tractors manufactured on or after March 1, 1997

will have to be equipped with ABS and comply with the braking-in-a-

curve test and high coefficient of friction stopping distance

requirements; trailers and single-unit air-braked trucks and buses

manufactured on or after March 1, 1998 will have to be equipped with

ABS, and, except for trailers, comply with the high coefficient of

friction stopping distance requirements; and hydraulic-braked trucks

and buses manufactured on or after March 1, 1999 will have to be

equipped with ABS and comply with the high coefficient of friction

stopping distance requirements. The Agency has decided that these

effective dates, which were widely supported by vehicle manufacturers,

brake manufacturers, and safety advocacy groups, will provide for an

efficient implementation of the heavy vehicle braking rulemakings.

F. Intermediate and Final Stage Manufacturers/Trailer Manufacturers

Vehicle manufacturers must certify that each of their vehicles

complies with all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

While this statutory certification requirement is straightforward with

respect to vehicles produced by a single manufacturer, it is more

complex for vehicles produced in two or more stages. With such

multistage vehicles, one or more manufacturers produce an ``incomplete

vehicle'' which requires further manufacturing operations by another

manufacturer to become a completed vehicle. As defined in 49 CFR 568.3,

an incomplete vehicle includes, at a [[Page 13294]] minimum, a frame

and chassis structure, power train, steering system, suspension system,

and braking system. Incomplete vehicles may be grouped in two

categories: (1) Chassis-cabs (which are incomplete vehicles with fully

completed occupant compartments that require only the addition of

cargo-carrying, work-performing, or load-bearing components to perform

their intended functions and become completed vehicles (49 CFR 567.3))

which are certified by the chassis-cab manufacturer (49 CFR 567.5), and

(2) incomplete vehicles other than chassis-cabs (``non chassis-cabs''),

which are not certified by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer.

The National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA) commented that

manufacturers of multi-stage vehicles may not be able to demonstrate

compliance with the proposed amendments because they may not be able,

in all cases, to ``pass through'' the incomplete vehicle manufacturer's

certification. NTEA claims that these manufacturers will not have a

practicable and objective means of demonstrating compliance, since they

lack the financial resources and capabilities to sponsor testing to the

requirements. Therefore, NTEA suggested that the Agency exclude multi-

stage vehicles from the proposed road testing requirements.

As explained below, NHTSA has concluded that the stopping distance

requirements do not pose an unreasonable burden for final stage

manufacturers. NHTSA is aware of the concerns of final stage

manufacturers about road testing their vehicles. However, the final

stage manufacturers can avoid the necessity of conducting independent

testing by staying within the limits (``the envelope'') set by the

incomplete vehicle manufacturer. In fact, S6 of Standard No. 121

currently provides that ``Compliance of vehicles manufactured in two or

more stages may, at the option of the final-stage manufacturer, be

demonstrated to comply with this standard by adherence to the

instructions of the incomplete manufacturer provided with the vehicle

in accordance with Sec. 568.4(a)(7)(ii) and Sec. 568.5 of title 49 of

the Code of Federal Regulations.''13 In the final rule adding this

provision in response to the 9th Circuit's decision in PACCAR, the

Agency stated that it provides directly in the regulation ``an

alternative to road testing * * * that would constitute `due care' in

certification by any final-stage manufacturer that adopted it, whatever

its resources and engineering expertise.'' (43 FR 48646, October 19,

1978.)

\13\ In today's Federal Register notice amending Standard No.

105 with respect to stopping distances of hydraulically-braked

vehicles, the Agency is also modifying that Standard to include

identical language about compliance by final stage manufacturers so

that this concept expressly applies to hydraulic-braked vehicles

manufactured in two or more stages, as well.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to chassis-cabs, the name of each manufacturer in the

chain of production is required to appear on one or more certification

labels that are permanently affixed to the vehicle. (49 CFR Parts 567

and 568.) Under these regulations, certification of an incomplete

vehicle that is a chassis-cab can ``pass through'' to the final stage

manufacturer, provided that the final stage manufacturer takes the

precautions necessary to ensure it does not invalidate the

certification. The final stage manufacturer must ensure that it

completes the vehicle without exceeding the GVWR and GAWRS assigned by

the chassis-cab manufacturer, altering any brake system component,

moving the center of gravity of the completed vehicle with the body

installed outside the ``envelope'' of specifications provided by the

chassis manufacturer, or otherwise violating that envelope. If the

final stage manufacturer complies with all of the chassis-cab

manufacturer's specifications, the final stage manufacturer can base

its certification of compliance with the braking standard entirely upon

the statement of the chassis-cab manufacturer and therefore will not

have to recertify the vehicle.

The provision in S6 also applies to non-chassis-cabs, since the

manufacturer of a non-chassis-cab is required to furnish documentation

that indicates a means of compliance with applicable standards to

intermediate or final stage manufacturers (49 CFR 568.4), and the final

stage manufacturer is required to identify the incomplete manufacturer

on the certification label that the final stage manufacturer places on

the completed vehicle. As with chassis-cabs, the final stage

manufacturer can avoid the necessity of conducting independent testing

by staying within the envelope set by the incomplete manufacturer.

Based on the above considerations, the final stage manufacturer

would only be required to certify compliance independently in those

cases in which the final vehicle violates those specifications. NTEA

commented that there are situations in which the final stage

manufacturer ``must exceed the `envelope' of restrictions provided by

the chassis manufacturer due to customer specifications.'' The Agency

believes that in virtually all such cases the body or equipment that is

specified by the customer could be fitted on a different truck chassis

having a larger ``envelope''. Moreover, when the customer has an

overriding need to specify a particular truck chassis that cannot be

completed with the desired body or equipment without exceeding the

envelope, it is reasonable to expect the customer to bear the

additional cost burden of assuring that the completed vehicle complies

with the standard. In such situations, it is reasonable to require the

final stage manufacturer to accept responsibility for certification,

given the important safety concerns discussed below. The Agency

emphasizes, however, that it is not necessary for final stage

manufacturers to make this choice. They can instead select an

appropriate incomplete vehicle that can be completed without departing

from the envelope specified by the incomplete vehicle manufacturer.

Some of the manufacturers that build multi-stage vehicles and

choose not to stay within the envelope are small businesses that may be

unable to conduct their own road tests. While manufacturers must

certify that their vehicles meet all applicable safety standards, this

does not mean that every final stage manufacturer must independently

conduct the specific tests set forth in an applicable standard. A final

stage manufacturer may also certify compliance to the stopping distance

standard based on, among other things, engineering analyses and

computer simulations. Moreover, manufacturers need not conduct these

operations themselves. They can utilize the services of independent

engineers and testing laboratories. They can also join together through

trade associations to sponsor testing or analysis. Finally, they can

rely on testing and analysis performed by other parties, including

brake manufacturers. Brake manufacturers typically perform extensive

analyses and tests of their products and, in order to sell those

products, have a strong incentive to provide their customers, the

vehicle manufacturers, with information that can be used to certify the

vehicle to the applicable brake standards. Some manufacturers of motor

vehicle components currently provide this type of information to

vehicle manufacturers. Based on the above considerations, NHTSA has

concluded that manufacturers can certify compliance with the stopping

distance requirements by means other than road testing.

Moreover, road testing to establish compliance with the braking

requirements does not involve expensive and destructive crash testing,

which cost $18,000 or more, not [[Page 13295]] including the cost of

the vehicle which is destroyed as a result of the test. Thus, while

brake testing does involve some expense (the Agency estimates that a

complete compliance test series for Standard No. 121 would cost

$5,000), it should be feasible for manufacturers, including small

manufacturers (especially in groups or through associations), to

certify compliance, particularly since the road testing does not

require destruction of their vehicles.

Furthermore, NHTSA is not authorized when establishing safety

standards to differentiate between manufacturers on the basis of their

size or financial resources. While the agency must ``consider whether

any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and appropriate

for the particular type of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment for

which it is prescribed,'' (49 U.S.C. 30111(b)(3), formerly section

103(f)(3) of the Vehicle Safety Act), the legislative history of the

Vehicle Safety Act reveals that any differences between standards for

different classes of vehicles ``of course [are to] be based on the type

of vehicle rather than its place of origin or any special circumstances

of its manufacturer.'' S. Rept. 1301, 2 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News,

2714 (1966), cited in Chrysler Corp. v. D.O.T., 472 F.2d 659, 679 (6th

Cir. 1972).

Strong policy reasons underlie Congress' refusal to differentiate

between vehicles on the basis of the manufacturers' ``special

circumstances.'' To protect unsuspecting members of the public from

exposure to unreasonable risks posed by unsafe vehicles, there is good

reason to require that every vehicle meet all ``minimum performance

standards'' that are prescribed for vehicles of its type.

Moreover, the statute does not authorize NHTSA to grant permanent

exemptions from safety standards to small manufacturers who otherwise

would be covered by those standards. See Nader v. Volpe, 475 F.2d 916,

918 (D.C. Cir. 1973). While Nader involved a single manufacturer that

sought to be permanently exempted from safety standards, its reasoning

applies equally to classes of manufacturers that seek such exemptions.

Although the Safety Act was amended after the Nader decision to permit

small manufacturers to seek temporary exemptions from safety standards

if they can demonstrate that compliance with the standard would cause

them ``substantial economic hardship'' and that they have made a good

faith effort to comply (49 U.S.C. 30113, formerly section 123 of the

Vehicle Safety Act), Congress has severely restricted the agency's

authority to grant such exemptions to very narrow, limited

circumstances. NTEA is in effect seeking a permanent exemption from

Standard No. 121 that the statute does not permit.

NHTSA emphasizes that there are important safety reasons that

necessitate having a final stage manufacturer certify the completed

vehicle if it does not stay within the envelope set by the incomplete

vehicle manufacturer. For instance, if a final stage manufacturer adds

additional components so that the completed vehicle's GVWR exceeds the

recommended maximum GVWR weight specified in the envelope for the

vehicle, the vehicle's braking performance could be adversely affected.

As an example, a brake system designed to bring a 15,000 pound vehicle

to a stable and short stop would obviously not be able to safely stop a

20,000 pound vehicle. Moreover, the brakes on such an underbraked

vehicle would be prone to overheating. While it is relatively easy to

understand the degradation in performance in such a gross example, the

potential for reduced, safety-related performance also exists in

situations were the ``violation'' of the envelope is much smaller.

Similarly, if the center of gravity is made too high, a vehicle would

likely be overbraked on its rear axle(s) and thus be prone to

instability caused by wheel lockup.

NHTSA emphasizes that the kinds of crashes that result when a heavy

vehicle is unable to stop to avoid another vehicle are very serious. As

part of the cost effectiveness analysis contained in the Final Economic

Analysis (FEA) for this final rule, the agency used 1992 GES data to

identify a group of crashes involving heavy vehicles defined as

``unable-to-stop-in-time'' crashes. The agency examined these crashes

and the number and severity of the resulting injuries in evaluating the

impact of this regulation. One means of comparing the relative severity

of various types of crashes is to ``convert'' the injuries at different

levels of severity into ``equivalent fatalities''\14\ and to divide

that by the number of crashes that resulted in those injuries. The

resulting ratio, equivalent fatalities per crash, can be calculated for

various types of crashes and compared to indicate the relative severity

of different crash types. Using 1992 GES data, estimates were made of

the equivalent fatalities per crash for multiple-vehicle crashes

involving all types of vehicles, 0.01402 equivalent fatalities per

crash, for multiple-vehicle crashes involving heavy vehicles, 0.02089

equivalent fatalities per crash, and for the ``unable-to-stop-in-time''

crashes mentioned above, 0.03634. Comparing the rates of equivalent

fatalities indicate that not only are multiple-vehicle crashes

involving heavy vehicles 49% more severe than all multiple-vehicle

crashes, but the ``unable-to-stop-in-time'' crashes, which are the

types of crashes affected by this final rule, are 159% more severe than

all multiple-vehicle crashes in general. Also using 1992 GES data, the

agency made separate estimates of the rate of equivalent fatalities per

crash for the heavy vehicle occupants and the occupants of other

involved vehicles. This was done for both multiple-vehicle crashes

involving heavy vehicles and for the ``unable-to-stop-in-time''

crashes. The comparison of these rates shows that the ``unable-to-stop-

in-time'' crashes are 31% more severe in terms of injuries to the heavy

vehicle occupant and 79% more severe for the occupants of other

involved vehicles than multiple-vehicle crashes involving heavy

vehicles.

\14\The basic methodology used to convert injuries at various

levels of severity into equivalent fatalities is outlined in the FEA

for this final rule.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Costs

As explained in detail in the FEA, the costs associated with the

rulemaking involve additional testing costs and hardware/equipment

costs. The agency estimates the minimum initial testing costs

associated with reinstating stopping distance requirements for all

heavy air-braked vehicles would be about $6 million. As noted in the

FEA, the estimated annual compliance testing costs in years following

the effective dates of this final rule are estimated to be about $2

million. Assuming the industry continues to produce about 208,500 heavy

Class 5-8 air-braked vehicles per year (which are the largest heavy

vehicles and tractor trailers), the initial testing cost per vehicle

would be about $29 and for later years the testing cost per vehicle

would be about $10.

The hardware and equipment costs of meeting the proposed stopping

distance requirements for air braked heavy vehicles are based on the

anticipated improvements to heavy vehicles. The agency notes that all

of the changes made to meet these requirements would affect vehicles

operating in the fully loaded, or nearly fully loaded configurations.

These improvements in braking performance, which are achieved by

substituting air chambers, slack adjusters and brake linings, are

estimated to be necessary on about 104,000 air-braked vehicles,

including both truck tractors and single-unit trucks. The average cost

per vehicle of [[Page 13296]] these changes is estimated to be $50,

resulting in a total cost of $5.21 million, which is the total

estimated cost for vehicle modifications necessitated by this final

rule.

The total estimated initial cost impact of this proposal is $11.21

million ($6.0 million in compliance test costs plus $5.21 million in

vehicle modification costs), which for an estimated annual production

of 208,500 air-braked equipped vehicles, is an average of about $54 per

vehicle.

The total estimated outyear cost impact of this proposal is $7.21

million ($2.0 million in compliance test costs plus $5.21 million in

vehicle modification costs), which for an estimated annual production

of 208,500 air braked equipped vehicles, is an average of about $35 per

vehicle.

VI. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O. 12866. NHTSA

has considered the impact of this rulemaking action under the

Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures. This

action has been determined to be not ``significant'' under those

policies and procedures.

A FEA setting forth the agency's detailed analysis of the benefits

and costs of this rulemaking (along with the other rules issued today)

has been prepared and been placed in the docket. This rulemaking is

based on the FEA and all additional data available to the agency. The

Agency estimates that reinstating the stopping distance requirements

for Standard No. 121 will result in an average of approximately 3.2

lives saved per year and 84 injuries prevented per year. As mentioned

above, the agency estimates that the initial annual costs attributable

to these requirements are approximately $11.21 million ($6.00 million

for compliance testing and $5.21 million for net equipment costs) and

the outyear annual costs attributable to these requirements are

approximately $7.21 million ($2.00 million for compliance testing and

$5.21 million for net equipment costs).

Based on its analysis, the agency concludes that the requirements

will improve safety by ensuring that all heavy vehicles are capable of

stopping within a specified, safe distance. Based on information

detailed in the previous section, the agency believes that implementing

the stopping distance requirements for heavy vehicles will not result

in significant costs since most of these vehicles currently comply with

the reinstated requirements. For those vehicles that do not currently

comply with the requirements, the agency believes that they could be

upgraded by substituting other with currently produced braking

components for those now used on these vehicles.

Since these components are not significantly more expensive than

those used in poorer performing brake systems, the net cost of

substituting these components will not be significant and is estimated

to be about $50 for each vehicle that requires such changes.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

NHTSA has also considered the impacts of this notice under the

Regulatory Flexibility Act. I hereby certify that this rule will not

have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities. There may be a small number of intermediate and final stage

manufacturers that are small businesses that may be impacted by this

final rule, but as discussed previously, the Agency does not believe

that that impact is substantial, particularly in comparison to the

possible crash-related consequences of vehicles produced by such

manufacturers not complying with the rule.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-

511), there are no requirements for information collection associated

with this rule.

D. National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA has also analyzed this rule under the National Environmental

Policy Act and determined that it will not have a significant impact on

the human environment. No changes in existing production or disposal

processes will result, except that there is a reduction in these

factors resulting from the removal of the ALV. There will be a weight

increase of a few pounds per tractor with the installation of a BPV on

tractors, but such a small increase should not have any significant

effect on fuel consumption. Nor should production and disposal

processes have a significant adverse affect on the environment.

E. Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)

NHTSA has analyzed this rule in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in E.O. 12612, and has determined that this rule

will not have significant federalism implications warranting the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

F. Civil Justice Reform

This final rule does not have any retroactive effect. Under 49

U.S.C. 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in

effect, a State may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable

to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal

standard, except to the extent that the State requirement imposes a

higher level of performance and applies only to vehicles procured for

the State's use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets forth a procedure for judicial

review of final rules establishing, amending or revoking Federal motor

vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a

petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before

parties may file suit in court.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571

Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Rubber and rubber

products, Tires.

In consideration of the foregoing, this notice amends Standard No.

121, Air Brake Systems, in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations

at Part 571 as follows:

PART 571--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 571 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166,

delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50.

Sec. 571.121 [Amended]

2. Section 571.121, is amended by removing the undesignated text

following paragraph (g) in S3; in S4 by adding the definition for

``Wheel lockup;'' by revising S5.3.1, S5.3.1.1, and Table II; by

deleting S5.3.2, S5.3.2.1, and S5.3.2.2; by reserving S5.3.2, and by

revising S5.7.1 to read as follows:

* * * * *

Wheel lockup means 100 percent wheel slip.

* * * * *

S5.3.1 Stopping distance--trucks and buses. When stopped six times

for each combination of vehicle type, weight, and speed specified in

S5.3.1.1, in the sequence specified in Table I, each truck tractor

manufactured on or after March 1, 1997 and each single unit vehicle

manufactured on or after March 1, 1998 shall stop at least once in not

more than the distance specified in Table II, measured from the point

at which movement of the service brake control begins, without any part

of the vehicle leaving the roadway, and with wheel lockup permitted

only as follows: [[Page 13297]]

(a) At vehicle speeds above 20 mph, any wheel on a nonsteerable

axle other than the two rearmost nonliftable, nonsteerable axles may

lock up, for any duration. The wheels on the two rearmost nonliftable,

nonsteerable axles may lock up according to (b).

(b) At vehicle speeds above 20 mph, one wheel on any axle or two

wheels on any tandem may lock up for any duration.

(c) At vehicle speeds above 20 mph, any wheel not permitted to lock

in (a) or (b) may lock up repeatedly, with each lockup occurring for a

duration of one second or less.

(d) At vehicle speeds of 20 mph or less, any wheel may lock up for

any duration.

Table I.--Stopping Sequence

1. Burnish.

2. Stops with vehicle at gross vehicle weight rating:

(a) 60 mph service brake stops on a peak friction coefficient surface

of 0.9, for a truck tractor with a loaded unbraked control trailer,

or for a single-unit vehicle.

(b) 30 mph service brake stops on a peak friction coefficient surface

of 0.5, for a truck tractor with a loaded unbraked control trailer.

(c) 60 mph emergency brake stops on a peak friction coefficient

surface of 0.9, for a single-unit vehicle. Truck tractors are not

required to be tested in the loaded condition.

3. Parking brake test with vehicle loaded to GVWR.

4. Stops with vehicle at unloaded weight plus up to 500 lbs.

(a) 60 mph service brake stops on a peak friction coefficient surface

of 0.9, for a truck tractor or for a single-unit vehicle.

(b) 30 mph service brake stops on a peak friction coefficient surface

of 0.5, for a truck tractor.

(c) 60 mph emergency brake stops on a peak friction coefficient

surface of 0.9, for a truck tractor or for a single-unit vehicle.

5. Parking brake test with vehicle at unloaded weight plus up to 500

lbs.

6. Final inspection of service brake system for condition of adjustment.

S5.3.1.1 Stop the vehicle from 60 mph on a surface with a peak

friction coefficient of 0.9 with the vehicle loaded as follows: (a)

loaded to its GVWR, (b) in the Bobtail configuration (truck-tractors

only) plus up to 500 pounds, and (c) at its unloaded vehicle weight

(except for a truck tractor) plus up to 500 pounds (including driver

and instrumentation). If the speed attainable in two miles is less than

60 mph, the vehicle shall stop from a speed in Table II that is 4 to 8

mph less than the speed attainable in 2 miles.

Table II.--Stopping Distance

[In feet]

Service brake Emergency brake

Vehicle speed in miles per hour -----------------------------------------------------

PFC 0.9 PFC 0.9 PFC 0.9 PFC 0.9 PFC 0.9 PFC 0.9

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20........................................................ 32 35 38 40 83 85

25........................................................ 49 54 59 62 123 131

30........................................................ 70 78 84 89 170 186

35........................................................ 96 106 114 121 225 250

40........................................................ 125 138 149 158 288 325

45........................................................ 158 175 189 200 358 409

50........................................................ 195 216 233 247 435 504

55........................................................ 236 261 281 299 520 608

60........................................................ 280 310 335 355 613 720

Note: (1) Loaded and unloaded buses; (2) Loaded single unit trucks; (3) Unloaded truck tractors and single unit

trucks; (4) Loaded truck tractors tested with an unbraked control trailer; (5) All vehicles except truck

tractors; (6) Unloaaded truck tractors.

* * * * *

S5.7.1 Emergency brake system performance. When stopped six times

for each combination of weight and speed specified in S5.3.1.1, except

for a loaded truck tractor with an unbraked control trailer, on a road

surface having a PFC of 0.9, with a single failure in the service brake

system of a part designed to contain compressed air or brake fluid

(except failure of a common valve, manifold, brake fluid housing, or

brake chamber housing), the vehicle shall stop at least once in not

more than the distance specified in Column 5 of Table II, measured from

the point at which movement of the service brake control begins, except

that a truck-tractor tested at its unloaded vehicle weight plus up to

500 pounds shall stop at least once in not more than the distance

specified in Column 6 of Table II. The stop shall be made without any

part of the vehicle leaving the roadway.

* * * * *

Issued on: March 1, 1995.

Ricardo Martinez, M.D.

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95-5413 Filed 3-7-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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