In the Matter of: Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2); Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304]

In the Matter of: Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Nuclear Power

Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2); Exemption

I.

Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd or the licensee) is the holder

of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48, which authorize

operation of the Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, at a

steady-state reactor power level not in excess of 3250 megawatts

thermal. The facilities are pressurized water reactors located at the

licensee's site in Lake County, Illinois. The licenses provide, among

other things, that the Zion Nuclear Power Station is subject to all

rules, regulations, and Orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect.

II.

Sections III.B and III.D.2.(a) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,

Option A, require that Type B local leakage rate periodic tests shall

be performed during reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient

intervals, but in no case at intervals greater than 2 years. In

addition, Sections III.C and III.D.3 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,

Option A, require that Type C local leakage rate periodic tests shall

be performed during each reactor shutdown for refueling, but in no case

at intervals greater than 2 years. These requirements are reflected in

the Zion Technical Specifications (TS) as requirements to perform Type

B and C containment leakage rate testing in accordance with 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix J and approved exemptions.

III.

The licensee has determined that certain containment isolation

pathways have not been locally leakage rate tested (Type B and C tests)

as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option A. There were 23

untested pathways in Unit 1 and 18 in Unit 2. In a letter dated August

16, 1995, the licensee requested relief from the requirement to perform

the Type B and C containment leakage rate tests of certain penetrations

and valves in these pathways in accordance with the requirements of

Sections III.B, III.C and III.D of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option

A. Continued operation of the Zion units was authorized by a Notice of

Enforcement Discretion (NOED) orally granted on August 15, 1995, until

such time as the staff acted on the exemption requests. The NOED was

granted in writing on August 16, 1995.

If the exemptions the licensee requested in its letter dated August

16, 1995, are granted, the tests, except those for which permanent

exemptions were requested, would be performed: (1) during the fall 1995

Unit 1 refueling outage, or (2) during power operation on Unit 2 prior

to September 15, 1995, or (3) during the Unit 2 refueling outage in the

fall of 1996.

Attachment 1A of the licensee's letter contained one-time schedular

exemption requests and justifications for pathways that can be tested

at power. Although the tests can be performed with the units at power,

time was needed to properly develop and perform the necessary test

procedures. Accordingly, the licensee requested that the Type B and C

testing of the pathways associated with Zion, Unit 2, be deferred, with

final test completion of the affected pathways (as listed in Attachment

1A) prior to September 15, 1995. The tests have been completed on Unit

2. In addition, the licensee requested that the affected penetrations

associated with Zion, Unit 1, be deferred until the completion of its

current refueling outage, which began on September 9, 1995.

Attachment 1B of the licensee's letter also contains one-time

schedular exemption requests and justifications for pathways that can

only be tested with the unit shutdown. The tests of the penetrations

listed in Attachment 1B would be performed during the next cold

shutdown of sufficient duration. In all cases, the testing would be

performed prior to the end of the next refueling outage on each unit.

The refueling outage is currently in progress for Unit 1 and is planned

for the fall of 1996 for Unit 2.

Attachment 2 of the licensee's letter contains permanent exemption

requests and justifications for pathways that cannot satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option A, due to system/

penetration design; that is, a test is not feasible, without making

physical plant modifications.

Pathways Listed in Licensee's Attachment 1A

Attachment 1A of the licensee's letter requested temporary,

schedular exemptions for components in the following containment

penetrations:

Units 1 and 2:

P-14, Valve 1(2) RC8045, Nitrogen to the Pressurizer Relief Tank.

Unit 2 only:

P-30, Valve 2AOV-DT9159A, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Gas

Analyzer.

For Unit 2, the required tests were completed prior to September

15, 1995.

For Unit 1, the required tests will be performed before startup

from the current refueling outage. The Zion TSs do not require

compliance with containment leakage rate limits during refueling

outages, because there is little risk of an accident occurring which

would release significant amounts of radioactivity. Therefore, the

staff finds acceptable the schedular exemption request to delay the

local leakage rate testing of valve 1 RC8045 until no later than

startup from the current Unit 1 refueling outage.

Pathways Listed in Licensee's Attachment 1B

Attachment 1B of the licensee's letter requested temporary,

schedular exemptions for components in the following containment

penetrations:

Units 1 and 2:

P-60, Valve 1(2)AOV-RV0005, Containment Vent Isolation

P-70, Valve 1(2)SF8767, Refuel Cavity to Purification Pump

P-80, ECCS Relief Valve Header to Pressurizer Relief Tank

P-99, Valve 1(2)SF8787, Purification Pump to Refuel Cavity

Unit 1 only:

P-30, Valve 1AOV-DT9159A, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank to Gas

Analyzer

For Unit 1, the required tests will be performed before startup

from the current refueling outage. The Zion TSs do not require

compliance with containment leakage rate limits during refueling

outages, because there is little risk of an accident occurring which

would release significant amounts of radioactivity. Therefore, the

staff finds acceptable the schedular exemption request to delay the

local leakage rate testing of the Unit 1 components listed above until

startup from the current Unit 1 refueling outage.

For Unit 2, the leakage pathways do not consist of through-valve

leakage paths, but rather leakage paths out of

[[Page 58687]]

containment isolation valves or barriers through or past valve packing,

diaphragms, flanges, or other resilient seals. The potential leakage

paths are small or restrictive and are at mechanical joints of flange

and compression fittings, through valve packing, or through cracks or

tears in valve diaphragms. Although none of the penetrations in

question were tested in accordance with the requirements, most of them

were tested during the most recent Type A containment leakage rate test

or by process flow, with either no or minimal leakage. For those

penetrations that were not tested, the leakage path for a significant

leak to occur requires a sequence of events for which the probability

of occurrence during the limited time period of the exemption is low

enough to provide reasonable assurance of no significant increase in

risk to the health and safety of the public. In addition, seismic

qualification of some of the systems, missile protection, and the

isolation valve seal water system all provide additional assurance that

the risk of a significant leak is minimal. For these reasons, the staff

finds that the requested schedular exemption is justified and that it

is acceptable to delay the local leakage rate testing of the Unit 2

components listed above until the next cold shutdown of sufficient

duration for testing, but no later than startup from the next Unit 2

refueling outage, currently scheduled for September 1996.

Pathways Listed in Licensee's Attachment 2

Attachment 2 of the licensee's letter requested permanent

exemptions for components in the following containment penetrations:

Units 1 and 2:

P-14, Valve 1(2) FCV-SA01A, Service Air Supply to Containment

P-19, Valve 1(2) MOV-CC9413A, Component Cooling Water Supply to the

Reactor Coolant Pumps

P-34, Valve 1(2) DW0030, Demineralized Flushing Water to

Containment

P-43, Valve 1(2) LCV-DT1003, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump

Discharge

P-75, Valves 1(2) VC8402A, 1920HCV-VC182, 1(2) VC8402B, 1(2)

VC8403, Chemical and Volume Control to Regenerative Heat Exchanger

P-76, Valve 1(2) VC8480A, Reactor Coolant Loop Fill Header

P-77, Valves 1(2) PP0101, 1(2) PP0102, 1(2) PP0103, 1(2) PP0104,

Penetration Pressurization to Containment Valve Stations

P-88, Valve 1(2) FCV-RV112, Containment Hot Water Supply

P-102, Valve 1(2) AOV-RC8029, Primary Water to the Pressurizer

Relief Tank

Unit 1 only:

P-16, Compression Fittings on Five Reactor Vessel Leak Detection

System Lines

To provide time for additional staff review before granting

permanent exemptions, the staff will consider only schedular exemptions

for these components. Final staff action on these exemption requests

will be taken by December 31, 1995.

The leakage pathways listed above do not consist of through-valve

leakage paths, but rather leakage paths out of containment isolation

valves or barriers through or past valve packing, diaphragms, flanges,

or other resilient seals, except for Penetration P-77, which is

reviewed separately below. The potential leakage paths are small or

restrictive and are at mechanical joints of flange and compression

fittings, through valve packing, or through cracks or tears in valve

diaphragms. Although none of the penetrations in question were tested

in accordance with the requirements, most of them were tested during

the most recent Type A containment leakage rate test or by process

flow, with either no or minimal leakage. For those penetrations that

were not tested, the leakage path for a significant leak to occur

requires a sequence of events for which the probability of occurrence

during the limited time period of the schedular exemption is low enough

to provide reasonable assurance of no significant increase in risk to

health and safety of the public. In addition, seismic qualification of

some of the systems, missile protection, and the isolation valve seal

water system all provide additional assurance that the risk of a

significant leak is minimal. For these reasons, the staff finds that a

schedular exemption is justified and that it is acceptable to delay the

local leakage rate testing of the components listed above (except

Penetration P-77) until final staff action on these exemptions, which

will be taken prior to December 31, 1995.

Penetration P-77

Manual containment isolation valves 1(2) PP0101, 1(2) PP0102, 1(2)

PP0103, 1(2) PP0104, are in four lines that are part of the Penetration

Pressurization (PP) system. There is one valve in each line and it is

open during power operation. The piping associated with the PP system

is seismically supported and missile protected. The valves' primary

post-accident design function is to remain open so that the PP system

can continue to pressurize containment penetrations, such as electrical

penetrations, preventing containment leakage out through those

penetrations. These valves have not been locally leakage rate (Type C)

tested for through-valve leakage. Local leakage rate testing is

conducted with the valves open, with the packing of the four valves

part of the test boundary. The leakage rate from this test is added

into the sum of all local leakage rate tests for comparison to the 0.6

La acceptance criterion. This test was completed with satisfactory

results during refueling outage Z1R13 which ended March 1994 for Unit 1

and during refueling outage Z2R13 which ended April 1995 for Unit 2.

The portion of the PP system that includes these valves is continuously

monitored for leakage, with a high flow condition annunciated in the

control room. Additionally, these valves are tested for seat leakage

during the Type A (integrated leak rate) test.

The post-accident design function of the PP system is to pressurize

components to a pressure greater than Pa, the calculated peak accident

pressure of the containment atmosphere during a design-basis accident,

thereby preventing containment out-leakage. The licensee asserts that

Penetration P-77 and its associated valves are provided with a suitable

alternative to Type C testing due to the leak detection and mitigation

capability of the system. The PP system features which provide that

capability are summarized as follows:

(1) Supply characteristics:

(a) Normal supply: 100 psig air receivers

--passive components

--pressurized greater than or equal to 1.10 Pa (Pa=47 psig)

(b) Backup supplies--high degree of redundancy

--three PP air compressors: safety-related, seismic, auto start

feature, powered from ESF buses

--passive supply from high pressure Nitrogen bottles: safety-related,

seismic

--non-safety-related Instrument Air system;

(2) Leak Detection Capabilities: continuously monitored, main

control board alarms on low pressure and on high flow;

(3) Piping system characteristics: seismically designed, missile

protected;

(4) Operational readiness--TSs maintain:

(a) Required pressure and flow

(b) Availability of supplies (air compressors and Nitrogen) and

emergency power supplies

[[Page 58688]]

(c) Periodic testing requirements for compressors.

This system is required to be operable during Operational Modes 1-4

per the TSs. In addition, the PP system seal pressure is designed to

continuously maintain a nominal pressure of 1.04 Pa during post-

accident conditions. Since this penetration and associated valves are

maintained at a pressure greater than or equal to post-loss-of-coolant

accident containment pressure, containment leakage is unlikely through

this penetration.

Based on the above, the staff finds that a schedular exemption is

justified and that it is acceptable to delay the local leakage rate

testing of the four subject valves in Penetration P-77 until final

staff action is taken on these requests. Final staff action will be

taken by December 31, 1995.

In addition, the Commission will not grant an exemption unless at

least one of the special circumstances, as defined in 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2), are present. One of the special circumstances is that: the

exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable

regulation and the licensee has made good faith efforts to comply with

the regulations. The licensee presented the following discussion to

show that the requested exemptions provide only temporary relief and

that the licensee made good faith efforts to comply.

The Requested Exemptions Proved Only Temporary Relief and the

License Made Good Faith Efforts to Comply

As discussed above, the exemption request is for short duration

relative to the discovery of the aforementioned issues (30 days for

Unit 2; completion of the upcoming refueling outage for Unit 1). All

pathways that can be safely tested during reactor power operation

for Unit 2 will be tested within 30 days. Such pathways for Unit 1

will be deferred until entry into Hot Shutdown at the completion of

the upcoming outage (outage begins September 7, 1995). For pathways

that cannot be tested during power operation, testing described in

Attachment 1B will be performed during the next opportunity of

sufficient duration when Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in Mode 5. The

pathways selected for testing will be based upon the expected

duration of the shutdown and the time required to prepare the

pathways for testing. Pathways not tested during a Cold Shutdown

will be tested during subsequent cold shutdowns that may occur prior

to the upcoming refueling outages. In all cases, tests will be

completed by the end of Unit 1 outage scheduled to commence

September 7, 1995 and for Unit 2 prior to the completion of the

September 1996 refueling outage. This meets an additional criterion

for a special circumstance per item (v) of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(v),

i.e., ``The exemption would provide only temporary relief from the

applicable regulation and licensee or applicant has made good faith

efforts to comply with the regulation.'' ComEd believes that testing

to be performed prior to September 15, 1995 for Unit 2 and during

the upcoming refueling outage for Unit 1 demonstrates a good faith

effort.

The exemption request is for a short duration relative to the

discovery of the above issues. On Unit 2, the pathways that could be

safely tested during power operation were tested prior to September 15,

1995. On Unit 1, this exemption allows the deferment of the testing of

these pathways until Unit 1 enters hot shutdown during the current

refueling outage. For pathways that can not be tested during power

operation, the testing described in Attachment 1B will be performed on

Unit 1 prior to the end of its current refueling outage and on Unit 2,

prior to the completion of the refueling outage currently scheduled to

commence in September 1996. The staff has decided that a good faith

effort on the part of the licensee to comply with the regulations has

been demonstrated by the testing that has already been completed on

Unit 2, the testing that will be completed on Unit 1 prior to startup

from its current refueling outage, and the schedule for completion of

the remainder of the testing.

IV.

Sections III.B and III.D.2.(a) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,

Option A, require that Type B local leakage rate periodic tests shall

be performed during reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient

intervals, but in no case at intervals greater than 2 years. In

addition, Sections III.C and III.D.3 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,

Option A, require that Type C local leakage rate periodic tests shall

be performed during reactor shutdown for refueling, but in no case at

intervals greater than 2 years.

The licensee proposes an exemption to these sections which would

provide relief from the requirement to perform the Type B and C

containment leakage rate tests of certain penetrations and valves in

accordance with the requirements of Sections III.B, III.C, and III.D of

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option A.

The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1),

this exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to

the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense

and security. The Commission further determined, for the reasons

discussed above, that special circumstances, as provided in 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(v), are present justifying the exemption; namely, that the

exemption would provide only temporary relief and the licensee made

good faith efforts to comply.

Based on its review of the licensee's justifications, the staff

finds the licensee's requests for schedular exemptions for Type B and C

tests of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option A, that can be performed

while at power (Attachment 1A to the licensee's letter) and those that

must be performed while shutdown (Attachment 1B to the licensee's

letter) to be acceptable. The staff has reviewed the licensee's

requests for permanent exemptions for components in certain

penetrations. To provide additional time for staff review before

granting permanent exemptions, the staff will at this time grant only

schedular exemptions until final staff action is taken on these

requests for these components. Final staff action on these exemption

requests will be taken prior to December 31, 1995.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that

granting these exemptions will not have a significant impact on the

human environment (60 FR 45499).

This exemption is effective upon issuance and shall expire upon

completion of the Unit 2 refueling outage, currently scheduled to

commence in September 1996.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of November 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jack W. Roe,

Director, Division of Reactor Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-28978 Filed 11-27-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P