Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Nuclear Plant; Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-344]

Portland General Electric Company, Trojan Nuclear Plant;

Exemption

I.

Portland General Electric Company (PGE or the licensee) is the

holder of Facility Operating (Possession Only) License No. NPF-1, which

authorizes possession and maintenance of the Trojan Nuclear Plant

(Trojan or the plant). The license provides, among other things, that

the plant is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The plant is a permanently shutdown, defueled, pressurized light-

water reactor undergoing the initial stages of decommissioning, which

is located along the banks of the Columbia River in Columbia County,

Oregon.

II.

Trojan received an operating license on November 21, 1975. On

January 4, 1993, the Directors of PGE voted to accept the

recommendation of the PGE management to permanently cease power

operations at Trojan. The facility had been shut down since November 9,

1992, when a leak in the ``B'' steam generator was detected. PGE

completed defueling of the reactor on January 27, 1993. On March 24,

1993, the NRC staff issued a confirmatory order to confirm a commitment

by PGE not to move new or spent fuel into the reactor building without

prior NRC approval. On May 5, 1993, the Commission issued Amendment No.

190 for Facility Operating License No. NPF-1, which converted the

license to a possession-only license (POL).

Section 140.11(a)(4) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, (10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)) requires each licensee to have and

maintain primary nuclear liability insurance of $200 million. In

addition, each licensee is required to maintain secondary financial

protection in the form of private liability insurance under an industry

retrospective plan. However, 10 CFR 140.8 allows the Commission, upon

application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, to

grant such exemptions from the requirements of Part 140 as it

determines are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public

interest.

In a letter dated April 6, 1995, the licensee requested a reduction

in primary financial coverage and an exemption from participation in

the industry retrospective rating plan requiring secondary level

coverage requirements in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). The licensee requested

that the exemption become effective on November 9, 1992, 3 years from

the date of final shutdown of the reactors.

III.

The licensee justified the exemption request by citing existing NRC

policy that provides for exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR

140.11(a)(4) for plants that have been permanently shut down, as

presented in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated July 13, 1993,

on SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large

Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning.'' The licensee contends

that as of November 9, 1995, no potential will exist for a reasonably

conceivable accident at Trojan that could cause offsite damage

resulting in liability claims exceeding $100 million. The licensee's

conclusion is based on (1) Its analyses of operating events and design-

basis accidents for Trojan in the permanently defueled condition

described in the Trojan Defueled Safety Analysis Report; (2) the NRC

staff's technical evaluation in SECY-93-127; and (3) the permanently

shutdown status of the plant, including the significant period of

elapsed time (3 years on November 9, 1995) in which the spent fuel

decay heat will have had to dissipate.

The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical

issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to

permanently shutdown reactors in SECY 93-127. In its evaluation, the

staff concluded that the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act

establishes a legal framework and the discretionary authority to

respond to licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary

financial protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry

retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific

configuration and the amount of elapsed time since permanent shutdown,

the staff also concluded that potential hazards may exist at

permanently shutdown reactors for which financial protection is

warranted. The staff further concluded that accidents and hazards

insured against under the Price-Anderson Act go beyond design-basis

accidents and beyond those accidents considered ``credible'' as that

term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and in cases interpreting the

application of the regulation.

In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission

could, so long as a potential hazard existed at a permanently shutdown

reactor, require the full amount of primary financial protection and

full participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such

time as the hazard is determined to no longer exist, the Commission may

reduce the amount of primary financial protection and permit the

licensee to withdraw from participation in the industry retrospective

rating plan.

Because the legislative history does not explicitly consider the

potential hazards that might exist after termination of operation, the

staff generically evaluated the offsite consequences associated with

normal and abnormal operations, design-basis accidents, and beyond-

design-basis accidents for reactors that have been permanently defueled

and shut down. The staff concluded that aside from the handling,

storage, and transportation of spent fuel and radioactive materials, no

potential exists for a reasonably conceivable accident that could cause

significant offsite damage.

A severe transportation accident could cause local contamination

requiring cleanup and offsite liabilities resulting from traffic

disruption and damage to property. The possibility of this type of

accident would warrant the licensee's maintaining some level of

liability insurance. The liabilities and indemnification requirements

associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the

Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the

future, when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.

The most significant accident sequence for a permanently defueled

and shutdown reactor involves the complete loss of water from a light-

water reactor spent fuel pool. This beyond-design-basis accident

sequence could result in a zirconium fuel cladding fire that could

propagate through the spent fuel storage pool and result in significant

offsite consequences. Although such an accident is beyond the design

bases, it may be considered ``reasonably conceivable'' and could

warrant requiring substantial financial protection. Such an accident is

possible during the first year after reactor shutdown for a low-density

spent fuel storage configuration and during the first 2 to 3 years

after shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high-density

configurations.

[[Page 57461]]

Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in

conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically

further extend the time at which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could

occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water,

air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products

would most likely be inhibited by such blockage. The staff believes

that this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.

Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has

elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence is no longer a

concern because the fuel would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium

fuel cladding combustion. Possible accident scenarios after these

cooling periods have elapsed possess greatly reduced consequences but

could result in small releases or precautionary evacuations that could

result in offsite liability.

With respect to the Trojan plant-specific evaluation, the NRC staff

independently evaluated the legal and technical justifications for the

exemption presented by the licensee. The NRC recognizes the current

condition of the Trojan plant, that is, permanently shut down and

defueled, licensed for ``possession-only,'' and under a confirmatory

order that prohibits fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the

reactor building without approval of the Commission. The staff

concurred with the licensee's evaluation of credible design-basis

accidents and their minimal associated offsite consequences.

The staff also considered liability coverage needs associated with

decommissioning activities, transportation of radioactive materials,

design-basis accidents, and beyond-design-basis accidents as previously

noted herein. The results of the staff's evaluation, as embodied in the

staff requirements memorandum of July 13, 1993, on SECY 93-127 and in

SECY 93-127, allow (after the requisite minimum spent fuel cooling

period has elapsed) a reduction in the amount of financial protection

required of licensees of large nuclear plants that have been

prematurely shut down. The Trojan plant was permanently shut down on

November 9, 1992; therefore, as of November 9, 1995, 3 years will have

elapsed since the permanent shutdown of the Trojan plant. This time

period meets the criteria established in SECY 93-127 for relief from

financial protection requirements.

IV.

On the basis of its independent evaluation as embodied in the staff

requirements memorandum of July 13, 1993, on SECY 93-127 and in SECY

93-127, the staff concluded that sufficient bases exist for the

Commission's approval of relief from the financial protection

requirements for the Trojan plant. The staff also concluded that

granting the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or

consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at this

facility.

V.

Based on Sections III. and IV. above, the Commission has determined

that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, this exemption is authorized by law and

is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission grants

an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent

that primary financial protection in the amount of $100 million shall

be maintained. An exemption from participation in the industry

retrospective rating plan (secondary level financial protection) is

granted for the Trojan plant effective November 9, 1995, 3 years from

the date of final shutdown of the reactor.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment (60 FR 55741 dated November 2, 1995).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of November 1995.

Brian K. Grimes,

Acting Director, Division of Reactor Program Management, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-28157 Filed 11-14-95; 8:45 am]

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