Notification of Common Carriers of Service Disruptions

Federal RegisterNov 14, 1995

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 63

[CC Docket No. 91-273; FCC 95-417]

Notification of Common Carriers of Service Disruptions

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This Order on Reconsideration (Order) amends the Commission's

rules regarding the reporting of telephone network outages in

accordance with requests for reconsideration filed in response to the

Second Report and Order. Previously the rules required carriers to

report, inter alia, fire-related incidents impacting 1000 or more of a

carrier's lines and outages affecting major airports and 911

facilities. Under the previous rule, outages affecting 911 were to be

reported if they disrupted 25% or more of the lines to a Public Service

Answering Point (PSAP) and outages affecting major airports were to be

reported if they were ``likely to be of media interest.'' The present

Order alters these aspects of the outage reporting rule.

For 911 outages, the Order replaces the requirement that carriers

report all outages that disrupt more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP.

The old requirement was difficult to apply. The new rules simplify the

system.

Reports will hereafter be required in the following situations: If,

for 24 hours or more, one or more PSAPs cannot be reached by 911

callers, and each such isolated PSAP serves fewer than 30,000 access

lines, an initial report of the outage is due within 120 minutes of the

carrier's first knowledge of such an outage; if, for at least 30

minutes, an E911 Tandem fails to relay 911 calls to one or more PSAPs,

an initial report is due within 120 minutes, regardless of the number

of access lines served by that tandem; if, for at least 30 minutes, an

end office serving 50,000 or more access lines fails to relay 911

calls, or one or more PSAPs serving in the aggregate 50,000 or more

access lines cannot be reached by 911 callers, an initial report is due

within 120 minutes; or if, for at least 30 minutes, an end office

serving from 30,000 to 50,000 access lines is cut off from 911 service,

or one or more PSAPs serving in the aggregate 30,000 to 50,000 access

lines cannot be reached by 911 callers, an initial report is due within

3 days. Final reports of all these outages are due within 30 days.

The Order also eliminates the requirement that carriers report any

outage affecting a major airport that is ``likely to be of media

interest.'' This rule was too subjective. The new rule requires that

carriers report any outage affecting a major airport that ``has

received any media attention of which the carrier's reporting personnel

are aware.''

The Order denies the request of Pacific Bell that the Commission

clarify that the obligation to report fire-related incidents does not

apply to telephone poles and aerial cables that are consumed in fires.

This requirement has not proved burdensome to carriers and will supply

the Commission with valuable information.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 12, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert E. Kimball, (202) 418-2339, Network Services Division, Common

Carrier Bureau.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order

in CC Docket No 91-273, FCC 95-417, adopted October 4, 1995, and

released October 30, 1995. The item is available for inspection and

copying during normal hours in the Commission's FCC Reference Center

(room 230), 1919 M St., NW., Washington, D.C., or a copy may be

purchased from the duplicating contractor, International Transcription

Service, Inc. (202) 857-3800, 2100 M Street NW., Suite 140, Washington,

D.C. 20037. The Order will be published in the FCC Record.

OMB Review

Implementation of this collection of information will be subject to

approval by the Office of Management and Budget.

Title: Amendment of Part 63 of the Commission's Rules to Provide

for Notification by Common Carriers of Service Disruptions (Section

63.100): Order on Reconsideration.

OMB Number: 3060-0484.

Expiration Date: 6/30/96.

Action: Revised collections.

Respondents: Business or other for profit.

Frequency of Response: On occasion. Initial report due 120 minutes

or 3 days after incident depending on number of potentially affected

customers and nature of disruption. Final report due twenty-eight or

thirty days after initial report, depending on nature of disruption.

Estimated Annual Burden: For the entire reporting requirement

inclusive of the amendments, the estimated burden remains the same as

that approved by the OMB for the Second Report and Order, 59 FR 40264,

August 8, 1994. 200 responses; 5 hours each; 1000 hours total. The

information to be furnished is generally gathered by carriers during

outages and will be less than is presently being provided, so the

requirement is not burdensome.

Paperwork Reduction: Public reporting burden for this collection of

information is estimated to average 5 hours per response, including the

time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,

gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing

the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden

estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Federal

Communications Commission, Records Management Division, Room 234,

Paperwork Reduction Project (3060-0484), Washington, D.C. and to the

Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (3060-

0484), Washington, D.C. 20503.

Needs and Uses: Section 63.100 of the Commission's Rules, 47 CFR

Sec. 63.100, is amended to provide for the collection of information

which we believe is essential to our mission of ensuring that the

public is protected from major disruptions to telephone services. The

amendments modify 47 CFR Section 63.100 to require that local exchange

or interexchange common carriers or competitive access providers that

[[Page 57194]]

operate either transmission or switching facilities and provide access

service or interstate or international telecommunications service

report outages that affect 30,000 or more customers or that affect

special facilities and report fire-related incidents impacting 1000 or

more lines. With such reports the FCC can monitor and take effective

action to ensure network reliability. The present amendments provide

for the replacement of the requirement that carriers report 911 outages

that disrupt 25% or more of the lines serving any PSAP with a less

burdensome requirement that will, nevertheless, supply the Commission

with all necessary 911 outage information. The present amendment also

replaces the requirement that carriers report outages affecting major

airports that are likely to attract media attention with a less

burdensome requirement that will supply the Commission with all

necessary information on major outages affecting airports.

Analysis of Proceeding

In requiring carriers to report 911 outages that disrupt more than

25% of the lines serving any PSAP, the previous rules were supposed to

simplify the criteria under which carriers had voluntarily reported

special facilities outages prior to the Second Report and Order (59 FR

40264, August 8, 1994). A subcommittee of the Network Reliability

Council, a Federal Advisory Committee providing reporting

recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission, suggested

that carriers report, inter alia, any ``outage of a loop facility

containing 75% or more of the lines to the PSAP.'' Prior to the Second

Report and Order, confusion among carriers submitting voluntary reports

seemed to result from the multiplicity of other 911 reporting criteria

suggested by the subcommittee, especially the criteria involving tandem

or tandem-affecting failures. During the two years of voluntary

reporting under the subcommittee's suggestions, the Commission received

no indication that carriers were having difficulty determining the

percentage of lines affected. By applying a lower percentage standard--

25%--and eliminating all other 911 reporting criteria, the Second

Report and Order attempted to clarify the 911 reporting standards,

obtain the same amount of data, better measure the relative impact of

911 outages and motivate carriers to take greater cognizance of those

routes that serve 911 PSAPs. In the present Order, however, commenters

have demonstrated that determinations of the exact percentage of lines

affecting a particular PSAP involve greater difficulties than had been

anticipated.

On the basis of the comments submitted in this proceeding and

comparisons of 911 outage reports received before and after the Second

Report and Order went into effect, the present Orders concludes that

the 911 outage reporting requirements adopted in the Second Report and

Order have produced a far greater number of 911 reports and a far

greater reporting burden for some carriers than anticipated. In the

five months following September 7, 1994, the effective date of the

Second Report and Order, the Commission received 64 reports of outages

affecting 911 services. In the five months prior to the September 7,

1994 effective date, carriers using the TRG Guideline standards

reported only seven 911-affecting outages. Non-911 outages reported

since September 7, 1994 have not significantly increased. Commission

analyses of 911 reports do not reveal any common causes of 911 outages

relating to network vulnerability that account for this increase.

Some 911 reports received since the effective date of the Second

Report and Order appear to be the result of carriers preferring to err

on the side of over-inclusiveness where they are unable to determine

accurately the percentage of lines serving PSAPs that may have been

affected by an outage. Numerous initial reports, not included in the

totals above, have been withdrawn when carriers were subsequently able

to determine with greater accuracy the effects of the outages reported.

The most pronounced reason, however, for the increased 911 outage

reporting is that carriers in less populated areas serve a very large

number of small, dispersed PSAPs. Eleven of the sixty-four 911 outages

reported since September 7, 1994 occurred in a single state where there

are approximately 560 PSAPs. Approximately 80% of these PSAPs are

manned by only one or two operators. Twenty of the sixty-four 911

outages were reported by a single carrier serving an area encompassing

over 700 PSAPs. Nearly 600 of these PSAPs are served by fewer than

three voice connections, including connections maintained solely to

provide redundancy. Failure of a single line to any PSAP served by no

more than three lines will generate an outage report under the

standards set forth in the Second Report and Order even if the failed

line is provided solely for redundancy. In these circumstances the

``outage'' will have no effect at all on PSAP operators or customers.

Half of the 911 outages reported under these standards have been

reported by the two carriers (including those carriers' subsidiaries)

serving the largest number of predominantly rural areas.

The Order finds that, because of the disproportionate number of

very small rural PSAPs, the criteria for reporting 911 outages are

unnecessarily broad to achieve the rule's intended purpose. The effect

of the rule is to require the greatest amount of reporting for those

PSAPs serving the fewest number of lines. This was not the object of

the rule. It is clear from the NRC's E911 Focus Group Report that

outages affecting 911 service were believed to be especially important

because each 911 system was thought to represent a uniquely vulnerable

point in the telecommunications network. An E911 PSAP was viewed as a

gateway through which the whole variety of possible requests for

emergency help would converge, be rapidly evaluated, and connected with

the nearest and most appropriate public safety services. The rapid

nationwide deployment of these increasingly complex and concentrated

systems justified federal interest in discovering any common threats to

their reliability. In rural areas where PSAPs are numerous and very

small, where, for example the PSAP is a telephone in the local fire

department, such convergence and vulnerability is more limited. The

large number of 911 outage reports proceeding from these areas does not

provide the Commission with significant, new information or promote the

stated objectives of 911 outage reporting in the Second Report and

Order.

Burdensome federal reporting requirements may also increase the

costs of 911 service reliability. Under the present reporting standard,

for example, providing a redundant line to a PSAP will increase the

probability that additional outages will have to be reported. The costs

of such reporting could increase the costs of the line. Since the

reliability of 911 service in rural areas will often depend on whether

local governments can afford to deploy redundant lines, the federal

reporting requirements could make it less likely that reliability will

be increased in this way. The particular expenses carriers incur as

providers of 911 service capabilities should not be inflated by a

requirement that they monitor, analyze, tabulate, and report 911

outages that are numerous, not because of any real threat to

reliability, but only because the PSAPs in certain areas are, by

necessity, small, separate and widely dispersed. The cost of providing

911 service reliability should

[[Page 57195]]

not be augmented by unnecessary federal reporting requirements.

The problem of unnecessary 911 outage reporting can be fairly

resolved without ignoring outages that affect smaller PSAPs. No

statistical base of comparison will be sacrificed if a longer reporting

threshold is established for outages that isolate the smaller PSAPs

likely to be found outside major urban areas. A duration of 30 minutes

or more for an outage in a rural area will not necessarily have the

same significance for purposes of analyses as an outage of 30 or more

minutes in an urban area. Restoration times for small installations

over widely dispersed areas are likely to be longer due to their

remoteness from vendors and from the more sophisticated equipment or

technical help often needed to diagnose and to restore service. An

outage lasting just 30 minutes in a rural area, for example, is likely

to proceed from different causes and involve simpler solutions than an

outage lasting the same amount of time in an urban area. A longer

reporting threshold for smaller PSAPs will, however, alleviate the

disproportionate burden the present 911 requirements impose on carriers

serving such PSAPs. This order, therefore, amends Section 63.100(a)(4)

of our rules, altering the duration threshold for reporting smaller

outage affecting PSAPs.

The amendments herein adopted replace the percentage standard,

which has proven confusing and difficult to apply, by redefining 911

reportable outages as those that lead to isolation of one or more

PSAP(s) for 24 hours or more, if the isolated PSAP(s) collectively

serve fewer than 30,000 access lines and no alternate routing has been

invoked. The amendments define 911 outages requiring a report as those

for which loss of call processing capabilities in the E911 tandem(s)

continues for 30 minutes or more, regardless of the number of customers

affected, if no alternate routing has been invoked. The amendments

require reporting of both these types of 911 outages within 2 hours of

the carrier's first knowledge that the outage is reportable. This will

resolve the problems of reporting outages affecting smaller PSAPs while

enabling the Commission to continue monitoring such outages at a more

reasonable level.

Previously, the rules allowed use of the blocked calls standard to

determine whether the numerical thresholds had been reached for LEC

tandem outages. In the case of 911 outages, however, it is more

practical to require reporting of larger 911 outages according to the

number of access lines served by the affected PSAP, regardless of the

number of blocked calls. Carriers have had considerable difficulty

determining the number of blocked 911 calls during outages. 911 outages

are also less likely to be predictable on the basis of historical time-

of-day traffic loads, the alternative method of determining blocked

calls provided for in the Second Report and Order. The number of access

lines, on the other hand, is easily determined and will ensure maximum

coverage of larger 911 outages. The amendments herein require reporting

of larger 911 outages according to the number of access lines served by

the affected PSAP, regardless of the number of blocked calls.

To make as accessible and clear as possible the 911 outage

reporting requirements under both the special facilities subsection and

the numerical thresholds subsection of section 63.100 of the

Commission's Rules, the amendments change the definition of ``special

facilities'' to remove reference to 911 in that paragraph and

consolidate all 911 reporting rules in a separate new subsection, 47

CFR 63.100(h). To make application of this new subsection as specific

as possible, the amendments complete the definition of reportable 911

outages in section 63.100(a)(4) by including outages for which there

is: (1) isolation of one or more PSAP(s) for 30 or more minutes, if the

isolated PSAP(s) collectively serve(s) 30,000 or more access lines and

no alternate routing has been invoked; or (2) isolation of an end

office switch or host/remote cluster from 911 services for 30 minutes

or more, if these installations collectively serve 30,000 or more

access lines and no alternate routing has been invoked. For 911

outages, only those that fall within these two categories or those

described in the paragraph above will be reportable under the

amendments.

Under the previous rule, the time periods for initially reporting

outages at the 50,000 and 30,000 potentially-affected-customers

thresholds are 2 hours and 3 days, respectively. To avoid confusion,

the amendments herein establish parallel reporting periods for 911

outages affecting 50,000 and 30,000 customers respectively. Whether

these thresholds have been reached will be determined by the number of

access lines served by the isolated 911 installations. The amendments

set a 3 day deadline for filing initial reports of outages isolating

911 installations serving 30,000 to 50,000 lines and 2 hours for those

serving 50,000 or more access lines.

Finally, the amendments change the information requirements by

eliminating the sentence, ``Carriers must indicate, when 911 is one of

those services, whether more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were

disrupted and there was no automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP.''

Any known effect on 911 services attributable to any outage reportable

under other criteria is to be described under the information

requirement that carriers specify the ``types of services affected.''

The amendments make this clear.

In establishing an exemption for reporting 911 outages in

situations where there is automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP, the

Second Report and Order attempted to avoid the reporting of 911 outages

that had no real impact on 911 customers. The phrase ``automatic

rerouting to an alternate PSAP,'' however, has resulted in some

confusion and overreporting. Therefore, the present Order eliminates

that phrase and, instead, requires 911 outage reports only where

rerouting to the same or an alternate PSAP location did not occur. This

will make it clear that an outage is reportable if there is a rerouting

capability that is not used, but not reportable when calls are

successfully rerouted.

Since the Second Report and Order went into effect on September 7,

1994, few outages affecting major airports have been reported. None has

been reported because of the likelihood that it would attract media

interest. Commenters have shown that attempting to estimate the

newsworthiness of an outage, along with the other reporting and

restoration efforts at hand, is an unreasonable task to impose on

telecommunications technicians. The Commission's role as a source of

information to which the public can turn when concerned about matters

involving telecommunications, however, the Commission needs to know if

an outage affecting a major airport does, in fact, receive media

attention. The Order amends Section 63.100(a)(6) of the Commission's

rules, therefore, to require the reporting of any outage affecting a

major airport that ``has received any media attention of which the

carrier's reporting personnel are aware.''

The reporting requirement triggered when an outage arises because

of a fire can give us and the industry valuable information about such

vulnerabilities, particularly if alternative technologies, such as

underground cable, could significantly improve reliability. For these

reasons, the Order declines, at this time, to modify the reporting

requirement for fire-related incidents.

Ordering Clauses

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), and 201 of the

Communications Act

[[Page 57196]]

of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154 and 201, Section 63.100 of the

Commission's Rules, 47 CFR 63.100, IS AMENDED as set forth below,

effective April 12, 1996.

It is Further Ordered, that, the Secretary shall cause a summary of

this Order to be published in the Federal Register which shall include

a statement describing how members of the public may obtain the

complete text of this Commission decision. The Secretary shall also

provide a copy of this Order to each state utility commission.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 63

Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Service disruptions.

Federal Communications Commission.

William F. Caton,

Acting Secretary.

Rule Changes

Part 63 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations

is amended as follows:

PART 63--EXTENSION OF LINES AND DISCONTINUANCE, REDUCTION, OUTAGE

AND IMPAIRMENT OF SERVICE BY COMMON CARRIERS; AND GRANTS OF

RECOGNIZED PRIVATE OPERATING AGENCY STATUS

1. The authority citation for part 63 is revised to read as

follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-205, 218, 403 and

533, unless otherwise noted.

2. Section 63.100 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4),

and (a)(6); in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) by removing the

sentence ``Carriers must indicate, when specifying the types of service

affected by any reportable outage, when 911 is one of those services,

whether more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were disrupted and there

was no automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP.'' and adding in its

place ``When specifying the types of services affected by any

reportable outage, carriers must indicate when 911 service was

disrupted and rerouting to alternative answering locations was not

implemented.''; and adding paragraph (h) to read as follows:

Sec. 63.100 Notification of service outage.

(a) * * *

(3) Special offices and facilities are defined as major airports,

major military installations, key government facilities, and nuclear

power plants. 911 special facilities are addressed separately in

paragraph (a)(4) of this section.

(4) An outage which potentially affects a 911 special facility is

defined as a significant service degradation, switch or transport,

where rerouting to the same or an alternative answering location was

not implemented, and involves one or more of the following situations:

(i) Isolation of one or more Public Service Answering Points

(PSAPs) for 24 hours or more, if the isolated PSAPs collectively serve

less than 30,000 or more access lines, based on the carrier's database

of lines served by each PSAP; or

(ii) Loss of call processing capabilities in the E911 tandem(s),

for 30 minutes or more, regardless of the number of customers affected;

or

(iii) Isolation of one or more PSAP(s), for 30 or more minutes, if

the isolated PSAPs collectively serve 30,000 or more access lines,

based on the carrier's database of lines served by each PSAP; or

(iv) Isolation of an end office switch or host/remote cluster, for

30 minutes or more, if the switches collectively serve, 30,000 or more

access lines.

* * * * *

(6) An outage which ``potentially affects'' a major airport is

defined as an outage that disrupts 50% or more of the air traffic

control links or other FAA communications links to any major airport,

any outage that has caused an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)

or major airport to lose it radar, any ARTCC or major airport outage

that has received any media attention of which the carrier's reporting

personnel are aware, any outage that causes a loss of both primary and

backup facilities at any ARTCC or major airport, and any outage to an

ARTCC or major airport that is deemed important by the FAA as indicated

by FAA inquiry to the carrier management personnel.

* * * * *

(h)(1) Any local exchange or interexchange common carrier or

competitive access provider that operates transmission or switching

facilities and provides access services or interstate or international

telecommunications services, the experiences an outage on any

facilities that it owns, operates or leases that potentially affects

911 services must notify the Commission within the applicable period

shown in the chart in this paragraph (h)(1) if such outage meets one of

the following conditions, as defined in paragraph (a)(4) of this

section:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Condition Lines affected Duration Period

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Loss of E911 Tandem capability...... No limit............... 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.

Isolation of PSAP(s)................ Under 30,000 access 24 hours or more...... 120 minutes.

lines served.

Isolation of PSAP(s)................ 50,000 or more access 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.

lines served.

Isolation of PSAP(s)................ 30,000 to 50,000 access 30 minutes or more.... 3 days.

lines served.

Isolation of EO switch, host/remotes 50,000 or more access 30 minutes or more.... 120 minutes.

from 911. lines served.

Isolation of EO switch, host/remotes 30,000 to 50,000 access 30 minutes or more.... 3 days.

from 911. lines served.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Satellite carriers and cellular carriers are exempted from the

reporting requirement in this paragraph (h). Notification must be

served on the Commission's Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24 hours a

day in the FCC headquarters building in Washington, D.C., or on a

secondary basis it may be served on the Commission's Watch Officer on

duty at the FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska. The notification

must be by facsimile or other record means delivered within the

notification period indicated above from the time of the carrier's

first knowledge that the service outage ``potentially affects a 911

special facility'' as described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section and

summarized in the chart in paragraph (h)(1) of this section and the

service outage has continued for the duration indicated in paragraph

(a)(4) of this section and summarized in the chart in paragraph (h)(1)

of this section. Notification shall identify a contact person who can

provide further information, the telephone number at which the contact

person can be reached, and the information known at the time

notification is made about the service outage including: the date and

estimated time (local time at the location of the outage) of

commencement of the outage; the geographic area affected; the estimated

number of customers affected; the types of services affected; the

duration of the outage, i.e. time elapsed from the estimated

commencement of the outage

[[Page 57197]]

until restoration of full service; the estimated number of blocked

calls during the outage; the apparent or known cause of the incident,

including the name and type of equipment involved and the specific part

of the network affected; methods used to restore service; and the steps

taken to prevent recurrences of the outage. The report shall be

captioned Initial Service Disruption Report. Lack of any of the

information in this paragraph (h)(2) shall not delay the filing of this

report. Not later than thirty days after the outage, the carrier shall

file with the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, a Final Service Disruption

Report providing all available information on the service outage,

including any information not contained in its Initial Service

Disruption Report and detailing specifically the root cause of the

outage and listing and evaluating the effectiveness and application in

the immediate case of any best practices or industry standards

identified by the Network Reliability Council to eliminate or

ameliorate outages of the reported type.

[FR Doc. 95-27300 Filed 11-13-95; 8:45 am]

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