Operational Measures To Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank Vessels Without Double Hulls

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes regulations that would require the

owners, masters, or operators of tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons (GT)

or more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil in bulk as

cargo to comply with certain operational measures. The proposed

regulations contain requirements for bridge resource management

training, rest hour minimums, enhanced surveys, maneuvering performance

capability requirements, and other measures aimed at reducing the

likelihood of an oil discharge from these vessels. Additionally, the

Coast Guard proposes to amend requirements for the carriage of onboard

emergency lightering equipment. These proposed regulations represent

the second step in the Coast Guard's three-step effort to establish

structural and operational measures for tank vessels without double

hulls as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).

DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 1, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to the Executive Secretary, Marine

Safety Council (G-LRA/3406) (CGD 91-045), U.S. Coast Guard

Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, or may

be delivered to room 3406 at the same address between 8 a.m. and 3

p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone

number is (202) 267-1477. Comments on collection-of-information

requirements must be mailed also to the Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street

NW., Washington DC 20503, ATTN: Desk Officer, U.S. Coast Guard.

The Executive Secretary maintains the public docket for this

rulemaking. Comments will become part of this docket and will be

available for inspection or copying at room 3406, U.S. Coast Guard

Headquarters, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

A copy of the material listed in ``Incorporation by Reference'' of

this preamble and references for this preamble are available for

inspection at room 1312, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and have also

been included in the public docket.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, Standards Evaluation and

Development Division, at (202) 267-6490. This number is equipped to

record messages on a 24-hour basis.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Request for Comments

The Coast Guard encourages interested persons to participate in

this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or arguments.

Persons submitting comments should include their names and addresses,

identify this rulemaking (CGD 91-045) and the specific section of this

proposal to which each comment applies, and give the reason for each

comment. Please submit two copies of all comments and attachments in an

unbound format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for

copying and electronic filing. Persons wanting acknowledgment of

receipt of comments should enclose stamped, self-addressed postcards or

envelopes.

The Coast Guard will consider all comments received during the

comment period. It may change this proposal in view of the comments.

On January 20, 1994, the Coast Guard held a public meeting on

structural and operational measures for tank vessels. The Coast Guard

plans no additional public meetings. Persons may request a public

meeting by writing to the Marine Safety Council at the address under

ADDRESSES. The request should include the reasons why a meeting would

be beneficial. If it determines that an additional opportunity for oral

presentations will aid this rulemaking, the Coast Guard will hold a

public meeting at a time and place announced by a later notice in the

Federal Register.

Drafting Information. The principal persons involved in drafting

this document are LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, and

Jacqueline Sullivan, Project Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel.

Regulatory History

Section 4115(b) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (which

appears as a statutory note following 46 U.S.C. 3703a) directs the

Coast Guard to develop structural or operational requirements for tank

vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more without double hulls to serve as

regulations until 2015, when all tank vessels operating in U.S. waters

are required to have double hulls under section 4115(a) of OPA 90 (46

U.S.C. 3703a). Regulations issued under the authority of section

4115(b) must provide as substantial protection to the environment as is

economically and technologically feasible.

On November 1, 1991, the Coast Guard published an advance notice of

proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (56 FR 56284) which discussed structural

and operational measures intended to meet the requirements of section

4115(b) of OPA 90. The ANPRM included a request for data on the

technical and economic feasibility of those measures for use on vessels

covered by section 4115(b). Eighty-eight comments were received by the

close of the extended comment period, which ended on January 30, 1992

(57 FR 1243).

After reviewing the comments, the Coast Guard published a notice of

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Structural and Operational

Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without Double

Hulls'' (Existing Vessels) on October 22, 1993 (58 FR 54870). The Coast

Guard issued two subsequent correction notices on November 19, 1993 (58

FR 61143), and December 14, 1993 (58 FR 65298), which made technical

corrections to the NPRM. In response to several comments received on

the NPRM, the Coast Guard published on December 16, 1993, a notice of

public meeting and extension of comment period (58 FR 65683).

The Coast Guard held a public meeting on January 20, 1994, to

obtain information from the public on the proposed regulations. Topics

addressed by speakers included applicability, differences between tank

barges and tankships, exemptions, and economic and technical

feasibility of the proposed regulations. Some of the basic assumptions

of the proposed regulations related to certain structural measures were

also discussed, particularly their reliance on Regulation 13G of Annex

I of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78).

Information on the public meeting is available for public review at the

address under ADDRESSES.

In light of the comments received at the public meeting and in

response to the written comments received on the NPRM, the Coast Guard

is reviewing the proposed requirements for structural measures. To

expedite the implementation of section 4115(b) of OPA 90, the Coast

Guard developed a three-pronged approach which

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encompassed three separate rulemaking projects. First, the Coast Guard

issued a final rule on August 5, 1994, requiring the carriage of

emergency lightering equipment and the inclusion of the vessel's

International Maritime Organization (IMO) number in the advance notice

of arrival report (59 FR 40186); second, it is issuing this

supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) regarding additional

operational measures; and third, it is reviewing comments on the NPRM

for major structural measures and revising the Regulatory Assessment

(RA) before issuing an SNPRM regarding structural requirements for tank

vessels. Structural measures that will be addressed in this third step

include hydrostatic loading requirements, structural refit of existing

hull areas, emergency cargo off-loading capabilities and other

structural adaptations or major cargo carrying adjustments.

Background and Purpose

Section 4115 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L.

101-380) mandates regulations to provide improved protection from oil

spills from tank vessels in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States due to collisions and groundings. This section applies to

tank vessels that are constructed or adapted to carry, or that carry

oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue.

The Coast Guard has determined that the applicability of these

proposed regulations would reflect section 4115(a) of OPA 90 which

requires certain existing tank vessels without double hulls to be

phased out of operation by 2015. The Coast Guard rulemaking

implementing section 4115(a) entitled ``Double Hull Standards for

Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk'' (CGD 90-051) (57 FR 36222) added 33 CFR

157.10(d), which establishes the applicability of the regulations. The

regulations also apply to certain tank vessels carrying oil in bulk as

cargo operating in U.S. waters, including vessels unloading oil as

cargo at deepwater ports, lightering in established lightering zones,

or lightering more than 60 miles from the territorial sea baseline;

they also apply to non-dedicated oil spill response vessels (OSRVs).

The Navigation and Inspection Circular (NVIC) 10-94, ``Guidance for

Determination and Documentation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA

90) Phaseout Schedule for Existing Single Hull Vessel Carrying Oil in

Bulk,'' provides a detailed explanation of the applicability of section

4115(a).

In the preamble to the Existing Tank Vessels NPRM, the Coast Guard

proposed to limit the applicability of the rule to ``oil tankers'' as

defined in 33 CFR 157.03(oo) rather than tank vessels as defined in 33

CFR 157.03(v). The NPRM specifically excluded vessels carrying only

animal fats and vegetable oils because the proposed structural

requirements were believed to be too costly for vessels carrying only

non-petroleum oils. Additionally, the exemption was proposed in an

effort to be consistent with the international standards of MARPOL 73/

78, which also establishes structural measures for certain existing

vessels. The Coast Guard has determined that the operational

requirements proposed in this SNPRM would be applied to all existing

tank vessels, including vessels which carry only non-petroleum oils.

The Coast Guard has long contended that a discharge of non-petroleum

oils can be as damaging to the environment as a discharge of petroleum

oil, especially if spilled in bulk. In 1992, an IMO study entitled

``Harmful Effects on Birds of Floating Lipophilic Substances Discharge

from Ships On the Plumage of Birds'' was published by the Netherlands

Institute for Sea Research. This study gives numerous examples of

lethal contamination of seabirds by certain non-petroleum oils spilled

from ships. This study is available for public inspection at the

address under ADDRESSES. The Coast Guard also researched the number of

tank vessels potentially affected by this proposal and found no tank

vessels which are certificated to carry only non-petroleum oils. The

Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this proposed rulemaking

on vessels that carry only non-petroleum oils. Comments on the impact

of the proposed rulemaking on areas that could be adversely affected by

a non-petroleum spill are also requested.

The Coast Guard proposes to revise the applicability of

Sec. 157.400 of the Existing Tank Vessels final rule issued on August

5, 1994 (59 FR 40186), which requires oil tankers to carry emergency

lightering equipment and report the vessel's IMO number in the advance

notice of arrival report. The SNPRM proposes to apply the lightering

equipment requirement to all tank vessels. A separate rulemaking

proposes to change the reporting requirements of a vessel's IMO number

to include vessels 300 gross tons (GT) or more.

To clarify how each of these regulations, both existing and

proposed, apply to foreign flag vessels, the Coast Guard proposes to

amend the applicability section of 33 CFR part 157. The proposed change

would ensure that, to be consistent with international law, the

regulations do not apply to foreign flag vessels in innocent passage in

U.S. navigable waters, including the territorial sea of the United

States, or while operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) unless

they are engaging in lightering operations or off-loading oil in bulk

at a deepwater port.

This proposal would also require a barge owner to assume additional

responsibility for the actions of the towing vessel. Barge operations

for loading cargo are generally handled by company representatives or

facility personnel. However, navigational control of the tank barge has

historically been the responsibility of the towing vessel. Although

section 4115(b) of OPA 90 did not specifically recognize the towing

vessel's shared role in tank barge operations, the towing vessel's role

in the navigation and control of the tank barge must be addressed to

reduce accident risk from tank barges. The proposed regulations require

the tank barge owner or operator to ensure the towing vessel meets

certain standards comparable to those proposed for tankships.

This additional level of control should have a minimal effect on

tank barge companies because most tank barge owners or operators also

own the towing vessels and employ their crews. For those tank barge

companies that rely on leased towing vessels to move their tank barges,

these proposed requirements could result in some additional contractual

arrangements, additional oversight of the towing vessel companies, or

hiring criteria that incorporate these requirements. These measures

would ensure that tank barge owners exercise direct control over the

manner in which their cargo is transported. This direct oversight is

prudent for tank barge owners because in most cases, under section 1002

of OPA 90, tank barge owners are held financially responsible for any

removal costs and damages for discharged oil. The Coast Guard is

soliciting comments on the extension of certain towing vessel

requirements to the tank barge industry.

Discussion of Comments and Changes

Background information on proposals for structural measures for

existing vessels without double hulls is provided in the preambles to

the ANPRM and the NPRM. Operational measures were discussed in both the

ANPRM and the NPRM; however, the NPRM focused on measures to reduce oil

outflow after collisions and groundings, not on the mishap risk

reduction for these vessels.

[[Page 55906]]

The Coast Guard has issued many requirements that could be

considered operational in nature. Other regulations mandated by OPA 90

affect the marine industry, especially the tank vessel fleet. To

address the most common hazardous operational deficiencies on tank

vessels today, the Coast Guard has conducted a qualitative evaluation

of the tank vessel operating system. Previous studies of this type

include (1) ``Research Needs to Reduce Maritime Collisions, Rammings,

and Groundings'' by the Maritime Transportation Research Board (1981);

(2) ``Development and Assessment of Measures to Reduce Accidental Oil

Outflow from Tank Ships'' by the Coast Guard (May 1989); and (3)

``Human Error in Merchant Marine Safety'' by the Maritime

Transportation Research Board (1976). These studies along with other

risk analysis literature formed the baseline for the ``fault trees''

depicted in the following figures:

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Figure 1 shows how a qualitative evaluation of a marine system can

identify effective improvements for existing or proposed regulations.

Figure 2 identifies the general pollution hazard created by tank

vessels. The scope of this analysis was further narrowed to those areas

where a tank vessel without a double hull may pose a higher risk than

other vessels or to areas where inconsistencies exist between

requirements for U.S. domestic vessels and foreign certificated

vessels. The Coast Guard developed detailed qualitative models for

structural and fire or explosion accidents because the majority of the

existing tank vessel fleet is older and not required to conform to many

of the recent safety regulations. Collisions, allisions, and groundings

were considered because of the oil spill potential of these incidents.

The operational spill segment of the fault tree in Figure 2 and the

terminal operations portion are only included in this analysis in areas

where present regulations do not hold U.S. and foreign vessels to

comparable standards. Figures 3 through 6 display the detailed

qualitative models and associated high risk components within each

identified hazard.

This type of analysis contains a subjective element. The Coast

Guard has drawn from the knowledge of its experienced inspectors and

licensed mariners to develop the fault trees identified in Figures 3-6.

These fault trees are not meant to be comprehensive, instead they are

used to clarify further discussion within this proposed regulation by

identifying major operational causes of oil discharges and the measures

that could potentially mitigate these causes from a tank vessel without

a double hull.

As an example of this process, 33 CFR 164.35(g) requires all ships

of 1,600 GT or more to post a list in the wheelhouse which identifies

the vessel's general maneuvering characteristics. This requirement

mitigates problems arising from ``lack of knowledge'' which may cause a

collision, allision, or grounding as identified in Figure 5. In

analyzing this requirement's effectiveness to mitigate this ``lack of

knowledge'' component, it becomes clear that the requirement may not be

as effective as it could be. A discussion of this issue can be found in

a recent ``Marine Technology'' paper entitled ``Maneuvering Information

for the Pilot/Navigator: Its Source Value and Limitations,'' written by

Mr. Thomas G. Knierim (Vol 31, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 123-144).

The Coast Guard received a total of 132 comments on the Existing

Vessel NPRM. Thirty of these comments discussed over 70 issues relating

to operational measures. The following discussion is divided into seven

categories: (1) General comments which address broad issues and the

general content of the NPRM; (2) comments on proposed revisions to

emergency lightering equipment requirements in 33 CFR 157.410; (3)

comments on personnel training and information (see the fault-tree

components of Figures 5 and 6 which address failure to perform a task,

failure to correctly perform a task, and lack of knowledge or

training); (4) comments on vessel maintenance surveys (see the

components of Figures 3 through 6 for equipment failure, hull

structural failure, or failure due to explosion); (5) comments on

navigation and maneuverability (see the components of Figures 5 and 6

involving a lack of knowledge, training, or the use of incorrect

information); (6) comments on requirements for the control and movement

of tank barges (see the components of Figure 6 related to towing vessel

operations and equipment); (7) comments on operational measures that

are not addressed elsewhere in this SNPRM.

1. General

Several comments expressed concern that the proposed regulations do

not reflect congressional intent. The comments stated that the NPRM

improperly emphasized structural measures without adequate regard for

operational measures which could have an equal or greater benefit for

the environment at less cost. They also stated that the failure to

assess significant regulatory alternatives violates the statutory

mandate of OPA 90 and the requirements of Executive Order 12866. This

SNPRM proposes operational measures that meet both the statutory

mandate of OPA 90 and the mandate of the Executive Order.

Some of the comments stated that the requirements proposed in the

NPRM would not satisfy the statutory mandate to provide ``as

substantial protection to the environment as is economically and

technologically feasible'' as required by section 4115(b) of OPA 90.

One comment stated that operational measures would do more to protect

the environment because 80 percent of all oil pollution is caused by

human error, not by structural malfunctions. Several comments indicated

that the operational measures could be implemented more quickly than

structural measures. Many comments stressed the need for operational

measures to prevent collisions or groundings, rather than structural

requirements to reduce oil outflow after a vessel collision or

grounding.

This SNPRM proposes operational measures for both foreign and U.S.

vessels that should improve the overall quality of tank vessel

operations. Rulemakings complementing this effort propose navigation

equipment for towing vessels and towing vessel operating license

changes.

One comment suggested that vessel owners should be able to choose

from a list of measures that, when used together, would equal a

specified level of protection. This would require that each operational

measure be assigned a credit based upon additional prevention or

decreased oil outflow.

The Coast Guard considered various ways of allotting credits and

developing a minimum level of protection. This concept did not address

the different objectives of each proposed requirement. For example, how

could a requirement for the pilot to plan a passage, intended to reduce

the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding (Figure 5), be

quantified in relation to a maintenance program intended to reduce the

risk of a structural failure (Figure 3)? Blurring the lines between

failure modes and risk components would not achieve equitable risk

reduction among affected tank vessels. An ``a la carte'' idea was also

researched to compare each failure mode with a list of possible risk

reduction measures. Equivalencies between each measure could not be

determined because, even among the components, an accurate quantitative

assessment method was not available.

Instead, the Coast Guard evaluated these operational measures in

terms of the failure mode which they address, whether vessel personnel,

navigation, or maintenance practices. The Coast Guard is proposing

minimum training requirements to address vessel personnel, information

requirements and minimum equipment and tests to address navigation and

maneuvering problems, and survey and physical prevention measures to

address the integrity of the vessel's structure. Where the same risk

component is addressed, within each measure, some equivalency

determinations are provided to allow individual companies or vessels to

tailor requirements to their operational needs. The proposed measures

consider both the technical and economical feasibility mandates of the

statute.

Other comments recommended that the Coast Guard strictly enforce

its current pollution prevention regulations. The Coast Guard enforces

the requirements of both international and domestic law. Additional

[[Page 55913]]

enforcement measures have been established and implemented that include

the increased scrutiny of certain vessels that consistently violate

laws or have a history of casualties. Until the effectiveness of these

recent enforcement measures has been assessed, the Coast Guard does not

intend to propose additional measures.

One comment requested that Canadian or other foreign flag vessels

passing through the St. Lawrence Seaway in route to a Canadian port be

exempt from these proposals. The comment estimated that the true cost

of the proposals would be four to five times those quoted by the Coast

Guard. Another comment requested that tankers calling at deepwater

ports, where there are already various operational measures in effect,

be exempted. One comment requested exemption for vessels which lighter

60 miles offshore and for those that call at the Louisiana. Offshore

Oil Port (LOOP) because section 3703a of title 46 of the United States

Code does not apply to them. As previously discussed, these vessels do

have phaseout requirements and are subject to the provisions in section

4115(b). The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed operational

measures are appropriate and do not conflict with St. Lawrence Seaway

or LOOP operations.

One company requested that asphalt carriers be exempted from the

proposed rule; the Coast Guard does not agree. Asphalt is a petroleum-

based cargo and the requirements contained in this portion of the

rulemaking present no unique difficulties for an asphalt carrier.

Two comments requested that vessels transporting oil to American

Samoa be exempted because of the remoteness of the islands and the

fragility of the economy. Both comments stated that vessels calling

there satisfy international requirements and will have no incentive to

incur the additional cost these rules would impose. One of these

comments contended that if this regulation were applied to these

vessels, the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to American

Samoa would be in jeopardy and the cost of fuel would rise. The other

comment specifically requested that vessels transporting oil to the

Pacific Islands be exempt from the requirements of the proposed rule

that exceed the requirements of Regulation 13G of MARPOL 73/78. This

would include the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the

commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and other U.S.

possessions in the Western Pacific. The comment stated that the small

number of foreign tanker operators willing to comply with the

regulation, coupled with the limited U.S. flag product tanker fleet,

will severely limit the supply of essential petroleum products to the

Pacific Islands.

The Coast Guard believes that the operational requirements

contained in this rulemaking are economically feasible for vessels

transporting oil to all of these areas. Equivalency provisions offer

flexibility in compliance with certain requirements. Incorporated

international standards accommodate both the foreign and domestic

industry. The Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this

proposed rulemaking on vessels transporting oil to specific remote

geographic areas like American Samoa and other Pacific Islands.

Comments on the impact of the proposed rulemaking on areas that are

economically dependent on tourism or fishing are also requested.

2. Emergency Lightering Requirements

The Coast Guard is proposing revisions to requirements for

emergency lightering equipment published in a final rule on August 5,

1994, (59 FR 40186) entitled ``Emergency Ligthering Equipment and

Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels

Without Double Hulls.'' Section 157.410(c) of the final rule referenced

the requirements of 46 CFR part 56.25 for cast iron and malleable iron

fittings and flanges. Cast iron and malleable iron have very high

failure rates in cargo piping systems due to their low cycle fatigue

susceptibility and tendency to weaken when subjected to high

temperatures. To ensure that these fittings are not installed in piping

lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids near open flame, or any

parts reaching temperatures above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F), this SNPRM

proposes to amend Sec. 157.410(c) to specifically prohibit the use of

such valves or fittings.

3. Personnel Training and Information

Data attributes 80 percent of marine accidents to some form of

human error. Human factors are broadly defined as a scientific and

engineering discipline concerned with analysis, research, design

development, and evaluation of human/human, human/machine, human/

information and human/environment interfaces. Human factors issues

include any condition or circumstance which affects the quality of

human performance required to accomplish a complex task or series of

tasks safely and effectively. As related to vessel navigation, this

applies to four general subjects: error trapping or human intervention,

task or mission coordination, team communication, and vessel

integration. Error trapping or human intervention is responsible for

``near misses'' as discussed in the report entitled ``The Role of Human

Error in Design, Construction, and Reliability of Marine Structures''

published by the Ship Structure Committee (SSC-378, November 1994).

Error trapping occurs when humans intervene to interrupt potentially

catastrophic combinations of actions and events to bring systems back

to within safe operating conditions. This SNPRM emphasizes human

factors issues which would reduce the risk of accidents caused by ship

personnel: failing to perform tasks, incorrectly performing tasks,

lacking knowledge or training to perform assigned tasks, using

incomplete or incorrect information, and failing to identify or correct

social or managerial problems.

Because the prevention of accidents through improving the people

involved in the system is an effective way to reduce risk within the

marine industry, the Coast Guard established a task group on January

13, 1995 (60 FR 3289), formed by the Chief, Office of Marine Safety,

Security and Environmental Protection to develop a long-term strategy

to focus prevention efforts on casualties caused by human error. The

Coast Guard's Prevention Through People (PTP) initiative has

established a framework by which the Coast Guard, other government

agencies, and the maritime industry, nationally and internationally,

can work together outside of the regulatory process to manage maritime

risks systematically. The task force report entitled ``Prevention

Through People'' stresses the use of risk management tools to identify

root causes and cost effective preventive measures; the employment of

proactive action to detect, assess, and prevent human errors that

affect safety; and improvement of investigative methods, data

collection, analyses, and feedback. This report is available for public

inspection at the address under ADDRESSES.

Training. The Coast Guard received several comments on improving

personnel training. Six comments stated that additional personnel

training was needed to ensure the competency of the crew. One of these

comments urged the Coast Guard to require specific in-house training.

Another of these comments suggested that drug and alcohol testing and

awareness training be required.

Proposed Secs. 157.415 and 157.420 include training requirements

and performance standards to ensure the development and retention of

certain skills. Drug and alcohol testing program requirements already

exist and are applicable to the crews of tank vessels. For this SNPRM,

existing drug and

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alcohol requirements were considered. The Coast Guard has determined

that additional requirements are not needed for drug and alcohol

testing or awareness training at this time. The Coast Guard, however,

commends companies with programs that exceed Federal requirements.

Three comments stated that bridge management training, including

simulator training, would improve the competency of the crew. They

recommended that vessels carry a bridge management manual which

codifies the company's standards, practices, policies, and procedures.

Two different risk reduction solutions were proposed by the

comments. The first solution addressed additional training requirements

for improving crew navigational skills or development of management

skills for the bridge crew. The second solution pertained to developing

extensive operational procedures for various shipboard operations and

navigational situations. Both risk reduction solutions address the lack

of knowledge and the management components noted in Figure 5.

Company management generally develops various operational

procedures in the form of bridge reference material. The crew is then

expected to review the material and refer to it, if time permits, prior

to acting in an emergency or a unique situation. Several sections of

OPA 90 contain extensive planning requirements for emergency situations

(i.e., the Vessel Response Plan requirement in 33 CFR part 155.) In

contrast to these written procedures, recently developed team training

techniques focus on the operation of the bridge team during both normal

and emergency situations. This type of training is an example of

reducing the risk of a marine casualty through improving the response

of the people directly involved with the system.

The Coast Guard has proposed general bridge management training

requirements to the Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW)

Subcommittee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since

1991. However, the STW Subcommittee has not yet developed a training

standard. The Coast Guard consider such training desirable for the

crews of all vessels. This rulemaking may serve as the precedent for

future regulations addressing the reduction of accident risk due to

human error through team management training programs.

The bridge resource management (BRM) training proposed in

Sec. 157.415 of this SNPRM is similar to the techniques and practices

that have been used in the aviation field. BRM is not intended to teach

the more ``traditional'' aspects of bridge watchstanding (i.e.,

navigation, shiphandling, and collision avoidance); rather, it focuses

on integrating ``traditional'' technical skills with human factors

skills to reduce the risk of human error-related accidents. These

concepts reflect an emphasis on effective communication among

watchstanders; the proper delegation of tasks and responsibilities; the

importance of using all available resources (equipment, information,

and personnel); and the need for watchstanders to understand the way

stress and fatigue affect their performance.

The Coast Guard seeks uniform curriculum requirements for both U.S.

and foreign licensed officers, and is presently working within IMO to

develop these requirements. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or

other instrument that includes BRM skills and course curriculum, the

Coast Guard intends to substitute, incorporate by reference or propose

rules which reflect these international standards. In the interim, a

general course curriculum was developed based on review of various

existing courses used to train pilots, masters, mates, and military

personnel. The Coast Guard proposes this general curriculum to ensure

that the training courses emphasize open team communications, task

coordination, and the integration of operations. Specific course length

and a requirement for simulator training have not been included. The

following references were used to develop the general course curriculum

proposed in this rulemaking:

(1) IMO Guidelines ``Human Relationships, 1.21'' and ``Ship

Simulator and Bridge Teamwork, 1.22'';

(2) American Petroleum Institute's ``Guidelines for Developing

Bridge Management Teams'';

(3) U.S. proposal papers for both the Standards, Training and

Watchkeeping Subcommittee (STW 25/3/14, STW 26/4/13) and the Safety of

Navigation Subcommittee (NAV 38/13);

(4) Presentation on ``Bridge Resource Management'' by Mr. Richard

T. Johnson, et al. (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers

Panel 0-44), to the International Conference on Marine Simulation and

Ship Manoeuvrability (MARSIM 93), Saint John, Newfoundland, Canada,

September 1993;

(5) SAS Flight Academy's course curriculum for its ``Bridge

Resource Management'' course;

(6) ARCO Marine's Bridge Team Management Training course curriculum

utilizing SimShip and the Star 360 deg. simulator; and

(7) The Coast Guard's student handbook for its course on ``Team

Coordination Training.''

The training proposed in Sec. 157.415 would be required for

designated officers in charge of a navigational watch serving on either

tankships and towing vessels. The Towing Safety Advisory Committee

(TSAC) recommended that this type of training be required for towing

vessel personnel as well as tankship personnel because it is an

effective means of preventing accidents. Thus, an example of the

personnel affected by Sec. 157.415 would be the master, chief mate, one

second mate, and the two third mates (a typical tankship officer

complement) or the master and two mates (a towing vessel's officer

complement). These individuals would be required to attend the initial

BRM training and refresher training no less than once every 5 years.

Initial course completion including a series of performance standards

and course completion documentation is proposed in Sec. 157.415 to

verify that a vessel's officers have been adequately trained. The 5-

year refresher training would coincide with present license renewal

requirements. For U.S. licensed individuals, a rulemaking to propose

requirements for this training and provisions for an endorsement

directly onto the license is under development.

The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners, masters, or

operators would be required to research course availability and to

establish training programs to comply with the proposed bridge resource

management training requirements. Therefore, in Sec. 157.415(a) the

Coast Guard is proposing that compliance with these requirements would

not be required until 1 year after the effective date of the final

rule. In addition, the Coast Guard recognizes that a substantial pool

of merchant mariners already have received comparable BRM training and

is proposing that these individuals be credited for the completion of

this training if it has occurred within 3 years of the effective date

of the final rule.

A more aggressive measure to address the entire crew and their

interaction with the vessel operations is ``Vessel Resource

Management'' training. This training course would apply to engine room

personnel as well as other personnel assigned to the vessel. The

integration of support services, bridge functions, engine room

functions, maintenance, and communications with facilities or company

management would be covered by this training. The Coast Guard

recognizes the value of this

[[Page 55915]]

training and solicits comments on whether this type of comprehensive

training should be required or recommended.

Training of unlicensed watchstanding personnel is also imperative.

The Coast Guard is proposing vessel specific watch training for those

watchstanding personnel who assist the officer in charge of a

navigational watch. TSAC also recommended that this training

requirement be applied to towing vessel personnel. This training would

ensure that unlicensed watchstanders receive training tailored to

management expectations and the equipment on board either the tankship

or the primary towing vessel, prior to taking on watchstanding duties.

General subjects for training are listed in Sec. 157.420(a) to ensure

watchstanders receive instruction on essential items that would enable

them to provide accurate and useful information to the officer in

charge of a navigational watch or other senior personnel. To ensure

this training remains current and to account for personnel changes or

equipment upgrades, an annual refresher of this watchstanding training

is proposed.

The Coast Guard has included a proposed definition for the term

``officer in charge of a navigational watch'' to clarify which

personnel would be required to complete the bridge resource management

training. This term would also provide consistency with the terminology

of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW). The proposed definitions

for ``primary towing vessel'' and for ``fleeting or assist towing

vessel'' would clarify that personnel on the towing vessel responsible

for the navigation and control of the tank barge during most of the

voyage would be required to have bridge resource management training,

vessel specific watch training, and certain other requirements proposed

in this rulemaking. This distinction is made because (1) during assist

towing operations, the towing vessel personnel that made the transit

with the barge (the primary towing vessel) generally stay on site and

direct the mooring or anchoring operation; (2) in most cases, the tank

barge company has management control over the primary towing vessel and

its personnel because they directly own the vessel and employ its crew;

and (3) this would ensure integrated tug barge operations are included

in the rulemaking.

Pilot Licensing Programs. Three comments suggested improvements to

the pilot licensing process. One comment recommended more aggressive

pilot licensing and revocation procedures and the adoption of more

rigorous penalty standards. Another comment recommended a comprehensive

review of mariner licensing standards and more rigorous enforcement of

current regulations such as background checks; one recommended checking

the National Drivers Register (NDR) before issuing a license.

A separate NPRM published on March 13, 1995 (60 FR 13570), proposed

the incorporation of an NDR check prior to issuing a license. A

licensing study is underway and revisions to current requirements are

anticipated. In conjunction with the licensing study, a 1994 National

Research Council Committee on Advances in Navigation and Piloting

report entitled ``Minding the Helm'' (ISBN 0-309-04829-X) discusses and

recommends several actions that could be taken by the Coast Guard to

improve marine navigation and piloting. The Coast Guard is presently

reviewing this report and anticipates future rulemakings to implement

some of the recommendations.

Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. Another component of the accident

hazards, shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, deals with fatigue. Current work

hour restrictions and rest hour requirements attempt to mitigate the

risk of accidents. The Coast Guard evaluated existing requirements and

proposes to expand the rest hour requirement for both foreign and U.S.

crew members with duties directly related to vessel safety and oil

transfer operations.

Proposed Sec. 157.425 would require the owner, master, or operator

of each tank vessel to ensure crew members involved in navigation,

engineering, or oil transfer operations are provided a minimum of 6

continuous hours of rest within 12 hours prior to departing port or

prior to cargo transfer operations. Because the operation and safe

navigation of the tank barge hinges on the actions of the towing vessel

personnel, tank barge owners would have to ensure that the towing

vessel master or operator, any crew member assigned to helm or lookout

tasks, as well as any personnel assigned tankerman duties for the barge

cargo complied with these requirements. For tank barge companies that

do not directly own the towing vessel or employ its crew, this

requirement could be met by management oversight of the towing vessel

company, a contractual agreement, or by towing vessel hiring practices.

A definition for ``rest hour'' is proposed to be added to

Sec. 157.03. This term is borrowed from STCW. Watchstanding, assigned

clerical duties, assigned painting, maintenance, or housekeeping duties

all fall within a crewman's typical daily work load. A rest hour is

that period during which a crew member has no assigned tasks. A rest

hour, however, does include the time spent on drills or during an

emergency situation. The Coast Guard also recognizes travel to a work

site is not addressed in this proposal. The intention of this proposal

is to ensure that well rested individuals are assigned to tasks that

are important to vessel operations. Travel can have a negative effect

on an individual's alertness; however, some commute time to the job

site is standard for every profession. The Coast Guard is soliciting

comments on when and how travel time should be factored into a rest

hour requirement.

The Coast Guard recognizes the benefit of adequate rest for all

mariners and is working within the IMO framework to establish an

international standard. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or

other instrument that includes provisions for rest, the Coast Guard

intends to substitute, incorporate by reference, or propose rules which

reflect these international standards. The Coast Guard is also

considering the incorporation of the more stringent work hour and rest

hour requirements found in section 4114 of OPA 90 to include foreign

tankships and other tank vessels. These work hour requirements have

been included in the Designation of Lightering Zones Final Rule

published on August 29, 1995 (60 FR 45006). The Coast Guard is

soliciting comments on the feasibility of expanding application of the

work hour and rest hour restrictions of section 4114 or the adoption of

similar IMO provisions, under the authority of section 4115(b) of OPA

90.

4. Vessel Maintenance Surveys

Figure 3 depicts the qualitative evaluation of a structural failure

hazard to a tank vessel. These types of hazards have been reduced in

the past through drydock examinations, classification society

requirements, and construction requirements such as the welding

qualifications of 46 CFR part 57. The Coast Guard analyzed past

requirements addressing structural failures and equipment failures as

indicated in Figures 5 and 6. More significantly, because these vessels

have been scheduled for a mandatory phase-out, it is suspected that the

human factors issues related to management's reluctance to sufficiently

supply or upkeep the vessel, and the vessel operator's failure to

inspect or test the

[[Page 55916]]

tank vessel equipment may become more frequent. Vessel owners or

operators may begin to weigh the maintenance investment against the

short-lived return and could down-scale vessel upkeep accordingly. The

Coast Guard recognizes this possibility and has evaluated existing

requirements that would ensure vessel structure and equipment remain in

safe operating condition. This analysis indicated that some additional

measures could reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure,

and the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding due to equipment or

upkeep problems.

The Coast Guard received several comments on improved maintenance

aboard vessels. Three comments suggested that the Coast Guard require

internal audits of vessel operations, equipment, and personnel for

compliance with all applicable regulations and company standards. One

comment recommended preventive maintenance programs on ships; another

suggested formal in-house ship inspection programs.

In Secs. 157.430 and 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing a two-

step approach to ensuring existing tank vessels are maintained at a

level that will reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure.

Under this proposal, tankships, integrated tug barges, and tank barges

would be required to (1) have an enhanced survey or an enhanced survey

equivalent, and (2) conduct frequent vital system surveys.

Enhanced Surveys. Proposed Sec. 157.430(a) would require an

enhanced survey for all tank vessels of 5,000 GT or more as detailed in

IMO Resolution A.744(18), entitled ``Guidelines on the Enhanced

Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil

Tankers.'' To prevent the need for additional drydockings, the

requirement would reflect either the frequency of the U.S. scheduled

drydock exam requirements in 46 CFR part 31 or that of a foreign

vessel's flag administration. This requirement already exists under the

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,

1973 and the related amendment to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78; however, the

U.S. has expanded the scope of this requirement to include tank vessels

of 5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. This survey requires

detailed visual inspection as well as specific gauging. This survey

should reduce the risk of both a global and local structural failure by

closely recording and inspecting the hull prior to the vessel's

phaseout date. It would also ensure that a detailed survey of the cargo

piping and hull are available for Coast Guard examination. This would

enable the Coast Guard to affirm that vessel upkeep is adequate for

safe operation.

Alternate Enhanced Surveys. To allow companies flexibility and

credit for existing in-house survey programs, tankships not required to

meet Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 and all tank barges would have the option

of meeting an equivalent standard. This provision is proposed in

Sec. 157.430(b) and would allow companies with established in-house

survey programs to simply upgrade them slightly and include oversight

provisions.

The Coast Guard anticipates that many tank barge owners and small

tankship owners already have preventive maintenance programs that

include routine hull gaugings, pipe gaugings, and inspections beyond

current Coast Guard requirements. These programs provide company

management personnel with material condition documentation necessary

for long-range company planning of vessel replacement or overhaul

scheduling. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) would permit the company to follow

its own program rather than start an entirely new process if the

company can document that the present survey process is comparable in

scope and recordkeeping to the IMO requirements. In addition, this

section would require oversight of these programs to ensure that the

vessel is adequately surveyed until it is phased out of service. Review

of the gauging and inspection analysis would provide clear assessment

of the vessel's structural soundness. The enhanced survey or preventive

maintenance program reports would be required to be retained on board

or made available within 24 hours to enable Coast Guard personnel to

readily assess the vessel's suitability for service and also to assist

in any emergency cargo transfer operations or emergency repairs.

Vital Systems Surveys. While an enhanced survey reduces the risk of

both catastrophic and local hull failure, it does not directly address

risk of equipment failure or the risk of a fire or an explosion.

Figures 3 through 6 indicate certain mechanical or equipment failures

which may contribute to or cause these types of accidents. The Coast

Guard researched the present inspection and regulatory requirements in

effect for each system. Many of these systems are inspected annually by

either flag or port administrations. However, while 33 CFR 164.25

requires some tests and inspections, it does not detail some of the

systems unique to tank vessels. While most companies already have

routine equipment maintenance and inspection programs, several systems

are overlooked or not included in these programs.

In Sec. 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing more frequent surveys

of systems deemed vital to the safe transfer of cargo, fire and

explosion risk reduction, and maintaining navigational control. To

ensure these systems get the maintenance they need to remain safe,

these inspections would be conducted by vessel personnel, company

personnel, or company designated representatives that are knowledgeable

of the equipment's safe operating parameters and that have the

authority, capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action

when equipment is not functioning properly. Because tank barge systems

require similar vigilance to ensure they remain safe, tank barge

owners, masters, or operators would be included in this requirement and

would have a responsibility to ensure the barge systems outlined in

proposed Sec. 157.435 are surveyed by the appropriate personnel.

Those systems related to vessel control, such as steering and

navigational equipment, are presently required to be tested and

inspected as specified in 33 CFR part 164 if the vessel is 1,600 GT or

more. For towing vessels, the Coast Guard recently proposed similar

control and navigational equipment checks. However, the inspection of

the emergency towing equipment required in the IFR published December

22, 1993 (58 FR 67988), is not covered in 33 CFR part 164. This

emergency towing equipment is generally located on the vessel's deck

and is required to be rigged for ready use. This towing equipment along

with mooring lines and similar equipment are included as a vital system

survey because of their exposure to prolonged adverse environmental

conditions and their infrequent use. The Coast Guard solicits comments

on these vital systems survey requirements. The Coast Guard

specifically requests comment on whether additional systems should be

surveyed to prevent equipment failure, which could lead to an oil

spill, fire, or an explosion during cargo transfer operations, and

whether specific emergency systems should be inspected more frequently

than proposed or required.

This proposal also would require the inspection findings to be

logged in the Oil Record Book required by 33 CFR 151, in the vessel's

log, or other similar onboard documentation to ensure that the master

or operator is aware of the condition of these vital systems.

[[Page 55917]]

No reporting requirements are proposed in Sec. 157.435; however,

there are existing port specific reporting requirements or port entry

restrictions that would remain in effect if this proposal became a

final rule. The Coast Guard solicits comments on reporting requirements

for the failure of specific components within the proposed vital

systems.

5. Navigation and Maneuverability

Improved navigation equipment and maneuvering systems would

mitigate the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding attributable

to lack of knowledge or reliance on incomplete or incorrect data. These

two components within Figure 5 and 6 can be effectively addressed in

various ways. Present regulations reflect highly technical navigation

equipment requirements for tank vessels in 33 CFR part 164. This

navigation equipment is being improved almost daily as computing

systems and programming capabilities increase. Human error in reading

the equipment or interpreting the data is also addressed within present

requirements through radar operator endorsement requirements and other

licensing requirements. The risk of an accident due to navigation

equipment failure is also mitigated by the reporting requirements of 33

CFR parts 160 (Ports and Waterways Safety) and 164 (Navigation).

Maneuvering systems are addressed in present requirements for

information about the vessel's maneuvering characteristics and

reliability of the vessel's control systems.

Autopilot Alarm. One comment stated that vessels should be equipped

with an alarm that sounds when the helm is turned more than 5 deg. from

amidships while the autopilot is engaged.

The Coast Guard agrees with this practical and simple alarm

requirement and in Sec. 157.440(a) is proposing a requirement for an

additional alarm on all tankships with installed autopilot equipment.

As recommended by TSAC, a tank barge owner or operator would be

required to ensure that the towing vessel has a means to indicate to

the towing vessel operator that the autopilot is engaged and manual

rudder commands would not be effective unless the autopilot is shut

off. Because a towing vessel wheelhouse is generally arranged for a

single operator and the autopilot system is simplistic, a physical

indicator to remind the master or operator that the autopilot is

engaged would serve as adequate warning. On tankships, there are

multiple watchstanders, frequent duty rotations, and complex autopilot

systems that make it easier to lose track of the autopilot status. An

alarm requirement on a tankship would ensure both the officer in charge

of a navigational watch and the helmsman are aware of the autopilot

status.

Accident data indicates that there have been incidents when bridge

crew personnel were unaware of the autopilot status and attempted to

manually steer the vessel while the autopilot was engaged. In some

instances their actions did not result in the desired change to the

ship's heading or rudder angle due to the autopilot settings. The

requirements proposed under Sec. 157.440 would be in addition to

requirements in 33 CFR 164.13 which restrict the use of an autopilot on

tank vessels of 1,600 GT or more in certain areas and under certain

conditions. These two requirements would not conflict because 33 CFR

part 164 restricts the use of the autopilot, while this proposal would

alert the tankship officer in charge of a navigational watch and the

helmsman if the helm is turned manually while the autopilot is engaged.

The Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the inclusion of a

requirement for primary towing vessels to have a restriction on the use

of the autopilot similar to 33 CFR 164.13(d).

Maneuvering Performance Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.445 addresses

both the lack of knowledge component and the use of incorrect or

incomplete information component in Figure 5. Maneuvering performance

capability is directly related to the vessel's design and can easily be

established. The standards for ship maneuverability outlined in IMO

Resolution A.751(18) use conventional trial maneuvers to evaluate vital

maneuverability characteristics. IMO has deliberated ship maneuvering

issues since 1968. Resolution A.601(15), entitled ``Provision and

Display of Maneuvering Information On Board Ships,'' was adopted in

1987. Resolution A.751(18) was adopted in November 1993, and is based

on the premise that vessel maneuvering characteristics can be assessed

from the results of typical sea trials. It differs from the present

posting requirements of 33 CFR part 164 in two fundamental ways: (1) It

scales maneuvering test results against minimum criteria; and (2) it

requires zigzag maneuvers to establish first and second overshoot

angles.

This performance standard serves to highlight those vessels with

poor control capabilities due to design, or vessels that experience

dynamic instability during some maneuvers. Under proposed

Sec. 157.445(b), the owner, master, or operator must inform the COTP if

the vessel fails to meet the IMO minimum criteria in any of the seven

test areas. This provides the port state a guideline for recognizing

the capabilities of approaching vessels and for taking appropriate

action to reduce the risk of a grounding, allision, or collision.

Providing advance notice to the Captain of the Port (COTP) that a

vessel does not meet this performance standard mitigates the external

factor component of Figure 5.

The Coast Guard also recognizes the twofold potential for these

test results to assist a pilot: (1) They provide overshoot angle

information; and (2) they provide the maneuvering information in

relationship to the ship's length. This type of information is not

contained within IMO's Resolution A.601(15) maneuvering wheelhouse

poster nor in the existing 33 CFR part 164 wheelhouse maneuvering

characteristic requirement. Posting of the test results of this

performance standard would provide pilots with nondimensional

maneuvering information. In addition, a thorough knowledge of this

performance standard and its development would enable the pilot to

compare the test results among vessels. It provides a benchmark for

quantifying how well the vessel can be expected to respond under

general conditions.

The Coast Guard has considered the applicability of these

performance standards. The IMO resolution applies only to vessels of

100 meters or more in length constructed on or after July 1, 1994. The

Coast Guard proposes to apply these requirements to all tankships of

5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. The IMO performance

criteria was based on a study of 600 existing vessel designs and

reflects simple, practical changes to current ship maneuverability

trials. For those vessels which do not meet this standard, the proposed

regulation does not bar them from port entry. Proposed Sec. 157.445(b)

would allow vessels which do not meet the standard to continue port

entry; however, a vessel would be required to comply with a mandatory

reporting requirement to ensure that the COTP is alerted to the

inferior maneuvering performance of the vessel.

The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners and operators would

require adequate time to perform the maneuverability tests required by

this proposed requirement; therefore, under proposed Sec. 157.445(a),

the Coast Guard intends to delay the implementation of this proposed

measure until 1 year after the final rule is published in the Federal

Register.

[[Page 55918]]

Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. Section 157.450 proposes

to incorporate by reference an IMO resolution with three specific

requirements: (1) standardizing the presentation of the maneuvering

information required by 33 CFR part 164; (2) requiring the use of a

pilot card; and (3) requiring a maneuvering booklet to be available to

the master on board the vessel. The maneuvering poster required by this

resolution incorporates all of the information that is required to be

displayed by a vessel of 1,600 GT or more under 33 CFR part 164. This

proposed requirement would ensure that every tankship presents this

maneuvering data in the same format so the pilot can quickly assess the

maneuvering characteristics of the vessel. The pilot card provides a

``snapshot'' of the vessel's current equipment status and maneuvering

information unique to the transit. The maneuvering booklet gives

detailed information on the specific maneuvering capabilities at

various drafts and in various hydrodynamic situations. These details,

along with squat characteristics, are essential for difficult transits

through constricted channels and for damage control situations in the

event of a marine casualty.

All three of these requirements have been recommended by the Coast

Guard since 1989 through NVIC 7-89, ``Maneuvering Information.'' Use of

standardized forms to help prevent omission of important information is

a common theme within bridge resource management philosophy. The Coast

Guard also solicits comments on whether the pilot card should have

additional information.

Minimum Under-keel Clearance. Three comments favored the

implementation of minimum under-keel clearance requirements to prevent

groundings. The Coast Guard agrees and in Sec. 157.455 is proposing

regulations which would establish a minimum under-keel clearance

requirement for all tank vessels departing or entering a port. This

proposed regulation is intended for both tankships and tank barges. The

tank barge company would be required to ensure the tank barge meets

this minimum under-keel clearance requirement either through

establishing and enforcing company policy, through a contractual

agreement with the towing vessel company, through hiring practices, or

through direct company oversight of the tank barge's under-keel

clearance calculations prior to port entry or departing port.

This requirement has been suggested in several forms over the past

10 years. The Coast Guard, with the aid of the Navigation Safety

Advisory Council (NAVSAC), considered a draft for similar requirements

in 1991. After much debate, it decided not to pursue a federally-

mandated clearance requirement. The difference between the current

proposal and past proposals is fundamental. Past proposals considered

``real-time'' or actual under-keel depth and minimum under-keel depth

throughout a transit. Problems with this type of requirement were

substantial. The accuracy of the onboard depth sounder, the number of

depth sounders and their hull placement, and the inconsistencies

between published data and actual water depth, all complicated the task

of regulating actual under-keel depth.

The proposed requirements in Sec. 157.455 are based on anticipated

under-keel depth and represent a fundamental passage planning

requirement. IMO has provided guidance on general under-keel clearance

considerations since 1978 in its ``Guide to the Planning and Conduct of

Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978). As a passage planning

requirement, this proposal would reduce human error by ensuring the

hazard components (shown in Figures 5 and 6) related to failure to do a

task, failure to correctly perform a task, incomplete or incorrect

information, and lack of knowledge or training are addressed on those

tank vessels presenting a higher oil spill risk, due to design, if a

grounding occurs. Conscientious operators already carefully calculate

the deepest draft of the vessel and then review the intended route to

ensure there is adequate depth underneath the keel. Several companies

already have policies dictating this planning requirement and several

U.S. ports, such as the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, already

have established guidance for minimum under-keel clearances. NAVSAC

recommended that an adequate depth for transit determination be made by

a joint agreement between the local Captain of the Port (COTP) and the

port and harbor safety authority or association or other similar group.

This recommendation would be appropriate if the safe navigation of a

particular port indicates that it is necessary to establish permanent

under-keel clearance requirements. The Coast Guard recognizes that some

local COTP and port and harbor safety authorities presently have or may

wish to establish clearance requirements. This proposal would not

preempt present or future local standards. The proposal establishes an

anticipated minimum under-keel clearance of at least .5 meters (2 feet)

for all ports. If a local standard is less than the proposed .5 meter

clearance, the proposed notification requirement enables the COTP to

positively control the local policy. It is anticipated that a local

under-keel clearance requirement that is more stringent than the .5

meter clearance would be enforced through a joint COTP and harbor

safety authority agreement. This proposed clearance reflects general

industry standards and provides an added cushion of safety for vessels

while operating in areas where charted depths may not have been updated

by surveying agencies for sometime. Tank vessels fitted with double

bottoms would be exempt from this under-keep clearance requirement

because within the risk framework developed for this rulemaking, the

double bottoms provide protection from oil spills that may be caused by

this type of accidental or non-emergency intentional grounding.

A vessel's log or similar onboard documentation should indicate

that the master or operator has considered the factors that may affect

a vessel's draft and has reviewed the appropriate scaled charts, tide

tables, and other applicable publications to calculate the anticipated

controlling depth. Charts and publications may contain conflicting

water depth information. Some of these variances are due to different

survey periods, survey techniques, or recording purposes. The most

conservative depth should be used to calculate the anticipated depth.

This preventive measure would require all affected vessels to

carefully plan port transits. Grounding would not indicate a violation

of the requirements in proposed Sec. 157.455 if the owner, master, or

operator has properly logged or documented the proposed planning

requirements and can recreate the calculations done prior to port entry

or departure. Satisfying the planning requirements, however, does not

relieve the owner, master, or operator of ensuring that other

navigational requirements and practices are followed.

Intentional grounding during a transit, unless done to reduce the

risk of a collision or allision, or during a similar type of emergency,

would violate the regulation if done with without the express approval

of the COTP. This proposed restriction on intentional grounding is not

intended to unconditionally prohibit this practice rather, it focuses

on ensuring that the local COTP understands the vessel's operation and

agrees to the practice. In areas where port bottom conditions are

[[Page 55919]]

known and do not pose a threat to the integrity of the hull, approval

for certain vessels to load cargo by intentionally grounding would be

acceptable. An anticipated caveat to a vessel being allowed to

routinely ground for loading operations is a specific shell plate and

weld condition survey or some other type of structural review provision

to ensure the vessel remains structurally fit for the additional

loading stresses.

Pilotage Passage Plans. One comment recommended that the Coast

Guard require pilot passage plans. This would require the pilot to

prepare a written passage plan prior to boarding a vessel, provide

copies of the plan to the bridge team, and discuss the plan with the

bridge team prior to beginning the passage. Guidance on this issue has

been developed by IMO and is entitled, ``Guide to the Planning and

Conduct of Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978).

Although many pilots already prepare plans for passage through a

port, the vessel's crew also needs to actively communicate with the

pilot prior to a port transit. This proposed rulemaking addresses only

the vessel's responsibility to accurately inform the pilot of the

vessel's status and to monitor the pilot during a transit by

incorporation of pilot cards and bridge resource management training.

The Coast Guard and IMO are undertaking a separate initiative to

address the pilot's responsibilities to the vessel.

Navigation Equipment. Several comments stressed the need for

improved navigation equipment and suggested requiring state-of-the-art

navigation equipment such as a Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver

and collision avoidance radar. Other suggestions included electronic

charts, advanced sonar systems and a speed log.

Within both the international community and among U.S. vessel

operators, a significant amount of discussion has centered on the value

of navigational information versus the training of navigators. While

equipment with additional capabilities is extremely useful,

navigational safety also depends on the officer using this information.

The Coast Guard has determined that the present automatic radar

plotting aid (ARPA) requirements and the electronic positioning device

required in 33 CFR part 164 set an adequate minimum standard. The

proposed bridge resource management training would give the officers

responsible for vessel navigation the tools they need to interpret and

use all the information gathering systems at their disposal. The Coast

Guard is considering future proposals for Electronic Chart Display and

Information System (ECDIS) or differential GPS (DGPS) capabilities on

vessels. While ECDIS may indicate the ship's actual position on an

electronically generated chart, any requirement for electronic

positioning devices is premature until standards for equipment have

been developed and DGPS signals can provide an accurate, high integrity

signal throughout the United States. However, owners purchasing new

units should consider a GPS unit capable of receiving a DGPS signal or

interfacing with a differential receiver.

VEssel Traffic Service Systems. Several comments stated that the

Coast Guard needs to develop stronger rules for Vessel Traffic Service

Systems (VTS). Three comments stated that the Coast Guard should

require a vessel's mandatory participation in a harbor's active VTS.

Other comments stated that more ports were in need of VTS. One comment

stated that the VTS existing in Valdez, AK, San Francisco, CA, New

Orleans, LA, and New York, NY, have deficiencies including inadequate

funding, lack of maintenance and poor training. Most comments stated

that VTS are an obvious measure to reduce oil pollution which should be

improved and extended to more ports.

Section 4107(b)(1)(B) of OPA requires the Secretary to study the

need for new, expanded or improved VTS. The 1991 Port Needs Study

(Vessel Traffic Service Benefits) documents the benefits and costs of

Coast Guard VTS in 23 selected ports on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific

coasts. The study employs a comprehensive cost-benefit model that

considers the far-reaching consequences of marine accidents based on

navigational risk. The results are being used by the Coast Guard to

make capital investment decisions for the entire VTS program. One

change is the establishment of requirements and procedures which

simplify previous VTS regulations and mandate participation in all VTS

(59 FR 36316; July 15, 1994). Other VTS developments are being proposed

in separate documents and are not within the ambit of this rulemaking.

Voyage Data Recorder (Black Box). Another comment suggested

installation of a comprehensive event recorder (black box) to allow

investigators to reconstruct the events leading to a near-miss or

marine casualty.

As indicated in Figures 3 through 6, a black box would not directly

reduce the risk of an accident. Present regulations require recording

capabilities on depth sounding devices and logging requirements for

various other navigation indicators. This information has been used in

the past to reconstruct accident events. A comprehensive recording

system such as a black box could improve investigation quality and

reduce the time needed to reconstruct accident events. Additionally, it

might be a factor in reducing the risk of future casualties if used as

a management oversight tool to heighten management's awareness of

vessel operations. In addition, use of the black box could provide

information on near-misses which could be used to assess regulatory

effectiveness and pinpoint potential areas of traffic or operational

concern.

Other types of recorders that include active warning systems

(linked into existing VTS or capable of alarming a vessel automatically

in a potential collision situation) are in use on some offshore oil

platforms. These early warning systems work in conjunction with DGPS

and ECDIS. Because of their dependence on DGPS and ECDIS, the Coast

Guard believes that it is premature to require active warning systems.

While voyage data recorders and early warning systems are both

technologically feasible, they are costly. A general requirement for an

automatic, tamper proof voyage recording system that would record

voice, radar, position information, engine, and course data would

impose significant costs. This SNPRM solicits comments on a voyage data

recorder requirement, inclusion of an early warning capability in a

recording device, and recommended provisions for near miss data

collection.

Escort Vessels

Several comments pointed out the value of escort vessels. One

comment also recommended requiring bow thrusters for tankers without

tug escorts. The escort vessel issue is being addressed in a separate

regulatory project. This proposed rule considers escorts as a possible

alternative when the vessel does not meet certain maneuverability

performance standards. The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed

requirements for emergency steering capabilities combined with

maneuvering performance standards would reduce the risk of a collision,

allision, or grounding due to poor maneuverability and mitigates some

of the equipment failure components in Figure 5. Comments on possible

requirements for bow thrusters are solicited in this proposed

rulemaking.

Routing Restrictions.

Several comments suggested various route restrictions to increase

safety.

[[Page 55920]]

Four comments recommended more stringent pilotage requirements. Five

comments recommended limitation of vessel movement. Two other comments

recommended voluntary routing. One comment recommended mandatory speed

limits. One comment suggested that the Coast Guard identify those ports

with rocky bottoms and prohibit entry by tankers without double

bottoms. Such provisions directly correlate with the risks of

structural failure (Figure 3) from impact.

Although the Coast Guard recognizes that groundings and collisions

could be reduced through routing restrictions, it does not have the

authority at this time to enforce mandatory routing restrictions or

exclusionary transit zones on foreign vessels outside of U.S. navigable

waters. At the sixty-fifth session of the Marine Safety Committee

(MSC), in May of 1995, the Committee adopted amendments to the

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its

Protocol of 1978, which would permit the establishment of mandatory

routing measures through IMO. This MSC resolution, MSC 46(65), becomes

effective January 1, 1997.

Present routing practices off the coast of California are voluntary

and were developed after extensive research. Diverse weather patterns,

vessel traffic, marine life considerations, and other factors pose

safety problems in some geographic areas. Because of the unique nature

of each port and offshore area, the Coast Guard has traditionally left

speed limit, safety zone and other restrictions to the local COTP. As

required by section 4111(b) of OPA 90, the Coast Guard is currently

studying tanker routing and solicits comments on establishing routing

restriction requirements.

6. Additional Operational Requirements for Tank Barges

Several comments suggested improvements to towing vessels. One

comment stated that the Coast Guard should require navigation equipment

on towing vessels. Another comment stated that independent emergency

steering capability should be required on towing vessels. One comment

recommended restrictions on tandem towing when loaded, requiring twin

screw tugs, and requiring towing vessel horsepower to barge deadweight

ratios. One comment recommended that the Navigational Safety

requirements of 33 CFR part 164 be extended to towing vessels. One

comment suggested two independent propulsion systems.

The Coast Guard has issued several rulemakings affecting the entire

commercial towing industry. The recent proposed rulemaking entitled

``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels'' (60 FR XXXX)

contains several of the requirements mentioned above. It proposes

requirements for vessels engaged in towing that are 8 meters or more in

length. These requirements include certain navigational equipment, such

as radar; searchlights; and electronic position fixing devices,

depending on the vessel's area of operation; general navigation safety

requirements; and towline inspections for vessels engaged in towing

astern. Further requirements on licensing for towing vessel operators

also may be proposed.

Emergency Steering Capability. In Sec. 157.460(a), the Coast Guard

is proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be

responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel has either twin

screws with independent power or a backup steering system. Twin

propulsion designs with separate engine controls, dual shafts, and

propellers certainly would meet the intent of this requirement and are

allowed under this proposal. To reduce the impact of this regulation

and to allow vessel owners time to schedule shipyard facilities, the

Coast Guard proposes a 1-year delayed implementation of this

requirement.

This requirement was proposed after review of the risks of

equipment failure and loss of steering as shown in Figures 5 and 6.

Loss of steering for tankships is addressed by 33 CFR 164.39, 46 CFR

58.25, and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,

1974, and its Protocol of 1978, with amendments, Chapter II-1, Part C,

regulation 29. Therefore, this SNPRM does not propose additional

steering requirements for tankships.

Fendering Systems. The qualitative evaluation of the structural

failure hazard (Figure 3) revealed that structural fractures due to the

stress on local hull areas of a tank barge, where a towing vessel or a

pier routinely comes in contact with the barge, have not been addressed

and could contribute to the cause of some oil spills. While this type

of fracturing may be identified by the enhanced survey requirements

proposed in Sec. 157.430 of this SNPRM, a more fundamental and cost

effective solution is adequate fendering. Because fendering on a barge

would be very costly, would decrease structure accessibility under the

fendering system, and may increase the rate of local structural

deterioration surrounding the fendering system, the Coast Guard is

proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be

responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel and any other assist

or fleeting towing vessels have adequate fendering systems. This

proposal would require vessel owners and operators to ensure towing

vessel fendering systems are assessed through management policy, on-

site inspection or oversight, contractual arrangements, or hiring

practices as an important protective measure for their barge's

structural integrity. Fleeting and assist towing vessels are included

in this proposal because during docking operations, the forces they

exert on the barge hull also contribute to the fracture problem.

Although there are no international or domestic guidelines for

appropriate fender technical specifications, Sec. 157.460(b) proposes a

performance guidelines for preventing metal to metal contact of the

towing vessel and the tank barge.

7. Other Operational Measures

Many of the comments proposed improvements through other

operational measures, including planning improvements. Two comments

recommended cargo loading and casualty planning. The comments stated

that the risk of pollution could be reduced significantly through a

strategic cargo loading plan which included criteria for loading a

partial cargo or discharging at several ports. For example, if cargo is

retained after discharging at the first port of call, cargo can be

retained in center tanks instead of wing tanks. One comment stated that

effective casualty planning would reduce the likelihood of a pollution

incident; these plans are not currently required.

Hydrostatic balanced loading minimizes the accidental oil outflow

by strategically loading cargo tanks to take advantage of the

hydrostatic balance between the cargo and sea water. This concept is

presently being studied and will be considered in the Existing Vessel

Structural Measures rulemaking. Casualty planning requirements are

addressed in ``Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans'' (59 FR 51332;

October 7, 1994).

Three comments were received regarding emergency transfer systems

(ETS). Two of these comments supported the implementation of ETS while

one comment stated that ETS was unproven and not likely to prevent

pollution. These systems generally require additional cargo piping and

pump refit or installation. It should also be noted that the Coast

Guard has completed a report to Congress entitled, ``The Feasibility of

Using Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT) for Emergency

[[Page 55921]]

Transfer of Cargo and Storage of Recovered Oil,'' 1995. In this study,

it was found that in the event of a vessel casualty, such as a

collision or grounding, there are often fundamental changes in the

vessel's stability condition which make it potentially unsafe and

inadvisable to use SBT for emergency transfer of cargo. The regulatory

assessment study for the third portion of this project will address

these systems and any special considerations in their use.

Three comments recommended that wing tanks be kept empty. One

stated that empty wing tanks would reduce the likelihood of oil outflow

in collisions by 100 percent and in groundings by at least 50 percent,

compared to estimates of 30 percent and 15 percent provided in the

Existing Tank Vessels NPRM. This comment specifically suggested that

the wing tanks remain empty rather than ballasted with water or other

non-petroleum cargo. Significant structural refit to reinforce

bulkheads between empty wing tanks and cargo tanks, possible piping

refit, and substantial stability reassessment may be required. The

Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the economic and technical

feasibility of this proposal.

One comment recommended emergency retrieval equipment or emergency

towing pendants similar to those provided for in Washington State

regulations. Four comments stated that tow wire maintenance and

inspection should be required. An interim final rule (IFR) requiring

emergency towing equipment was published in the Federal Register on

December 22, 1993, entitled, ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels

Carrying Oil'' (58 FR 67988). This required the majority of existing

tank vessels to have an emergency towing wire meeting an IMO standard.

This IMO standard has been revised to incorporate a requirement that

the equipment can be deployed automatically and by a limited number of

crew. The Coast Guard supported these changes at IMO and intends to

implement these new requirements in a future rulemaking. In addition,

an NPRM entitled, ``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels''

published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register proposes

minimum tow wire standards and inspection requirements.

Amendments to 46 CFR Part 31

To ensure cross reference to the proposed enhanced survey

requirements, tables (a) and (b) in 46 CFR 31.10-21 would be revised to

direct individuals using 46 CFR part 31 to Sec. 157.430(a); however, it

does not change existing drydock requirements.

Amendment to 46 CFR Part 35

To ensure cross reference to part 157, Sec. 35.01-40(c) of title 46

of the CFR is revised to refer individuals using 46 CFR part 35 to the

applicable pollution prevention requirements.

Incorporation by Reference

The following material, in part, would be incorporated by reference

in Sec. 157.02: IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15) with Appendices 1-3,

``Provision and Display of Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships'';

IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18) Annex B, ``Guidelines on the Enhanced

Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil

Tankers''; IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18) with Explanatory Notices

in MSC/Circ.644, ``Interim Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability''; and

Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) ``International Safety

Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals'' (Second Edition). Copies of the

materials are available for inspection where indicated under ADDRESSES.

Copies of the material are available for the sources listed in

Sec. 157.02.

Before publishing a final rule, the Coast Guard will submit this

material to the Director of the Federal Register for approval of the

incorporation by reference.

Assessment

This proposal is a significant regulatory action under section 3(f)

of Executive Order 12866 and has been reviewed by the Office of

Management and Budget under that order. It requires an assessment of

potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. It is

significant under the regulatory policies and procedures of the

Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).

A draft Assessment has been prepared and is available in the docket

for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The

Assessment is summarized as follows.

This rulemaking would apply to all existing vessels of 5,000 GT or

more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil, including non-

petroleum oil, in bulk as cargo. An estimated 1359 existing tank

vessels (190 U.S. tankships, 1080 foreign tankships, 86 U.S. tank

barges and 3 foreign tank barges) currently operating on the U.S.

navigable waters would be affected by this proposed rulemaking.

Industry Cost

Some of the proposed operational measures require actions prior to

each port transit or cargo transfer. As a result, vessels on coastwise

or frequent transit schedules would incur higher expenses than vessels

with a lower frequency of port calls. In contrast, the decrease in

fleet size as vessels arrive at their phaseout date results in a

downward trend in estimated annual costs from 1996 through 2014.

First year compliance cost of this SNPRM would total about $183.8

million. Annual costs of the proposal would trend downward, leveling

out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014, the final years that the proposal

would be in effect. The present value of this proposal is discounted at

7 percent throughout this assessment in accordance with current Office

of Management and Budget guidance to reflect the costs or benefits as

they would have been in the year OPA 90 was enacted. The present value

of this proposal, discounted at 7 percent, would total $443.6 million.

U.S. tankships and tank barges would together account for an estimated

one-third of total costs, and foreign tank vessels and barges would

account for the remainder. A discussion of costs for each proposed

requirement follows.

The costs associated with the operational measures proposed in this

SNPRM were developed based on vessel type, vessel use, and average

vessel size. The cost analysis was applied to tankships and tank

barges. Cost analysis calculations were based upon the following

assumptions:

(1) The proposed rulemaking would come into effect in 1996;

(2) The recurring cost of this rulemaking would reflect the future

vessel population decrease as required by the phaseout schedule in

section 4115(a) of OPA 90 and shown in NVIC 10-94;

(3) Both costs and benefits developed for this rulemaking are

discounted at 7 percent back to 1990; and

(4) All recurring costs are calculated for the year 2001.

Emergency Lightering Equipment. Lightering equipment costs were

based on the costs used in the Emergency Lightering Equipment and

Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels

Without Double Hulls Final Rule (59 FR 40186). This SNPRM proposes to

expand the applicability of these emergency lightering requirements

from oil tankers to all tank vessels. No U.S. tank vessels with

exclusive non-petroleum oil cargo carriage authority are in operation.

[[Page 55922]]

There would be no costs to U.S. tankships or tank barges. An estimated

114 foreign tankships and 2 foreign tank barges carry non-petroleum

cargo and may be affected by this change. The onetime costs for this

proposed requirement for foreign tankships is estimated to be $456,000-

$1.1 million and for foreign tank barges would be $8,000-$19,000. Based

on the average onetime cost for foreign tankships and tank barges, the

present value of point-estimate costs for emergency lightering

discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would be $530,000.

Bridge Resource Management Training. The cost of proposed

Sec. 157.415 would vary based on crew complement, crew salary, and

estimated existing training programs. Based on typical crew compliments

and accounting for personnel turnovers, seven tankship officers were

assumed to require this training per tankship while six officers were

used to estimate the cost to each tank barge. Crew daily wages were

estimated based on American Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) data,

Tanker Advisory Report statistics, and American Waterways Operators

(AWO) information. Although simulator training is not proposed as a

required element of the BRM training course, past completion of an

existing Coast Guard approved bridge resource management course would

meet the proposed requirements. An estimated 60 percent of U.S.

tankships and tank barge companies have already met this training

requirement for their deck officers through commercial bridge

management courses. An estimated 30 percent of the foreign vessels

operating on routes within U.S. waters have trained their officers in

management-type curriculum. The commercial bridge management course

fees, approximately $5,000 per person (for a 5-day course), were used

to estimate the cost of this proposal. The refresher training course

offered by commercial vendors was estimated to be $500 per person.

Total cost of the proposed BRM training requirement to industry for

U.S. tankships would be $3.7 million. Foreign tankship total initial

estimated cost would be $33.0 million. The U.S. tank barge total

initial estimated cost would be $2.0 million. The total cost to the

foreign tank barge industry would be $79,000. The present value of the

costs of BRM training discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $35.1

million.

Vessel Specific Watch Training. The Coast Guard estimates the

additional cost incurred by proposed Sec. 157.420 would be negligible.

The cost attributed to time loss due to this training is negligible

because this type of training falls within the scope of a master's

present responsibility to ensure the crew is ``fit for duty.''

Recordkeeping requirements are addressed in the ``Collection of

Information'' section.

Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. To meet proposed Sec. 157.425,

shoreside augmentation of the vessel crew to allow the vessel officers

and crew members time to rest, is estimated to include one officer

(assume average second mate salary) and two tankerman (assume average

third mate salary) for each port visit on a tankship and one tankerman

(assume average mate salary) for a tank barge. On U.S. vessels, one

officer was not included because under 46 U.S.C. 8104(a), the master is

presently required to meet this rest hour minimum. Shoreside

augmentation requirements would vary based on the number of port visits

per vessel correlated with an estimate on average visit length. Careful

crew scheduling and time management could reduce the amount of

augmentation required prior to departing port. It is estimated that

U.S. tankships would require shoreside augmentation prior to 60 percent

of their port departures, foreign tankships would require augmentation

prior to 40 percent of their port departures, and tank barges (both

foreign and U.S.) would require 80 percent augmentation to meet this

proposal. If shoreside augmentation would be required prior to a port

departure, a full day's wage for the estimated number of personnel

required for augmentation was used. The cost for posting a notice to

crew members on the rest hour minimums was not calculated because it is

minimal.

The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tankships

would be $2.2 million and for foreign tankships would be $1.5 million.

The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tank barges

would be $991,000. The 1-year cost for augmented manning for foreign

tank barges would be $6,500. By 2001, the total cost of this proposed

requirement to the U.S. tankship industry would be $1.55 million, and

to foreign tankships, $1.03 million. For the tank barge industry, this

recurring augmentation cost would be $714,000 for the U.S. industry and

slightly less than $4,000 for the foreign industry. The present value

of the costs of rest hour minimums discounted at 7 percent to 1990

would total $19.7 million.

Enhanced Survey and Alternate for Enhanced Survey. Those tankships

regulated by flag administrations signatory to MARPOL 73/78 and having

adopted Regulation 13G of Annex I are presently required to complete

the proposed enhanced survey of Sec. 157.430(a) starting in 1995. For

this proposed rulemaking, no cost is associated to this group of

vessels for the enhanced survey requirement. U.S. tankships presently

are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78.

Under this proposal, they would be required to conduct enhanced surveys

and incur the cost associated with these surveys.

The cost of an enhanced survey for a vessel classed by a recognized

classification society is estimated to be 25 percent higher than the

cost of the special survey currently performed by the class societies.

This cost includes the fee for the surveyor's time and required

documentation. For a 21,000 GT tankship, the increased cost for a

surveyor and a final report is estimated to be $11,000. Additional

costs to the industry for this proposed requirement would include

making approximately two tank interiors accessible to the surveyor

through the use of scaffolding, ladders, lines, or other arrangements

and additional gauging requirements (approximately 30 percent more than

present classification society requirements). Some additional repair

costs could also be incurred after a review of the survey is completed.

Cost estimates do not include the cost to drydock the vessel, gas free

it for inspection, or keep it in the drydock. These costs are already

incurred with present drydocking requirements.

It is estimated that 64 tankships are either not classed or are

classed by classification societies not recognized by the Coast Guard.

These vessels would incur additional costs associated with a design

review and a condition survey for reclassification by a recognized

society. Classification costs or enhanced survey costs for vessels

already required to drydock, but never classed or not classed by a

recognized classification society, would be $514,000.

Tank barges are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of

MARPOL 73/78. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) allows tank barges and vessels

smaller than the MARPOL cutoff to substitute comparable company

programs for the enhanced survey requirements. Because the company

program clause assumes the owner has an established survey program and

would not need to conduct extensive additional repairs, the cost of

these company programs would be less than the cost of a classification

survey.

The cost estimates associated with proposed Sec. 157.430 (a) and

(b) were amortized to reflect a 12-month period. First year cost

averages would be $14.9

[[Page 55923]]

million for U.S. tankships; $23.0 million for foreign tankships; $2.3

million for U.S. tank barges; and $80,000 for foreign tank barges.

Because the cost estimates have been averaged and it has been assumed

that the vessels affected by this rulemaking would be in service for at

least two drydock enhanced surveys prior to their phaseout, recurring

cost would be the same as the first year costs listed above. The Coast

Guard recognizes this recurring cost estimate is conservative; however,

as the fleet population diminishes the average cost of an enhanced

survey may increase due to the age and possible repair requirements of

the remaining tank vessels subjected to the survey. The present value

of the costs of the enhanced survey discounted at 7 percent to 1990

would total $67.38 million.

Vital Systems Surveys. The cost of proposed Sec. 157.435 would vary

based on port departure frequency, crew salary, and the estimated time

required for each survey. A survey would be required before a tank

vessel begins cargo transfer operations or prior to a vessel departing

port. An estimate of port departures was calculated based on 1993 Coast

Guard data and reflects an average departure frequency of 28 for U.S.

tankships, 32 for U.S. tank barges, 6 for foreign tankships, and 7 for

foreign tank barges. Three surveys were estimated for each port

departure.

Crew members affected by this proposed requirement would be senior

personnel. For tank barge surveys, an average towing vessel master's

wage was used for cost evaluation. For tankship surveys, an average

chief mate's wage and a chief engineer's wage were used for cost

evaluation. Survey time was estimated at 1 hour on a tankship (\1/2\

hour each for both the chief mate and the chief engineer) and

approximately 48 minutes for the master of a primary towing vessel or a

senior tank barge representative.

The vital systems survey cost for U.S. tankships would be $660,000

with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of $472,000. The cost to foreign

tankships would be $465,000 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of

$322,000. The survey cost to U.S. tank barges would be $289,000 with a

recurring cost (for year 2001) of $208,000. The survey cost to foreign

tank barges would be $2,500 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of

$1,500. The present value of the costs of vital systems discounted at 7

percent to 1990 would total $6.0 million.

Autopilot Alarm or Indicator. The cost for the alarm or indicator

proposed in Sec. 157.440 was calculated based on the assumption that 10

percent of the U.S. tankships presently meet this requirement, none of

the foreign tankships presently have this capability, and 3 towing

vessels would require an indicator for every 2 tank barges affected by

this rulemaking. It was also assumed that the tank barge company owned

the towing vessel and would incur the cost of this requirement. The

estimated installation cost of a visual and audible autopilot alarm is

$5,000 on electronic tankship steering systems and the estimated

autopilot indicator cost is $100. The cost attributed to the testing of

this alarm would be negligible based on the short amount of time

required to test the device and the preexisting requirement to do so

under 33 CFR 164.25. This proposal would have a onetime estimated cost

to U.S. tankships of $855,000; to foreign tankships, $5,400,000; to

U.S. tank barges, $12,900; and to foreign tank barges, $500. The

present value of autopilot alarm costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990

would total $4.2 million.

Maneuvering Performance Capability. To meet proposed Sec. 157.445,

tankships would require additional maneuvering tests and also

recalculation or confirmation of previous maneuvering characteristics

presently required by 33 CFR 164.35(g). Additional tests are proposed

primarily to evaluate overshoot angles and time to check yaw. Computer

simulations of these performance tests would not be accepted. A cost of

$18,500 was based on an independent subcontractor coming on board a

tankship to conduct the tests and provide the documentation required.

This estimate reflects industry cost for test preparation, equipment,

personnel, transportation, vessel operational delay, data processing,

and final report collation. It was assumed that the tests required to

meet this performance standard proposal have not been completed by any

of the tankships affected by this SNPRM. The total onetime cost to the

U.S. tankship industry would be $3.5 million and the cost to the

foreign tankship industry would be $20.0 million. The present value of

maneuvering performance capability costs discounted at 7 percent to

1990 would total $15.7 million.

Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. No additional

maneuvering tests would be required for proposed Sec. 157.450, however,

some recalculation of data from the original tests used to develop the

wheelhouse poster of 33 CFR 164.35(g) may be required. To compile a

maneuvering booklet, additional calculations and documentation also may

be required. A cost estimate of $1,080 was developed for this proposal

and reflects an average U.S. licensed naval architect fee for 4 hours

spent to recalculate wheelhouse poster data and 16 hours spent to

assemble the maneuvering booklet. Vessel population estimates indicated

that 75 percent of both foreign and U.S. tankships presently meet the

wheelhouse poster requirement and 20 percent presently meet the

maneuvering booklet requirement. The cost attributed to the pilot card

requirement would be negligible because the cost of the pilot cards

themselves would be minimal while the time spent to complete them would

be incorporated into the scope of an officer in charge of a

navigational watch's normal duties.

Proposed Sec. 157.450 has a onetime cost attributed to the

wheelhouse poster and the maneuvering booklet. The estimated onetime

cost of this proposal would be $142,000 for the 190 U.S. tankships and

$805,000 for the 1,080 foreign tankships. The present value of

maneuvering and vessel status information costs discounted at 7 percent

to 1990 would total $631,000.

Minimum Under-keel Clearance. The cost estimate for proposed

Sec. 157.455 assumed that tankships presently entering or departing

U.S. navigable waters operate with an under-keel clearance range of

0.15 meters to 2.00 meters and an average anticipated under-keel

clearance of 0.6 meters (2 feet). Present tank barge under-keel

clearances were estimated to be much less than tankship averages. An

estimate of the number of port entries and departures was made for each

vessel type. Tank barges were estimated to be affected by this proposal

during each port entry and each port departure. U.S. tankships were

estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and

during 35 percent of the port departures. Foreign tankships were

estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and

during 20 percent of the port departures.

The cost of the proposal was estimated to be a 3 percent loss of

cargo carrying capacity for each .3 meters needed to decrease the tank

vessel's draft. An estimate of required draft decrease or cargo loss

due to this proposal was made for each vessel type. It was estimated

that 30 percent of the affected tank barge (10,000 GT average size)

population would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal,

50 percent of the population would lose 3 percent of their cargo

carrying capacity, and 20 percent would lose 6 percent of their cargo

carrying capacity. It was estimated that 75 percent of the affected

U.S. tankship (33,300 GT average size) and foreign tankship (50,000 GT

average size) population

[[Page 55924]]

would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal, 20 percent

of the tankship population would lose 3 percent of their cargo carrying

capacity, and 5 percent of the tankship population would lose 6 percent

of their cargo carrying capacity. The cost attributed to the proposed

recording requirement would be negligible because the time spent

completing the vessel log entry or other similar documentation would be

incorporated into the scope of the officer of a navigational watch's

normal duties.

As a result of the reduced cargo capacity, the first year cost of

proposed Sec. 157.455 for a U.S. tankship would be $18 million. Foreign

tankship costs would be $35.1 million. U.S. tank barge costs would be

$12.4 million and foreign tank barge costs would be $142,000. By 2001,

the total cost of proposed Sec. 157.455 to the U.S. tankship industry

would decrease to $13 million, and the cost to foreign tankships would

decrease to $27.3 million. For the tank barge industry, the recurring

cost of under-keel clearance would be $13.3 million for the U.S.

industry and $142,000 for the foreign industry. The present value of

the costs of under-keel clearance discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would

total $292.6 million.

Emergency Steering Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.460(a) applies to

the primary towing vessels engaged in towing tank barges of 5,000 GT or

more without a double hull. An estimated total of 134 towing vessels

would be affected by this proposal. Of these vessels, research

indicates 80 percent presently meet this proposed requirement. It was

assumed that the towing vessels that do not meet this proposed

requirement are owned by the tank barge company. The cost to

reconfigure the towing vessel's steering gear would be $25,000 based on

an independent subcontractor installing additional piping and tankage

on an existing hydraulic steering system.

The onetime emergency steering requirement cost would be $645,000

for U.S. tank barge companies; and $25,000 for foreign tank barge

owners or operators. The present value of emergency steering capability

costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $446,000.

Fendering System. Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) applies to the primary

towing vessels and the fleeting or assist towing vessels engaged in

maneuvering tank barges of 5,000 GT or more without double hulls. A

total of 312 towing vessels would be affected by this proposal. Of

these vessels, research indicates 80 percent presently have adequate

fendering systems. It was assumed that those towing vessels that do not

meet this proposed requirement are owned by the tank barge company or

the tank barge company would realize a cost increase in the leasing of

an adequately fendered towing vessel. The cost to add or reconfigure

the towing vessel's fendering system would be $1,320 based on a towing

vessel's personnel installing an additional 8 linear feet of commercial

fenders during a routine maintenance period.

Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) would have an estimated initial cost to

U.S. tank barges of $79,500; and to foreign tank barges of $3,000.

Recurring costs, reflecting the diminishment of the tank barge fleet by

2001, would be $57,000 for U.S. tank barges and $2,000 for foreign tank

barges. The present value of the cost of fendering systems discounted

at 7 percent of 1990 would total $329,000.

Government Cost

Federal Government cost would include Coast Guard personnel time

and resources to review survey records and documentation required by

this proposed SNPRM during annual tank vessel examinations (foreign

vessels) or annual inspections (U.S. vessels). The length of time added

to a typical examination or inspection would vary based on the type of

service in which the vessel engages. The Coast Guard is estimating that

these requirements would increase the time of examination or inspection

by an average of 0.5 hours for any given requirement. The various

requirements range from 0.25 hours to inspect log entries or records to

8 hours to review documentation of an enhanced survey on a U.S.

tankship or tank barge.

Government costs attributable to implementation of this rule are

based on twelve proposed requirements. The Coast Guard examination or

inspection would evaluate relevant documentation on BRM training,

vessel specific training, minimum rest hours, enhanced surveys, vital

systems surveys, maneuvering performance capability information,

maneuvering information, and minimum under-keel clearance. During an

annual examination or inspection the Coast Guard inspector would also

ensure the emergency lightening equipment, the autopilot alarm or

indicator, the emergency steering gear and the fendering systems on the

towing vessels meet the proposed requirements.

The proposed maneuvering performance test requirement, specified in

Sec. 157.445(b), instructs tankships that do not meet the IMO criteria

to report their maneuvering capability to the COTP 24 hours prior to

port entry. Requests of this nature are not anticipated to be frequent.

For this cost estimate, 10 percent of the existing tankship population

was assumed to require some deviation from the IMO criteria. To review

a vessel request for port entry and determine appropriate operational

restrictions would take Coast Guard personnel an average of 4 hours.

Therefore, the government cost analysis assumes the increased

annual inspection time would average 6.95 hours for U.S. tank vessels

and 4.75 hours for foreign tank vessels. In addition, deviation

requests from U.S. tankships for the proposed maneuvering performance

standard would be 76 hours while requests from foreign tankships would

average 432 hours. Based on a $35.00 per hour wage estimate for a Coast

Guard inspector, the Coast Guard expects the 1,188 additional man-hours

of inspection and deviation request evaluation time would cost $39,801

annually.

Cost-Benefit Evaluation

Costs. Cost estimates were based on the forecast 19-year life for

this proposed rulemaking. For all proposed requirements, the

undiscounted costs of compliance are projected to be $897.6 million.

The present value of the costs of this proposed regulation discounted

at 7 percent to 1990 would total $443.6 million.

Benefits. Pollution mitigation benefits from the proposed

operational measures would accrue mainly in areas around loading

terminals, narrow channels, and in open waters during lightering

operations.

A review of casualty and spill data was conducted in an attempt to

pinpoint past accident frequency as related to each proposed

operational measures. However, the complex cumulative effect of human

error and equipment failure made it difficult to quantify the benefits

of each measure. For example, the grounding of the foreign tankship

WORLD PRODIGY off Brenton Reef in Rhode Island Sound was caused by a

combination of fatigue, poor bridge resource management, and

insufficient passage planning (especially under-keel clearance) which

lead to this 1989 oil spill. The major explosion aboard the U.S.

tankship MT SURF CITY was caused by poor tank entry precautions and

undetected bulkhead deterioration between a cargo tank and a ballast

tank. Because of the interrelationship between the proposed

requirements that focus on a reduction in human error along with the

proposed requirements for improved equipment inspections and

capabilities, the Coast

[[Page 55925]]

Guard chose to quantify the benefits using a gross estimate of benefits

for this SNPRM regulatory assessment.

A preliminary estimate of the anticipated benefits and resultant

cost-benefit for each measure was conducted and is described in detail

within the regulatory assessment. This preliminary estimate included a

review of certain tank vessel casualties from 1989 through 1994, the

resultant oil spill or potential for an oil spill, vessel damage, and

loss of life. Benefits were estimated for each proposed measure by

reviewing the casualty report, analyzing each casualty's root causes,

and estimating a percentage of the recorded or estimated spillage

associated with each root cause. The actual and potential amounts of

oil spilled were then broken down from these estimated root cause

percentages and accredited to each of the proposed measures, if

applicable.

Using Figures 3 through 6 of this SNPRM, a risk effectiveness

factor was developed that estimated the percentage of causal factors

leading to an accident that would be eliminated if each proposed

measure was established. A range of total anticipated benefits over the

19-year span of this rulemaking was estimated for each proposed measure

by annualizing the per-vessel benefits resulting from the actual and

potential spill data, extrapolating this into a cumulative present

value of oil spills avoided based on the number of vessels remaining in

service each year, and multiplying this cumulation by the measure's

effectiveness factor. The Coast Guard intends to include an estimate or

qualitative discussion of the benefits of each proposed measure in the

final rule. Relevant comments are requested on the methodology used for

the preliminary benefit analysis as well as each measure's anticipated

benefits and its economic feasibility.

The gross estimate of benefits for this rulemaking was conducted

and involved an assessment of casualty data over the past 20 years. The

Coast Guard estimates that the proposed measures would avert at least

one major spill of about 300,000 barrels over the next 19 years. This

is equivalent to a spill resulting from a collision between two 70,000

GT tankships, with cargo loss from at least two tanks on each tank

vessel. Alternatively, this would be equivalent to a grounding that

results in a complete loss of cargo from a small (21,000 GT) tankship.

The monetary benefits of the proposed regulation would include the

avoided costs of spill cleanup, third-party compensation (lost earnings

to fishermen, etc.), and natural resource damages. Historically,

casualty reports have either not addressed these avoided costs, or

their results have been widely disputed. There are many reasons for

this. For example, there are numerous factors affecting the possible

impact associated with an oil spill, such as type of product,

environment, time of year, location, and weather conditions. Therefore,

the assessment of damage and associated costs were subjective and in

some cases, even in large spills, they were never confirmed.

Accordingly, the Coast Guard uses the unspilled oil quantity in barrels

as the benefit value, discounted at 7 percent back to 1990. If the

averted 300,000-barrel spill were to occur in 1996, when the final rule

is scheduled to take effect, the discounted benefit would be the value

of avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990. If the averted 300,000-

barrel spill were to occur in 2014, the discounted benefit would be the

value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990.

Cost-Benefit. The benefit of this proposed rule would range from

the value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990 to the value of

avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990, depending on when the averted

spill is assumed to occur. The net present value of the cost of this

proposed rulemaking would range from $2,075 to $5,700 per barrel of

unspilled oil, when a mean present value of $3,900 per barrel of

unspilled oil. This compares with, for example, $13,000 per barrel of

unspilled oil for the ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels

Carrying Oil'' IFR (58 FR 67988); $12,500 per barrel of unspilled oil

for the ``Vessel Response Plans'' IFR (58 FR 7376); $7,000 per barrel

of unspilled oil for the ``Overfill Devices'' IFR (59 FR 53286); and

$1,300 per barrel of unspilled oil for the ``Response Plans for Marine

Transportation-Related Facilities'' IFR (58 FR 7330).

Small Entities

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), the

Coast Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will have

a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small

entities. ``Small entities,'' may include (1) small businesses and not-

for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and

are not dominant in their fields and (2) governmental jurisdictions

with populations of less than 50,000.

This rulemaking considered small business impact for vessels

privately held by independent companies with an estimated capital

investment value of less than $500 million or companies that have less

than 500 employees. State and local governments, which altogether own

less than a dozen tank vessels, will not be significantly affected.

Not-for-profit organizations do not engage in the transportation of oil

in bulk by water.

There are a number of companies meeting the definition of small

business operating in each segment of industry (tankship, tank barge,

and towing vessel). Of the 190 U.S. tankships affected by this proposed

rulemaking, 16 are owned by 6 small businesses. Many of these company's

tankships are over 30 years old, have less cargo carrying capacity than

their competition, and are laid up due to market or company financial

conditions. Six small businesses own or operate 32 of the affected U.S.

tank barge population. No foreign small businesses own or operate

foreign tank vessels that would be affected by this proposed

rulemaking. Tank barge companies are required under this proposal to

enlist towing vessels with certain capabilities and trained personnel.

Indirectly, some towing vessel companies may also be affected by these

proposed requirements; however, the Coast Guard has determined that

most tank barge owners also own their towing vessels or regularly

contract with a limited number of towing companies.

An economic impact is unavoidable, as the statute clearly targets

existing vessels of 5,000 GT or more than carry oil in bulk as cargo

and that do not have double hulls. The present value of the total cost

to the industry of this proposal discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would

total $443.6 million. However, the Coast Guard has proposed several

measures within this rulemaking to accommodate small business needs and

provide flexibility to small entities affected by this rulemaking.

The proposed training requirements include allowances for

comparable company training courses and a 1-year compliance delay. In-

house training by smaller businesses would be accepted as long as the

curriculum and demonstration of skill provisions could be met. Company

programs are anticipated to cost a fraction of commercial training and

should provide smaller businesses with a means to train personnel at a

lower cost than the present commercial courses.

Additionally, the proposed rulemaking acknowledges past course

completion; thus, personnel would be given a longer time to meet this

requirement if they have completed similar courses, either company-

sponsored or commercial, within 3 years of the effective date of the

rule. Maritime schools and many commercial courses have been offering

this type of curriculum since 1991. Allowing for the

[[Page 55926]]

delayed compliance date and past course completion, the training course

phase-in period would be 4 years. This longer phase-in period should

assist smaller companies in setting up a suitable in-house or

commercial course program. It also recognizes that a substantial number

of merchant mariners in the industry are already trained. The 4-year

phase-in is also intended to ease the competitive burden of obtaining

commercial course slots, should entities choose to use commercial

training facilities.

Small business needs are accommodated in the proposed enhanced

survey requirement by allowing companies owning tank barges or tank

vessels less than 30,000 dwts to conduct their own surveys and to

choose among various organizations for program oversight.

To accommodate small businesses in the tank barge industry, the

cost of reconfiguring a towing vessel owned by the tank barge company

was minimized by requiring the proposed autopilot alarm to be an

indicator; a simple sign placed on the wheel would suffice. This gives

a comparable warning in the small confines of the one-man towing vessel

wheelhouse as would an alarm for the larger, multiple-person, complex

bridge of a tankship. The proposed emergency steering capability

requirement accommodates a range of designs by allowing for either a

secondary steering system or twin propulsion capability. This allows

the majority of tank barge companies to continue using their vessels or

the vessels they typically lease; however, it also ensures that the

master or operator would have some maneuvering capability in an

electrical, hydraulic or engine failure, which would be a benefit to

all operators.

Smaller tankship companies should have the capability to conduct

the maneuvering performance standard tests of IMO Resolution A.751(18).

While the assessment cost of this item is for a commercial company to

conduct the maneuvering tests, this proposed rulemaking in no way

prohibits a company from conducting the tests in-house. The guidelines

and technical details of the tests are well documented and are within

the capabilities of a licensed master or pilot. The equipment needed

for these types of maneuvering tests, such as a DGPS, is available on

the commercial market at low cost.

The proposed operational measures would affect several small

businesses within the maritime industry until 2015, a period of about

19 years. Through the design of this proposal's measures as described

in the preceding paragraphs, the Coast Guard believes that the

flexibility in this proposed rulemaking balances the requirements on

tank barges and tankships and provides equitable treatment of U.S. and

foreign flag vessels.

Therefore, the Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that

this proposal, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small entities. If, however, you think that

your business or organization qualifies as a small entity and that this

proposal will have a significant economic impact on your business or

organization, please submit a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why

you think it qualifies and in what way and to what degree this proposal

will economically affect it.

Unfunded Mandate

Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (Pub. L. 104-4), the Coast

Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will result in

an annual expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the

aggregate, or by the private sector, or $100 million (adjusted annually

for inflation). That Act also requires (in Section 205) that the Coast

Guard identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory

alternatives and from those alternatives select the least costly, most

cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the

objective of the rule.

The cost analysis completed for this SNPRM estimates first year

compliance costs to be 183.8 million. Annual costs of the proposal

would trend downward, leveling out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014,

the final years that the proposal would be in effect. The only time

this proposal would result in estimated costs of $100 million or more

to either State, local, or tribal governments in the aggregate, or to

the private sector would be in its first year of implementation. State,

local, and tribal governments, which altogether own less than a dozen

tank vessels, would account for less than 2 percent of the estimated

first-year costs. Therefore, the private sector would be most impacted

by first-year costs. The preliminary cost-benefit analysis done for

this SNPRM addresses expected cost-effectiveness for each proposed

measure. For those measures that were estimated to be the most costly,

alternative requirements, extended implementation periods, or

provisions for a COTP to determine appropriate implementation on a

case-by-case basis were proposed in this SNPRM.

If you think that your business or organization falls under the

provisions of the Act and this proposal will have an annual impact on

your business or organization that meets the parameters, please submit

a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and in

what way and to what degree this proposal will economically affect it.

Collection of Information

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews each proposed rule that

contains a collection-of-information requirement to determine whether

the practical value of the information is worth the burden imposed by

its collection. Collection-of-information requirements include

reporting, recordkeeping, notification, and other, similar

requirements.

This proposal contains collection-of-information requirements in

the following sections: Secs. 157.415, 157.420, 157.425, 157.430,

157.435, 157.445, 157.450, and 157.455. The following particulars

apply:

Dot No: 2115.

Administration: U.S. Coast Guard.

Title: Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank

Vessels Without Double Hulls.

Need for Information: Without adequate operational measures on tank

vessels, the potential for spills as a result of human error is greatly

increased. This proposal requires the mariner to record, post, keep

documentation or provide notification that is necessary for the safe

operation of the vessel including: (1) Documentation for company

management and the Coast Guard to ensure personnel are trained and

systems are being surveyed both frequently and thoroughly; (2)

information to ensure the crew is informed of rest hour requirements;

(3) certain vessel specific maneuvering characteristics so that

personnel navigating the vessel have a quick reference to critical

information; (4) documentation of a vessel's command and control status

to ensure a pilot receives accurate information prior to maneuvering

evolutions. These requirements are consistent with good commercial

practice and the dictates of good seamanship for safe navigation and

maintenance of vital equipment. Additionally, a vessel owners, master,

or operator would be required to notify the COTP if the vessel did not

have certain maneuvering capabilities so that safe port entry

provisions can be made.

Proposed Use of Information: The primary use of this information

would be for Coast Guard inspectors to determine if a vessel is in

compliance or, in the case of a casualty, whether

[[Page 55927]]

failure to meet these proposed regulations contributed to the casualty.

The Coast Guard has no specific plan to collect this data for

statistical analysis.

Frequency of Response: Owners, masters, or operators of tank

vessels subject to this proposed regulation would be required to

record, post, keep documentation, or provide notification of the

following: (1) Under Sec. 157.415(d), annual completion of bridge

resource management training for each officer of the navigational

watch; (2) under Sec. 157.420(d), completion of annual training by

letter or vessel log entry, by each crew member assigned to a

navigational or engineering watch; (3) under Sec. 157.425(b), permanent

posting of the minimum rest hour requirement in crew lounge areas and

work spaces; (4) under Sec. 157.430 (a) and (b), completion of an

enhanced survey during each drydock examination (this information must

also be provided to the Coast Guard upon its request); (5) under

Sec. 157.435, by vessel log entry or similar means on board the vessel,

completion of each required vital systems survey; (6) under

Sec. 157.445(b), notification of a maneuvering capability that is less

than the IMO criteria; (7) under Sec. 157.445(c), permanent posting of

test results for maneuvering performance capability; (8) under

Sec. 157.450, permanent posting of standardized IMO maneuvering

information in the wheelhouse, completion of a pilot card before

entering the port or place of destination and prior to departing port,

and maintenance of an onboard maneuvering booklet; (9) under

Sec. 157.455(a)(3), by vessel log entry or similar means on board the

vessel, calculations of under-keel clearance before entering the port

or place of destination and prior to departing port.

Burden Estimate: 76,913 hours.

Respondents: 1404.

Average Burden Hours per Respondent: 55.

The Coast Guard has submitted the requirements to OMB for review

under section 3504(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Persons

submitting comments on the requirements should submit their comments

both the OMB and to the Coast Guard as indicated under ADDRESSES.

Federalism

The Coast Guard has analyzed this proposal under the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and has determined that

this proposal does not have sufficient federalism implications to

warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

Environment

The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this

proposal and concluded that preparation of an Environmental Impact

Statement is not necessary. An Environmental Assessment and a draft

Finding of No Significant Impact are available in the docket for

inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The additional

training, survey, and operational considerations required by this rule

would enhance navigation safety and thereby reduce the likelihood of an

oil spill or other environmental damage.

List of Subjects

33 CFR Part 157

Cargo vessels, Oil pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

46 CFR Part 31

Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

46 CFR Part 35

Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Occupational

safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Seaman.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes

to amend 33 CFR part 157, 46 CFR part 31, and 46 CFR part 35 as

follows:

PART 157--RULES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

RELATING TO TANK VESSELS CARRYING OIL IN BULK

1. The authority citation for part 157 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1903; 46 U.S.C. 3703, 3703a (note); 49 CFR

1.46. Subpart G also is issued under section 4115(b), Pub. L. 101-

380, 104 Stat. 520.

2. In Sec. 157.01, paragraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 157.01 Applicability.

(a) * * *

(2) Any other vessel that enters or operates in the navigable

waters of the United States, or that operates, conducts lightering

under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives cargo from or transfers cargo to a

deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., in the United States

Exclusive Economic Zone, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8).

* * * * *

3. Section 157.02 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.02 Incorporation by reference.

(a) Certain material is incorporated by reference into this part

with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that

specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the Coast Guard must

publish notice of change in the Federal Register; and the material must

be available to the public. All approved material is available for

inspection at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC, and at the U.S. Coast Guard,

Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documentation Division (G-MVI), 2100

Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, and is available from the

sources indicated in paragraph (b) of this section.

(b) The material approved for incorporation by reference in this

part and the sections affected are as follows:

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, England.

IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15), Provision and Display of

Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships, Annex sections 1, 2.3,

and 3 with appendices...........................................157.440

IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18), Guidelines on the Enhanced

Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil

Tankers, Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-2.6, 3-

8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.............................157.430

IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18), Interim Standards for Ship

Manoeuvrability, Annex sections 1.2.2, 2.2-2.4, 3-5 with

Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644...............................157.440

Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

6th Floor, Portland House, Stag Place, London SWIE 5BH, England.

International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Second

Edition, Chapters 6, 7, and 9...................................157.430

4. In Sec. 157.03, paragraphs (pp) through (tt) are added to read

as follows:

Sec. 157.03 Definitions.

* * * * *

(pp) Departing port means departing from an anchorage or facility

for a transit beyond the navigable waters of the United States as

established in 33 CFR 2.05-25(b) or, for a vessel on the Great Lakes, a

transit beyond the breakwater of harbor entrance.

(qq) Fleeting or assist towing vessel means any commercial vessel

engaged in towing astern, alongside, or pushing ahead, used solely

within a limited

[[Page 55928]]

geographic area, such as a particular barge fleeting area or commercial

facility, and used solely for restricted service, such as making up or

breaking up larger tows.

(rr) Officer in charge of a navigational watch means any officer

employed or engaged to be responsible for navigating or maneuvering the

vessel and for maintaining a continuous vigilant watch during his or

her periods of duty and following guidance set out by the master,

international or national regulations, and company policies.

(ss) Primary towing vessel means any vessel engaged in towing

astern, alongside, or pushing ahead and includes the tug in an

integrated tug barge. It does not include fleeting or assist towing

vessels.

(tt) Rest hour means an off-duty period of 1 hour during which no

tasks are assigned to the crew member and the crew member is not

scheduled to perform any duty. A rest hour may include response to

drills or emergencies.

SUBPART G--STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR CERTAIN TANK

VESSELS WITHOUT DOUBLE HULLS

5. Section 157.400 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 157.400 Applicability.

This subpart applies to each tank vessel of 5,000 gross tons or

more that--

(a) Carries oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue;

(b) Enters or operates in the navigable waters of the United States

or that operates, conducts lightering under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives

cargo from or transfers cargo to a deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501

et seq., in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as defined

in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8); and

(c) Is not currently equipped with a double hull meeting

Sec. 157.10d of this part, or an equivalent to the requirements of

Sec. 157.10d, but required to be equipped with a double hull at a date

set forth in 46 U.S.C. 3703a(b)(3) and (c)(3).

6. In Sec. 157.410, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 157.410 Emergency lightering requirements for tank vessels.

* * * * *

(c) Reducers, bolts, and gaskets must meet the requirements of 46

CFR subpart 56.25. Cast iron and malleable iron shall not be used for

valves or fittings in lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids

which are directly connected to, or in the proximity of, equipment or

other lines having open flames, or any parts operating at temperatures

above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F).

7. Section 157.415 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.415 Bridge resource management training.

(a) After [12 months after the effective date of the final rule.],

a tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a person to

duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless that

person has satisfactorily completed a course that includes the

following:

(1) Instruction in the following areas:

(i) Communications: effective management of the flow of

information, including but not limited to, the exchange of information

between the master and the pilot, the master and the crew members, and

the officer in charge of a navigational watch and crew members.

(ii) Voyage planning: the planning of both ocean and pilotage water

transits to account for navigational hazards, weather, vessel traffic,

operational restrictions, facility and port requirements, and

compliance with local and international regulations.

(iii) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a

sequence of events that could lead to an accident.

(iv) Situational awareness: accurate perception of any factors and

conditions that affect a vessel over time.

(v) Pilot and bridge team integration: the effective flow of

knowledge between the vessel's crew and the pilot to incorporate

knowledge of the local port area and ensure cooperation in the

development of the vessel's navigation plan.

(vi) Watch team training: method for training watchstanding

personnel to efficiently and effectively stand a watch.

(vii) Emergency situation procedures: development and use of

procedures, including communications between crew and shoreside

personnel and use of onboard safety equipment, for successful emergency

response.

(2) Practical demonstration of the following skills:

(i) Ability to recognize potential hazards to navigation,

incorporate these considerations into a voyage plan, and communicate

these hazards to subordinates, senior watchstanding personnel, and a

pilot during a voyage.

(ii) Ability to recognize subordinate limitations and take

appropriate action to ensure the subordinates are attentive and provide

accurate feedback on their assigned tasks during a voyage.

(iii) Ability to recognize and initiate communications with other

vessels, subordinates, and senior watchstanding personnel to prevent

miscommunication or an inappropriate action.

(iv) Ability to work with and, at the same time, monitor a pilot to

ensure consistency with vessel operating characteristics and the voyage

passage plan.

(v) Ability to use all available bridge equipment to perform their

assigned duties, and to display knowledge of the appropriate action(s)

to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.

(b) Tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a

person to duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless

that person has demonstrated knowledge of company and vessel standard

operating procedures including allowed variations, watch augmentation

provisions, relationship of the officer in charge of a navigational

watch to the master or pilot when both are on the bridge, and emergency

navigation procedures.

(c) The training identified in paragraph (a) of this section must

be completed at least once every 5 years.

(d) Satisfactory completion of a commercial or company course

approved by the Coast Guard or, for an individual holding a foreign

license, the appropriate flag administration, that contains elements

comparable to those required in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this

section meets the initial training requirement if completed after [36

months prior to the effective date of the final rule.].

(e) Course completion must be documented by a certificate, license

endorsement, or a letter confirming that each officer in charge of a

navigational watch has satisfactorily completed the training

requirements. Copies of each officer's certificate, endorsement, or

letter confirming their completion must be retained on board the vessel

or otherwise be made readily available to the Coast Guard for

examination upon request.

(f) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those

individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are

similar to the duties of the officer in charge of a navigational watch

also complete bridge resource management training as specified in

paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section.

8. Section 157.420 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.420 Vessel specific watch training.

(a) The owner, master, or operator of a tank vessel shall not

assign duties to an individual assigned lookout, helmsman, or

engineering watch duties unless that person has successfully

[[Page 55929]]

completed a course that includes academic instruction in the following

areas, as applicable to the individual's job responsibilities:

(1) Communications: effective flow of information between

personnel, including the importance of feedback and timeliness.

(2) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a

sequence of events that could lead to an accident.

(3) Equipment: employing correct use and monitoring requirements of

the equipment necessary to perform assigned duties, including the

appropriate action(s) to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.

(4) Watch team integration: the effective flow of information among

the vessel's crew to ensure the person in charge of vessel navigation

is kept aware of events pertaining to equipment operation and personnel

effectiveness.

(b) Each individual must complete initial training that meets the

requirements of paragraph (a) of this section prior to assignment of

watchkeeping duties.

(c) Each individual must complete annual training that meets the

requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) Completion of training must be documented by a certificate,

vessel log entry, or a letter confirming that each individual has

satisfactorily completed the training requirements. Copies of the

certificate or letter confirming completion must be retained on board

the vessel or otherwise made readily available to the Coast Guard for

examination upon request.

(e) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those

individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are

similar to lookout, helmsman, or engineering watch duties also complete

vessel specific watch training as specified in paragraphs (a) through

(d) of this section.

9. Section 157.425 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.425 Minimum rest hour requirement.

(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure each person

is provided a minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours

prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer operations before

assuming the following duties:

(1) Officer in charge of a navigational watch, lookout, helmsman,

engineer officer in charge of a manned engine room on a tankship,

member of an engineering watch on a tankship, and the operator or

master of the vessel, if scheduled as a member of the duty rotation for

officer in charge of a navigational watch.

(2) Person in charge of cargo transfer operations.

(b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that the

individuals on the primary towing vessel having duties similar to those

listed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section are provided a

minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours before assuming

his or her duties prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer

operations.

(c) If a crew member's rest hours have been interrupted by drills

or emergencies, the operator or master shall assess the crew member's

fitness for duty before assigning him or her to any of the duties

described in this section.

(d) Minimum rest hour requirements must be posted on tank vessels

in crew lounge areas and work spaces.

10. Section 157.430 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.430 Enhanced survey requirements.

(a) Enhanced survey. The tank vessel owner, master, or operator

shall ensure an enhanced survey is conducted during each regularly

scheduled drydock examination required under 46 CFR part 31 or at a

frequency specified by the vessel's flag administration. Survey scope

and recordkeeping requirements must comply with the standards of IMO

Resolution A.744(18), Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-

2.6, 3-8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.

(b) Alternate enhanced survey. For a tankship of less than 20,000

deadweight tons (dwt) carrying crude oil, a tankship of less than

30,000 dwt carrying product, or a tank barge, one of the following may

be substituted for the enhanced survey requirements in paragraph (a) of

this section:

(1) An enhanced survey performed by a recognized classification

society.

(2) An enhanced survey performed by the company with oversight by

the Coast Guard or the vessel's flag administration, a recognized

classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved

by the Coast Guard if--

(i) The frequency of survey is no less than that required by 46 CFR

part 31 or as specified by the vessel's flag administration;

(ii) Program plans establishing comparable standards with the

requirements in paragraph (a) of this section are approved by the

Commandant (G-MVI) and contain the following information:

(A) The scope of the inspection program.

(B) Permanent recordkeeping requirements.

(C) An implementation plan outlining a continuous survey program

and identifying by job title those individuals whom the company will

assign to conduct the surveys.

(D) Confirmation from the administration, a recognized

classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved

by the Coast Guard that the oversight implementation plan is feasible.

(c) A copy of the most recent survey must be retained onboard the

vessel or, upon request by the Coast Guard, made available within 24

hours for examination.

11. Section 157.435 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.435 Vital systems surveys.

(a) A tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall survey the

following systems:

(1) Cargo systems. The survey must include the examination and

testing of the items listed in Chapters 6, 7, and 9 of the

International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, if

applicable, prior to cargo transfer operations.

(2) Mooring systems. The survey must include a visual examination

of the emergency towline, the anchor releasing mechanism, and mooring

lines prior to departing port.

(b) Surveys must be conducted by company management personnel,

company designated individuals, or vessel senior officers knowledgeable

about the equipment operating parameters and having the authority,

capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action when the

equipment is not functioning properly.

(c) The material condition of each system identified in paragraph

(a) of this section must be recorded in the vessel's Oil Record Book,

Part I or Part II, as applicable, the vessel's log, or other onboard

documentation.

12. Section 157.440 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.440 Autopilot alarm or indicator.

(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that each

installed autopilot unit without automatic manual override has an

audible and visual alarm, which is distinct from other required bridge

alarms, that will activate if the helm is manually moved while the

autopilot is engaged.

(b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that each autopilot

unit without automatic manual override installed on the primary towing

vessel has a means to clearly indicate the autopilot status and warns

personnel of

[[Page 55930]]

the requirement to disengage the autopilot if positive rudder control

is needed.

13. Section 157.445 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.445 Maneuvering performance capability.

(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that

maneuvering tests in accordance with IMO Resolution A.751(18), sections

1.2.2, 2.3-2.4, and 3-5 (with Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644) have

been conducted by [12 months after the effective date of the final

rule]. Satisfactory completion of maneuvering performance tests must be

shown by--

(1) For a foreign flag tankship, a letter from the flag

administration or a recognized classification society stating the

requirements in paragraph (a) of this section have been met; or

(2) For a U.S. flag tankship, test results from the vessel owner

confirming the completion of sea trial maneuvers or a letter from a

recognized classification society stating the requirements in paragraph

(a) of this section have been met.

(b) If a vessel undergoes a major conversion or alteration

affecting the control systems, control surfaces, propulsion system, or

other areas which may be expected to alter maneuvering performance, the

tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that maneuvering tests

are conducted as required by paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) If a vessel does not meet the performance standards of IMO

Resolution A.751(18), the owner, master, or operator must inform the

Captain of the Port (COTP) by message, letter, or radio contact, at

least 24 hours before entering the port of place of destination. Upon

notification, the COTP will determine if additional operational

restrictions for port entry should be imposed on the vessel. These may

include, but are not limited to--

(1) Requiring a tug escort or augmentation of existing escorts;

(2) Restricting transit times;

(3) Restricting vessel speed;

(4) Requiring the vessel to follow a specified route and make

specified reports;

(5) Barring entry into port; or

(6) Imposing other measure(s) appropriate for local conditions.

(d) Performance test results, recorded in the format of Appendix 6

of the Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644, must be prominently displayed

in the wheelhouse.

14. Section 157.450 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.450 Maneuvering and vessel status information.

A tankship owner, master or operator shall comply with IMO

Resolution A.601(15), Annex sections 1, 2.3, and 3 with appendices.

15. Section 157.455 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.455 Minimum under-keel clearance.

(a) For a tank vessel that is not fitted with a double bottom that

covers the entire cargo tank length, a vessel owner, master, or

operator shall meet the following requirements prior to entering the

port or place of destination and prior to departing port:

(1) The tank vessel's deepest navigational draft must be calculated

including the following factors--

(i) The mean draft;

(ii) The trim and list characteristics; and

(iii) The intended transit speed and the corresponding squat

characteristics, if known.

(2) The anticipated controlling depth must be calculated including

the following factors--

(i) Tide and current conditions;

(ii) Present sea state conditions;

(iii) Past weather impact on water depth;

(iv) The depth at the facility or anchorage; and

(v) The depth of the transit area found in the publication and

chart materials required to be on board the vessel by 33 CFR part 164.

(3) The anticipated under-keel clearance must be calculated by

subtracting the tank vessel's deepest navigational draft from the

anticipated controlling depth. The vessel's calculated deepest

navigational draft, anticipated controlling depth, and the calculated

anticipated under-keel clearance must be recorded in the vessel's log

or in other onboard documentation.

(4) The vessel shall not proceed without the approval of the local

COTP if the anticipated under-keel clearance is less than .5 meter (2

feet).

(b) For a tank barge that is not fitted with a double bottom that

covers the entire cargo tank length, the tank barge owner or operator

shall ensure that the primary towing vessel owner, master, or operator

meets the requirements specified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (4) of

this section.

16. Section 157.460 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 157.460 Additional operational requirements for tank barges.

(a) Emergency steering capability. The owner or operator of each

tank barge shall ensure that by [12 months after effective date of the

final rule] the primary towing vessel has--

(1) A steering gear system with a main power unit, an alternative

power unit, and two remote steering gear control systems, except that

separate steering wheels or steering levers are not required. The

steering gear control systems shall be arranged so that if the system

in operation fails, the other system can be brought into immediate

operation from a position on the navigating bridge; or

(2) Twin screw propulsion with separate control systems for each

propeller.

(b) Fendering system. An owner or operator of a tank barge shall

ensure the primary towing vessel and any fleeting or assist towing

vessels have a fendering system that is of substantial size and

composition to prevent metal to metal contact between the towing vessel

and the barge during maneuvering operations.

PART 31--INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION

17. The authority citation for part 31 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1321(j); 46 U.S.C. 2103, 3306, 3703; 49

U.S.C. App. 1804; E.O. 12234, 45 FR 58801, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p.

277; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 793; 49 CFR

1.46; Section 31.10-21a also issued under the authority of Sec.

4109, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 515.

18. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (a) is revised to read as follows:

[[Page 55931]]

Table 31.10.--21 (a) Salt Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ship and Double

Double Double single hull

Ship and hull barge hull barge Single hull Wood hull hull barge barge Single hull Double

single with with barge with ship and grade D grade D asphalt hull

hull internal external independent barge and E and E barge\6\\9\ asphalt

barge\9\ framing\1\ framing\2\ tanks\3\\9\ cargoes cargoes barge\7\

only\4\\9\ only\5\

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Drydock....................................... 2.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0

Internal structural........................... 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 5.0 5.0 2.5 10.0 2.5

Cargo tank internal........................... \8\2.5 \8\5.0 \8\10.0 \8\10.0 \8\2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 15.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes:

\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.

\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for

examination from voids, double bottoms, and other similar spaces.

\3\Applicable to single hull tank barges with independent cargo tanks where the cargo tanks are not a contiguous part of the hull structure and which

has adequate clearance between the tanks and between the tanks and the vessel's hull to provide access for examination of all tank surfaces and the

hull structure.

\4\Applicable to single hull tankships and tank barges certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.

\5\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.

\6\Applicable to single hull tank barges certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.

\7\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.

\8\Or as specified in part 38 or 151 as applicable.

\9\Enhanced survey requirements apply as specified in 33 CFR part 157.

19. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (b) is revised to read as follows:

Table 31.10.--21(b) Fresh Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ship and

single Double

Ship and Double Double Single hull hull hull Single Double

single hull barge hull barge barge with Wood hull barge barge hull hull

hull with with independent ship and grade D grade D asphalt asphalt

barge\9\ internal external tanks3,9 barge and E an E barge6,9 barge\7\

framing\1\ framing\2\ cargoes cargoes

only4,9 only\5\

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Drydock.......................................... 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0

Internal structural.............................. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0

Cargo tank internal.............................. \8\5.0 \8\5.0 \8\10.0 \8\10.0 \8\2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 15.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes:

\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.

\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for

examination from voids, double bottoms, an

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