Record of Decision Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

Facility

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of

Decision (ROD) regarding the DOE's proposed Dual Axis Radiographic

Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

(LANL) in northern New Mexico. DOE has decided to complete and operate

the DARHT facility at LANL while implementing a program to conduct most

tests inside steel containment vessels, with containment to be phased

in over ten years. The environmental analysis to support this decision

was issued by DOE in the August 1995, DARHT Facility Final

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), DOE/EIS-0228, which identified

the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative

as DOE's preferred alternative. DOE has decided to implement the

preferred alternative.

DATES: This ROD is effective immediately. On January 27, 1995, DOE was

enjoined from further procurement or construction of the DARHT facility

pending completion of the DARHT EIS

[[Page 53589]]

and this ROD. Actions to implement this ROD will not occur unless and

until the injunction is dissolved; DOE will seek immediate dissolution

of the injunction.

ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the DARHT EIS or this ROD should be

addressed to: Ms. Elizabeth Withers, NEPA Compliance Officer, Los

Alamos Area Office, Department of Energy, 528 35th Street, Los Alamos

NM 87544. Ms. Withers may be contacted by telephone at (505) 667-8690

or by facsimile at (505) 665-4872.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE

NEPA process, please contact Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office

of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue SW., Washington DC 20585. Ms. Borgstrom may be

contacted by leaving a message at (800) 472-2756 or by calling (202)

586-4600.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

DOE is responsible for ensuring that the United States nuclear

weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. As part of its

mission to ensure the safety and reliability of the weapons in the

stockpile, DOE and its predecessor agencies have conducted a

hydrodynamic testing program at LANL since the late 1940's. The

existing hydrodynamic testing facility at LANL is the Pulsed High-

Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX), which has been in

operation since 1963. In 1983, DOE began hydrodynamic testing operation

of the Flash X-Ray (FXR) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL) in California.

In September 1992, President Bush declared a moratorium on all

nuclear testing by the United States. In July 1993, President Clinton

extended the moratorium, and in August 1995 the President announced

that the United States will seek a ``zero-yield'' Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty. He further stated that the conduct of a science-based

stockpile stewardship program is a condition of U.S. entry into such a

treaty.

PHERMEX and FXR historically have been used in conjunction with

underground nuclear testing to identify and correct potential problems

with the stockpile. Neither PHERMEX nor FXR can provide the degree of

radiographic resolution, x-ray intensity, or three-dimensional or time-

sequenced views that are needed to provide answers to current questions

regarding weapons condition or performance necessary for science-based

stockpile stewardship. Although DOE expects to operate and upgrade the

FXR facility as described in section 3.3.4 of the final EIS, and also

expects to operate and appropriately upgrade PHERMEX until use of the

latter is phased out after initial DARHT operation, neither facility

can fully meet DOE's purpose and need to provide enhanced high-

resolution radiography capability. In addition to its radiographic

performance limitations, PHERMEX is over thirty years old, and DOE does

not expect it to remain a viable facility over an extended time because

of the increasing difficulty and cost of maintaining and operating the

facility as it ages.

To conduct an effective science-based stockpile stewardship

program, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced capability to conduct

radiographic hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. The capability

to obtain high-resolution, multiple-time, multiple-view information is

needed to assess the safety, performance, and reliability of nuclear

weapons; evaluate aging weapons; obtain information about plutonium

through dynamic experiments; and for other uses. Such an enhanced

capability cannot be obtained at either PHERMEX or FXR, as currently

configured. Accordingly, DOE has decided to complete and operate the

DARHT facility to provide an enhanced high-resolution radiographic

capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in

support of its historical mission and the near-term stewardship of the

nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.

DOE began construction of the DARHT facility in April 1994. In

October 1994, three citizen groups requested of the Secretary of Energy

that DOE prepare an EIS on the DARHT facility, and halt further

construction until an EIS was completed. On November 16, 1994, two of

these groups filed suit in the United States District Court for the

District of New Mexico, seeking to enjoin DOE from proceeding with the

DARHT project until completion of an EIS and associated ROD. On

November 22, 1994, DOE published a notice of its intent to prepare the

DARHT EIS [59 FR 60134]. On January 27, 1995, the court issued a

preliminary injunction of further construction of the DARHT facility,

and related activities such as the procurement of special facility

equipment, pending completion of the EIS and ROD. The court entered

final judgment on May 5, 1995. No construction or procurement for DARHT

has taken place since January 27, 1995; in January and February, 1995,

DOE took actions allowed by the court to stabilize the construction

site.

The DARHT EIS was prepared pursuant to the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.], the Council on

Environmental Quality NEPA regulations [40 CFR Parts 1500-1508] and the

DOE NEPA regulations [10 CFR Part 1021]. DOE issued the final DARHT

Facility Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0228, in August 1995

following the issuance of the draft DARHT EIS for public review in May

1995. The Environmental Protection Agency published its Notice of

Availability regarding the final DARHT EIS on September 8, 1995 [60 FR

46833].

The DARHT EIS includes a classified supplement that provides

additional information and analyses. The NEPA regulations provide that

EISs which address classified proposals may be restricted from public

dissemination; however, the document may be organized so that

classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified

portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR Part 1507.3(c); 10

CFR Part 1021.340(a)]. NEPA's public disclosure requirements are

subject to the exceptions spelled out in the Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) [5 U.S.C. 552; 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c)]. FOIA exempts materials

from public disclosure where specified by statute. Under the Atomic

Energy Act [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], material pertaining to nuclear

weapons design or related national security matters is classified and

exempted from public disclosure under FOIA and therefore under NEPA.

Accordingly, DOE prepared a classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, and

relied on information in that supplement to make this decision. The

classified supplement has been withheld from public dissemination, but

DOE provided the draft classified supplement for review by

appropriately cleared representatives of parties with a need to know

the classified information. These representatives include the

Department of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State

of New Mexico and certain American Indian tribal governments, so that

in accordance with the provisions of NEPA, these government agencies

could ensure that the public health and welfare are being adequately

protected.

DOE invited the public to comment on the adequacy and accuracy of

the draft EIS, and on any other matter concerning the DARHT review. The

public comment period on the draft DARHT EIS ended on June 26, 1995;

[[Page 53590]]

DOE held public hearings on the draft EIS in Los Alamos, New Mexico, on

May 31, 1995, and in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on June 1, 1995. The final

DARHT EIS includes transcripts of the public hearings and copies of

written comments, and explains how DOE considered all comments

received.

Alternatives Considered

The DARHT EIS analyzed six alternative ways to implement DOE's

proposed action to obtain enhanced radiographic capability. DOE

considered, but did not analyze in detail, other alternatives which DOE

determined would not meet the Department's purpose and need for

enhanced testing capability.

Certain aspects of the DOE hydrodynamic testing and dynamic

experiment program would not change regardless of the course of action

selected, and were considered to be common to all alternatives. These

include: the way hydrodynamic tests are conducted; the conducting of

contained dynamic experiments with plutonium; infrastructure

requirements; continued operation of the FXR Facility at LLNL;

continued operation of the LANL Radiographic Support Laboratory at

Technical Area 15; waste management considerations; decontamination and

decommissioning considerations; and other operational and site

characteristics of LANL. (Aside from the provisions in this ROD

regarding PHERMEX and DARHT, this ROD does not affect operation of any

other facility at LANL or any other DOE site, including the continued

operation of the FXR facility at LLNL or the continued operation of the

Radiographic Support Facility at LANL.)

Alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS are as follows:

--No Action Alternative. DOE would continue to use PHERMEX at LANL and

FXR at LLNL in support of its stockpile stewardship mission. The DARHT

structure would be completed for other uses.

--DARHT Baseline Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the DARHT

facility and phase out operations at PHERMEX, but would not pursue a

program of enhanced containment.

--Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. The DARHT facility would be completed

for other uses. DOE would construct major upgrades at PHERMEX,

including installing the high-resolution radiography planned for DARHT

and constructing a second accelerator for two-axis imaging.

--Enhanced Containment Alternative. DOE would complete and operate the

DARHT facility and phase out operations of PHERMEX as under the DARHT

Baseline Alternative; in addition, some or all tests would be conducted

inside a containment vessel or structure. Three options were

considered: (1) Vessel Containment Option (most tests would be

contained in modular steel vessels, starting with operation of the

first axis of DARHT); (2) Building Containment Option (all tests would

be contained inside a permanent building starting with operation of the

first axis of DARHT); and (3) Phased Containment Option, the DOE's

preferred alternative (most tests would be contained in modular steel

vessels, to be implemented over a ten-year period). Under options 1 and

3, DOE would construct and operate a Vessel Cleanout Facility to clean

the portable steel vessels and recycle materials as appropriate; under

option 2, DOE would construct and operate a separate cleanout facility

to assist in maintaining the containment building and recycling

materials as appropriate.

--Plutonium Exclusion Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT

Baseline Alternative; however, plutonium would not be used in any of

the experiments at DARHT. Under this alternative, in the future, DOE

may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; those involving

radiography would be conducted at PHERMEX and would be contained in

double-walled vessels.

--Single Axis Alternative. DOE would implement the DARHT Baseline

Alternative; however, only one accelerator hall (single axis) would be

operated for hydrodynamic tests or dynamic experiments. The other hall

would be completed for other uses.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

While some of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS were

unacceptable in that they did not meet programmatic needs, none posed

unacceptable environmental impacts. The analyses in the DARHT EIS

indicate very little difference in the environmental impacts among the

alternatives analyzed. The major discriminators would be contamination

of soils near the firing point, health effects to workers, and the

amount of construction materials consumed. After consideration of the

environmental impacts identified through the EIS, DOE has determined

that the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative,

including DOE's preferred alternative (the Phased Containment Option),

would be somewhat environmentally preferable. These three options,

particularly the building containment option, would result in

considerably less release of depleted uranium and other metals to the

general environment than would the other alternatives analyzed

(including No Action because of the continued use of PHERMEX). However,

these options would result in a higher radiation dose to workers over

the life of the project compared to the other alternatives analyzed

(although the dose would be well below regulatory and administrative

limits). The benefit of reducing the amounts of materials released is

directly related to DOE's responsibility for environmental stewardship

and the desire to minimize cleanup activities at the end of the

facility's lifetime.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

DOE weighed environmental impacts as one factor in its decision

making process regarding the DARHT facility. DOE considered the impacts

from construction and operation of alternative facilities, and the

consequences that might be expected under accident scenarios. After

consideration of the environmental impacts identified and analyzed in

the DARHT EIS, DOE concludes that for the most part, environmental

impacts would be expected to be similar among all six of the

alternatives analyzed. None of these alternatives would present an

unacceptable level of adverse environmental impact to the human

environment.

DOE analyzed the potential impacts that might occur to land

resources, air quality, noise, water resources, soils, biotic

resources, cultural resources, socioeconomics, and human health. DOE

considered impacts that might occur from use of plutonium; facility

accidents, and transportation of radioactive materials. DOE considered

the amount of waste that would be generated under different

alternatives; irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources;

and the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the

maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. For all

alternatives analyzed, DOE determined that some contamination of soils

could occur and would present an unavoidable adverse impact.

Most impacts identified were essentially the same for all

alternatives analyzed. For the Vessel Containment Option and the Phased

Containment Option, one additional acre of land would be disturbed to

construct the Vessel Cleanout Facility. All three

[[Page 53591]]

options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would result in less

materials dispersed (the amount of depleted uranium released to the

environment is of particular interest because of its potential to

result in soil or water contamination); therefore, soils and water

resources would be less contaminated under that alternative. Under the

postulated testing program analyzed in the DARHT EIS, the amount of

materials released from the firing point under any of the action

alternatives would be 15% lower than under the No Action Alternative.

Because all of the action alternatives would provide an enhanced

radiographic capability, less material would need to be expended to

obtain more and better data. An even greater reduction would be

achieved under the Enhanced Containment Alternative options (a total of

95% reduction for Building Containment, 75% for Vessel Containment, and

50% for Phased Containment). Annual releases of depleted uranium would

be up to 90 pounds (41 kilograms) under the Building Containment

Option; up to 450 pounds (205 kilograms) under the Vessel Containment

Option; and up to 720 pounds (327 kilograms) (averaged over the

lifetime of the project with a range of from 1,460 pounds [664

kilograms] to 450 pounds [205 kilograms] per year) under the Phased

Containment Option. Under the other five alternatives, up to 1,540

pounds (700 kilograms) would be released annually. Compared to the

other five alternatives, the Enhanced Containment Alternative would

result in an unquantified beneficial impact to noise levels, wildlife

habitat and cultural resources; the benefit would be greatest under the

Building Containment Option.

The adverse impact to the health of the uninvolved public would be

less under the Enhanced Containment Alternative than the other five

alternatives: the dose to the affected population would be 8 person-rem

over the 30-year life of the project under the Building Containment

Option, 13 person-rem under the Vessel Containment Option, and 17

person-rem under the Phased Containment Option, compared to 30 person-

rem under all other alternatives. However, due to the concentration of

depleted uranium and other hazardous materials inside the Vessel

Cleanout Facility, the health hazard to workers would be greater under

the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative when compared

to the other alternatives, although doses would be well below

regulatory and administrative limits. The average annual dose to

workers under the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative

would be 0.6 rem compared to 0.3 rem for the other five alternatives

and the collective dose over the 30-year life of the project would be

60 person-rem compared to 9 person-rem. No additional latent cancer

fatalities would be expected over 50 years to the general population or

workers under normal operations under any of the six alternatives

analyzed.

Under the accident scenarios examined, an unexpected high-

explosives detonation would result in 15 fatalities (all personnel

present) at the facility under all alternatives analyzed. No additional

latent cancer fatalities would be expected over 50 years among members

of the general public from accidental release of depleted uranium under

any of the alternatives. Between 5 and 12 additional latent cancer

fatalities could occur from the accidental release of vaporized

plutonium. Such an accident is extremely unlikely (estimated to occur

once in every 10,000 to 1,000,000 years).

The two alternatives involving major additional construction (the

Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative and the Building Containment Option of the

Enhanced Containment Alternative) would result in considerably greater

commitment of construction resources (concrete and diesel fuel); the

Vessel Cleanout Facility under the Vessel Containment Option and the

Phased Containment Option would result in a slightly greater commitment

of construction resources.

Socioeconomic impacts would vary for each alternative, primarily

driven by duration and timing of new construction and whether PHERMEX

would be phased out of operation. More people would be employed under

any other alternative than under the No Action Alternative. The Vessel

Containment Option would result in the greatest increase in employment

(321 additional full-time jobs generated in the regional economy).

Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, 273 additional jobs would be

generated, compared with 253 under the Phased Containment Option, 238

under the Building Containment Option, 199 under the Upgrade PHERMEX

Alternative, 191 under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and 104 under the

Single Axis Alternative.

Review of Final EIS

DOE distributed approximately 800 copies of the final EIS to the

State of New Mexico, American Indian tribal governments, local

governments, other federal agencies, and the general public. The United

States Environmental Protection Agency commented that selection of the

Phased Containment Option as the preferred alternative should provide

additional environmental protection over the life of the project. No

other written comments specific to the final DARHT EIS were received.

However, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, in a letter to DOE dated

September 12, 1995, clarified the language of its August 3, 1995 letter

regarding mitigation measures to protect the nesting habitat of the

Mexican spotted owl, a federally-listed threatened species. (The August

3, 1995 letter concurred with the DOE determination that operation of

DARHT would not be likely to adversely affect the Mexican spotted owl,

and the September 12, 1995 letter does not affect that concurrence.)

A member of the public telephoned DOE and pointed out a typographic

and calculational error in the tables regarding air quality in the

final EIS. An error was noted in the conversion of the three-hour

standard for sulfur dioxide from parts per million to micrograms per

cubic meter in calculating the percent of regulatory standard in

conjunction with potential air quality impacts. The corrected

calculated percent of regulatory standard is a factor of 10 higher for

sulfur dioxide concentrations. For tables S-1, 3-3, and C1-8 the

percent of regulatory standard in the most restrictive case increases

from 2.2 to 22%; this is constant across all alternatives and does not

change the overall analysis of air quality impacts. In addition, the

caller pointed out a typographic error in table 5-1 regarding the

calculated annual concentration of nitrogen dioxide; it should be 0.04

micrograms per cubic meter rather than 0.004. None of these changes

affect the results of the environmental analysis.

DOE also identified an additional typographic error in the

document. The DARHT EIS provides a comparison of costs for the reader's

information; there is an inconsistency between the cost figures shown

in the summary table 3-4 and the corresponding table in the body of the

analysis, table 5-19. The cost estimates in table 3-4 are correct

(those in table 5-19 are from the draft EIS but inadvertently were not

updated).

Decision

DOE has decided to complete and operate the DARHT facility at LANL

to provide enhanced high-resolution radiography (x-ray photography)

capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in

[[Page 53592]]

support of the Department's historical mission and the near-term

stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE will mitigate

potential environmental effects by implementing an enhanced approach to

containing expended test materials. This will be done by conducting

tests in modular steel containment vessels to be phased in over ten

years. DOE will also construct and operate a separate Vessel Cleanout

Facility in conjunction with the operation of the DARHT facility. This

is the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment

Alternative, identified as the preferred alternative in the DARHT Final

EIS.

DOE will complete construction of the DARHT facility with the

intent to operate both axes of the facility. As soon as possible, DOE

will resume construction of the firing site facility, complete both of

the two accelerator halls (dual axes), and will resume procurement,

testing and installation of equipment required for operating the DARHT

firing site facility with the first axis x-ray machine. DOE will equip

the first axis with an accelerator capable of achieving a nominal 20

million electron volts (MeV) of electron- beam energy, and an output x-

ray dose of up to 1,650 roentgens (R). The DARHT facility will be

completed to the original plans, with minor modifications if necessary

to accommodate the accelerator and x-ray equipment and the use of the

portable modular containment vessels.

DOE intends to eventually operate DARHT in a dual axis mode, and

will procure, test and install equipment for the second axis. Based on

the results of installing, testing and proving the linear accelerator

equipment in the first axis, DOE may incorporate modified or improved

technology for the second axis or retrofit the equipment previously

installed in the first axis. As long as no substantial change to the

building footprint is required, and as long as the energy output of

both the first and second accelerator falls within the range analyzed

in the DARHT EIS (electron beam energies of up to 30 MeV and output x-

ray dose of up to 2,000 R for each accelerator), no additional NEPA

review will be required for modifications to equipment for the first or

second axis.

DOE will operate the DARHT facility to provide high-speed, high-

resolution flash radiographs which will be used to measure or diagnose

the results of tests and experiments involving high explosives and

other systems. Other types of portable low- energy x-ray, electronic,

optical, and photographic diagnostic equipment may be used at the

facility. DARHT may be operated with one or two x-ray beams from one or

both axes, either simultaneously or with a timing variation.

DOE plans to conduct some dynamic experiments using plutonium.

Dynamic experiments with plutonium will always be conducted in

specially-designed double- walled containment vessels. DOE will

maintain the capability to stage, maintain, and clean out plutonium

containment vessels at LANL. The Vessel Cleanout Facility will not be

used for this purpose.

DARHT will have the following uses and potential uses:

--To study the implosion of mock nuclear weapons primaries. This

information would be used to assist the DOE with its stockpile

stewardship and management mission in order to ensure the continued

safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile,

and to further a basic scientific understanding of the behavior of

nuclear weapons.

--To conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in order to obtain more

information regarding the physical and chemical properties of

plutonium. All such experiments will be conducted in specially-

designed, double-walled steel containment vessels.

--To continue to assist other nations in evaluating the condition,

safety and reliability of their existing nuclear weapons under current

international agreements, and any future agreements.

--To assess the condition, safety and performance reliability of other

nuclear weapons, such as those that might be designed by a non-friendly

nation or a terrorist and obtained by the United States.

--To continue to assist the Department of Defense with evaluations of

conventional weapons and other military equipment.

--To continue to study explosives-driven materials and high-velocity

impact phenomena for non-weapons applications and other uses of

interest to industry.

--To pursue other applications of the radiography or accelerator

technology and other equipment developed for high-resolution

radiography.

In 1991, President Bush stated that the United States would not

design new nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. However, in the

event that this nation decides, as a matter of policy, that new nuclear

weapons should be developed, or in the event that retrofit components

need to be developed for existing nuclear weapons, DARHT could be used

to assist in the development of weapons or weapons components. Any

decision to develop new nuclear weapons would be made by the President

subject to the review and approval of Congress. Neither DARHT nor any

other facility operated by DOE will be used for this purpose unless

such a Presidential determination is made.

The completed DARHT facility will be operated with a 2,500 foot

(950 meter) radius exclusion zone as a safety feature to provide

protection to personnel and structures while testing takes place. The

completed DARHT facility will include the already-constructed earthen

berm on the northern side of the facility to serve as a radiation

protection measure. Explosives or special nuclear materials will not be

stored, handled or processed inside the DARHT firing site building.

As soon as the first axis of the DARHT facility becomes

operational, DOE will phase out operation of the PHERMEX facility over

approximately four years and, at the end of that time, will

decommission and decontaminate the PHERMEX facility unless an

alternative use is identified for the structure or facility equipment.

Activities needed to decommission and decontaminate the structure, or

to convert it to another use, may be subject to further NEPA review or

other environmental review.

DOE will use a modular containment vessel system to contain the

materials released from tests and experiments--materials such as

depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and other materials that

would otherwise be released to the general environment. As discussed

previously, DOE has always in the past, and will continue in the

future, to conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium in special

double-walled containment vessels. However, these vessels are not

appropriate for tests not involving plutonium. They are limited to high

explosive charges of 44 pounds (20 kilograms); a containment system for

non-plutonium tests must accommodate much larger charges (see below).

The existing vessels also impose substantial limitations on experiment

configurations and diagnostic capabilities. Therefore, DOE will

undertake a development program to design, test, and build containment

vessels specifically for tests that do not use plutonium. This modular

system will allow the containment vessel to be modified to meet size

and configuration needs for a given test. Containment of tests not

involving plutonium will be phased into DOE's long-term hydrodynamic

testing program at LANL according to the following plan, with

[[Page 53593]]

the first phase starting when the first axis of DARHT becomes

operational. The first three phases will involve tests that use up to

110 pounds (50 kilograms) of high explosives.

--Phase 1--Demonstration (years 1 through 5). DOE will put into place

at DARHT a prototype vessel system and portable cleanout unit as part

of a process to reduce the material released to the open air over this

5-year period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects

that such a reduction would be at least 5% compared to the releases

expected from the testing program if containment were not used.) During

this period, DOE will design and build an additional vessel system,

incorporating experience gained during this phase. Based on the final

vessel design, DOE will design and start construction of the Vessel

Cleanout Facility.

--Phase 2--Containment (years 6 through 10). Over the second 5-year

period DOE will put into place a 5-vessel containment system which will

be used to further reduce the material released over this 5-year

period. (Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that

this reduction would be at least 40%.) DOE will start to operate the

Vessel Cleanout Facility.

--Phase 3--Enhanced Containment (years 11 through 30). Based on DOE's

experience gained from the first two phases, the modular containment

vessels will be continually improved. DOE will use the vessel system to

further reduce the material released over the next 20-year period.

(Based upon the analyses in the DARHT EIS, DOE expects that this

reduction would be at least 75%.)

--Phase 4--440-lb (200-kg) Containment Option. If justified by the

development effort and operating experience after Phase 1, DOE may

develop and use a vessel to contain material from tests and experiments

larger than 110 pounds (50 kilograms). These could include tests of up

to 440 pounds (200 kilograms) of high explosives, thus allowing DOE to

contain a greater percentage of material. Phase 4 may be implemented at

any time after Phase 1.

DOE will design, construct, and operate the Vessel Cleanout

Facility to support use of the portable modular containment vessels.

DOE analyzed two alternative locations for this facility in the DARHT

EIS. DOE's intention is to locate and construct the Vessel Cleanout

Facility at the southernmost location analyzed, because that location

is closest to the DARHT facility and closest to existing utility lines.

However, if during the detailed design stage DOE determines that it

would be more beneficial (from the standpoint of operating conditions

or environmental protection) to construct or operate the cleanout

facility at the northernmost location, DOE may construct and operate

the Vessel Cleanout Facility there without performing additional NEPA

review. DOE will improve an existing firebreak (dirt) road to provide

access to the Vessel Cleanout Facility at either of the two locations.

Road improvements will be located to avoid adverse impact to cultural

resource sites, if any, in the vicinity. If, after designs are

completed, neither location analyzed in the DARHT EIS proves to be

suitable, a decision to locate the Vessel Cleanout Facility somewhere

else may be subject to further NEPA review.

The modular containment vessel intended for non-plutonium tests has

not previously been used by DOE, and the operation of this system is

not well-established. Although DOE expects a highly effective vessel

design to be achievable, if technological problems were to be

encountered in fabricating or using the vessel system, or if for some

other reason the vessels cannot be deployed according to the phased

schedule, DOE will conduct testing operations at DARHT in such a way as

to continue to reduce, to the extent practicable, the amount of

materials released to the environment. Such a reduction may be achieved

by other methods, including (but not limited to) altering the number of

experiments or tests, and picking up the expended materials.

Some non-plutonium tests or experiments of the type anticipated for

DARHT cannot be conducted inside containment vessels due to diagnostic

equipment limitations or the type of diagnostic information needed.

Although DOE will eventually conduct most tests and experiments inside

containment vessels, DOE may conduct any given test or experiment that

does not involve plutonium in an open-air configuration, so long as the

above percentages of material containment are met.

Other Decision Factors

In addition to environmental factors, DOE considered costs, timing,

technology, national security, and infrastructure availability. DOE

considered classified information, including the information and

analyses in the classified supplement to the DARHT EIS, in making its

decision. The environmental impacts identified in the classified

supplement, specifically those relating to human health, were not in

and of themselves classified, and were therefore also included in the

environmental analyses in the unclassified portion of the DARHT EIS.

However, the specific details of the operations that would produce

those impacts are classified, and are presented only in the classified

supplement. The factors discussed here include information from the

classified as well as the unclassified portions of the DARHT EIS.

Cost

Because DOE must be fiscally prudent, DOE considered construction

and operating costs. DOE estimates that the total capital cost for

construction and equipment would vary considerably among alternatives.

The capital cost for the Phased Containment Option would be the highest

and that for the No Action Alternative would be the lowest. Over the

predicted 30 year life of the facility, the Phased Containment Option

has the lowest estimated total cost of all containment options when

considering capital cost plus annual operating costs. The total capital

construction and equipment cost for the Phased Containment Option would

be about $187 million; on the average, operating costs would be about

$9.8 million per year. For comparison, DOE estimates the approximate

total capital costs and operating costs, respectively, for other

alternatives at $181 million and $10.4 million for the Building

Containment Option; $176 million and $10.4 million for the Vessel

Containment Option; $167 million and $6.5 million for the Upgrade

PHERMEX Alternative; $145 million and $6.5 million for either the DARHT

Baseline Alternative or the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative; $97

million and $5.4 million for the Single Axis Alternative; and $49

million and $4.2 million for the No Action Alternative. As documented

in the draft DARHT EIS, DOE originally calculated project capital costs

based on installing 16 MeV linear accelerators. DOE estimates that the

additional cost to install 20 MeV accelerators would be about $8

million per machine.

Timing

Because DOE needs to begin establishing baseline conditions of

weapons in the enduring stockpile as soon as possible, DOE considered

when it could achieve that level of enhanced capability provided by a

single axis, and then considered if it could achieve the full enhanced

multiple-view capability as well. PHERMEX and FXR are now in

[[Page 53594]]

use, so under the No Action Alternative the existing (non-enhanced)

capability is currently available and multiple-view capability would

never be available. Under the DARHT Baseline Alternative and all other

alternatives except the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, the first axis

would be ready 38 months after construction resumes; for the DARHT

Baseline Alternative and all other alternatives except as noted, the

second axis would be available in 66 months (an additional 28 months).

Under the Building Containment Option, dual axis capability would be

ready in 77 months without interim single axis capability due to the

additional time to construct the containment building. (Under this

option, no tests would be conducted until the containment building was

operational.) Under the Single Axis Alternative, a multiple-axis

capability would never be available. Under the Upgrade PHERMEX

Alternative, the existing operating capability would be lost for 51

months due to construction, and the second axis would be ready 71

months after construction began.

DOE considered whether it would be prudent to wait for development

of the technology and design of an even more advanced multiple-view

hydrodynamic testing capability instead of pursuing DARHT. Although DOE

has conceptualized the next generation of advanced hydrodynamic testing

capability, potential technologies for such a facility have not yet

been selected, developed or proven. DOE would incur additional risk to

its ability to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons

stockpile if, instead of obtaining a known enhanced capability in the

near-term, it waited the several years necessary to identify and

develop an advanced technology.

DOE also considered whether it would be prudent to wait until it

has made the programmatic decisions expected to follow the completion

of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS [60 FR

31291] or the LANL Sitewide EIS [60 FR 25697] now under preparation.

The DARHT EIS notes that the actions needed to improve DOE's capability

to conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments are included

within the stockpile stewardship mission defined by the President and

Congress. The DOE proposal to provide enhanced high-resolution

multiple-view radiographic capability responds to Presidential and

Congressional direction. For the reasons noted below, DOE finds that

this decision to acquire enhanced capability will not prejudice its

future decisions regarding stockpile stewardship and management, or

regarding providing an environmentally-sound operating envelope for

LANL.

DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic testing program,

and will need the enhanced capability provided by DARHT to implement

that program, regardless of any other decisions to be made regarding

stockpile stewardship and management. Thus, the courses of action

analyzed in the DARHT EIS, and the action decided upon in this ROD, are

justified independently of the stockpile stewardship and management

program, and will not prejudice any ultimate decision on the program,

nor will they be influenced by the expected programmatic decisions. The

LANL Sitewide EIS will assist with decisions on how to operate LANL in

an environmentally-sound manner; this ROD will not prejudice any

decisions expected to result from the LANL Sitewide EIS. Accordingly,

DOE finds that it would not be consistent with the nation's need to

obtain enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic capability as quickly as

possible if the Department delayed its decisions on DARHT until after

completion of the other two EISs, nor would the Department benefit

programmatically from such a delay.

Technology

DOE could achieve enhanced high-resolution radiographic capability

under any of the alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS except the No

Action Alternative. While still operating adequately at this time, the

existing equipment at PHERMEX is approaching the end of its design life

and DOE is concerned that it will become increasingly difficult and

expensive to continue to maintain the aging accelerator over time.

Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not achieve the three-

dimensional or sequential capability that could be achieved with dual

axis capability, thus defeating a key component of the purpose and need

for the project.

The three options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would

impede the image quality somewhat, but not to an unacceptable level.

Containment also decreases testing efficiency in that it would take

more time to prepare and execute a new test and would not allow for

overhead diagnostics.

National Security

DOE needs to achieve high-resolution, high-speed multiple-axis

radiographic hydrodynamic capability as soon as possible to ensure the

greatest degree of confidence in the continued safety and reliability

of the nuclear weapons stockpile. DOE needs to be able to use this type

of capability to perform contained dynamic experiments with plutonium

in support of its nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and management

mission. The existing hydrodynamic facilities at PHERMEX and FXR cannot

provide the needed level of confidence to support our national security

goals. Under the Single Axis Alternative, DOE could not obtain the

three-dimensional or rapid-time-sequenced images needed to provide the

maximum amount of diagnostic information to meet national security

goals. Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, DOE could not use the

enhanced capability to diagnose the effects of dynamic experiments

involving plutonium, which would not meet national security goals.

Under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, DOE would lose the ability to

perform any hydrodynamic testing at LANL, and the capability to perform

dynamic experiments with plutonium for 51 months, which would encumber

national security goals.

Infrastructure

DOE needs to be able to use an enhanced radiographic capability for

dynamic experiments involving plutonium. These experiments will always

be conducted in special double-walled steel containment vessels.

Special facilities are needed to fabricate plutonium shapes; store and

handle plutonium; perform plutonium chemistry diagnostics; process

material for experiments and for storage; and to ensure worker safety

and security. The large, heavy, double-walled containment vessels that

would be used for dynamic experiments with plutonium would be difficult

to handle or to transport over long distances. While LANL already has

the requisite plutonium storage and handling infrastructure at its

Plutonium Facility and other facilities, no other DOE site currently

has a plutonium storage and handling capability sufficient to support

dynamic experiments with plutonium. DOE has determined that it would be

unreasonably costly (up to about $10,000 per square foot) to construct

new plutonium handling and storage facilities at another site when

adequate operating technical facilities are already in place and in use

at LANL. In addition, LANL already has an infrastructure in place to

support the ongoing (non-plutonium) testing program at PHERMEX.

Balancing Decision Factors

In order to be able to continue to ensure the safety and

reliability of the existing stockpile, DOE needs to obtain an enhanced

capability to perform

[[Page 53595]]

hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments, and to obtain that

capability as soon as possible. DOE cannot afford to wait for

development of future advanced technologies, but instead must make use

of known technology.

Because DOE needs to be able to perform contained dynamic

experiments with plutonium, DOE needs to have a plutonium handling

capability to support the dynamic experiments; this support

infrastructure is already in place at LANL and it would be too costly

(several hundred million dollars) to replicate these facilities at

another site solely to support an enhanced radiographic capability.

Similarly, the safe transport of containment vessels that have been

used for dynamic experiments with plutonium from another site to LANL

would be prohibitively expensive. For these reasons, DOE needs to

provide an enhanced radiographic capability at LANL.

DOE has concluded that the existing radiography equipment at

PHERMEX (the No Action Alternative) does not meet the Department's need

for enhanced high-resolution multiple-view radiographic capability.

Enlarging the existing PHERMEX facility or constructing a second axis

at PHERMEX would require DOE to forego its hydrodynamic capability at

LANL for 51 months. DOE finds that a 51-month loss of its ability to

conduct hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments at LANL is an

unacceptable situation. Therefore DOE decided not to upgrade the

existing PHERMEX facility to achieve enhanced single or dual axis

radiographic capability (the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative).

DOE needs to obtain high-resolution multiple-view radiographic

capability to obtain the best information about nuclear weapons

primaries. To equip only one axis of the dual axis DARHT facility would

not allow DOE to obtain three-dimensional or time-sequenced

information. Although there would be a cost reduction of about one-

third if DOE did not equip the second axis, there would be very little

difference in environmental impact, and national security goals would

not be met. Therefore, DOE decided against installing accelerator

equipment in only one axis of the DARHT facility (the Single Axis

Alternative).

DOE needs to obtain high-resolution radiographic capability to

conduct, among other things, contained dynamic experiments with

plutonium. It would be inconsistent with national security goals to go

to the expense of obtaining the high-resolution radiographic equipment

planned for DARHT and to not use it for dynamic experiments with

plutonium. In the event that DOE decided to operate DARHT without

conducting plutonium experiments, DOE would have to maintain PHERMEX

into the indefinite future to provide a capability to conduct plutonium

experiments without taking advantage of DARHT's enhanced capability.

This would neither be cost-effective nor meet national security goals.

Accordingly, DOE decided against the option of completing DARHT but

limiting the use of the facility to exclude the use of plutonium while

maintaining PHERMEX indefinitely (the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative).

DOE initially preferred the DARHT Baseline Alternative. However,

after examining the environmental impacts identified in the DARHT EIS,

and the public and agency comments on the draft DARHT EIS, DOE

recognized that achieving an enhanced level of containment provides an

opportunity to increase the quality of DOE's environmental stewardship

by decreasing contamination from expended test materials (the Enhanced

Containment Alternative). Therefore DOE has decided against

implementing the DARHT Baseline Alternative by itself, even though

providing an enhanced level of containment is more expensive. From a

programmatic standpoint, the immediate use of vessel or building

containment could have serious design or operating limitations. Phasing

a program of vessel containment over ten years would allow DOE to take

advantage of the environmental mitigation effect of enhanced vessel

containment while still allowing the DARHT facility to be completed

relatively quickly to meet national security needs as soon as possible.

Under the Building Containment Option, the concrete containment

structure would have to be very large in comparison to the firing site

to contain the overpressure from an explosive test; DOE would forego

the capability for experiments or tests using large amounts of high

explosives or other specific types of large-scale tests because of the

structural limitations of the building. Also, this option would place

serious constraints on DOE's ability to conduct dynamic experiments

with plutonium because of the difficulty in moving the large, double-

walled steel containment vessels needed for plutonium experiments in

and out of the containment building.

The DARHT EIS analysis of the Vessel Containment Option assumed

that the DARHT facility would operate from the outset with most tests

and experiments conducted inside modular single-walled steel

containment vessels. If this limitation were imposed, the number of

tests that could be conducted early in the operating life of the

facility would be significantly reduced. Although some conceptual work

has been done, DOE has not yet designed the modular vessels. DOE would

have to perfect a prototype vessel before fabricating all the vessels

needed. The use of modular vessels depends on construction and

operation of the Vessel Cleanout Facility; the design for this building

could not be finalized until after the prototype vessels were perfected

in order to determine the specific details of cleanout equipment and

techniques. DOE estimates that it would take approximately 10 years

beyond the available date of the DARHT facility to complete these

activities and be able to conduct a full schedule of contained tests.

DOE finds that a delay of five or ten years to implement the modular

vessel containment system before operating the DARHT facility would be

unacceptable and would not meet the Department's need to obtain the use

of DARHT's capability as soon as possible.

By phasing the implementation of the vessel prototyping program,

within about 10 years DOE could achieve the same environmental

protection results as could be obtained under the Vessel Containment

Option without delaying or adversely affecting its ability to operate

DARHT. Therefore, DOE developed the Phased Containment Option. Under

this option, for the first 10 years environmental mitigation would be

greater than would occur under the DARHT Baseline Alternative but less

than would occur under the Vessel Containment Option; after that point,

environmental mitigation would be the same for the Phased Containment

Option and the Vessel Containment Option. Accordingly, DOE has decided

to implement the Phased Containment Option rather than delay operation

of DARHT, as would have been the case under the Vessel Containment

Option.

For some tests, DOE cannot meet programmatic objectives if vessel

containment is used. Therefore, on a case-by case basis, DOE may opt to

conduct certain types of non-plutonium tests as uncontained, such as

those using a very large explosive charge (larger than the containment

vessel rating); those requiring complex diagnostics (such as certain

optics or laser tests) that cannot be achieved using a containment

vessel; those requiring measurement of material movement beyond the

confines of the vessel; or those using a very small

[[Page 53596]]

explosives charge or small amounts of hazardous materials in which use

of the vessel would not be practical, cost-effective, or

environmentally significant. After the phased containment program is

fully implemented, DOE expects to reduce by at least 75% the emissions

from test assemblies made from beryllium, depleted uranium, or Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act characteristic metals. For any experiment

that is contained, DOE expects that at least 99% by mass of these

materials would be retained inside the vessel.

Mitigation Measures

Through the environmental impact analysis process, and in

conjunction with consultations with affected American Indian tribes and

with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, DOE developed several

mitigation measures to protect soils, water, wildlife, biotic, and

cultural resources. Some mitigation measures would apply during

construction activities, and some for the duration of the project. DOE

has agreed to an ongoing consultation process with affected American

Indian tribes to ensure protection of cultural resources and sites of

cultural, historic or religious importance to the tribes. DOE will take

special precautions to protect the Mexican spotted owl, a federally-

listed threatened species, and in consultation with the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service, will prepare a laboratory-wide habitat management

plan for all threatened and endangered species occurring throughout

LANL in order to determine long-range mitigation actions to protect the

habitats for these species. The habitat management plan will be

completed within 3 years from the date of this decision, and will be

updated as necessary. DOE will implement the mitigation measures

discussed in section 5.11 of volume 1 of the DARHT EIS. In accordance

with 10 CFR 1021.331, DOE is preparing a Mitigation Action Plan that

will identify specific actions needed to implement these mitigation

measures, and provide schedules for completion. These mitigation

measures represent all practicable means to avoid or minimize harm from

the alternative selected.

Conclusion

In accordance with the provisions of NEPA, its implementing

regulations, and DOE's NEPA regulations, and consistent with the U.S.

District Court Order of May 5, 1995, I have considered the information

contained within the final DARHT EIS, including the classified

supplement to that EIS, and the public comments received in response to

the draft DARHT EIS. Being fully apprised of the environmental

consequences of the proposal and its several alternatives, as well as

the cost considerations and other decision factors described above, I

have concluded the following:

--Completing and operating the DARHT facility at LANL would meet the

need of the Department and this nation to obtain as soon as possible an

enhanced capability to perform high-resolution, multiple-image

radiography to diagnose hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments.

--Conducting most tests and experiments inside modular steel

containment vessels will reduce the potential for contamination from

dispersal of materials from the explosive-driven tests.

--Phasing in the implementation of the modular vessel system over a

ten-year period will allow DOE to gain the benefit of operating the

DARHT facility as quickly as possible.

--The incrementally higher impacts during the phase-in period do not

pose an unacceptable risk to public health and welfare, or to the

environment.

I have therefore determined that DOE will implement the Phased

Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, identified

as the preferred alternative in the DARHT EIS. As part of this action,

DOE will take additional mitigation measures, specified herein,

including those to protect the habitat of threatened or endangered

species, and to protect cultural resource sites and other locations of

interest to affected American Indian tribes. These actions will allow

DOE to meet its responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of

the nuclear weapons stockpile, while meeting its additional

responsibility for environmental stewardship of the lands and resources

entrusted to its care.

Issued at Washington, D.C. October 10, 1995.

Victor H. Reis,

Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.

[FR Doc. 95-25596 Filed 10-13-95; 8:45 am]

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