Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts From the United Kingdom

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

[A-412-602]

Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative

Review: Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts From the United Kingdom

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

EFFECTIVE DATE: October 5, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian C. Smith or John Beck, Office of

Antidumping Investigations, Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202)

482-1766 or (202) 482-3464, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Case History

On May 4, 1995, the Department published in the Federal Register

the preliminary results of its 1992-93 administrative review of the

antidumping duty order on certain forged steel crankshafts

(crankshafts) from the United Kingdom (60 FR 22045). The review covers

one manufacturer/exporter. The review period is September 1, 1992,

through August 31, 1993. On June 5, and 12, 1995, both parties

submitted their case and rebuttal briefs, respectively. There was no

request for a hearing. On July 26, 1995, the Department requested

comments from both parties regarding the issue of the 20 percent weight

criterion it intended to use in making its product comparisons. On

August 9, 1995, both parties submitted their comments. On August 22,

1995, both parties submitted rebuttal comments. The Department has now

conducted this review in accordance with section 751 of the Tariff Act

of 1930, as amended (the Tariff Act). The final margin for United

Engineering & Forging (UEF) is listed below in the section ``Final

Results of Review.''

Applicable Statute and Regulations

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Statute and to the

Department's regulations are in reference to the provisions as they

existed on December 31, 1994.

Scope of the Review

The products covered in this review are certain forged steel

crankshafts. The term ``crankshafts,'' as used in this review, includes

forged carbon or alloy steel crankshafts with a shipping weight between

40 and 750 pounds, whether machined or unmachined. The products are

currently classifiable under items 8483.10.10.10, 8483.10.10.30,

8483.10.30.10, and 8483.10.30.50 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of

the United States (HTSUS). Neither cast crankshafts nor forged

crankshafts with shipping weights of less than 40 pounds or more than

750 pounds are subject to this review. Although the HTSUS subheadings

are provided for convenience and Customs purposes, our

[[Page 52151]]

written description of the scope of this proceeding is dispositive.

Such or Similar Merchandise

In determining similar merchandise comparisons, we considered the

following physical characteristics, which appear in order of

importance: (1) Twisted vs. untwisted; (2) number of throws; (3)

forging method; (4) engine type; (5) number of bearings; (6) number of

flanges; and (7) number of counterweights. We applied weight separately

based on a range of plus or minus 20 percent of the weight of the U.S.

model. We applied weight as we did to ensure that we would consider all

of the matching criteria in making our product comparisons (see Comment

1 in the ``Interested Party Comments Section'' of this notice). We did

not consider cost as a matching criterion (see Comment 2).

Fair Value Comparisons

To determine whether UEF's sales of crankshafts from the United

Kingdom to the United States were made at less than fair value, we

compared United States price (USP) to foreign market value (FMV), as

specified in the ``United States Price'' and ``Foreign Market Value''

sections of this notice.

United States Price

We calculated USP according to the methodology described in our

preliminary results.

Foreign Market Value

As stated in the preliminary results, we found that the home market

was viable for sales of crankshafts and based FMV on home market sales.

We calculated FMV according to the methodology described in our

preliminary results.

For four U.S. products, we found no home market product comparisons

after applying the model matching methodology, the contemporaneity

test, and the difference-in-merchandise (difmer) test. For the four

products, we based FMV on CV. We calculated CV based on the sum of the

respondent's submitted cost of materials, fabrication, general and

administrative (G&A) expenses, U.S. packing and profit.

We reduced G&A expenses for certain plant redundancy expenses

because such expenses were already included in the cost of manufacture

(COM) (see Comment 6 for a further discussion).

In accordance with section 773(e)(1)(B) (i) and (ii) of the Act, we

included the actual general expenses, which exceeded the statutory

minimum of ten percent of the COM. We used the statutory minimum

profit, which is eight percent of the sum of COM and general expenses,

because the actual profit amount was less than the statutory minimum

(see Comment 7 for a further discussion).

Currency Conversion

We made currency conversions in accordance with 19 CFR 353.60(a).

All currency conversions were made at the rates certified by the

Federal Reserve Bank.

Interested Party Comments

Comment 1: Application of the Weight Criterion

The petitioner contends that when matching sales of U.S. to home

market merchandise, the Department has always applied the weight

criterion in its matching hierarchy only to avoid comparisons of models

of greatly disparate weight. Moreover, the petitioner contends that the

Department's application of the weight criterion in the preliminary

results was flawed because the Department's methodology did not

consider all matching criteria. Therefore, the petitioner supports the

use of a 20 percent weight range in the matching hierarchy.

The respondent argues that the Department should not apply the

weight criterion only to avoid comparisons of greatly disparate weight

and should keep using the method from the preliminary results. The

respondent argues that use of a 20 percent weight range would be

arbitrary, too narrow, and would treat differences in weight

erratically. The respondent further argues that if the Department must

change the application of the weight criterion from the method used in

the preliminary results, it should use weight differences only to

``break ties'' between models that are equally similar in terms of

primary characteristics.

DOC Position

We agree, in part, with the petitioner. In past reviews, we applied

the weight criterion to avoid comparisons of models that were ``greatly

disparate'' in weight. See Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Review: Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from the United

Kingdom (56 FR 5975, 5979, Feb. 14, 1991)(Second Review). We did not,

however, define the term ``greatly disparate'' in those reviews. In the

final results of this review, we sought to increase the predictability

of our matching hierarchy by clarifying what we consider ``greatly

disparate.''

In the preliminary results, we considered weight as the third

matching criterion and applied the criterion by selecting the home

market model that was closest in weight to the U.S. model. This was

consistent with the matching methodology outlined in a February 1993

memorandum prepared during the third review, and in furtherance of our

efforts to increase the predictability of our matching hierarchy.

However, we then discovered two flaws in our methodology for applying

the weight criterion, which compelled us to seek an alternative

methodology to that used in the preliminary results.

First, we realized that in the preliminary results, by applying

weight as the third criterion of a descending hierarchy and selecting

the home market model that was closest in weight to the U.S. model, our

methodology effectively nullified the remaining matching criteria

(i.e., forging method, engine type, bearings, flanges and

counterweights). This problem would be avoided only in the rare

instance where two or more home market models were identical in weight.

Thus, our methodology in the preliminary results frustrated the proper

operation of our matching hierarchy.

Second, we realized that simply choosing the home market model that

was closest in weight to the U.S. model did not prevent us from

comparing models that were greatly disparate in weight, because the

methodology failed to address situations where all home market models

were greatly disparate in weight compared to the U.S. model. In such

cases, one home market model could be ``closest'' in weight to the U.S.

model, but still greatly disparate. This would violate our established

practice of not comparing models that are greatly disparate in weight.

See Second Review (56 FR 5979). The 20 percent difmer test would not

necessarily prevent such comparisons because, in past crankshafts

reviews, we have found that the relatively high material costs of

heavier crankshafts may be offset by the relatively high cost of

producing the other physical differences in lighter crankshafts.

As a result, two products could appear on paper (i.e., according to

the difmer test) to be more similar than they actually were. Id.

Due to these problems, on July 26, 1995, we indicated to both

interested parties that we were considering applying the weight

criterion as a 20 percent weight range rather than by choosing the home

market model that was closest in weight to the U.S. model. Under our

proposed methodology, the weight of a home market model would have to

be within 20 percent of the weight of the U.S. model to be

[[Page 52152]]

considered ``similar'' for purposes of the weight criterion. We also

invited the interested parties to suggest an alternative methodology

and explain why their proposed methodology would be more reasonable

than our proposed 20 percent weight range.

We proposed the 20 percent weight range for two reasons. First, we

wanted to define the phrase ``greatly disparate,'' and the only way to

do so with any kind of predictability was to assign a specific value to

the term. Second, we used a 20 percent range rather than any other

percentage range because the Department uses a 20 percent range in

similar circumstances when applying its difmer test. As discussed

above, the function of the weight criterion in these reviews is similar

to that of the difmer test, and ensures that we do not make

unreasonable comparisons.

We disagree with the respondent's claim that the Department's 20

percent weight range treats differences in weight erratically. By

applying the weight criterion as a range, we are simply setting an

outside parameter for acceptable weight differences. Within that range,

the Department applied the remaining criteria to find the most similar

matches. If there was more than one potential home market match after

applying the remaining criteria, the Department chose the home market

model that was closest in weight to the U.S. model. Applying weight as

a specific percentage range, and then choosing the model that is

closest in weight if there is more than one potential match after

applying the remaining criteria, makes the criterion's operation

predictable, not erratic.

The Department would be treating differences in weight erratically

if it were to apply the weight criterion only to choose the home market

model that is ``closest'' in weight to the U.S. model, because in some

cases the potential home market comparisons may be very close in weight

to the U.S. model, and in other cases the potential home market

comparisons may all be far from the weight of the U.S. model. Simply

choosing the home market model that is ``closest'' in weight, without

also setting an outside limit for acceptable weight differences, would

thus treat differences in weight differently in analogous

circumstances. The respondent's proposed solution of making weight the

fifth criterion or using it only to ``break ties'' would not avoid this

problem. Moreover, each of the respondent's proposed alternative

methodologies would, like the Department's preliminary methodology,

effectively nullify any remaining matching criteria.

We also disagree with the respondent's contention that a 20 percent

range is too narrow. As discussed above, we solicited comments from the

parties on our proposed methodology. If the respondent believed that a

20 percent range was too narrow, it had an opportunity to suggest a

broader range and explain why that broader range would have been more

appropriate than the Department's proposal. While the respondent

suggests the range should have been ``much'' broader than 20 percent,

it declined our invitation to quantify what that range should be.

Moreover, after asserting that the range should have been much

broader than 20 percent, the respondent then asserted that any

percentage ``cutoff'' would be inappropriate. While the respondent

seems to believe that there is no point at which the differences in

weight between the home market and U.S. models would be so great as to

make comparisons ipso facto unreasonable, we disagree. If the

Department were to accept the respondent's argument, we would be

required to make ad hoc determinations of what constitutes a ``great

disparity'' in weight each time we made a comparison. This would

frustrate our intent to ensure greater predictability in our

application of the weight criterion.

We also disagree with the respondent's argument that the Department

has previously determined that a range approach would be inappropriate

for comparing crankshafts. In the original investigation, we simply

declined to group crankshafts according to size because crankshafts are

not sold in specific sizes. Our methodology in this review does not

create ``groups'' of U.S. and home market models; it merely establishes

boundaries for comparing individual U.S. models to all potential home

market comparisons.

Finally, we disagree with the respondent's assertion that our

methodology is inconsistent with the Act and our prior determinations.

First, the respondent claims that there are no compelling reasons to

change our methodology from the preliminary determination, because

there were no ``unreasonable'' matches in this review. As noted above,

however, the methodology we applied in the preliminary results was

flawed in several respects. Thus, the matches may not be those that are

truly most similar when all of the criteria are considered. It would

undermine our attempts to make our matching hierarchy more accurate and

predictable if we were to continue applying that methodology in this

review, only to change the methodology in a future review when the

flaws manifested themselves in unreasonable matches.

Second, the respondent claims there is no evidence that our

preliminary methodology was unpredictable, and that a 20 percent range

will not increase predictability. We disagree. Our preliminary

methodology, while ``predictable,'' was flawed; applying the weight

criterion as a range will increase predictability without invalidating

the remaining matching criteria.

Third, the respondent argues that applying the weight criterion as

a 20 percent range will require the use of CV for certain models.

However, as discussed below in Comment 3, the goal in establishing a

model match methodology is not simply to yield the greatest number of

matches, the goal is to identify matches of ``similar'' products. We

have determined that products are not similar if the difference between

the U.S. and home market weights are more than 20 percent; in such

situations, resort to CV would be appropriate.

Finally, the respondent's argument that our methodology will permit

the use of more than one home market comparison for a single U.S. model

is incorrect. As discussed above, if there were two or more potential

home market matches after applying each of the Department's matching

criteria, we chose the model that was closest in weight to the U.S.

model because that model was, objectively speaking, ``most'' similar to

the U.S. model.

Comment 2: Excluding Certain Models from Use in Matching

The petitioner contends that the Department should have excluded,

as potential matches, all home market crankshaft models that appeared

to have been sold at prices below their COP. The petitioner argues that

the Department has the information necessary for initiating a COP

investigation in accordance with section 773(b) of the Act and should

have done so. Furthermore, the petitioner argues that if the Department

is applying the 90/60 rule and difmer test in order to limit the pool

of possible home market comparisons, then the Department should also

take into account whether models are sold at or above their costs of

production.

The respondent contends that the Department should not disregard

any sales of home market models when selecting its matches because no

authority cited by the petitioner supports disregarding them in this

case. The respondent maintains that: 1) the

[[Page 52153]]

petitioner never requested a COP investigation as set out in section

773(b) of the Act; and 2) the use of COP as a matching criterion is

contrary to both the Department's practice and section 773(b) of the

Act.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. We have rejected the petitioner's

argument for initiating a COP investigation for the reasons stated

below.

According to 19 CFR 353.31(c)(ii), in an administrative review, the

Department will not consider any allegation of sales below the COP that

is submitted by the petitioner more than 120 days after the date of

publication of the notice of initiation of the review, unless a

relevant response is considered untimely or incomplete. If the response

is received more than 120 days after initiation, however, the

Department may use its discretion in determining what constitutes a

reasonable amount of time for the petitioner to make a sales below cost

allegation.

In this case, on June 9, 1994, the petitioner submitted a letter

expressing its concern that specific home market models appeared to be

sold at below COP. We spoke with the petitioner's counsel on June 14,

1994, and asked whether the letter was a sales below cost allegation

(see June 15, 1994, memorandum from Brian Smith to the file). Rather

than answer the question, the petitioner's counsel simply urged the

Department to consider cost when making its LTFV comparisons. The

petitioner made a submission on that same day which stated, among other

things, that it was not making a ``typical'' allegation of sales below

cost. Because the petitioner said it was not making a typical

allegation of sales below cost, the Department did not investigate

whether initiation of such an inquiry would have been appropriate. We

disagree with the petitioner's suggestion that the June 9, 1994, letter

``could have been'' considered a sales below cost allegation.

Even if the March 9, 1994 letter could have been considered an

allegation of sales below cost, the letter did not contain sufficient

information to support initiation of a COP inquiry. For example, the

petitioner made no attempt to provide fixed cost information for the

two specific models it mentioned in its letter. Rather, the petitioner

merely claimed there was ``reason to question'' whether sales of these

two models were made above the COP.

Moreover, if the petitioner's case brief was intended to represent

such an allegation, the allegation was untimely, and could not serve as

the basis for initiating a sales below cost investigation. In the Final

Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfur Dyes, Including

Sulfur Vat Dyes, From the United Kingdom, 58 FR 3253, 3255-56 (Comment

2)(Jan. 8, 1993), the petitioner had access to the raw data necessary

to support a sales below cost allegation, but chose not to make an

allegation until it filed its case brief. The Department noted that the

petitioner could have filed an allegation after receiving the

respondent's supplemental response, and that the allegation would not

necessarily have been considered untimely. Because the petitioner

waited to make the allegation until it filed its case brief, the

Department found the allegation to be untimely.

We disagree with the petitioner's argument that the Department

should have self-initiated a COP inquiry based on the June 9, 1994

letter. As the CIT has stated,

[G]iven the burdens placed on ITA by the statute it is not

reasonable to expect ITA in every case to pursue all investigative

avenues, even such important areas as less than cost of production

sales, without some direction by petitioners. It should be

remembered that cost of production need not be investigated in every

case, but only where reasonable grounds are present. Part of whether

ITA has ``reasonable grounds to believe or suspect'' that a less

than cost of production analysis is needed is whether it has been

requested.

Floral Trade Council v. United States, 704 F. Supp. 233, 236 (CIT

1988). In this case, the petitioner did not request a sales below cost

investigation; in fact, it affirmatively stated that its June 9, 1994

letter was not a typical allegation. The CIT has stated that the

Department ``may be relieved of its duty to utilize certain information

potentially favorable to a party, if that party has acted in a manner

which directs the investigation in another direction.'' Floral Trade

Council of Davis v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 925, 926 (CIT 1988).

Finally, we disagree with the petitioner's argument that the

Department should have considered cost as a factor in choosing between

various home market models in making its FMV calculations, because cost

is not a criterion for determining what is most similar merchandise

under the statute. See, e.g., Final Determination of Sales at Less Than

Fair Value: Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Canada, 59 FR

Reg. 18791, 18793 (Apr. 20, 1994); Policy Bulletin 92/4, The Use of

Constructed Value in COP Cases 3-4 (Dec. 15, 1992).

Comment 3: Improper Use of CV

The petitioner contends that the Department improperly used CV

because it placed undue importance on the twisted/untwisted criterion.

The petitioner argues that in the second administrative review, the

Department indicated that all crankshafts were one ``such or similar''

category and that crankshafts would be compared if reasonable

adjustments could be made for physical differences in merchandise. In

this case, the petitioner argues that the Department resorted to CV

even though there were untwisted home market models (which passed the

difmer test) which the Department could have matched to the U.S.

twisted model. The petitioner argues that the Department's resort to CV

in this case is inconsistent with its clear preference for price-to-

price comparisons found in its own regulations.

The respondent maintains that comparing twisted to untwisted

crankshaft models is contrary to the law of this case. The respondent

points out that in the second administrative review of crankshafts, the

Department declined to match twisted and untwisted models and used CV

as the basis for FMV because it could not adjust for the difference

between twisted and untwisted crankshafts.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. We have not compared twisted with

untwisted cranshafts and vice-versa because we cannot adjust for

physical differences between twisted and untwisted crankshafts. In the

original LTFV investigation, we examined the issue of whether a twisted

crankshaft was sufficiently similar to a non-twisted crankshaft to

allow comparison. See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair

Value: Certain Forged Steel Crankshafts from the United Kingdom, (52 FR

32951, 32952, 32954, September 1, 1987). In the Second Review, we

revisited the issue. We determined in both cases that it was

inappropriate to compare twisted with untwisted crankshafts.

Furthermore, we concluded in the second review that we could not adjust

for the physical differences between twisted and untwisted crankshafts.

We disagree with the petitioner's argument that the Department was

unjustified, because of the statutory preference for price-to-price

comparisons, in resorting to CV rather than match a twisted to an

untwisted crankshaft. Section 773(a)(2) of the Act specifically

provides that when neither identical merchandise nor similar

[[Page 52154]]

merchandise is available for comparison, the Department may resort to

CV as FMV. The goal in establishing a model match methodology is not

simply to set up a method that yields the greatest number of matches

between U.S. and home market models; the goal, rather, is to set up a

method that identifies matches of reasonably ``similar'' merchandise.

The statute clearly permits the use of CV where the Department

determines that there are no models in the two markets that constitute

``similar'' merchandise. Because the Department has determined that it

would be inappropriate to compare a twisted crankshaft to an untwisted

crankshaft, resorting to CV is justified.

Comment 4: Use of the CV Data

The petitioner argues that the Department cannot rely on certain

COM data for two die numbers because the reported data is flawed. The

petitioner argues that the Department should have sent a supplemental

CV questionnaire for the two die numbers and then verified that data if

it was to be used.

The respondent maintains that the COM data in question has been

verified by the Department and is reliable.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. Contrary to the petitioner's

allegation, the information necessary to calculate CV for the two die

numbers in question was contained in the respondent's questionnaire

response. We verified this information and have used it for purposes of

the final results.

Comment 5: Treatment of the Difmer

The respondent contends that the Department should revise its

calculation of the dumping margin by subtracting the difmer adjustment

from FMV, rather than adding the difmer to the FMV. The respondent

maintains that all of the home market products are more costly to

produce than the U.S. products. Therefore, the respondent alleges that

the Department should have subtracted the difmer from FMV instead of

adding it to FMV. The respondent cites to the Import Administration

Antidumping Manual, chapter 9, pages 21-22, (Antidumping Manual) in

support of its argument.

The petitioner maintains that the Antidumping Manual states that

the Department is to add difmer adjustments to FMV and this is what the

Department has done in this case. Therefore, the petitioner maintains

that the Department properly added the difmer adjustment to FMV in the

SAS computer program.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. We have changed the SAS instructions

in our computer program such that we now subtract the difmer from FMV.

We have made this change because it is the Department's practice to

decrease FMV by the difmer if the home market materials, labor and

overhead costs are greater than the U.S. materials, labor and overhead

costs. In the preliminary results, we incorrectly added the difmer

amount to FMV in the SAS computer program.

Comment 6: Redundancy Expenses

The respondent alleges that the Department erroneously included

certain plant redundancy expenses in its G&A calculation because these

costs were already reported in its submitted cost of manufacturing.

The petitioner contends that all redundancy expenses should be

included in calculating G&A expenses rather than UEF's submitted COM.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. We find that the respondent included

certain plant redundancy expenses in its submitted COM (see pages 12-13

of the June 20, 1994, submission and cost verification exhibit 1).

Therefore, we have reduced the G&A expense by the amount of plant

redundancy expenses.

Comment 7: Profit

The respondent asserts that the Department miscalculated profit by

excluding fixed overhead costs. According to the respondent, its home

market profit with the adjustment for fixed overhead costs was less

than the statutory minimum of eight percent. Therefore, the respondent

maintains that the Department should apply the statutory minimum profit

of eight percent.

The petitioner contends that the respondent's fixed overhead cost

calculation and revised profit argument is untimely and unsupported.

Thus, the petitioner maintains that the Department should not revise

the respondent's profit in the final results.

DOC Position

We agree with the respondent. We have now applied the statutory

minimum profit. Contrary to petitioner's claim, we find that the

respondent demonstrated that its average home market profit was less

than the statutory minimum of eight percent and that the argument for

revising the profit calculation is not untimely (see August 18, 1994,

Constructed Value Verification Report, p. 11 and the respondent's case

brief).

Final Results of Review

As a result of the comments received, we have revised our

preliminary results and determine that the following margin exists:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Margin

Manufacturer/exporter Review period (percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

UEF...................................... 9/01/92-8/31/93 0.02

------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department shall determine, and the Customs Service shall

assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. Individual

differences between USP and FMV may vary from the percentage stated

above. The Department will issue appraisement instructions directly to

the Customs Service.

Furthermore, the following deposit requirement will be effective

for all shipments of crankshafts from the United Kingdom entered, or

withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the publication

date of the final results of this administrative review, as provided by

section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff Act: (1) The cash deposit rate for UEF

will be zero because the rate is less than 0.50 percent and, therefore,

de minimis; (2) for previously reviewed or investigated companies not

listed above, the cash deposit rate will continue to be the company-

specific rate published for the most recent period; (3) if the exporter

is not a firm covered in this review, a prior review, or the original

LTFV investigation, but the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will

be the rate established for the most recent period for the manufacturer

of the merchandise; and (4) the cash deposit rate for all other

manufacturers or exporters will be 6.55 percent, which is the amended

``all others'' rate from the LTFV investigation. It is not 14.67

percent, as was erroneously published in the preliminary results.

These cash deposit requirements, when imposed, shall remain in

effect until publication of the final results of the next

administrative review.

This notice serves as a final reminder to importers of their

responsibility under 19 CFR 353.26 to file a certificate regarding the

reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation of the

relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply with this

requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that

reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent

assessment of double antidumping duties.

[[Page 52155]]

This notice also serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (APO) in this investigation of their

responsibility covering the return or destruction of proprietary

information disclosed under APO in accordance with 19 CFR 353.34(d).

Failure to comply is a violation of the APO.

This administrative review and notice are in accordance with

section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 CFR

353.22.

Dated: September 29, 1995.

Susan G. Esserman,

Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 95-24806 Filed 10-4-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P