Section 4(c) Contract Market Transactions

Federal RegisterOct 2, 1995

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 36

Section 4(c) Contract Market Transactions

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final rules.

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SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 4(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act, the

Commission is promulgating final rules to exempt certain contract

market transactions from specified requirements of the Commodity

Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (``CEA'' or ``Act''), and Commission

regulations thereunder. The Commission proposed these rules after

considering the public comments on petitions for exemptive relief

submitted by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (``CME'') and by the Board

of Trade of the City of Chicago (``CBT'').

Based upon its consideration of the comments received in response

to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and upon its independent

analysis, the Commission is promulgating final rules establishing a

three-year pilot program to permit certain transactions to trade on

section 4(c) contract markets exempt from specified requirements of the

Act and Commission rules. The Commission believes that permitting, on a

pilot basis, the trading of this new class of contract market

transaction, which can be offered only to specified categories of

individuals or entities, is in the public interest.

The final rules will permit these exchange-traded products greater

flexibility in competing with foreign exchange-traded products and with

both foreign and domestic over-the-counter transactions, while

maintaining basic customer protection, financial integrity and other

protections associated with trading in an exchange environment. In

particular, new Part 36 permits greater flexibility with respect to

trading rules (section 36.3); listing of transactions (section 36.4);

reporting requirements

[[Page 51324]]

(section 36.5); registration requirements (section 36.36) and risk

disclosure (section 36.7). It also reserves the anti-manipulation

prohibitions in the Act and Commission Rule 33.9 and provides for anti-

fraud prohibitions in addition to those otherwise applicable to section

4(c) contract market transactions under the Act and Commission Rule

33.10.

Finally, although the Commission requested comment relating to the

advisability of making certain conforming changes to its Part 35

Exemption of Swap Agreements, the Commission has determined to make no

changes herein to Part 35.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 1, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul M. Architzel, Chief Counsel,

Division of Economic Analysis; Alan L. Seifert, Deputy Director, or

Lawrence B. Patent, Associate Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and

Markets; or Ellyn S. Roth, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel;

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581, (202) 418-5260, 418-5450, and

418-5120, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Statutory Background

The Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, P.L. No. 102-546

(October 28, 1992) (``1992 Act''), added new subsections (c) and (d) to

section 4 of the Act. These new provisions authorize the Commission, by

rule, regulation, or order, to exempt any agreement, contract or

transaction, or class thereof, when entered into between ``appropriate

persons'' from the exchange-trading, or any other, requirement of the

Act other than section 2(a)(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. 2.1 Before granting

such an exemption, the Commission must determine that its action would

be consistent with the public interest and would not have a material

adverse effect on the ability of the Commission to discharge its

regulatory responsibilities or of any contract market to discharge its

self-regulatory responsibilities under the Act.2

\1\ Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Act grants the Commission

exclusive jurisdiction over ``accounts, agreements (including any

transaction which is of the character of * * * an `option' * * * ),

and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for

future delivery traded or executed on a contract market * * * or any

other board of trade, exchange, or market. * * * '' 7 U.S.C. 2. The

CEA and Commission regulations require that transactions in

commodity futures contracts and commodity option contracts, with

narrowly defined exceptions, occur on or subject to the rules of

contract markets designated by the Commission.

Specifically, Section 4(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 6(c)(1), provides:

In order to promote responsible economic or financial innovation

and fair competition, the Commission by rule, regulation, or order,

after notice and opportunity for hearing, may (on its own initiative

or on application of any person, including any board of trade

designated as a contract market for transactions for future delivery

in any commodity under section 5 of this Act) exempt any agreement,

contract, or transaction (or class thereof) that is otherwise

subject to subsection (a) (including any person or class of persons

offering, entering into, rendering advice or rendering other

services with respect to, the agreement, contract, or transaction),

either unconditionally or on stated terms or conditions or for

stated periods and either retroactively or prospectively, or both,

from any of the requirements of subsection (a), or from any other

provision of this Act (except Section 2(a)(1)(B)), if the Commission

determines that the exemption would be consistent with the public

interest.

\2\ Specifically, Section 4(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. 6(c)(2), states:

The Commission shall not grant any exemption under paragraph (1)

from any of the requirements of subsection (a) unless the Commission

determines that--

(A) The requirement should not be applied to the agreement,

contract, or transaction for which the exemption is sought and that

the exemption would be consistent with the public interest and the

purposes of this Act; and

(B) the agreement, contract, or transaction--

(i) will be entered into solely between appropriate persons; and

(ii) will not have a material adverse effect on the ability of

the Commission or any contract market to discharge its regulatory or

self-regulatory duties under this Act.

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II. The Petitions for Exemptive Relief

On August 16, 1993, the Commission published in the Federal

Register notice of, and a request for comment on, petitions for

exemption under section 4(c) of the Act submitted by the CME and the

CBT.3 As detailed in that Federal Register notice, the CME sought

an exemption from most of the provisions of the Act and Commission

regulations with regard to the purchase and sale of its Rolling

SpotTM futures and options contracts. The CBT's petition,

submitted on June 30, 1993 (``section 4(c) petition''), and

subsequently joined by the New York Mercantile Exchange

(``NYMEX''),4 requested that the Commission establish a

``professional trading market exemption'' from most of the provisions

of the Act and regulations for trading in any instrument of the CBT and

other boards of trade, including those designated previously as

contract markets by the Commission. Under both petitions, trading in

exempted instruments would have been limited to certain participants,

and trades would have been cleared through an exchange clearing system

approved by the Commission.

\3\ 58 FR 43414 (Aug. 16, 1993); 58 FR 44402 (Aug. 20, 1993)

(correction); 58 FR 52948 (Oct. 13, 1993) (extension of comment

period to Dec. 15, 1993).

\4\ By letter dated September 20, 1994, subsequent to the close

of the comment period, the NYMEX joined in the CBT's petition.

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The substance of the comments on the petitions is discussed in the

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 FR 54139 at 54140-54141 (Oct. 28,

1994). The CBT, as part of its comments responding to the Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, offered several amendments to its section 4(c)

petition. Of these, the most notable would limit the transactions

eligible for exemptive relief to ``swap agreements'' as defined by

Commission Rule 35.1(b).5

\5\ See Comment letter of the Board of Trade of the City of

Chicago, dated December 13, 1994.

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III. The Proposed Rules

In light of the comments received on the exchange petitions, and

based on its own analysis, the Commission proposed a new Part 36 of its

rules.6 The proposed rules would establish a pilot program to

provide more streamlined procedures for listing new exchange-traded

products and greater flexibility in the trading procedures for those

products, the offer and sale of which would be limited to specified

categories of individuals or entities. In addition, the proposed rules

would provide greater flexibility to qualified market users in certain

areas, particularly relating to registration and account opening

procedures.

\6\ 59 FR 54139 (Oct. 28, 1994); 59 FR 64359 (Dec. 14, 1994)

(extension of comment period to January 31, 1995).

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A. Duration and Scope of Exemption

The Commission proposed to implement these rules under the

framework of a three-year pilot program, providing the exchanges and

the Commission an opportunity to test whether actual trading under the

proposed rules, in fact, was, and remained, in the public interest, and

to determine the effect of such trading on the integrity of the

marketplace as a whole. The Commission specifically requested comment

on the concept and feasibility of such a pilot program. Given the pilot

nature of this program, the Commission also proposed that the exemption

could be revoked at any time, following notice and an opportunity for

hearing, upon a determination that the continued operation of the

exemption was no longer consistent with the public interest.

With regard to the scope of the exemption, proposed section 36.1(b)

provided that boards of trade listing section 4(c) contract market

transactions for trading would be deemed to be ``contract markets''

which must comply with all provisions of the Act and

[[Page 51325]]

Commission regulations, except for those provisions which are

``specifically inconsistent'' with the proposed rules. Transactions in

these instruments were proposed to be limited to ``eligible

participants,'' the definition of which was based upon the list of

``appropriate persons'' set forth in section 4(c)(3) (A) through (J) of

the Act, with certain revisions tailored to this particular market and

reflecting the Commission's experience in applying similar concepts in

the context of other exemptions. In this regard, the Commission asked

commenters to address the issue of whether certain of the proposed

revisions should be applied to the Commission's previously-granted

exemption under Part 35,7as well.

\7\ Part 35 of the Commission's rules exempts swap agreements,

as defined in Section 35.1(b), from,

all provisions of the Act (except * * * Sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4b,

and 4o of the Act and Sec. 32.9 of this chapter * * *, and the

provisions of Sections 6(c) and 9(a)(2) of the Act to the extent

these provisions prohibit manipulation of the market price of any

commodity in interstate commerce or for future delivery on or

subject to the rules of any contract market), provided the following

terms and conditions are met:

(a) the swap agreement is entered into solely between eligible

swap participants * * * ;

(b) the swap agreement is not part of a fungible class of

agreements that are standardized * * * ;

(c) the creditworthiness of any party having an actual or

potential obligation under the swap agreement would be a material

consideration * * * ; and

(d) the swap agreement is not entered into and traded on or

through a multilateral transaction execution facility.

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Proposed section 36.2 limited the potential breadth of the

exemption, specifying that section 4(c) contract market transactions

must be: (1) cash-settled, or that delivery be by ``means other than

the transfer or receipt of any commodity, except a major foreign

currency;'' (2) cleared through a clearing organization subject to

Commission oversight; and, (3) based on commodities other than the

agricultural commodities enumerated in section 1a of the Act, except

for a broad-based index thereof. Proposed section 36.2(a)(4) further

would have limited section 4(c) contract market transactions to those

transactions which could ``reasonably be distinguished'' based upon the

contract's hedging function or pricing function from futures or option

contracts already designated by the Commission at the time of

application to trade a section 4(c) contract market transaction.8

Finally, any transaction subject to section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7

U.S.C. 2, including stock index futures contracts, was proposed to be

excluded from the scope of the exemptive rules.

\8\ As proposed, Section 36.2(a)(4) specifically identified the

following as eligible Section 4(c) contract market transactions:

flexible commodity options (which trade under contract market option

rules, but are not separately designated); contracts in foreign

currency known as Rolling SpotTM Contracts; five- and ten-year

interest rate swaps contracts; and foreign currency forward futures

contracts and options thereon.

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B. Trading Rules and Procedures

Section 36.3 proposed to permit section 4(c) contract markets

greater flexibility in trading procedures and systems and to establish

a streamlined procedure for Commission review of the contract market

rules implementing those procedures. As proposed, section 36.3 would

have permitted significant flexibility for trading procedures and

systems. In particular, by permitting upstairs or other forms of off-

floor execution if certain broad criteria were met, the proposed rule

departed profoundly from current regulatory constraints. The limiting

criteria included: meeting certain Commission recordkeeping and audit

trail requirements; maintaining customer protection standards under

Commission Rules 155.2, 155.3, and 155.4, to the extent applicable;

providing for post-trade transparency of the transactions, including

specified reporting requirements identifying section 4(c) contract

market transactions from non-section 4(c) contract market transactions;

and clearing such transactions on the same schedule as products traded

on non-section 4(c) contract markets. Further, any submission made

under the proposed rule would have been required to describe fully the

contract market procedures and systems to assure compliance with

sections 4b and 4c(a) of the Act, which prohibit the abuse of customer

orders. Such abuses include frontrunning customer orders, misuse of

information, wash sales and fictitious trades. Procedurally, the

Commission proposed that such trading rules be submitted for its review

prior to being put into effect. Absent notification to the contrary,

these rules would become effective ten days after receipt.

C. Listing Procedures

The Commission proposed that section 4(c) contract market

transactions be listed for trading ten days after submission to the

Commission of their terms and conditions, unless the Commission

notified the board of trade in writing during that period that the

transactions did not meet the conditions specified by the rules. In

that event, the terms and conditions of the transaction would be

subject to the usual rule approval procedures under section

5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act.

D. Reporting Requirements

The Commission proposed that, in lieu of its current reporting

requirements under Parts 16-19 of its rules, section 4(c) contract

markets, futures commission merchants (``FCMs''), and large traders

comply with reporting requirements specifically geared toward these

markets. Most notably, in addition to publishing daily information on

total open interest, transactions, and prices for each commodity or

type of contract, the Commission proposed that section 4(c) contract

markets provide open interest and transaction information for each

clearing member similar to that required under current Rule 16.00.

However, although required to be maintained in a manner that is readily

accessible, contract markets would be required to supply information

concerning large traders conducting section 4(c) contract market

transactions only on call by the Commission. The actual frequency of

those reports would be determined based upon market developments.

E. Special Temporary License, Registration or Principal Listing

Procedures; Risk Disclosure Requirements

The Commission also proposed, in section 36.6, to allow special

registration procedures for persons associated with an FCM or

introducing broker (``IB'') whose activities were limited to

instruments specified by the Commission in an Appendix to Part 36.

These special procedures would be established upon the petition of a

contract market and under approved procedures of the National Futures

Association (``NFA''). The Commission noted in the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking that particular areas of flexibility in the registration

process might include the waiver of NFA's fingerprint requirement and

acceptance of alternative proficiency tests. With regard to risk

disclosure, the Commission proposed, when accounts for section 4(c)

contract market transactions were opened, allowing the use of

disclosure statements appropriate to a customer's expertise and

financial capacity and tailored to a particular product. This

disclosure requirement would have replaced the basic risk disclosure

statements generally required when opening accounts. See, e.g.,

Commission Rules 1.55, 1.65, 33.7, and 190.10.

[[Page 51326]]

F. Fraud and Manipulation in Connection With Section 4(c) Contract

Market Transactions

Finally, the Commission proposed that section 4(c) contract market

transactions be subject to the anti-fraud proscriptions of sections

4b(a) and 4o of the Act, those provisions of sections 6(c), 6(d), and

9(a) of the Act that prohibit price manipulation, and Commission Rules

33.9 and 33.10, which prohibit fraudulent conduct and price

manipulation in connection with commodity option transactions. The

Commission also proposed to include in Part 36 a free-standing anti-

fraud rule modeled after Commission Rule 33.10, the anti-fraud rule

applicable to exchange-traded commodity options, and requested comment

on the need for a free-standing anti-manipulation rule. In this regard,

the Commission specifically requested comment on whether such stand-

alone anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules were appropriate and

whether the swaps exemption also should be amended to include similar

rules.

IV. Comments Received

The Commission received 34 comment letters from 29 different

commenters 9 in response to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The

commenters included: four futures exchanges; two clearing

organizations; a securities exchange; seven trade associations; four

federal regulatory agencies; a Commission Administrative Law Judge;

three bar association committees; two industry lawyers; three

investment firms; and two other futures professionals.

\9\ Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (``Morgan Stanley''), the

Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''), and the Futures

Industry Association (``FIA'') each sent two letters, one on Part 36

and one on Part 35; the CBT sent three.

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The comments carefully analyzed the proposed rules and many

responded to the specific questions raised by the Commission. The vast

majority of the commenters favored the general concept of the proposed

rules, although many recommended clarifications, revisions or

modifications to particular provisions. Several industry associations,

a state bar association subcommittee, and others, in supporting the

proposal, opined that introducing these changes through the framework

of a pilot program would be a prudent step toward accommodating and

meeting changes that are occurring in the traditional markets.

In this regard, one commenter noted that this proposal is

consistent with the Commission's sustained efforts to enhance the

competitiveness of the U.S. futures markets. A second commenter noted

favorably that the proposal recognizes that certain sophisticated

market participants, although enjoying the benefits and enhanced safety

of exchange trading, do not necessarily require the full panoply of

protections and regulatory provisions.

Significantly, the NYMEX, a futures exchange which joined in the

original CBT section 4(c) petition, stated its belief that the

structure of the program set forth by the Commission generally strikes

the correct balance for establishing an exempt exchange-style market.

In its view,

[s]everal of the areas from which the Commission declined to

grant exemptive relief are areas that * * * require regulation in

the context of an exchange-traded marketplace, where participants

are brought together in a blind-match system and the clearinghouse

provides the ultimate source of credit and financial backing.

Other commenters, including, in particular, the other futures

exchanges which commented on the proposal, were of the opinion that the

Commission did not go far enough in extending relief under the proposed

rules, particularly in light of the restrictions on market access. The

CME commented, in particular, that the proposed scope of the exemption

was too narrow to allow U.S. futures exchanges to compete effectively

against over-the-counter (``OTC'') markets and foreign futures

exchanges.

One commenter, a commodity trading advisor (``CTA''), urged the

Commission to consider expanding the proposed relief to reduce any

unwarranted regulatory costs that might be imposed on an exchange-style

swaps trading and clearing facility. A futures industry trade

association noted that the proposed Part 36 rules would provide relief

predominately in the relatively narrow context of trading practices,

and recommended that the Commission consider implementing broader

exemptive relief for institutional users of the futures markets.

Finally, certain government regulators commenting on the proposed

rules, although generally urging caution, recognized that a pilot

program was an appropriate framework for proceeding. In particular, the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (``Federal Reserve

Board'' or ``Board'') noted that it supported the Commission's use of

its authority to grant exemptions to classes of products and market

participants for which many of the Act's requirements are unnecessary

or burdensome. The Board further stated, however, that exemptions of

the breadth contemplated by the exchange petitions could have

unintended effects on market integrity, and urged the Commission to

take a cautious approach in applying its exemptive authority to

exchange-traded instruments.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'') also urged

caution, stating that although the SEC would not support every element

of proposed Part 36, a pilot program would offer the Commission an

opportunity to evaluate the entire Part 36 approach in a controlled

environment. The United States Department of Labor (``Department of

Labor'') stressed that, although the Department of Labor believed that

the exemption, as proposed, raises several issues regarding ERISA plan

investment in the exempted transactions, by purchasing contracts

covered by this exemption rather than over-the-counter (OTC) contracts,

plan fiduciaries may secure additional protection for plan assets. The

Pilot program would offer several of the advantages of OTC

transactions, while operating in an exchange-type environment with its

clearinghouse function, transparent pricing, reporting requirements,

daily settlement, heightened liquidity and reduced credit risk.

In general, although opinion was divided between those commenters

who urged caution in proceeding and those who urged the Commission to

provide greater regulatory relief, few, if any, were of the opinion

that the Commission should refrain from according some form of the

proposed relief to markets that limit access to eligible participants.

Based upon the agreement of the commenters that the proposed

exemption's general direction was correct, the Commission is

promulgating final rules adding a new Part 36. These final rules

establish a three-year pilot program to permit limited-access contract

markets which have differing regulatory requirements, tailored to the

nature of the market's participants. However, based upon its careful

consideration of all of the comments received, and particularly in

light of the many comments received raising technical issues or making

specific recommendations regarding various of the proposed rules, the

Commission has determined to make various modifications to the proposed

rules. These specific modifications are highlighted below, along with a

discussion of the corresponding public comment.

[[Page 51327]]

V. Final Rules

A. Duration and Scope of Exemption

1. Pilot Program

A key feature of the Commission's proposal was its implementation

as a three-year pilot program, beginning when the first contract trades

pursuant to these rules. See Proposed section 36.1(a). The Commission

noted that a pilot program would provide an opportunity to test the

operation of the exemption, determine the effect of section 4(c)

contract market transactions on the integrity of the marketplace as a

whole, and determine whether continued trading under the exemption

would be in the public interest. The Commission further noted in the

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that it and other agencies had

successfully used the concept of a pilot program. For example, the

Commission used a pilot program to reintroduce exchange-traded

commodity options.10

\10\ 46 FR 54500 (Nov. 3, 1981).

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Most commenters supported the concept of implementing the Part 36

exemption provisions on a trial basis. Many agreed with the

Commission's reasoning that a pilot program would allow the exchanges

to test the operation of the exemption, while also allowing the

Commission to assess the impact of the exemption on the operation of

the markets as a whole. Some commenters stated that, in light of the

legitimate potential regulatory concerns in exempting exchange-traded

transactions from substantive provisions of the Act, the use of a pilot

program would be an appropriate means of encouraging market innovation

without limiting the Commission's ability to add later limitations or

modifications as needed to maintain market integrity.

While generally endorsing the concept of a pilot program, several

commenters asked the Commission to clarify that ongoing trading

activity would not terminate automatically at the end of the three-year

period and to clarify the effect on outstanding section 4(c) contract

market transactions should it determine to terminate the pilot program.

These commenters noted that section 4(c) contract market transactions

could be listed for maturities of five years or longer. Market

participants, they reasoned, would not be comfortable trading these new

instruments if trading possibly could be suspended or terminated prior

to the instruments' maturity, leaving no opportunity to unwind open

positions. These commenters suggested that the Commission begin its

evaluation during the probationary three-year period to avoid any

potential disruptions in an established market, and, if the program

were not made permanent, provide a mechanism for a smooth transition

into the traditional contract market framework. Finally, one commenter

suggested that the Commission clarify the criteria it plans to use in

evaluating the success of the pilot program.

The Commission continues to believe that the introduction of

section 4(c) contract markets on a pilot basis is appropriate. As the

Commission stated previously, the trial nature of this program reflects

the Commission's belief that the exemption constitutes a significant

departure from the regulatory scheme under which futures and option

contracts have been trading for over 70 years. The pilot program will

enable the Commission to obtain market experience on which to base any

permanent program. A pilot program also will permit the Commission to

make modifications or adjustments consistent with the program's trading

and regulatory experience.

Since section 4(c) contract market transactions might have terms

providing for expiration beyond the end of the three-year pilot

program, the Commission agrees with the commenters' views on the need

for market certainty. Accordingly, the Commission plans to review the

program and whether to make it permanent well before the end of the

three-year pilot period. As part of its review, the Commission intends

to evaluate whether to extend or otherwise alter the exemptive relief

granted herein. The Commission also will consider whether to expand the

exemptive relief provided by these rules to other transactions or

markets. Any Commission decision to terminate the program will be based

on a finding that trading in section 4(c) contract market transactions

has adversely affected the ability of the Commission to discharge its

regulatory responsibilities or the ability of a contract market to

discharge its self-regulatory duties under the Act or that a permanent

program for such transactions would not be consistent with the public

interest and the purposes of the Act. Should the Commission determine

to terminate the program, all previously listed section 4(c) contract

market transactions would be permitted to continue trading until their

expiration; however, no new section 4(c) contract market transactions

with more distant expirations could be listed.

2. Scope of the Exemption

a. Scope of the Relief

The Commission set forth the proposed scope of the exemption with

respect to section 4(c) contract market transactions in proposed

section 36.1(b), stating that each board of trade on which such

transactions are traded would be deemed to be a contract market.11

As such, they would be required to comply with all provisions of the

Act and Commission rules, except for those provisions which are

``specifically inconsistent'' with Part 36.12

\11\ The Commission's proposal did not limit contract markets

eligible to provide a facility for trading in Section 4(c) contract

market transactions to current contract markets. New markets wishing

to offer a facility for such transactions would be required to

comply with those provisions of the Act and Commission rules

governing a board of trade seeking an initial designation as a

contract market. Accordingly, among other things, a prospective

Section 4(c) market must submit all rules relative to matters such

as governance, disciplinary and arbitration proceedings, and

financial requirements under the current provisions of Section

5a(a)(12) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 7a(a)(12). 59 FR 54139, 54143, 54144.

\12\ 59 FR 54139, 54143, 54151.

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The three petitioning exchanges (CBT, CME and NYMEX) commented that

the structure of the proposed exemption created ambiguity with regard

to what was included within its scope. The CBT requested that the

Commission specify all of the statutory and regulatory provisions

superseded by Part 36. In contrast, NYMEX requested that the Commission

specify only those sections of the Act and Commission rules to which

the section 4(c) exemption would be inapplicable. At a minimum, the CBT

suggested that the word ``specifically'' be deleted from the phrase

``specifically inconsistent,'' stating that without that deletion,

market participants might be less able to ascertain what legal

requirements apply.

The Commission has considered carefully these comments and has

determined that the scope of the exemption is generally appropriate, as

proposed. If Part 36 does not specifically exempt section 4(c) contract

market transactions from a statutory or regulatory provision, there is

no exemption from that provision. However, the provisions of Part 36

govern the trading of section 4(c) contract market transactions in the

following specified areas: section 36.3 (trading rules); section 36.4

(listing of transactions); section 36.5 (reporting requirements);

section 36.6 (registration requirements); and section 36.7 (risk

disclosure). Also, section 36.9 provides for anti-fraud and anti-

manipulation prohibitions in addition to those

[[Page 51328]]

applicable to section 4(c) contract market transactions under the Act

and Commission Rules 33.9 and 33.10.13 All other provisions of the

Act and Commission rules, including those related to, among other

things, segregation of customer funds, adjusted net capital (except for

the capital requirements of certain IBs as discussed infra),

supervision, bankruptcy (see discussion infra), exchange emergency

actions, reparations proceedings and private rights of action, will

continue to apply.

\13\ The remainder of Part 36 sets forth the duration of the

exemption (36.1(a)), definitions for purposes of Part 36 (36.1(c)),

mandatory conditions and prohibited transactions (36.2) and a

procedure for suspension or revocation of the exemption (36.8).

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Nevertheless, the Commission, as discussed below, is modifying

section 36.3 to provide greater specificity with respect to the trading

procedures that are permissible under this exemptive relief. Moreover,

in responding to the public comment on the proposed rules, the

Commission has provided guidance on the scope and operation of the

exemption beyond that which was provided in the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking.

b. Definitions

Several commenters held opposing views regarding the nature of the

instruments to be included within the proposed broad definition of

``section 4(c) contract market transaction,'' 14 In adopting Part

36, the Commission is exercising its authority under section 4(c) of

the Act, 7 U.S.C. 6(c), to exempt certain instruments and transactions

from certain provisions of the Act and Commission rules. Accordingly,

the proposed definition of ``section 4(c) contract market transaction''

is included to make clear that an election by a contract market to

trade an instrument on a section 4(c) contract market pursuant to the

Part 36 exemptive system will be deemed to be an election to submit

that instrument to the Act and Commission rules in accordance with this

Part.15

\14\ Proposed Section 36.1(c)(1) defined a ``Section 4(c)

contract market transaction'' as ``[a]ny agreement, contract, or

transaction (or class thereof) entered into on or subject to the

rules of a contract market in accordance with the provisions of this

Part, and that is executed by a member of the Section 4(c) contract

market that is an eligible participant for its own account, or a

futures commission merchant or floor broker for its own account or

on behalf of an eligible participant.''

\15\ Any instrument meeting the criteria of Part 36, except for

those specifically excluded thereunder, could be eligible to trade

under these rules. See H.R. Rep. No. 978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83

(1992).

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In addition, an industry trade association expressed concern that

proposed section 36.1(b) may have created an ambiguity regarding the

treatment of these transactions under the United States Bankruptcy

Code. According to the commenter, the absence in proposed section

36.1(b) of the words ``designated as'' before the phrase ``a contract

market within the meaning of the Act'' could leave open to question the

applicability of the special protective provisions 16 of the

Bankruptcy Code with respect to commodity broker bankruptcies in the

context of section 4(c) contract market transactions.17

\16\ The commenter noted that these provisions are designed to

enhance the integrity of the futures markets by preventing the

trustee of an insolvent customer or FCM from, among other things,

(1) avoiding contractual obligations, (2) rescinding transfers of

margins and positions, or (3) impeding the liquidation of defaulted

contracts.

\17\ See 11 U.S.C. 761-766. Presumably, this conclusion could be

based upon the Commission's definition of ``commodity contract'' for

purposes of its Bankruptcy Rules, which incorporates by reference

Section 761(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, Commission Rule

190.01(g). The Bankruptcy Code defines ``commodity contract'' as a

``contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future

delivery on, or subject to the rules of, a contract market or board

of trade'' (11 U.S.C. 761(4) (A) and (D)) and defines a ``contract

market'' as a ``board of trade designated as a contract market by

the Commission under the Act.'' 11 U.S.C. 761(7) (emphasis added).

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The Commission intends that its Part 190 Bankruptcy Rules will

apply in the context of Part 36.18 To remove any perceived

ambiguity, the Commission is modifying the language of the final rule

as suggested by the commenter. Accordingly, the Commission is adding to

section 36.1(b) the words ``designated as'' before the phrase ``a

contract market within the meaning of the Act.''

\18\ See 59 FR 54139, 54144.

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c. Eligible Participants

As proposed, the definition of a ``section 4(c) contract market

transaction'' included the requirement that an agreement, contract, or

transaction be executed by, or on behalf of, an ``eligible

participant.'' Proposed section 36.1(c)(2) defined ``eligible

participant,'' by setting forth a list of those individuals and

entities permitted to trade section 4(c) contract market transactions.

This list, with several additions tailored to the operation and

structure of this particular market, was modeled on the list of

``appropriate persons'' set forth in section 4(c)(3) (A) through (J) of

the Act, and on the definition of ``eligible swap participant'' under

Part 35 of the Commission's Rules. However, as proposed, the definition

of ``eligible participant'' under Part 36 differed in several respects

from the definition of ``eligible swap participant'' under Part 35. The

proposed differences related to employee benefit plans, municipalities,

and certain types of investment vehicles. The Commission also sought

comment on whether the definition of ``eligible swap participant''

under Part 35 should be conformed to the proposed revisions. Many of

the comments focused on these proposed revisions, which are discussed

in greater detail below.

i. Employee Benefit Plans

As proposed, section 36.1(c)(2)(vii) would have limited employee

benefit plans eligible to participate in section 4(c) contract market

transactions to those subject to the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (``ERISA''), or similar foreign plans, with total

assets exceeding $5 million and (rather than the ``or'' provided in

section 4(c)(3)(G) of the Act and in section 35.1(b)(2)(vii)) whose

investment decisions were made by a bank, trust company, insurance

company, investment adviser (``IA'') under the Investment Advisers Act

of 1940, or a CTA under the Act.19 The Commission specifically

sought comment concerning whether there is an asset level for an

employee benefit plan which should qualify it as an eligible

participant irrespective of whether its investment decisions are made

by a bank, trust company, insurance company, IA or CTA and whether Part

36 should be conformed to Part 35 in this regard.

\19\ The Commission's proposed asset floor for an eligible

employee benefit plan in this context, $5 million, was five times

the $1 million asset floor for an employee benefit plan set forth in

section 4(c)(3)(G) of the Act, but the same as specified under the

Part 35 swaps exemption.

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Several commenters, including three exchanges, an industry trade

association and a bar association committee, stated the view that Part

36 should conform to the existing language of Part 35, so that those

currently eligible to participate in swap transactions also could

participate in section 4(c) contract market transactions. Moreover, the

Department of Labor and the FIA opposed this revision in the proposed

rule, reasoning that requiring an employee benefit plan to use a bank,

trust company, insurance company, IA or CTA to make its investment

decisions with respect to section 4(c) contract market transactions

would create burdens for large sophisticated plans that manage plan

assets in-house.

The Commission has carefully considered these comments in the

context of the Act and Part 35 and does not believe that it should be

more difficult for an employee benefit plan to

[[Page 51329]]

participate in a transaction under Part 36 than in an exempt swap

transaction under Part 35. In adopting section 36.1(c)(2)(vii),

therefore, the Commission is substituting the word ``or'' for the

proposal's ``and.'' Accordingly, employee benefit plans with total

assets exceeding $5 million will not be required to have their

investment decisions with respect to section 4(c) contract market

transactions made by a bank, trust company, insurance company, IA or

CTA.

The Department of Labor also objected to the level of the asset

floor set forth in proposed Rule 36.1(c)(2)(vii). Although it

recognized that this threshold is five times that set forth in section

4(c)(3)(G) of the Act, it stated its belief that $5 million is too low

a threshold to be an accurate gauge of sophistication or understanding

of complex financial instruments. The Department recommended that the

asset floor for an employee benefit plan be $50 million if an outside

investment advisor is used and $100 million, otherwise. The SEC,

without setting forth a specific dollar amount, also advocated a

substantially higher threshold.

The Commission has carefully considered these comments, but does

not believe that it is appropriate to make the threshold amount higher

for section 4(c) contract market transactions than for OTC transactions

exempted under Part 35. However, it should be emphasized that Rule

36.1(c)(2)(vii) sets forth minimum standards for eligibility. As the

administrator of ERISA, the Department of Labor can establish a higher,

controlling standard of eligibility for participation in section 4(c)

contract market transactions by employee benefit plans subject to

ERISA.20

\20\ An association representing state and local finance

officers requested clarification whether proposed Section

36.1(c)(2)(vii) included both private and public employee benefit

plans. In adopting Section 36.1(c)(2)(vii), the Commission notes

that the rule includes the phrase ``subject to ERISA.'' Because

ERISA does not cover public employee benefit plans, such plans are

not encompassed in Section 36.1(c)(2)(vii), but rather would be

included under Section 36.1(c)(2)(viii), as an instrumentality,

agency or department of a governmental entity or subdivision,

thereof. See note 22 infra.

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ii. Municipalities

In proposing section 36.1(c)(2)(viii), the Commission questioned

whether municipalities should be included as eligible participants and,

if so, whether any limitations on their participation would be

appropriate. All of those commenting on the issue, except for the SEC,

strongly supported the proposed inclusion of municipalities as eligible

participants without limitation. An association of state and local

government finance officials opined that, although certain government

entities have experienced trading losses, municipalities as a class are

no more or less sophisticated than other types of eligible

investors.21 Several commenters further reasoned that limitation

of the investment authority of municipalities is a function more

appropriately reserved to the various states. In contrast, the SEC

expressed concern that there are no qualifying standards for

municipalities, noting that municipalities are not included in the

definitions of ``qualified institutional buyer'' under SEC Rule 144A or

``accredited investor'' under SEC Regulation D.22

\21\ Orange County, California, recently suffered trading losses

of approximately $1.7 billion, primarily from transactions in

government securities and governmental agency obligations and

declared bankruptcy in December 1994. The commenter noted, in this

regard, that Orange County would have been considered a

sophisticated investor by any common measure.

\22\ 17 CFR 230.144A and 230.501(1995), respectively. However,

any plan established and maintained by a state, its political

subdivisions, or any agency or instrumentality of a state or its

political subdivisions, for the benefit of its employees, shall be

deemed a ``qualified institutional buyer'' if it owns at least $100

million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the

plan, and shall be deemed an ``accredited investor'' if it has total

assets in excess of $5 million. 17 CFR 230.144A(a)(1)(i)(D) and

230.501(a)(1)(1995), respectively.

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After carefully considering the comments, the Commission is

persuaded that, as a matter of state/Federal comity, it should continue

to refrain from precluding the participation of municipalities in

exempt transactions. This policy applies both to section 4(c) contract

market transactions and to exempt swap agreements under Part 35 of the

Commission's rules. Accordingly, the Commission is adopting section

36.1(c)(2)(viii) as proposed.

Nevertheless, the Commission has emphasized in several reports,

Congressional testimony and administrative proceedings, that all

institutions, including municipalities, need to establish and implement

strong internal controls and risk management practices with respect to

financial market transactions. The Commission also notes that

representatives of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets

23 have met with representatives of various state and local

government associations to discuss sharing and disseminating

information on appropriate investment guidelines for governmental

entities, and to promote their use. The Commission and its staff stand

ready to meet with such associations or any other appropriate entity to

pursue the development of such guidelines or to otherwise provide

information concerning risk management practices relevant to the

exchange markets subject to its supervision. The Commission also will

provide further guidance on the responsibilities of FCMs for

supervision of such accounts.

\23\ The Working Group includes the Secretary of the Department

of the Treasury and the Chairs of the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC

and the CFTC.

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iii. Other Entities

Proposed Part 36 specifying the list of eligible participants for

section 4(c) contract market transactions also included certain

technical or clarifying changes from that used in defining eligible

swap participants under Part 35. Many, if not all, commenters were of

the view, however, that conformity between the two exemptions should be

maintained, to the greatest degree possible. In light of these views,

the Commission, in adopting section 36.1(c)(2) has attempted to conform

the substance, and the language, of Part 36 to that of Part 35,

wherever possible. In a few instances, however, the final Part 36 rules

do not mirror precisely their counterparts in Part 35.

For example, as proposed, section 36.1(c)(2)(iv) required that to

be an eligible participant, investment companies be regulated under the

Investment Company Act of 1940 (``ICA'') or subject to foreign

regulation, provided that such investment company was not formed solely

for the purpose of constituting an eligible participant and has total

assets exceeding $5 million. This proposed rule differs from its Part

35 counterpart defining investment companies as eligible swap

participants by including a $5 million asset floor and by the language

requiring that the investment company be regulated under the ICA,

rather than subject to regulation.24

\24\ Compare proposed 36.1(c)(2)(iv) with Section 35.1(b)(iv).

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In adopting section 36.1(c)(2)(iv), the Commission has modified the

proposal to refer to investment companies subject to regulation under

the ICA, more closely conforming the provision to its Part 35

counterpart.25 This modification

[[Page 51330]]

will permit hedge funds,26 which although subject to the ICA are

generally excluded from regulation under it, to qualify as eligible

participants. The $5 million asset floor, however, which applies to

commodity pools under both Part 36 and Part 35,27 is being adopted

under section 36.1(c)(2)(iv).28 In all other respects the

substance of section 36.1(c)(2)(iv), as adopted, conforms to its

counterpart under Part 35.

\25\ The Commission is also adopting similar conforming changes

to the language of Section 36.1(c)(2)(v), relating to commodity

pools. Specifically, the language requiring that, to be an eligible

participant, a commodity pool be formed and operated by a person

regulated under the Act, is being modified to read subject to

regulation. The remaining conditions, that the commodity pool is not

formed solely for the purpose of constituting an eligible

participant and has total assets exceeding $5 million are already

consistent with Part 35, and are being adopted as proposed.

\26\ The term ``hedge fund'' is now commonly used to refer to a

wide array of private collective investment vehicles, usually

organized as limited partnerships and organized so as to avoid the

application of most securities laws.

\27\ See, 17 CFR 35.1(b)(2)(v) (1995).

\28\ The $5 million asset floor being adopted under Section

36.1(c)(2)(iv) will apply to hedge funds even though there is no

comparable requirement for eligibility under Part 35. The Commission

believes, however, that this slight difference in the definitions

will not disadvantage any hedge funds seeking to participate in

Section 4(c) contract market transactions and provides for

consistent treatment under Part 36 for commodity pools and hedge

funds with respect to the imposition of an asset floor.

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The provisions of proposed section 36.1(c)(2)(vi), which would

apply to a corporation, partnership, organization, trust, or other

entity, would have required that such an entity not be formed solely

for the purpose of constituting an eligible participant, and have

either (1) assets exceeding $10 million, or (2) a net worth of $1

million and that the transaction be entered into in connection with the

conduct of the entity's business or to manage the risk of an asset or

liability owned or incurred in the conduct of the entity's business or

reasonably likely to be owned or incurred in the conduct of its

business. The proposed Part 36 rule differed from the Part 35 provision

in two respects. First, proposed section 36.1(c)(2)(vi) did not include

a provision similar to that of section 35.1(b)(2)(vi), which permits

the entity to be an eligible swap participant by obtaining a guarantee

of the obligation of the party under the swap agreement in lieu of

meeting the $10 million asset test. However, because all section 4(c)

contract market transactions will be guaranteed by a clearing

organization, the ability to obtain a guarantee is not a measure of

counterparty creditworthiness, and hence the alternative guarantee test

of swap eligibility is inapplicable to section 4(c) contract market

transactions. Accordingly, the final Part 36 rule continues, as

proposed, to differ in this respect from Part 35.29

\29\ The proposed rules also differed from Part 35 to the extent

they did not impose specific financial requirements on floor brokers

and floor traders. Such requirements were not imposed based on the

Commission's understanding that any floor broker or floor trader

would, by necessity, be a member in good standing of the 4(c)

contact market whose transactions thereon would be guaranteed by an

exchange clearing member. The Commission's understanding in this

regard was confirmed by one exchange. A second exchange expressed

its view that exchange rules adequately address such financial

matters. Accordingly, at this time, the Commission sees no need to

impose explicit clearing member guarantee or financial requirements

on floor brokers and floor traders.

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The second difference between the proposed Part 36 rule and its

Part 35 counterpart was a clarification in section 36.1(c)(2)(vi) that

commodity pools, investment companies or hedge funds qualify for

exemptive relief under the specific eligibility provision applicable to

them, and not under the more general provision of subsection (vi). The

Commission's inclusion of the phrase ``other than a commodity pool or

other collective investment vehicle'' in proposed subsection (vi) was a

technical clarification, and was not intended as a substantive change

to the exemptive framework.

However, in order to maintain consistency between the language of

Parts 36 and 35 to the greatest degree possible, the Commission is not

including this additional, clarifying language in section

36.1(c)(2)(vi). Nevertheless, the Commission intends that to be deemed

an eligible participant in a section 4(c) contract market transaction,

an investment company or a hedge fund must qualify under section

36.1(c)(2)(iv), and a commodity pool must qualify under section

36.1(c)(2)(v). The Commission interprets Part 35 similarly, so that to

qualify as an eligible swap participant, an investment company or hedge

fund must meet the standards of section 35.1(b)(2)(iv), and a commodity

pool must meet the standards of section 35.1(b)(2)(v). These specific

provisions are the only avenues through which a commodity pool,

investment company or hedge fund can qualify as an eligible participant

for section 4(c) contract market transactions under Part 36, or as an

eligible swap participant under Part 35.30

\30\ Section 36.1(c)(2)(vi) cannot be used to abrogate the

limits on commodity pool or other collective investment vehicle

eligibility. Section 36.1(c)(2)(vi) (B) and (C) only apply to an

entity engaged in risk management or commercial conduct that has a

principal business other than serving as a passive investment

vehicle and is not intended to be available to passive investment

vehicles like commodity pools, investment companies or hedge funds.

See also, Section 35.1(b)(2)(vi)(C).

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B. Conditions on Transactions Which Are Included Under Part 36

As summarized above, transactions included within the proposed Part

36 exemption were required to meet a number of additional conditions.

Specifically, proposed section 36.2 required that section 4(c) contract

market transactions provide for cash settlement, be cleared through a

clearing organization, not involve domestic agricultural commodities,

not involve a previously designated futures or option contract, and not

involve futures or option contracts subject to the provisions of

section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act. The comments submitted on each of these

conditions are discussed below.

1. Cash Settlement

The Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, Inc. (``CSCE'') objected to the

requirement as proposed in section 36.2(a)(1) that the settlement or

delivery of section 4(c) contract market transactions be in cash or by

means other than transfer or receipt of a commodity. The CSCE opined

that requiring cash settlement would limit section 4(c) contract market

transactions to economically inferior contracts in those instances

where a physical delivery contract may be superior to a cash settled

contract. The CSCE further reasoned that because access to section 4(c)

contract markets is limited to sophisticated traders, who presumably

have greater familiarity with the procedures for making or taking

physical delivery, there is less reason to restrict the availability of

physical delivery contracts under the exemption.31

\31\ A commenter stated that a physical delivery commodity

futures contract, in fact, may require that certain documents,

rather than the actual commodity itself, be transferred at the time

of delivery. The commenter noted that these documents create a

subsequent contractual agreement to deliver the physical commodity

and therefore such contracts should be eligible to trade as Section

4(c) transactions. The Commission disagrees. Most ``physical

delivery'' contracts provide for the transfer of documents (e.g.,

warehouse receipts, shipping certificates, vault receipts, etc.) as

part of the delivery process. However, the ultimate satisfaction of

such contracts is by physical delivery of the commodity pursuant to

exchange-specified rules. Thus, the fact that documents are

transferred as a means of executing the delivery process does not

qualify such contracts for Section 4(c) transactions, because

settlement ultimately would not be in cash or means other than

transfer or receipt of a commodity, as required by Rule 36.2(a)(1).

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The Commission disagrees with this view. To the contrary, the

Commission notes that, in its experience, most surveillance problems

have arisen in the context of market congestion relating to the

delivery of physical commodities. Generally, in order to minimize the

possibility of market congestion or manipulation, the Commission

evaluates the adequacy of deliverable supplies and delivery procedures

during its review of contract market

[[Page 51331]]

applications for designation. Section 4(c) contracts, however, will not

be required to undergo such a review process. Accordingly, the

Commission believes that restricting eligible section 4(c) contract

market transactions to those that do not involve physical delivery of a

commodity is a prudent measure to mitigate concerns regarding the

delivery process and deliverable supplies. That is not to say, however,

that after gaining experience with the trading of section 4(c) contract

market transactions during the pilot program, the Commission will not

revisit this issue for all, or certain classes of, commodities.

The proposed limitation on the physical delivery of commodities on

section 4(c) contract market transactions did contain an exception for

the physical delivery of a ``major foreign currency.'' The CME

suggested that the restriction of this exception to ``major'' foreign

currencies should be removed from the final regulations. It reasoned

that the need for risk management by participants in markets for many

of the ``non-major'' currencies is as great, if not greater, than in

the major currency markets. In its view, the rule, at a minimum, should

be revised to clarify the meaning of ``major currency,'' a term

otherwise undefined in the proposed rules. The CME suggested that

``major'' currencies include all currencies for which there are no

legal impediments to delivery or cash settlement and in which a

sufficiently liquid spot market exists.

The Commission disagrees with the commenter that physical delivery

should be permitted on a section 4(c) contract market for any foreign

currency, no matter how thin its cash market. To the contrary, the cash

market for a foreign currency must be sufficiently liquid and unimpeded

by legal restraints to permit its ready delivery. Otherwise, the

contract would be susceptible to manipulation, price distortion or

default. Indeed, it was based upon this reasoning that the Commission

initially proposed to limit the exception to physical delivery of

``major foreign currencies.''

However, the Commission agrees that the proposed rule's use of the

undefined term ``major currency'' needs clarification. The final rule,

therefore, substitutes the descriptive criteria suggested by the

commenter for the term ``major currency.'' That is, physical delivery

is permitted in section 4(c) contract market transactions for foreign

currencies which have no legal impediment to such a delivery and for

which there exists a sufficiently liquid cash market.

2. Clearing and Related Financial Integrity Issues

a. Clearing

Because the exemption deems all section 4(c) contract markets to be

designated as contract markets, the Commission also proposed to require

that section 4(c) contract markets maintain a clearing facility subject

to Commission oversight, and that the rules of the clearing

organization be submitted to the Commission for approval pursuant to

section 5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act.32 The Philadelphia Stock Exchange

(``PHLX''), commented that the Commission should apply this requirement

``flexibly.'' According to the PHLX, the Commission should permit, for

example, transactions cleared by a registered securities clearing

agency pursuant to a comparable regulatory scheme.

\32\ The term ``contract market'' includes a clearing

organization that clears trades for the contract market. Commission

Rule 1.41(a)(3).

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As the Commission noted in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in

proposing these rules it did not intend:

to limit contract markets in section 4(c) contract market

transactions to current contract markets or exchanges. In order to

qualify, such an entity would be treated similarly to a board of

trade seeking an initial designation as a contract market.

59 FR at 54144. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that all section

4(c) contract markets should be subject to direct Commission oversight

and enforcement of all of the self-regulator's rules, particularly

those regarding the financial integrity of the transactions.

Accordingly, although a clearing agency registered under a comparable

regulatory scheme such as that administered by the SEC would be

eligible to clear section 4(c) contract market transactions under Part

36, the entity would, nonetheless, also be required to qualify as a

clearing organization under the CEA and Commission rules, clear for a

board of trade which has been designated as a section 4(c) contract

market, and submit its rules for approval to the Commission pursuant to

section 5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act.

In addition to those questions relating to the clearing of section

4(c) contract market transactions,33 several commenters raised a

variety of issues relating to the financial integrity requirements

applicable to all designated contract markets. Under the proposed pilot

program, these financial integrity requirements would be applied to

section 4(c) contract markets. Commenters noted that the Commission did

not propose, in the context of this section 4(c) exemption, any

modifications to these requirements and requested various forms of

relief.

\33\ The CME suggested that the Commission permit the clearing

of Part 36 transactions on a faster schedule or otherwise in a more

innovative fashion than that provided for traditional designated

contract markets. This issue is discussed below, as it relates to

trading rules. As a general matter, however, the Commission believes

that, for all markets, whether traditional or exempt under Part 36,

an expeditious clearing system, by reducing the time during which

transactions are unsettled and the parties at risk, is crucial to

minimizing systemic risks. Accordingly, although Section 4(c)

transactions generally may be part of the same clearing regimen as

non-exempt transactions, nothing in the Part 36 rules would prohibit

faster or more innovative clearance of these instruments.

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b. Segregation of Customer Funds

For example, the CME, both in its petition and in its comments on

proposed Part 36, asserted that the requirement of Commission Rule 1.20

to segregate all customer funds is not necessary to ``the smooth and

safe functioning of the Rolling Spot Futures Contracts.'' 34

However, segregation of customer funds is a cornerstone of the

Commission's customer protection and financial integrity framework. In

light of its importance to safeguarding customer funds, the Commission

is not prepared to grant relief from the segregation requirement.

\34\ 58 FR 43424-25.

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The CBT requested that the Commission grant an exemption for

section 4(c) contract market transactions from Commission Rule 1.25,

which the CBT describes as a rule prohibiting an FCM from investing

customer funds in anything other than U.S. government

securities.35 The CBT views the permissible investments under Rule

1.25 as unduly restrictive and stated that there are other liquid

investments, such as corporate investment grade bonds, that would be

safe, appropriate investments of customer funds. The CBT stated that

exchanges should be allowed to determine how customer funds deposited

with an FCM in connection with trading on these exempt markets can be

invested.36

\35\ In fact, Rule 1.25 also permits customer funds to be

invested in certain municipal securities, subject to staff

interpretations that such investments must be liquid. Rule 1.25

provides in pertinent part that ``[n]o [FCM] and no clearing

organization shall invest customer funds except in obligations of

the United States, in general obligations of any State or any

political subdivision thereof, or in obligations fully guaranteed as

to principal and interest by the United States.'' See also CFTC

Interpretative Letter No. 86-21, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm.

Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) para.23,266 (Sept. 17, 1986).

\36\ As an alternative to exemption from Rule 1.25, the CBT

suggested that the Commission specify an expanded range of

permissible investments of customer funds. If this approach were

adopted, the CBT believes it should be available with respect to all

funds deposited with an FCM by an eligible participant under Part

36, without regard to whether the customer is trading exempt or

traditional contracts.

[[Page 51332]]

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The Commission believes that it is inappropriate to grant the

requested relief from Rule 1.25 at this time. That rule derives from

the statutory limitations set forth in the final proviso of section

4d(2) of the Act. The investment limitations are intended to assure

that the pool of customers' funds remains safe, liquid and available

for distribution to customers on demand or, following an FCM's

bankruptcy, to facilitate transfers to another firm should that become

necessary.

The Commission envisions that customer funds related to section

4(c) contract market transactions will be commingled with other

customer funds in a combined pool of segregated funds and would be

treated as funds of customers involved in traditional futures contracts

in the event of an FCM's bankruptcy. Therefore, it is inappropriate and

impracticable to apply provisions different from the general provisions

of section 4d(2) of the Act and Commission Rules 1.20-1.30, 1.32 and

1.36 concerning segregation of customer funds to section 4(c) contract

market transactions. However, as a consequence of the failure of

Barings PLC, the Commission, joined by regulators and self-regulators

worldwide, currently is reviewing the safeguarding of customer funds,

both domestically and internationally, to determine if statutory or

regulatory changes are appropriate.

Two commenters also suggested that required subordination

agreements relating to customer funds held in foreign depositories be

limited. In 1988, the Division of Trading and Markets issued Financial

and Segregation Interpretation No. 12 to permit funds of United States-

domiciled customers to be segregated in foreign depositories subject to

conditions intended generally to prevent the dilution of customer funds

held in segregation in the United States in the event that an FCM

holding segregated funds offshore became bankrupt.37 Among other

requirements, the FCM must obtain a customer's authorization to deposit

its funds into a foreign depository. The customer also must agree in

writing that, in the event the FCM is placed in bankruptcy and there

are insufficient funds in a foreign currency to satisfy customer claims

in that currency, the customer will subordinate its claim attributable

to funds held offshore in that particular foreign currency to the

claims of customers whose funds are held in dollars or other foreign

currencies.

\37\ 53 FR 46911 (Nov. 21, 1988), reprinted in 1 Comm. Fut. L.

Rep. (CCH) para.7122. Prior to 1988, the Commission required

segregated funds to be held in the United States except for certain

funds of foreign-domiciled customers.

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Commenters also suggested that the Commission limit the

applicability of the subordination requirement of Interpretation No. 12

with respect to section 4(c) funds. Specifically, one commenter

suggested that a subordination agreement should be required only in

``cases where access to funds held in a foreign depository is subject

to potential restriction by foreign governmental authorities or

agencies.''

The Commission believes that there is no basis for applying a

different standard in requiring subordination of section 4(c) and non-

section 4(c) segregated funds. However, as noted above, the Commission

is reviewing this and other requirements contained in Interpretation

No. 12 in response to the recent collapse of Barings and to address

issues that have developed since Interpretation No. 12 was first

published.38 Any revision of the current safeguards for funds held

outside the United States on behalf of customers trading on futures

exchanges in the United States likely will be uniform across section

4(c) and non-section 4(c) contract markets.

\38\ For example, the Federal Reserve Board did not allow banks

in the U.S. to accept deposits denominated in foreign currencies

until January 1990.

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c. Margining of Customer and Proprietary Accounts

Two commenters raised issues regarding the margining of section

4(c) contract market transactions. One commenter recommended that the

Commission permit eligible participants initially to cross-margin

section 4(c) contracts, and subsequently to cross-margin section 4(c)

and non-section 4(c) contracts. Although the Commission has not

provided for cross-margining as part of this rulemaking, the Commission

would consider such a feature as part of the pilot program. In this

connection, the Commission notes that it has approved numerous cross-

margining plans for exchange trading, beginning in 1988. Accordingly,

the Commission encourages interested persons to submit a detailed

petition for such a plan during the course of the Part 36 pilot

program.

The second commenter suggested that the Commission allow ``futures-

style'' margining for option contracts. Futures-style margining would

permit the initial purchase of option contracts with a performance bond

or margin payment as currently permitted for futures contracts, rather

than with full payment of the option premium.

Commission Rule 33.4(a) requires payment of the full amount of each

option premium at the time the option is purchased. After that rule was

adopted, the issue of whether ``futures-style'' margining is also

appropriate for options was raised, culminating in publication in the

Federal Register of two petitions to repeal Rule 33.4(a)(2).39

Although a number of supportive comments were submitted, many also

opposed the concept. The pilot program for the trading of section 4(c)

contract market transactions presents an ideal opportunity to test

prudently, within the confines of a limited-access market, the

potential benefits and risks of futures-style margining. Accordingly,

the Commission has determined, in principle, to permit ``futures-

style'' margining for section 4(c) option transactions under the Part

36 pilot program, and will consider any such proposals submitted.

\39\ See 54 FR 11233 (March 17, 1989).

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Finally, an investment banking firm requested clarification of

several technical issues relating to financial integrity requirements.

Specifically, it inquired regarding the terms on which an FCM may

transfer excess funds 40 belonging to the same customer from an

account containing section 4(c) contract market transactions to an

account containing traditional contracts, e.g., whether a separate

signature is required. Because the Commission will treat customer funds

related to section 4(c) contract market transactions the same as those

of traditional futures contracts for segregation purposes, it would be

unnecessary to maintain separate accounts for section 4(c) and

traditional contracts of the same customer.

\40\ The commenter did not define the term ``excess funds.'' The

Commission uses the terms ``excess funds'' and ``free funds'' to

mean the amount by which the net liquidating equity in an account

exceeds the initial margin requirement for the positions in that

account.

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The commenter also expressed the view that although customer and

proprietary positions in section 4(c) contract market transactions

should be accounted for in the same fashion as in non-exempt futures

and option contracts, to the extent that positions in section 4(c)

contract market transactions may be margined differently than non-

exempt futures and options transactions, a different adjusted net

capital treatment might be appropriate. The Commission reiterates that

the general financial and segregation rules applicable to non-exempt

futures and

[[Page 51333]]

option contracts will apply in the same manner to section 4(c) contract

market transactions.41

\41\ For example, the same distinctions between customer and

proprietary transactions will apply for segregation and adjusted net

capital purposes, so that the amount of customer funds related to

Section 4(c) transactions will be included in the calculation of an

FCM's minimum adjusted net capital requirement. Proprietary

positions in such transactions will be subject to the same haircuts

as proprietary positions in traditional contracts when an FCM

computes its adjusted net capital. To the extent that Section 4(c)

contract market transactions result in more long-dated transactions

or in transactions with features, such as embedded options, which

are substantially different from customary futures contracts, the

Commission will reassess the continued efficacy of its capital

requirements and make appropriate adjustments. Separately, the

Commission may consider whether adjustments are appropriate in light

of responses to the SEC's concept release on capital. 58 FR 27486

(May 10, 1993). In addition, the Commission recently held a

roundtable on capital issues, generally.

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3. Excluded Commodities

The scope of the section 4(c) exemption was proposed to be further

limited by its inapplicability to transactions in certain, identified

commodities and by the general restriction that a section 4(c) contract

market transaction could not be offered for a contract previously

designated as a traditional contract market. Two commenters objected to

section 36.2(a)(3)'s proposed prohibition of section 4(c) contract

market transactions on specified domestic agricultural

commodities.42 The CME and the CSCE noted that the Commission did

not propose to prohibit section 4(c) trading in many other physical

commodities already trading as non-exempt futures and options, such as

sugar, coffee, copper, crude oil, lumber, and scrap metal. Any

distinction between these two classes of physical commodities,

according to the commenters, would be artificial.

\42\ The rule, however, does allow for Section 4(c) transactions

on a broad index of these enumerated commodities.

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The Commission disagrees. The commodities excluded from eligibility

under proposed section 36.2(a)(3) are those agricultural commodities

specifically enumerated in section 1a of the Act. The Commission is of

the opinion that these commodities share certain characteristics

relating to their underlying cash markets and the seasonality of their

production, which make different treatment appropriate. As the

Commission noted in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the enumerated

agricultural commodities are treated differently, as a class, in other

contexts, as well. For example, the Commission directly administers

speculative position limits under Part 150 of its rules only for these

commodities. In light of the apparent ability of the currently

designated contract markets in these commodities to fulfill the price

basing and hedging needs of market users and the untested operation of

the Part 36 rules, the Commission believes that caution requires that

these commodities be excluded from the pilot program. The Commission

will reconsider this determination when it evaluates the success of the

pilot program.

The Commission also proposed to exclude any transaction subject to

section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 2, including stock index

futures contracts, from the scope of the exemptive rules.\43\ In

contrast to the SEC, which specifically concurred with this part of the

proposal, PHLX commented that:

\43\ See Proposed Section 36.2(a)(5). See also 59 FR at 54145.

nothing in the section 2(a)(1)(B) limitation on section 4(c)

[prevents] the Commission from permitting a securities exchange that

obtains a designation tailored to its special circumstances or a

contract market affiliate of a securities exchange to trade stock

index futures contracts or analogous products meeting the special

criteria for futures contracts on groups or indexes of securities in

a securities-style environment pursuant to the requirements of the

1934 Act, as long as the SEC has an opportunity to express its views

on such contracts in accordance with the provisions of section

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2(a)(1)(B).

Accordingly, PHLX asserted that the proposed exclusion of section

2(a)(1)(B) commodities was overly broad and should be narrowed or

deleted in the final rules and that these issues be addressed in the

context of individualized requests for exemptive relief.

Section 2(a)(1)(B) commodities raise particular issues in light of

the nature of the underlying cash market and the special procedures

that apply to designation of these commodities. Accordingly, the

Commission continues to believe that inclusion of these commodities in

a pilot program is inappropriate and has determined not to further

revise section 36.2(a)(5) at this time. The Commission may reconsider

the issue in the future, depending upon its regulatory experience.

More generally, the Commission proposed to limit section 4(c)

contract market transactions to transactions which do

not involve any commodity futures contract or commodity option for

which any board of trade has been designated by the Commission * * *

prior to its application to trade as a section 4(c) market

transaction, unless it can reasonably be distinguished * * * based

on its hedging function and/or pricing basis.44

\44\ Proposed Section 36.2(a)(4) is intended to address, among

other things, the concerns expressed by some commenters regarding

the problems of a two-tier marketplace. Although the CME and CBT

have indicated that they do not intend to trade the same contract on

both a Section 4(c) contract market and a traditional contract

market, this provision would prevent a Section 4(c) contract market

transaction from trading if the same traditional contract were

already trading on a contract market.

The Commission explained that it will base determinations as to

whether proposed section 4(c) contract market transactions can be

``reasonably distinguished'' from existing contracts on the same

considerations that it now applies in deciding whether proposed futures

and options contracts are treated as separate designation applications,

and provided several examples of instruments that are ``reasonably

distinguishable'' from existing contracts. 59 FR 54145.45

Nevertheless, several commenters complained that the Commission's

inclusion of examples of acceptable section 4(c) contract market

transactions is not adequate to prevent misapplication or

misinterpretation of the rule's terms. They suggested that the rule be

amended to set forth a brighter line delineating those transactions

which could be traded under Part 36.

\45\ In that regard, however, Section 36.2(a)(4) specifically

states that five- and ten-year interest swap futures and option

contracts, rolling spot and currency forward futures and option

contracts and flexible options may be listed as Section 4(c)

transactions.

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The Commission believes that further enumeration of specific

standards or commodity characteristics defining the universe of

permissible section 4(c) contract market transactions would

unnecessarily restrict the exchanges' and the Commission's flexibility

for innovation under the proposed rules. Because the universe of

eligible section 4(c) contract market transactions is so broad--

including a wide range of diverse tangible commodities, financial

instruments and indexes--a comprehensive listing of eligibility

standards likely would be incomplete, failing to address questions

regarding novel section 4(c) contract market transactions that may be

designed in the future. Moreover, a detailed listing of eligibility

requirements could have the unintended effect of excluding certain

types or classes of contracts or commodities from the exemption. For

these reasons, the Commission believes that a broad standard based on

two fundamental economic characteristics of futures contracts--their

hedging function or the basis on which they are priced--will provide

maximum flexibility to the exchanges in

[[Page 51334]]

developing new section 4(c) contract market transactions, while

maintaining the goal of the rule to avoid two-tiered, identical markets

trading under two differing regulatory regimes.46

\46\ One commenter specifically requested that the Commission

clarify whether a contract based on cash-settled North Sea crude oil

or a contract based on cash-settled West Texas Intermediate (WTI)

crude oil would be considered ``reasonably distinguished'' from the

existing light sweet crude oil futures contract which provides for

physical delivery of, and for which the pricing basis represents,

WTI. Regarding the former, North Sea crudes are distinct from WTI,

having different (albeit related) pricing characteristics, so that a

WTI-based crude oil contract may not meet the hedging needs of firms

having positions in North Sea crudes. Accordingly, Section 4(c)

transactions would be permitted for cash-settled North Sea crude

oil, since the hedging and pricing functions of these transactions

would be distinguished from the existing designated WTI-based crude

oil contract. In contrast, a cash-settled WTI crude oil contract

would not be permissible, since there should be no material

difference in the pricing basis of the contracts (both would reflect

the value of WTI crude oil at Cushing, OK) and the hedging uses

provided by each contract would be identical.

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On a related issue, the CME suggested that even if the Commission

concludes that the proposed standard separating exempt and non-exempt

markets were appropriate, the mere existence of a similar, previous

contract market designation is an overly-broad criterion. The comment

suggested that the prohibition should apply only to contracts that have

open interest at the time a Part 36 market proposes to list the section

4(c) transaction; otherwise, competing exchanges could stymie

innovation by obtaining traditional contract market designations for

markets which are never listed for trading.

The Commission agrees that this comment has merit. The Commission

intends that the above provision only limit the trading of two-tiered

markets, and does not intend for it to be a means of forestalling

competition. Accordingly, the Commission is modifying the restriction,

limiting the availability of the Part 36 exception only to contracts

that are trading at the time a board of trade proposes to list for

trading a section 4(c) contract market, rather than to all designated

contract markets. Traded contracts are those in which any transactions

occurred during the six complete consecutive calendar months preceding

the date of application to trade a section 4(c) contract market.47

\47\ The six-month period is consistent with the time period

specified in Commission Rule 5.2 for classifying designated contract

markets as ``dormant,'' after which Commission approval is required

to reactivate trading. However, the Commission is not including as a

condition for Section 4(c) eligibility, Rule 5.2's five-year grace

period, which commences at designation, during which a designated

market is exempt from being considered ``dormant.''

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4. Speculative Position Limits

Finally, an exchange commenter opined that the Commission should

exempt section 4(c) contract markets from the requirement under Rule

1.61 that they set and administer speculative position limits. The

commenter reasoned that enforcing speculative limits would serve little

purpose in light of the requirement that all section 4(c) contract

markets (except for foreign currencies) be cash-settled.

As the Commission articulated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

Commission Rule 1.61 already is applied quite flexibly, permitting the

exchanges to substitute various position accountability rules for

speculative position limits for many futures and option contracts.

However, commenters have argued forcefully that OTC markets and foreign

exchanges enjoy a competitive advantage by generally not providing for

any type of position accountability or position limit rules. The

Commission, nevertheless, continues to believe that these types of

rules provide the exchanges with a useful and flexible tool for

addressing market surveillance concerns.

In any event, based upon the continuing perception of some industry

sources that the existence of these rules on U.S. futures exchanges is

an actual source of competitive disadvantage, the Commission, by adding

a new subsection (b) to section 36.2, is exempting section 4(c)

contract markets from the requirements of Rule 1.61. However, the

decision of an exchange to discard this particular device from its

surveillance tool chest does not, in any way, diminish the exchange's

responsibilities under the Act to assure orderly markets. Accordingly,

exchanges remain free, as a matter of exchange discretion, to apply

position accountability or speculative position limit rules to section

4(c) contract markets.

C. Trading Rules and Procedures

1. The Proposed Rule

Proposed section 36.3 would have permitted a board of trade to

submit for Commission approval flexible trading procedures for section

4(c) contract market transactions which were not required to comply in

all respects with existing competitive trading requirements and other

trading standards relative to the exposure of orders and trades. The

proposal represented a substantial change in the principles underlying

the required method of trading futures and futures option contracts in

that it would have allowed the execution of section 4(c) contract

market transactions without exposing such transactions to competition

in the pit. The proposal would have permitted exchanges, under a pilot

program that would provide some relaxation in competitive trading

requirements for certain market participants, to develop new trading

procedures designed to address the needs of their increasingly

institutional market participants and to compete more aggressively with

the OTC market. The proposal also would have required exchange

compliance with certain regulatory safeguards in order to maintain

essential market and appropriate customer protection.

After reviewing the comments to proposed section 36.3 and customer

protection rules in other markets, the Commission has determined to

adopt section 36.3, modifying it from the proposal to address certain

comments. As adopted, section 36.3 provides a framework of safeguards

intended to set forth non-exclusive conditions for the execution of

section 4(c) contract market transactions. Section 36.3 would permit

expeditious review of exchange rules without prejudicing the ability of

the exchanges to request Commission approval of other procedures

pursuant to the usual rule approval procedures under section

5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act and Commission Rule 1.41(b). Effectively, the

Commission is establishing a framework of safeguards for transparent,

negotiated off-floor/ex-pit trading. Experience with the permitted

procedures may be required to determine whether other or different

limitations are necessary or whether the type of activity that should

be deemed to be in violation of the applicable anti-fraud rule should

be further specified. Therefore, the Commission intends to evaluate its

experience with contract market rules adopted under section 36.3 twelve

months after such rules become effective and to propose, if necessary,

modifications or limitations to the parameters for section 4(c) trading

rules set forth herein to address any market problems which it

observes.

Paragraph (a) of proposed section 36.3 provided that a board of

trade could submit for Commission approval section 4(c) contract market

trading rules to permit trading procedures for section 4(c) contract

market transactions that do not satisfy all of the requirements of

Commission Rules 1.38(a), 1.39, 155.2, 155.3 and 155.4. Paragraph

(b)(3) of the proposed regulation, however, required compliance with

Commission Rules 155.2, 155.3 and 155.4 to the extent applicable.

[[Page 51335]]

2. Specific Exemptive Relief

Two commenters requested that the Commission provide increased

specificity with regard to the kinds of transactions that could be

executed using section 4(c) contract market trading procedures.

Specifically, the FIA stated that it would be helpful ``if the

Commission would further set out the kinds of core trading practices it

believes would be acceptable in the exempt exchange markets.'' The CBT

stated that the ``proposal would be greatly improved if the agency

could provide some concrete idea of the kinds of procedures that would

be acceptable under the exemption.'' The CBT further recommended that

the Commission make explicit in its exemptive relief whether trading

opposite customer orders and matching trades between customers or

between customers and FCMs would be permitted.

The Commission believes that these comments have merit and has

modified the trading rules requirements to provide explicit relief in

the form of a safe harbor from the requirements of sections 4b(a)(iv),

4b(b) and 4c(a) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 6b(a)(iv), 6b(b), and 6c(a), and

Commission Rules 1.38(a), 1.39, 155.2, 155.3 and 155.4 for section 4(c)

contract market transactions executed using ``special execution

procedures'' in accordance with exchange rules that meet certain

standards and are permitted to become effective by the Commission. For

section 4(c) contract market transactions, such special execution

procedures could permit noncompetitive bids, offers, negotiation and/or

execution of such orders and transactions.

Subject to the requirement that they satisfy certain specified

Commission recordkeeping and audit trail requirements, the Commission

would allow exchange rules providing special execution procedures to

become effective. These special procedures would permit a member to

trade for his own account opposite the account of another

member,48 permit an FCM or floor broker to take the opposite side

of a customer order for its own account, or permit the execution of

customer orders of different principals directly between customer

accounts.49 The Commission also would allow to become effective

exchange rules that permitted the execution of section 4(c) contract

market transactions using any combination of special execution

procedures and competitive on-floor trading procedures provided that

certain additional requirements were satisfied.50

\48\ Section 36.3(b).

\49\ Section 36.3(c).

\50\ Section 36.3(d). Any section 4(c) contract market

transactions executed competitively on-floor must comply with

applicable Commission regulations and exchange rules that currently

govern competitive on-floor trading.

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Exchanges also may submit for Commission review and approval,

pursuant to the usual rule approval procedures contained in section

5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act, and Commission Rule 1.41(b), other section

4(c) contract market rules which do not conform to the specific trading

standards set forth in section 36.3 and which do not satisfy the

requirements of the Act and Commission regulations with regard to

competitive trading requirements and other trading standards relative

to the exposure of orders and trades.

In this regard, the Commission has provided greater specificity to

give further content to the type of flexibility it intends to provide

the exchanges to adapt trading procedures to new products, technology

and market circumstances without sacrificing important customer and

market protections. For example, it is the Commission's belief that

boards of trade designated as section 4(c) contract markets could have

market makers with affirmative obligations, specialist systems, ``all

or nothing'' large-trader execution procedures and other trading

procedures currently not necessarily consistent with Rules 1.38 and

1.39. The Commission would, however, expect the exchanges to have

procedures to protect the integrity of pricing and to monitor

compliance with the conditions and limitations of the relief as set

forth herein, consistent with the affirmative obligations of exchanges

to enforce compliance with existing exchange and Commission rules.

a. Recordkeeping and Audit Trail Requirements

As previously stated, all transactions executed using special

execution procedures must satisfy certain recordkeeping and audit trail

requirements. Paragraph (e)(1) of section 36.3 requires that the

contract market provide for record maintenance and retention consistent

with Commission Rule 1.31. The audit trail for all transactions

executed using special execution procedures must meet the books and

records, trade register, trade timing, and contract market oversight

requirements of Rules 1.35(a), (e), (g) and (i), respectively.51

In addition, the recordkeeping requirements set forth in Commission

Rule 1.38(b), which requires the special identification of such

transactions, must be satisfied for all transactions executed using

special execution procedures. This is intended to permit identification

of such transactions as different from regular contract market

transactions for price discovery purposes.

\51\ In order to meet the trade timing requirement for

transactions executed using special execution procedures, the

contract market rule must specify that the actual time of execution

must be recorded and reported to the exchange immediately following

the execution.

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b. Customer Orders and Disclosure Requirements

Customer orders that could be executed using special execution

procedures, i.e., where the FCM or floor broker takes the opposite side

of a customer order for its own account or executes orders directly

between customer accounts of different principals, would be required to

satisfy certain recordkeeping and disclosure requirements in lieu of

those now set forth in Commission Rules 1.39, 155.2, 155.3 and 155.4,

but in addition to those required where members trade opposite each

other.

The exchanges' rules must prohibit the FCM or floor broker from

disclosing customer order information for purposes other than to

facilitate the execution of that order. The exchanges' rules also must

require that an FCM or floor broker provide certain disclosure to

affected customers. Before the FCM or floor broker executes the first

transaction using special execution procedures for a particular

customer, he must provide the customer with a description of such

procedures and, in particular, describe how such procedures differ from

competitive on-floor trading procedures. The Commission believes that

the FCM or floor broker should be required to make such disclosure to

the customer only once, prior to the first transaction executed under

such procedure for that customer, and that the disclosure should focus

primarily on the differences relative to the method of determining the

price at which the transaction is to be executed. Thus, although

permitting certain practices which currently are prohibited in the

exchange environment, these rules nevertheless will provide a greater

degree of regulatory protection than is the case for similar OTC

transactions.

FCMs and floor brokers executing customer orders also would be

required to satisfy certain audit trail and recordkeeping requirements

in that the FCM or floor broker must create and maintain a written

record, such as an office order ticket, reflecting each customer order.

The record must

[[Page 51336]]

include customer account identification, order number, time of order

receipt and, in addition, must include in the terms of the order, some

price-specific instruction provided by the customer.

The Commission is adding the requirement that the customer provide

some price-specific instructions or indications to assure that the

customer has had an opportunity to determine a price at which the

transaction should be executed, in that exchange markets, unlike OTC

markets, contemplate agency as well as principal-to-principal

transactions. The Commission notes that, unlike trading on most other

markets and the futures exchanges,52 there will be no published or

otherwise open or publicly, readily available bid or offer prices for

transactions executed using special execution procedures.53 The

only pricing data that would be publicly available to the customer is

the post-execution report of previous transactions, required to be

disseminated by paragraph (e)(2) of Rule 36.3.54

\52\ Trades executed directly between customers, in the

securities ``fourth market,'' do not have any price reporting or

other pricing requirements.

\53\ Unlike auction markets or markets with designated market

makers, prices for transactions using special execution procedures

would be determined through negotiation. Nonetheless, Exchange rules

could require that members maintain and disseminate bid and offer

prices.

\54\ Certain trades executed by affiliated investment companies,

however, have a pricing restriction imposed by Regulation 17a-7, 17

CFR Sec. 270.17a-7 (1995). Under this regulation, transactions that

are (1) at current market prices, (2) between certain affiliates,

and (3) reviewed by the affiliates' boards, are exempt from the

prohibition against affiliated investment company transactions

contained in Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Pension law also imposes some restrictions on transactions between

affiliated entities. The exchanges may want to impose their own

restrictions on the pricing of affiliated transactions in this

market in order to attract customers who operate under such

restrictions.

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Under these circumstances, the Commission believes that requiring

some price indication, rather than just specifying ``market price,''

for instance, provides a means to help the customer determine whether

the FCM or floor broker is fulfilling his fiduciary duty to exercise

due diligence in the execution of the customer's order. It also is

intended to improve the enforceability of section 36.9, which prohibits

fraud and manipulation in connection with section 4(c) contract market

transactions.

The customer-provided, price-specific information could take

various forms. A ``limit order'' or an order that contains a specific,

negotiated price at which the customer wants the order to be executed

may be examples of such information. A customer-provided maximum price

on a buy order or minimum price on a sell order also would fulfill the

requirement. In addition, where special execution procedures may be

used to fill large orders that cannot be filled in a single

transaction, thereby requiring partial executions at different times

and prices to obtain a complete fill, a customer-provided range of

acceptable prices at which transactions could be executed to fill the

order would meet the requirement.

In proposing section 36.3, the Commission indicated that

regulations for which exchange alternatives could be submitted include

the audit trail requirements of Commission Rule 1.35.55 A

Commission Administrative Law Judge urged the Commission not to amend

Commission Rule 1.35(a-1), which generally requires FCMs, introducing

brokers and contract market members to identify customer accounts upon

receipt before the trades are executed.56 According to this

commenter, ``[e]ven the most sophisticated clients will be unable to

protect their own interest if the Commission omits th[is] very tool

such clients would use to detect fraud.''

\55\ 59 FR at 54145.

\56\ This commenter also made a passing reference to Rule

1.35(a-2), but did not provide any further explanation.

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The Commission agrees that customer account identification can be

an important component in detecting customer abuse. The information

required to be recorded on the written record that must be created by

the FCM or floor broker for each section 4(c) contract market customer

order exceeds that required by Commission Rule 1.35(a-1). In addition

to account identification, order number and time of order receipt, the

written record must include the terms of the order, including, as

previously discussed, some price-specific instructions from the

customer.

c. Combination Transactions

Paragraph (d) of section 36.3 provides that if they meet certain

additional requirements, section 4(c) contract market rules could

permit transactions to be executed using a combination of special

execution procedures and competitive on-floor procedures. The exchange

could require, for example, that some, or all, of any section 4(c)

contract market transactions negotiated using special execution

procedures be exposed to the floor for execution.57 In this

regard, the CSCE commented

\57\ New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') Rule 76, which governs

cross trading, requires that a member who has set up a block trade

and is bringing it to the floor to be crossed first announce the

proposed bid, offer, and transaction size to the floor. The member

must then wait a reasonable amount of time to allow the ``crowd''

(including specialists) to trade against either side before

completing the transaction. In addition, NYSE Rule 127 provides that

members who bring block trades to the floor that are priced outside

current quotations must permit the crowd to participate in a portion

of the block. See also NYSE Rule 72, which provides priority to an

agency cross transaction where both orders consist of 25,000 shares

or more. See also SEC Release No. 34-35837 (June 12, 1995)(order

approving proposed NYSE rule changes that prevent members with

knowledge of block orders for execution after the close from

effecting transactions in that stock with the intention of reversing

the position by participating in the contra-side of the block trade

and that require members to establish and maintain procedures

reasonably designed to review block trading activities). that ``it

is inappropriate, in the case where transactions can occur both in

the pit and off the floor, to not require a potential trade to be

exposed to the pit.''

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The Commission believes, however, that the exchanges should be free

to develop approaches that would best serve the identified needs of

their customers consistent with the rule. In this connection, exchange

rules permitting the use of combined procedures would be required to

set forth the circumstances under which such transactions could or

should occur competitively on-floor, i.e., under what conditions, when,

and to what extent any portion of a section 4(c) contract market order

should be exposed to the pit.

Of course, each exchange will continue to have an affirmative

obligation under sections 5 and 5a of the Act and Commission Rules 1.51

and 1.52 to carry out a program for the enforcement of its rules

relating to the trading of section 4(c) contract market transactions.

This includes, in particular, those rules relating to special execution

procedures and the associated procedures that the exchange has in place

to address the maintenance of orderly markets which are free from fraud

and other abuses. As stated above, the Commission will evaluate its

experience with section 4(c) contract market transaction special

execution procedures after their implementation and determine whether

further specific guidance is necessary or appropriate.

In addition, exchange rules that permit section 4(c) contract

market transactions to be executed using any combination of special

execution procedures and competitive on-floor procedures must provide

that any transaction executed using special execution procedures must

be in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of

section 36.3, discussed above. As previously stated, any section 4(c)

contract market transaction executed competitively on-floor must comply

with applicable

[[Page 51337]]

Commission regulations and exchange rules that currently govern

competitive on-floor trading. Finally, an exchange rule that permits

transactions to be executed using such a combination of procedures must

include a specific prohibition against frontrunning between the on- and

off-floor markets.58

\58\ Commission staff reviewed frontrunning prohibitions on

other markets. See, e.g., NYSE/CME Joint Frontrunning Interpretation

(November 27, 1989)(prohibiting trading to take advantage of

material non-public information about a trade in the option, stock,

or stock index futures markets that can be expected to have a

favorable impact on the trading); SEC Release No. 34-27047 (July 19,

1989)(order approving proposed NYSE rule changes that relate to the

Joint CME/NYSE Frontrunning Interpretation); NASD Frontrunning

Policy (prohibiting trading to take advantage of material non-public

information about a trade in the option or stock markets that can be

expected to have a favorable impact on the trading); and NASD

Schedule G, Section 4(f)(1), Trading Practices (prohibiting members

from buying or selling securities while holding unexecuted market or

limit orders).

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Morgan Stanley, among others, commented that the Commission should

clarify the extent to which its relaxation of trading restrictions and,

in particular, the relaxation of restrictions on off-floor discussions

permitted under proposed section 36.3 is applicable to the execution of

positions in non-exempt futures or option contracts which are related

to section 4(c) contract market transactions. For example, although,

under proposed Rule 36.2(a)(4), an exchange would not be able to trade

identical section 4(c) and non-exempt futures or option contracts,

traders may seek to trade on spread relationships between exempt and

non-exempt 4(c) contracts.

The commenter suggested that the trading rules governing section

4(c) contract market transactions should be applicable in instances

where a trading strategy involves both exempt and non-exempt

transactions. The Commission disagrees. Where a trading strategy

involves transactions executed under both special execution procedures

and on-floor competitive procedures, the trader may not rely on its

safe harbor for special execution trading procedures to govern

both,59 although other exchange rules which address this situation

could be submitted for Commission consideration.

\59\ For example, in the case of a spread, the trader could

comply with the competitive on-floor trading procedures applicable

to the non-exempt portion of the spread for both sides, or the

trader could leg into the spread transaction using the particular

trading procedures which are available to each side of the spread.

In any event, the trader could not rely upon the existence of

special execution procedures as the basis for non-compliance with

the rules which are applicable to trading traditional designated

futures and option contracts.

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3. Price Transparency

As the Commission stated in proposing section 36.3, transactions

under this provision must be transparent.60 In that regard,

paragraph (e)(2) of section 36.3 requires the immediate post-execution

report of each purchase and sale transaction executed using special

execution procedures by the member specified by exchange rule and the

dissemination thereof. The required information includes, at a minimum,

price, quantity and contract. The Commission believes that the

dissemination of this information is critical for price basing purposes

and, therefore, has noted in paragraph (e)(2) of the regulation that

special execution transactions may be executed only during hours in

which such immediate post-execution dissemination of price basing

information is available.61 The Commission believes that the

exchanges should determine how best to structure their proposals so as

to assure the integrity of the prices set pursuant to special execution

procedures. The Commission wishes to provide the exchanges significant

flexibility to address this issue. In addition to other appropriate

steps, an exchange could establish a minimum transaction size or could

combine special execution procedures and on-floor procedures. The

Commission also believes that to fulfill their other self-regulatory

obligations, exchanges will have to define monitoring or other

surveillance procedures to ensure compliance with these transaction

reporting requirements.

\60\ 59 FR at 54147.

\61\ In proposing Rule 36.3, the Commission stated the

following: ``To the extent that a proposal for section 4(c) contract

market transactions might provide for trading when the exchange

floor is closed, the Commission would still require the immediate

report and dissemination of that transaction information.'' 59 FR at

54147.

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4. Clearing

Paragraph (b)(5) of proposed section 36.3 would require that

transactions be reported to clearing, and be cleared, on the same

schedule as trades subject to Commission Rules 1.38 and 1.39 or

otherwise be immediately reported to clearing. The CME commented that

the proposal, taken literally, ``would prohibit an exchange from using

a Part 36 product as a testing ground to develop faster and more

accurate procedures for clearing transactions.'' The Commission

believes that this comment has merit and, in paragraph (e)(3) of this

regulation, requires the report to clearing, and clearing, of each

special execution transaction as quickly as practicable, but in no

event later than that required for trades subject to Commission Rules

1.38 and 1.39.62

\62\ The section 4(c) contract market clearing organization

would have an affirmative duty under the Act and Commission

Regulations to enforce its rules, and would be subject to

recordkeeping, documentation, and other applicable requirements.

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5. Price Reporting for Block Trades

The Commission also requested comment on whether to require the

dissemination of separate pricing information for block trades.63

The FIA commented that ``an exchange submitting a proposed block

trading procedure should be afforded the alternatives of including a

separate price reporting system or explaining why one is not

appropriate or necessary to protect the public interest.'' The CME

commented that ``the requirement of a separate ticker for non-standard

trades would be both unnecessary and potentially burdensome.'' The

Commission has determined that the reporting and dissemination of

special execution transactions under existing reporting systems should

be satisfactory so long as special execution transactions are clearly

identified as such when reported and disseminated and such transactions

are executed only during hours when existing reporting systems are

available to make immediate post-execution dissemination. Of course,

exchanges may choose to operate a separate but comparable ticker for

section 4(c) contract market transactions.

\63\ As an example, the Commission noted that the NYSE and its

vendors maintain a separate ``block trade'' ticker which runs

throughout the day and reflects only the size and price of block

trades.

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6. Prohibition Against Fraud and Manipulation

Paragraph (c) of proposed section 36.3 would require that rules

submitted under this section describe the manner in which the rules or

procedures would assure compliance with the provisions of sections 4b

and 4c(a) of the Act prohibiting false reports, frontrunning, misuse of

information, fictitious sales, wash sales, and abuse of customer

orders. This paragraph has been replaced by paragraph (e)(4) of section

36.3.64 This new paragraph requires that rules submitted under

this section provide for compliance with section 36.9, which prohibits

fraud and manipulation in connection with section 4(c) contract market

transactions, except that any trade executed using special execution

procedures need not be executed in

[[Page 51338]]

compliance with section 4b(a)(iv) of the Act.

\64\ With regard to customer orders, paragraphs (c) and (d) of

the regulation provide more guidance as to what activity the

Commission would consider to be prohibited.

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Section 36.9 provides, among other things, that it shall be

unlawful to cheat, defraud or deceive or attempt to cheat, defraud or

deceive any other person or to willfully make any false report or

statement. The Commission believes that compliance with these

provisions, when combined with compliance with the other specific

customer protection provisions included in section 36.3, should provide

for appropriate customer protection safeguards. Rules submitted

pursuant to paragraph (c) of section 36.3, which would permit customer

order transactions to be executed using special execution procedures,

require a specific prohibition against the improper disclosure of

customer order information. Rules submitted pursuant to paragraph (d)

of Rule 36.3 which would permit transactions to be executed using

combined special execution and on-floor competitive procedures, require

a specific prohibition against frontrunning. Further, these safeguards

apply in a market already limited to specified eligible participants.

In addition, the Commission believes that it is important to

provide examples of trading activity that would be permissible and

activity that could constitute fraud and customer abuse in violation of

section 36.9. It would be permissible to engage in anticipatory

hedging. An FCM or floor broker would be allowed to cover when he took

the opposite side of a customer order. It would not be permissible for

an FCM or floor broker executing transactions using special execution

procedures to take the opposite side of a customer order when doing so

would deny the fill to another customer. For example, if an FCM or

floor broker were to receive matching buy and sell orders from

different customers, the FCM or floor broker should not take the

opposite side of one of the customer orders if doing so would result in

the inability to fill the order of the other customer. It also would

continue to be impermissible for an FCM or floor broker to trade ahead

of a customer order to the disadvantage of that order.65

\65\ With certain exceptions, trading ahead of customer orders

recently has been restricted in the OTC securities markets. On May

22, 1995, the SEC issued Securities Exchange Act Release No. 35751

(May 22, 1995), 60 FR 27997 (May 26, 1995), an order approving a

proposed rule change submitted by the National Association of

Securities Dealers, Inc., (``NASD'') relating to limit order

protection on NASDAQ. The rule change amended NASD's interpretation

to Article III, Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. The

interpretation generally provides that a member firm cannot accept a

limit order in a NASDAQ security from its own customer, or from a

customer of another member, and continue to trade that security for

its own account at prices that would satisfy the customer limit

order without filling that order at the limit order price or at a

price more favorable to the customer. Limit orders for retail

customers that involve 10,000 shares or more and a value of $100,000

or greater are exempt from this prohibition, as are limit orders of

any size for institutional accounts. The NASD Rules of Fair Practice

define an institutional account as an account of a bank, savings and

loan association, insurance company, or registered investment

company; a registered investment adviser; or any other entity

(whether a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust, or

otherwise) with total assets of at least $50 million. (``Release 34-

35751''). See also NYSE Rule 92 (limiting members' trading when they

hold an unexecuted customer order); NASD Schedule G, Section

4(f)(1), Trading Practices (prohibiting members from buying or

selling securities while holding unexecuted market or limit orders);

and CBOE Rule 6.73 (requiring a floor broker to handle an order

using due diligence to execute the order at the best price available

to him).

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7. Safe Harbor Provision

Paragraph (f) of section 36.3 enunciates the ``safe harbor''

provisions of the regulation. Transactions in exempt contracts executed

in compliance with special execution procedures contained in exchange

rules that are permitted to become effective shall not be deemed to be

in violation of sections 4b(a)(iv), 4b(b) or 4c(a) of the Act or

Commission Rules 1.38(a), 1.39, 155.2, 155.3 and 155.4. Transactions in

exempt contracts that are not executed in compliance with such exchange

rules shall be deemed to be in violation of section 36.3.

8. Procedures for Permitting Rules to Become Effective

Section 36.3 provides for expedited procedures under which section

4(c) contract market trading rules may be permitted to become

effective. Pursuant to paragraphs (g) (1) and (2) of the regulation,

section 4(c) contract market trading rules must be submitted to the

Commission for review prior to becoming effective. Such rules may

become effective ten days after receipt by the Commission unless the

Commission, within that ten-day period, notifies the submitter that the

proposal does not meet the conditions of this section. Pursuant to

paragraph (g)(4) of section 36.3, any subsequent proposed modifications

of such rules consistent with this section shall be subject to the same

expedited Commission review procedures. In the event that the trading

rules, or subsequent modifications thereof, are not permitted to become

effective, they shall be subject to the usual rule approval procedures

under section 5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 7a(12), and Commission

Rule 1.41(b).

Paragraph (g)(3) of section 36.3 provides for expedited review of

certain large order execution procedures. If a contract market submits

for review large order execution procedures for section 4(c) contracts

which are substantially similar to procedures approved by the

Commission pursuant to Commission Rule 1.39 for non-section 4(c)

contracts, then such procedures shall be deemed effective upon

Commission receipt thereof.

Proposed exchange clearing and financial integrity rules are not

eligible for review under these expedited procedures and, thus, are

subject to the usual rule approval procedures under section

5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 7a(12), and Commission Rule 1.41(b).

In addition, pursuant to paragraph (g)(5), exchanges may submit for

Commission review and approval, pursuant to the usual rule approval

procedures contained in section 5a(a)(12)(A) of the Act and Rule

1.41(b), other section 4(c) contract market rules which do not conform

to the specific trading standards set forth in section 36.3 and which

do not satisfy the requirements of the Act and Commission regulations.

D. Listing Procedures

The proposed rules specify a 10-day notification requirement prior

to listing new section 4(c) contract market transactions. Most

commenters supported the proposed 10-day notification requirement.

Several commenters further suggested that a 10-day period should apply

to all exchange-traded contracts or to certain categories of such

contracts, such as financial futures and options. One commenter stated

that the Commission should allow new section 4(c) contract market

transactions to become effective, and to begin trading, immediately

following the Commission's receipt of notice. This commenter further

noted that, if the Commission thereafter determines that trading in a

new section 4(c) transaction violates the listing standards in Rule

36.2, the Commission could take appropriate measures, suspending

trading without a prior adjudication, pending further review.

The Commission believes that a 10-day advance notification

requirement is appropriate. This limited period should allow

flexibility in listing new eligible products without impairing

exchanges' ability to respond rapidly to market situations. The

Commission will evaluate whether the notification period should be

eliminated or revised, and whether the 10-day notification provision

should be extended to certain non-section 4(c) contract market

transactions, when it evaluates trading experience under the pilot

program.

[[Page 51339]]

E. Reporting

Proposed section 36.5(f)(2) would require traders to provide to the

Commission information specified in Commission Rule 18.04 within one

business day following receipt of a special call. Commission Rule 18.04

relates to reports regarding a trader's positions and transactions in a

particular market as well as identifying, and other, information

contained on CFTC Form 40. One commenter questioned whether it is

realistic, and necessary, to expect such information to be furnished by

a large trader in that time frame. The commenter stated that it would

be preferable to rely upon the contract markets and FCMs to provide the

data in such a time-sensitive fashion, noting that a federal regulatory

requirement for recordkeeping by reportable traders would discourage

participation in section 4(c) contract market transactions.

As suggested by the commenter, the Commission normally would rely

on clearing member reports in conducting routine oversight of the

section 4(c) contract markets. However, the Commission believes that

the special call provisions in proposed Rule 36.5(f) are necessary in

order to preserve its ability to respond fully and flexibly to concerns

it may have regarding potential or developing market congestion,

disruptions or other anomalies in section 4(c) contract market

transactions. The Commission plans further to review its information

needs during the course of the pilot program, but notes that prompt

access to large-trader information also has been fundamental to its

effective response to market disruptions posed by financial problems at

firms holding large concentrations of positions.

F. Risk Disclosure, Temporary Licensing, and Dispute Resolution

1. Risk Disclosure

The Commission proposed, in section 36.7, to permit accounts to be

opened for section 4(c) contract market transactions without furnishing

an eligible participant with the basic risk disclosure statements

applicable generally to non-exempt futures and option contracts under

Commission Rules 1.55, 1.65, 33.7 and 190.10,66 or the

Commission's generic risk disclosure statement.67 In lieu of

requiring a specific statement or format, the proviso to proposed

section 36.7(a) would require an FCM or, in the case of an introduced

account, an IB, to furnish an eligible participant with disclosure

appropriate to the particular instrument and the eligible participant

prior to the eligible participant's entry into the first section 4(c)

contract market transaction involving a particular instrument.68

Proposed section 36.7(b) makes clear, however, that these provisions do

not relieve an FCM or IB from any other disclosure obligation it may

have under applicable law.69

\66\ The basic risk disclosure statements are intended to

provide a brief description of some of the risks attendant to

futures and options trading and are designed to be understood by all

customers.

\67\ 59 FR 34376 (July 5, 1994). This statement currently can be

used in the U.S., in the United Kingdom and in Ireland. Several

other jurisdictions are considering its adoption.

\68\ Because Section 4(c) contract market transactions may be

different from traditional futures and option contracts, and are

limited to the eligible participants specified in the rule, the

Commission expressed its belief in proposing Section 36.7 that it

may be preferable to substitute for standard disclosure statements,

such disclosure as may be appropriate to the customer's expertise

and financial capacity. See, 59 FR 54139, 54149-54150.

\69\ The Commission explained that this provision was included

as a reminder that Section 4b of the Act requires all material

information to be disclosed. 59 FR 54139, 54150 & n.47.

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Several commenters addressed this issue. The CBT stated that

proposed section 36.7 leaves to an FCM or IB the flexibility to

determine what level of risk disclosure is appropriate for eligible

participants, thereby freeing FCMs and IBs from having to provide the

CFTC-mandated disclosure forms to new customers, and reducing the

competitive advantage foreign firms now enjoy in the risk disclosure

area. NYMEX also supported proposed section 36.7 as a sensible approach

given the fact that the likely customers of the section 4(c) contract

market will be sophisticated entities.

Other commenters, however, expressed concerns about proposed

section 36.7. A futures industry association stated that because

persons who qualify as eligible participants in section 4(c) contract

market transactions are capable of obtaining whatever information they

need before engaging in such transactions, a specific requirement to

provide disclosure is unnecessary. It also expressed concern, however,

that customers would be bombarded with differing disclosure documents

that could become the basis of lawsuits or arbitration claims. Others

agreed that proposed section 36.7 might create uncertainty, increasing

the risk of litigation without decreasing the burden and volume of

disclosure. They urged the Commission to follow here an approach

similar to Commission Rule 4.7.

The CME recommended that to the extent that any disclosure is

required for eligible Part 36 participants, FCMs and IBs be given the

choice of using either a specially-prepared disclosure document or the

current generic, two-page disclosure statement available for non-exempt

products. Morgan Stanley suggested that FCMs and IBs would prefer a

safe harbor which required them to furnish the basic risk disclosure

statements that are currently generally required, supplemented as

specified by the section 4(c) contract market.

The Department of Labor noted that while the proposed Part 36 rules

would provide relief from providing certain disclosure requirements to

sophisticated investors, pension plan fiduciaries may nonetheless be

required by ERISA to request and obtain much of the otherwise required

information in order to meet their statutory obligations. The

Department further noted that to the extent such information is either

unavailable or difficult to obtain, pension plan investment in exempt

transactions may be adversely affected.

The Commission has carefully considered these comments and has

determined to adopt section 36.7 as proposed. The Commission believes

that this rule provides FCMs and IBs with sufficient flexibility

concerning risk disclosure with respect to section 4(c) contract market

transactions, yet still requires, in accordance with section 4b of the

Act, that all material information be disclosed. The Commission

believes this approach is consistent with that set forth in Rule 4.7.

For those FCMs and IBs seeking guidance in this area, the Commission

believes, as a general proposition, that providing the generic risk

disclosure statement approved in July 1994, together with any

additional risk disclosure developed by the contract market upon which

the section 4(c) contracts are traded, as required hereunder for

special execution procedures, would be appropriate.\70\

\70\ The Commission notes a general trend toward the use of

generic risk disclosure statements for newer products. For example,

the Framework For Voluntary Oversight published by the Derivatives

Policy Group in March 1995 includes on page 37 thereof a guideline

for professional intermediaries on generic risk disclosure which

states that ``[a] professional intermediary should consider

providing new nonprofessional counterparties with disclosure

statements generally identifying the principal risks associated with

OTC derivatives transactions and clarifying the nature of the

relationship between the professional intermediary and its

counterparties.''

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The Commission reiterates, however, that all material information

must be disclosed. Thus, the circumstances relating to a particular

instrument and customer should be considered by an FCM or IB. For

example, to the extent instruments are priced ex-pit, how

[[Page 51340]]

prices are obtained may be relevant in certain cases. This requirement

does not change existing requirements under sections 4b and 4o of the

Act. The Commission particularly notes that the primary relief accorded

to customers trading only in section 4(c) contract market transactions

is the waiver of the acknowledgment requirement otherwise applicable to

non-section 4(c) customers. This relief should materially facilitate

access to such transactions, particularly for offshore customers and

securities customers who are unaccustomed to acknowledging disclosures.

For business or internal control purposes, of course, firms would be

free to retain the acknowledgment procedure.

With respect to ERISA concerns, the Commission notes that section

36.7 does not relieve an FCM or IB from any other disclosure obligation

it may have under applicable law. Thus, to the extent ERISA

requirements pertain to a particular customer, the Commission's rules

should not inhibit an FCM or IB from making appropriate disclosures to

a pension plan fiduciary. Moreover, in contrast to privately created

trading vehicles or instruments, whose specialized characteristics can

be meaningfully disclosed only by their creators, information on the

mechanics of trading of section 4(c) contract market transactions will

be readily available from the listing exchange.

2. Limited Registrations

The Commission proposed section 36.6 to allow special temporary

license, registration or principal listing procedures to be available

to a person associated with an FCM or IB who limits his or her

activities under the Act to section 4(c) contract market transactions.

Proposed section 36.6 would require the person to certify that he or

she is licensed or otherwise authorized to do business and in good

standing with another federal financial regulatory authority or a

foreign financial regulatory authority with which the Commission has

comparability arrangements under the Part 30 rules, and is not subject

to a statutory disqualification from registration under section 8a(2)

of the Act. The Commission indicated that a contract market and NFA

could develop procedures applicable to these persons that would not

require submission of fingerprints and could provide for proficiency

testing requirements other than those generally applicable to

registrants under the Act.\71\

\71\ 59 FR 54139, 54149.

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Several commenters addressed the registration issue. The NFA, which

has been delegated a substantial portion of registration functions by

the Commission, although commending the Commission's desire to

streamline the proficiency testing and fingerprint requirements for

persons who limit activities to section 4(c) contract market

transactions and recognizing the need for flexibility, expressed the

concern that different registration procedures ultimately could be

time-consuming, confusing, and administratively cumbersome. The FIA

agreed, noting, in addition, that it would be difficult for the

industry to develop compliance procedures. The CME reasoned further,

that although such special procedures may be useful in the longrun,

initially they would be costly to develop and would apply to only a

small subset of the industry.

The FIA stated that it was unclear whether the CFTC was conferring

on the NFA the ability to waive proficiency testing completely for the

individuals involved in the sale of section 4(c) products or merely to

establish different tests for different people selling the same

product. In its view, requiring registration and full testing for

certain individuals involved in selling futures and exempt futures

products, yet requiring little or no testing for others, raised issues

of fairness and fair competition. The SEC expressed concern that

securities training for registered representatives of securities

broker-dealers may not be sufficient for purposes of participating in

section 4(c) contract market transactions, and stated that the

registration requirements should be designed to assure that those

licensed have sufficient training to participate in such transactions.

The CBT stated that the Commission should permit the same

unregistered sales force as is permitted to vend OTC swaps under Part

35 to market section 4(c) contract market transactions. Alternatively,

the CBT urged the Commission to grant limited registration to

individuals who intend to sell section 4(c) contract market

transactions upon a showing that the individual or his or her employer

is in good standing with another federal financial regulatory

authority, without requiring Commission registration for the sponsoring

employer.

The CBT further commented that proposed section 36.6 should be

expanded, in any event, because it applies only to associated persons

(``APs'') of an FCM or IB. Employees of non-FCMs or non-IBs, such as

securities broker-dealers or banks, would have to be sponsored by

entities other than their employers. The CBT stated that this would

unduly restrict the potential number of limited registrants able to

market section 4(c) contract market transactions and suggested, as a

remedy, the creation of a ``limited'' IB registration category for

securities broker-dealers or banks in good standing under their

respective federal regulatory schemes.\72\

\72\ Under this approach, a securities broker-dealer, for

example, could qualify as a ``limited IB'' to sponsor its own

employees for limited AP registration status under Part 36. The

securities broker-dealer would have direct supervisory

responsibility over its APs.

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The Commission disagrees with various commenters' recommendation to

delete registration requirements for section 4(c) contract market

transactions sales persons. Registration is a key element in an

effective regulatory and enforcement program. In addition, the

Commission believes that fitness checks and a proficiency testing,

training or experience requirement are necessary.

However, the Commission has determined to adopt the CBT's

alternative suggestion for a ``limited'' IB registration category. Rule

36.6 will allow entities to qualify for limited IB status if they are

in good standing with a federal financial regulator or a foreign

financial regulator. Banks and securities broker-dealers would be

eligible for this special treatment. Insurance companies would not be

eligible under Rule 36.6 because of the large number of state insurance

regulators and the diverse nature of the applicable regulations.

However, the Commission may be willing to entertain proposals developed

by contract markets and NFA to permit flexible procedures for insurance

company participation in section 4(c) contract market transactions.

As the Commission envisions the process, an entity would provide

the NFA with basic identifying information about the firm and its

principals and pay the appropriate processing fee. The applicant would

also certify that (1) it is in good standing with its other regulator,

(2) its principals have filed their fingerprints with the other

regulator, (3) neither it nor its principals are subject to statutory

disqualification from registration under section 8a(2) of the Act, (4)

it will restrict its activities under the Act to section 4(c) contract

market transactions, and (5) it will be liable for all acts, omissions

and failures, and responsible for the diligent supervision, of its APs,

employees and agents in connection with its activities as a limited IB

involving section 4(c) contract market transactions.\73\

\73\ Registration, of course, could continue to be denied,

conditioned, suspended, restricted or revoked under Sections 8a(3)

or 8a(4) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 12a(3) or 12a(4).

[[Page 51341]]

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A firm would not need to submit fingerprints for its principals if

it provided similar information to its primary regulator and this

information were accessible to the Commission, nor would it be subject

to the minimum financial requirements applicable generally to

independent IBs provided it met the capital requirements of, and was

otherwise in good standing with, its primary regulator. The Commission

believes that the limited nature of an IB's activities, its

responsibility for its employees and good standing with another

financial regulator with such requirements permit waiver of the IB

financial requirements.\74\

\74\ Thus, such an IB would not need to raise its own capital or

enter into a guarantee agreement with an FCM as generally required

for IBs by Commission Rules 1.17(a)(1)(ii) and (a)(2)(ii),

respectively. The Commission believes this is consistent with a no-

action letter issued on December 1, 1994 by the Division of Trading

and Markets, wherein an IB that is a member of various U.K. futures

exchanges and a wholly-owned subsidiary of a U.S. FCM was permitted

to continue to introduce U.S. contract market transactions based on

substituted compliance with U.K. regulatory requirements in lieu of

a guarantee agreement under Commission Rule 1.10(j). The Division

based its position upon, among other things, the IB's status as a

registrant under the Act pursuant to which it is subject to CFTC

requirements including, but not limited to, registration, sales

practice and other conduct of business rules, recordkeeping,

reporting and anti-fraud provisions.

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Customers of a ``limited'' IB, like customers of a regular IB,

would be required to transmit funds for trading directly to an FCM,

which would carry all customer positions on a fully-disclosed

basis.\75\ The IB would be required to sponsor its salespersons, who

would be subject to a proficiency testing, training or experience

requirement, as discussed below. The NFA and the section 4(c) contract

markets would determine the specific format of the information to be

supplied to the NFA.\76\

\75\ Commission Rule 1.57, 17 CFR 1.57 (1995).

\76\ The CBT also stated that the term ``temporary,'' used in

proposed Section 36.6 could suggest impermanence or a transition

period until a final license would be obtained, and that the term

``limited'' more accurately depicts the registration status of those

APs eligible only to market Section 4(c) transactions. The

Commission agrees that, in light of its adoption of the provision

for limited IBs referred to above, it is also appropriate to refer

to APs confining their activities to Section 4(c) contract market

transactions as ``limited APs.'' The Commission notes that limited

APs may also be eligible for a temporary license during the period

that background checks are performed by the NFA.

With respect to testing requirements for limited APs, the NFA

could substitute participation in a training module developed by the

contract market offering the Section 4(c) transactions or an

experience requirement in lieu of the regular, generally applied

proficiency test. This is consistent with the Commission's previous

approval of NFA Registration Rules 401(b), (c), and (d), permitting

persons registered as general securities representatives who

restrict their activities under the Act to register as APs without

taking the generally required National Commodity Futures Examination

(``Series 3 test'') and permitting persons to register if they have

passed the regulatory portions of the Series 3 test and the test of

a foreign futures authority. The Commission expects that the

regulatory portions of the Series 3 test would be included in any

modified testing or training module developed for limited APs

referred to herein. Further, the Commission will entertain

applications to substitute training received in connection with

other regulatory requirements, or to recognize specialized ethics

training, in satisfaction of the training required under Commission

Rule 3.34.

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As discussed above, certain commenters viewed different

registration requirements for each section 4(c) product as potentially

administratively unwieldy. Similar concerns were expressed when the

Commission adopted Rule 3.12(j), upon which proposed section 36.6 was

modeled.\77\ Despite the fact that the Commission has permitted section

4(c) contract markets and the NFA, subject to Commission approval, the

discretion to vary registration procedures on a contract-by-contract

basis, the Commission believes that the special registration procedures

ideally would be substantially identical for the various section 4(c)

contracts, and that it would be preferable to implement uniform

procedures for all such contracts at the outset. As when the Commission

adopted Rule 3.12(j), a contract market seeking special registration

procedures with respect to persons limiting their activities to section

4(c) contract market transactions may consult and develop the

applicable procedures with the NFA and submit them for Commission

consideration in conjunction with the other submissions which must be

filed under this Part. Of course, if a particular contract market or

firm found administration of the alternative procedures too difficult,

it could follow the general provisions applicable to any IB or AP.\78\

\77\ See 57 FR 23136, 23141-23142 (June 2, 1992).

\78\ Persons following the registration procedures which are

generally applicable to transactions under the Act, as well as all

of those already registered under the Act, can be involved in the

offer and sale of Section 4(c) contract market transactions without

being subject to additional registration requirements.

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3. Dispute Resolution

As proposed, all of the provisions of the Act and Commission rules

concerning reparations and private rights of action will continue to

apply under Part 36. 59 FR at 54144. The CBT commented that section

4(c) contract market transactions should be exempt from Commission Rule

180.3(b)(6), 17 CFR 180.3(b)(6)(1995), which prescribes language that

must be included in any pre-dispute arbitration agreement between an

FCM and its customers. The prescribed language essentially notifies the

customer that, notwithstanding the agreement to arbitrate, the customer

can pursue a claim against the FCM through the Commission's reparations

forum.

The CBT reasoned that institutional customers do not need this

protection, ``either negotiat[ing] such rights or elect[ing] not to

sign the pre-dispute arbitration agreement.'' The NYMEX agreed, arguing

that the availability of the reparations forum was unnecessary because

disputes involving section 4(c) contract market transactions would be

``more than adequately addressed by existing exchange arbitration

procedures and comparable NFA procedures.''

The Commission has determined to retain the availability of

reparations as a forum for section 4(c) contract market transaction

participants as well as the notice provisions of Rule 180.3(b)(6).

Although section 4(c) contract market transactions will be entered into

by institutional or relatively ``sophisticated'' participants, the

reparations program was designed as an inexpensive forum where any

customer may seek redress for violations of the Act committed by

industry professionals registered with the Commission. The Commission

sees no reason to eliminate the availability of this dispute resolution

forum.

G. Anti-fraud and Anti-manipulation

The Commission proposed in section 36.9 to apply to section 4(c)

contract market transactions the proscriptions against fraud and

manipulation found in the Act,79 and Commission Rules 33.9(d) and

33.10, 17 CFR 33.9(d) and 33.10, which prohibit price manipulation and

fraud, respectively, in connection with commodity option transactions.

In addition, proposed section 36.9 included a stand-alone prohibition

of fraudulent misconduct in connection with section 4(c) contract

market transactions.

\79\ Specifically, proposed Section 36.9 applied to Section 4c

contract market transactions Sections 4b and 4o of the Act, 7 U.S.C.

6b and 6o, and those provisions of Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a) of

the Act, 7 U.S.C. 9, 15, 13b and 13(a), that prohibit price

manipulation.

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Commenters expressed varying views on the need for a stand-alone

prohibition of fraud in connection with section 4(c) contract market

transactions. Some supported including in Part 36 an anti-fraud

provision separate and independent from the provisions of the Act and

Commission regulations that would, in any event, continue to apply.

Others, however,

[[Page 51342]]

asserted that the existing statutory anti-fraud provisions, i.e.,

sections 4b and 4o, would be adequate as applied to section 4(c)

contract market transactions, and questioned whether it was appropriate

in any event to include a stand-alone anti-fraud provision in Part 36.

In addition, many commenters noted that the text of proposed

section 36.9 could be construed as eliminating the scienter requirement

which has been held to exist in section 4b of the Act. These commenters

observed that the Commission had suggested no policy basis for

eliminating scienter as an element of fraud in connection with section

4(c) contract market transactions, thus imposing a lesser standard of

proof than applicable for futures transactions in general.

The Commission has concluded that a free-standing anti-fraud rule

for section 4(c) contract market transactions is appropriate. Effective

prohibition of fraud is a cornerstone of any fair and efficient market.

While section 4b of the Act provides an adequate tool to address fraud

in traditional futures contract trading, and section 4o adequately

addresses fraud in connection with commodity pool and trading advisor

activities, section 4(c) contract market transactions may involve

innovative trading methods and resources that the courts have not

addressed previously under the statutory provisions. The Commission is

aware of no reason why an additional, comprehensive prohibition of

fraud should not apply to section 4(c) contract market transactions

across the board. Under the rule as adopted, section 4(c) contract

market transactions would be subject to existing prohibitions of fraud

and manipulation whenever applicable and the specific prohibitions in

Rule 36.9.

However, the Commission agrees with commenters who questioned

whether it would be appropriate to have a disparity in scienter

requirements applicable to section 4(c) contract market transactions

and futures markets in general. Accordingly, section 36.9 as adopted

includes the term ``willfully'' in paragraphs (a)(2) and (3), providing

a scienter requirement in section 36.9 parallel to that of section

4b.80 In all other substantive respects, section 36.9 is being

adopted as proposed.81 The Commission notes that actions brought

under section 4o(1)(B) of the Act, whether involving section 4(c)

contract market transactions or other transactions subject to the

Commission's jurisdiction, would continue to be governed by existing

legal standards, which do not require proof of scienter.82

\80\ See Hammond v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham and Co., Inc.,

[1987-1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) para.24,617

(CFTC March 1, 1990).

\81\ In a related matter, the Commission's proposal requested

comment on adopting a stand-alone prohibition of fraud in connection

with swap transactions exempt under Part 35 of the Commission's

rules. The Commission is not at this time adopting such a provision.

\82\ See Messer v. E.F.Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 679 (11th

Cir. 1988); CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 285 (9th Cir. 1979); and

In re Kolter, [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)

para.26,262, at 42198 (CFTC Nov. 8, 1994).

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VI. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA''), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.,

requires that agencies, in proposing rules, consider the impact of

those rules on small business. The Commission previously determined

that contract markets,83 futures commission merchants,84

registered commodity pool operators,85 and large traders 86

should not be considered ``small entities'' for purposes of the RFA.

The Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, previously certified that

the proposed rules would not have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities. 59 FR 54151.

\83\ 47 FR 18618 (April 30, 1982).

\84\ Id. at 18619.

\85\ Id.

\86\ Id. at 18620.

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In certifying pursuant to section 3(a) of the RFA that the proposed

addition to its rules of Part 36--Exemption of section 4(c) Contract

Market Transactions would not have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities, the Commission invited comments

from any firm which believed that the proposed rules, if adopted, would

have a significant economic impact on its activities. No such comments

were received.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, (``PRA'') 44 U.S.C. 3501 et

seq., imposes certain requirements on federal agencies (including the

Commission) in connection with their conducting or sponsoring any

collection of information as defined by the PRA. In compliance with the

PRA, the Commission previously submitted these rules in proposed form

and their associated information collection requirements to the Office

of Management and Budget. The Office of Management and Budget approved

the collection of information associated with these rules on Jan. 20,

1995, and assigned OMB control number 3038-0047 to the rules. The

burden associated with these specific final rules, is as follows:

Average burden hours per response: 2.88

Number of respondents: 300

Frequency of response: on occasion

Copies of the OMB approved information collection package associated

with this rule may be obtained from Jeff Hill, Office of Management and

Budget, Room 3220, NEOB, Washington, D.C. 20503, (202) 395-7340.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 36

Commodity futures, Commodity options, Prohibited transactions.

In consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to the authority

contained in the Commodity Exchange Act, and in particular, sections 2,

4, 4c, and 8a, 7 U.S.C. 2, 6, 6c, and 12a, as amended, the Commission

hereby adds Part 36 to Chapter I of Title 17 of the Code of Federal

Regulations as follows:

PART 36--EXEMPTION OF SECTION 4(c) CONTRACT MARKET TRANSACTIONS

Sec.

36.1 Exemption and definitions.

36.2 Trading of section 4(c) contract market transactions.

36.3 Section 4(c) contract market trading rules.

36.4 Listing of section 4(c) contract market transactions.

36.5 Reporting requirements.

36.6 Special procedures relating to registration and listing of

principals.

36.7 Risk disclosure.

36.8 Suspension or revocation of section 4(c) contract market

transaction exemption.

36.9 Fraud and manipulation in connection with section 4(c)

contract market transactions.

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 6, 6c, and 12a.

Sec. 36.1 Exemption and definitions.

(a) Duration of Exemption. The provisions of this Part apply to any

section 4(c) contract market transaction entered into on or after

November 1, 1995. The provisions of this Part expire, and are no longer

valid as to any such transaction entered into on or after three years

following the date the first contract trades pursuant to this Part.

(b) Scope of Exemption. Each board of trade on which section 4(c)

contract market transactions are permitted to be traded pursuant to

this Part shall be deemed for such purposes to be designated as a

contract market within the meaning of the Act and, with respect to

section 4(c) contract market transactions, shall comply with and be

subject to all of the provisions of the Act and the Commission's

regulations

[[Page 51343]]

applicable to a contract market other than those provisions which are

specifically inconsistent with this Part, in which case the provisions

of this Part shall govern.

(c) Definitions. As used in this Part:

(1) ``Section 4(c) contract market transaction'' means:

Any agreement, contract, or transaction (or class thereof) entered

into on or subject to the rules of a contract market in accordance with

the provisions of this Part, and that is executed by a member of the

section 4(c) contract market that is an eligible participant for its

own account, or a futures commission merchant or floor broker for its

own account or on behalf of an eligible participant.

(2) ``Eligible Participant'' means:

(i) A bank or trust company;

(ii) A savings association or credit union;

(iii) An insurance company;

(iv) An investment company subject to regulation under the

Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 80a-1, et seq.) or an

investment company performing a similar role or function subject as

such to foreign regulation, provided that such investment company or

foreign person is not formed solely for the purpose of constituting an

eligible participant and has total assets exceeding $5,000,000;

(v) A commodity pool formed and operated by a person subject to

regulation under the Act or a foreign person performing a similar role

or function subject as such to foreign regulation, provided that such

commodity pool or foreign person is not formed solely for the purpose

of constituting an eligible participant and has total assets exceeding

$5,000,000;

(vi) A corporation, partnership, proprietorship, organization,

trust, or other entity not formed solely for the purpose of

constituting an eligible participant (A) which has total assets

exceeding $10,000,000; or (B) which has a net worth of $1,000,000 and

enters into a section 4(c) contract market transaction in connection

with the conduct of its business; or (C) which has a net worth of

$1,000,000 and enters into a section 4(c) contract market transaction

to manage the risk of an asset or liability owned or incurred in the

conduct of its business or reasonably likely to be owned or incurred in

the conduct of its business;

(vii) An employee benefit plan subject to the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 or a foreign person performing a similar

role or function subject as such to foreign regulation with total

assets exceeding $5,000,000 or whose investment decisions are made by a

bank, trust company, insurance company, investment adviser subject to

regulation under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.

Sec. 80b-1, et seq.), or a commodity trading advisor subject to

regulation under the Act;

(viii) Any governmental entity (including the United States, any

state, or any foreign government) or political subdivision thereof, or

any multinational or supranational entity or any instrumentality,

agency, or department

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